Conflicts and Political Changes in the Middle East

Semester September 2023- February 2024 CAT 2

Challenge 2: WHO PLAYS ON THE MIDDLE EAST CHESSBOARD?

Course instructor: Amal Abu-Warda Pérez

Course coordinator: Daniel Rajmil Bonet

CAT 2.- Conflicts and Political Changes in the Middle East

List of questions

PART I True/False Test

Questions:

1. During the time that the British colonial presence in the Middle East lasted, it had
as its main objective the control of communication and commercial routes to India.

False. Although Britain’s presence in the Middle East sought access to different ports
along the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, so that its communication
with India kept its possessions, this was not the reason for the duration of its presence in
the region. Furthermore, Britain kept its feet in the Middle East because of the business
venture of the new commercial routes, which offered the Empire the possibility of
extending its quests for enrichment, especially within the oil industry.

2. The United States' takeover of European colonialism sponsored the formation of

the state system in the Middle East.

False. It was within the period of European colonialism, specifically under the French and
British everchanging rule, that the Arab world was divided as we know it today, and
further enrolled in a continuum of competition between states. And even though the
Ottoman Empire had its division of the region, it was after its decline that, with the new
European mandate, new borders were defined.

3. Access to Oil reserves was a primary issue that was disputed in bipolar
competition in the Middle East.

True. This period is known as the Oil Crisis, which occurred between 1973 and 1974,
when oil-producing Arab countries within the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries) raised oil prices considerably and ceased imports to Western Countries, as a
means to protest Israeli support, and with determination to shift the balance of the oil
industry from the destination countries and companies to the producing countries.
4. The United States' policy towards the Middle East is the result of the coordinated
and consensual interaction of a number of policymakers who intervene in its
formulation and implementation.

True. Unlike other foreign US policies, the Middle East has a characteristic approach, as it
draws from the US’ domestic policies, and depends on different key structures and their
conjunction to be developed. These structures include the White House, the executive
and legislative branches, the political parties, the “opinion-makers” and the lobbies.
Middle Eastern policies are conducted as such because action and opinion from different
key actors are necessary so that all areas of interest can be actively and critically
approached from different viewpoints and the diverse needs that this present can be
covered.

5. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighborhood Policy

(ENP), and the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) were initiated as European Union
initiatives.

True. As the EU sought to maintain ties with the Arab countries and build up their
relationship with the same approach as to other neighboring regions - whilst handling
conflicts that emerged during the Arab uprising - the European Union launched three
initiatives, aimed to maintain security and grant prosperity through soft power normative.
These initiatives were the EMP in 1995, the ENP in 2004, and lastly the UFM in 2008.

6. The dialogue inaugurated at the Barcelona Conference was built around three
fundamental pillars: political-economic, security, and the alliance of civilizations.

False. During the Barcelona Conference, held in 1995, the participating countries – fifteen
state members of the EU together with twelve Arab states – followed a three-sided
agenda; and, although politics, economy, and security were part of it, the specific tiers
were: economic, political and cultural, and security.

7. With some exceptions, the European Union, through its soft power approach, has
not consolidated a common and credible position as a global actor in the Middle
East.
 False. The EU has undoubtebly encountered and is continuing to face challenges in the
Middle East, as flows of migration don’t cease, terrorism and its European sympathizers
spread terror and the EU’s engagement to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking is scarce.
Nevertheless, the EU has become increasingly integrated into the Middle Eastern
economy, as an aid provider and principal export market; and its ongoing migrations,
although tough, have granted a bond between the EU and the Middle East, its politics,
and its people. Therefore, it’s accurate to say the EU has secured its global actor position
in the region.

8. An advantage shared by current Chinese and Russian diplomacy in the Middle

East, unlike Europeans and Americans, is their historical credentials as non-
imperialist powers in the region.

False. Although China and Russia do indeed have historical credentials as neo-imperialist
powers, so does the US. Both the US and the Soviet Union initially had a clear advantage
during the decolonization process, as neither of them had a colonialist involvement in the
region. It is Europe, however, that doesn’t benefit from its imperialist historical record.

9. As part of its Cold War rivalry with the Western powers in the Middle East, the
Soviet Union strongly supported the national liberation movements against the
Western colonial powers and imperialist ambitions, highlighting its constant
support for the Palestinian’s independence claims.

False. Although the Soviet Union supported anti-Western movements and took a stand for
Arab communities, both powers – the URSS and the US – took their time to define their
roles, and their relationships with Middle Eastern regions changed over time. Even its
support for Palestine wasn’t a constant, as the Soviet Union supported the creation of the
state of Israel in 1948, thus it thought to follow socialist principles.

10. Domestic factors are highly interconnected in shaping the policy of China, Russia,
and the United States in the Middle East.

True. China Russia and the US are the three external powers playing the Middle Eastern
board game, and their interest in the region vary; they concern both their relations with
Middle Eastern states and their internal development and well-being. By way of
 illustration, Russia is keen on remaking the international order, China is becoming one of
the central commercial players, and the US has a long history of military presence in the
region.

PART II: Discussion topic: “European Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict”

Assess the role of the European Union in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its resolution:
‘player’ or ‘payer’? leading or marginal? Congruent or incoherent?

Explain the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Europe’s main initiatives and policies
in the Middle East

Over the decades, the European Union has become one of the principal actors in the Middle
East and its conflicts. The proximity between the two regions has allowed both to involve
themselves not only in commercial affairs – with the EU becoming the major trading partner
of the Arab world (Khader, 11) – but also in human movement and conflict solvency (or the
unfruitful will to do so), especially in regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

When talking about the EU’s relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it’s important to reflect on the
conflict’s impact on EU policy-making and initiative development towards the Middle East,
thus it provides a larger understanding of how the happenings in both regions, preceded by
their intertwined relationship, shape the actions of one towards the other.

The primal impact the Arab-Israeli conflict has had on EU policies is probably that of
“reshaping” its priorities, concerns, and targets; put into comas due to the uncertainty of the
outcome – that is, if the policies have been reshaped or it has stayed a mere attempt at doing
so -. This policy “reshaping”, nevertheless, has been the result of decades of Middle Eastern
community claims and voicing of needs, which have been reluctantly ignored in favor of the
EU’s interests. Let us look at different examples:

Relations between the EU and the Middle East through the mid-20 th century and early 21st
century, though vast, can be into categorized four spheres: the Euro-Arab dialogue, the
multilateral (EU)-bilateral agreements, the multilateral agreements with sub-regional
organizations and, lastly, other sub-regional relations between European member states and
Arab countries. In all four categories, two main characteristics can be found, which refer to
the EU’s priorities and the generalized lack of involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
(and those of an undemocratic and repressive nature). Nevertheless, a small yet steady
evolution within the urgency of the subject of democracy and representativeness within the
Arab-Israeli conflict can be sought when analyzing these initiatives.

In the Euro-Arab Dialogue, for starters, the aims of both sides fell into different sides: while
the Arabs were mainly concerned with the definition of a common and coherent European
policy on the Palestinian question, the EU sought economic, financial, and energetic
dividends (Khader, 12). Following, the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972-1990), the
cooperation agreements aimed at financial protocols and preferential trade agreements, so to
achieve an increase in the European trade in the Med region, and opening it to
Mediterranean agricultural and industrial products. The outcome, however, didn’t coincide
with the expected and, once again, didn’t succeed in promoting integration in the conflicted
areas. Similarly, the FOROMED, though not having a significant impact on the matter,
focused its concerns on a wider range of subjects, including security and mutual
understanding of its participants. Lastly, the Barcelona Process (1995), though also shines
proof in EU’s “policy being realistically driven, and built upon the principle of self-interest
under which norms occupy a secondary marginal position” 1 (Ziadeh, 120), was structured in
tree vast areas of interest (political and security, economic and financial, and socio-cultural).
Its main objective also followed that of economic liberalization and free trade, willing to
promote order rather than reform, arguing that it would be through economic growth that
political security could be achieved2.

Although there is a subtle change along these initiatives, it is within the context of the Arab
Uprising that the EU was forcefully driven to remap its concerns. Taking place between 2010
and 2011, the Arab Uprising not only delegitimized myths surrounding the Arab community,
its identity and its capacity for democracy and change; but also impelled a European
response, which came in two formats: the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared
Prosperity” and the “New Response to a Changing Neighborhood”. The first one steps into
the importance of the EU not being a “passive spectator (but to) support the wish of the
people in (their) neighborhood, through a qualitative step forward in a joint commitment to
common values: democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of
common law” (Khader, 35). Similarly, the second ought to the mutual benefits of a
partnership with middle eastern neighbors, accounted by a “shared commitment to the

1
Adeeb Ziadeh, EU Foreign Policy and Hamas: Inconcistencies and Paradoxes, 120.
2
Khader, The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring, 24.
universal values, a higher degree of differentiation, comprehensive institution-building, and
imperative and deep democracy” (Khader, 36).

Having viewed the different policies developed through the years, it is undeniable that the
Ara-Israeli conflict, as well as the prominent needs of the Middle Eastern community and its
voicing, have shaped the EU’s notions and actions towards the region. Furthermore, the EU
seems to be heading in the right coordinates when talking about the direction of its initiatives.

Be that as it may, it is equally important to understand the actual impact they have had, and
to question if the development of these initiatives has taken off as once put into paper. What
has been, then, the role of the EU in its policies?

Dr. Christian Koch, Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center, said it best:
“The track record of European policies in the Middle East is a disappointing one. On the
surface, here is a rich continent with in-depth experience in promoting economic growth and
overcoming historical animosities and conflict. Yet, about the Middle East, its most prominent
geographic neighbor, European policies have had virtually no impact on the trajectory of the
Middle East towards greater stability and prosperity” (Koch, 222). European role has
consisted of marginal and incoherent policies, strictly attached to economic bias.

In the Euro-Arab Dialogue, Arab civil organizations were marginalized because of Europe’s
priority of not antagonizing President Reagan’s US. Within the Global Mediterranean Policy,
as well as the Renewed Mediterranean Policy, the security dimension was missing while
Europe focused on the increasement of grants and loans. During the Barcelona Process, the
ambiguity of the EU’s role was revealed, showing how the pursuit of economic modernization
and liberation in the Mediterranean stemmed from the desire to protect Europe from radical
movements, migration overflow, and potential turbulence. The incoherence also followed in
the ENP (European Neighborhood Policy), thus “Europe was torn apart: if it remained true to
its values, it had to press for real democratic reform, but if it sought to defend its immediate
interests, it has to entertain friendly relation with autocracies” (Khader, 28). Even with the
response documents resulted from the Arab Uprising, Europe centered its actions towards
money, market and mobility. The “more for more” formula, tough thought to achieve greater
reform with means of aid, trade and advanced status, turned out very similar to previous
approaches, with a strong position on neo-liberal capitalist market economy 3. Cooperation,
therefore, is solely based on economic partnerships that would benefit the EU. Being that is

3
Khader, The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring, 45.
the case, it can be determined that “its de facto relations have not lived up (to) its de jure
position” (Muller and Solminski, 2016).

It is clear, as follows, that the role of the EU within the Middle East has been non other that
that of a payer, hence its policies have revolved around economic aid, partnerships and
reformation; that its role, though having the possibility to be that of a great normative power,
has turned to be incoherent and selfish. The EU works with “a selection of interests, in which
it chooses when and how to act, most likely at the extent of a third country […] or its own
coherency” (Rommane, 2017). Its conflicting interests have let to an incapacity of acting
autonomously, and a mistrust issued from the Arab community.

Despite of everything, the EU still has great power over the Middle East and will continue to
have an impact on it for as long as its political and economic relations follow. Its perception in
the region, however, is far from satisfactory, so it is in the EU’s hands to redirect the situation,
taking into account the reality emerging in the Arab and Mediterranean regions and their
needs.

In drawing to a close, “the two areas in which the EU must work are those of the
(re)construction of its image as a reliable and consistent actor in the Mediterranean on the
one hand and the adoption of policies which keep in mind both the short term and the long-
term results on the other. More specifically, the EU should develop an active presence in the
neighborhood with immediate concrete results and it should make sure that long term results
go beyond short-term interest related policymaking. All this, of course, should be
accompanied with more consistency (Kienzle, 2014) and possibly a higher degree of moral
judgement” (Rommane, 2017).
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