Discussion Paper Series — 2009/01 HARMONISATION OF MIGRATION POLICY AND TURKEY’S SECURITY CHALLENGES Kemal Kirisci Executive Board Member of EDAM. Professor, Director of European Studies Center and Jean Monnet Center of Excellence, Bogazici University. June 2009 [ME Semen nt of the United States EDAM Discussion Paper Seties is supported by the German Marshall Fund ofthe United States (GMF). The views expressed here are those ofthe author and do not necessary represent the views of GMF.Harmonisation of migration policy and Turkey's security challenges Kemal Kirigei Introductio Turkey sits in the midst of a geography that attracts large scale movements of people. Almost 92 million foreign nationals moved in and out of Turkey between 2005 and the end of 2007! Besides western European countries suchas Britain, Germany, France and Italy.a significant proportion of these people came from Turkey's neighborhood They were mostly nationals of the former Soviet Union, Balkan countries, Iran and Israel.One reason for the large volume of peoples passing through the country is a liberal visa policy which the ‘Turkish government has applied since the late | 980s. Some of these people are tourists but many are engaged in economic interactions. Included in these figures are also people from countries such as Bulgaria,a member of the European Union, Moldava, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Iran and Iraq, not to mention Central Asian republics, who take up employment in Turkey sometimes legally but often illegally. Asylum seekers and stranded transit illegal migrants are not reflected in these figures. There were between 1995 and 2007 more than 50,000 people applied for asylum and more than 25,000 were recognized as refugees. Most of these refugees were or are being resettled out of Turkey. During the same period there were also approximately 350,000 transit illegal migrants apprehended by the authorities. There are no reliable figures on the number of illegal migrants that actually successfully make it chrough Turkey to the European Union. With the exception of Iran, almost none of the asylum seekers and illegal transit migrants come from countries whose nationals make up theabove mentioned total of 92 million people. Movement of foreign nationals in Turkey is circumscribed by the nature of Turkey's relations with the EU. Since 2005, the Turkish EU accession process has encountered numerous difficulties. As of May 2009, 10 out of 35 chapters had been opened for negotiations compared to 25 chapters in the case of Croatia. Croatia is expected to complete the negotiation process at the end of the year, depending on the resolution ofa border dispute with Slovenia Turkey's accession process, on the other hand, remains“open- ended” as the possibility of negotiations on eight chapters have been suspended by the December 2006 decision of the European Council. This decision will be reviewed at the end of 2009.There are another five chapters over which France is exercising its veto power and preventing any possibility of opening negotiations. Among the remaining chapters that do not face any legal or political obstacles to being opened for negotiations is Chapter 24. This is the chapter on justice, freedom and security. ‘An important part of the acquis associated with this chapter deals with the regulation of movement of people within the EU and across its borders. This acquis is a product of the EU's common migration policy and covers policies concerning asylum, combating illegal migration and trafficking in human beings as well as visas for non-EU nationals. This acquis also includes policies of the EU to seek greater cooperation from third countries, especially those in its immediate neighborhood with respect to controlling migration. This policy is known as the external dimension of the EU's common migration policy and in the last few years has been incorporated into the European Neighborhood Policy as well as the EU's development assistance programs with third countries." ‘Managing Irregular Migration in Turkey:A Poiial-Bureaucratic Perspective” Euro-Mediterenean Consortium for ‘Applied Research on hternational Migration, (Analytical and Synthetic Notes 2008/61, European University Institute, The Robert Schuman Centre for AdvancedStudies 2008),p. 1 2 Thereis a wide body of erature dealing with theexcernlizton of he EU's common migration policies on neighboring Final Act ofthe Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain signed in Born on 25 June 1991, Declaration con the towns of Ceuta and Melila"The specific arrangements for visa exemptions for local border trafic between Ceuta and Mell and the Moreccan provinces of Tetuan and Nador shall continue to apply."*Morecean nationale who are net resident in the provinces of Tetwan or Nudor and wh territory of the towns of Ceusa and Molita exclusively shall remain subject to the visa requirement” wish to encer theAnother example is that of Portugal, which provided an assurance to the other Schengen members with regard to its Visa Waiver Agreement with Brazil. A declaration attached to its Accession Treaty to Schengen provides that Portugal would readmit any Brazilian national entering the territories of the contracting parties via Portugal under the ‘Visa Waiver Agreement between Portugal and Brazil of 9 August 1960,and interceptedafter ‘the maximum period of three months provided by Article 20. of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement.> Hence, given Turkey's geographical location and its close ties with its neighborhood and given the objectives of the EU's ENRit would bea useful confidence building exercise in EU-Turkish relations.That is,it would encourage both sides to think about how the EU's immigration related security could be reconciled with the EU's grand aim of achieving a peaceful, prosperous and stable neighborhood by engaging Turkey in amore positive spirit. The issue of readmission agreements is another area where the EU could benefit from critical thinking. It would be important to take stock of the EU policy that calls for nothing less than the imposition of these agreements on weaker parties in return for the promise of visa facilitation which the EU often fails to implement. How many such readmission agreements have actually been signed and are actually being implemented? How far have such readmission agreements enhanced the security of the EU? Where have such readmission agreements left the countries that have signed them?What are they doing with the illegal transit migrants and rejected asylum seekers belonging to third countries that EU member states may have sent? Are they able to return them to their respective countries of origin? If they are unable to do it what are the economic, cultural and social consequences of stranded migrants on the receiving countries? More importantly what about the migrants themselves and their human rights?These are questions that need to be seriously confronted and debated if the EU wants to maintain a well deserved image in the world asa“soft and normative” power-Turkish governmentand civil society may well be ina. Position to contribute to such a debate, and engagement in itself could engender confidence building on both sides to the benefit ofall stakeholders. In terms of the immediate future, the EU could consider adopting two specific confidence building policies towards Turkey. Recently the EU has taken the decision to engage Turkey in a discussion of impact studies of free trade agreements that the EU plans to sign with third parties. This does not resolve the longstanding grievance of Turkey that such free trade agreements leave Turkey at a disadvantage. Butit is an important step in the right direction in terms of recognizing the grievance and launching discussion about it.The EU could do something similar in respect to readmission agreements that Turkey itself is ‘trying to negotiate and sign with the countries of origin of illegal transit migrants that would be returned to Turkey. An impact study similar to the one on free trade agreements or a simple willingness on the part of EU officials to enter a conversation with their Turkish counterparts on how the EU might assist Turkey in negotiating effective agreements with the third governments may goa long way in confidence building. Otherwise, the expectation that Turkish officials will accept that Turkey becomes a place where illegal transit migrants can be“dumped” is simply unrealistic and would only be a constant source of aggravation for both sides Worse,as mentionedin the reports of HCA and HRW, the EU would directly be implicated in human rights violations resulting from poor and cramped detention centers in Turkey or for that matter in neighboring EU member states to Turkey which may happen to be on the path of movements of illegal migrants. Final Act ofthe Agreement on the Accession of the Portuguese Republic, Declaration on Brazilan rationals entering PortugalundrtheViea Waiver Agreementhetween Portugaland Brazilof® August 1960.A second confidence building measure the EU could take would be to negotiate pilot projects encouraging the return of stranded illegal transit migrants in Turkey to their country of origin. There are at least two examples of such projects that have worked in the past and that earned invaluable goodwill in Turkish bureaucratic circles.AnIOM projectrun in cooperation with Turkish authorities during 1995 and |997 was called Stranded Migrants in Turkey (SMIT) Its purpose was to help the voluntary return of illegal migrants fromTurkey to their country of origin. During this ,550 stranded migrants were assisted with voluntary return The project was discontinued early in 1998 for lack of funds?® Repeated efforts to revive the program by IOM officials failed. A similar project was run with the financial support from the Swiss government in cooperation with the Turkish government and a Turkish non-governmental organization called the Anatolian Development Foundation.The project made it possible for the voluntary return, between January 2004 and December 2006, of 169 illegal migrants stranded in Turkey from countries like Afghanistan. Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Morocco, Pakistan and Uzbekistan2? It has already been mentioned that with or without accession Turkey should overhaul and upgrade its asylum system ifit wants to bein the same league as countries with high standards of democracy, human rights and rule of law.Yet, Turkey's geographic location and long established policies can not be expected to change overnight, especially when there is a pervasive mistrust of the EU in this area and a conviction, right or wrong, that the EU simply sees Turkey as a buffer zone. The resettlement of recognized refugees has been a typical characteristic of asylum practices left over from the Cold War years. It also goes without saying that Turkish authorities have taken this burden-sharing practice rather for granted. However, just as Turkey ought to acknowledge this long standing burden-sharing tradition which does involve a number of EU member countries,the EU ought to recognize that supporting and encouraging resettlement, even if on a diminishing scale, would go a long way helping build confidence and goodwill among Turkish officials. Such a mave would be received as a display of solidarity and concrete manifestation of burden-sharing. This would undoubtedly make a positive contribution to the efforts of those in Turkey that advocate reforming the Turkish asylum system and lifting of the “geographical limitatior ‘One last proposal regarding confidence building concerns visas for Turkish nationals. This has been a sore point in EU- Turkish relations for along time and conflicts with the well established visa-free travel that had been in place and supported by Council of Europe conventions until |980. It must be recognized that in spite of the strict visa policies of many western European countries, an exceptionally large number of Turkish nationals did enter and settle in these countries as illegal migrants or asylum seekers and refugees. However, it must also be recognized that the economic and political instability that provoked these movements of people has by and large — and ironically — been resolved thanks to the EU engagement of Turkey and the reform process since 2002. The number of migrants from ‘Turkey settling in EU member countries has dropped significantly and if anything there are signs that second and third generation Turkish migrants are returning to Turkey to seek jobs. These developments ought to lead to a reconsideration of visa requirements towards Turkish nationals, especially given that Turkey is in the midst of negotiating accession. Furthermore, the EU oughit to recognize that restrictions on business people and service providers in particular run against both the spirit and letter of the Customs Union. The recent European Court of Justice ruling may become blessing in terms of initiating a process of seriously addressing these visa related grievances. 2 rift nd ome fsx Erk los (TESE stab 202.45 Inrvacon proved oy Guns dpomatintted ne pes fall mange 2 une 208,Conclusion: Turkey and the EU need each other with regard to the management of migration. Turkey must show goodwill and recognize the importance of adopting the EU acquis on migration, not just for the sake of EU membership but also in order to become a truly ‘twenty-first century modern state capable of exercising its national sovereignty within the bounds of the rule of law and the norms associated with pluralist democracy.The EU must show evidence of wanting to re-establish the credibility of conditionality. Political conditionally induced a fascinating transformation in Turkey with respect to meeting the Copenhagen political criteria. That momentum has been lost. Undoubtedly Turkey must take some of the blame but the EU must also recognize its share. The manner in which Turkey's membership prospects have been thrown into doubt over the last wo years have. made some mockery of the very pillar on which the EU is based, pacta sund servanda, Reviving the credibility of the EU will make it that much easier to achieve a“win-win" game in terms of the management of migration. It would be a win for the EU, for Turkey, for neighboring countries, but also for bona fide refugees and migrants including illegals. After all“even” illegal migrants are entitled to the protection of their basic human rights. An EU that fails to ensure respect for the most vulnerable inside or in its neighborhood could not continue to claim the high groundassociated with“soft” or“normative” power. APPENDICES Appendix I: Asylum applications between 1995 - 2007 laccepted rejected fexine frrensen] Withdrawals Country __|Applications leases _ases _ases Protection iraq a6o7| sor S200} 4707] 22] re Iran 28963] 18314 3225] 6.088 274] ___1100) Inighanistan sasq ial 280860) i 27 fussia ad 1 ad a 1 {Usbetistan 234 7 ag 13 | y Former Soviet lunion® 104 1 «| aa | Balkanc** a 5: 2 4| 4 Iwestem Eurepe’** E 3] 4 1 others*** 2asy]___33i]__ass|__a.670)___ ag 53 [otal 50,364 25,027] 9,285] 13393] ssa]_2,075) ‘Includes Azerbaijan, Georgia. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine. ‘Includes Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greace, Macedonia, Romania, and Yugeslevi, ‘9 Includes Belgium, Germany, lely, Switzerland. ‘wo Indludes Algeria, Bangladesh, Brmaria (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi Cameroon, China, Congo, Egyps Ertra, Eth Ghana, Guinea, Ind, Israd, Ivory Coast, jordan, Kenya, wate, Lebanen, Liberia, Lby2, Malaysia Mauritana, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paleszine, Philippines, Rwanda, Saud Arabia Serra Leone, SriLanla, Somalia Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, United States of America, Yemen, Western Sahara, Zaire. ‘Source: Dita abtained from the Fareigners Department af MOI Data current as of 10.122008nt out of Turkey by country of origin and country of settlement between 1995 and 2007 ‘ountry of [Origin Country of Settlement cnauad Wr 5,821] ‘Africa 251 North Africal 3] Rows: Africa: Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan Notth Africa: Moreso, Libya, Tunisia Asie: Burma, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan Middle Fast: Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Yemen (Orhers*: Burundi, Kyrgyastan, Jordan, Columns: ‘Oceania: Australia, New Zealand. ‘Other Europe: Austria, Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Naly, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine. Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden (Othors: Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Dubai, indonesia Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOL Data current 2s of 10.1,2008‘Appendix Il: illegal transit migrants arrested by Turkish security forces 19 1995 - 2007 45000 40000 5000 15000 ‘0000 1995 1296 1997 1985 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Countries covered ae Aighanstan, Agri, Bangladesh, Egy, iran, rag, Mowooo, Libya, Pasian, Syria and Tunisia Source: Data obiained fram the Foreigners Department the Turkish Mins o he Interior (NOI),Appendix IV Entry of persons from the Soviet Union and former Soviet Republics between 1964 and 2007 {Soviet Union Russia E 677,152 [1,855,900 454.962 ‘entral Asian States IKazakhstan | 1.373 8,959 [108.167 [195.030 Kysayasten | 052.780) Loi7 14.536 fFajikistan 087 Ps 811 poss Alurkmenisten fra202 [76.286 [Uzbekistan 1,060 4.634 Subtotal Pp 296,395 [757,881 2.058.821 _P.850,249 south Paueasus Armenia am fears Fas Azerbagan | {100,249 Litt 33.455 Georgia 6.709 67.148 f29.785 Kubtotal 22.303 14892 ].116398 [Western byewiy [Independent tates evis) faewns ia pea froa _ftosaso [Moldova [Ukraine 3,794 67.103, Subtotal [02,588 245,860 [533,981 froran faa kas24 Woo1s 22.537 _)1.021,256 [1,380,731 [3,407,094 (General froraL 29,347 fr24,754 )1,057,364 b,301,250 8,538,864 [10,428,153 20275213 22,249,775 ‘Source: Complied from data ebtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI and State Statistical Institute Annual ReporisAppendix V Entry of persons from neighboring Balkan and Middle Eastem states, 1964-2007 jiv64fio7 froso fiov0 [i096 ooo 003 00S Bo07 idle [East Viean Iraaa7 19,958 [379,003 beost9 i840 _ps7.204 [1057987 Ieaq 919 foSI8 [14086 [13.372 [14,137 0.776 9.940 [107,972 [180,208 Syaa 3.184 113,959 2.033 fi22.417_is4.108 87.343 31368 sult 2,048 16.603, States 3.088 _|40029_ho.537__ 13,503 ‘akistan [L961 [7383 800 _f.247__[i2.410_f.908 _]12.33¢ |i. _ Bion ubtotal 8,672 [41,332 197.724 [537.612 BS1457 [724.156 [1.426.905 [1,667,250 [Balkans Tania saa poo7l po7as 2.682 Fos3 6955 [Bosnia i215 _psost__Bsi9 4.716 50.376 Bulgaria 139.698 B81545 {1.007.535 |1,620.939 1.238.280 Freese 103,720 [147.553 18,092 _po8.425 [548,268 _}04,847 ced ona [41.269 [108.928 |i17.819 ]119.157 63.672 fomania 52,034 ]191,203 65.128 [184,182 01.807 P88,132 Serbia- 175,294 ]140,237 fontenegro| [44,600 _h28383_|186.423 ugoslavia subtotal 507,350 ,932,185 B.760,604 1,252,245]1,134 971,711,912 2,656,341 4,187,599 1,039,749 301,250)8.538,864)10,428,153}13,461,42020,275,213)22,249.77Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) is an independent think tank based in Istanbul Its work focuses on Turkish foreign policy, Turkey - EU relations and Turkey's position in the global economy Please visit the EDAM website www.edam.org.tr for more information about EDAM projects and publications. 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