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Ubuntu GST 222 Introduction To Peace and Conflict Resolution
Ubuntu GST 222 Introduction To Peace and Conflict Resolution
GST 222
PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
UBUNTU-GACACA RESTORATION
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CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS / CLARIFICATIONS OF CONFLICT
Conflict occurs when there is a sharp disagreement or clash, for instance, between
divergent ideas, interests or people and nations. Conflict is universal yet distinct in every
culture. It is common to all persons yet experienced uniquely by every individual. It is a
visible sign of human energy and often the result of competitive striving for the same goals,
rights and resources. Most of the times, we assume and take for granted that we share a
single reality with others, but this is not always the case. Conflict in essence is the
construction of a special type of reality. It may be viewed as occurring along cognitive
[perception], emotional [feeling] and behavioral [action] dimensions. This three
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dimensional perspective can help us understand the complexities of conflict and why a
conflict sometimes seems to proceed in contradictory directions.
There are many ways to resolve conflicts. These are by surrendering, running away,
overpowering the opponent with violence, filing a lawsuit etc. Primarily, conflict can be
resolved using two basic approaches namely; peaceful negotiation or arbitration and force.
Resolving a conflict by force is generally inadequate and can make the conflict protracted
and difficult to manage. Most societies therefore, prefer peaceful resolution to open combat.
In this respect, all societies have a framework of laid-down conventions or rules by which
conflicts are resolved.
CAUSES OF CONFLICT
There are several causes of conflict however, these can largely be classified under a limited
number of headings, ranging from land disputes, politics, religious and cultural differences
distribution and the use of resources, individual differences, structural causes, clashes of
interest, change, data collection etc. Most conflicts are caused by combination of factors
and it is very difficult, in most case to-highlight the dominant and less dominant causes.
Malthus the eminent economist suggested that, reduced supply of the means of sustenance
is the root cause of conflict. To him conflict is caused by the increase of population in
geometrical progression and food supply in arithmetical/progression. According to Charles
Darwin, the biological principles of "struggle for existence" and the survival of the; fittest
are the main causes of conflict.
Other psychologist hold the view that the innate instinct for aggression in man is the main
causes of conflict. Thus, there are various structural imbalance and several causes of
conflict, which can be categorized into the following sources in discourse of this book
(a) Conflicts may occur due to resources: These conflicts erupt when two or more
parties aspire for scarce resources. The region is now baptized with environmental
degradation, catastrophic increase via inter communal crisis, insurgency and counter
insurgency, political exclusion and structural backwardness e.g Congo BR
(b) Conflicts may take place as a result of Psychological needs: The psycho-dynamic
perspective, probes the basis of conflicts in unconscious human- need, in this case conflict
arises due to psychological needs that cannot be seen, in" principle which are psychological
in nature as they involve a' mental phenomenon within an emotional frame work. Through
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different dimension of perceptions; intrapersonal perceptions, interpersonal perceptions,
and the perception of situation/ environment, the input of average workers are affected in
multi-dimension airways, as a result of psychological needs, which affect the entire system
where labour is disarticulated. Conflicts-may erupt due to' values: Value includes
philosophy, religion and. ideology among others.
The Values describe our personalities, our potentials and shortcomings even our down-lows.
In Nigeria, religious crises have been a great problem. The main problem is not the
differences in the religious practice's but the conduct, lack of tolerance and the 'operation of
various religious classifications are the problem.
Conflicts may' emerge resulting from mismanagement of information:
Information plays a vital role in, the conduct of human and organizational interactions or
relationship information if not well manage can generate conflict situation. The way an
average informed person perceives things will definitely be different from the way an
uninformed individual will behave on a specific issue at a given time. Even though it-is said
that conflict is inevitable, but we should as a matter of fact improve our communication and
perception, and channel enough resources to renounce or discourage violent and conflict.
Some structural reasons behind the causes of conflict
Political Reasons
• International organization propaganda to sell the weapon to undeveloped countries
e.g. African's State.
• Long over state of political actors in the political offices.
• Colonialism mentality against Africans struggle for power/supremacy
• the sit-tight tendencies of African leaders
Economic Reasons
• War mechanics from developed countries
• Resources control
• The struggle for citizenship and settlers
• External military aid
• Regional or secessionist rebellion
• Corporate Interest, poverty, corruption, injustice, exploitation.
• Greed and grievance
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• Proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
Social Reasons
• Armed Robbery cases
• Self-defense arms position
• Rampart production of locally made arms
• Poor economic conditions
• Political Mobilization
• Youth-Unemployment
Ethnicity Reasons
• Wars Civil wars,
• Post wars conflict,
• Vigilance/heroism
• Ethnic identity crises
IDENTITY CONFLICT
Identity is a keyword of contemporary society and a central focus of social psychological
theorizing and research. At earlier historical moments, identity was not so much an issue;
when societies were more stable, identity was to a great extent assigned, rather than selected
or adopted. In current times, however, the concept of identity carries the full weight of the
need for a sense of who one is, together with an often overwhelming pace of change in
surrounding social contexts changes in the groups and networks in which people and their
identities are embedded and in the societal structures and practices in which those networks
are themselves embedded.
According to social identity theory, identity competition plays a central role in the inception
and escalation of intergroup conflict, even when economic and political factors also are at
play. Individual and group identity competition is considered a byproduct of individuals'
efforts to satisfy basic human needs, including various psychological needs. Groups often
serve these psychological needs more comprehensively and potently than other repositories
of cultural meaning that contribute to the construction and maintenance of individual and
group identities. Groups frequently supply cosmologies, moral framework, institutions,
rituals, traditions and other identity supporting content that. answer to individuals' needs for
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psychological stability in the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem,
and even self-actualization. The peculiar ability of group identity to serve the human identity
impulse thus may partially explain why intergroup conflict so frequently occurs along ethnic,
section and religious fault lines.
IDENTITY .
If you meet a stranger for the first time and asked who they were, the response you most
likely wished to elicit was their nationality, ethnicity, religious persuasion, and probably
social class, political affiliation, and sexual orientation. Gjulcwu and Onifade (2010)
conceptualize identity as any group attribute that provides Recognition or definition,
reference affinity, coherence and meaning for individual members of the group. For
Olcpanachi (2010), identity is the progress of construction of meaning on the basis of
cultural attributes, which is given priority over other sources of meaning. According to
Erikson (1968), it is an individual's sense of belonging to a group if such belongingness
influences his political behaviour. Identities are sources of meaning for themselves, and by
themselves, constructed through a process of individuation (Giddens, 1991).
Following the various perspectives above, we may conceptualize identity as a value-based
attribute by which an individual or a group is recognized and which sets them apart from
other individuals or groups.
FORMS OF IDENTITY
The political philosopher Karl Marx classified society into two broad identity forms: the
haves and the have-nots; the oppressors and the oppressed; the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. This classification is based on Marx's theory of historical materialism, according
to which society is divided into the owners of the means of production (bourgeoisie) on the
one hand, and the working, exploited people (proletariat) on the other.
On his part, Huntington (1996), while theorizing on the basis for post-cold war conflicts,
provides a typology in which the world community is divided into seven or eight identity
forms, which he termed "civilizations." These identity forms or civilizations are Western,
Islamic, Latin American, Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,' Confucian, and African(?).
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Idyorough (2005:40) identifies some identity classes in Nigeria as "ethnic, religious, and age
groups." Other forms of identity apart from those mentioned by Marx, Huntington and
Idyorough can be gleaned from, the myriad of literature available on the subject. These
would include political identity, -racial identity, national, social class, gender, clan, sexual
orientation, religious identity, ethnic identity etc. It is possible within a given identity type
to have sub- identities. Thus, under the Christian identity there are Catholics \ and
Protestants. Islam has the Sunni, the Shi'a, the Ahmadiyya, etc. The Caucasian race has Jews
and Aryans.
Realist Theory
Realist theory or realism highlights inherency and traces the root of conflict to a flaw
in human nature which is seen to be selfish and engaging in the pursuit of personalized self-
interest, defined as power. The theory originates from classical political theory and shares
both ideological and biological doctrine about an apparent weakness and individualism
inherent human nature. Thus, the starting point for the explanation of conflict is the
individual level.
In conclusion, actors should prepare to deal with the outcome and consequences of conflict
since it is inevitable, rather than wish there were none. This theory greatly justified the
militarization of internal relations, the arms race and helped the emergence of other theories
like deterrence theory, balance of terror etc. The theory has been accused of elevating
power and the state to the status of an ideology. Suffice it to say, however, that realism has
had tremendous impact on conflict at the international level.
Economic Theory
There is a tendency among economists, to provide an economic explanation for the
existence and endurance of conflict. This is largely because people in conflict are assumed
to be fighting over, not about, something that is material; for instance, Collier pointed out
that some people commonly referred to as “Conflict Entrepreneurs” actually benefit from
chaos; while the overwhelming majority of the population are affected by the negative
impacts of conflict, the leaders of armed formations that are actually perpetrating the
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violence often profit from the chaos, and that while the prospect of pecuniary gains is
seldom the principal incentive for rebellion, it can become for some insurgent groups, a
preferred state of affairs.
Bridal and Malone agree that social conflicts are generated by many factors, some of which
are deep-seated. For them, across the ages, conflicts have come to be seen as having a
“functional utility” and are embedded in economic disparities. War, the crisis stage of
internal conflicts, has sometimes become a vast private and profit-making enterprise.
Furthermore, they contend that even though issues in conflict may later be packaged as
resulting from ideological, racial or even religious differences, these represent at the most
basic level, a contest for control over economic assets, resources or systems. Economic
theories highlight resources, and to that extent, are close to the radical structural theory of
conflict, except for the emphasis of leftwing structuralists on the exploitative relationships
between parties.
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d. De-escalating or outcome stage: There is an assumption that all conflicts will pass
through this stage, one way or the other. Either one side wins and another loses or a
ceasefire may be declared. One may surrender, or the government or other third party
intervening forces stronger than the warring parties intervene to impose a solution and stop
the fighting. The critical issue at this stage is that the violence is decreased, which allows
room for some discussion to commence, or alternative means of settling the conflict.
e. Rebuilding reconciliation or the post-conflict stage: At this stage, violence has
either ended or significantly reduced and the parties have gone past the crisis stage. This
is the stage to address the underlying causes of the conflict, these incompatible goals which
created the conflict in the first instance such as the needs and fears of the parties. If they
are not tackled at this stage, the conflict cycle may be re-enacted and a return to the pre-
conflict stage, with consequent re-eruption of violence, is a possibility. These conflict
stages are also referred to by other names, such as “conflict process” or “conflict
progression”. All of them constitute useful point of conflict analysis.
Merits
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Demerits
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CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION
It is a known fact that insecurity is a major challenge facing Nigeria today. The' Issue1 of
'conflict is innate in all social interactions, conflict is any form of confrontation between two
or more parties resulting from 'a situation where more interdependent group or systems of
action have incompatible goals' (Diller, 1997:6) of course, it is universally acknowledged
that conflict is inevitable. It is every moment occurrence. The belief that conflict can be
prevented and resolved is part of the Zeitgeist of the late 20th, century. Sustainable human
development, economic growth, security conflict prevention and resolution as well as good
governance are all intricately intertwined. The emergence of conflict, crisis, violence and
war in human societies over time' threaten the peaceful co-existence of human race. The
consequence of conflict in the societies of the World especially in the continent of Africa in
particular are enormous, the United National Development has embarked upon an extensive
review of the most effective means to prevent conflict through appropriate governance, by
promoting suitable environments for sustainable human development. On cases of conflict
and violence, there are two major lines of thought; the' mainstream or dominant theory tends
to emphasize the internal factors within a nation as the root causes.
These have to do with lack of economic growth on one hand and poor governance on
the other hand. The corresponding solutions to some extent are economic g rowth and
good governance. Therefore, conflict prevention and resolution emerged as a distinct
discipline in social sciences in the 1950's, the main impetus was the realization that
war, which was fought primarily for territorial defense, religious dynasti c,
colonization' and competition' for markets and influence as a normal phase in
relationship between states, if not logically prevented will become in a very real
sense a threat to the survival of humanity. It seems clear, however to every region in
human society need conflict prevention mechanism. Perhaps-it-is logical to say “here
that” with rare exception, 1970s scholars like Johan Galtung expostulate structural
explanations of conflict and drew on Marxists thinking which was repopularised in
the 1900’s by International Political Economy (IPS) in analysis ol conflict and war
(MC CanlessE: 2007).
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Thus, this book will look at some various attempts made by prominent scholars in
the prospects and challenges of conflict resolution, security, causes of conflic t,
theories and the concepts of conflict prevention, for a formidable and effective
framework in rebuilding mechanism in conflict prevention, resolution and the
principle of prevention with significant to other domain of social life.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
Conflict:
The term conflict derives from the Latin conjugere, which denotes "to strike
together". The term initially means, "opposition among 'social entities directed
against one another". (Otite and Albeit 2001:1 -2). The use of the term "opposition"
means a process by which social entities functions in the disservice of one another.
Over the years, approaches to conflict have manifested in many ways from power
bargaining echniques normative and legal approaches to psychological attempts to
change attitudes, 'problem solving' conflict management to conflict resolution. The
structuralist’s approach emphasizes the influence of objective conditions in the
generation of conflict. Conflict may be defined as a struggle or contest between
people with opposing “needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals”
Coser (1956:232) defines conflict" as a struggle over values or claim to status power,
and scarce resources," in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to
gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. Careful
analysis of these definitions will reveal what they have in common. First, they
indicate the inevitability of conflict in human affairs, second, they reveal the features
of conflict situation, involve interdependent who perceive incompatibility from each
other in achieving their goals. Therefore, it suggests that conflict is inherent in human
society. Whether, or not conflict plays a functional or dysfunctional role in human
relation depends- on the manner such a conflict is managed and resolved nothing in
the above situations suggest that conflict should necessarily be violent.
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Conflict can also be defined as "the pursuit of incompatible goals or interests by
different groups or individuals (Bakut Tswah Bakut in peace and conflict studies in
West Africa edited by Shadrack Gaya Best 2006).
Conflict is when one individual or group of individuals does/do something which
tends to decrease the probability of (actually prevented) others obtaining things they
want. (Umar Mohammed Kaoje in politics and political power relations in Nigeria
edited by Mike Kwanashie 2003).
Conflict according to McEnery (1985: 41-42) is "a process which emerges whenever
two or more persons (or groups) seek to possess the same object, occupy the same
space or the same exclusive position, play incompatible goals or undertake mutually
incompatible means for achieving their purpose".
Within the social content, conflict has been defined as purposeful struggle between
collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain
status, power, resources and other scarce values (Himer, 1980)
i. Prevention:
Conflict prevention is usually grouped into structural- and direct preventive
measures. Structural measure aims at specific groups or issues _ like economic
development political participation or cultural autonomy. Structural preventive
measures are mostly applicable in a stable peace environment.' The prevention of
conflict has been known to be more cost effective than later attempts to manage,
resolve or. - transformed situations that have been allowed to escalate. Conflict
prevention works best when _ individuals and groups responsible for decision and
necessary preventive measures or action are sufficiently proactive. This can be done
in part by adherence and swift response to early warning 'signs of conflict (Best
2007:80).
Conflict prevention has been on the top of the agenda of the United - Nation (UN)
and the defunct organization of Africa Unity (OAU) since their creation. Article 1
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(Para 1) of the UN charter-stipulates that "The purpose of the UN are to maintain
international peace "and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggressions or other breach of peace, and to bring about
peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of - international disputes or situations which might leads
to breach of peace (UN Charter:/: Chapters (vi) and (vii). Therefore, conflict
prevention undertaken with the - express intent to anticipate a conflict or fore tall the
possibility of i ts escalation into generalized and uncontrolled violence whether
between two 'groups or, at the level of society at large. Meaning to address the
structural of underlying factors "root causes" to curb or halt its escalation into deadly
violence of all; the conflict prevention emphasis by the constructive act of the African
Union (AU) early warning is undoubtedly for conflict prevention; it includes the
following:
i.Political Indicators; the, eternal 'political dynamics, processes and issues
related to identity and relationship.
ii.Economic indicators. The cost of living, inflation rate, unemployment,
scarcities.
iii.Personal Security: Law and order, civil military relations, the proliferation
of small arms and light- weapons.
iv.Military buildup 'and expenditures" official, discourse national or group
security, the proliferation of militia and paramilitary forces.
v.Social Indicators: demographic makeup, population changes and movement
and population density.
vi.Environmental indicators Water security, natural catastrophes e.t.c
Conflict Prevention work effectively in the case of early warning. Best S. G. (2012: 184 -
200). Aristotle once put it thus: "To know the causes which destroy constitutions is and' to
know the causes which ensure their preservation". In other words, analysis of what causes
conflicts should be avoided by any policy maker and by all (Adekange 2007:170 - 173). The
variance in the concept of prevention from more narrow- ones focusing on limited ways of
prevention such as preventive diplomacy of conflicts. Lund (1993:37) states;
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Actions taken in vulnerable places and times to-avoid-the-threat or use of armed force or
groups to settle the political disputes that economic, social political and international
concern would help to prevent conflict and deter the reoccurrence of conflicts.
On the other hand, Boutros B. Ghali conceptualized preventive diplomacy as the use
of diplomatic techniques to prevent 'disputes arising, that will escalate into armed'
conflict from spreading. (Boutros 1996: 18) But Carmen understand conflict
prevention to mean a medium and long-term proactive operations or structural
strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, to iden tify and create the enabling
conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment
(Carmen 2003.11). According to the organization for economic cooperation and
development = (OECD) states that a culture of prevention could be achi eve if the
international community were able to analyze the causes 'and ' dynamics of conflict
and peace in order to understand how their actions will affect the structural "stability"
of a society or country. (OECD 2001:31).
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also needs to affect structures that generate conflict through deprivation, exclusion
and other forms of injustice. It also seeks to understand cultural patterns and values
of parties.
Conflict suppression is used to portray the unwillingness of more powerful parties,
or stronger interveners who have the ability to transform or manage a conflict
situation, to take necessary measures leading to "the management or resolution of
the conflict. Instead, they use instruments of power or force to push away the issues
under the carpet or to impose a solution that is not sustainable and with which the
parties are not satisfied. This happens in unequal relationships. Governments and
repressive regimes are usually guilty of this situation by declining to take
appropriate decisions as and when due, or trying to lord it over others, leading to
protracted conflicts. Sometimes, the state uses its coercive apparatus to suppress
conflicts, but this cannot be sustainable.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
The idea of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is about the search for, and
application of, "non-conventional" peaceful methods of settling disputes and
resolving conflict situations using the least expensive methods, and in ways that
satisfy the parties, as well as ways that preserve relationships after a settlement
might have been reached. ADR is specially meant to serve as an alternative to the
official conventional means of settling disputes, mainly through litigation and the
courts, but with preference for non-violence.
The conflict resolution and transformation spectrum consist of a range of options
employable for non-violent management of conflict. These can be classified into
two, namely the voluntary processes, and the involuntary processes. The voluntary
processes are those in which parties have some control over the outcome. They
include fact finding, in-depth research and case studies, facilitation, negotiation,
conciliation, mediation and brokerage. The involuntary processes on the other hand,
are more often than not, outside the control of the parties to the conflict Even though
they may be non-violent, the third parties who broker the process may sometimes
hand down outcomes, which the parties have to accept either in principle or in law.
These options include arbitration, adjudication and law enforcement (otherwise
called crisis management) using the coercive apparatus of state.
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African Traditional Dispute Resolution
Africa is represented by a diversity of cultural and religious practices. This diversity
affects the approaches to dispute and conflict resolution in the traditional setting.
Generally, the approach would tend to differ from the Western alternative dispute
resolution in several respects. Even then, in Africa itself, the approach may also differ
from one culture to another. The universal religions of Christ' and Islam have also
impacted on the approaches used in Africa in the same ways they have impacted on
the culture " the people. In Islamic societies, for instance, the religion
comprehensively prescribes the ways conflicts involving" believers are to be
resolved. In that case, pre-Islamic methods of dispute resolution would be
significantly eroded as typified by the situation in the Hausa community of northern
Nigeria.
The approaches also differ as one move from one level of conflict to another. There
are variations in conflicts involving property, land, family, marriage, communities,
as well as those between Muslim parties on the one hand, and then Muslim and non-
Muslim parties on the other. In some African societies, the universal religions have
nearly completely displaced the traditional methods of dispute resolution. In others,
the principles of Islam and Christianity have affected parts of the tradition, redefined
and reshaped others, and left some intact. This topic is the subject of another chapter
of this book and need not delay us here.
Domination: According to Best (2006), this a style of dealing with a conflict derived
from the disposition of a people to assert themselves in situations. Here, there is little
or no interest in the well-being or interest of the other party. In other words, it is all
about the person and the person alone. In a given conflict then, one party that is
assertive tries to eclipse the other party. In a way, it is an attempt to deny the rights
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of the other person. The primary motivation in domination is the desire to wi n, and
therefore, make the other party lose. Thus, the assertive party behaves in a manner to
suppress the views of the other party using strong arguments or emphasizing his/her
rank or economic position. ,
This style of conflict management is rooted in power relationship where one of the
conflicting parties perceives him/her self as more powerful than the other over t he
conflict issue. Dominance is deliberately selected as an attitude or because in the
opinion of the domineering party, the others have little or no capacity to respond
adequately to the power being displayed by the dominant party. Domination style of
conflict management can hardly lead to lasting resolution of conflict. Even if the
assertive person succeeds in "winning" the case, there is tendency that the re solution
will leave grudges in the hearts and minds of the other party. Hence, whenever the
opportunity arises the party will express discontent, which will eventually lead to
reopening of old wounds. A good example where this style of conflict management
if found is an organization where there is conflict involving a junior and senior staff
who are to appear before a conflict resolution committee.
Avoidance: - This is also referred to as Turtle Style. In this approach, one party in a
potential conflict ignores the conflicting issues or denies its significance in their life.
This simply means that there is withdrawal of one party from the potential conflict
issues; hence, the problem is dealt with through a passive attitude. Avoidance is
mostly used when the perceived negative end, outweighs the positive outcome. In
employing this style, the conflicting parties end up ignoring the Problem, believing
that the conflict will resolve itself, hence Postponing the doom days. This is
exemplified in the refusal of various governmental administrations in Plateau State
to implement the various reports submitted by various panels and commissions of
inquiry set up by the various governments in the State investigate the remote and
immediate causes of cyclical violence in the State starting from 1994 up to 2011.
Because of avoidance or refusal to implement the reports, the violence kept re-
occurring.
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Avoidance style of conflict management is a way of not addressing the problem, or
tactical way postponing the problem for another time. In the case of Plateau State,
the government is unassertive ab-initio as they had no intention of implementing the
reports. As it is often the case in Plateau State, those conflict issues have not been
resolved by avoidance or ignoring the report findings of various panels/ commissions
of inquiry. Conflict avoidance is a dangerous style of co nflict management because
unresolved conflict issues could get worst in the long run. However, conflict
avoidance could provide a temporary measure to potentially dangerous situation.
Collaboration: - This is also referred to as the Owl Method. This method tries to
solve problems in ways that an optimum result is provided for all parties involved in
the conflict, in that both parties get what they want, and neg ative feelings are
minimize, hence communication is an important part of t his strategy. In this
mechanism effort is exerted in digging into the issue to identify the needs of the
conflicting parties without removing their respective interest from the pictu re.
Collaborating individuals aim to come up with a successful resolution without
compromising their own satisfaction. A good example of collaborating is the case of
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the federal Government of
Nigeria (FGN) in 2013, where ASUU and FGN collaborated in the renegotiation of
2009 agreement, leading to ASUU suspending their over six months industrial action.
In this method, the parties identify and begin a discussion on the conflict, by seeking
solutions that satisfy both of them. Owls style, maintain the relationship and it is not
satisfied until a solution is found, that achieves goals of both parties. They are not
satisfied until the tensions and negative feelings have been fully resolved. Parties get
what they want and negative feelings are eliminated, it creates mutual trust and
builds commitment. This takes a great deal of time and effort. The appropriate time
to use this style is when maintaining relationship is very important and time is not a
concern. When trying to gain commitment through consensus and when learning and
trying to merge different perspective.
In this approach compromise is assertive and cooperative, the result is either win-
lose, win-win or lose-lose. It is useful in complex issues without simple solutions,
all parties are equal in power, relationship is maintained and conflict removed. Only
that no one is really satisfied. It is best when there are no time restraints, when
important/simple issues leave no clear or simple solutions and when all conflicting
parties are equal in power and have strong interest in different solutions. Handling
of conflict is not an easy task. Conflict Managers must carefully introduce methods
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and create avenues that would make for peaceful settlement of the disagreements or
disputes.
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goal. It includes the use of whatever means to attain what he/ she thinks is right
(Noun 2006). Sharks use force and are highly goal oriented; they do not hes itate to
use aggressive behavior to resolve conflicts. Sharks have a need to win, therefore
other, must lose, hence creating win-lose situation. An example is the recent
insurgency in Nigeria by Boko-Haram Sect. Here there is completion between the
Boko-Haram sect and federal Government of Nigeria over who will be in contro l of
the sovereign entity called Nigeria especially the North -Eastern party. Both of them
are being violently assertive in an attempt to deny the rights of the other party. The
primary motivation in competing is the desire to win and the other to lose (Bes t
2006).
The styles of conflict management are inexhaustible, different individuals, groups,
communities/ society may have their unique style that is working for them. For
Mcswain and Treadwell, in the National Open University of Nigeria Handbook
(Noun, 2006), some characteristics that goes with the choice of styles of conflict
management include;
a. The super Helper: This is an approach where one of the parties to the conflict
constantly works to help others without giving much thought to self.
b. The power broker: Here, finding a solution to the problem is what that matters
to the party so that their relationships can be enhanced.
c. The facilitator: This where an intervening third party adapts a variety approaches
and styles in order to achieve a compromise between competing factions.
d. The fearful loser:- This style is like avoidance, where a party to the conflict runs
from conflict probably because they are personally insecure.
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1. The voluntary processes, and
2. Involuntary processes
Voluntary Processes:- These are processes in which parties can control the outcome
of the decisions. They include fact finding, in-depth research and case studies,
facilitations, negotiation, conciliation, mediation and brokerage.
Involuntary Processes.- These on the other hand, are the processes in which parties
have no control over the outcome the decisions despite that the p rocesses are
peaceful. The third party who brokers the process can down play the outcome and
parties must accept either in principles or in law. These options include arbitration,
adjudication and law enforcement (Best 2006). For better understanding of th e
ADR, this paper hereby picks some of the following for a brief explanation.
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d) Arbitration:- This is another third party intervention i n managing conflict
situation. Parties who choose arbitration style to resolve their conflict tend to
lose control of their conflict situations. Although it is non - violent, but the
intervening third party listens to the submission of the conflicti ng parties and
thereafter renders decisions which is often binding on the parties.
Before the advent of colonialism, communities living in Africa had their own
indigenous ways of resolving conflicts. This is seen as many regions in African
societies still hold onto this traditional conflict management mechanism. These
traditional values, which lay emphasis on togetherness/harmony over and above
individual interest and humanity, can be seen in such practices/concerns as Ubuntu,
which emphasis principle of "I am, because you are" (Romose, 1990). Almost all
communities in Africa in one way or the other have Ubuntu principle in their cultures
as well as the concept of Gacaca "judgment on the grass" practiced in Rwanda.
27
UBUNTU:- The Ubuntu philosophy came about during the South African's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. It was more of a rehabilitative, restorative justice
process instead of retributive form of justice. It had both formal and informal
processes using traditional methods of "truth telling" to encourage reconciliation.
Derived from the Bantu languages principles of East, Central and Southern Africa,
Ubuntu seeks mainly on reconciliation done collectively by members of a
community, by way of placing the generality of interest of peaceful co -existence
above an individual interest, to that of the whole community (David Crocker,
2002:7). People treat each other as human beings and not simply as tools or a means
to an end (Broodry, 2002). In essence, the Ubuntu principles are for equality of all
and human dignity.
GACACA:- The concept of Gacaca is a conflict management style indigenous to the
people of Rwanda. It popularized particularly after the Rwanda genocide of 1994,
motivated by the need to come up with the solutions to bring justice and in particular,
reconciliation. It is more of restorative justice. Gacaca, which means "judgment on
the grass” proffers practical and community, based solutions to over a hundred
thousand genocide suspects awaiting trial and other war crimes. After the Rwanda
genocide, the need arose tor a traditional dispute resolution process to reduce
congestion in Rwandan prisons which posed as a source of many human rights
violations.
Also, the re-integration of suspect back into the societies and the truth-telling nature
of confessions offered hope for reconciliation. In essence, Gacaca's positive
attributes lays in its characterization as a model of restorative justice. This (Gacaca)
was done in the occurrence at a meeting that was convened by elders whenever there
was a dispute between individuals or families in a community and was settled only
with the agreement of both parties (Jessica, 1994). As was done in the government
of Rwanda, it does not mean that Gacaca today strictly adheres to its indigenous form.
ACHOLI CONCEPT:- The Acholi tribe was chosen because they occupy the
Northern region in Uganda, in both Gulu and Kitgum districts where war has been
raging for quite a long time. The word "Mato-Oput" means reconciliation among the
28
Acholi. It is a detailed ceremony meant to reconcile conflicting parties. Persons in
conflict appear before the council of elders who patiently listen to each party and
cross-examine them in order to establish the root causes of the conflict. After
scrutiny, a prescribed therapy is given to the guilty party, of which it must lead to
harmony and peace. An animal is sacrificed and blood sprinkled on the shrine of the
gods of truth and the reconciler. The two parties will share the meat and drink beer
together. Mato-oput. is performed in an isolated place, or at the bank of a river to
chase away hatred and revenge.
Drawing from the discussions so far, it is clear that while Africans may apply some
of these traditional methods, they also employ Western methods of conflict
management (Best 2006). Both the Western methods and African ADR are non violent
methods of conflicts management, but they differ in their roots and cultural
specificities. The African ADR resembles arbitration rooted in history, tradition and
culture. The Western version is more diversified, and it is easier to differentiate
between them, even though some of the methods are closely related. Discussion
pertaining styles of conflict management indicted that in general, the utilization
and/or preference for style are related to some key features. Some of them are more
socially adoptable than others. Some of the factors to consider according to (Best,
2006), before selecting a conflict management style include but not limited to:
• Whether the style has the potential to reduce the intensity of the conflict,
• Whether or not the Style has the potential to leave behind grudges between the
parties,
• Whether the style gives a sense of control over the final outcome to the parties.
RECOMMENDATION/ CONCLUSION:
Everyone encounters situations where they must handle some type of conflict, most people
favour one conflict handling style to another. But there is no "one-size-fits-all" response to
conflict. Conflict managers must therefore critically analyses or assess each conflict situation
before choosing the most appropriate management style. Conflict occurs every day, and so
29
how we respond to and resolve conflict will limit or enhance our success in managing the
conflict. Our goal has been present some of the styles to managing conflict and empower us
with variety of effective choice of conflict management style when we are faced with a
conflict situation. None of these conflict management styles is a "one-size-fits-all”. It
depends on which one is best fitted in a given situation which also depends on a variety of
factor, including the analysis of the conflict and appraisal of the level of conflict. Hence you
either collaborating "win-win", compromising win some/lose some, accommodating
lose/win, competing "win-lose, and avoiding "no-winners, no-losers". This will help us
accept conflict as inevitable part of life.
30
✓ Baldwin sees security as protection from threat and danger (damage) abs ence of
threat to acquire values freedom from fear.
✓ B a l d w i n also define security as low probability of damage to acquire values,
this means that security i s to protect and preserve values. When there is low
probability of protecting your acquire values inspite the threat.
These four cardinal questions contained POLICY and STRATEGY issues. All four
but in particular the first three are questions directed at POLICY. The last question
address, STRATEGY.
31
1. On Security: What is security? Whose security? What counts as security issue?
How can security be achieved?
3. On Core security issue: What is core security issue? Whose core security issue?
What counts as core security issue? How can core security issue be achieved?
These four cardinal questions contained POLICY and STRATEGY issues. All four
but in particular the first three are questions directed at POLICY. The last question
address, STRATEGY.
The recent happening in the country today in south east Nigeria involving IPOB and
the Nigeria Military, Herdsmen attacked in Miyango (IRIGWE) chiefdom of Plateau
State which led to the death of many innocent people within the space of two weeks
is an indication of insecurity in the country.
32
Terrorist employ conventional welfare, guerilla or insurgency welfare and
international terrorism.
The US Dept of Defense (DOD) has describe terrorism as a phenomenon in transition
and has indicated that nature of the terrorist threat has change drastically
characteristic of terrorism includes resilient, tough and difficult to defeat, intelligent
gathering, the use propaganda, threat, hostage taking, kidnapping, bombing, hijack,
piracy high profile killing etc and the mode of operation.
Example of terrorism group includes:
Alquaeda, Alshaba in Somalia, Taliban in Pakistan, Hesbolah in Lebanon,
Boko Haram in Nigeria, Islamic state (I.S) in Syria, Libya. Iraq etc.
Counter insurgency is defined as comprehensive civilian and military effort taking
to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address it root causes.
Insurgency is a organized use of subversion and violence to seize nullify or
challenges political control of region. There are three pillar of counter insurgency.
1. Security: these include military, police, human security and population security.
▪ Isolate & apply pressure on the states that sponsor terrorism to force them
top change their behavior.
The chain of law of enforcement, intelligence and military countries roles were
quaty enhance and the various agencies were suspended with the newly created Dept.
of homeland security.
The secret service has the most define role in protecting government official from
terrorist attack with a particular responsibility for the president and VIP. Nigeria
counter terrorism war especially the ongoing war against Boko Haram in the North
east Yobe, Borno and Adamawa, there is collaboration between the military, police,
DSS, Civilian JTF, civil defense, NGO, NEMA and other stakeholders in the
country. That has greatly contributed to the success recorded so far in the war against
terrorism. There is also a security cooperation between Nigeria and neighboring
countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad which has led to the formation of multi -
national joint task force. Counter terrorism cannot be achieved by one security
agency alone but need cooperation and collaboration of o ther sisters’ agency and
general public. Counter terrorism strategy in Nigeria should be a collective
responsibility. Strategy is usually operated base on situation on ground.
34
CONFLICT PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY:
Conflict preventive 'diplomacy is the practice of conducti ng relationship between
actors with intents to influence, transmit a positions or negotiation on a given
assessed by checking the realization, of a series pre-conditions, such' as the capability
of values, A Weakness feeling, democratization, economic growth, the expectation
of mutual benefits, mobility, effective governance, constructive transformation of
ethnic and nationalist arms control, etc. The usefulness of intervention whether
positive in the form of aid or negative in the form of sanctions, usually differs
throughout the course of conflict. 'Generally, using the remote economic measures
as either incentives or disincentives, to contend or Influence the course of conflict is
complex. Touval draws lessons for future attempts at preventives diplomacy from the
Yugoslavian case (Tourval 1996: 414).
First, the international community must prioritize its goals, by demanding both
democratization and unity. Second, the international community should a void
presenting vague equivocal or ambiguous goals. They s hould "refrain from reciting
broad value and-instead-define in concrete terms what they expect from the
disputants. He argues the ethnic conflict are an exception to the conventional
wisdom, which says that conflicts are easier prevented. The conflict preventive
Diplomacy may take place bilaterally between two states, or multilaterally when
several 'states cooperate together, even regional or; globally through
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The goal is to maintain power over weaker
nations and balance of power, with nations of equal status. This encourages
positional bargaining rather than a more integrative or cooperative approach.
i.The perspectives of conflict prevention and social stability: The Integrated approaches
linking security and development are essential for conflict prevention and social
stability. Thus, it denotes a vision of society built on solidarity, togetherness of people
and the responsibility people have for each other.
The development of indigenous mechanism and the types of, action that may harness these
strategies for contemporary conflict prevention.
Therefore, conflict prevention facilitates peace social stability and development process in
African societies/it’s also set the pace for mutual understanding and communal co¬existence.
Challenges: Insecurity remains the most challenging problem of mankind despite
humanity's outstanding and unsurpassed advancement in the field of science and technology
in regards to conflict prevention. The positive benefits of regional cooperation and Peace
building seems slow and difficult ~o realize and promote prevention mechanism. African-
Union (AU) is criticized for paying too little attention to conflict prevention which is
understood to be far more proactive and less a costly approach- to promoting peace and
security. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons outside formal control of the
state is one of the serious challenges to conflict prevention, peace and security.
The actors in' modern' warfare vary widely, the combatants, includes Terrorism, warlords,
mercenaries and child soldiers. Consequently, the Geneva conventions do not correspond to
today's conflicts and should updated to account for currently and combatants.
36
CONCLUSION:
This study is to harness and enhance our understanding of the various methods of conflict
prevention and management matrix. Most especially in the light of divers’ phenomena
ranging from group dynamics for: de-escalation to structural transformation of 'an
adversaries’ social system. On the concept of conflict, we deduce that conflict is inevitable
in human nature, but the degree and the intensity is determined by the attitudes, mode of
approaches adopted by the parties involved. Conflict prevention should be seen as part of a
continuum that aims at creating the condition for peace consolidation. We advocate the
promotion and incorporation of mechanisms, institutions of restorative justice within the
constitutions of states and societies in transition so that they could be more accessible, widely
utilize, acceptable and legitimate forms in the rule of law. If efforts and strategies are put in
place to prevent conflict, what is mostly needed, is the political will to make things happen.
In a proactive conflict impact 'assessment system, that works in the taxonomy of peace and
conflict prevention worldwide. Kofi Anna (2004) rightly puts: The aim of conflict prevention
must be to create synergy truth with those civil society groups that are bridge builders, truth
finders, watchdogs, human right defenders and agents of social protection and economic
revitalization. Conflict prevention is perhaps the most appropriate way of curbing/conflict.
37
was also based on the struggle for identity by Muslims of British India, during which
an estimated t w o million Hindu and Muslim faithful were killed (Yamin, 2008).
The global war on terror is without a doubt an identity-based conflict, as this has led
to a palpable escalation of tensions between the West and Islam. The 2006 cartoon
caricature of Prophet Muhammad by a Danish newspaper in 2006 offended, the
religious sensibilities of Muslims everywhere, leading to viol ent reactions including
in Nigeria, where some Christians paid with their lives for the indiscretion of some
journalists in faraway Europe.
The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in the former USSR is a fulfillment of Marx's
prediction that at the appropriate moment, the class struggle between the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie would lead to the defeat of the latter by the former and ultimately
the enthronement of a classless society. Marx (1930) had urged all the workers of the
world to unite against the oppression of the owners of the means of production, the
bourgeois class. Although the Bolshevik revolution was short lived, the fact remains
that the oppressed class everywhere is a potential source of conflict.
Gender-based conflict rears its ugly head in the form of hegemonic masculinity, a
situation whereby men prove their "manliness" by displaying tough, aggressive,
violent attitudes and employing same for the subjugation and oppression of women.
Gender oppression may be expressed in the form of domestic violence, rape, genital
mutilation, restriction of movement, etc. Sometimes, though seldom, men are the
victims and women the agents.
The conflict in Somalia provides a paradigm of how clannish identity can become the
basis for violent conflict. The Somalia conflict followed the collapse of the regime
of Siad Barre. Then clans within the country warring in the leadership vacuum set
the country ablaze (Rice and Loomis, 2007). Though a relatively homogeneous
country, clans formed coalitions to compete for influence in the rudderless Somalian
state. By September 1992, according to Rice and Loomis (1992), the International
Committee of the Red Cross estimated that as many as 1.5 million Somalis faced
imminent starvation, as many as 5 million more relied on outside assistance for food,
and nearly a million people had fled the country.
In Rwanda, the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups had historically held each other in
suspicion following issues of political domination of the latter by the former, who
38
were favoured by colonial policy. The Hutu, the majority group, resented being
dominated, and when independence from Belgium came in 1959, they turned the table
and took control (Orend, 2006); This was followed by a genocide in which an
estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were murdered, mostly by mobs of Hutu
youth (Rice and Loomis, 2006).
While the roots of ethno-religious and other identity- based conflicts in Nigeria have
been linked to "colonialism and the Cold War" (Machava, 2008:2), other scholars
have argued that such conflicts are rooted in bad governance, politicization of ethnic
and religion identities, and competition for access to political power by the v arious
ethnic and religious communities (Anarfi, 2004). Despite strong optimism that the
enthronement of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 would avert or mitigate violent
identity-based conflicts, "the country has rather witnessed a resurgence in high lev el
ethnic, religious, communal and citizenship conflicts with devastating consequences"
(Kwaja, 2009: 105).0ne of the claims for the enthronement of democracy as well as
democratic consolidation in Nigeria lies in the fact that as a centripetal force,
democracy is the only institutional arrangement that can guarantee "the peaceful
resolution or management of ethnic, religious and other identity conflicts" (Olayode,
2007:134). Sadly, democratic rule has not achieved this objective in Nigeria.
According to Ibrahim (2000:69), ethno-religious and communal conflict in, Nigeria
are linked to citizenship within the context of identity, which is rooted in the politics
of inclusion or exclusion. These are tied to claims and counterclaims over identity as
a basis for determining who is excluded or included from decision making as well as
access to opportunities and privileges under the 'we' versus 'them' cliché (Kwaja,
2008; 2009). Thus, the ethnic, religious and communal groups that feel marginalized
by the major ethnic groups (Hausa and Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo) are forced to adopt
constitutional and extra-constitutional means to challenge the hegemony of the major
ethnic groups.
The main cause of violent, identity-based conflicts is that most minority groups have
remained permanent minorities, while the majority groups are permanent majority, a
trend which has serious implications for inter-ethnic and religious relations among
the diverse ethnic and religious identities. In this way, the incentives f o r
c o o p e r a t i o n , consensus and compromise are undermined, thereby posing an
39
enormous challenge for the task of peacebuilding, as diverse ethnic groups are forced
to co-exist in an environment of mutual mistrust, apathy and suspicion.
GENDER CONFLICT
MASCULINITIES
A gendered classification of women and men is into femininity and masculinity. The
images of the archetypal man promoted in the media and through socialization are
those of ruthlessness, aggressiveness, adventure and strength. 'Mascu linities', writes
Connell (2005), concern the position of men in a gender order. In this order, those
with the masculine attributes occupy a superior position. This is because to conquer,
to overcome - if need be, through the use of violence - is seen as an" attribute of a
'real man'.
Masculinity is not just a male stuff. According to Taylor and Voss it requires
conformity to masculine norms by all those participating, whether male or female.
The male or female body does not confer masculinity or femininity on an individual;
40
rather it takes on meaning through social practices (Steans, 2006). Moreover, like
gender, masculinity is a social construct, it is discursive, and is shaped by culture
and epoch.
What this implies is that there is not a single masculini ty but rather-masculinities.
The idea of what makes a real man 200 years ago is different from today's idea; and
even today the idea varies across cultures. Thus, the normative conception of
masculinity in Victorian England, for example, is not the same in the 21s1 century;
and even in the 21st century the conception of masculinity in England is different
from that in Nigeria. According to Connell (2005: 68), in speaking of masculinity at
all, then, we are 'doing gender' in a culturally specific way. Differ ent cultures, and
different periods in history, construct gender differently (News Peace).
Types of Masculinities
Connell identifies four forms of masculinity, based on the manner in which the
various masculinities relate with one another. These are hegemo nic, subordinate,
complicit, and marginalized (Connell, 2005).
Subordinate masculinity: Those who fall under this category exhibit qualities that
are the opposite of those values in hegemonic masculinity. They may exhibit physical
weakness or be very expressive with emotions; like gay or effeminate men.
Marginalized masculinity: Those in this category cannot fit into the hegemonic
because of certain characteristics like race or disability. However, they subscribe to
norms of hegemonic Masculinity like physical strength and aggression (Sammie's
Blog, Nd.)
41
The paper will look at the driving principles in peace, war, love, and mercy as tools
for reconciliation.
FEMININITY
Femininity or one's gender identity (Burke et al 1988); Spence 1985) refers to the
degree to which persons see themselves as masculine or feminine in what it means to
be a man or women in society.
Femininity and masculinity are rooted in the social (one’s gender) rather than the
Biological (one's sex) Members of a society decide what being a male or female
should be. Men (masculine) are meant to be dominant, powerful, brave and useful,
while women female is meant to be passive, submissive and emotional. Males would
generally respond by defining themselves as masculine while females will generally
define themselves as feminine.
These are merely social definition; it is possible for one to be female and see herself
as masculine or male and see himself as feminine.
From a sociological perspective, gender identity involves all the meanings that are
applied to one self on the basis of one's gender identification. In turn, these self -
meanings are a source of motivation for gender related behavio r (Burke 1980).
Conceptions of what it means to be male or female are usually transmitted through
institutions such as religion or the educational system, with time they may see
themselves as departing from the masculine or feminine cultural model. A perso n
may label herself female but instead of seeing herself in a stereotypical female
manner such as being expressive, warm and submissive (Ashmore et al 1986) may
view herself in a somewhat stereotypically masculine fashion such as being
instrumental, rational or dominant.
This means that people have views of themselves along a feminine masculine
dimension of meaning, some being more feminine, some are masculine and some
perhaps a mixture of the two. It is this meaning along the feminine -masculine
dimension that 'in their gender identity and subsequently guides their behavior. When
42
one's gender identity and biological sex are not congruent, the individual may be
identified as transsexual or as a transgender category.
Forms of feminity: absolute and liberal feminity.
This is also putting down someone because of their "sex" or not believing they are
able to do something because they are either male or female. For example, a woman
that her car develops a mechanical problem suddenly in a traffic Jam. You will hear
things like no wonder na woman in our pidgin parlance.
Gender Roles: these are social and behavior91 norms that are generally considered
appropriate for either a man or a woman in a social or interpersonal relationship.
Gender roles differ according to culture historic context, and while most cultures
express 2 genders, some express more, androgyny has been proposed as a thir d i.e. a
combination of masculine and feminine characteristics. Sexual ambiguity may be
found in fashion gender identity etc.
Gender Role Altitude: A person's gender ro1e attitude reflects beliefs about the roles
of men and women. There altitudes define the kinds of things that are acceptable or
appropriate for men is engage in but not women and vice versa.
Peace
According to Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia peace can be said to be an occurrence
of harmony characterized by the lack of violence, conflict behaviors and the freedom
from fear of violence commonly understood as the absence of hostility and
retribution, peace also suggests sincere attempts at reconciliation, the existence of
healthy or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships, pro sperity in
matter of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality and a working
political order that serves the true interest of all.
43
War
War on the other hand, connotes violence. Also, from Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia, it is defined as an organized and often prolonged conflict that is carried
out by states or non-state actors. It is generally characterized by extreme violence,
social disruptions and economic disruption. War should be understood as an actual,
intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities and
therefore is a form of political violence or intervention.
Love
Love is a variety of different feelings, states and attitude that ranges from
interpersonal affection to pleasure. It can refer to an emotion of a strong attraction
and personal attraction. Love is the attachment that results from deeply appreciating
another's goodness.
Mercy
According to Wikipedia, mercy is the kind, sympathetic and forgiving treatment of
others that works to relieve their distress and cancel their debt. It is compassionate
combined with forbearance and action. Mercy looks at the trouble of others and cares,
acts, forgives and preserves.
Reconciliation
John Paul Lederach (1997) posits that 'Reconciliation is a meeting point where tr ust
and mercy have met, and where justice and peace have kissed', thus, reconciliation is
the ultimate goal of peace building. Reconciliation occurs when disputantants
develop a new relationship base on apology, forgiveness and newly established trust.
It involves four processes: It brings people together, enabling them to grow beyond
the past, re-establish normalcy and peaceful, trusting relationship' in the present.
44
PRINCIPLE OF PEACE AS A TOOL FOR RECONCILIATION
The concept of peace has been viewed and perceived by different school of thoughts.
One thing that extant conception of peace has in common is that there is a state of
affairs or condition in thought, nature and society that is characterized as peace. This
condition is pristine, perfect, order and originality. It is a condition in which
according to Rousseau, "all men are born free' and exist as "gentle savages' but
subsequently social conditions put them 'everywhere in chains' Peace as a tool for
reconciliation involves a process and activities that are directly or indirectly linked
to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within spe cific societies and
in the wider international community. An important concept of peace is the non -
violent transformation of conflict. Non- violence, as a strategy to resist oppressive
power relations and unjust structures. It is equated with passive resis tance and non-
resistance, and refusal to sanction violence as a means to eradicate causes of violence
and other socioeconomic and political inequalities. Non-violence is about struggles
for freedom," and justice, the transformation of unjust and unequal po wer relation,
and confrontation with repressive socio-political institutions.
The principle of war as a tool for reconciliation could be traced back to the concept
of the Just war theory. The principle guiding the conduct of a Just war emphasizes
the idea of restoration of peace which is the main motive of a Just war. So in St.
Augustine's thinking, a war was limited by its purpose, its authority and its conduct.
He says:
“We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may
have peace. . Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you vanquish those
whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace”.
The development of the Just war theory in the 13th century formalized three criteria
for a Just war which includes right authority (a sovereign government rather than
individuals), just cause (to avenge wrongs or to restore what was unjustly seized) and
right attention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.
45
NONVIOLENCE AS AN INDIGENOUS PRINCIPLE ENTRENCHED IN
AFRICAN PEACE BUILDING PROCESSES
INTRODUCTION
Nonviolence philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi was rooted in the Hindu culture of India
and that of Martin Luther King, Jr. was inspired by his deep Christian faith and
African- American culture of the United States. The actions of these two men and
their followers were not identical because each grew out of, and was validated by the
culture and religion in which it was rooted. This fact gives nonviolence a creative
powerful expression appropriate for the challenges of a specific time and place
(Ayindo, Doe and Jenner, 2001). The key question this book wishes to respond to is
whether nonviolence is an invented, imported principle or a principle that is heritage
in the African Peacebuild.ng processes.
Nonviolence is not a foreign concept borrowed into the African Peace building
processes. It is an old principle that is entrenched in the African religions, values,
traditions and the people's experiences from time immemorial. Afric a over a long
period of time has evolved its own mechanism and institutions for managing and
resolving conflicts in ways that preserved its societies and encourage peaceful
coexistence (Best, 2006). As rightly asserted by Wanjohi J. (1997) in his book the
wisdom and philosophy of Gikuyuproverbs, the idea of nonviolence is valued so
much in African societies that it has become integral part of the people's languages
and their ways of life. It >s entrenched in the people's culture and believes and
peculiar to their different societies and experiences. The only thing that is new about
this concept is the refinement, repackaging and reintroduction of what was originally
African to keep up with changing times.
46
Two concepts arc important in our attempt to fully explore the issues raised above.
These concepts are the subject matter of this paper. They are nonviole nce and
peacebuilding. A detailed but concise definition of the two concepts has become
imperative to the understanding of the book.
Nonviolence:
Weber, T and Burrow. B. (2010) defines nonviolence as a 'weapon' available to all
which is least likely to destroy opponents and third parties. It beats the circle of
violence and counter violence as it gives the possibility of conversion. It is the surest
way of achieving public sympathy. They state that nonviolence is likely to produce
a constructive rather than destructive outcome and it's a method of conflict resolution
that is aimed at the truth of a given situation rather than a mere victory for one side.
They also view it as the only method of struggle that is consistent with the teaching
of major religions.
According to Weber and Burrow, nonviolence goes beyond the conviction that is a
useful or even the only 'correct' method of conflict resolution when employed. It can
also be the basis for a way of life. It is consistent with a belief in the underlying uni ty
of humankind and it is the only method of action, interpersonal or political that does
not block that part to what has often been referred to as 'self-realization'.
Ayindo B., Doe S. and Jenner J. (2001) refer to nonviolence as a deliberate and
calculated effort to raise structural and covert conflict to the consciousness of parties
involved while renouncing violence at the same time. Nonviolence as they put it
perceives conflict as a product of unjust structures in relationships and societies.
They view nonviolence not as just absence of violence, but as a positive and active
potent force for attaining certain goals. They categorized nonviolence into principled
and pragmatic but concluded that both are not exclusive as they are most times been
utilized concurrently.
Peace building:
Bliss S. (2010) has defined peace building as a term within the international
development community used to describe the processes and activities involved in
resolving violent conflicts and establishing a sustainable peace. It includes conflict
transformation, restorative justice, trauma healing, reconciliation, development and
47
leadership. She pointed out that it is similar to conflict resolution but goes beyond
seeking a sustainable social and economic development. More import antly, it is about
prevention of future wars and violence.
Gaulden P. (2004) refers to peace building as the process of ma king sure that a
country or society creates a condition for sustainable peace. Such conditions can be
created when a country is already in a state of being peaceful. In such situation, the
conditions are created in order to prevent conflict from erupting a nd therefore peace
is sustained. The conditions can also be created in post conflict situations.
This is done after a conflict must have been put to an end through a conflict resolution
mechanism. Under such a situation the process of peace building begins with the
transition period. The various processes of implementing aspect of peace agreement
become the process of peace building. He further states that the process of peace
build.ng is a continuous one as it entails taking various measures which include
transformation of state organs, socio-economic development, democratization and
regional integration.
Peaceful and nonviolent approach to building in the society has always been utilized
by Africans for a long time. Such approaches are employed by communities based on
48
their values and beliefs to ensure continuous peaceful co-existence within them and
with other neighboring communities. There has always been in Africa variety of
peaceful and nonviolent local initiatives and traditions employed to res pond to
permanent instabilities and different violent conflicts as well as other levels of
disputes in communities.
These are indigenous African methods used by Africans to prevent the outbreak of
conflicts, to de-escalate potential conflicts or keep conflict from becoming manifest.
This is an aspect of peace building that is crucial and of paramount importance to
Africans. Traditional communities in Africa are held by traditions and cultures that
down play conflicts through the promotion of humanness (Ubuntu), co mmunity life,
togetherness and clustering of groups. These preventive methods entails community
based trust, confidence building measures, communication and communal
collaboration. They are usually expressed in collective activities that ensure social
cohesion such as building houses, bridges, roads and sharing of markets among others
(Best, 2006).
Other nonviolent traditional ways employed by Africans to prevent conflict and
ensure peaceful co-existence at all levels of relationship are entrenched in their
proverbs, words of ancestors, songs, festivals, dances, joking relationships e.t.c.
These traditional aspects of Peace building basically promote nonviolence as the best
way of sustaining peace in the society.
49
nonviolent African approaches to conflict resolution are practically employed even
in modern times to resolve conflict and ensure peace building in contemporary
African societies. Below are examples of some traditional methods employed to build
peace in Africa:
Ubuntu: this is an African concept for a universal concept. Its cardinal spirit is
expressed in Xhosa, one of South Africa eleven languages as
umntungumntungabayeabantu to mean "people are people through other people". It
is an indigenous conflict prevention and peace building concept that embraces the
notion of acknowledgement of guilt, showing of remorse and repentance by
perpetrators of injustice, asking for and receiving of forgiveness and paying
compensation as a prelude for reconciliation and peaceful co -existence. As a peace
building strategy ubuntu is based on the principle of reciprocity, inclusivity and a
sense of sharing destiny between people. It is also a princ iple of nonviolence which
ensures that peace is not only an absence of war but also the absence of unequal and
unjust structures and cultural practices, respect for other people, development and
justice. Ubuntu spirit in African communities is the live for ce of the principle of
nonviolence in the African peacebuilding (Chaplin K., 2006). The concept is
indigenous in most African communities though expressed differently. For instance,
among the Bwatiye people in Adamawa State it is called Bwnraune which simp ly
means humanness.
Gacaca courts: This is a Rwandan court saddled with the responsibility to promo te
reconciliation, restoring harmony and social order as well as integrate offenders into
the society. It provides an avenue for the community to gather toge ther to talk, to
hear the truth and learn to live together again. It was used as a solution followi ng the
Rwandan genocide of 1994 to reconcile the Rwandan people and bring an end to the
vicious circle of extreme violence (Brouneus,2003). Even if it was criticized as being
used by the government, the Gacaca courts had great success in building and resto ring
peace in the once war turn Rwanda.
Jir Assemblies: this is a mediator mechanism among the Tiv people in the North
central zone of Nigeria. The Jir is an. assembly of neighbors and kinsmen which
decides dispute from the simplest to the highest level. Bitter disputes are handled by
50
jir ityo, a larger council of elders drawn from all the segments of the society, forming
a court of judicature. A Jiris normally held in the compound or homestead of the
person who initiates it; all the elders of his lineage come as guests to be the mediators
or arbitrators. Before the commencement of the session, the spirits of the ancestors
are usually consulted for guidance and to be witnesses.jir can be done either at home
level, clan level, community level or involving the entire Tiv land. It is used by the
Tiv people to repair broken relationship and ensure peaceful co -existence (Gbenda .
L 2010).
Mato Oput: The Acholi people of Northern Uganda believe that nonviolence is a
search for truth through acceptance, forgiveness and reconciliation (Bongomin c.,
2000). Mat a Oput is a reconciliation ritual performed by the Acholi people. It is
employed by the people's elders or rulers to subdue the bitter relationship between
disputants. The essence of the ritual is nonviolent reconciliation. It entails offenders
accepting responsibility for their action and repenting before they are cleansed with
the Oput herbs and reintegrated back into their society. The Uganda rebels who had
done so many atrocities beyond description were forgiv en and accepted back into
their societies by their people through the Mata Oput (Malan J, 1997).
It is worthy to note that the nature of these methods is not adversarial or punitive.
The emphasis is always on reconciliation; restoration and reintegration. For instance
the Gacaca courts in Rwanda have tried cases of genocide leading to transitional
justice and Mota Oput was employed to reconcile former LRA figh ters with their
communities in Northern Uganda. Other traditional methods like the Ukuziclla in
South Africa and the fambultak in Sierra Leone were inculcated in the countries'
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions processes following violent conflicts.
51
various stages of peace processes such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking,
peacekeeping and post conflict peace building. Inebo Bob manuel (2000) gives
account of the Luo women of Kenya who were known for their capacity to interven
between warring communities to resolve their conflicts nonviolently. As part of
tradition of peace building, the elderly Luo women could arrange marriages between
deputing families, clans or communities to ensure sustainable peace. In deed, the
African woman's existence and influence on peace building in the society are based
on ethic of care that is rooted in her motherhood and nature which is tolerant.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussions, it is evident that nonviolence is an ind igenous
principle that is in build in the different African traditional conflict resolution and
peace building processes. It could best be described as an African cultural heritage
that is handed down from one generation till the other through the African informal
education system. The African principle of nonviolence gives priority to restoring
and improving relationships, values, aspirations, perception as well as promoting
platforms for social, economic and political developments. It takes into considera tion
holistic aspects of conflict and resolution including the disadvantaged and
marginalized groups.
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the aforementioned definitions of religion could be said to be the world view
or perspective, where every definition could fall in place with these concepts.
However, a more pragmatic view is description opined by Best (2011), Best associate
52
religion with belief, the unseen, life in the hereafter, rituals and practices, etc. and
could be perpetuated by institutions and systems of reproduction.
Every religion believes and recognizes only itself as the correct (true) religion which
implies that other religions represent falsehood.
In the process of recruiting converts, they portray others as false and even make
uncharitable remarks on the others to the latter's displeasure;
Every religion has the inherent desire to stamp out others through persuasion,
coercion or a combination of both.
Religious identity has often been used to mobilize one side against the other, as has
happened in Iraq, Sudan, and elsewhere. Populations have responded to calls to
defend one's faith community. But to describe many such confli cts as rooted in
religious differences or to imply that theological or doctrinal differences are the
principal causes of conflict is to seriously oversimplify and misrepre sent a complex
situation. The decades- long civil war in Sudan is often described as a religious
conflict between Muslim and Christians, with the North being predominantly Muslim
and the South predominantly Christina or animist.
There is some truth to this characterization, particularly after 1989, when an Islamic
fundamental government came to power in Khartoum with an agenda to Islamize all
of Sudan. But the difference between North and South go well beyond religion and
rarely are the disagreements religion or theological in character. Northerners speak
Arabic and want Arabic to be Suda's national language. Southerners generally speak
Arabic only as a second or third language, if at all, and prefer English as the lingua
franca.
Northerners are more likely to identity with the Arab world, whereas Southerners
tend to identify themselves as Africans. Thus, racial identity is fundamental to the
division between North and South. The religious division between Christians and
53
Muslims happens to overlap with these racial, ethnic and geographical divisions, but
the conflict's divide has been confined to or even dominated by religion (Smock.
2008).
But the causes of many of the killings have not been exclusively religious. In places
like Kaduna and Plateau States for instance, conflicts described as religious have
been more complicated than that. The causes also include the placing of markets,
economic competition, occupational differences, the ethnic identity of government
officials, respect for traditional leaders, and competition between migrants and
indigenous population (Smock, 2006).
However, most of these conflicts tend to take religious dimensions. Another rec ent
conflict in Central Africa Republic (CAR) is not religiously motivated but the
religious leaders were deeply troubled by the fact that some fighters use religion to
justify their heinous crimes, dividing the country along religious lines.
In both Somalia and Afghanistan, one source of the conflicts is over which brand of
Islam will prevail. But in both cases clan and ethic differences define the composition
of the forces in conflict as much as religious differences do. In the Arab - Israeli
conflict, the management of and access to religious sites are sources of serious
disagreement and extreme religious groups-both Jewish and Muslim - exacerbate the
problem. But religion is not the principal factor underlying the conflict; rather,
conflict is principally over control of land and state sovereignty.
All of these cases demonstrate that while religion is an important factor in conflict,
often marking identity differences, motivating conflict, and justifying violence,
religion is not usually the sole or primary cause of conflict. The reality is that religion
becomes intertwined with a range of causal factor - economic, political, and social -
that define, propel, and sustain conflict.
54
Certainly, religious disagreements must he addressed alongside these economic ,
political, and social sources to build lasting reconciliation. Fortunately, many of the
avenues to ameliorate religious violence lie within the religious realm itself.
Conflict and persistent insecurity became more prevalent on the African continent
alter the attainment of
Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Uganda as well as different forms of
civil unrest have also plagued Africa. More recently, revolutions have caused a
change in government across North Africa in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya. In the last ten years, the majority of conflict-rclatcd deaths and injuries in the
world have occurred in this region, and large numbers of people continue to suffer
from insecurity and fear of violence. Violent conflicts in Africa have hampered
political stability, economic prosperity and the socio-economic development of the
continent. Preventing and reducing violent conflict has become a key priority for
African governments in a globalized era.
Peace is understood in two ways, according to John Galtung that is: The negative
peace which is characterized by absence of direct violence which typically through
coercion rather than cooperation, and the positive peace which implies rec onciliation
and restorations through creative transformation of conflict. Peace is a process
involving activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development
55
and reducing conflict, both within specific societies and in the wider intern ational
community Ibeanu 2006 summarily conceptual peace as:
INTRODUCTION
"The events of April to July 1994 in Rwanda have been well documented. Apart from
the human tragedy, Rwanda has received much scholarly interest because of the
convergence of explosive issues like ethnicity, nationalism and political, social and
economic exclusion. It was the historical development and interaction of these
dynamics that created decades of volatile mutual suspicions, which regularly erupted
and responded to various conflict triggers. Though the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) Tutsi Diasporas invasion was in 1990, the conflict trigger in 1994 was the
assassination of Rwanda's Hutu then-president, Juvenal Habyarimana. Within 24
hours of Habyarimana's assassination, the Hutu majority commenced indiscriminate
and organized killing of the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus.
56
history of ethnic massacres preceded 1994; unfortunately, it did not attract
international attention. As Richard Dowden, who reported on the events from
Rwanda in 1994, aptly noted: "Burundi came and went (1993) and about 250 000
people died. Nobody covered it and nobody missed it." Although Rwanda was to
become a major point for the application of transitional justice by the international
community (Dowden 1995)
Rwanda suffered one of the worst genocides in history. During 100 days of kill ing,
800,000 people died. More people died in three months than in over four years of
conflict in Yugoslavia; moreover, the speed of killing was five times faster than the
Nazi execution o, the Final Solution. Unlike the killings that occurred during the
Holocaust, Rwandans engaged in "a populist genocide," in which many members of
society, including children, participated in killing their neighbors with common farm
tools (the most popular was the machete). While not all Hutus engaged in killing and
not all victims were Tutsi, Hutus executed the vast majority of the killings and Tutsis
were largely the target of their aggression.
Fourteen years after the genocide, Rwanda is still struggling with how to rebuild the
country and handle the mass atrocities that occurred. During the first four years
following the genocide, four types of courts developed to prosecute genocidaires.
The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, foreign courts exercising universal
jurisdiction, domestic criminal courts, and a domestic military tribunal. Regrettably,
none of these courts has been able to resolve the enormous problems related to
adjudicating genocide suspects. In 2001, the government created gacaca. a fifth
system for prosecuting genocidaires, to solve the problems it s aw in the other courts.
Gacaca is highly lauded by the government and many outside observers as the
solution to Rwanda's genocide. A researcher, who studied two gacaca pilot programs
for five months, noted that "the official discourse is so passionate abou t gacaca and
its anticipated outcome that the system is almost granted a mythical status"
(JessicaI994). Unfortunately, gacaca cannot fully operate as either a court or a
customary dispute resolution mechanism because of its tw in goals: retribution and
reconciliation.
57
Moreover, Rwanda's limited resources and the astounding number of suspects require
enormous revisions to gacaca. This section explores why Rwanda implemented
gacaca, the reasons for gacaca's failure and possible solutions for moving forward.
Part I presents an overview of the history of ethnic tension in Rwanda, the even ts
leading up to genocide, and the genocide itself. Part II examines the four courts
created before gacaca to adjudicate genocide, their failures in the eyes of the
Rwandan government and international observers, and the government's creation of
gacaca. Part III explores the goals of the Rwandan gacaca model, and whether they
are attainable or desirable. Part IV examines gacaca courts' failure to implement
criminal procedure protections. Part V suggests revisions to the current adjudication
of genocide suspects, including an alternative model of gacaca. Additionally, this
section highlights the importance of addressing Rwandans' economic struggles, as a
necessary element of reconciliation (WFWI 2005).
What is Gacaca.
The revival of a traditional model of dispute resolution to deal with the over one
hundred thousand genocide suspects awaiting trial has received a mixed response
both inside and outside of Rwanda. Gacaca, meaning "Judgment on the Grass," offers
a pragmatic and community-based solution. It is expected to relieve the congestion
in Rwandan prisons that are the source of many human rights violations.
Additionally, the reintegration of suspects back into the community and the truth-
telling nature of confessions offer hope for reconciliation. Gacaca's positive
attributes lie in its characterization as a model of restorative justice.
In its pre-colonial form, Gacaca was used to moderate disputes concerning land use
and rights, cattle, marriage, inheritance rights, loans, damage to properties caused by
one of the parties or animals, and petty theft. Gacaca was intended to "sanction the
violation of rules that are shared by the community, with the sole objective of
reconciliation" through restoring harmony and social order and reintegration of the
person who was the source of the disorder. Additionally, compensation could be
awarded to the injured party. Gacaca occurred at a meeting that was convened by
elders whenever there was a dispute between individuals or families in a community
and was settled only with the agreement of all parties (Jessica 1994) The Government
58
of Rwanda does not pretend that Gacaca today strictly adheres to its indigenous form.
Officials argue that its reinvention takes the form that it goes to better accommodate
for the severity of the crimes in its mandate and the volume of cases to be tried.
Category one suspects is the most serious and will be prosecuted by the national
courts of Rwanda who have the authority to hand out punishments of life
imprisonment or the death penalty upon conviction. This category targets the
planners, organizers, "notorious" murderers, perpetrators in a position of religious
and political authority, and those who committed acts of "sexual torture or violence."
The Gacaca courts hold jurisdiction over categories two to four of the Organic Law
for which the punishments vary but do not include the death penalty. Category two
to four suspects range from the perpetrators, conspirators , or accomplices of
intentional homicide, to those who destroyed property (D Pie tro 1999). Punishments
range from life in prison to community service and reintegration. Plea bargaining is
a controversial but key element of the process that allows for the p ossibility of
immediate release if a suspect confesses. Prosecution in Gacaca is communally
participatory in that a general assembly acts as the prosecutor to identify perpetrators
and victims as well as present evidence.
The approximately 10,000 Gacaca courts were far behind in their scheduled trials.
Many courts remain in the pre-trial stages. These stages began with the elections of
judges that were completed in 2001. The trials have to be preceded by a seven step
pre-trial process that includes identifying suspects and witnesses and establishing the
appropriate categories for offences. In June 2002, twelve pilot trials began and were
followed several months later by 760 courts beginning their pre-trial phases. The rest
59
of the 10,000 courts have not begun their work and as of June 2003, less than half of
the pilot trials had finished their pre¬trial phases (Hirondelle 2003).
The Rwandan culture includes not only the population of Rwanda but people in
neighboring states, particularly Congo and Uganda, who s peak the Kinyarwanda
language. The important ethnic divisions within Rwanda cult ure between Hutu, Tutsi
and Twa are based on perceptions of historical group origins rather than on cultural
differences. All three groups speak the same language, practice the same religions,
and live interspersed throughout the same territory; they are t hus widely considered
to share a common culture, despite deep political divisions. The Rwandans in Congo
and Uganda include both refugees, who generally maintain a string ident ification
with the Rwandan national state, and Kinyarwanda speakers who have liv ed outside
Rwanda for generations and therefore have a distinct cultural identity within the
wider national culture.
Gacaca: Mitigating the Failures of the ICTR through Restora tive Justice
60
Due Process Primary of truth telling Primacy of rules and
procedures; defendant's
rights
Local prisoner support for the ICTR is very low. The U.S. based Internews Network
has shown what are known as the "Arusha Tapes" in Rwandan prisons to give
genocide suspects a view of what has been happening in the ICTR trials and to
encourage debate on Rwanda's own judicial process (Arusha 2001). Ironically, while
the tapes are meant to generate support for the tribunal, they have had opposite effect
on local prisoners. The reactions to the tapes have revealed concerns among the
prisoners over the absence of the death penalty at the tribunal and the luxurious living
conditions of the tribunal prisoners as compared to those of the Rwandan prisons.
The issue of the death penalty is significant because it is used by the national courts
in Rwanda but not at the international tribunal. One prisone r replied, "why is it that
the tribunal gives them more lenient sentences than us, they are the ones who told us
to kill on radio…. How come we are paying the higher price?”.
The objection and shock registered by prisoner to the Arusha Tapes were reflected in
their support of the Gacaca process as an appropriate and fai r judicial process.
Awareness and acceptance of the community courts is evidenced by the high and
increasing number of confessions among the prisoners, numbering in the tens of
thousands, and a willingness to provide testimony and evidence against other
genocide suspects. It is acknowledged that some of these prisoners have opted for
61
confession on the basis of a personal cost-benefit analysis whereby they have their
sentences reduced and can possibly indict someone with whom they hold a grudge.
However, the personal intentions of suspects aside, confessions still provide a
function of restorative justice that is the discovery of truth over punishment.
The Gacaca courts are expected to have a community impact when Rwandans become
participants as judge and jury of genocide suspects. A consensus is needed among
the participants to cither find someone guilty or all of them to be reintegrated into
their society. Unlike those convicted by the ICTR, many Gacaca defendants will most
likely be reintegrated into the community immediately or within several years if the
plea bargain system is "widely used. Therefore, it is necessary for the community to
make the decision on the desirability of an individual's integration.
In contrast, those on trial at the ICTR were isolated from community life in Rwanda
during the genocide. Many of the prisoners held in Rwanda saw for the first time in
the Arusha Tapes what the orchestrators and leaders of the genocide looke d like (Daly
2002). As the tribunal is isolated from Rwanda in terms of its geography and impact,
and its defendants equally distanced by their former elite status in the genocide, the
indictment of the genocide leaders at the ICTR will have very little ef fect on
reconciliation within Rwandan communities. In line with t he restorative paradigm,
Gacaca is presented as a shift in power in the community, a of "populist response to
a populist genocide"(Daly 1994).
There are additional benefits that Gacaca brings to the reconciliation process that
differentiates it from the norms of retributive and international justice. One such
benefit is the recognition of a specific demographic, namely women, in the justice
and reconciliation process. The demographics of post- genocide Rwanda illustrate
that the socio-economic responsibilities of women increased dramatically. As the
heads of tens of thousands of households and the producers of up to 70% of the
country's agricultural output, they are overwhelmingly responsible for the livelihood
and stability of their community (Homilton 2000).
Rwandan women have a lot invested in the success of the Gacaca courts for several
reasons. The importance of women and the crimes committed against them is
recognized in the Organic Law where crimes of sexual violence fall under Category
62
One (most serious) and will be tried in the national courts. Some women will be
attending the trials of their husbands or family members who have been accused and
to whom they have been bringing food and supplies to while in prison. Others want
to accuse those on trial of crimes committed against them or their families and to tell
their stories as witnesses and victims. Additionally, some women will receive
compensation from the government or from reintegrated perpetrators if their property
had been destroyed or the breadwinners in their family were killed by the accused.
Most importantly, Rwandan women seek to hear the confessions of the accused and
an admission of guilt. As reconciliation for most Rwandans represents an act between
two people where one confesses and the other forgives, the confession is a necessary
first step for reintegration. Rwandan women will be expected to live in the same
communities as those who assaulted them or killed their family members. As judges
and witnesses, women will have the responsibility of determining punishment or the
desirability of the suspect's reintegration. In sum, the community basis of Gacaca
allows women to participate on various levels, recognizes their role in the
reconciliation process, and brings their identity beyond tha t of victimization.
Further to the restorative justice paradigm, decisions rendered by Gacaca courts will
allocate compensation to victims. The Rwandan government set up a genocide
survivor's fund in 2003 that accounts for eight per cent of the annual budg et and
assists destitute survivors. The Organic Law provides for the commutation of half of
the sentences through Gacaca to community services. Therefore, the Gacaca courts
will assist in supplementing the compensation fund from the property constructed
and services provided by prisoners. To further aid reconciliation, the compensation
fund hopes to ease the burden of female and child-headed households.
In sum, the Gacaca courts subscribe to the restorative justice paradigm most
diligently in the elements that liken it to its indigenous form. The emphasis on
reconciliation and reintegration' over punishment is evident in the confession and
plea bargain procedures stipulated by the Organic Law. Furthermore, the array of
participants is widely extended in Gacaca to include all those affected by the crimes
and also those who will be affected by the suspect's return to the community. These
characteristics of restorative justice are also indicative o f the purpose of Gacaca in
63
its traditional form. Gacaca carries enormous potential for reconciliation if it remains
true to the principles of restorative justice.
Traces the origin of Rwanda, a former German colony, to the 15th century. At this
time, the territory was inhabited by three ethnic groups: the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa,
the minority group. Before John Speke visited Rwanda and the Rwandese became
part of German East' Africa following German conquest in 1895, the Tutsis had
conquered the territory and forced all the others into a feudal political system in
which the Twa became court jesters, the Hutus subjects and the Tutsis the rulers.
Oral tradition asserts that present day Rwanda was in the period before the 15th
century part of a centralized state s- largely roots to the Buganda and Bunyoro
Kingdoms in neighboring Uganda. It comprised of a cattle-owning nobility and an
agricultural serfdom majority considered by historians to be the precursors of the
modem day traditionally more powerful Tutsi minority and the Hutus respectively.
(GAP, 2007: 34).
German Colony
No matter which historical version the reader prefers, this power equation did not
change in real politic terms once the Germans declared Rwanda their colony, for the
Germans, who kept the indigenous administration system by copying the British
strategy of indirect rule in neighboring Uganda, depended at the beginning
completely on the existing government. No wonder, the German colonial authorities
did practically nothing to develop the colony economically. Once Germany ignited
the First World War, it was clear that nothing would change in this connection.
But Rwanda was not blessed with the disappearance of the Germans after the First
World War. The more direct rule of the Belgians, who took over "on behalf of the
League of Nations", was even harsher than German rule. Ironically, the Belgians,
who evidently realized the value of native rule, used the classic intrigue card to play
64
the minority Tutsi upper class over lower classes of Tutsi and Hutus, with their
forced- labour policies and stringent taxes being enforced not by Belgians, but by the
Tutsi upper class. This way, the Belgian colonial masters sought to bu ild a buffer
against anger from the Rwandese people while polarizing the Hutu and Tutsi.
To escape harassment and hunger, many young Rwandese peasants of both Hindu
and Tutsi origin escaped into neighboring Zaire (today Democratic republic of
Congo) and Uganda, where their skills came to the advantage of plantations in those
foreign countries.
But the Belgians were still there to stay even after the collapse of the League of
Nations and the end of the Second World War. Rwanda became a United Nations
trust territory administered by Belgium
The Belgians soon became dominant players in internal affairs. With their help, the
Hutus, until now the subjects of the Tutsi royal class, would gain the upper hand and
hold virtually all power upon Rwanda's independence on July 1, 1962. The process
began in 1959, when King Mutara III was assassinated to give way to his younger
brother to become King Kigeli. About two years later, as he was in Kinshasa, Zaire
(Democratic Republic Of Congo), to meet UN Hammarskjold, King Kig eli V was
overthrown by Dominique Mbonyumutwa, who boasted Belgian government support.
The King fled to neighboring Uganda. The era of the Hutus at The expense of the
Tutsis was born, just as one could say that Tutsi domination of Hutus finally ended.
(GAP, 2007: 35).
Many Tutsis saw themselves forced to leave the country At independence, the
problem of "Tutsi refugees- could not be ignored as it led to increasing social tension.
The fact that neighboring countries soon had up to million Tutsi refugees mean t that
this problem would gain an international dimension. Affected were mainly
neighboring Uganda and Burundi.
Unfortunately, Gregoire Kayibanda, the first President of Rwanda (1962 - 1973), and
Juvenal Habyarimana (1973 - 1994), the military dictator who became the second
President, were both unable to find a solution to this problem or even respond
65
wholeheartedly to calls for democracy to the contrary. The reg ime in Kigali became
more and more oppressive.
For Rwandese refugees, most of Tutsi origin, the situation in Ugandan would become
a blessing in disguise. In that country, a group of politicians had rejected the rigged
national elections of 1980 and gone back to the bush to fight the powers in Kampala,
the Ugandan capital.
These Rwandese would leave Uganda a few years later following the infamous
genocide in Rwanda that shamed the United Nations, under a Secretary-General of
African origin, and the entire international community for watching as hundreds of
thousands of innocent persons were massacred by a scrupul ous regime in Kigali.
Even as the situation worsened, the UN forces in Rwanda remained poorly funded
and understaffed while world diplomats continued with endless debates at the UN
headquarters in New York, debates that put their respective national intere sts first
and little gave the impression of thinking about the lives of innocent people in far
away Rwanda.
There is no general consensus on Rwandan history in pre -colonial times. There are
two main interpretations of this period. One was propagated by the former (Hutu)
regime, especially during the 1994 genocide; the other is supported by the current
regime. Selectivity in the use of the available sources and the nature of the
interpretation given to the author would like to thank Stef Vandeginste and Luc
Huyse for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. The final text has
greatly benefited from their support. The usual disclaimer applies. The author has
used the forms 'Bahutu' and 'Batutsi' rather than 'Hutu* and 'Tutsi' as being more
faithful to the original language. Muhutu and Mututsi are th e respective singular
forms. The roots, 'Hutu' and Tutsi', have been preferred for the adjectival form
66
(IDEA2008). Crucial ancient institutions which structured the interaction between
the different social groups, such as clientship (ubuhake) and forced labour
(uburetwa), defines the reading of history. This section briefly sketches the main
threads of these readings of history. The truth, as always, probably lies in between.
Before independence in 1962, the country was a kingdom. A Tutsi king (mwami) and
aristocracy ruled over the masses, who were predominantly Bahutu. A central
kingdom was engaged in the continuous Endeavour to conquer and control
surrounding territories in order to exploit the Hutu population. The Batutsi we're
pastoralists rearing large herds of cattle. They invaded the region centuries ago and
managed to subjugate the Hutu population of agriculturalists, tillers of the soil. The
Bahutu had equally, although earlier, migrated to the region that became known as-
Rwanda. But, while the Bahutu had come from other regions in the centre of Africa
and were considered to be descendants of the Bantu race, the Batutsi were thought to
originate from the North, being of Semitic or Hamitic origi n. The Batwa were
considered to be the original inhabitants of the region. This is one reading of the past.
Another version of this pre-colonial history, currently in vogue in Rwanda, rather
than emphasizing the distinct geographical and racial origins of the groups inhabiting
& the country, stresses the unity of the people of Rwanda-the banyarwanda-and
Rwandan citizenship based on a common thread Rwandanicity' (Ubanyarwanda), or
'Rwandaness'. Hutu and Tutsi were originally not racial categories, but
socio¬economic classes. Abatutsi (in the plural) was the name given to wealthier
persons possessing cattle (1DEA628:26, Poorer families, with only little or no land,
and no cattle, were referred to as the Abahutu. Mobility was possible.
A family obtaining cattle became 'testified'; those losing status degraded into a
situation of 'hotness Colonialism then further 'created' ethnic groups out of a perfectly
harmonious society whose only divisions were socio- economic ones.
67
THE CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT: THE MAIN
PARADIGMS OF INTERPRETATION
Other paradigms focus on elite manipulation; ecological resource scarcity; the socio
psychological features of the perpetrators; and the role of the international
community. The elite manipulation paradigm' explores the desire of the Rwandan
elite to stay in power. The RPF invasion and the following war, the international
power sharing agreement and the pressure for democratization followed by the birth
of the political opposition all threatened the monopoly of power and the privileges
of Rwanda's elite. This elite was ready to use all means to survi ve politically and
keep a hold on the privileges associated with state power (Uvin, 2001). This 'elite
manipulation paradigm' fits neatly with the 'socio-cultural features of Rwandan
society paradigm'. A powerful elite, desperate to stay in power, makes us e of the
highly centralized state structure, with command lines that go deep into rural life, to
mobilize an 'obedient', conformist' and 'uncritical' army of peasants, even if this
means slaughtering their neighbors. Another paradigm focuses
The role of the international community has also received a great deal of attention in
the past few years. The focus is mostly on the months preceding and during the
genocide. The argument is that the nature of the (in) action of international
stakeholders paved the path towards genocide, either intent ionally-implicitly-or
unintentionally. It is also argued that the long-standing presence of the international
68
community in Rwanda in the form of development enterprise fuelled the momentum
of the genocide through its apolitical and socially and culturally ignorant presence in
the country. Macro-level paradigms for explanation fail to capture the dynamics and
experience of violence at the local level. Apart from the need to understand the
general causes of the conflict.
The Rwanda Patriotic front (RPF) took over power on 4 July 1994 and ended the
genocide. The defeated Government and its armed forces fled to the neighboring
Democratic Republic of the Con-o (DRC) and a large part of the population followed.
The consequences were felt way beyond the Rwandan borders and caused regional
instability and insecurity for years to come. Although the genocide machine came to
a halt after 100 days in July 1994, violence remained t he order of the day. Fieldwork
in Rwanda reveals that Rwandans have known a decade of violence between 1990,
with the start of the civil war and the introduction of multiparty politics, and the end
of the 1990s, when overt hostilities on Rwandan soil ceased. From 1996 onwards,
after the violent dismantling of the camps in the DRC, the defeated government
forces and the Interahamwe militia attacked northern Rwanda from their basis in the
69
DRC. This came to be known as the war of the infiltrators (abacengezi), in which
hundreds-most probably thousands-of civilians were killed.
They are a home-grown, almost pre-colonial resource; the courts are meant to fight
genocide and eradicate the culture of impunity, and they need to reconcile. Rwandans
by (re¬inforcing unity.
70
PEACE KEEPING THEORIES AND PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
The term peacekeeping is totally missing in the UN Charter, and is widely credited
to Lester Pearson, a Canadian Diplomat, who coined the term in the 1950fs -following
Egypt's "suez crisis", although the international management of political violence has
a far longer history. And it's the most sustained effort by international bodies to
reduce and manage armed conflict (Bellamy & Williams 20 10).
Furthermore, peacekeeping is what one may call the official code of conduct adopted
by states to make life worth living. Moreover, to gain a better understanding of
peacekeeping, we must remain sensitive to how it fit. ;„ -a fhe ebb and How of global
political currents (Op eU 2m A)
J Following this is the fact that, there's not a complete consensus about the role that
peacekeeping operations should play in global politics, though there are more points
of agreement today than at any time previously (Ibid). This point tends to give a clear
picture regarding the subject of national interest which is tied to every state's foreign
policy. More so, the point on not having a total consensus on the role of peacekeeping
71
vis-a-vis global politics is expressed in the Westphalian and Post Westphalian
concept or perspective on peacekeeping operations.
Post Westphalian proponents on the other hand, opined that in as much as it's good
for states to have good relations bome out of understanding and g ood governance,
it's also good to be interested in the internal or domestic activities of states vis -a-vis
peace and security of lives and properties among other things. They also agree that
states have the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) their citizens, b ut submitted that,
where states fail (like in Rwanda et al) in this responsibility, the international
organization assume that responsibility to protect-'in a timely and decisive manner' -
vulnerable population, especially now that the R2P principle have b een codified into
the UN and AU arrangements in 2005 and 2006 respectively. This is where Chapter
VII of the UN Charter is invoked (Evans 2008; Bellamy 2009 in ibid). In summary;
implanting democratic tenets into states is the deepest concern of the post
Westphalian proponents.
What is Peacekeeping?
• Individual States
For the records therefore, and also for Clarity purposes, peacekeepers usually operate
under the banner of particular states or international organizations. States sometimes
conduct peacekeeping missions alone but more commonly, they act as part of a
Coalition, alongside other willing states. Note also, that, not all international
organizations conduct peace operations as it is the UN, and certain regional
arrangements that have most commonly engaged in such activities.
• Mandate
• Terms of Reference
• Rules of Engagement
• Historical Examples
Closely related to the above point, is the fact that it is very important to get the
consent of the host nation/parties to the conflict, be impartial, neutral, firm, anticipate
the possibility of ugly incidents and plan on how to neutralize, elimi nate or avoid
them among other things (ibid).
Moving further, while it's generally accepted that three events shaped the formation
of peacekeeping and namely: The Egyptian 'suez crisis (1956 -1967), The Greek and
Turkish communities in Cyprus violence (1964-present) and the Ethiopian and
Eritrean border conflict (2000-2008), it is a known fact that the first UN mission was
in Congo in 1960 under UNSCR 143 of 14th July, 1960 (Galadima 2006).
However, it should be noted that while, some peacekeeping operations did not get
UNSC's nod before taking off, they eventual did when thei r actions and efforts were
justified as was the case with ECOWAS in Liberia-1990-97, UK in Sierra Leone-
2000, South Africa in Burundi-2001-03 and so on. Also, some peacekeeping
operations have been carried out without the consent of the host government and they
include but not limited to the following, NATO in Kosovo- 1999.
Currently, there are 15 on-going peacekeeping operations across the globe with
Africa accounting for seven (7) of them (UN fact sheet 2013). Among these on -going
peacekeeping operations, you will find those existing without Troops, UN
Volunteers, Military Observers, and Police. All these goes to show the various levels
of success attained in these peacekeeping operations. More so, Mali is the most recent
host to UN peacekeeping operations under the 35 paragraph UNSCR 2100 of 25th
April, 2013, with paragraph 16 & 17 capturing the operations mandate in clear terms
(Minusma mandate 2013).
Primarily, Article 43(1) in' Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides a clear reason for
any peacekeeping operation and it reads: All members of the UN, in order to
contribute to the maintenance of international-peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a spe cial
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rites of
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.'
(Adapted from Bellamy & Williams 2010)
The relevance of article 43 above was captured by Oliver and Woodhouse (2000),
0badiah(2013) and re-phrased in our own words: peacekeeping is all tailored towards
intervening or prevailing on a conflict happening outside your zone or location before
it gets into your own location if not intercepted.' And this also can be used as a
platform to submit that the UN, since its creation has been called upon to do the
following:
74
• Prevent disputes from escalating into war-using early warning system,
peacemaking, peace building etc
• Persuade opposing parties to use the conference table rather than the force of
arms.
• Help restore peace-stability- where conflict has broken out. (UNDPKO 200)
Going further, the UN's responses to conflict (Peace Operations) are often grouped
into four stages namely: peace¬making, peace enforcement, peace keeping and peace
building.
• Peace enforcement: Is coercive and usually come to play where a clear consent
proves difficult, and breaches of peace and acts of aggression persist and action or
intervention becomes necessary-.chapter VII
75
peacekeeping was initially a creation of power politics and conflict containment
(Mingst and Karns 2000). Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the
United Nations Charter, to our mind, has evolved into one of the main Instruments
used by UN to achieve its purpose of creation which is maintaining International
Peace and Security and also, 'encourage and promote conflict resolution between
parties to any conflict.
In support of the above rationale, Boutros Boutros- Ghali, in the Blue Helmet
(1996:9) submitted that, '...the UN is called upon not only to contain conflicts and
alleviate the suffering they cause, but also to prevent the outbreak of war among
Nations and to build towards enduring peace.
Furthermore, the DPKO is split into two main offices: the office of operations and
the office of mission support. However, a March 2007 UN General Assembly
Resolution advocated that the department be assisted by a new department which will
among other things handle logistics, thereby allowing the DPKO to concentrate on
policy implementation (History of DPKO. Accessed 11/6/13).
PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES
• Consent: peacekeepers should be deployed with the consent of the parties to the
conflict.
• Restraint: in the use of force - Although force must be used in a restrained fashion
if it may be employed only for self and mandate defense.
• Legitimacy: operations must be seen as legitimate Th;« expresses the firm and fair
exercise ofTZ2 circumspect use of force, discipline of the peacekeepers' and
respects shown to the local population.
• The importance of the above mentioned principles and guidelines cannot be over
emphasized knowing this has helped to clarify the nature and purpose of
peacekeeping operations as well as strengthen best practices. (Bellamy &
Williams 2010)
77
KEY PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL
PEACEKEEPING TASK
Peacekeepers' task usually depends on the mandate of the mission in question and
includes but not restricted to the
Following
• Human rights: monitoring human rights and conducting human rights education
and investigations etc
78
• Administration: supervision or controlling the administration of states, control
foreign affairs, national defense, public security, finance and information
(ibid), (Handbook of UNDPKO 2003).
This statement does not deny the fact that some peacekeeping operations hav e been
carricd out without authorization from the UNSC. For example, South Africa in
Burundi 2000-03, UK IN Sierra Lconc, ECOW AS-ECOMOG- in Liberia and so on
(Bellamy and Williams 2010), although some of the above were later upheld or
endorsed.
79
assumptions. Additionally, the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) consisting of
all relevant UN stakeholders is established to implement the reports of the IMPP.
All these processes and several others form part of the Panning processes which in
themselves are aimed at implementing the Mandate so authorized. As earlier
mentioned, the EU and AU have their own planning circle and it runs in this manner:
The EU planning involves the active participation of all member states because
reaching a unanimous decision is key to its planning process which usually involves
Foreign Affairs Ministers of member states, since there are no permanent structures
for the military. For the AU, the peace and Security Council, being, the' standing
decision making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict
takes charge of giving the final word on planning. Also attached to the PSC are:
In fact, the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) is an example of the MTF above. It
should however be noted that in practice, the planning processes of the UN, EU and
AU etc are rarely conducted in a coordinated and harmonized manner.
From the foregoing and borrowing the words of Fortuna (2008a: 17 in Bellamy &
Williams 2010:1) "The answer to the question of whether peacekeeping works is a
clear and resounding yes."
No doubt, several peacekeeping operations have taken place both within and outside
Africa, but for the purpose of this presentation, special attention will be accorded
peacekeeping operations in Africa with particular emphasis on some of them. Having
said this, the following countries (and many more) have witnessed peacekeeping
operations on different occasions and with varying results or outcome:
Several literatures have argued that "the UN response to many of the conflicts that
necessitated peacekeeping operation, were usually slow and in some cases erratic.
Many of the responses they posited, came only after a major humanitarian disaster
has occurred.' Rwanda. Liberia and Sudan are clear examples (Galadima 2006:295).
Currently, peacekeeping operations, due to the dynamic nature of today's' conflicts
are altogether complex, multidimensional, and operating with Chapter VII authority
of the UN charter. Closely related to the above is the fact that mandates are now
being developed less according to established tenets or codified principles, and more
in an-adhoc, and reactive manner.
In addition, many recent African peacekeeping operations are hybrid, while multiple
organizations have played a lead role in peacekeeping mission in concert with the
UN. In Liberia for example, the ECOW AS deployed her troops in 2003, assisted by
the USA, and then transitioned the mission later that same year-October- to the UN.
In Burundi, the African Union (AU) led the peacekeeping operations before the UN
took over in 2004 (UNDPKO) Also, it will be recalled that in. Sudan, the AU led a
vanguard force into the Darfur region while the UN mobilized for a peacekeeping
mission there. Judging from the above, IJN absorption of operations has typically
followed initial regional engagement or operations given the trend in peacekeeping
operations witnessed in Liberia, Cote D' Ivoirc etc. (Op.cit)
Moreover, it should be noted that the ritual of signing peace agreements or ceasefire
no longer represent an end to violence as events of the past have shown that ceasefire
81
agreements were broken after they were signed in Liberia, .Somalia, Sierra leone and
many more and all these make peacekeeping operations in intra-state conflict very
serious (complicated) and challenging.
This mission was originally established by the security council on 20th Decembe r,
1988 at the request of the Government of Angola and Cuba. The mission sprang up
from (he 1988 New York agreement that sought to achieve a regional peace
settlement in Southern Africa. This mission's was a traditional one which is to verify
the withdrawal of the 50;000 Cuban troops from Angola" in accordance with the tinle
table established in a bilateral agreement between the two governments. The mission
was successful on ground that it achieved its mandate. The report credited to this
mission in 1991 confirms this (ibid).
In addition, following the success of UNA VEM I, UNA VEM II AND III were
authorized respectively. UNA VEM II was anchored on UNSCR 696(1991) and
aimed at seeing the "peace accord-Acordos de Paz" through its implementation and
the success recorded also led to UNA VEM III whose mandate included: providing
good offices and mediation to the parties; monitoring and verifying the extension of
administration throughout the country and of national reconciliation, among other
things. Upon the success of UNA VEM III came the observer mission-MONUA-
which replaced UNA VEM III (ibid). Note that this peacekeeping was Purely
traditional in nature.
UNMIL took over from a peacekeeping force led by the ECOWAS, a sub-regional
body in Africa in October of 2003. As of 2004, the UN mission consisted of over
14,(XX) military and Civilian Personnel. It has a hroad mandate under Chapter VII
82
of the UN Charter to among other tasks, monitor the ceasefire train local police;
maintain law and order; facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; assist the
interim government with preparations for national elections; and assist with
Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-integration and repatriation programs. Previous
UN peacekeeping involvement in Liberia included a small 300-strong Observer
Mission, the UN military observer mission in Liberia(UNOMIL), which operated
parallel to ECOWAS peacekeepers from 1993-1997. UNMIL, as of June 2004, was
the largest UN mission in operation, with fifty-seven Nations contributing 13,374
troops, 1,049 Civilian Police, and 192 Military Observer (UNDPKO).
Judging from the above peacekeeping operations, it's clear that the traditional
peacekeeping operations have proved that it belonged to the cold war era due to th e
multi¬dimensional nature of to day's intra-state and post cold war conflicts.
MINUSMA: The UNSC at it 69520d meeting1. Taking note of the letter, dated 25
march 2013, addressed to the SG by the Transitional Authorities in Mali, which
request the deployment of a UN Operation to stabilize and restore the authority and
the sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its national territory' and also, of the
letter dated 26 march 2013, addressed to the SG by the President of the ECOWAS
Commission requesting the transformation of AFISMA into a UN stabilization
mission and taking note of the communique ,dated 7 march 2013, of the AU peace
and security council, as well as the attached letter dated 7 march 2013 and addressed
to SG by the AU Commissioner for peace and security, expressing AU support for
the transformation of AFISMA into a UN Stabilization Operation in Mali...' and
under the 35 paragraph UNSCR 2100 of 25th April, 2013, declared MINUSMA, with
paragraph 16 & 17 capturing the operations mandate-to stabilize key population
centres, especially in the North of Mali, support the transitional authorities to extend
and re-establish state administration throughout the country and so on - in clear terms
(Minusma mandate 2013, S/RES/2100(2013).
84
AU LED MISSIONS
AU-the refined OAU-and some other sub regional bodies-especially ECOW AS- have
provided leadership within Africa in terms of peacekeeping and also, have suppOlled
greatly UN missions outside of Africa. Also, it must be understood that the AU, no
doubt, depends on sub regional organizations for peacekeeping operation s. In
addition and by way of information, some of these sub regional bodies include:
ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, and CEMAC.
In 2001, after the ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD was icned, AU deployed a 2,870
strong peacekeeping force into Burundi, composed mainly of South Africa, Ethiopian
and Mozambique peacekeepers. This was the first AU mission after ihc change from
OAIJ and it was supported by the USA and pU On Is1 June, 2004, with a final pe ace
agreement seemingly within reach, the UN MISSION (ONUB) took over the AU
mission with a chapter VII mandate. However, most of the AU peacekeepers still
formed part of the UN peacekeepers. That AU mission was lagged "Successful" by
the then SG -Kofi Anan- during the AU-UN transition ccrcmony in June 2004
(SG/SM/9337 in Galadima 2006:31)
Using Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone Troops landed in Monrovia in
August 1990 under heavy attack from NPFL after it could not get a cease fire from
both parties. ECOMOG fought its way into Monrovia (Vogt 1992 in ibid). Upon
landing, they went into offensive to drive Taylor's men out and secured the capital.
Also, they employed peace-making and peace enforcement before obtaining a
ceasefire (BBC monitoring report, 11th Sept. 1990; Document 74 in Galadima 2006).
ECOMOG succeeded in 1997 after lose of men and material, and after 12 failed peace
accords. The UN under Resolution 1509 and acting within Chapter VII later took
over the mission after ceasefire was signed.
85
CEMAC, on the other hand established a peacekeeping operation in CAR in 2002
with support from France, Germany and China. Mandate was to protect President
Ange-Felix
Patasse restructure the country's national army among other things H owever, while
CEMAC's original mandate was to protect President Patassa, it seemed to have
signaled that they back the new Bozize-former army chief-government due to
possible backing of IMF and World Bank (UNMIL/PIO/PR/97 press in Galadima
2006).
All the above examples and many more shows what efforts have been made and is
still been made towards the process of conflict containment and eventual resolution.
In general however, while there have been cases of successes like in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Burundi etc, there has also been varying cases of failure like in Somalia and
Rwanda (Sluggishness, non commitment and not heeding to the recommendation
given for the operation and lateness). Also, Rwanda's case shows how flexible the
mandate can be (adjusted and expanded) when it comes to achieving peacekeeping's
set goals or objectives.
It's an established fact that the concept and practice of peacekeeping have undergone
tremendous changes from what it used to be since its inception and will continue to
develop mainly because of the recent critiques, comments and debates on its mode
of operations.
Two important events that further questioned the capabilities of the UN peacekeeping
experience include the Rwanda genocide of 1994, where more than 800,000 people
were killed. It was described as "one of the most abhorrent events of the twentieth
century". A year later, in one of the worst war crimes since the end of the Second
World War, the Bosnian town of Sebrenica was besieged by Serb militias. During
this siege, about 8,000 Muslims were killed under the watchful eyes of the UN
peacekeeping contingent deployed there.
Investigations were conducted and reports concluded that faced with the growing
efforts to murder, expel or terrorize the entire population, the neutral, impartial and
mediating role of the UN was proving to be grossly inadequate. Also, there was a call
for the UN to undergo a process of reflection in order to better clarify and improve
87
on its capacity to respond to the various forms of conflict. More so, (he politics of
consultations and negotiations that usually preccde peacekeeping preparation
/operations and its attendant bottleneck, can best be blamed for most IJN failures
(Galadima, 2013).
In essence, it seems reasonable for us to argue that, fhc major challenge for
peacekeeping in the twenty first century remains in the development of a concept that
will clarify the specific ways in which new peacekeeping efforts should properly
function. This must include specific suggestions and recommendations for the
incorporation of the concepts into practice.
Moving further, Bedont (2005 :86)" posited thai the system has proved dysfunctional
and incapable of providing accountability where national authorities have failed t o
act' in the area of prosecuting or punishing soldiers who have committed some form
of offense or breached the Rule Of Engagement during PKO's.
We must add here that peacekeeping functions have diversified significantly in recent
years, and all peace seeking organizations have strove to adapt to new tasks and
challenges, given the fact that the contexts and environments in which these missions
are deployed have also become more complex. (Millennium Report). Just recently,
on the 23rd of April, 2015, (Aljazeera News) UN Peacekeepers were killed in Sudan,
88
and this is also one of the daunting challenges being faced by the UN and indeed
other Peacekeeping Actors.
4. Inadequate funding
12. The non use of force in self-defense has to be considered' as one of the
challenges
The UN has not relented in its efforts at addressing the hortcomine associated with
her operational capacity. Boutros Boutros Ghali, upon assumption of office in 1992,
introduced* An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaki ng And
Peacekeeping' which was geared towards creating possibilities for successfully
meeting threats to common security Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, gave his analysis
and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient, within
89
the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capacity of the UN for preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping-to which he had added the closely related
concept of peace building. In addition and stressing the need for preventive
diplomacy, the SO observed; among other things, the need for 'confidence building
measures' that is hinged on information-gathering and fact-finding (Early Warning)
which could involve preventive deployment among other things.
Also, In July 1997, Kofi Annan proposed reforms that are aimed at confronting the
challenges of the coming decades and also, emphasizing that any reform is an
evolving process. This reform is aimed at avoiding any failure in the R2P civilians
in a timely manner (as experienced in Bosnia and Rwanda) and a lso to ensure that
there is adequate self-defense mechanisms for peacekeeping forces and UN staff
members (Learning from the situations in Sierra Leon and East Timor, ere. UN Staff
were kidnapped and murdered by Mobs and PeaIT}' Mr' Annan repeatedly
emphasized the need for keeping forces to develop new capabilities for peacekeeping
mandates among population in conflict zones while arguing that peacekeeping forces
are now in need 0f greater coercive capacity. However, he cautioned that reliance on
coercion alone is insufficient.
Moreover, while we are in agreement that till this date, all of the above mentioned
steps (and many more) geared towards making peacekeeping better, are still evolving
and will continue to take shape as the years roll by, we will add that it has also been
suggested that the Security Council be enlarged and that the veto power of the
permanent members be amended. For us, that is a welcome development.
Therefore, we are unanimously in support of the fact that the UN, no doubt, is stil l
very much relevant and needed today. But if the UN wants to use that relevance to
live up to its charter and save the coming generations from the heart -ache of conflicts
and/or wars, she needs to be armed in its peacekeeping agenda. The UN, obviously,
needs the funding, the strength and the capacity to mount and support a new
generation of peacekeeping operations because, in our opinion, based on the position
of various reform suggestions, the nature of today's wars has changed and
peacekeeping MUST 'dress up'for her call.
90
CONCLUSION
While it is accepted that peacekeeping has recorded success in some areas, in others
it has ended in fiasco (like in OAU's Chad and UN's Somalia) and into further
degeneration especially where the conflict is tribal or an ethn ic one (like in Ethiopia
and Eritrea's case) which centered on border problems. Furthermore, a lot more issues
make the African case difficult and/or peculiar given the nature of conflict on the
African continent and the activities of peacekeepers vis-à-vis observing to the latter
the Rules Of Engagement.
Onoja (1996:9) succinctly captured the above point in these words: 'UN forces must
abuve all behave in such a way aS not to take part in a conflict. It must not be used
either to protect certain positions or one of the parties or to oblige one part to accept
a certain political result or to influence the political balance.' Onoja's words brings
to mind what happened in the CAR-2002 between the peacekeepers, President
Pattasse and Bozize, his former Army Chief (UNMILIPI O/PR/97 Press).
In the final analysis, while it is true to state in clear terms that peacekeeping has
helped a great deal in attaining one of UN's mandate which is 'international peace
and security' in some areas, it has further deepened the conflict in Africa, since in
most cases, it'-s only the people within this states that know what really is their
problem and only them know how best to solve it. The international and regional
bodies have done very little or nothing towards allowing the cul tures and traditions
of these states to play out during conflict resolution processes, steps or consultations.
Negotiated peace may not always be the best part to peace-especially bearing in mind
the fact that some of these warring parties may just buy into the peace deal because
of some form of negative mind control technique or 'hidden threat' directed at them,
or under some form of duress since it's possible that some of these international
organizations just want to save face or are trying to be seen' a s carrying out or
achieving their mandate.
After careful analysis of the various thoughts captured ln the literatures true and real
peace is hand-made and not jnachine-made. By hand-made, simply invoked the
virtues of orgiveness, tolerance, respect, patience, understanding, and airness while
machine-made peace includes but riot limited to
91
importing foreign conflict resolution processes, steps techniques into another culture
or society without due regard the practices and/or norms peculiar to that host cultu re
society. This we have branded Quick fix syndrome.
Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations (UN) has undertaken responsibility
for maintaining world peace and security. Drafters of the UN Charter envisioned an
organization engaged in the entire spectrum of conflict management and resolution,
from preventive measures, to ad hoc responses to crisis, to the long -term stabilization
of conflict areas.
The UN's responses to conflict are often grouped into the three stages of
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace- building. Peacemaking involves diplomatic
efforts to manage or resolve the conflict and peace-building strives to stabilize post-
conflict situations by creating or strengthening nation al institutions. Peacekeeping
operations, however, have occupied a somewhat ambiguous place between the
diplomats and the democracy. (James 1990).
With the end of the Cold War came two important challenges. Armed conflicts more
often emerged at the intra- state level. The level and scope of involvement had to
ch^T accordingly. The changing nature of conflicts following tf end of the Cold War
made it imperative for the UN to launch new era of humanitarian interventions, some
of which cam* into conflict with the concept of sovereignty. But, the tj^ over-
extended its resources and lost much of its polity backing. Peacekeeping forces were
plagued with conceptual and structural problems.
92
Two solutions followed: reform and regionalization For reform to be successful, it
needs to help the UN to adapt to the changing nature of armed conflicts. But, the
policy of regionalization could prove dangerous for the UN's credibility and ultimate
mission. (Mackinlay 1996).
United Nations peacekeeping was initially developed during the Cold War as a means
of resolving conflicts between states by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military
personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, to areas where warring
parties were in need of a neutral party to observe the peace process. Peacekeepers
could be called in when the major international powers (the five permanent members
of the Security Council) tasked the UN with bringing closure to conflicts threatening
regional stability and international peace and security. (Marrack 1993).
These included a number of so-called "proxy wars" waged by client states of the
superpowers. As of October 2011, there have been 66 UN peacekeeping operations
since 1948, with sixteen operations ongoing. Suggestions for new mission arise every
year.
This mission, (he United Nations Truce Supervision organization (UNTSO), was sent
to the newly created State of urTcl. *herc a conflict between the Israelis and the Arab
1 '^tes over the creation of Israel had just reached a ceasefire. The UNTSO remains
in operation to this day, although the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has certainly not
abated. Almost a
vC.',r later, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP) was authorized to monitor relations between the two nations, which
were split off from each other following the United Kingdom's decolonization of the
Indian subcontinent.
As the Korean War ends with the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, UN forces
remained along the south side of demilitarized zone until 1967, when American and
South Korean forces took over. (Griffin 1999).
93
Returning its attention to the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the
United Nations responded to Suez Crisis of 1956, a war between the alliance of the
United Kingdom, France, and Israel, and Egypt, which was supported by other Arab
nations. (Fortna 2004).
When a ceasefire was declared in 1957, Canadian diplomat (and future Prime
Minister) Lester Bowles Pearson suggested that the United Nations station a
peacekeeping force in the Suez in order to ensure that the ceasefire was honored by
both sides. Pearson had initially suggested that the force consist of mainly Canadian
soldiers, but the Egyptians were suspicious of having a Commonwealth nation defend
them against the United Kingdom and her allies. In the end, a wide variety of national
forces were drawn upon to ensure national diversity. Pearson would win the Nobel
Peace Prize for this work, and he is today considered a father of modern
Peacekeeping.
In 1988 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to th United Nations peacekeeping forces.
The press release stat \ that the forces "represent the manifest will of the communit
of nations" and have "made a decisive contribution" to the resolution of conflict
around the world.
SINCE 1991
The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in UN and multilateral
peacekeeping. In a new spirit of cooperation, the Security Council established larger
and more complex UN peacekeeping missions, often to help implement
comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra -State conflicts and
civil wars. Furthermore, peacekeeping came to involve more and more non -military
elements that ensured the proper functioning of civic functions, such as elections.
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was created in 1992 to support this
increased demand for such missions.
By and large, the new operations were successful. In El Salvador and Mozambique,
for example, peacekeeping provided ways to achieve self-sustaining peace. Some
efforts failed, perhaps as the result of an overly optimistic assessment of what UN
peacekeeping could accomplish. While complex missions in Cambodia and
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Mozambique were ongoing, the Security Council dispatched peacekeepers to conflict
zones like Somalia, where neither ceasefires nor the consent of all the parties in
conflict had been secured. These operations did not have the manpower, nor were
they supported by the required political will, to imp lement their mandates. The
failures - most notably the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 1995 massacre in
Srebrenica and Bosnia and Herzegovina - led to a period of retrenchment and self-
examination in UN peacekeeping. (Blucq 2009).
That period led, in part, to the United Nations Peace building Commission, which
works to implement stable peace through some of the same civic functions that
peacekeepers also work on, such as elections. The Commission currently works with
six countries, all in Africa.
GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING
These factors also emerged as key in operations that went beyond interposition or
monitoring, so-called second and third generation operations.
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'antagonism, saw peacekeepers engage in what would come to be called "peace -
building.
A conceptual link was established by then Secretary. General Boutros Ghali between
peacekeeping and the range of other peacemaking and peace-building activities
Prescribed by the UN Charter (Boutros-Ghali 1992).
The concept that describes this new range of tasks is called Peace Support operations
(PSO). Peace Support Operations (PSO) are multifunctional operations in which
impartial military activities are designed to create a sccurc environment and facilitate
the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace
(Wilkinson, 2000: 63-69; Mackinlay, 1996).
PSO may include peace keeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) as well as conflict
prevention, peacemaking, peace-building and humanitarian operations. Outside of
military circles, the term Peacekeeping' is often used erroneously to embrace all PSO,
including PE.
Invoking Chapter vii the Security Council to bypass the specific injunction in the
Charter not to intervene in their internal affairs of states. Usually undertaken in the
context of humanitarian crises and massive flows of refugees, such third generation
operations are characterized by even more complex mandates with less clear-cut
objectives than in the past.
These setbacks resulted from a range of factors, including not only the overextension
of UN resources despite evident, continuing limitations but also dilemmas inherent
in the situations, which the organization was attempting to address.
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The UN was also undermined by a critical discrepancy between mandate and
resources, whereby financial support and political will did not matc h the complex
mandates being authorized by the Security Council.
Soon the "over-credibility" of the early 1990s gave way to a dearth of confidence in
the UN's capabilities. These new imperatives have forced the UN and the
international community to re-think and circumscribe their expectations of UN-led
peace operations.
The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional
capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Under present
conditions, ad hoc member states in the "coalitions of the wiling" offer the most
effective deterrent to aggression or to the spread of conflict. As in the past, a mandate
from the Security Council authorizing such a course of action is essential if the
inform in is to have broad international support and legitimacy.
Times have changed to the point where traditional peacekeeping no longer address
the challenges of either managing or resolving many complex intrastate conflicts.
Between 1989 and 1994, UN peacekeeping generally expanded its number of
missions, criteria for intervention, and tasks of intervention.
The nature of the intra-state conflicts in cases like Somalia, the former Yugoslavia,
Haiti, Liberia, and Serial Leone, forced additional changes on peacekeeping.
In the wake of such optimism, came a new wave of efforts. Along with the new tasks
of early 1990s came third- generation missions that were largely enforcement
operations under Chapter VII of the Charter. They primarily involved internal
conflicts and they often lacked the consent of the parties, as in Somalia and Bosnia.
The operations of the early 1990s were overly ambitious, given the considerable
financial and political constraints placed on the UN by member states. To a large
degree, the UN overextended its management capabilities, its resources and its
political backing. These new endeavours were mostly incorporated into existing
administrative and management structures, often lacking success.
Infact, the problems of third generation operations in Somalia and Bosnia, and the
"disastrous" mission in Rwanda "prompted a period of retrenchment." The Security
Council- particularly the United States-was reluctant to authorize, implement or
finance new peacekeeping operations. Rather than setting up more missions, the UN
turned to improving its infrastructure and its operational efficiency. (Dandeker,
Christopher, Gow and James 1997).
The total deployment of UN military and civilian personnel fell from its 1993 peak
of more than 80,000 to approximately 14,000 in 1998. Along with this retrenchment
also came a general consensus that much needed to be done to approach conflict
management more inclusively with other fields. Many saw a need to better co-
ordinate humanitarian concerns, human rights, social development and traditj
military approaches.
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Given the financial, logistical and political constraint the UN also turned to a policy
of delegation-some would say devolution.
While affirming its three basic principles-consent impartiality, and use of force only
for self-defence-the \JN delegated the enforcement of mandates to coalitions of
willing member states and regional organizations more equipped to deal with the
actual activities. This new approach continues to be followed and was affirmed in the
16 July 1997 Programme for Reform announced by the then Secretary General, Kofi
Annan. Now former.
The recent relationship between the United Nations and NATO's war in Kosovo has
taught some important lessons: it is both an affirmation that the UN is still important
and a wake-up call that reform is urgently needed. The UN was largely excluded from
the initial stages of war.
This was mostly a tactical move on the part of the United States in anticipation of a
Chinese or Russian veto in the Security Council. In the end, though, the UN was
invoked largely for the sake of legitimacy.
If the UN wants to be involved earlier in the process next time, it needs the budget
and the infrastructure to command operations like that of Kosovo. The UN needs the
capacity for both humanitarian and military operations more than ever since they are
inseparably linked. (Dandeker, Christopher, Gow and James 1997).
This means that in future Nato and regional organization can take action in
peacekeeping operation without necessarily waiting for UN intervention.
Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999, which provided measur es for
rebuilding Kosovo, proved that the UN is still relevant and needed.
CHALLENGES TO PEACEKEEPING.
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For the operation to be successful, it was essential that the parties to the conflict
offered their collaboration and support. However, in recent conflicts, involving
ethnic-based disputes, internal political struggle or the collapse of state institutions,
the UN has been acting without the clear consent of the parties to the conflict.
(Howard 2008).
The result is that the environment for peacekeeping is no longer benign. Peacekeepers
increasingly work in a climate of continuing armed conflict, sometimes in places
where there are poorly defined borders or cease-fire lines and no guarantees of
respect for their safety or role.
Petru Oimitriu argues that this new and complex environment, together with the
ambitious objectives of the United Nations and ever-growing pressure on scarce
resources, has made it more imperative than ever to think clearly about when and
how the UN should become involved ln peacekeeping operations.
Mats Berdal argues that "the fundamental distinction between enforcement and
peacekeeping should be maintained combining peacekeeping with enforcement
action in one operation, as is effectively the case with the United Nations' Operation
in Somalia, carries with it considerable military and political risks." Indeed, the cases
of Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia bring new challenges to the task of
peacekeeping.
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resolutions under UN Chapter VII without providing the organizations with adequate
resources for the mandate drains the process of credibility.
A force equipped for peace enforcement would not enjoy the same acceptance as a
friendly and impartial force. A peace enforcement force must be prepared to operate
in a hostile atmosphere. So, one of the basic principles of peacek eeping-the use of
force in self-defence-has to be considered. Mandates should suit the situation.
For example, in July 1995, Serb forces overrun the declared 'safe area' of Srebrenica
and thousands of Muslim civilians were slaughtered in full view of the l ightly armed
UNPROFOR contingent whose mandate did not extend the use of force to protect
civilians. The force's mandate should have been better suited the situat ion in which
they were placed.
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are visible tools, well suit ed for particular
conflicts but they should not overlap in c*ne poorly defined mission. The mandate
needs to be clear, Whether it is peacekeeping or enforcement. Thus, a mission's
success will be judged by its original intent. In fact, many peace enforceme nt
missions have been publicly judged as failures, largely because they were judged
through peacekeeping criteria. (Fortna 2004).
Met with increasing cnticism-not only from the United States, but also from the rest
of the world-and the changing nature of operational environment, the UN has begun
to address shortcomings in its efficiency and operational capacity. In July 1997, Kofi
Annan proposed reform measures to confront the challenges of the coming decades.
In terms of peace operations, the organization hopes to streamline its often slow and
cumbersome responses to emerging crises. In many cases, precious opportunities
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have been lost by the lapse of time between the decision of the Security Council to
mandate an operation and the moment when the peacekeeping forces arrive in the
area. Earlier deployment of peacekeeping forces might prove to be more efficient in
stabilizing a critical situation before it erupts into widespread violence.
Improve communication between operations in the field and the New York
headquarters, establish a central planning agency at the Secretariat, assign s upport
regiments for UN duty, pre-stock general supplies at regional depots, arrange faster
airlifts, improve early-warning capabilities and secure better military intellig ence
from member states. (Boutros 1992).
The UN planning task requires not only co-ordination within a department but also
cohesion with various departments, offices, divisions and units involved in all aspects
of UN peacekeeping.
At the heart of UN peacekeeping reform, though, lies the Security Council. Griffin
argues "the single greatest stumbling block in efforts to improve responses by the
UN to crisis situations is the impasse over the reform of composition and procedures
of the Security Council." But, this issue has proved to be the "thorniest item on the
current agenda".
Many have suggested that the Security Council should he more geographically
representative. Some have suggested that the Council be enlarged and that the veto
power of the permanent members be somehow amended. Japan, for instance, now
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contributes nearly 13 percent of the general budget, but has little say in security
issues. Unless reforms to the decision-making process of the Council are realized,
the Council's legitimacy as a global decision making body will be hampered. Much
of the strength of the UN is its universality, but a peacekeeping process comprising
that universality could jeopardize not only the individual mission, but also the
legitimacy of the UN in general.
For example, the UN's involvement in the Gulf Crisis was widely considered to have
boosted the organization's power and profile. However, the US's disproportional say
in the decision-making procedures and the lack of influence of such countries as
Japan and Germany (both of whom contributed vast amounts to the operation), led
many to question the process.
The very reason the US went to the IJN was to gain legitimacy, but such a u se of the
Security Council erodes the legitimacy of the entire process. Other member states in
the UN had little or no say in operational decisions either.
Another constraint to operations has been the issue of sovereignty. Globalization and
the rise of intra-state wars have diminished the power of states as players in conflicts,
and the UN needs to adapt to this changing political landscape. The UN Charter
certainly upholds sovereignty in principle.
But, the UN was set up, not to protect governments and states, but to 'save next
generations from the horrors of war.' Under chapter VII, "Threats to peace, breaches
of the peace, or acts of aggression" could merit intervention. (Mats 1993).
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Resolution 688 offered specific UN protection to the Kurdish minority in Iraq,
indicating that the flow of refugees might constitute a threat to international peace.
Then, Resolution 1199 asked the Yugoslav government to withdraw its security
forces from a part of its national territory. Clearly, there is a growing consensus that
human rights abuses merit interventions into conflicts previously closed behind the
doors of sovereignty.
The UN Charter does make mention of co-operation with regional organizations. But,
this regionalization seems to have arisen largely out of necessity and its ultimate
effects could prove counterproductive.
In the long term, it marginalizes the UN, and, then, seen only as an outside pla yer in
world conflicts, the organization might have an even harder time commanding funds
and political support. Moreover, as Griffin argues, although this organization
represents an innovative solution to the crisis at the UN, regionalization "entails a
growing tolerance for external interventions, the motivations for which may be less
altruistic and the conduct of which is not subject to rigorous multilateral supervision.
CONCLUSION
In this section, examined the variety of peacekeeping operations in the w orld. It has
been noted that peacekeeping has become more complex involving a much wider
range of tasks, including protecting territory, people, and aid operations, disarmi ng
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belligerents, policing demilitarized sites and monitoring demobilization, monitor ing
and running elections, and helping to reconstruct governments, police forces, and
armies.
The book contends that the nature of peace operations have affected the
understanding of peace operations across the world and has brought about
phenomenal changes in some notions of intervention that were held sacrosanct.
Recent experience has demonstrated that regional organizations can be a vital part of
the multilateral system.
Their efforts need not contradict United Nations efforts, nor do they absolve the
United Nations of its primary responsibilities for peace and security. The key is to
organize regional action within the framework of the Charter and the purposes of the
United Nations, and to ensure that the United Nations and any regional organization
with which it works do so in a more integrated fashion.
United Nations as a rally point for international peacekeeping have play important
role in international peacekeeping operation. Using various Charters such as VI, VII,
If the UN wants to use that relevance to live up to its haner and "save next generations
from the horrors of war," it to amend its peacekeeping agenda.
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