Case: 25CI1:23-cv-00672-EFP Document #: 6 Filed: 12/04/2023 Page 1 of 13

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

RICHARD’S DISPOSAL, INC. APPELLANT

VS. CAUSE NO. 23-672

THE CITY OF JACKSON, APPELLEE

MISSISSIPPI

APPELLEE THE CITY OF JACKSON’S

MOTION TO DISMISS RICHARD’S DISPOSAL, INC.’S “NOTICE OF APPEAL” FOR
LACK OF STANDING AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, AND TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS PENDING RULING

On or about November 22, 2023, Richard’s Disposal, Inc. (“Richard’s” or “RDI”)

filed a purported Notice of Appeal in this Court.1 Richard’s claims to be appealing “the

decision of The City of Jackson, Mississippi (“City”) on November 16, 2023, to issue a

Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for Solid Waste Collection Services.” Complaint, ¶ 1.

Richard’s Notice of Appeal must be dismissed because Richard’s lacks standing to

pursue this appeal because (1) the City’s issuance of an RFP is not an appealable final

judgment; and (2) even if the issuance of an RFP were an appealable final judgment, the

issuance of an RFP has not aggrieved Richard’s in the context of Miss. Code § 11-51-75.

In short, Richard’s has no right to appeal the City’s efforts to provide for the basic

needs of its citizenry. Just as Richard’s could not legally interfere with the City’s decisions

to provide police and fire protection to its citizens, Richard’s cannot legally interfere with

the City’s decision to request solid waste collection proposals from qualified vendors for

1
The statute requires the appellee to respond to the Notice of Appeal within ten days “from the filing of the notice
of appeal with the circuit clerk.” Miss. Code § 11-51-75(b). The City was not served until November 27, 2023.
Nevertheless, the City is filing this Motion to Dismiss within ten days of the filing date of November 22, 2023.
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the purpose of entering into a contract for garbage collection pursuant to the statutory

authority granted by Miss. Code § 31-7-13(r).

Richard’s is currently being paid to provide garbage services pursuant to an

agreement which will terminate on March 31, 2024. In order to ensure that citizens are

not exposed to a gap in garbage collection services beginning on April 1, 2024, the City

initiated an RFP in November of this year. The City’s RFP is mandated and governed by

Miss. Code § 37-7-13(r). The issuance of the RFP is merely the first in many steps which

are intended to ultimately result in the awarding of a garbage services contract to a

responding vendor. The issuance of the RFP is not a final decision; it is the beginning of

a process that will ideally lead to a decision.

Richard’s has not been and will not be harmed in any manner by the City’s RFP.

The City’s RFP seeks a vendor to begin garbage collection services on April 1, 2024.

Richard’s can choose to participate in the current RFP or not. If Richard’s does not submit

a proposal, the City cannot be said to have caused Richard’s any harm. If Richard’s

submits a proposal and is chosen, the City cannot be said to have caused Richard’s any

harm. If Richard’s submits a proposal and is not chosen due to legally permissible

reasons, the City cannot be said to have caused Richard’s any harm. Regardless, it is clear

that Richard’s cannot claim to be harmed by the mere issuance of an RFP.

The Court may take judicial notice that this is Richard’s second attempt to appeal

a City decision. The other Notice of Appeal was filed in this Court, Cause Number 23-200,

and is assigned to the Honorable Adrienne Wooten. In that appeal, Richard’s argues that

the City Council’s rejection of Richard’s garbage proposal to an October 2021 RFP was

arbitrary and capricious, and that Richard’s should be awarded a garbage contract with

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the City based on that 2021 proposal. The City has denied that it acted improperly in

rejecting the Richard’s proposal.

In this more recent appeal, Richard’s argues that until its appeal of the October

2021 proposal is complete, the City lacks the legal authority to solicit proposals under

Miss. Code § 31-7-13(r) to ensure that Jackson citizens do not experience a gap in garbage

collection services.

Richard’s argument is devoid of any statutory or precedential support. The City has

not located any Mississippi case in which a Court stopped a governmental authority from

fulfilling its statutory and governing obligations by interfering with the RFP process.

Richard’s arguments should be rejected by this Court, and this Notice should be dismissed

with prejudice.

Richard’s argument also lacks an element of common-sense decision-making. It is

impossible to know whether Richard’s prior appeal will be resolved by April 1, 2024, or

far enough in advance of that date to permit an RFP process. If Richard’s were successful

in stopping the 2023 RFP, that decision will likely lead to a circumstance where the City

is forced to either forego garbage collection from April 1, 2024, on, or is forced to negotiate

with Richard’s alone, as it will have prevented the City from soliciting proposals from

various vendors. Such a result is clearly contrary to governing principles, separation of

powers, and the ability of the City to govern itself. The conclusion is the same—this Notice

should be dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

In October of 2021, the City issued an RFP pursuant to Miss. Code § 31-7-13(r),

soliciting proposals from vendors for collecting and disposing of solid waste services.

Complaint, ¶ 15. Richard’s was one of three vendors which responded with a proposal,
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along with Waste Management of Mississippi, Inc. (“Waste Management”) and FCC

Environmental Services (“FCC”). Complaint, ¶ 21. The Mayor chose Richard’s proposal

and presented it to the City Council. Complaint, ¶¶ 18-19. The City Council voted not to

approve the Richard’s proposal. Complaint, ¶ 9.

Pursuant to Miss. Code § 11-51-75, Richard’s appealed the City Council’s April 1,

2023 vote not to approve the Richard’s proposal. That appeal is currently before this

Court, the Honorable Adrienne Wooten, having been assigned Cause Number 23-200.

Among other things, Richard’s seeks through that appeal to be awarded (1) the six-year

garbage contract it sought through its proposal to the 2021 RFP, as well as (2) damages

Richard’s alleges it incurred as a result of the denial of granting it the garbage contract.2

In October of 2022, Richard’s and the City settled litigation that had been filed in

federal court. See Judgment and Agreed Final Order, attached as Exhibit 1. Pursuant to

that settlement, Richard’s was to continue garbage pickup for the City until April 1, 2023.

See id., ¶ 4. Later, pursuant to a settlement of a related matter in Hinds County Chancery

Court, Richard’s contracted to continue garbage pickup for the City until March 31, 2024.

See Agreed Judgment, attached as Exhibit 2.

With the termination date of March 31, 2024, fast approaching, the City issued a

new RFP in November of this year, again soliciting garbage proposals pursuant to § 31-7-

13(r). The RFP does not make any reference to Richard’s, except to address the

contingency of Richard’s appeal of the City Council’s vote not to approve its 2021 RFP

proposal. The RFP does not limit Richard’s (or any other vendor) from submitting a

2Notably, Richard’s makes those same requests for relief in the current appeal. See
Complaint, p. 11, ¶¶ 3-4.
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qualified proposal. See, generally, 2023 RFP, attached as Exhibit 3. Vendor proposals are

due on or before December 18, 2023, at 3:30 p.m. See Exhibit 3, cover page. The RFP

expressly acknowledges Richard’s pending appeal concerning the 2021 RFP, stating in

part that any “Contract entered into pursuant to this current RFP shall be subject to the

decision of the Court in the pending appeal.” Exhibit 3, p. 3, ¶ 1.2.1. The City reserved the

right to terminate a contract awarded pursuant to the 2023 RFP if necessary to comply

with the resolution of that appeal. Id. The City also reserved the right to reject any or all

proposals at any time during the selection process. Id. at p. 9, ¶ 2.3.3

The City will follow the RFP and the law in evaluating any proposals it receives to

the 2023 RFP, including any proposal it receives from Richard’s. The City is seeking to

contract with a vendor to begin garbage services on April 1, 2024, to avoid any gap in

garbage services after Richard’s contract terminates on March 31, 2024.

Richard’s is not a “person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the …

governing authority of a municipality.” See Miss. Code § 11-51-75. No party has a

garbage contract with the City past March 31, 2024. The City has a compelling interest in

receiving proposals from vendors to contract for garbage services from April 1, 2024 and

after. Richard’s has not suffered any particular harm by the City exercising its statutory

authority to contract for garbage collection.

Richard’s has the same right as every other similar vendor to submit a proposal for

evaluation. No vendor—Richard’s included—has a property or contract interest in the

City’s garbage collection after March 31, 2024. While Richard’s may incur some expense

3The City reserved this right in the October 2021 RFP, as well. See 2021 RFP, attached
as Exhibit 4, at p. 9, ¶ 2.3.
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if it chooses to submit a proposal to the 2023 RFP, it is no more an expense than any other

vendor must incur to participate in the RFP process.

Even if Richard’s could establish that it is aggrieved, there is no final judgment or

decision of the City of Jackson that is appealable. The decision to issue an RFP is simply

the first step in a process that attempts to culminate in a contract with a vendor for

garbage services. If the City ultimately contracts with a vendor in a manner that aggrieves

Richard’s, Richard’s may then have standing to pursue a second appeal. Any such claim

at this point is purely speculative. At this time, Richard’s potential claims are simply not

ripe and must be dismissed for lack of standing and for this Court’s lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

In order to establish jurisdiction in this matter, Richard’s relies on the right to

appeal granted by Miss. Code § 11-51-75, which states in part that “[a]ny person aggrieved

by a judgment or decision of the … governing authority of a municipality, may appeal the

judgment or decision to the circuit court of the county … in which the municipality is

located.”

A. Richard’s Lacks Standing to Pursue this Appeal Because (1) the

City’s Issuance of an RFP is Not an Appealable Final Judgment; and (2)
Richard’s is Not an Aggrieved Person.

An “appeal is not a matter of right but is subject to the statutory provisions, and

the basic requirement is that appeals are proper only if from a final judgment.” Sanford

v. Board of Sup’rs, Covington Co., 421 So. 2d 488, 491 (Miss. 1982). Jurisdiction in the

circuit court is not conferred pursuant to § 11-51-75 until and unless the basic statutory

requirements are met—that the appeal is brought by a person aggrieved by a municipal

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decision, and that the municipal decision be a “final judgment.” Sanford, 421 So. 2d at

490.

Generally, under Mississippi law “parties may sue only where they assert a

colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect

from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise authorized by law.”

City of Jackson v. Greene, 869 So. 2d 1020, 1024 (Miss. 2004) (internal quotes and

citations omitted).4 The “party challenging a municipal decision under Miss. Code Ann. §

11–51–75 has the burden of “demonstrat[ing] a specific impact or harm felt by him that

was not suffered by the general public.” Id. See also Aldridge v. West, 929 So. 2d 298, 301

(Miss. 2006).

B. Because the City’s Issuance of an RFP is Not an Appealable Final

Judgment, Richard’s Lacks Standing to Prosecute this Appeal. In Other
Words, the Circuit Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear this Appeal
Because Richard’s Appeal is Not Ripe.

In Sanford, a board of supervisors entered an order which “laid out” a public road

across the petitioner’s property. 421 So. 2d at 489. The Supreme Court ultimately

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the supervisors’ actual order did

not include a decision to build the road, but merely to establish a committee pursuant to

§ 65-7-57 who would physically examine the site, determine the practicability of building,

lay out the road, and report back to the supervisors. Id. In other words, the supervisors

had entered an appropriate order that tracked the statutory requirements for the county

to eventually order the building of the road. Id. While that potential eventual order to

4For a person or entity to have standing, “the person(s) aggrieved,…whether one or more,
should allege an adverse effect different from that of the general public.”) Belhaven
Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 507 So.2d 41, 47 (Miss.1987).
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build could still occur in the future, the petitioner’s current appeal was not yet ripe5 in the

absence of a final order from the board that the road would be built. Id. at 491.6

The circumstances before this Court are nearly identical. The City has initiated an

RFP process. Pursuant to § 31-7-13(r), that is the first step towards selecting a garbage

collection vendor and contract. The statute requires that the RFP be advertised, that the

City select the most qualified proposal(s), and that the City negotiate and enter into

contracts with one or more of the proposing vendors or deem none of the proposals to be

qualified or otherwise acceptable and therefore reinitiate the process.

In other words, the City has not made a final decision with regard to the 2023 RFP

process that is appealable. The statutory process may lead to one or more vendors being

selected or none being deemed acceptable. The statutory process may lead to garbage

contract with a proposing vendor, or it may lead to a reinitiation of the process.

Regardless, Richard’s has no jurisdictional right to an appeal of the first step of an

RFP process. This Notice of Appeal must be dismissed.

C. Even if the City’s Issuance of an RFP Were an Appealable Final

Judgment, Richard’s Lacks Standing to Prosecute this Appeal. In Other
Words, the Circuit Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear this Appeal, So
that this Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear the Purported Appeal.

Even if the City’s decision to issue an RFP were an appealable final decision,

Richard’s cannot articulate any adverse effect that it has suffered or will suffer that

5 “Sanford’s appeal here is premature….” 421 So. 2d at 491.

6A final judgment or order is one that adjudicates the merits of a controversy and settles
all the issues as to all the parties. See, e.g., Mississippi Waste of Hancock County, Inc. v.
Board of Sup’rs of Hancock County, 818 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 2001).
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demonstrates a specific impact or harm felt by it that will not be suffered by the general

public.

As previously noted, § 11-51-75 only confers jurisdiction on the circuit court to hear

appeals of final orders, brought by individuals who “assert a colorable interest in the

subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the

defendant” by “demonstrat[ing] a specific impact or harm felt by [them] that was not

suffered by the general public.” Greene, 869 So. 2d at 1024. Richard’s cannot satisfy this

burden.

First, the Notice of Appeal alleges only a single harm that is purportedly caused by

the 2023 RFP, that

Requiring Richard's to submit an offer or bid on the 2023 RFP before

the resolution of its present Appeal regarding the 2021 would pose
undue expenses and hardship on Richard. Such a requirement is also
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of power and discretion, lacking
sufficient evidence, and otherwise contrary to law.

Complaint, ¶ 30.7, 8

This argument should be summarily disregarded. First, the 2023 RFP does not

require Richard’s nor any other vendor to submit a proposal to the City. Submitting a

7Richard’s alleges other adverse effects, but all are a result of the City denying a contract
to Richard’s pursuant to the 2021 RFP, which is the subject of Richard’s appeal docketed
at Cause Number 20-300. For example, Richard’s alleges that it was harmed by the City
Council voting not to accept its proposal to the 2021 RFP (Complaint, ¶¶ 27-29). In fact,
the vast majority of this Notice of Appeal is merely an effort to re-argue the points made
in Richard’s previous appeal, docketed at 20-300.

8Richard’s also alleges that it “is entitled to compensatory damages for losses it has
sustained due to challenging the issuance of the 2023 RFP.” Complaint, ¶ 3. However,
Richard’s choice to file a Notice of Appeal in a matter in which it lacked standing to do
so is a voluntary action taken by Richard’s—not an action required by any action taken
by the City.
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proposal is a voluntary decision made by each vendor. Second, having submitted a

proposal in 2021, and given that such proposals are generally how Richard’s obtains

contracts, it is difficult to believe that Richard’s would have to undertake substantial

expense or hardship to update its scope of work and prices to submit a 2023 proposal if it

chose to do so.

All other potential harms are shared by Richard’s and any other citizen or entity

who wishes to submit a proposal to the 2023 RFP. Richard’s could only become aggrieved

by the 2023 RFP if it submits a proposal which is ultimately rejected for reasons not

permitted by the RFP or by law. As of the filing of this Motion, Richard’s has not even

submitted a proposal, precluding any claim that it is or will be harmed by the 2023 RFP.

It seems evident that Richard’s real argument is that it should not have to submit

a proposal for a 2023 RFP which it believes it validly “won” in 2021. The answer to that is

equally evident, however—Richard’s did not “win” the previous RFP. It submitted a

proposal which was ultimately rejected by the City Council. While Richard’s may have the

legal right to pursue an appeal of that rejection and to obtain whatever relief may be

available if it is successful, Richard’s is not entitled to have the City stop engaging in

efforts to govern itself while Richard’s prosecutes its appeal relating to the 2021 RFP. The

City has contracted for garbage collection services through March 31, 2024. The City has

every right to follow the statutory scheme necessary to contract for garbage collection

services after March 31, 2024. Richard’s has no legal authority to prevent the City from

doing so, and it cites no such authority in its Notice of Appeal.

It is conceivable that Richard’s will one day be successful in its appeal docketed at

20-300. If so, a Court may fashion relief which will require the City to pay Richard’s some

amount or to terminate or modify any contract ultimately awarded through the 2023 RFP
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process. As of today, however, any such results are purely speculative. None can give rise

to establishing standing to pursue this appeal, of the City’s decision to issue a 2023 RFP.

And while not a focus of this Motion to Dismiss, the City also points out that

granting the relief sought by Richard’s would pose serious separation of powers issues, as

Richard’s expressly asks this Court to find that there are not legitimate legislative and

executive reasons for issuing the 2023 RFP. Richard’s asks the Court to set aside the City’s

2023 RFP by substituting the judgment of the judicial branch for that of the legislative

and executive branches. See Complaint, ¶¶ 36-38.

D. This Court Should Enter a Stay Until Ruling on the City’s Motion
to Dismiss. It Would be Inequitable and a Waste of Resources to
Prepare a Record and Brief Issues for Which This Court Lacks
Jurisdiction.

This Motion to Dismiss is premised on this Court lacking subject matter

jurisdiction over the matter. “Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry which

must be determined before a court may proceed to the merits.” Schmidt v. Catholic

Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So. 3d 814, 821 (Miss. 2009).

Here, the Court must make a subject matter jurisdiction determination before the

appeal can go forward. In the interim, Richard’s interests are adequately protected by its

prior appeal, which seeks nearly identical relief as does this newly-filed appeal.

In order to prevent the waste of time and resources which would occur in the

absence of a stay, the Court should expressly stay all matters until it rules on the

jurisdictional issue. The parties should not be forced to expend resources litigating over

the proper scope of the record or drafting briefs in a matter that the Court likely lacks the

authority to hear.

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Accordingly, the Court should enter an Order expressly staying all proceedings in

this matter other than this Motion to Dismiss, until the Court rules on the City’s Motion

to Dismiss.

III. CONCLUSION

Richard’s lacks standing to pursue an appeal of the City’s decision to issue an RFP

in November of 2023 for garbage services. Richard’s lack of standing means that this

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Richard’s purported appeal.

In its previous appeal, Richard’s claims to have been aggrieved when the City

Council took a specific final action—voting not to accept the Richard’s proposal to a 2021

RFP. While the City does not concede the merits of that appeal, the City makes the

comparison to point out what § 11-51-75 does and does not permit. One day, the City may

vote to accept or not accept one or more proposals submitted pursuant to the 2023 RFP.

If that day comes, one or more vendors may have appeal rights pursuant to § 11-51-75.

However, no vendor—especially one who has not even submitted a proposal—has

a legal right to unilaterally stop the City from governing itself. No vendor has the authority

to put an end to a lawfully instituted municipal RFP for garbage collection services, so

long as § 31-7-13 is followed. Richard’s makes no allegation that the City has failed to

comply with any statute in issuing the 2023 RFP.

The City needs a vendor to continue garbage collection services after March 31,

2024. The City’s legal efforts to make that selection have nothing to do with Richard’s

pending appeal in Cause Number 20-300, and they are not subject to this new appeal.

The present Notice of Appeal should be dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: December 4, 2023.

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Respectfully submitted on behalf of the

Defendant City of Jackson,

/s/ Drew M. Martin

Drew M. Martin, MSB# 101045

OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY

455 East Capitol Street
Post Office Box 2779
Jackson, Mississippi 39207-2779
601.960.1799 telephone
601.960.1756 facsimile

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the date indicated below I electronically filed the foregoing via

the Court’s CM/ECF system, which sent notification of the filing to all counsel of record.

/s/ Drew M. Martin

Dated: December 4, 2023.

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