Relief Valves

Training Services
Relief System Design
2003 ENGINEERING DESIGN SEMINAR – LIMITED DISTRIBUTION: This material is UOP LLC technical information of a confidential EDS 2003/RV-1
nature for use only by personnel within your organization requiring the information. The material shall not be reproduced in any manner or
distributed for any purpose whatsoever except by written permission of UOP LLC and except as authorized under agreements with UOP LLC.
Outline
n Introduction
n Hazard Identification
n Process Model for Relieving Conditions
n PRV Calculations: External Fire
n PRV Calculations: Electrical Power Failure
n Sizing and Selecting a Pressure Relief Device
Protection Layers Emergency Response
in Community
Emergency Response
within the Process Unit
Pressure Relief Systems
Safety Instrumented Shutdowns
Critical Alarms & Operator Intervention
Basic Process Control
Plant Design (Inherent Safety)
Managing Process Safety
Maintenance
Inspection Procedures
Process Safety
Management
Permits Training
Managing Change
Collapsed Fractionating Column
Failed Pressure Test
OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety
Management
n Process Safety Information

n Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
n Operating Procedures
n Training
n Pre-Startup Safety Review
n Hot Work Permits
n Management of Change
n Incident Investigation
n Emergency Planning
OSHA Requirements
n Accepted methodologies for the process hazard

analysis (What If, HAZOP, FMEA, Fault Tree)
n Team make-up and experience level
n Systematic review of the process unit
n Documentation of the process hazard study
n Protocol of resolving action items and
managing changes to the process design
n Periodic updating of the hazard analysis
Factors Affecting PHA Methodology
n Current Stage of the Design

n System Characteristics
– Complexity
– Type of operation
– Nature of hazard
– Event of concern
n Perceived Risk and Experience
– Length of experience
– Accident history
– Potential risk
Factors Affecting PHA Methodology
(continued)
n Available Resources and Preferences

– Personnel availability
– Time constraints
– Funding
– Consistency
Approved PHA Methods
n Checklist
n "What if " Analysis
n Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
n Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies
n Fault Tree Analysis
HAZOP
Methodology
HAZOP Objectives
n Identify credible causes, consequences, and

safeguards
n Qualitatively rank each credible scenario
n Recommend improvements to the process design
or to its operation
n Provide compatible information for subsequent
process safety efforts
n Comply with OSHA’s process safety requirements
Scope of HAZOP Analyses
n Review is limited to the piping, instrumentation,

and equipment shown on the P&IDs
n Review is limited to deviations from normal
operation
n Primary intent is to identify hazards
n Impact of process unit on the utility systems or
other process units will be noted as requiring
further study
Process Unit
Feed(s) from Other
Process Units
Feed(s) from Storage Interface
Utilities
Injection
Chemicals
Process Unit
Catalysts,
Absorbents
Ancillary
Systems
Product(s) to Other Product(s)

Process Units to Storage
Study Node HAZOP
Flowchart
Design Intention
Process Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Risk Ranking
Recommendations
Yes
More Deviations ?
Yes
Other Nodes ?
Study Nodes
n P&IDs for the process unit are broken into manageable

sections called study nodes.
n Study nodes generally consist of major unit operations
and associated piping.
n Study nodes are defined prior to the meeting, but can be
redefined by the PHA team as needed.
n A “Global Issues” node is included to capture hazardous
events that impact the entire process unit. For example:
– Loss of containment
– Sampling
– PSV maintenance
– Utility failure
– Facility siting and equipment spacing
Problem 1A: Node Break-Up
Using the Process Flow Diagram provided, divide

the C3/C4 Splitter into study nodes.
l There is no “right” way to define study nodes.

l Focus on defining manageable study sections.
l Unit operations with associated piping make
convenient node breaks.
l There is a direct relationship between the size of the
node and the number of process deviations analyzed
in that node.
l An external heat stream can be incorporated in the
exchanger node or it may be defined as a separate
node.
Process Deviations
n Process deviations are developed list for each node.

n Controlled variables are, by definition, important to
process operation and deviations (high/low) from the
control point should be considered.
n Unit operations may also indicate process variables.
n Once significant process variables are identified, the
process deviations follow automatically.
n Supplement the process deviation list using deviation
lists given in commercial software and/or process
safety books.
Design Intent for Process Parameters
n The design intent for each process parameter

should be listed.
n Design intent identifies:
– Control range for a process variable.
– Unit operation being conducted.
– Operating procedure being performed.
n The normal operating range for a process
variable is the difference between rated and
turndown operation.
Problem 1B: Process Deviations
Using the P&ID provided, identify the process variables
that apply to the overhead condenser system (node
highlighted in yellow). Construct your process deviation
list based on these process variables.
l Use the process control instrumentation to help

identify the process variables.
l Determine the function of the unit operations
contained in the node, and add that functionality to
your process variable list.
l For each process variable, build a deviation list by
adding a guideword to the process variable.
Determining the Causes for a Deviation
n Consider only those causes that originate within

the study node boundary.
n Deviations could be caused by:
– Equipment or process control failure
– Human error
– Loss of utilities
– External events, e.g. fire
– Long term processes, e.g. erosion, corrosion, coking
n If process instrumentation crosses a node
boundary, control malfunction is considered a
cause in both nodes.
Determining the Causes for a Deviation
(continued)
n Deviations that require the simultaneous

occurrence of two or more unrelated causes are
not considered in the HAZOP study.
n Process deviations occurring upstream of the
process unit, and therefore outside the study
scope, are included in the feed node as “causes”.
Problem 1C: Causes
Using the P&ID for the overhead condensing system, list the
causes for two deviations: “High Pressure” and “Low
Pressure”.
l Consider this failure list when determining causes.

– Equipment or process control failure
– Human error
– Loss of utilities
– External events
– Long term processes
l Loss of control function is treated as a single cause, and it is
not broken down to its component parts, ie. a sense element,
process controller, valve, improper set point, improper
isolation, etc.
Consequences
n Describe all consequences, even those that propagate

outside the node.
n Consequences may include:
– Personnel injury
– Environmental damage
– Equipment damage
– Property loss
– Extended downtime
– Operability problems
n Consequences are described assuming there are no
safeguards.
n Describe consequences as a chronological sequence
of events.
Safeguards
n Safeguards may include:

– Equipment design
– Instrumentation (control and shutdown)
– Pressure relief valves, depressuring valves
– Administrative procedures
n Only list those instruments that have an alarm as a
safeguard.
n Control instrumentation response must automatically
correct or mitigate a process deviation.
n Operator training and administrative procedures can
be listed provided they are part of an overall process
safety management program
Problem 1D: Consequences and Safeguards
Using the P&ID provided for the overhead condensing system,

describe the consequences and safeguards for each cause of
high and low pressure.
l Determine the consequence(s) for each cause listed for

the high and low pressure deviations.
l Describe significant consequences, including those that
propagate outside the node.
l Describe consequences chronologically.
l For each consequence, list the safeguards that will
prevent it from happening, mitigate the effect, or alert
the operator to take corrective action.
Qualitative Risk Assessment
n Rankings establish a priority for resolving action items

and a rationale for allocating process safety resources.
n It considers the severity of the event and the likelihood
that it will occur.
n Severity is assigned assuming the safeguards do not
respond as designed.
n Likelihood is assigned assuming that the safeguards do
respond as designed.
n If sufficient information is not available to estimate the
risk ranking, a recommendation should be made for
further study.
Severity Definitions
Level I II III IV
Description Catastrophic Severe Moderate Low
Human Impact Death Injury Minor None
Environmental Damage Major Serious Minor None
Production Loss > 6 Months 1- 6 Months 1- 4 Weeks < 1 week
Damage Value > $10M $1M - $10M $0.1M - $1M < $0.1M
M = Million
Likelihood Definitions
n Frequent (Level 1)
– Expected to occur frequently (many times a year)
n Occasional (Level 2)
– Expected to occur occasionally (once a year)
n Infrequent (Level 3)
– Expected to occur under unusual circumstances
(once or twice during facility lifetime)
n Unlikely (Level 4)
– Could occur; however, not likely during facility
lifetime
Risk Ranking Matrix
Severity
I II III IV
1 D D C B
Likelihood
2 D C B A
3 C A A A
4 A A A A
Response to Risk Ranking
Ranking Action
A No action required; risk is considered acceptable.
B Consider adding an administrative control to manage

risk.
C Consider a design change and/or administrative control

to manage risk.
D Risk is unacceptable; a design change is required to

improve the risk ranking to “C” or better.
Recommendations
n Recommendations are made to:

– Eliminate a cause
– Prevent or mitigate the consequence
– Reduce the likelihood that the hazard will occur
n Examples of recommendations include:

– Equipment changes
– Instrumentation changes
– Further study needed
– Verification of design assumptions
– Administrative systems to manage hazards
– Inspection and maintenance
– Operator training
Engineering Review of Recommendations
Make Engineering review:

Recommendation
Address the Hazard?
Introduce New Hazards?
Warranted Given Risk?
Assign Technically Feasible?
Responsibility Best Option?
Assign Priority
Implement or Reject
Recommendation
During After
HAZOP HAZOP Document Decision in
Meeting Meeting Follow-up Report
Using the Results from a HAZOP Study
List of Overpressure Events
Requiring PRV Protection Enhanced Process Safety
Management Systems
Rationale For
Allocating Resources
HAZOP
Study Results
Operator Training
Documentation
Required by OSHA
Fire-Heated Boiler
Process Modeling
for Relief Conditions
Heat and Mass Balances
Steady State Balance:
In = Out
Unsteady State Balance:
In + Depletion = Out + Accumulation
Blocked Outlet Transient
RS 31.4-R00-4
Upstream Control Valve Fails Open
RS 31.4-R00-5
Relief Model Development
n Identify Credible Causes for Overpressure
n Determine the Sequence of Events
n Rate Equipment Performance for Relief Conditions
n Consider Instrumentation Response
Codes and Practices
ASME Code Requirements
Section I Steam Systems

Section VIII Pressure Vessels
API Recommended Practice
520 Parts I & II Sizing, Selection, and

Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices
in Refineries
521 Guide for Pressure Relieving and
Depressuring Systems
2000 Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage
Simplifying Assumptions
If simplifying assumptions are made, they should:
n Incrementally increase the relieving rate

n Have minimal economic impact
n Consider the risk associated with making a wrong
assumption
n Make use of available information
Instrumentation Response
API recommends that no credit for instrumentation
response should be taken if that response reduces
the relieving requirement.
RS 31.4-R00-7
Instrumentation Response
API recommends that instrumentation should be

assumed to respond as designed if that response
increases the relieving requirement.
RS 31.4-R00-8
Operator Response
n Consider the time it takes to correct the problem

n Do not assume the operator will respond if
the emergency affects many process variables
simultaneously (multiple alarms)
n Assess operator effectiveness
n Consider the risk involved if the operator does
not respond as assumed
PSV Calculations:External Fire
Feed Surge Drum
LLC
RS 31.5-R00-9a
Fire Case Model
n Assume that the operator stops

feed to the surge drum
n Heat from the fire will vaporize
the stagnant liquid
n The relieving rate is equal to
vaporization rate
Qfire RS 31.5-R00-9c
Heat Input Due to External Fire
Q = 2100FA 0.82
where: Q = heat input due to fire, Btu/h

F = environmental factor
A = wetted surface area, ft2
Environmental Factor
n The environmental factor provides a credit for

insulation reducing heat input to the vessel.
n If the insulation can be dislodged by water spray
from the fire hoses, F = 1.0.
n The factor assumes General Refining Conditions,
such as:
– Ground sloped; no pools of flammable liquid
beneath the vessel
– Adequate fire fighting equipment is available
– Trained personnel
Wetted Surface Area
25 ft.
Elev.
RS 31.5-R00-10
Vaporization Rate
Q
Wfire =
∆Hv
n Minimum latent heat of vaporization is 50 Btu/lb

n Above critical temperature, expansion rate of the
dense fluid is estimated using the vaporization
approach
Latent Heat of Vaporization
Problem 2: Relief Rate for an External Fire
n Design Pressure = 50 psig

n Vessel Tangent Length = 15 ft.
15 ft. n Liquid Mole Weight = 100
6 ft. n Vessel Diameter = 5 ft.
n Liquid Height = 6 ft.
n Vessel Elevation = 18 ft.
18 ft. n ∆Hv = 75 BTU/lb
(Hint: The surface area for an elliptical head = 1.089D2 )
Liquid Filled Vessel: Initial Conditions
Initially, all liquid is

displaced out the PSV
Qfire Qfire
Liquid Filled Vessel: Later Conditions
Later on, sufficient space is

available for vapor-liquid
disengagement, and all vapor
flows out the PSV
Qfire Qfire
UOP Design Practice for Liquid Full Vessels
n Size PSV for all vapor flow

n Rate PSV selected for all liquid flow and report
liquid flow rate
n Determine the total volume of liquid discharged
to relief header and report that volume for
sizing the flare KO drum
n If auto-chilling occurs upon flashing in the relief
header, report the flash temperature obtained
PSV Calculations:
Debutanizer
Debutanizer
Problem 3: Construct a HWB at Normal Conditions
Using the HWB report for normal conditions, construct a heat
and weight balance around two sections of the fractionating
column.
n Draw an envelope around fractionating column,
including the feed -bottoms exchanger and
reboiler, but not the overhead system.
n Draw a second envelope around the overhead
condensing system, including the condenser and
overhead receiver.
n Construct a HWB for each envelope, assigning
positive values to streams entering the envelope
and negative values to streams leaving.
n Sum the heat and mass streams entering/leaving
the envelope, and confirm that the total is zero.
Summary of Overpressure Events
for the Debutanizer
n Electrical power failure (refinery wide & localized)

n Loss of air-cooled condenser duty
n Reflux failure
n Pressure control loop malfunctions
n Product separator LLC fails open
n External fire
Refinery-Wide Electrical Power Failure
n Motor-driven feed pump stops.

n Low-low flow shutdown stops reboiler firing; 40% reboiler
duty remains due to radiation as the refractory cools down.
n Condenser fans stop; 20% residual duty remains due to
natural convection.
n Receiver level control eventually stops reflux; bottoms level
control stops net bottoms product.
n Once feed and reflux stop, no fractionation occurs.
n Pressure controller will open the net vapor product valve.
However, no credit is taken for this instrumentation
response.
Debutanizer
(Electrical Power Failure Model)
Condenser Duty
(natural convection)
HWB 1 HWB II
Reboiler Duty
(radiation from refractory)
Power Failure HWB I
Mass Heat
Reboiler Duty + QREB

Vaporized Bottoms − WB − WBhv
Depleted Bottoms + WB + WBhl
Liquid
Total 0 0
HWB I: Power Failure Case
(Working Equations)
0 = QREB − WBhv + WBhl
QREB
WB =
∆H V
Vaporization rate is determined by solving heat

and mass balance equations simultaneously.
HWB II: Power Failure Case
Residual Condenser Credit (natural convection):
Qcond
Wcond =
∆H v
Relieving rate (difference between vaporization

rate and residual condensation rate and net vapor):
Wrel = WB − Wcond − Wnet vap
Problem 4: Construct HWB I at Relief Conditions
Using the working equation for HWB I, determine the amount
of bottoms vapor that must leave the first envelope to obtain a
heat and mass balance during the electrical power failure
case.
n Assume that your process simulator reported the
bubble point temperature of the bottoms liquid
was 435°F at relieving pressure, and that its
specific enthalpy was 230 BTU/lb.
n In addition, assume that your process simulator
reported the specific enthalpy the bottoms vapor
to be 315 BTU/lb for the first bubble.
n Determine the amount of bottoms liquid that must
be vaporized the balance the system during an
electrical power failure.
Loss of Air-Cooled
Condenser Duty
Loss of Condenser Duty
n PRC opens wide to attempt pressure control

n Debutanizer pressure increases in spite of
controller action
n Liquid inventory in overhead receiver decreases
n LLC on overhead receiver stops reflux by
resetting FRC on reflux
n Heavy material migrates to top section as liquid
contacting in top section of debutanizer stops
Debutanizer
(Model for Loss of Condenser Duty)
Condenser Duty
(natural convection)
HWB 1
HWB II
Reboiler Duty
(normal)
RS 31.6-R00-17
Condenser Failure HWB I
Mass Heat
Feed
+ Wf + Wf hf
Net bottoms
− Wnb − Wnbhnb
Reboiler Duty
+ Qreb
− Wno − Wnohno
Net Overhead Vapor
− WT − WThv
Vaporized Tray Liquid
+ WT + WThl
Depleted Tray Liquid
Total 0 0
Vaporized Tray Liquid
(Working Equation)
0 = WFhF − WNBhNB + QREB − WNOhNO − WThv+ WT hl
(WF hF − WNBhNB + QREB − WNOhNO)

WT =
∆Hv
Reflux vs. Liquid Inventory
Normal Operation Reflux Stops
Gross Total Overhead

Overhead at Relief
Reflux Liquid Inventory

on Tray
RS 31.6-R00-18
Heat Content of Net Bottoms
(Leaving the Envelop)
Before F/B exchanger After F/B exchanger
F/B exchanger
must be rated
regardless of
heat & mass
envelop
RS 31.6-R00-19
Feed/Bottoms Exchanger Duty
T hsi
( Thsi − Tcsi )rel 

 
Qrel = Qnor  
( Thsi − Tcsi )nor 
T csi
 
Assumes:
Straight line enthalpy profiles.

Similar thermal effectiveness factor.
Constant overall heat transfer coefficient.
Problem 5: Construct HWB I at Relief Conditions
Using the working equation for HWB I, determine the amount
of tray material that must leave the first envelope as a vapor to
obtain a heat and mass balance during a condenser failure case
n Assume that your process simulator reported the

bubble point temperature of the tray liquid was
180°F at relieving pressure, and that its specific
enthalpy was 80 BTU/lb.
n In addition, assume that your process simulator
reported the specific enthalpy the tray vapor to be
190 BTU/lb at its dew point.
n Determine the amount of tray liquid that must be
vaporized the balance the system during an
condenser failure case.
Condenser Failure HWB II
Mass Heat
Overhead Vapor + Wo + Wo h v
Relieving Rate − (Wo - WA) − (Wo - WA) hv
Condenser Duty − Qcond
Accum. Liq. Inventory − WA − WA hl
Total 0 0
Loss of Condenser Duty Relieving Rate
Residual condenser duty (natural convection):
Qcond
Wcond =
∆Hv
Relieving rate (difference between total vapor rate
leaving debutanizer and residual condensation):
Wrel =Wtotal− Wcond
Reality Check
Always check the reasonableness of the calculated

relieving rates for each case.
n During a reflux failure, loss of condenser duty,

or PRC failing closed, the relieving rate should
be similar to the normal gross overhead rate.
n During a electrical power failure, the relieving

rate should be similar to the normal reboiler
vapor rate.
If the rates differ significantly from that given

above, rationalize the difference, i.e., dramatic loss
of reboiler duty due to low LMTD.
Receiver PRC Fails Closed
n Net vapor cannot exit overhead system and it

blankets the overhead condenser
n Lose overhead condenser duty
n Debutanizer pressure increases
n LLC on overhead receiver stops reflux by
resetting FRC
n Net overhead liquid continues until pump loses
positive suction
Separator LLC Fails Opened
n Initially, liquid feed rate to column doubles and floods

bottoms section of debutanizer
n Reactor vapors then enter debutanizer and blanket the
overhead condenser
n Lose overhead condenser duty
n PRC opens wide to attempt pressure control
n Debutanizer pressure increases in spite of controller
action
n LLC on overhead receiver stops reflux by resetting FRC
n Net overhead liquid continues until pump loses positive
suction
Selecting the
Pressure Relief Device
Types of Relief Devices
n Spring Loaded Pressure Relief Valve

n Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve
n Rupture Disc
n Weighted Pallet
n Vent Line
Conventional
Pressure Relief Valve
RS 31.7-R00-22
Balanced-Bellows
Pressure Relief Valve
RS-31.7-R00-23
Opening & Closing
Spring-Loaded PSV
Impact on Design
n Spread between operating and set pressure

(preventing leakage through valve)
n Inlet pressure loss (avoiding valve chattering)
n Capacity affected by back pressure (outlet line
size, spring setting, valve type)
n Rapid opening (free draining inlet and outlet
piping)
Force Balance
Conventional Pressure Relief Valve
RS 31.7.R00- 27
Seating Force
Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valve
RS 31.7.R00-26
Valve Leakage
n Valve will “simmer” at 92% of set pressure

n Set pressure of valve is chosen relative to
operating pressure and selected to minimize
leakage, e.g. 10% or 25 psi, whichever is
greater
% of Set Pressure
100
Set Pressure
Spread between operating

92
Significant Leakage pressure and set pressure

90
Operating Pressure
Design Options for Leakage
n Provide greater pressure differential between

operating and set pressure
n Lap valve seat surfaces to improve tightness
n Install elastomeric seats
n Select a pilot operated relief valve
n Install spare relief valves to permit
maintenance while unit is operating
Inlet Pressure Loss
n Valve will “chatter” if the inlet pressure loss

exceeds the blowdown pressure of valve
n Blowdown pressure varies between 5-7% of
PSV set pressure (depending on valve model)
n Inlet pressure loss is limited to 3% of the PSV
set pressure
% of Set Pressure
97 100
Set Pressure
Minimum Inlet Pressure
95
} Blowdown Pressure
90 93
Operating Pressure
Inlet Line Sizing
Pressure Drop Calculated Using
Rated Capacity of Valve
Equivalent length
includes:
Sudden contraction
Elbows
Tee
Reducer
Length of piping
RS 31.7.R00- 40
Design Options for Meeting 3% Inlet ∆P
n Do not ignore — this is a severe problem
n Locate PSV nearer to vessel (shorter inlet line)
n Increase diameter of inlet piping
n Select a pilot operated relief valve with remote

pressure source
Force Balance
Conventional Pressure Relief Valve
RS 31.7.R00- 25
Effect of Back Pressure
RS 31.7.R00-29
Force Balance
Balanced Pressure Relief Valve
RS 31.7-R00-30
Effect of Back Pressure
Balanced Relief Valve
16 %
RS 31.7-.R00-31
Design Options for High Back Pressure
n Increase diameter of discharge piping

n Select a balanced bellows or pilot operated relief
valve which can withstand a higher back pressure
n Offset the back pressure by lowering the
springsetting of a non-balanced pressure relief
valve (constant back pressure only)
n Lower set pressure of non-balanced pressure relief
valve below vessel design pressure to offset the
higher backpressure
Summary
Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valves
110
% of Set Pressure Accumulated Pressure
97 100
Set Pressure (Design Pressure)

Minimum Inlet Pressure
90 92 95
Closing Pressure (Blowdown)
Significant Leakage
Operating Pressure
Sizing for Vapor
Spring Loaded Relief Valve
W TZ
RA = If heat capacity ratio is
CKPacc K b MW unknown, assume CK = 306
RA = Required area, in2

W = Flow rate, lb/hr
C = Coefficient based on Cp/Cv ratio
K = Coefficient of discharge (K = 0.97 for JOS/JBS
series)
Kb = Back pressure correction factor
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psia
T = Temperature, °R
Z = Compressibility factor
MW = Molecular weight, lb/lb mol
Sizing for Liquid
Pressure Relief Valve with Liquid Trim
Q SpGr
RA =
38 K Pacc − Pb

Q = Flow rate, gpm
K = Coefficient of discharge
SpGr = Specific gravity of liquid
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psig
Pb = Total back pressure, psig
Sizing for Flashing Flow
1. Determine pressure at outlet of nozzle

Subcooled liquid - One-half saturated pressure at inlet
Temperature two phase flow - One-half accumulated pressure
Low vapor pressure material - Relief header pressure
2. Flash material at nozzle outlet pressure or relief
header pressure, whichever is greater
3. Determine area required for vapor part of
relieving fluid
4. Determine area for liquid part of relieving fluid
5. Add the two areas together
Pop-Action Pilot-Operated Valve
(Flowing Type)
RS 31.7-.R00 -34
Flow Characteristic
Open and Closing
% Capacity
No Blowdown
Modulating Pilot
No Leakage
-10% Pset +5% +10%

Inlet Pressure
RS 31.7-R00-35
Force Balance
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve
Exposed area on top of piston

is greater than the exposed area
at bottom of piston.
Seating Force = Pinlet (Atop - A bott)
RS 31.7-R00-36
Seating Force
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve
RS 31.7-R00-37
Unique Considerations
Pilot Operated Relief Valves
n Backflow Preventer
n Remote Sense Line
n Material Compatibility (Elastomeric Seats and

Seals, Lower Metallurgy Availability)
n More Restrictive Temperature Limits
Backflow Through a PORV
RS 31.7-R00-36
Backflow Preventer
RS 31.7-R00-39
Remote Sensing
Applying the 3% Pressure Loss Constraint
n 3% rule applies to pressure drop

from vessel to sense point
n Sense point should be on relatively
low velocity line (Bernoulli effect)
n Capacity of PORV may have to be
adjusted for high inlet pressure
losses (DP>5% Pset)
P
PORV Advantages
n Seat Tightness
n Remote Pressure Sensing
n Less Sensitive to Back Pressure
n Field Testing of Pilot Set Point
n Remote Depressuring
n Ability to Modulate Flow
PORV Disadvantages
n Difficult to Specify
n Temperature Constraint
n Elastomeric Compatibility
n Limited Metallurgy Selection
n Unfamiliar Technology
PORV Applications
n High Pressure (Above 1000 psig)

n Low Pressure (Below 20 psig)
n Revamps (Operating Pressure Close to Set Pressure)
n Remote Sense Required for 3% Rule
n Minimize Valve Leakage
n Large Liquid Relief
PORV Sizing for Vapor
W TZ
RA =
CKPacc MW

W = Flow rate, lb/hr
C = Coefficient based on Cp/Cv ratio
K = Coefficient of discharge (K = 0.86 for 400
series PORV)
Z = Compressibility factor
MW = Molecular weight, lb/lb mol
PORV Sizing for Liquid
Q SpGr
RA =
38 K Pacc − Pb

Q = Flow rate, gpm
K = Coefficient of discharge (K = 0.67 for
400 series PORV)
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psig
Pb = Total back pressure, psig
Multiple Valves
n Select minimum number of PSVs for a given service
n Select multiples of same size PSV
n At least one valve must be set at design pressure;

other valves can be set up to 5% above design
n Code permits accumulated pressure of 116%
Example
Required Area 8.5 in2 28.0 in2 65.0 in2
Number of Valves One Two Three
Area per Valve 8.5 in2 14.0 in2 22.0 in2
Orifice Designation 6Q8 6R10 8T10
Accumulation 110% 116% 116%
Spare Valves
n Spare valves may be requested when a customer’s

experience indicates:
− Fouling or plugging of PSV
− Severe corrosion
− Valve leakage is likely
− PSV testing period is shorter than turnaround
n UOP design practice is not to spare PSV’s
n UOP will specify spare PSV in accordance with

customer design practice
Isolating Block Valves
Design Considerations
n Isolating block valves and vents permits

maintenance of leaking valve while operating
n Inlet line size must ensure that the 3% inlet

pressure loss is not exceeded
n For multiple valves applications, install one spare

set at design pressure
Rupture Discs
Tension Loaded Reverse Buckling
Safety Head
Process Process
Pressure Pressure
RS 31.7-R00-41
Rupture Disc Applications
n Protecting temporary piping used for inert gas

regeneration operation
n Installed under a PSV to prevent leakage or to
protect valve from corrosive environment
n Fast response time required, e.g., tube rupture in
a high pressure exchanger which is liquid filled
on LP side
n Runaway reaction (highly exothermic) where
pressure is intentionally reduced below normal
operating pressure to regain control
In Combination With PSV
n Capacity of PSV derated by 10%

n Means of isolation for disc
replacement
n Inlet pipe size may have to be
increased
n Telltale indicator monitoring
pressure between disc and PSV
RS-31.7-R00-42
Rupture Disc Sizing
Atmospheric Discharge Piping System
Assume Equivalent Length =75 L/D
Critical Flow Equation
RS 31.7-R00-43
Critical Flow
(Critical Flow Equation for a Rupture Disc)
Qm S g T
RA =
260 Pacc
RA = Required flow area for rupture disc, in2

Qm = Flow rate at standard conditions, scfm
Sg = Specific gravity of vapor, (MW/29)
Piping Systems
Atmosphere
Po
P2
Rupture Disc P1
P4
P3
From Reactor To Reactor
Section Section
P5
RS 31.7-R00-44

Relief Valves

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Training Services

Relief System Design

Pressure Relief Systems

Safety Instrumented Shutdowns

Critical Alarms & Operator Intervention

Basic Process Control

Plant Design (Inherent Safety)

n Process Safety Information

n Accepted methodologies for the process hazard

n Current Stage of the Design

n Available Resources and Preferences

n Identify credible causes, consequences, and

n Review is limited to the piping, instrumentation,

Product(s) to Other Product(s)

n P&IDs for the process unit are broken into manageable

Using the Process Flow Diagram provided, divide

l There is no “right” way to define study nodes.

n Process deviations are developed list for each node.

n The design intent for each process parameter

l Use the process control instrumentation to help

n Consider only those causes that originate within

n Deviations that require the simultaneous

l Consider this failure list when determining causes.

n Describe all consequences, even those that propagate

n Safeguards may include:

Using the P&ID provided for the overhead condensing system,

l Determine the consequence(s) for each cause listed for

n Rankings establish a priority for resolving action items

A No action required; risk is considered acceptable.

B Consider adding an administrative control to manage

C Consider a design change and/or administrative control

D Risk is unacceptable; a design change is required to

n Recommendations are made to:

n Examples of recommendations include:

Make Engineering review:

Steady State Balance:

Unsteady State Balance:

In + Depletion = Out + Accumulation

n Identify Credible Causes for Overpressure

n Determine the Sequence of Events

n Rate Equipment Performance for Relief Conditions

n Consider Instrumentation Response

ASME Code Requirements

Section I Steam Systems

API Recommended Practice

520 Parts I & II Sizing, Selection, and

If simplifying assumptions are made, they should:

n Incrementally increase the relieving rate

API recommends that instrumentation should be

n Consider the time it takes to correct the problem

n Assume that the operator stops

where: Q = heat input due to fire, Btu/h

n The environmental factor provides a credit for

n Minimum latent heat of vaporization is 50 Btu/lb

n Design Pressure = 50 psig

(Hint: The surface area for an elliptical head = 1.089D2 )

Initially, all liquid is

Later on, sufficient space is