US v. Eduave, G.R. No. 12155, 2 February 1917, 36 Phil.

209
Facts: Defendant Protasio Eduave, who was the querido of the victim’smother,
attacked the victim from behind using a bolo creating a gash of 8and a half inches long
and 2 inches deep because the latter accused thedefendant of raping her. Knowing that
he has already killed the victim, hethrew the body into the bushes and left. Then,
he gave himself up anddeclared that he had killed the complainant.
Issue: WON
Held: We believe that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder. The crime cannot be
attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts
which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from
further acts.
We are satisfied that there was intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The
blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to
kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up
he declared that he had killed the complainant.
There was alevosia to qualify the crime as murder if death had resulted. The accused
rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp
bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-
half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that
she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her
and with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was living
with her as such at the time the crime here charged was committed.

Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188
Facts: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cavite, Branch 90.
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April
1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to
a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his
wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated
exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to
look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and
his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on
Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In
that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal
area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident
shouted: "Awatin sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael
threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car
arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the
parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven days. The doctor
prescribed medicine for Ruben's back pain, which he had to take for one month.
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house
and banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When
he went out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with
each other. He fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife
arrived, and he was pulled away and brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but
Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter
fled. He went home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in
front of their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation.
Ruben banged the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to
shoot him. His brother Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the
problem was. A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben
aside. Ruben fell to the ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardo's shirt and hair,
and, in the process, Ruben's head hit the lamp post.
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder.
Issue : WON The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the CA, insisting that
the prosecution failed to prove the intention to kill
Held: NO. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated
or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent
is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove
the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist
blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden
and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block.
Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in
the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed
hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have
died.

Baleros v. People, G.R. No. 138033, 22 February 2006, 483 SCRA 10

Facts: In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30.
Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Malou, slept on a folding bed. Early
morning of the following day, she was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of
cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands
covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight Still, MALOU continued
fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this ...the
opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she
then squeezed.
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building
at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with "'...a
marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter SF' and below the quoted letters
the word '1946' 'UST Medicine and Surgery'.
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision convicting petitioner of
attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
Held: YES. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man
who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age
or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code,
rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of
rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal
knowledge in the present case. Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case,
it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth
in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically
and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the
performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou.

Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007

Facts : On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted
outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along
North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post
at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an
identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart
with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases
in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside
the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide
Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the
cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were
eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area.
When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon
reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards
of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen
merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases
of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of
detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were
transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police,
Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police investigation records that apart
from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security
guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in
connection with the incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the
Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the
Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the
incident.
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed
having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the
afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security guards
after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the
afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM
account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the queue for the ATM
was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. It was
while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head
out of the building to check what was transpiring. As they were outside, they were
suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus commencing their detention. Meanwhile,
petitioner testified during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at
the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle
going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused
him and the other people at the scene to start running, at which point he was apprehended
by Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the
security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the
Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of
detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutor's
office where he was charged with theft. During petitioner's cross-examination, he
admitted that he had been employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing, "assigned at the
supermarket" though not at SM.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
Issue : WON the crime was frustrated or consummated theft
Held: We are obliged to apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the
answer. Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts
committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not
produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." There
are clearly two determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not "produced," and
that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second
factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first,
however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in
the Revised Penal Code as to when a particular felony is "not produced," despite the
commission of all the acts of execution.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.
As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of
the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said
rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there
can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the
correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal
Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to
the higher reverence for legislative intent.

People v. Lamahang, L-43530, 3 August 1935, 61 Phil. 703

Facts : The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and
sentencing him to suffer two years and four months of prision correccional and to an
additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual
delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat
on Delgado and C. R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act
of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on
the last named street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside
with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in
unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested
him and placed him under custody.
Issue: WON there was a attempted robbery
Held: NO: Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when
a private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will. Against the
accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for
robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall should not be taken into
consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in
this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.

People v. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463, 18 December 1930, 55 Phil. 433

Facts: Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H. Mooney,
a resident of the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one Juan Lawaan for the
construction of a fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the
construction of the corral. On the morning of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his
men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect from him the whole amount fixed by the
contract, notwithstanding that only about two-thirds of the fish corral had been finished.
As was to be expected, Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon at that time. On
hearing this reply of Mooney, Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay, something would
happen to him, to which Mooney answered that if they wanted to do something to him
they should wait until after breakfast, inasmuch as he had not yet taken his breakfast.
Lawaan then left with his men, and Mooney, after partaking of his morning meal, returned
to his shop.
On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of
Perpetua Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back being to
the window. Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from
the window strike with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in
the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair on which
Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow, but
was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it
should be stated that Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this
Mooney, who is an American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that
he did not hit the back of Mooney but only the back of the chair. But Borinaga was
persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife
in hand, to renew it, out was unable to do so because Mooney and Perpetua were then
on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again that same
night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed his mark and was unable to
give another blow because of the flashlight. The paint of the knife was subsequent, on
examination of the chair, found imbedded in it.
Issue: WON there was a frustrated or attempted murder
Held: Frustrated. The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all
the acts of execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish
the work of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose
by reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily
desisted from further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was
passed.

People v. Kalalo, G.R. No. 39303-05, 17 March 1934, 59 Phil. 715

Facts : On November 10, 1932, the herein appellants Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan
Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Court of First Instance of Batangas jointly
with Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal case Nos. 6858,
6859 and 6860, the first two for murder, and the last for frustrated murder. On October 1,
1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the deceased, decided
to order the aforesaid land plowed, and employed several laborers for that purpose.
These men, together with Arcadio Holgado, went to the said land early that day, but
Marcelo Kalalo, who had been informed thereof, proceeded to the place accompanied by
his brother Felipe and Juan Kalalo, his brother- in-law Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro
Garcia, who were later followed by Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt,
respectively, of the first three.
The first five were all armed with bolos. Upon their arrival at the said land, they ordered
those who were plowing it by request of Isabela and Arcadio Holgado, to stop, which they
did in view of the threatening attitude of those who gave them said order.
Shortly after nine o'clock on the morning of the same day, Isabela Holgado, Maria
Gutierrez and Hilarion Holgado arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Before the
men resumed their work, they were given their food and long after they had finished
eating, Marcelino Panaligan, cousin of said Isabela and Arcadio, likewise arrived. Having
been informed of the cause of the suspension of the work, Marcelino Panaligan ordered
said Arcadio and the other laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos to continue
the work already began. At this juncture, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo approached
Arcadio, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn,
approached Marcelino Panaligan. At a remark from Fausta Abrenica, mother of the
Kalalos, about as follows, "what is detaining you?" they all simultaneously struck with their
bolos, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo slashing Arcadio Holgado, while the appellants Felipe
Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed Marcelino Panaligan, inflicting upon
them the wounds enumerated and described in the medical certificates Exhibits I and H.
Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received by
them in the presence of Isabela Holgado and Maria Gutierrez, not to mention the accused.
The plowmen hired by Arcadio and Isabela all ran away.
Arcadio Holgado's body bore the following six wounds
Issue: WON the appellants are guilty of murder of simple homicide
Held: It is true that under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines murder,
the circumstance of "abuse of superior strength", if proven to have present, raises
homicide to the category of murder; but this court is of the opinion that said circumstance
may not properly be taken into consideration in the two cases at bar, either as a qualifying
or as a generic circumstance, if it is borne in mind that the deceased were also armed,
one of them with a bolo, and the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the
contending parties and their strength was almost balanced because there is no doubt but
that, under circumstances similar to those of the present case, a revolver is as effective
as, if not more than so as three bolos. For this reason, this court is of the opinion that the
acts established in cases Nos. 6858 and 6859 (G.R. Nos. 39303 and 39304,
respectively), merely constitute two homicides, with no modifying circumstance to be
taken into consideration because none has been proved.

People v. Trinidad, G.R. No. 79123-25, 9 January 1989, 169 SCRA 51

Facts: Deceased victim, Soriano was a fish dealer based on Davao City. His helpers were
TAN, a driver, and the other deceased victim Marcial LAROA. On 19 January 1983, using
a Ford Fiera, they arrived at Butuan City to sell fish. In the morning of 20 January 1983
SORIANO drove the Fiera to Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, together with LAROA and a
helper of one Samuel Comendador. TAN was left behind in Butuan City to dispose of the
fish left at the Langihan market. He followed SORIANO and LAROA, however, to
Buenavista later in the morning.
While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a member of the Integrated National
Police, assigned at Nasipit Police Station, and residing at Baan, Butuan City, asked for a
ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao City. TRINIDAD was in
uniform and had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm — a .38 caliber
revolver. SORIANO, LAROA, TAN, and TRINIDAD then left Butuan on 20 January 1983
at about 5:20 P.M. bound for Davao City. TAN was driving the Fiera. Seated to his right
was SORIANO, LAROA and the accused TRINIDAD, in that order. When they reached
the stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised them to drive slowly because,
according to him, the place was dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN heard two gunshots.
SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did not actually see the shooting of LAROA
but he witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having been alerted by the sound of the first
gunfire. Both were hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine in killing the two
victims.
TAN then hurriedly got off the Fiera, ran towards the direction of Butuan City and hid
himself in the bushes. The Fiera was still running slowly then but after about seven (7) to
ten (10) meters it came to a halt after hitting the muddy side of the road. TAN heard a
shot emanating from the Fiera while he was hiding in the bushes. prLL
After about twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes, when a passenger jeep passed by, TAN
hailed it and rode on the front seat. After a short interval of time, he noticed that TRINIDAD
was seated at the back. Apparently noticing TAN as well, TRINIDAD ordered him to get
out and to approach him (TRINIDAD) but, instead, TAN moved backward and ran around
the jeep followed by TRINIDAD. When the jeep started to drive away, TAN clung to its
side. TRINIDAD fired two shots, one of which hit TAN on his right thigh. As another
passenger jeep passed by, TAN jumped from the first jeep and ran to the second.
However, the passengers in the latter jeep told him to get out not wanting to get involved
in the affray. Pushed out, TAN crawled until a member of the P.C. chanced upon him and
helped him board a bus for Butuan City.
TRINIDAD's defense revolved around denial and alibi. He contended that he was in
Cagayan de Oro City on the date of the incident, 20 January 1983. At that time, he was
assigned as a policeman at Nasipit Police Station, Agusan del Norte. He reported to his
post on 19 January 1983 but asked permission from his Station Commander to be
relieved from work the next day, 20 January, as it was his Birthday. He left Baan, his
Butuan City residence, at about 3:00 P.M. on 20 January 1983 and took a bus bound for
Cagayan de Oro City. He arrived at Cagayan de Oro at around 8:00 P.M. and proceeded
to his sister's house at Camp Alagar to get his subsistence allowance, as his sister was
working thereat in the Finance Section.
At his sister's house he saw Sgt. Caalim, Mrs. Andoy, one Paelmo, in addition to his sister.
Sgt. Caalim corroborated having seen TRINIDAD then.
Continuing, TRINIDAD claimed that he left Cagayan de Oro for Butuan at lunch time on
21 January 1983 arriving at the latter place around 6:00 P.M., and went to his house
directly to get his service carbine. He was on his way to Nasipit to report for duty on 21
January 1983 when he was arrested at around 6:00 P.M. at Buenavista, Agusan del
Norte.
Issue: WON the crime was Frustrated Murder
Held: NO. TRINIDAD can only be convicted of Attempted Murder. TRINIDAD had
commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform
all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of causes other than his
spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion,
and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the
wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted
on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the
accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about
death.

Martinez v. CA, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007.

Facts: Dean Dongui-is was a teacher at the Tubao National High School, La Union.
Petitioner Benjamin Martinez was the husband of Dean's co-teacher, Lilibeth Martinez.
Petitioner eked out a living as a tricycle driver.
On October 28, 1998, Dean and his wife Freda filed a complaint for damages against the
spouses Martinez in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tubao, La Union. They
alleged that in March 1998, petitioner, a suitor of Elvisa Basallo, had been peddling false
reports that Dean and Elvisa had illicit relations; he even told Freda that Elvisa was Dean's
mistress. This led to a quarrel between Dean and Freda, and the latter was hospitalized
for her heart ailment. Dean requested Lilibeth to stop her husband from spreading lies,
and she replied that Elvisa had been her husband's mistress. The spouses Martinez filed
a motion to dismiss but the court denied the motion.
At about 1:40 p.m. that day, Dean went to the Tubao Credit Cooperative (TCC) office to
pick up the dividend certificate of his wife who was a member of the cooperative. He left
the building and walked to his car which was parked in front. As he did, he read the
dividend certificate of his wife. Dean was about a step away from an L-300 van which was
parked in front of the building when petitioner, armed with a bolo, suddenly emerged from
behind the vehicle and stabbed him on the left breast. Dean instantly moved backward
and saw his assailant. Dean fled to the bank office and was able to gain entry into the
bank. Petitioner ran after him and upon cornering him, tried to stab him again. Dean was
able to parry the blow with his right hand, and the bolo hit him on the right elbow. Dean
fell to the floor and tried to stand up, but petitioner stabbed him anew on his left
breast. Dean managed to run to the counter which was partitioned by a glass. Unable to
get inside the counter, petitioner shouted at Dean: " Agparentomeng ka tatta ta talaga
nga patayen ka tatta nga aldawen (You kneel down because I will really kill you now this
day)."
Meantime, SPO1 Henry Sulatre was at the Tubao Police Station, about 100 meters away.
He was informed that a fight was going on in the bank. He rushed to the place on board
the police car. When he arrived at the scene, he saw Barangay Captain Rodolfo Oller and
his son Nicky Oller. Nicky handed to him the bolo which petitioner had used to stab
Dean. He and Rodolfo brought petitioner to the police station. On the way, they passed
by the loading area of tricycles, about 40 meters away from the police station. Petitioner
shouted: "Sinaksak kon pare, sangsangaili laeng isuna saan isuna to agari ditoy Tubao (I
stabbed him, he is just a visitor so he should not act like a king here in Tubao)." SPO1
Sulatre placed Benjamin in jail. Benjamin kept on shouting: " Napatay kon, napatay kon (I
killed him, I killed him)."
In the meantime, PO3 Valenzuela brought Dean to the Doña Gregoria Memorial Hospital
in Agoo, La Union. The victim was transferred to the Ilocos Regional Hospital (IRH) in
San Fernando, La Union where Dean was examined and operated on by Dr. Nathaniel
Rimando, with the assistance of Dr. Darius Pariñas. Dean sustained two stab wounds in
the anterior chest, left, and a lacerated wound in the right elbow, forearm. Had it not been
for the blood clot that formed in the stab wound on the left ventricle that prevented the
heart from bleeding excessively, Dean would have died from profuse bleeding.
Issue: WON the petitioner acted in self-defense whether complete or incomplete
Held: the well-entrenched rule is that findings of fact of the trial court in the ascertainment
of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of the evidence on record affirmed,
on appeal, by the CA are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the Court and
in the absence of any justifiable reason to deviate from the said findings.
In this case, the trial court gave no credence and probative weight to the evidence of
petitioner to prove that he acted in self-defense, complete or incomplete. Petitioner failed
to establish that the trial court and the appellate court misconstrued, misappropriated or
ignored facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a
modification or reversal of the decision of the CA that petitioner failed to establish clear
and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense, complete or incomplete. Like alibi,
petitioner's claim of self-defense is weak; it is also settled that self-defense is easy to
fabricate and difficult to disprove. Such a plea is both a confession and avoidance. One
who invokes self-defense, complete or incomplete, thereby admits having killed the victim
by inflicting injuries on him.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the accused proves
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression is a sudden and
unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or an
intimidating attitude.

Mondragon v. People, L-17666, 30 June 1966, 17 SCRA 476

Facts: At about 5:00 in the afternoon of July 11, 1954, while complainant Serapion
Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefield situated in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, to
drain the water therein and prepare the ground for planting the next day, he heard a shout
from afar telling him not to open the dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the
same voice shouted again, 'Don't you dare open the dike.' When he looked up, he saw
Isidoro Mondragon coming towards him. Nacionales informed appellant that he was
opening the dike because he would plant the next morning. Without much
ado, Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged the blow. Thereupon, appellant
drew his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of his body. Complainant backed
out, unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked appellant on the hand and forearm and
between the middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself. The appellant retreated,
and the complainant did not pursue him but went home instead.
Also upon the evidence, the offense committed is attempted homicide. Appellant's
intention to kill may be inferred from his admission made in court that he would do
everything he could to stop Nacionales from digging the canal because he needed the
water. However, it was established that the injuries received by the complainant were not
necessarily fatal as to cause the death of said complainant.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of
attempted homicide and not of the crime of less serious physical injuries.
Held: YES. The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, in our opinion, do not establish
the intent to kill on the part of the petitioner. The intent to kill being an essential element
of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. That element must be proved with the same degree of certainty
as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not
be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond
reasonable doubt (People vs. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488).

We hold that the facts brought out in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present
case do not justify a finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party.
On the contrary, there are facts brought out by the decision appealed from which indicate
that the petitioner had no intention to kill, namely: the petitioner started the assault on the
offended party by just giving him fist blows; the wounds inflicted on the offended party
were of slight nature, indicating no homicidal urge on the part of the petitioner; the
petitioner retreated and went away when the offended party started hitting him with a
bolo, thereby indicating that if the petitioner had intended to kill the offended party he
would have held his ground and kept on hitting the offended party with his bolo to kill him.
The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the
injuries suffered by the offended party were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in
less than 30 days, we hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only
that of less serious physical injuries.

People v. Sy Pio, L-5848, 30 April 1954, 94 Phil. 885

Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding
the defendant-appellant herein Sy Pio, alias Policarpio de la Cruz, guilty of frustrated
murder against the person of Tan Siong Kiap.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that early in the morning of September 3, 1949,
the defendant-appellant entered the store at 511 Misericordia, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Once
inside he started firing a .45 caliber pistol that he had in his hand. The first one shot was
Jose Sy. Tan Siong Kiap, who was in the store and saw the accused enter and afterwards
fire a shot at Jose Sy, asked the defendant-appellant, "What is the idea?" Thereupon
defendant-appellant turned around and fired at him also. The bullet fired from defendant-
appellant's pistol entered the right shoulder of Tan Siong Kiap and passed through his
back. Upon being hit, Tan Siong Kiap immediately ran to a room behind the store to hide.
From there he still heard gunshots fired from defendant-appellant's pistol, but afterwards
defendant-appellant ran away.
Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his wound was
treated. He stayed there on September 3 to September 12, 1949, when he was released
upon his request and against the physician's advice. He was asked to return to the
hospital for further treatment, and he did so five times for a period of more than ten days.
Thereafter his wound was completely healed. He spent the sum of P300 for hospital and
doctor's fees. The defendant-appellant shot two other persons in the morning of
September 3, 1949, before shooting and wounding Tan Siong Kiap; one was Ong Pian
and the other Jose Sy.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in not finding that Tan Siong Kiap received the shot
accidentally from the same bullet that have been fired at Jose Sy, and in finding that
defendant-appellant has commited a crime separate and distinct from that of murder
Held: NO. While the intent to kill is conclusively proved the wound inflicted was not
necessarily fatal, because it did not touch any of the vital organs of the body. As a matter
of fact, the medical certification issued by the physician who examined the wound of the
offended party at the time he went to the hospital, states that the wound was to heal within
a period of fourteen days, while the offended party actually stayed in the hospital for nine
days and continued receiving treatment thereafter five times for a period of more than ten
days, or a total of not more than thirty days.
In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was
hit, but he was able to escape and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to
escape, which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the
defendant- appellant that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. In
other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually performed all the acts
of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that
the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. And as it does not
appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and, as a matter of fact, he
ran away afterwards a reasonable doubt exists in our mind that the defendant-appellant
had actually believed that he had committed all the acts of execution or passed the
subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant-
appellant.
We are, therefore, not prepared to find the defendant-appellant guilty of frustrated murder,
as charged in the information. We only find him guilty of attempted murder, because he
did not perform all the acts of execution, actual and subjective, in order that the purpose
and intention that he had to kill his victim might be carried out.

People v. Dio, L-36461, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 151

Facts: That on or about the 24th day of July 1971, in Pasay City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Danilo Tobias @
Danny Kulot and Hernando Dio @ Way Kaon, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner, and with the use of a 'balisong', one of the accused was provided with, and
by means of force, threats and intimidation employed upon the latter, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and rob away from one Crispulo P. Alega,
one Seiko brand men's wrist watch (recovered); and the said accused in accordance with
and pursuant to their conspiracy, and in order to carry out their avowed purpose, with
intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
for several times Crispulo P. Alega, and which 'balisong' was directly aimed at the vital
portions of the body of said Crispulo P. Alega, thus performing all the acts of execution
causing his instantaneous death. Accused Dio pleaded not guilty.
Issue: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
OF THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AS DEFINED
AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 294, PAR. 1, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Held: YES. The crime committed by the appellant is attempted robbery with homicide and
the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. Since there was no attendant mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.
We have scrutinized the record, particularly the testimonial evidence, and indeed there
is no doubt that the appellant had a hand in the death of Crispulo Alega. There remains
to be considered, however, the claims of the appellant which are made in the
assignment of errors.
The appellant claims in his first assignment of error that he should not have been
convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery was
not consummated. He states that there was only an attempted robbery.

People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, 26 April 1990.

Facts: On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo
Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan was hatched about two days before. The
accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the
establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an employee thereat who was on her way out
for her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back
to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco,
and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie, the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told
the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter,
Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to
the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four
accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed.
Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after
which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there
as hostages.
At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four accused
also took turns eating while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to
produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released. Severino
answered that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the
lumber yard. Major Melquiades B. Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City,
negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed to them to surrender with
the assurance that no harm would befall them as he would accompany them personally
to the police station. The accused refused to surrender or to release the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the negotiations. In
her dialogue with the accused, which lasted for about four hours, Appellant demanded
P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00 instead,
explaining the difficulty of raising more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed
to receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco in going
out of the office. When they were out of the door, one of the accused whose face was
covered by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked
the padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the latter, in turn, gave
to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal
to the accused to surrender peacefully but they refused. Ultimatums were given but the
accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an
offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary
Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a
"macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be
amputated. The medical certificate described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic
shock when she was brought in to the hospital, and had to undergo several major
operations during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April 1986 he and
his co-accused entered the lumber yard and demanded money from the owner Severino
Choco. He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only P5,000.00, which he placed on
the counter of the office of the lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept
Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office. He maintained, however, that he
stopped his co-accused from getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the
P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were never touched by them. He claimed
further that they had never fired on the military because they intended to surrender.
Appellant's version also was that during the gunfire, Severino's daughter stood up and
went outside; he wanted to stop her but he himself was hit by a bullet and could not
prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to them to surrender but that
they gave themselves up only much later.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated
and in not holding that the same was merely attempted
Held: There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal
property belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation, the essence
of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and
consent and without the animus revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5
C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of
personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of robbery. Contrary to
Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated and not merely
attempted Robbery is in order.

People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990, 184 SCRA 105
Facts: The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal
Case No. 83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar.
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's
College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC)
soldier.
"In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her
classmates had just brought her home from a party .Shortly after her classmates had left,
she knocked at the door of her boarding house All of a sudden, Somebody held her and
poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of
another boarder
"She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since
the door which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced
complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor .With his left arm wrapped
around her neck and his right hand poking a 'balisong' to her neck, appellant dragged
complainant up the stairs.When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to
look for a room. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered
complainant's room.
"Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall.
With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed herself. He then ordered
complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off
her bra, pants and panty
"He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife
to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of
his penis entered her as she kept on moving
"Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position,
only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant
had both his hands flat on the door. Complainant thought of escaping.
"She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and
climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room.
Appellant again chased her. She fled to another room and jumped out through a window
"Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in
front of the boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she
ran around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were
inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs
crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it
around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and
saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
Issue: WON the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape
Held: The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced
due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will.
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the
labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina
is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration
of the female organ (People v. Tayaba,62 Phil. 559; People v. Rabadan, et al.,53 Phil.
694; United States v. Garcia,9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was
performed.The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts.Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of
rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in
rape can ever be committed.

People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, 30 March 2000

Facts: On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and
sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death, hence this case before us
on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA
7659.
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in
the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate
drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was
then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located
at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr.,brother of Corazon. As
Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan
inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants"
and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she
cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He
evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to
block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a
cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the
accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call
for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by
their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed.
Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-
genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her
hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter cdrep
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his
innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly
harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He asserted that in
truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly
pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position
that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and
accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back when
he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him as
he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo.
Vicente punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo
immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there.
Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not
true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead
pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the
relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall
instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Issue: WON
Held: Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ.
Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,touching of either labiaof
the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
But, to our mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic
potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and persist
in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already
been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal
behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazon's presence would have been to
pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although
relatively short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from
but even to conceal his evil design.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when
the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of
attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant case, hence,
the accused should be punished only for it
US v. Valdes, L-14128, 10 December 1918.
Facts: Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of April 28th of this year, when M. D. Lewin
was absent from the house in which he was living with his family, at No. 328, San Rafael
Street, San Miguel, Mrs. Auckback, who appears to have been a resident of the
neighborhood, called Mrs. Lewin and told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower
floor of the latter's house, for until then Mrs. Lewin had not noticed it, and as soon as her
attention was brought to the fact she ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the
fire, as he did, and he found, soaked with kerosene oil and placed between a post of the
house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a rag which were burning.
At that moment the defendant Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning,
while the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.
On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been
called for the purpose by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the
statement, Exhibit C, drawn up in the police station, admitted before several policemen
that it was he who had set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been noticed on the
date mentioned, and he also who had started the several other fires which had occurred
in said house on previous days; that he had performed such acts through the inducement
of the other prisoner, Hugo Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had trouble with,
their masters, and that, as he and his coaccused were friends, he had acted as he did
under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire that he should
start.
The defendant Severino Valdes admitted, in an affidavit, that he made declarations in the
police station, although he denied having placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked
with kerosene, in the place where they were found, and stated that it was the servant
Paulino who had done so. He alleged that, on being arraigned, he stated that he had set
fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he had gathered together, which is contrary to the
statement he made in the police station, to wit, that he had set the fire to the said rag and
piece of sack under the house.
Issue: WON Valdes is guilty consummated arson
Held: NO. The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant
performed all the acts conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to
causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The
offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said
inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn,
although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near
the partition of the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the fire not been
put out on time.
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed
beside an upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus
endangering the burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an
inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. This crime is
provided for and punished by Article 549, in connection with Articles 3, paragraph 2, and
65 of the Penal Code, and the sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation
is the defendant Severino Valdes, for, notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated
exculpations, the record discloses conclusive proof that it was he who committed the said
unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of having set the other fires that occurred
in said house. In an affidavit the defendant admitted having made declarations in the
police station, and though at the trial, he denied that he set fire to the sacks and the rag
which were found soaked in kerosene and burning, and, without proof whatever, laid the
blame unto his codefendant, the fact is that he confessed to having set fire to a pile of dry
leaves whereby much smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however,
did not forewarn his mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he
allowed the sack and the rag to continue burning until Mrs. Auckback, noticing a large
volume of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No proof was submitted to substantiate
the accusation he made against the servant Paulino, who apparently is the same person
as the driver Hugo Labarro.

People vs. Agao [G.R. No. 248049. October 4, 2022]

Facts: This appeal arose from two Informations dated October 27, 2014, which charged
accused-appellant Efren Agao y Añonuevo (appellant) with two counts of statutory rape,
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8353 in conjunction with R.A. 7610, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 1453-V-14 and 1454-V-14 lodged with Branch 172, Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City (RTC).
AAA was born on December 6, 1999 to BBB and CCC, her mother and father,
respectively. AAA's parents were not married, and separated when she was still a baby.
AAA added that her mother BBB later on lived with appellant, whom AAA identified as her
stepfather. AAA alleged that she first fell victim to appellant's abuse sometime in 2009,
when she was 10 years old, during an incident when appellant started touching her private
parts while he was bathing her. AAA thereafter chose not to tell her mother because she
was afraid the latter would not believe her.
AAA further testified that appellant first raped her in July 2010, at around 7:00 in the
morning. During her direct examination, she recalled that while she was sleeping, she
woke up to find appellant touching her breasts and vagina, and later on trying to insert his
penis into her vagina. AAA specifically testified that appellant undressed her and then
mounted her. She said that she both felt and saw appellant's penis hard against her, as
the appellant kept trying to insert it into her vagina, thereafter managing to introduce the
same into the outer fold, also called the labia majora of AAA's vagina. Appellant was
allegedly unable to fully penetrate AAA's vagina because she kept fighting back.
She further testified that appellant continued to molest her, including another time in
January 2012, when appellant raped her while she was sleeping. AAA testified that during
the latter incident, she woke up to find appellant touching her breast and then, later, trying
to insert his penis into her vagina. She added that similar to the incident in 2010,
appellant was also unable to fully penetrate her vagina as she also put up a fight.
Throughout all this time, despite the repeated assaults, she continued not to tell anyone,
not even her own mother BBB, for fear that BBB would not believe her, and that she would
only be humiliated. On cross-examination, it was further established that AAA chose not
to tell anyone about appellant's abuse because she was afraid that appellant might harm
her and BBB. It was also shown that up until the beginning of appellant's chronic abuse
of AAA, the latter did not harbor any ill feelings towards appellant.
Only after AAA and her mother BBB left appellant in June 2014, or over two years since
the last assault on her took place, did AAA muster the courage to tell her aunt about the
harrowing assaults she repeatedly experienced at the hands of appellant. Her aunt, in
turn, told her friend who was a police officer. When AAA told her father, CCC about it, the
latter accompanied her to the police station, where she finally lodged a complaint against
appellant.
Upon physical and genital examination on AAA by Police Chief Inspector Jocelyn P. Cruz
(PCI Cruz), it was found that there was no evident injury at the time of examination. PCI
Cruz opined that an erect penis, if it merely touches the labia, would not cause hymnal
laceration. She added that even if there was penetration, if the same happened sometime
in July 2010 and January 2012, it was medically possible that there were injuries and
lacerations sustained then, but the same may have already healed at the time of the
physical examination.
In his defense, appellant denied the allegations levelled against him, and countered that
he never molested AAA, but instead treated her like his own daughter. He added that the
allegations were triggered by CCC who signified that he wanted to get AAA, and that AAA
was only coached by CCC into spinning false accusations against him. Adding proof that
the accusations were baseless and that AAA did not harbor any ill feelings against him,
appellant testified that AAA even visited him several times during his detention, until she
was taken by the City Social Welfare Development Office.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the RTC decision which found
appellant guilty of two counts of rape through sexual intercourse as defined under Art
266-A par. 1 and Art 266-B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353 in conjunction with RA
7610
Held: WON the crime
Held: NO. Even more instructive is the Court's observation of an unmistakable lack of
clarity and consistency in the operative definition of the minimum genital contact which,
as we have seen in the jurisprudential arc, has been more of a subjective moving target
than a pinned down exposition. In other words, the appreciation of the minimum
genital contact that consummates rape, i.e., whether the erect penis of the accused
touched the labia of the pudendum of the victim's vagina as a precursor for vaginal
penetration, has been confounded, with said opacity easily resolvable by informing
jurisprudence of the exact anatomical situs of the pertinent body parts referred to
in settled jurisprudence, which, unlike other inexact matters that surround a rape
testimony, are as inarguable as they are true.
With careful and decisive reference to the anatomical illustration above, the Court clarifies
that when jurisprudence refers to "mere touching," it is not sufficient that the penis grazed
over the pudendum or the fleshy surface of the labia majora. Instead, what
jurisprudence considers as consummated rape when it describes a penis touching
the vagina is the penis penetrating the cleft of the labia majora, however minimum
or slight. Similarly, a mere grazing by the penis of the fleshy portion, not the vulval cleft
of the labia majora, will also constitute only attempted rape and not consummated rape,
since the same cannot be considered to have achieved the slightest level of
penetration. Stated differently, the Court here elucidates that "mere touch" of the
penis on the labia majora legally contemplates not mere surface touch or skin
contact, but the slightest penetration of the vulval or pudendal cleft, however
minimum in degree.
Doubtlessly, the minimum test of erect penile contact preparatory for consummation is
the soundest gauge of differentiating between attempted and consummated rape
because, as illustrated by the present case, this bare minimum penile contact may be all
that can be reasonably wrested from the testimony of a sexually abused child. On the
unenviable task of determining at which stage the crime of rape was committed,
the courts are further enjoined to be circumspect in their careful appreciation of
the language used to recount the manner, degree of penile contact, especially
when the victim attesting to the same is a minor child.
Appellant's attempts at ousting the positive and unequivocal testimony of the minor AAA
are of no moment, as minor inconsistencies that are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime charged are not material and will not sustain an acquittal. Furthermore,
jurisprudence is also replete with pronouncements from this Court that in child sexual
abuse cases, the child victim's disclosure is the most important evidence of sexual
abuse, which in this case is further physically corroborated by medical evidence.
Imputations of concoctions and false testimonies are also of no import as it is likewise
well-entrenched in our jurisdiction that courts are rightly inclined to lend credence to
testimonies of young offended parties in charges of sexual abuse, considering not only
their relative vulnerability but also the sheer trauma, scandal, and undue exposure
brought on by a public trial, which the offended minor would reasonably wish to avoid if
not for the fact that her accusations are as inconvenient as they are true. What is decisive
in a rape charge is that the commission of rape by the accused against the complainant
has been sufficiently proven. In this respect, the testimony of AAA, even on its own, is
credible, and sufficiently sustains a conviction. Further, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC
with respect to its non-appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of the stepdaughter-
stepfather relationship between AAA and appellant, since the marriage between AAA's
mother, BBB, and appellant was only alleged in the Information but not proved.