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Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Bharti Cellular LTD Delhi High Court
Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Bharti Cellular LTD Delhi High Court
in
+ I.T.A. 1120/2007
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WITH
+ I.T.A. 697/2008
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME
TAX (TDS) …Petitioner
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WITH
+ I.T.A. 1177/2007
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WITH
+ I.T.A.1020/2008
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WITH
+ I.T.A. 698/2008
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WITH
+ ITA 1154/2007
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WITH
+ I.T.A. 1155/2007
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WITH
+ I.T.A. 1129/2007
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WITH
+ I.T.A1159/2007
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WITH
+ I.T.A. 1135/2007
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WITH
+ I.T.A. 1171/2007
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+ I.T.A. 1121/2007
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CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKHDHER.
would continue to operate in the service areas for which the licences
by examples.
normal call charges from its subscriber ―A‖, it would have to pay a
long distance service provider) which would carry the call to the
from its subscriber ―A‖ and make the payment to BSNL as per the
in turn, would make the payment to Airtel (Delhi) for the local inter-
connect charges.
questions which have been framed in these appeals are related to the
source in view of the provisions of Section 194J of the said Act and
the assessees were liable to deduct tax at source when they made the
section 201 (1) of the said Act is not required to be made good by the
tax and have paid the entire tax. The learned counsel for the
liable to pay interest under section 201 (1A) of the said Act, as they
had not deducted tax at source which they were liable to deduct
charges were not covered within the expression ―fees for technical
that their case was clearly covered by the decision of the Madras
194J read with Section 9 (1) (vii), Explanation 2 of the said Act. It
was contended that the mere collection of a fee for use of a standard
facility provided to all those willing to pay for it does not amount to
the fee having been received for ―technical services.‖ It was also
Central BVoard of Direct Taxes and Anr : (1979) 118 ITR 312,
it was pointed out that ―technical service‖ has two components. The
first is the use of tools and the second being the application of human
contended that unless and until the element of human interface was
are relevant for the purpose of Section 194J would be those technical
the entire process of making a call and switching the call from one
charges could not fall within the meaning of ―fees for technical
194J of the said Act, was not correct in law. She contended that the
that the expression ―fees for technical services‖ has the same
parts. The first part is ―means and includes‖ type of definition and
appeals we are not concerned with the second part. The entire focus
Act.
avail of the benefit of the user of such equipment does not result in
payer of the fee and that mere collection of a ―fee‖ for use of a
standard facility provided to all those willing to pay for it did not
must examine the appeals at hand de hors the decision of the Madras
13. We have already pointed out that the expression ―fees for
section 9 (1) (vii) of the said Act. In the said Explanation the
words:-
This would mean that the word ―technical‖ would take colour from
cannot be a manager.
matter. Consult has also been defined in the said Dictionary as ―ask
and that too, sophisticated technology, but that does not mean that
(1) (vii) of the said Act. This is so because the expression ―technical
Ltd and Another v. State of U.P. and Others: (2005) 2 SCC 515, a
Supreme Court was of the view that the general meaning of ―luxury‖
Steels Ltd. v. CST: (1981) 2 SCC 141. The Supreme Court also
Phillips India Ltd (supra) observed that they did not read the said
also clear that the word ―technical‖ has been used in the ―society‖ of
Income Tax: (1999) 3 SCC 343 would be apposite. In that case the
80-HHC (2) (b) of the said Act relating to assessment years 1985-86,
1987-88 and 1988-89. In the said sub-section (2) (b) of Section 80-
HHC, it was provided that the Section did not apply to the following
The question that arose before the Supreme Court was whether
contention of the assessee before the Supreme Court was that while
Granite was a mineral in the general sense, it was not a mineral for
provided for therein was available to the assessee who was in the
arguments of the learned counsel for the assessee based upon the
HHC should be read in the context of the words ―ores‖ which it was
minerals as are extracted from ores and not others. While the
and ―ores‖ and not just ―ores‖. The Supreme Court held that these
three words taken together are intended to encompass all that may be
extracted from the earth. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that
employed the doctrine of noscitur a sociis and held that the word
―minerals‖ took colour from the words ―mineral oil which preceded
situation has arisen in the present appeals where the word ―technical‖
from the word ―managerial‖ and ―consultancy‖ and the three words
20. Before concluding we would also like to point out that the
construed in the abstract and general sense but in the narrower sense
machines or robots.
RAJIV SHAKHDHER
(JUDGE)