A Defense of Evidentialism: A Reply to Keith DeRoses objection against Richard Feldmans epistemic oughti Alfrederick C.

Araneta

This research paper will tackle the issue: when do we epistemically ought to believe a proposition. Richard Feldman gave three conditions to say that a person epistemically ought to believe a proposition. However Keith DeRose argues against this by giving a counter-example which shows that Feldmans conditions are insufficient. This paper then will argue against DeRoses objection by adding a fourth condition which Feldman calls well-foundedness. Using the notion of well-foundedness Feldmans epistemic ought will avoid the objection given by DeRoses counter-example. Introduction What should we believe? What should be the basis of our beliefs? These are some of the questions that are related to ones belief formation. These questions are covered by one main issue: when do we epistemically ought to believe a proposition? One evidentialist named Richard Feldman gave an account regarding this issue; Feldman (2000) Ethics of belief argues that, we epistemically ought to believe a proposition that follows from our evidence. Feldman (2000, 679) states that:
(O2) For any person S, time t, and proposition p, if S has any doxastic attitude at all towards p at t and Ss evidence at t supports p, then S epistemically ought to have the attitude towards p supported by Ss evidence at t.

This means that if we are to have an attitude (belief, disbelief or suspension of judgment) towards a proposition that we acknowledge and our evidence implies, we epistemically ought to have the attitude that our evidence supports. Suppose that a proposition tells us that it will rain tomorrow, following from Feldmans thesis we ought to believe it if we have strong evidence that supports it, disbelieve it if we have strong evidence against it and suspend our judgment if our evidence regarding this proposition is neutral. In defending (O2), Feldman says the reason we epistemically ought to believe something is because it is a way towards an epistemic goal. He says that there are three kinds of epistemic goals (truth, knowledge and reasonable belief) but Feldman says that only one of these three (which is reasonable belief) is a suitable goal for (O2) because the other two is problematic if we were to use it as a goal for (O2 ) (Feldman 2000, 682). Keith DeRose a known contextualist has tackled different issues in the field of epistemology, he argues against Feldmans (O2) by giving a counter-example. The counter-example implies that (O2)s conditions are insufficient because it respond against the objection of the counter-example. DeRoses counter-example shows Henry having good evidence for believing a proposition p, but he does not use it in believing proposition P, instead his belief is based on a different evidence which is in fact lousy 1

evidence. DeRose argues that following from Feldmans (O2), Henry is believing what he epistemically ought to believe but it would seem counter-intuitive to say that Henry is believing what he epistemically ought to, because Henrys belief is based on lousy evidence which led DeRose to conclude that Henry epistemically ought not to believe P. DeRoses criticism against (O2) lies in his understanding of the epistemic qualifier of ought. DeRose claims that, Henry ought not to believe P, is a more favorable candidate for the title of epistemic ought. The reason for this is that DeRose understands the epistemic qualifier of ought in the way that is most likely connected with knowledge (DeRose 2000, 698). DeRose says that should P turns out to be true, Henry would not know P, and that his failure to know would be tightly bound up with the fact that he was not believing as he ought, in this sense of ought (DeRose 2000 699). Hence, he claims that the epistemic qualifier is more appropriate where Henry ought not to believe that P. In this paper, I will defend Richard Feldmans account of epistemic ought against Keith DeRoses objection. I will argue that DeRoses counter-example does not threaten Feldmans (O2) for his example is epistemically defective. In proving this I will use one of Feldmans evidentialist notion which Feldman (1985) established in Evidentialism, which he calls well-foundedness. Well-foundedness is an evidentialist notion which is used to evaluate doxastic states, its application depends on two matter of evidence the evidence one has, and the evidence one uses in forming the attitude (Feldman and Conee 1985, 24). Using this I will prove that DeRoses counter-example is epistemically defective and is of no threat to (O2) because Henrys evidence, as well as the process that generated his attitude towards P are both defective. This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part I will discuss Feldmans evidential account of what epistemic ought means and the conditions to say that one epistemically ought to believe. In the second part I will present DeRoses arguments against Feldmans (O2). In the last part, using Feldmans account of well-foundedness as an added condition to Feldmans epistemic ought I will argue against DeRose.

Feldmans Evidentialism This part will be divided into two parts. The first part is an exposition of Feldmans notion of epistemic oughts and his formulation of (O2).Feldman argues that a person epistemically ought to believe a proposition when the proposition fits the evidence. In support of this claim, he started by giving a definition of epistemic ought and then gave the conditions in when to say a person epistemically ought to believe a proposition. In the second part I will discuss Feldmans three kinds of epistemic goals 2

(Truth, Knowledge and Reasonable Belief). Feldman use epistemic goals as a defense of (O2); he says that to be able to understand more about (O2) one should consider these epistemic goals. But Feldman says that only reasonable belief is a suitable epistemic goal for (O2) because the other two (truth and knowledge) would be a problematic epistemic goal for (O2).

A.

Feldmans Epistemic Ought I will start by giving a clear concept of what epistemic ought is for Feldman. Feldman (2000, 676)

writes:
There are oughts that result from ones playing a certain role or having a certain position. Teachers ought to explain things clearly. Parents ought to take care of their kids. Cyclists ought to move in various ways. Incompetent teachers, incapable parents, and untrained cyclists maybe unable to do what they ought to do. Similarly, Id say, forming beliefs is something people do. That is, we form beliefs in response to our experiences in the world. Anyone engaged in this activity ought to do it right. In my view, what they ought to do is to follow their evidence (rather than their wishes and fears). I suggest that epistemic oughts are of this sort they describe the right way to play a certain role.

Feldman is saying here that epistemic oughts are like role oughts in that they both tell us how to do things rights. Role oughts tell us how to play a certain role correctly while epistemic oughts tell us how to believe in the right way. He also says that it is our role to be believers and that it is something that we always do, it is really not something that we have a choice on because it is our way of responding to our everyday experiences. All of us then who are engage in this activity ought to do it right and the right way as Feldman puts it is by following our evidence. Now that I have given Feldmans definition of epistemic oughts, I will now go to Feldmans formulation of the conditions when we epistemically ought to believe a proposition. Feldman (2000, 678) states that:
(O1) For any proposition p, time t, and person S, S epistemically ought to have at t the attitude toward p that is supported by Ss evidence at t.

The attitude in question can be belief, disbelief or suspension of judgment. This means that if a person believes a proposition, that person epistemically ought to believe proposition p, at time t, if his evidence supports his belief on proposition p, at time t. We can see that (O1) gives two conditions:
1. A person has evidence for proposition p, at time t

2.

A persons evidence e, at time t, supports proposition p.

Suppose that a crime happened and Kevin is the perpetrator of the crime. Following from (O1) the investigators ought to believe that Kevin is the perpetrator of the crime if, first there are available evidence for the investigators regarding the crime (e.g. There are people who are willing to give testimonies about the crime.). Second, the evidence that the investigators acquire supports the belief that Kevin is the perpetrator of the crime (e.g. All of the testimonies say that they saw Kevin bathing in blood at the scene of the crime.). However Feldman thinks that (O1) is problematic because it seems that (O1) instructs us that we ought to have an attitude towards all the propositions that our evidence implies. Given the example earlier, the investigators believe that P1 (Kevin is the perpetrator of the crime.) and their evidence for this proposition is evidence E (Kevin is bathing in blood at the scene of the crime). But evidence E, also implies the proposition P2 (Kevin will wash his clothes when he gets home.). Following from (O1) the investigators epistemically ought to believe P1 and P2. Now the problem here is that, (O1) tells us that we ought to have an attitude not only to those propositions we consider but also to the propositions we do not consider but nonetheless are implied by our evidence. Feldman says that we are not obliged to believe all the propositions that our evidence implies because many of these propositions will be questionable and perhaps are of no value to us. It may happen that we are justified in believing some of these propositions because our evidence supports these propositions sufficiently well. But it is not true that we ought to believe them. To do so would constitute and exceedingly use of our cognitive resources (Feldman 2000, 678-679). In this case, it is wrong to say that the investigators epistemically ought to believe P2 since believing P2 at that moment is of no value for the investigators. Considering the problem present in (O1), Feldman reformulated his thesis. Feldman (2000, 679) states that:
(O2) For any person S, time t, and proposition p, if S has any doxastic attitude at all toward p at t and Ss evidence at t supports p, then S epistemically ought to have the attitude toward p supported by Ss evidence at t.

We can see here that there are now three conditions present in (O2). (O2) solves the problem that is present in (O1) by giving a third condition.
1. 2. 3. A person has evidence for proposition p, at time t. A persons evidence e, at time t, supports proposition p. A person considers/apprehends proposition p, in light of evidence e.

The third condition tells us that a person ought to have an attitude towards the proposition if the person knows the proposition in light of his evidence. This means that the person must know the 4

proposition is implied by the evidence. (O2) in using the third condition avoids the problem in (O1) by restricting us to have an attitude only to those propositions we consider/apprehend that our evidence implies. Going back to the investigators, following from (O2) the investigators epistemically ought to believe P1 (Kevin is the perpetrator of the crime.) but not P2 (Kevin will wash his clothes when he gets home.). Since at that moment the investigators do not even know that P2 is implied by evidence E (Kevin is bathing in blood at the scene of the crime) and at that time there is no reason for the investigators to believe P2. In effect (O2) still conjoins three principles that were also present in (O1): If a person is going to have an attitude towards a proposition then that person ought to believe it if his current evidence supports it, disbelieve it if his current evidence is against it, and suspend judgment about it if his evidence is neutral (Feldman 2000, 679). An example is, suppose that a group of student read in a piece of paper that classes are suspended tomorrow. Following from the three principles, the students ought to believe it if they have strong evidence that supports it (The teachers announced that there will be no class tomorrow). In cases that they have strong evidence against it (The teacher were the ones who wrote it and it was supposed to be a prank) they have to disbelieve it and suspend judgment if the contradicting evidences are equally weighty. Another feature of (O2) which Feldman claims is that it solves a confusing issue about whether epistemic principles state what you are required(ought) to believe or what you are permitted to believe. Suppose for example that a persons evidence supports sufficiently an unconsidered and unimportant proposition. This fact following from (O2) tells us that the person ought not to believe it. But if the person is to have an attitude towards it, it ought to be belief since the proposition is sufficiently supported. So, its not just that believing it is permitted, its the only permissible attitude. It is the one he ought to have if he is to have any attitude. Thus, no attitude is epistemically required, but one is epistemically permitted (Feldman 2000, 679-680). Following from this, (O2) thus rules out the possibility of having two attitudes towards a proposition being permitted at the same time. Some critics argue against this by making an analogy in terms of moral situations. They say that there are cases of ties in morality wherein two actions are morally permissible but neither is obligatory. Suppose that its permissible for me to give my extra money to the Cancer Society and its permissible to give it to the Heart Association. Its not permissible to spend it inappropriately. It follows then, that it is permissible to give my money to the Heart Association and also permissible to refrain from giving my money to the Heart Association. Both incompatible actions are thus permissible. Feldman argues against this by saying that epistemic cases are not similar to moral cases; there are no ties (in the sense of moral cases) in 5

epistemic cases. This means that in epistemic cases two different attitudes towards a proposition cannot be permitted at the same time (Feldman 2000, 680). Feldman then discusses three potential cases of epistemic ties. The first and the easiest to dispose of are cases in which the contradicting pieces of evidence regarding a proposition are equally weighty. In these cases, evidentialism implies that the only acceptable attitude is suspending judgment. Neither belief nor disbelief is permitted. The second kind of case consists in which both contradicting propositions are sufficiently supported by the evidence. For example, there is equally good evidence supporting the guilt of both suspects for a crime that could have been committed by only one person. Basing from the evidence we have good reason to think that either is guilty but obviously not both because evidence tells us that only one could have done the crime. In this case, it is permissible to believe that suspect A is guilty and suspect B is not, and it is permissible to believe suspect that B is guilty and A is not. In fact, however Feldman says that, in this situation described we should not believe that either suspect is guilty. Again, if we are to have an attitude towards these propositions, the right attitude is to suspend judgment since both propositions are equally well-supported. The third and most difficult sort of case Feldman says is when we only have a modest amount of evidence supporting a proposition. Its tempting to think that both belief and suspension of judgment are permissible attitudes to have. The reason is that belief requires more than just this modest amount of evidence and believing on only a modest amount of evidence involves taking some epistemic risk. In this kind of cases, Feldman says that we should believe when our evidence is supportive rather than neutral, even if the evidence is not at all decisive. Feldman argues that those who say that ones evidence supports believing a proposition only when the evidence is sufficiently strong will possibly be led to borderline cases. In a case in which this modest amount of evidence is slightly in favor of a proposition, they might think that both believing and suspension of judgment is permissible (Feldman 2000, 681). In these cases, we can see how important evidence is in determining what we ought to believe. But even though Feldman claims that evidence is a necessary element in forming ones belief, he also admits that there are still problems in the use of evidence. Feldman (2000 681-682) says that:
The evidentialist account of what we epistemically ought to believe relies crucially on the notion of evidential support. Analyzing this notion in a fully satisfactory way is no easy task. Among the problems to be worked out is that of determining which logical consequences of a body of evidence are supported by the evidence. There are possible cases in which a person has evidence that implies some proposition, but the connection between that evidence and that consequence is distant and difficult to see. It may be well

beyond the intellectual talents of the person. I believe that in such cases the person ought not to believe the consequence. Given his failure to see that is a consequence. To believe it would be rash. Furthermore, as I understand (O2), it has exactly the right result in this sort of case. The fact that a persons evidence implies some proposition is not sufficient for the evidence to provide evidential support for the proposition. Roughly, only those proposition whose connection to the evidence the person apprehends are actually supported by his evidence.

This tells us that although Feldman believes evidence is a significant part of what we epistemically ought to believe, he knows there are still problems regarding evidential support. He admits that these kinds of problems are complex and thus, he did not say more about these problems. But he said that in the kind of situation where one cannot see the connection between the evidence and the logical consequence, one ought not to believe the logical consequence. He claims that in this kind of situation (O2) gives us an idea on what to do. As I have discussed earlier (O2) restricts us to have an attitude only to those propositions we consider. Which makes us avoid the danger of being ought to form an attitude towards propositions that we do not consider but is supported by our evidence. I will also not tackle anything about the problems regarding evidential support. Instead, I will go to the next part of the paper where I will tackle what Feldman calls epistemic goals. B. Reasonableness as an epistemic goal Feldman claims that why we ought to do something right is because it is a way towards some goal/value. Similarly, why we epistemically ought to believe something is because it is a means towards an epistemic goal. Feldman claims then, to achieve something of epistemic value, what we ought to do is to follow our evidence. There are three kinds of epistemic value which Feldman discussed, first is truth, second is knowledge and third is reasonable belief. Feldman says only reasonable belief is a suitable defense of (O2), because truth and knowledge will be a problematic defense of (O2). B1. Truth The idea in achieving truth is by acquiring only true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Feldman (2000, 683) states that:
(V1) Each person maximizes epistemic value by making it the case that for every proposition p, he or she believes p if p is true and does not believe p if p is false.

Feldman says there are a few problems with a defense of (O2) that is based on (V1). For one thing, (V1) would seem better suited as a defense of (O1) (remember that O1 does not restricts us in having attitudes only to those propositions we consider), since (V1) assigns value to believing all truths, 7

not just to the ones about which one has some attitude or other. Furthermore, the connection between (V1) and (O2) is based on the assumption that following ones evidence is the best way to get at truth. But the problem here is that, if you are in unfortunate circumstances in which the evidence you have will lead to false beliefs, following your evidence is not the best way to truth. That is, it is not the most effective way to get at truth. In these circumstances ignoring your evidence is a better way to believe truths. But Feldman argues that even though following ones evidence might not be an infallible way to achieve the goal stated in (V1) or even the most effective way, it is nevertheless the best or most reasonable way in acquiring true beliefs (Feldman 2000, 683). B2. Knowledge Another kind of epistemic goal which is of epistemic importance is knowledge. Feldmans (2000, 684) for this, states that:
(V2) Each person maximizes epistemic value by making it the case that for every proposition p, he or she knows p if p is true and knows p if p is false.

Feldman says one argument from (V2) to (O2) goes as follows. Given that one acquires knowledge only if one has good evidence for what one believes, one can acquire beliefs with epistemic value only by following ones evidence. In other words, following ones evidence is a necessary condition for getting what (V2) says has epistemic value. If we epistemically ought to do what is necessary to obtain this epistemic value, then we epistemically ought to follow our evidence. Feldman says that the problem here is there are cases where beliefs do not satisfy the conditions for knowledge and therefore cannot be considered as knowledge. This means that considering knowledge as an epistemic goal would make these beliefs of no epistemic value. Feldman says that there is no reason to say that these beliefs that fall short of knowledge should be considered of no value because as long as these beliefs fits ones evidence, these beliefs have epistemic value. B3. Reasonable Belief Feldman says that we avoid the problems associated with identifying epistemic value with true belief or knowledge if instead we say that what has epistemic value is rational belief. As a believer to achieve something of epistemic significance, one must form only rational beliefs. To understand this evidential perspective on epistemic value and epistemic ought, Feldman gave an example. Consider a person who is contemplating a particular position. To carry out the role of being a believer in an epistemically good way, in a way that maximizes epistemic value, the person must adopt a rational attitude towards this proposition. There are other values that beliefs might yield. Some beliefs have prudential or moral value. They might make people feel good or provide comfort for others. They might 8

help one to undertake risky but beneficial behavior. They might give one, self-confidence that can be help to advance ones career. But beliefs that are beneficial in these ways can nevertheless fail to be rational. They can lack epistemic value. To achieve epistemic value one must, in each case, follow ones evidence (Feldman 2000, 685). Understanding this, Feldman (2000, 685) formulation of reasonable belief as a defense of (O2) states that:
(V3) When adopting (or maintaining) an attitude toward a proposition, p, a person maximizes epistemic value by adopting (or maintaining) a rational attitude toward p.

Given that (V3) specifies what maximizes epistemic value, a believer epistemically ought to form attitudes as directed by (O2): he ought to follow his evidence. This defense of {O2) depends on the substantive epistemological thesis that rationality consists in making ones beliefs conform to ones evidence. A feature of (V3) as a defense of (O2) is that anyone who is about to adopt an attitude towards a proposition, p, and who adheres to the dictates of (O2) will get knowledge (of p or of p) when ever such knowledge is attainable. If the available evidence is strong enough to yield a belief wellenough justified for knowledge, and the other conditions for knowledge are satisfied, then the person will have knowledge. Where knowledge is not attainable, the person will have reasonable belief (Feldman 2000, 685-686). In a way we can say that having reasonable belief is a simpler epistemic goal than knowledge and is easier to be attained because there is less condition to be satisfied. What we ought to do is to have a rational attitude towards a proposition. This means that if a person is to have an attitude towards a proposition, that attitude must fits the persons evidence and the attitude is wellsupported by the evidence Now that I have establish Feldmans evidentialist account of epistemic oughts, I will now proceed to the next part where I will discuss about Keith Deroses argument against Feldmans evidentialist account of epistemic ought. Keith DeRoses counter-example Keith DeRose presented an example to refute Feldmans account of evidentialism. His example presents Henry who firmly believes the proposition P1 (Kevin stole his bike.). Henry has excellent evidence, E1 (A friend of him saw Kevin stealing his bike.) for P1 which sufficiently supports the attitude he adopted towards P1. Suppose further that Henry doesnt possess evidence against P1, so the attitude towards P1 that fits all evidence Henry possesses is the confident belief that P1 which Henry in fact holds. But suppose that Henry doesnt believe P1 on the basis of evidence E1. Indeed, Henry hasnt even 9

considered P1 in light of evidence E1, and the fact that he possesses good evidence for P1 is no part of the explanation for why Henry believes that P1. Rather Henry believes P1 on the basis of a different evidence, E2 (He and Kevin had a fight yesterday.) that he considers good evidence for P1 but which in fact constitute absolutely lousy evidence for P1. Its Henrys hatred towards Kevin that led him to believe that this lousy evidence is strong evidence for believing that Kevin stole his bike. Looking at this counter-example, Feldmans (O2) tells us that Henry epistemically ought to believe that P1 because it is the attitude that fits his evidence (even if it is not good evidence). But it would seem counter-intuitive to say that Henry epistemically ought to believe P1 because his belief on P1 is based on lousy evidence. This problem led DeRose to claim that Henry epistemically ought not to believe P1. His first objection is that Henry epistemically ought not to believe P1 since his evidence is not good evidence for P1. This argument of DeRose lies in his understanding of the epistemic qualifier of ought as something that is tightly connected with the concept of knowledge. DeRose says that even if P1 turns out to be true, Henry would not know P1 because he is not believing as he ought in this sense of ought. Hence, in this case DeRose says that the epistemic qualifier of ought would be more appropriate in the ought where ought not to believe P1 (DeRose 2000, 698). DeRose added another scenario to his counter-example against Feldmans (O2). He says, suppose then that there is evidence E3 (A common friend of Henry and Kevin, is with Kevin at the time Henrys bike was stolen.) Henry very easily could have and should have gathered, but he negligently never encountered. This would have been very strong evidence against P1. So strong that despite the excellent evidence, E1, Henry possesses (which he didnt use) in favor of P1, this negative evidence that Henry should have gathered would have completely overwhelmed the positive evidence he actually possesses, such that disbelief of P1 would have been the attitude that would fit Henrys evidence (DeRose 2000, 699). Given this new addition, it reinforces DeRose claims that Henry epistemically ought not to believe P1. His second objection is that in this case Henry is not doing a good job of gathering evidence. This is a concern to Henrys role as a believer. Feldman argues that by following the conditions given by (O2) one can do well in playing his role as a believer who ought to believe things right. But in the counter-example even though Henry satisfies the conditions given by (O2), one can say that Henry is still not doing a good job of gathering evidence. Since there is evidence that he could easily have but never acquired which led him to have the wrong attitude towards P1. DeRose also says that what this new addition to the example do is to show how important is the sense of ought which yield the answer that Feldman wants. DeRose says that the challenge to Feldman is not to defend that there is some admissible sense of ought that supports his thesis (given how 10

semantically flexible ought is) but to tell us why that very particular sense is epistemically important (DeRose 2000, 700). Following from this, DeRose asks is there any way of understanding the phrase epistemically ought, a way on which (O2) is plausible but not trivial?, he says that there are two hints from Feldman in answering this question but both of these does not work (DeRose 2000, 701). DeRose says that the first hint is where Feldman writes as if the sense of ought in Henry ought not to believe that P are long-range senses, whereas the epistemic sense in which Henry ought to believe that P, and on which (O2) is true, specifies what Henry ought to believe right now. Feldman says that if there is evidence one could have and should have possessed this may indicate such a long-term conclusion as that one ought to go gather this evidence, or ought to adopt different policies of evidence gathering. These may generate various oughts about ones belief but as Feldman says, some of these might be moral or prudential ought and not epistemic ought. DeRose says, that this indeed would make Feldmans sense of ought important. But DeRose argues that the ought where Henry ought not to believe that P seems to specify also things about the status of Henrys belief right now. That there is important evidence against P that Henry could easily have and should have possessed. Henry right now ought not to believe that P. DeRose argues that the main problem he has with Feldmans (O2) involves not the evidence that Henry should possessed, but the evidence that Henry actually bases his belief in fact lousy evidence. This indicates an important sense in which Henry ought not to believe that P which most definitely indicates a problem with Henrys believing right now (DeRose 2000, 701-702). The second hint DeRose says, is where Feldman claims epistemic ought are in a sense tied up with the concept of role ought. DeRose says, this perhaps can give us a definition on what the qualifier epistemic mean in the title epistemic ought: To believe what you ought to believe, in this sense, is to perform well in fitting the role of a believer. DeRose says that if (O2) were correct about the ought that specified how we are to fill the role of a believer; it would certainly be a very important result. But DeRose argues that if this is what Feldman means, then his evidentialist thesis is surely false. The reason for this is that, Henrys performance is poor in all aspects. Hes doing it (believing), but not doing it right. Hes doing a lousy job of gathering evidence and a lousy job of processing the evidence he has. His belief seems irrational and unjustified, and even if it happens to be true, it certainly is not a piece of knowledge. Henry is not doing a good job of filling the role of a believer, yet DeRose understands that he satisfies the conditions of Feldmans (O2) for believing what he ought. DeRose says, that perhaps Feldman would say that although Henry did perform poorly, he still ended up believing what he would have believed if he had performed well in filling the role of a believer. In that way Henry is believing what he ought to believe, but DeRose claims that this would only be true on a very specialized notion of 11

what it is to fill the role of a believer. To do it right, to do a good job of filling the role of a believer, or of a reasonable believer, it seems one should both gather and process evidence in the right way. Also if Henry had both gathered and process evidence in the right way, he would not believe that P. So Henry did not perform well in filling the role of a believer, nor did he end up believing what he would have believed if he had performed well in that role, despite the fact that he satisfies Feldmans (O2) (DeRose 2000, 702-703). A Defense of Evidentialism Before I go to my argument against DeRose, let us first recall the claims of both sides. Feldman has given three conditions when a person epistemically ought to believe a proposition. First, a person has evidence for proposition P, at time T, second his evidence E, at time T, supports proposition P and third a person consider/apprehends proposition P, in light of evidence E. DeRose argues against this by giving a counter-example where the person (Henry) following from the conditions given by Feldmans (O2) is believing what he epistemically ought to believe. But it would seem that the person is not believing what he epistemically ought to believe because his evidence for his belief is actually lousy evidence. This led DeRose to conclude that, contrary to (O2), the person epistemically ought not to believe the proposition. The implication of this is that Feldmans (O2) is insufficient for it cannot account for this kind of situation. Now, my claim is DeRoses counter-example against Feldmans (O2) is epistemically defective and should be of no threat to (O2). In support of this claim I will use Feldmans (1985) notion of wellfoundedness as which he established in his previous paper entitled Evidentialism. Well-foundedness is an evidentialist notion which is used to evaluate doxastic states. It is an evidentialist notion because its application depends on two matters of evidence - the evidence one has and the evidence one uses in forming an attitude. Feldman (1985, 24) states that:
(WF) Ss doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is well-founded if and only if 1. 2. Having d towards p is justified for S at t; and S has d towards p on the basis of some body of evidence e, such that 2a. S has evidence at t; 2b. Having d towards p fits e; and 2c. There is no more inclusive body of evidence e had by S at t such that having D toward p does not fit e.

The first condition focuses on the attitude a person has towards a proposition. The first condition states a persons belief towards a proposition is well-founded if and only if his belief towards 12

the proposition is justified at time t. Understanding the term justified is important in understanding the first condition. We must understand here the justification of an attitude does not only imply that the attitude fits the evidence but also that the attitude was formed in the right way. This means that the person followed the right way of processing the evidence in forming the attitude and the evidence he used to form an attitude towards the proposition is the right evidence for the proposition. The second condition conjoins three sub-conditions and focuses on the evidence a person has. The second condition states that a persons belief towards a proposition is well-founded if and only if his belief on the proposition is based from evidence such that he has evidence at time t; his belief fits the evidence he has and he has not acquire evidence that goes against his belief on the proposition. This means that the attitude (belief, disbelief, suspensions judgment) a person has towards a proposition must always be well-supported by evidence to satisfy the second condition. The purpose of well-foundedness for evidentialism is that it avoids being refuted by cases in which a person has evidence but does not use justifying evidence in forming a belief. Using this as a fourth condition for Feldmans account of epistemic ought it will help avoid the counter-example given by DeRose where Henry did not use good evidence in forming the belief. Adding the notion of wellfoundedness the new formulation will be:
(O3) A person epistemically ought to have an attitude (belief, disbelief or suspension of judgment) towards a proposition, if the persons evidence supports his belief on the proposition at time t, the person considers the proposition in light of this evidence and the persons evidence and attitude towards belief is well-founded.

This tells formulation gives us now four conditions and the fourth condition avoids the objection of the counter-example given by DeRose by evaluating the attitude and evidence one uses in forming the belief.
1. 2. 3. 4. A person has evidence for proposition p, at time t. A persons evidence e, at time t, supports proposition p. A person consider/apprehend proposition p, in light of evidence e. A persons evidence e, and attitude d, at time t, towards proposition p, is well-founded.

Given this new formulation I will now analyze the counter-example given by DeRose in term of well-foundedness. It was stated there that Henry has good evidence E1, for a proposition P1 but instead he did not use this good evidence E1, in believing P1. Instead he used another kind of evidence E2 which is considered lousy evidence for believing proposition P1. In the condition given by well-foundedness 13

the counter-example was only able to satisfy the second condition but not the first condition. In the second condition although DeRose added in the counter-example that there is strong evidence against P that if Henry was able to acquire this evidence, his belief on P1 would not fit this evidence. Henry was not able to know of this evidence which means he did not violate what is stated by the third subcondition. This means that his belief towards proposition P1 still fits his evidence. But the problem arises when we analyze the counter-example in terms of the first condition. Henry did not satisfy the first condition which makes his belief on proposition P1, epistemically defective. Henrys belief on proposition P1, is not well-founded because although the attitude that Henry has towards proposition P1, fits lousy evidence E2, which he used in forming his belief, evidence E2 is not a good evidence for proposition P1. This means that evidence E2, although Henry thinks that it sufficiently supports proposition P1, it does not really sufficiently support proposition P1. This implies that Henrys evidence is defective which led him to also have a defective process of forming his belief. DeRose was right in saying that Henry did not perform well in filling the role of a believer. Henry has good evidence for believing proposition P1, but he did not use this good evidence in formulating his belief. Instead he used lousy evidence for believing P1, which tells that Henry did not process his evidence in the right way. There is also strong evidence against P that Henry could easily have acquired that if he was able to acquire this, he would have a different attitude towards proposition P1. This tells us that Henry also did not do well in gathering evidence because there is evidence he could easily have acquired but he never acquired. Considering the notion of well-foundedness in this case, Henrys belief is not well-founded because the evidence that he used are defective. Hence, given (O3) DeRoses counter-example is defective and should not be considered a threat to Feldmans account of epistemic ought.

14

Conclusion In the first part of this paper I established Feldmans account of epistemic ought. He says that epistemic ought are like role ought in that they both describe how to do things right. I also discussed the three conditions given by Feldman regarding when do we epistemically ought to believe. After that, I discussed what Feldman classifies as epistemic goals and which he claims reasonable belief as the suitable defense of (O2). In the second part I discussed DeRoses counter-example against (O2) and his arguments showing that Feldmans (O2) lacks in some way for it cannot account for the situation that was given by the counter-example. In the last part of the paper I presented my arguments against DeRose grounding on Feldmans own framework. Using the notion of well-foundedness as a fourth condition, I claimed that DeRoses counter-example involving Henry, is of no threat to Feldmans account of epistemic ought because Henrys formulation of belief is epistemically defective. I think that if DeRose were to argue against Feldmans epistemic ought, he should also consider the notion of wellfoundedness because this notion as Feldman says is vital in understanding evidentialism.

15

References:

Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee. 1985. Evidentialism.Philosophical Studies 48 (30 November): 1534.http://www.springerlink.com/content/nx3162564v154127/fulltext.pdf(accessed November 20, 2010).

Feldman, Richard. 2000. The Ethics of Belief.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.60, No.3: 667-695.http://0-www.jstor.org.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/stable/2653823(accessed January 30, 2010).

Derose, Keith. 2000. Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.60, No.3: 697-706.http://0-www.jstor.org.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/stable/2653824(accessed January 30, 2010).

I would like to thank the following the persons for assisting in the completion of this paper: My parents for their unconditional love and support throughout my extended stay in this University; Sir Mark Dacela for invaluable comments and suggestions regarding this paper; Sir Dennis Apolega for his guidance in the presentation and defense of this paper; and most importantly, for their stalwart friendship throughout the long and difficult road towards philosophical mastery the Fantastic Four: the Human Torch (Kevin Mizuchi), Invisible Woman (Steffi Hapitan), and Mr. Fantastic (Chuckie Manio). To further adventures in all possible worlds!

16