Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Understandin G A Statute
Understandin G A Statute
Understandin G A Statute
Understandin
g a Statute
Scope of the Module
Anatomy of a statute
Canons of Interpretation
Drafting a Statute
Anatomy of a Legislation
A statute is simply the will of
the legislature
INTRODUCTIO
N
The function of the court is to
interpret the statute
according to the intent of
them that made it
NUMBERING AND CITATIONS
01 02 03
Generally statutes are After the title the date Normally statutes are
cited by their short on which statute numbered serially
titles or more receives assent is throughout the year
precisely by the year inserted
and their passing and
their chapter
numbers.
Different Parts of A Statute- The Title
The long title is set out at the head of the statute and gives a fairly full description and
general purpose of the Act.
The modern view is that the Title is an important part of the statute and can be referred to as
an aid in the construction of an act/Statute.
Long title normally starts in these word “An Act to provide security for the tenure for
occupying tenants under certain leases of residential property at low rents”
Long title though can be looked at for resolving an ambiguity yet it may not be looked at to
modify the interpretation of plain language.
Different Parts of A Statute- Preamble
It defines the main objects of the Act and are considered as an aid in
interpretation of statutes
Preambles are however, same in weight as of enacting provisions
These are normally printed at the side of the Act with a view to help to summarize the effect
of the section
Notes are not the part of the statute therefore, should not be considered in construction of
the statute.
Different Parts of A Statute-
• Headings
Headings are regarded as preambles of the sections
• Heading cannot control the plain words of the statute but they may
explain ambiguous words.
• A heading of one group of sections cannot be used as an aid for
interpretation of another group of sections.
Different Parts of A Statute- Schedules
01 02 03 04
They are as much They can be used Similarly, Within a schedule
part of an Act as in constructing provisions in a ambigous words
any other part can provision in the schedule will be may be
be body of the Act construed in the constructed by
light of what is reference to the
enacted in the cross-headings
sections
Section 3
Subsection 2
Paragraph (a) (b)
Sub paragraph (i)
Layout of a statute
Identify the different parts of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023
Organize the Layout of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 in table
Exercise
Layout of a statute
1. Offences
If, save as permitted by this Act, any person mutilates, kicks, beats, nails,
or otherwise impales, stabs, burns, stones, crushes, drowns, drags, or
asphyxiates any wild mammal with intent to inflict unnecessary suffering
he shall be guilty of an offence.
[2. . . . omitted here]
3. Interpretation
In this Act ‘wild mammal’ means any mammal which is not a domestic or
captive animal within the meaning of the Protection of Animals Act 1911 . .
.
Exercise 5: Digital Personal Data
Protection Act
4. (1) A person may process the personal data of a Data Principal only in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and for a lawful purpose,—
(a) for which the Data Principal has given her consent; or
(b) for certain legitimate uses.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the expression “lawful purpose” means any purpose which is not expressly
forbidden by law.
5. (1) Every request made to a Data Principal under section 6 for consent shall be accompanied or preceded by a
notice given by the Data Fiduciary to the Data Principal, informing her,—
(i) the personal data and the purpose for which the same is proposed to be processed;
(ii) the manner in which she may exercise her rights under sub-section (4) of section 6 and section 13; and
(iii) the manner in which the Data Principal may make a complaint to the Board, in such manner and as may be prescribed.
Illustration for Exercise 5
X, an individual, opens a bank account using the mobile app or website of Y, a bank. To complete the Know-Your-
Customer requirements under law for opening of bank account, X opts for processing of her personal data by Y in
a live, video-based customer identification process. Y shall accompany or precede the request for the personal data
with notice to X, describing the personal data and the purpose of its processing.
(2) Where a Data Principal has given her consent for the processing of her personal data before the date of
commencement of this Act,—
(a) the Data Fiduciary shall, as soon as it is reasonably practicable, give to the Data Principal a notice informing
her,––
(i) the personal data and the purpose for which the same has been processed;
(ii) the manner in which she may exercise her rights under sub-section (4) of section 6 and section 13; and
(iii) the manner in which the Data Principal may make a complaint to the Board, in such manner and as may be
prescribed.
Questions related to Exercise 5
S. 6(4): Where consent given by the Data Principal is the basis of processing of personal data, such Data
Principal shall have the right to withdraw her consent at any time, with the ease of doing so being
comparable to the ease with which such consent was given.
S. 13: (1) A Data Principal shall have the right to have readily available means of grievance redressal
provided by a Data Fiduciary or Consent Manager in respect of any act or omission of such Data Fiduciary
or Consent Manager regarding the performance of its obligations in relation to the personal data of such Data
Principal or the exercise of her rights under the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
(2) The Data Fiduciary or Consent Manager shall respond to any grievances referred to in sub-section (1)
within such period as may be prescribed from the date of its receipt for all or any class of Data Fiduciaries.
(3) The Data Principal shall exhaust the opportunity of redressing her grievance under this section before
approaching the Board.
Interpretation of a
Statute
CANONS OF INTERPRETATION
Stat Interpretation -
What is it?
Example: In the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, the phrase “dangerous dog
breeds” is unclear. The Act prohibits keeping of these 4 dog breeds:
Pit Bull Terrier |Japanese Tosa |Dogo Argentino|Fila Brasileiro
What about breeds like Pakistani Bull Mastiff, Turkish Kangal Shepherd
Dog, what about mixed breed dogs.
Problems of interpretation
4. Unlike a conversation between two people, there is
no recourse to the original speaker when the problem
arises.
There is no opportunity to say, ‘Excuse me, but I didn’t quite
follow.
What exactly did you mean by that?’
However, court will not be able to refer or have conversation
with the Parliament to know the meaning of certain sections
in a legislation. They are forced to make up their own
extensions to interpret the statute.
Tools to interpret
courts
have The literal rule
developed
rules to
assist
The golden rule
judges in
interpretin The mischief rule
g statutes.
The purposive approach
Literal Rule
Methods of Interpretation – Literal Rule
Bloxham paid £500 for a car and promised a further £800 once the log-book was delivered.
The log-book was not delivered and Bloxham realised the car must have been stolen.
Eventually he sold the car for £200.
S22 Theft Act 1968 (1) “A person handles stolen goods if he dishonestly undertakes or
assists in their disposal by or for the benefit of another person”.
Answer:
X is another person who benefited from buying a cheap car, therefore Bloxham is guilty.
London & North Eastern
Railway Co v Berriman (1946)
There can be
disagreement as to
Creates loopholes
what amounts to Leads to injustice
in the law
the ordinary or
natural meaning
Creates awkward
precedents which Undermines public
require confidence in the
Parliamentary time law
to correct
Golden Rule
Golden Rule
The golden rule of statutory interpretation may be applied where an application of the literal
rule would lead to an absurdity. The courts may then apply a secondary meaning.
The golden rule aims to adapt the meaning of the words in the Parliament Act, in order to
not reach an absurd decision.
The court will always start off with the literal approach, however, if this fails to make sense,
the golden rule will be applied.
Narrow: the courts will choose
between the best of two
Narrow and alternative meanings. “If [words]
are capable of more than one
Wide meaning, then you can choose
Approaches between those meanings, but
beyond this you cannot go.”
Wider approach
Apply the literal rule firstly to this case. Would the Defendant be guilty?
Law:
You cannot obstruct a member of Her Majesty’s forces engaged in security duty in the
vicinity of a prohibited place.
Adler v George (1964)
Adler gained access to a Royal Air Force station (a prohibited place within the meaning of
the Official Secrets Act 1920) and was actually within its boundaries. He obstructed a
member of Her Majesty's forces engaged in security duty in relation to the station.
Adler v George – evidence of Literal rule absurdity.
Literal rule: would mean that Adler is not guilty because ‘in the VICINITY
of a prohibited place’ suggests NOT ON the premises but nearby.
However, the courts felt that this was not the Parliament’s intention, and
therefore the literal rule led to an absurd literal meaning.
Therefore, the GOLDEN rule was applied whereby the court held that:
The defendant was guilty of the offence because "in the vicinity of" should
be interpreted to mean ON OR NEAR the prohibited place.
Which approach is used? Wide/Narrow?
Wide.
WHY THE GOLDEN RULE??
Any suggestions?
It would be absurd for a court to insist on applying a literal
interpretation to the wording of the Act, without giving any thought
to the consequences.
Refer back to Adler v George – if courts stuck to literal meaning, any
trespasser would get away by being ON the premises of a prohibited
place, because they wouldn’t be considered to be ‘in the vicinity’.
R v Sigsworth [1935]
Facts:
A son murdered his mother. The mother had not made a will, but as per rules set
out in the Administration of Justice Act 1925, her next of kin would inherit (who
was the son).
Do you think he would be allowed to inherit, using golden rule?
Held:
A person who had murdered his mother was not allowed to benefit from the
proceeds of her estate. The court felt to modify the literal meaning, on the
grounds of PUBLIC POLICY, to prevent the murderer benefiting from the ‘fruits of
his crime’.
Which approach was used, Wide/ Narrow?
Wide.
Maddox v Storer (1963)
Facts:
D drove a minibus made to carry 11 people at over 30 mph. Under
the Road Traffic Act 1960 it was an offence to drive at more than 30
mph in a vehicle ‘adapted to carry more than seven passengers’.
Golden rule applied and court held:
‘adapted to’ could be taken to mean ‘suitable for‘.
Which approach was used: Wide or Narrow?
Narrow.
When can difficulties arise when deciding to use the golden
rule?
Lord Diplock:
Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous:
it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give
effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of
doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.
India: Under our Constitution it is Parliament’s opinion on these matters that is paramount."
Case: Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs (1980)
The House of Lords needed to interpret a section of the Trade Union and Labour Relations
Act 1974 which gave immunity to union members committing torts in
contemplation of a trade dispute.
At first sight, the wording of this Act may seem absurd as it suggests union members
cannot be liable for committing torts, if it is industrial based. HOWEVER…
It was established that this is CLEARLY what the Parliament intended to say, since the
phrase had been used in statutes SINCE 1906 and ITS MEANING WAS WELL SETTLED.
In what situations might a Judge use the G.RULE for the wrong reasons?
Political tendencies.
When they wish to offer empathy with one party.
Judges are not allowed to be biased and steer clear of political opinions, therefore if the
literal meaning makes sense/ and there is evidence, then it should remain so.
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
The golden rule can prevent the problems of the An absurdity may mean different things to
literal rule, e.g. injustice. different judges.
The rule can put into practice what Parliament May give judge too much discretion – how?
intended.
Golden rule provides a check on the strictness of Professor Zander’s criticisms of the golden
the literal rule. rule – ‘an unpredictable safety valve’ ***
1. What the common law was before the Act was passed
2. What the mischief was that the Act was designed to remedy
3. The remedy proposed in the Act
4. The reason for the remedy
The mischief rule aims to interpret statute to what it meant regardless of the wording, by
referring to any previous statutes for the same purpose and how did Parliament intend to
improve that statute in the new one. It also needs to find out the mischief in the case in order
for it to be used.
Smith v Hughes [1960]
It was held that the car was being ‘used on a road’ and needed
insurance, it was a hazard of the type which the statute aimed to
prevent. The High Court affirmed his conviction.
Lord Parker CJ said the mischief was the protection of third parties, so
"use" should be taken to mean "have the use of". Quite apart from the
fact that another vehicle had collided with the stationary car, it was on
a hill and could have rolled away if someone had let the brake off.
Advantages Disadvantages
It allows judges to “fill in the gaps” when Finding the intention of Parliament is not
Parliament had left something out. easy, even if Parliamentary Debates (Hansard
in UK) is used. It only shows the intention of
government
It allows judges to interpret statutes in the They may not be such a thing as “the
light of changing social, economic and intention of Parliament” so trying to find it
technological circumstances. out serves no purpose other than promoting
litigation between parties
It also allows the court to look at It could lead to confusion because judges
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard in UK) so could change the meaning of what an Act
that the words of the minister bringing the says.
bill before Parliament can be considered
In 1969, the Law Commission proposed that It gives too much power to judges. It should
the mischief rule should be the only rule be Parliament that makes any changes.
used.
Purposive Approach
80
Pickstone v Freemans plc (1989).
Facts: The claimant, Ms Pickstone, was an employee of the defendants, Freemans, where she worked as a warehouse
operative and received a salary equivalent to that of her male counterparts performing the same job.
However, the warehouse checkers, who were male, benefit from a greater salary than the warehouse operatives,
receiving £1.22 per week more.
Here, women warehouse operatives did the same work as male warehouse checkers.
Ms Pickstone subsequently alleged that the defendants were in breach of the Equal Pay Act 1970.
Issues
literal reading of the legislation would have meant that Freemans was not
breaching equal pay rights as the warehouse operatives and warehouse
checkers were performing different jobs.
House of Lords adopted a purposive approach to statutory interpretation,
permitting Ms Pickstone’s claim on the grounds that she was being paid less
than male workers completing work of equal value, despite the work per se was
not the same.
House of Lords was ensuring that Britain did not breach its European treaty
obligations to legislate and protect equal pay
Pepper v Hart
Mr Hart was a schoolmaster at a fee-paying school which operated a concessionary fee
scheme enabling members of staff to have their kids educated at the school at reduced fees if
surplus places were available.
Tax was payable by Mr Hart on ‘the cash equivalent of the benefit’, but the statutory definition
of that expression was ambiguous.
During the committee stage of the Finance Bill in the House of Commons the financial
secretary to the Treasury indicated that the basis of taxation for certain benefits in kind would
remain as cost to the employer of providing the service.
In Mr Hart's case the actual additional cost to the employer was negligible, because boys
educated through the scheme were filling places which otherwise would have been empty.
However, relying on the wording in the Act, the Inland Revenue had taxed a proportion of the
total cost of providing the services.
Pepper v Hart
Could the courts incorporate the use of Hansard into their interpretation
of legislation?
How does one interpret the relevant section of the Finance Act,
especially given that Mr. Hart was pointing to the debates during the
House of Commons where the Finance Secretary made a statement that
was pointing to the effect that such benefits should not be taxed,
instead seen as a cost to the employer.
Pepper v Hart (Decision)
• The majority held that the Hansard may be referred to, where legislation was
ambiguous, obscure or led to absurdity and the statements relied upon were
clear
• Such reference to the Hansard did not impeach Parliamentary Privilege.
• The purpose of looking at Hansard will not be to construe the words used by the
Minister but to give effect to the words used so long as they are clear. Far from
questioning the independence of Parliament and its debates, the courts would
be giving effect to what is said and done there’: p. 638H
Pepper v Hart
‘the use of clear ministerial statements by the court as a guide to the construction of
ambiguous legislation would not contravene anything’. It was held that the reference
to parliamentary materials should be allowed where
“The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict
constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt
the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a
purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of
legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material
that bears upon the background against which the legislation was
enacted.”
- Lord Griffiths in Pepper v Hart –
Purposive Approach
1. The purposive approach is often compared to the mischief rule. Under the
mischief rule the court is looking to see what gap there was in the old law
and how Parliament has filled the gap and what remedy has been
provided for.
2. The purposive approach, on the other hand, is broader still in that it is not
just looking to see what gap might have existed in the law previously, but
the judges are attempting to identify what they believe Parliament aimed
to achieve.
91
Outside the confines of the statute
1. When there is a preamble, it sets out the facts and assumptions upon
which the statute is based.
2. The long title and preamble are discussed together because the law
with regard to the use which may be made of each is the same, and
what is strictly a long title is sometimes erroneously referred to as a
preamble.
3. This approach has emerged in more recent times. Here the court is
not just looking to see what the gap was in the old law, it is making a
decision as to what they felt Parliament meant to achieve.
95
Purposive Approach
Lord Denning:
We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament to pieces and make
nonsense of it. We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and carry it out
and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment
than by opening it up to destructive analysis’
Class Exercises
R v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446
The defendant bit off his victim's nose.
Problem 1 The statute made it an offence 'to stab cut
or wound‘
Is the defendant guilty?
Problem 1 the court held that under the
literal rule the act of biting did not
come within the meaning of stab,
cut or wound as these words
implied an instrument had to be
used.
Therefore, the defendant's
conviction was quashed.
Problem 2
FACTS: The Royal College of Nursing challenged an action against the legality of the
involvement of nurses in carrying out abortions.
The Offenses against the Person Act 1861 states that it is an offence for any person to
carry out an abortion except a doctor who has been legally certified.
The Abortion Act 1967 stated that the doctor or a legal medical practitioner could carry
out the abortion under satisfying conditions.
As technology advanced surgical abortions were replaced by hormonal abortions (i.e.
induced labor with drugs).
In this case the first part was done by the doctor and the second part by the nurse without
the supervision of the doctor.
Problem
HELD: The judgment was that it is legal for the nurse to administer such abortions.
The Abortion Act 1967 was aimed to remove all the street abortions completely as there
is no proper medical care available on the streets.
it is lawful for the nurses to carry out this action.
Mischief Rule (ROYAL COLLEGE Of NURSING v DHSS(Delaware Health and Social
Services)[1981] 2 WLR 279)
Problem 3
In this case the defendant was charged with bigamy under Section 57 of the
Offences against the Person Act 1861 which made it an offence to ‘marry’ whilst
your spouse is still alive and not divorced. The ambiguous word was the word
‘marry’.
The court decided that in order to make sense of the provision, the word should be interpreted as
meaning to go through a second ceremony of marriage.
The word can also mean to become legally married but because someone who is already married
cannot legally marry someone else, the more general meaning of the word was preferred.
Under a literal interpretation of this section the offence would be impossible to commit since civil
law will not recognise a second marriage any attempt to marry in such circumstances would not
be recognised as a valid marriage.
Wider Approach (R v Allen)
Problem 4
A truck of the transporting company was taken into legal custody as it
contained opium along with the apples.
The transport company stated that they were unaware of the fact that
opium was also loaded in the truck.
According to Section 11 of the Opium Act 1878:
Where the the offender is transporting, importing or exporting any opium exceeding
the quantity (if any) which he is permitted to transport, import or export, as the case
may be, the whole of the opium which has is transporting or exporting shall be
confiscated.
Therefore, defendant’s vehicles were seized along with opium.
State of Madhya Pradesh v Azad Bharat
Financial Company, AIR 1967 SC 276
By applying the literal rule of the interpretation court stated that this interpretation is
leading to injustice and inequality.
Therefore, the golden rule is applied concluding that the words 'shall be confiscated'
should be interpreted as 'may be confiscated.'
State of Punjab V. Quiser Jehan Begam,
AIR 1963 SC 1604
Whether the limitation period starts from the day of sale or from the
day of getting the knowledge of the award.
State of Punjab v Quiser Jehan
Begam
• Held that the parties must first come to know the award in order to make an application
for reference under Section 18.
• The parties were not informed of the award by notice.
• Since the parties got to know of the award on a later date, the limitation period for Section
18 would start from this date and not the date on which the compensation was awarded.
• In this case, the Court applied the golden rule to modify the meaning of the
provision to include the start of the limitation period from the date of receiving the notice
of award.
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing
Association Limited (1999) 4 All ER
705
1. The lower court had declined to allow same-sex partners to inherit statutory tenancies on
the ground that they could not be considered to be the wife or husband of the deceased.
2. The Appellate Court held that the Rent Act, 1977 was incompatible with the convention on
the grounds of its discriminatory treatment of surviving same-sex partners.
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing
Association Limited (1999) 4 All ER
705
The court applied the golden rule and held that the incompatibility could be remedied by
reading the words 'as his or her wife or husband' as meaning 'as they were ‘his wife or
husband’.
Department of Public Prosecution v Bull
A man was charged with an offense under s.1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 which
makes it an offense for a ‘common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a public street or
public place for the purposes of prostitution’.
The magistrates found him not guilty on the grounds that ‘common prostitute’ only related
to females and not males. The prosecution appealed by way of case stated.
The court held that the Act did only apply to females.
DPP v Bull
The word prostitute was ambiguous and they applied the mischief rule.
The Street Offences Act was introduced as a result of the work of
the Wolfenden Report into prostitution.
The Report only referred to female prostitution and did not mention
male prostitutes.
The court, therefore, held the mischief the Act was aimed at was
controlling the behavior of only female prostitutes.
Bengal Immunity v State of Bihar
On the 24th October, 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a
letter to the appellant company which concluded as follows :-
“Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales
Tax Act. Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar Treasury at
an early date under intimation to this Department”.
The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the
appellant company is leviable by the State of Bihar.
Article 286: Restriction as to
imposition of tax on sale or purchase
of goods
(1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on
the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place—
(a) outside the State; or
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out
of, the territory of India.
Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall
be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have
actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the
purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under
the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by
reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State
Bengal Immunity v State of Bihar
This was done by construing article 286 whose interpretation came into question and the
meaning granted to it.
It raises a question of construction of article 286 of the Constitution. It was decided
that Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void.
Mischief Rule
Aids to Interpretation
Aids to
Interpretation
Intrinsic: Long title,
short title, schedules,
individual sections.
Extrinsic: Dictionary,
Hansard, international
treaties.
Rules of Language
Ejusdem generis:
Latin for “of the same kind”.
Where a list of words is followed by general
words, the general words are limited by the
specific words in the list.
Rules of Language: Ejusdem Generis
Evans v.
Cross The Court held that a painted line
on a road cannot be included in
the "other devices" as a traffic
sign because devices are here
indicating a thing, whereas
painted line on a road is not.
2. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
1. Norwich Crematorium was engaged in the trade of disposing dead humans through cremation.
2. Built in 1936-37, the amount invested was 2,157 pounds.
3. For the year 1964-65, the Crematorium appealed to the general commissioners against an
assessment of income tax in respect of profits for 8,500 pounds.
4. The commissioners asserted that the furnace chamber and chimney towers were industrial
buildings or structures as per Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1952.
5. Located at Horsham St Faiths, Norfolk, the Crematorium is a public company incorporated on
April 5, 1935, under the Companies Act, 1929.
6. The counsels representing the crematorium contended that first, the structure in question came
under the ambit of Section 271(1)(c) and the human corpse should be regarded as “material” to
entail a substantive meaning to the provision in the present case.
7. Second, it was also contended on their behalf that the structure had to be brought within the
scope of Section 271(1)(c) and in no way, it qualifies under Section 271(1)(a),(b) or (d).
Bourne v Norwich Crematorium
1. As per Section 271(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1952, crematoriums cannot be regarded as
“industrial buildings”.
2. According to Section 271(d) of the Act, including a human corpse under the scope of
“goods or materials” would be extremely immoral.
3. Consequently, the trade of taxpayers cannot be brought under the scope of Section
271(1)(c).
Bourne v Norwich Crematorium
Under section “5 (3) of the Abuse of Narcotics Act 1971”, the convict was charged with
possessing a prohibited drug with the intent to sell it.
His car contained a box containing £500 worth of cannabis. The marihuana, according to
the complainant, belonged to a friend who would pick it up later.
The trial judge determined that his conduct of returning the narcotics to his friend was an
act of supply.
The verdict was reversed by the “Court of Appeal”.
Decision
After careful consideration, the judges of the Court ruled that for the death of the husband
while working on the railroad, the wife was not entitled to reimbursement since the job of
“oiling” did not fall under the categories the statute enumerates.
As per the Literal Rule of Statutory Interpretation “, the words of a statute are taken to
mean as they are in their natural, ordinary, and grammatical context”.
Based on the literal rule of interpretation, ‘oiling’ did not fall under either “relaying or
repairing” the track in this situation. Therefore, the widow was not entitled to any
compensation as the judges applied the literal meanings of the terms “relay” and “repair”
to the facts of the case.
3. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO
ALTERIUS
when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class
are excluded.
the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another
The effect of the maxim is that if a list of words appearing in an act or legislation are specific in
nature and are not followed by general words then that act/legislation will only apply to the words
appearing in the list.
3. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO
ALTERIUS
In other words, there are 2 conditions which need to be fulfilled cumulatively in order to apply this
maxim for interpretation of statutes which are as follows:
Condition No.1 – The list of words appearing in a statute should be specific in nature And
Condition No.2: Those specific words should not be followed by general words
therefore mention of one or more specific things may be taken to exclude others of the same type.”
It is not necessary to add other words to the list in order to make sense of the provision. When something
is mentioned expressly in a statute it leads to the presumption that the things not mentioned are excluded.
Tempest v Kilner (1846)
In the court had to rule whether the Statute of Frauds 1677 applied to
the sale of stocks and shares.
The Act required contracts for the sale of 'goods, wares and
merchandise' to be evidenced in writing if they were above a specified
value.
The court decided that stocks and shares were not covered by the Act
as the specific words 'goods, wares and merchandise' were not followed
by general words
Three rules of Construction
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (1931): Punishes those who knowingly
transport a stolen “automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon,
motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for
running on rails.
Fact: Defendant knowingly transported an airplane, is he guilty?
Answer
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., writing for the Court in McBoyle v. United States, found that the statute did not
apply to an aircraft: An airplane is not a vehicle.
If one focuses on the term “vehicle,” the Court’s conclusion might seem puzzling. Isn’t an airplane a
vehicle?
Some have questioned whether the ordinary meaning of “vehicle” includes air-planes. Nevertheless,
even if some doubt exists, the specific context in McBoyle significantly bolstered the Court’s claim
that an airplane was not a vehicle.
But any puzzlement lessens when we consider the ordinary meaning of “vehicle” in context. The
general words, “any other . . . vehicle,” come after a long list of more specific terms: automobile,
automobile truck, automobile wagon, and motorcycle.
Perhaps, based on this context, an ordinary reader would understand the statutory rule to be more
specific: “Vehicle” refers to automobiles, motorcycles, and similar entities, like buses, that are
designed for traveling on land. But vehicles of a very different nature (e.g., canoes or airplanes) are
not “vehicles” in this context.
Explanation
“No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance working on
land, water or air …
But in everyday speech ‘vehicle’ calls up the picture of a thing moving on land.
So here, the phrase under discussion calls up the popular picture.
For after including automobile truck, automobile wagon and motor cycle, the words ‘ any
other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails’ still indicate a vehicle in the
popular sense, that is a vehicle running on land is the theme. It is a vehicle that runs, not
something, not commonly called a vehicle, that flies. Airplanes were well known in 1919
when this statute was passed, but it is admitted that they were not mentioned in the
reports or in the debates in Congress.
Exercise 4
Fact: The Defendant's house was called The Café; it was found open during the night,
and seventeen females and twenty gentlemen were there, and were supplied with
cigars, drinks which they consumed.
Defendant contended, that the premise is not
open for any public entertainment as she does
not play music in addition to the sale of
refreshments and therefore, she had not
committed the offence charged.
Judge: I do not think that entertainment need
Answer be something in the nature of playing music. It
is rather the correlative of resort-the reception
and accommodation of the public who resort to
the place. The court held that "entertainment"
did not mean musical entertainment but the
reception and accommodation of people, so the
defendant was guilty.
Exercise 5
Facts: Defendant had carried explosives in a cloth bag, where the law
required that:
Statute: explosives shall be carried into a mine within a ‘case or
cannister’.
Answer
By interpreting the definition of ‘case’ by the words around it (specifically, the words ‘or
cannister’), the court concluded that a cloth bag could not be within the statutory
definition, as ‘case’ was intended to refer to an alternative to a cannister, that necessarily
could provide protection and structural integrity similar to what a cannister could.
Under noscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag could not have been within the statutory
definition, because parliament's intention was referring to a case or container of the same
strength as a canister.
Exercise 6
Defendant is a registered dealer in 'dhoop' and 'aggarbatti‘. The Defendant was sought to
be made liable to pay sales tax at the rate of 10 paisa per rupee earned, as was leviable
upon items falling under the Entry No.16 of Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948.
Statute: Entry No.16 read: "Cosmetics, perfumery and toilet goods, excluding tooth-paste,
tooth-powder, kum- kum and soap,"
Answer
The question was whether "dhoop" or "dhoopbatti" fell within the description of "perfume"
thereunder.
It was held that perfumery means such articles as used in cosmetics and toilet goods viz,
sprays, etc but does not include ‘Dhoop’ and ‘Agarbatti’ .
Exercise 7
Facts: Bugaiski shot a dog he claimed was attacking his own dog. He was prosecuted under the dog law of 1919.
Statute: “Any person . . . may kill any dog which he sees in the act of pursuing, worrying, or wounding any livestock
or poultry or attacking persons, and there shall be no liability on such person, in damages or otherwise, for such
killing.”
“ Livestock ” means horses, stallions, colts, geldings, mares, sheep, rams, lambs, bulls, bullocks, steers, cows, calves,
mules, jacks, jennets, burros, goats, kids and swine, and fur-bearing animals being raised in captivity.
Answer
Issue: whether the Legislature intended that dogs be included within the definition of “livestock” as part of the
category “fur-bearing animals being raised in captivity.”
Dogs were not included within the definition of “livestock” as part of the category “fur- bearing animals being raised
in captivity.” The fact the Legislature listed “fur-bearing” animals as a separate category within the laundry list of
“livestock” indicates a specific intent to distinguish these animals from the rest of the list on the basis of their fur-
bearing characteristic, presumably at least in partial recognition of the commercial value of furs. Dogs are not so
distinguished.
Moreover, the deliberate use of the modifying phrase “being raised in captivity” implies the fur-bearing animals
contemplated in the category are not normally held in captivity. Again, dogs do not belong in this category.
Pengelly v. Bell Punch Co. Ltd [1964]
1 WLR 1055
The Bell Punch Company Limited have a storeroom at their factory at Uxbridge where they
stack a lot of reels of paper. They have racks on which the smaller reels are kept. At the
foot of the racks they store the big reels of paper. They are put in a double line at the foot
of the racks: so that they stand out 20 inches from the base of the racks.
Mr Pengelley was employed by the defendant company to get reels from this room and
carry them to other parts of the factory. On the 26th October, 1961, he went to get one of
the smaller reels from the top of the rack. For this purpose he had to stand beside the big
reels which were on the floor and reach up and across to the smaller reels. He had done it
for years, and other men had done it for years, without any mishap at all. On this occasion
he had got his foot in between two of the big reels at the bottom; he had got hold of a
small reel and was bringing it down: then as he turned, he twisted his knee. It was not a
severe injury. The total damages are £575.
The ground on which the plaintiff filed his case was that the employers had broken
Section 28 of the Factory Act 1961 which says:
"All 'floors, steps, stairs, passageways and gangways shall, so far as is reasonably
practicable, be kept free from any obstruction".
The court held that as all the other words were used to indicate passage, a floor used
exclusively for storage did not fall within the Act.
Rule: Noscitur a sociis
Exercise 8
A Poor Relief Act 1601 had the effect of raising taxes weekly:
“shall raise weekly or otherwise by taxation of every occupier of lands, houses, tithes, …
coalmines or saleable underwoods”
The Court was asked to determine whether the Act applied to limestone mines as well.
The Court used the rule ofexpressio unius est exclusio alterius and held
that since limestone mines were not expressly mentioned in the Act
and since the Act did not imply that it was not to applicable to
limestone mines
Exercise 9
The Applicant, the twenty three year old illegitimate daughter, born in Hong Kong, of a
Chinese mother and a father said (and assumed to be by the court) to be English,
applied on 24 November 1974 for entry clearance to the United Kingdom as a student.
Enquiries revealed that her intention was permanent residence and the application
was refused on the ground that as an illegitimate child she had no claim to reside in
UK under the Immigration Act 1971.
The statute allowed an illegitimate child born to a British mother, but not a father.
Statute: The word "parent" within the meaning of section 2(3)(a) of the Immigration Act
1971 includes the mother of an illegitimate child;...."
Answer
The question is whether the word "parent" in the present case includes also the putative father
of this young lady who, for the purposes of argument, is assumed to be a British subject.
Defendant argued that for a variety of reasons the word "parent" in this context must include
the father of an illegitimate child. Suggests that the word "parent" in ordinary conversation
must include the father of an illegitimate child: a man in the street would so conclude.
One only has to look at the definition section which I have already read, which reads" 'parent'
includes the mother of an illegitimate child".
One only has to apply to that the well known maxim of construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius to see that the express inclusion of the mother excludes the father of the
illegitimate child. Consequently for that reason alone judge dismissed this case.
Exercise 10
Terrace was a citizen of both the United States and Washington State. He was a farmer and
wanted to lease his land to Nakatsuaka (who was born in Japan) for five years for agricultural
purposes. The Attorney General was claiming Alien Land Law and trying to prosecute criminally
which could lead to a confiscation of the land and imprisonment.
Terrace pointed to the treaty between US and Japan that granted liberty to the citizens and
subjects of each party:
"to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, to carry on trade, . . . to own or lease and
occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, . . . to lease land for residential and
commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the
same terms as native citizens or subjects,”
Whether Terrace can lease land to Nakatsuaka for agricultural purposes given the treaty between
US and Japan allowed Japanese to enter, reside and carry on trade in US?
Answer