BOETHIUS

On Aristotle
On Interpretation 4-6
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 BOETHIUS
On Aristotle
On Interpretation 4-6

Translated by Andrew Smith

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

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Acknowledgements

The present translations have been made possible by generous

and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research
Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the
Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright
Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame
di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario
Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the
Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the
Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr
and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO/GW); the Ashdown Trust; Dr Victoria Solomonides,
the Cultural Attaché of the Greek Embassy in London.
The editor wishes to thank David Blank and Carlos Steel for
their comments, Ian Crystal for preparing the volume for press,
and Deborah Blake at Duckworth, who has been the publisher
responsible for every volume since the first.

Typeset by Ray Davis

Printed and bound in Great Britain
 Contents

Conventions vii
Textual Emendations viii
Introduction 1
Translator’s Note 11

Translation 13
Book 4 15
Book 5 60
Book 6 100

Notes 141
Select Bibliography 145
English-Latin Glossary 147
Latin-English Index 148
Index of Names 150
Subject Index 151

v
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 Conventions

[ ] Square brackets indicate additions to the translation to complete

the sense.
< > Angle brackets indicate additions to the Latin text.
Citations from Aristotle are in italics.
Propositions, phrases or words referred to explictly are put in in-
verted commas.
Italics are also used for Latin words and titles of books.
Bold type is occasionally employed for emphasis.

The references to Aristotle’s text by chapter and page/line are added

to aid the reader and do not indicate that Boethius divided his work
in this way.
All lemmata are those provided by Boethius himself. Divergences
from the lemmata in the continuous translation and the first edition
of the commentary are noted as are any divergences from the re-
ceived text of Aristotle.

vii
 Textual Emendations

231,16 I have restored the MS reading illa } subiecta.

320,29 I have changed the MSS correction finitum ‘finite’
back to the uncorrected indefinitum ‘indefinite’.
396,6-7 I have followed S2 in deleting the words non enim
propositionis.
424,21 Adding negationes with F2.

viii
 Introduction
Richard Sorabji

Boethius’ second and larger commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpre-

tation was written in Latin in the early sixth century AD in the style
of Greek commentaries on Aristotle. Both commentaries were part of
his project to bring to the Latin-speaking world knowledge of Plato
and Aristotle. His project was for comprehensive translation of them
and for adaptation of the Greek commentaries on them. The project
was cruelly interrupted by his execution at the age of about 45
between 524 and 526 AD, leaving the Latin world under-informed
about Greek Philosophy for 700 years, although his commentary on
Aristotle’s On Interpretation remained the standard introduction
throughout the Latin Middle Ages.

Aristotle’s On Interpretation
In the first six chapters of his On Interpretation Aristotle defines
name, verb, sentence, statement, affirmation and negation. This has
standardly been seen as a progression beyond the subject of his
Categories, which distinguishes single terms. For On Interpretation
already studies the complexity of a statement, and it can be seen as
pointing forward to the treatment in his Analytics of syllogistic
arguments, which combine three statements, two of them premisses
and one a conclusion. But C.W.A. Whitaker has argued that what
turns out to interest Aristotle from Chapter 7 onwards is contradic-
tory or contrary pairs of statements, and that these contradictory or
contrary pairs relate rather to the practice of dialectical refutation
discussed in Aristotle’s other logical works, the Topics and Sophistici
Elenchi.1
In Chapters 8 to 10, Aristotle examines exceptions to the rule that
in contradictory or contrary pairs one statement will be false and the
other true. Chapter 11 addresses some puzzles about complex asser-
tions, Chapters 12 to 13 consider pairs of statements involving
possibility and necessity, while the last chapter, 14, discusses beliefs
that are contrary.

1
2 Introduction

Boethius’ use of Alexander on the role of thoughts

Boethius reveals to us how On Interpretation was understood not
only by himself, but also by some of the best Greek interpreters,
especially by the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias (who flour-
ished around 205 AD) and the Neoplatonist Porphyry (232-309 AD).
Alexander, so Boethius tells us (11,13-13,11), defended the authen-
ticity of the work against Andronicus. The latter was already con-
cerned with questions of authenticity in the first century BC and had
questioned a cross-reference to Aristotle’s On the Soul. But he did so
only because he failed to understand that when Aristotle said in
Chapter 1 that his book was about the ‘affections’ which he had
already discussed in that other work, he was not referring to pas-
sions. He was referring to thoughts, which were indeed discussed in
On the Soul, as they are here (noêmata, 16a10 and 14). In fact the
point made here that truth and falsity have to do with combination
(sunthesis, 16a12 and 14) had been made in connexion with thoughts
at On the Soul 430a27-7 (sunthesis noêmatôn).
Boethius, like the Neoplatonists Dexippus and Ammonius before
him, goes a little further and insists that truth and falsity are
primarily created at the level of thoughts, not of spoken sounds, but
only when the thoughts are combined, not while they remain simple
(49,23-32). Aristotle himself had stated at 16a6 that spoken sounds
are signs in the first place (prôtôn) of affections of the soul, in other
words, of thoughts (noêmata, 16a10).

Boethius’ use of Porphyry on written,

spoken and mental names and verbs
Later in the first chapter at 30,1-14, Boethius quotes Porphyry
ascribing a distinction to the Aristotelian school, and making use of
it to explain Aristotle’s wording. According to Porphyry, the school
recognised three sentences (orationes), evidently types of sentence,
one written, one spoken and one composed in the mind, or at 42,15-
17, one in letters, one in spoken sound and one in thoughts. Porphyry
infers that the school would want the sentence in the mind to be
analysable into separate components corresponding to name and
verb. Thus there would be three types of name and verb, one written,
one spoken and one exercised in the quiet of the mind. Porphyry does
not raise the further question asked by Augustine in a theological
context a little later, when Augustine says (On the Trinity 15.10.19-
20), ‘The word which is sounded externally is a sign of the word that
shines inside, to which the name “word” is more applicable. } [This
word] is a prerequisite of any language, but is prior to all the signs
by which it is communicated.’ In other words, contrary to many
modern views, soliloquy is causally prior to communication. Of this
 Introduction 3
word in the mind, Augustine claims that it ‘does not belong to any
language, at any rate not to any of those which are called the
languages of the nations, of which our own Latin is one’. Porphyry
does not tell us whether the word in the mind is Greek. But in
Aristotle’s text the spoken and written names and verbs are both
Greek, and he does not consider whether the thoughts (noêmata) in
the soul at 16a9ff. are themselves names and verbs. Nonetheless,
Porphyry’s idea that they are names and verbs is repeated by Am-
monius in the period between Porphyry and Boethius and ascribed to
Aristotle himself in Boethius’ report.2 The idea that thinking is a kind
of inner talking goes back to Plato, but it did not at first enter into
such details as those raised by Porphyry and Augustine.3 Augustine’s
idea that thought is a language different from any natural language
was revived in modern times by Jerry Fodor,4 developing the ideas of
Noam Chomsky. Fodor was interested in a language of thought that
corresponded to whole sentences of any level of complexity, not just
to simple sentences consisting of names and verbs. Nonetheless, he
and Porphyry and Augustine in their different ways were speaking
of a language of thought and Fodor called his language ‘mentalese’.

Boethius’ use of propositio for written, spoken,

or mental sentences (orationes)
Porphyry’s idea helps us to understand Boethius’ definition of a
proposition (propositio). Boethius defines a proposition in his De
differentiis topicis 1174C as a kind of sentence (oratio), one which
signifies what is true or false.5 This is closest to, but not identical
with, Aristotle’s definition of logos (sentence) at 16b26. We would not
nowadays think of a proposition as a spoken, or as a written sentence.
But Boethius thinks of it as a wide term, neutral between any of the
three kinds of sentence, written, spoken, or mental. It is wide in other
ways as well. Boethius continues his definition of a proposition
(1174C-D) by saying that it can be a statement (enuntiatio) or asser-
tion (prolatio), or, if brought into doubt, a question, or, if confirmed
by arguments, a conclusion. It can have complexity, if, for example,
it is a conditional (1175A-B). In a conditional the ‘if’-clause and the
‘then’-clause can each be called a proposition.
A further complication concerns the word oratio, which is sometimes
applied to something less than a sentence, a phrase which does not on
its own signify what is true or false. Thus one oratio is predicated of
another in the sentence ‘Socrates with Plato and the students investi-
gates the essence of philosophy’ (1175D-1176A). Here oratio might be
rendered ‘expression’. But as this is the exception and does not fit the
definition of a proposition as signifying what is true or false, the
rendering ‘sentence’ has been maintained in the translation below.
4 Introduction

Boethius’ use of Porphyry on the differentiation of indi-

viduals by unshareable characteristics
In Chapter 7 Boethius says that a proposition acquires its character
in the first place from thought (intelligentia), and in the second place
(136,11-12) from the things of which the thought (intellectus) con-
sists. As an example of the second, if the sentence is singular, it gets
its singularity from the subject that it gets hold of, e.g. Plato, rather
than man (136,16). This gives Boethius occasion to introduce an
influential idea of Porphyry’s, that individuals are distinguished
from each other by each having a composite quality that is actually
unshareable (incommunicabilis, 136,17-137,26; 139,4-19). We know
that this idea is Porphyry’s, because he puts it in an even stronger
form in his Introduction or Isagôgê 7,19-8,3. The individual is there
said to be nothing but a bundle (athroisma, sundromê) of charac-
teristics that are (severally or jointly) distinctive. Distinctive charac-
teristics are called idiotêtes (Latin proprietates). I do not believe that
Porphyry is here drawing on Aristotle or the Stoics, because he leaves
out their idea that the distinctive characteristics would have to
inhere in, or be otherwise dependent on, matter, which the Stoics
called substance (ousia). I suspect he leaves matter out because he is
speaking to beginning students who are about to read Aristotle’s
Categories, which does not even mention matter and form, so Por-
phyry does not want to go into those complications.
I believe Porphyry is drawing instead on Plato. Plato Theaetetus
209C speaks of an individual (atomon), such as Socrates, consisting
of (ex hôn ei) uniquely distinctive characteristics (the word idios is
used earlier at 154A, 166C), such as his distinctive snubness of nose.
Snubness of nose is precisely the example used by Boethius when he
discusses Porphyry in his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagôgê
(235,5-236,6, ed. Brandt, CSEL). Plato has the idea that one cannot
think of Theaetetus at all without having his distinctive characteristic
in mind. In Porphyry what is unique may be a bundle (athroisma, a
word used at Plato Theaetetus 157B-C, or sundromê) of characteristics,
rather than a single one, and for Porphyry it is unique in the strong
sense that it would (ouk an, Isagôgê 7,16-24) not belong to another
individual. Hence Boethius’ word, ‘unshareable’ (incommunicabilis).
Plato is likely to have been the Stoics’ source of inspiration for their idea
that each individual has a distinctive characteristic.
Because Porphyry’s work was presented as an introduction to
many of Aristotle’s ideas, the notion of the individual as a unique
bundle of characteristics was taken by subsequent Neoplatonists, by
Proclus ap. Olympiodorum Commentary on Alcibiades 1 Westerink
204,8-12 and possibly by ‘Philoponus’ in An. Post. 2 437,21-438,2 , as
representing the Aristotelian view, despite the lack of any reference
to matter, or a subject for the characteristics to inhere in.
 Introduction 5

Does truth or falsity depend on the existence of the

subject of reference in a singular statement?
Aristotle had already anticipated in his Categories the subject of On
Interpretation Chapters 8 to 10. In Categories Chapter 10 at 13b12ff.,
he had supplied an exception to the rule that in contrary pairs of
statements, one of the pair must be true and the other false. If
Socrates no longer exists, then neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates
is well’ will be true. The subject arises again when Aristotle resumes
in On Interpretation Chapter 11 the discussion of puzzles about
compound sentences started in Chapter 8. But here he allows us to
say that the deceased Homer is a poet (21a25-8). The existential
import of singular statements had already been most brilliantly
discussed by Alexander and the Stoics.6 Boethius, and before him
Ammonius, overlap in the way they understand Aristotle’s treatment
of ‘Homer is a poet’. ‘Is’, according to Aristotle, is predicated ‘acciden-
tally’ of Homer because he is a poet, and not in its own right. Boethius
takes Aristotle to mean that ‘is’ applies to Homer only because of his
being a poet, and not because of his being Homer. Boethius (374,14-
27) and Ammonius (Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation
212,2-4) infer that the ‘is’ would no longer be applicable, if ‘poet’ were
not applicable. Presumably that is why the ‘is’ does not imply
Homer’s continued existence. The interpretation is repeated at 374.9-
376,15, but there Boethius addresses a further remark that Aristotle
adds (21a22-3) that the possibility of thinking about what is not does
not imply that it is. Boethius explains that the same analysis can be
repeated in relation to ‘Homer is thought about’. The ‘is’ there at-
taches primarily to ‘thought about’, not to Homer, and so does not
imply his existence.
Mario Mignucci has suggested that Aristotle did not intend to
generalise beyond his particular illustrative sentences. ‘Homer is a
poet’ obviously does not imply the subject’s present existence, ‘Socra-
tes is well’ obviously does, but not through the verb ‘is’, since On
Interpretation 6b19-25 tells us that that is nothing in itself, but
merely signifies a combination.7

Determinism: is a singular statement predicting

a future contingent event true or false?
By far the most famous example of a singular statement that is
perhaps neither true nor false was raised by Aristotle in Chapter 9
of On Interpretation. On one interpretation of 18b9-16, 18b33-19a6,
Aristotle saw it as a threat that events such as a future sea-battle
would have been irrevocable 10,000 years ago, if it was true 10,000
years ago that there would be a sea-battle on that day. The idea of
inevitability or determinism is therefore a major theme in Boethius’
6 Introduction
commentary. But he did not interpret Aristotle’s problem of the
future sea-battle in the way just suggested, and he did extend his
discussion to many other aspects of determinism as well. Through
Porphyry’s records he had access to the defence of indeterminism
mounted around 200 AD by the Aristotelian Alexander against the
deterministic arguments of Stoics and dialecticians. This led him to
discuss a whole range of topics that were then at issue: Is the idea of
chance merely a function of our ignorance?8 Is there room for free
choice of the will?9 For unactualised possibilities?10 For the idea of
things being up to us?11 Is God benevolent, if his actions are inevita-
ble?12 How far down the scale of beings does divine Providence
spread?13 How is possibility defined by Stoics and Aristotelians and
by the dialecticians Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo?14 Do pre-
dictions by oracles imply determinism?15
On the interpretation of Aristotle just mentioned, which is not
that of Boethius, Aristotle is worried by the irrevocability of past
truth about the future occurrence of a sea-battle. His solution, on this
interpretation, is to deny that it was either true or false 10,000 years
ago that there would be a sea-battle, although the prediction might
eventually start being true after a certain date. What would remain
true after the sea-battle would not presumably be a future-tensed
prediction. For after the battle it is not true that there will be a
sea-battle on that date. What remains true would rather need to be
either a past tensed proposition, or, as in modern logic, the tenseless
proposition that a sea-battle coincides with such and such a date.
If that represents Aristotle’s solution suitably adapted, it would, I
believe, be a viable but unnecessary line of thought. For Aristotle
need not have worried, if his anxiety was that past truth is irrevoca-
ble. Past truth about a future sea-battle really has to do with the
future, not the past. We may compare how I can now make my most
recent birthday to have been my last by plunging a dagger into my
bosom. That is not really a case of my affecting the past, because to
describe my most recent birthday as my last is to describe its relation
to the future. It is to say that it has no successor. Similarly to make
a past prediction to have been true is not really to affect the past. It
is to create a relation between a past prediction and a subsequent
state of affairs. That is why it is not too late now to make a past
prediction to have been true or false. By conducting or not conducting
a sea-battle tomorrow, I can make the prediction that I would con-
duct one true or false.
I need not go into too much detail on alternative interpretations of
Aristotle’s sea-battle by Boethius and by other ancient commentators
on Chapter 9 of Aristotle’s On Interpretation. For another whole
volume of the present series was devoted to the subject.16 It contained
translations by David Blank and Norman Kretzmann of the com-
mentaries of Ammonius and Boethius on this particular chapter,
 Introduction 7
along with four essays: ‘The three deterministic arguments opposed
by Ammonius’, ‘Boethius, Ammonius and their different Greek back-
grounds’, both by Richard Sorabji, ‘Boethius and the truth about
tomorrow’s sea-battle’ by Norman Kretzmann, and ‘Ammonius’ sea-
battle’ by Mario Mignucci. The present volume puts the subject in the
different perspective of Aristotle’s On Interpretation as a whole.
What needs to be said is that Boethius explains the idea of the
irrevocability of the past. But he takes the threat of determinism to
turn not on the irrevocability of past truth, but instead on the
principle, which does not seem to be Aristotle’s, that mere predict-
ability implies inevitability.17 He decisively rules out the interpretation,
which he calls Stoic, that Aristotle meets the problem by denying that
statements about future contingents are true or false.18 Instead he takes
an interpretation which may already have been described and attacked
by Alexander,19 and which had subsequently been endorsed by Am-
monius. This interpretation makes use of the idea of definite truth,
although that idea does not occur in Aristotle’s chapter on the sea-battle.
According to this interpretation, contradictory predictions about
whether there will be a sea-battle tomorrow definitely divide truth and
falsity between them. Hence each of the rival predictions is either true
or false. All Aristotle is saying is that neither of them taken singly is yet
definitely true or false. What does ‘definitely’ mean?
It would beg the question if ‘definitely’ simply meant determinis-
tically, because the question at issue is whether determinism holds.
Possibly Ammonius was guilty of understanding the word ‘definitely’
in this question-begging way, but Mignucci has suggested a different
interpretation of him. Boethius does not beg the question. He focuses
on the pair of propositions ‘there will be a sea-battle tomorrow’, ‘there
will not be a sea-battle tomorrow’. The pair is treated differently from
the members taken singly. It has one member true and one false, and
that is how ‘neither true nor false’ is avoided. But the truth and
falsity are not yet distributed in one direction rather than the other.
Picking up Boethius’ word ‘volubilis’, we can imagine the truth and
falsity already contained somewhere in the pair, ready to roll (volu-
bilis) into their respective positions, but not yet having rolled.
So far this is a metaphor, and it is not clear how to give it a
coherent interpretation. Kretzmann suggests that for Boethius the
future-tensed proposition, ‘there will be a sea-battle’ is either-true-
or-false, but if the battle eventually happens, that will retrospectively
make the proposition to have been true, even though we could not
predict that outcome. The retrospection already makes this a distinc-
tive interpretation. In addition, if we were to attempt a prediction,
saying ‘there will be a sea-battle’, the speech act of predicting would
have been false, as implying some necessity about the battle, even in
the case where subsequent events make the proposition ‘there will be
a sea-battle’ to have been true.
8 Introduction
Whatever Boethius’ interpretation of ‘definitely true’, it was differ-
ent from that of Ammonius, and this is not the only aspect of the reply
to determinism on which they differed. Ammonius, though familiar
with Porphyry, made most use of a later source, his teacher Proclus,20
and therefore of Iamblichus, who influenced Proclus. James Shiel
has effectively replied to the earlier view of Pierre Courcelle that
Boethius was particularly dependent on Ammonius.21

Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy

In Boethius’ later Consolation of Philosophy, written in prison await-
ing execution, he posed the related problem of future events being
inevitable because of God’s foreknowledge of them. This is not so far
from the question of the sea-battle, given Boethius’ interpretation
that the threatened inevitability of the sea-battle turns on its pre-
dictability by humans. It is important, however, that in the Consola-
tion of Philosophy, Book 5, Boethius turns to predictability by God.
For God’s knowledge, unlike human knowledge, is infallible. If in
addition God is aware for ever in advance of what we will do, that
awareness will be irrevocable. The combination of infallibility and
irrevocability will make it impossible for us to do anything else. One
way of avoiding this deterministic conclusion would be to see God’s
knowledge not as foreknowledge, but as outside of time altogether.
(After all, God is the creator of time.) God’s awareness will not then
be irrevocable. It is possible, but controversial, whether that time-
lessness is part of what Boethius means when he makes God’s
knowledge eternal.

Notes
1. C.W.A. Whitaker, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and
Dialectic, Oxford 1996.
2. Ammonius On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 23,10-15.
3. I have traced the development onwards from Plato Theaetetus 189E
and Sophist 263E in Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, A Source-
book, London 2004, vol. 3, Logic and Metaphysics, ch. 7b.
4. Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975, based on the
work of Noam Chomsky, and criticised by Hilary Putnam, Representation
and Reality, Cambridge MA 1988.
5. Boethius, De topicis differentiis, Book 1, Patrologia Latina vol. 64, col.
1174C, translated by Eleonore Stump, with notes and essays, Ithaca NY
1978.
6. Richard Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, A Sour-
cebook, vol. 3, Logic and Metaphysics, London 2004, ch. 11a.
7. Mario Mignucci, ‘Aristotle on the existential import of propositions’,
Phronesis 52, 2007, 121-38.
8. 193,26-195,2, cf. 224,3-9, Meiser.
9. 195,2-197,10.
 Introduction 9
10. 197,10-198,3.
11. 217,17-219,9.
12. 226,13-22.
13. 231,11-232,13.
14. 234,10-236,4.
15. 224,27-225,9.
16. Ammonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 with Boethius: On Aris-
totle On Interpretation 9, London 1998.
17. 228,3-4; 229,21-230,3.
18. 208,1-18.
19. So Robert W. Sharples, commenting on Alexander Quaestio 1.4, at p.
35n.81 of his Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, London 1992.
20. 1,6-11; cf. 181,30-1.
21. James Shiel, ‘Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’, in Richard Sorabji
(ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, 349-372, revised from a paper of
1958. Pierre Courcelle, Les letters grecques en Occident, Paris 1948, trans-
lated Harvard University Press 1969.

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Blank and Kretzmann 1998, 16-23.
Sorabji, R., Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, A Sourcebook, vol.
3, Logic and Metaphysics, London 2004.
Sorabji, R., ‘Meaning: ancient comments on five lines of Aristotle’, in Chris-
topher Shields (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, forthcoming Oxford
2010.
Stump, E., Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, translated with notes and
essays on the text, Ithaca NY, 1978.
Whitaker, C.W.A., Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialec-
tic, Oxford 1996.
 Translator’s Note

Boethius always takes great care to ensure that his reader knows
exactly what part of the text of Aristotle he is commenting on. This
sometimes involves him citing repeatedly the Aristotelian text.
Although it was tempting to make omissions or relegate such
repetitions to a footnote I have given Boethius’ text in full to keep
faithful to the style of the original even where the effect is some-
what clumsy. The manuscript usually gives the lemma or portion
of text which Boethius comments on. It should, however, be noted
that this Latin translation of Boethius in the lemmata is not
always identical with his separately published translation of the
whole text of de Interpretatione. On one occasion where a lemma
has been omitted from the manuscript I have reconstructed it from
his commentary (22b29-36); otherwise I have left the commentary
to speak for itself.
The original pagination of the Meiser edition is indicated by bold
figures in the body of the text. I have also included the traditional
division of the Aristotelian text into chapters. This convention is
irrelevant for Boethius, but I have included these chapter numbers
since they are sometimes used in modern discussions of the Aristote-
lian text. From time to time I have also attempted to clarify the
arrangement of Boethius’ comments by the inclusion of letters or
numbers in the translation. It should be understood that this is not
part of Boethius’ text.
I have retained the traditional and not very informative trans-
lation of interpretatio as ‘interpretation’ in my rendering of the
title of the work to avoid confusion. In the body of the text,
however, I have ventured to translate interpretatio as ‘communi-
cation’. Although this translation, too, is not altogether satisfactory,
it is possibly less odd than ‘interpretation’. ‘Communication’ should,
however, not be taken in the sense of communication between two
people but rather the transfer of signification from thing via thought
to verbal expression.
Lastly, I would like to thank the many readers who have carefully
looked through my first attempts at translation of a difficult text. I
have had to make many compromises in my response to their always
enlightening comments. With their help I hope to have removed at
12 Translator’s Note
least some of the most serious errors from the text and remain fully
responsible for any that remain. Thanks also are due to much help
and encouragement from Richard Sorabji and for the patience of the
editors in the final stages of publication.
 BOETHIUS
On Aristotle
On Interpretation 4-6

Translation
This page intentionally left blank
 The second edition or larger commentary of Anicius
Manlius Severinus Boethius on Aristotle’s
‘On Interpretation’ in six books

BOOK 4
The obscure ordering of the presentation in this book, which bears 250,20
the Latin title de interpretatione and the Greek peri hermeneias, is
added to the very obscure doctrines1 and so I would not have com-
mented on it in long volumes except to complete in the second edition
as clearly as I could, without flinching at the work involved, whatever 251,1
I had omitted in the first edition in terms of depth and complexity.
But you must forgive my prolixity and weigh the length of my work
against the obscurity of Aristotle’s book. However I have different
levels to satisfy the application and attention of readers desiring to 5
know important things in a very easy way; for after the two commen-
taries on this book I am composing a sort of summary2 where I will
use Aristotle’s own words partly, in fact almost entirely, except that
where he spoke obscurely through his terseness, I will make the 10
sequence of argument clearer with the addition of extra words, so
that between the terseness of the text and the diffuseness of the
commentary we will have an intermediate format which will bring
together what has been said diffusely and spread out the very closely
written work. So this is for later. 15
But now, because Aristotle showed above that in future contingent
propositions truth and falsity are not divided in a fixed and definite
manner and whatever the previous very broad discussion embraced,
his present intention is to enumerate such categorical propositions 20
as are composed in a simple form with a definite or indefinite name.
In the first volume3 it [is] said that a name is, e.g. ‘man’, and an
infinite name is, e.g. ‘not man’. Predicative (i.e. categorical) proposi- 25
tions are ones which consist of just two simple terms, either with a
definite name, e.g. ‘man walks’, or with an indefinite name, e.g. ‘not 252,1
man walks’. He now applies himself to the enumeration of those
simple categorical propositions which are formed by the addition of
an infinite name. But because all propositions differ either in quality 5
or quantity (in quality that one is affirmative, the other negative, in
quantity that one embraces several, the other few), how do the 10
propositions which say ‘man walks’ and ‘not man walks’ differ from
each other? In quality or in quantity? For ‘man walks’ designates a
certain quality of substance, i.e. that a man walks, and pronounces
that a definite thing and substance and single species is ‘walking’, 15
 16 Translation
whereas if I say ‘not man walks’ I abolish man as a definite thing and
signify countless things. Therefore that proposition which says ‘man
20 walks’ will appear to differ rather in quality, ‘not man walks’ in
quantity. Or is the following likely to be truer?: that ‘man’ in ‘man
walks’ as a simple name is very close to an affirmation, whereas the
25 infinite name ‘not man’ in ‘not man walks’ seems to be like a nega-
tion. But affirmation and negation differ in quality, and these are like
an affirmation and a negation, therefore they differ in quality rather
than any quantity. Or is the following likely to be truer, that ‘man
253,1 walks’ has the same relationship to ‘not man walks’ as does ‘Socrates
walks’ to ‘some man walks’? It is necessary that ‘some man walks’ is
true, if several are walking, but if several are walking, it is not
5 necessary that Socrates is walking. For several can be walking and
Socrates not be walking. But when several are walking, some man is
walking. This is the case because in the proposition ‘some man is
10 walking’ we join a particularity to the universality, i.e. man, and if
any do come under that universality ‘walking man’, the proposition
‘some man is walking’ must be true. But when we say ‘Socrates is
walking’, because Socrates concerns the property of a single individ-
15 ual, unless Socrates himself is walking, it is not true to say ‘Socrates
is walking’, although all men walk. Then just as ‘some man walks’ is
indefinite <and ‘Socrates walks’ is proper and defined>, so too with
20 ‘man’ and ‘not man’. One who says ‘man walks’ says that some animal
is walking and he specifies this by name and quality in saying ‘man
walks’. But one who says ‘not man walks’ does not remove every-
thing, but only man, while he declares that other animals are
25 walkers. Therefore whether a horse, ox or lion walks, ‘not man walks’
is true; but ‘man walks’ is not true unless man himself walks.
254,1 Therefore just as in the difference between ‘some man walks’ and
‘Socrates walks’ it is implied that if several men were walking, ‘some
man walks’ is true but ‘Socrates walks’ is not true unless Socrates
himself were walking, the same can be said of ‘man walks’ and ‘not
5 man walks’. For several things that are not men walk, it is true to say
that ‘not man walks’, but not true to say that ‘man walks’ unless man
10 himself walks. They seem then to differ in definiteness and property
rather than in any quantity as a whole or as a part or in any quality.
For, as will be demonstrated later, ‘not man walks’ is more an affirma-
tion than a negation. We have made enough introductory remarks. Let
15 it suffice to have gone so far with our introductory remarks.

Chapter 10
19b5-18 But because an affirmation is what signifies something
of something and this is a name or what has received no name,
and what is affirmed must be one thing and about one thing (we
20 have already spoken about name and what has received no
 Translation 17
name; for I do not mean that ‘not man’ is a name but an infinite
name; for it signifies in some way one infinite thing, just as ‘not
runs’ is not a verb but an infinite verb), every affirmation will
be composed of a name and a verb or an infinite name and a 25
verb. But there can be no affirmation or negation without a
verb; for ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’, ‘becomes’ or other things of this kind 255,1
are verbs according to what we have established; for they
additionally signify time. Then a first affirmation and negation
are: ‘man is’, ‘man is not’; then ‘not man is’ and ‘not man is not’;
again, ‘every man is’ and ‘every man is not’, ‘every not man is’, 5
‘every not man is not’.
In the second book,4 I think, we said that every simple statement, i.e.
predicative, consists of a subject and predicate and that the predicate
is always a verb or its equivalent5 as though a verbal expression was 10
put in, e.g. when we say ‘man walks’ a verb is put in, whereas when
we say ‘man rational’ the verb ‘is’ is understood, so that the full
thought is ‘man is rational’. So it is necessary that either a verb is 15
always predicated or what is like a verb and its equivalent in state-
ments. What acts as subject, we said, is either explicitly a name or
what can take the place of a name. Thus our main conclusion must
be that in a categorical proposition every subject is a name and every 20
predicate a verb. But because when he was talking about name he
introduced another kind of name which was not name in itself and in
the simple sense but was called infinite name, that which is ex-
pressed with a negative particle, and because every proposition has 25
a name as subject, and a categorical proposition is one which predi-
cates or denies something of something, and that of which it predi-
cates [something] is a name and, because infinite name is also
included in ‘name’, it is necessary that a categorical proposition 256,1
always have as subject either a name or what is called an infinite.
Infinite name is what he now calls what has received no ‘name’. So
all predicative proposition is divided into two types: either with a
subject formed from an infinite name or from a simple name; from an 5
infinite name when I say ‘not man walks’, and from a finite and
simple name, e.g. ‘man walks’. And there are two kinds with a finite
and simple name: either with a universal name for a subject, e.g.
‘man walks’ or with a singular name, e.g. ‘Socrates walks’. The 10
division is then as follows: of all simple statements, which consist of
two terms, there are those (1) with an infinite name as subject, and
those (2) with a finite and simple name. Of those that have a simple
subject some have a (2a) simple universal as subject, (2b) others a 15
singular as subject. Now above he taught us very clearly that there
are differences between propositions which posit a simple name as
subject: that some are universal, some particular and others indefi-
nite; they differ this way in quantity, and in quality in that some are 20
 18 Translation
affirmative, others negative. The same is true of propositions which
are stated with an infinite name as subject; for some of these are
indefinite, others definite. And of the definite some are universal,
25 others particular. Here too are the same differences in quantity as
well as quality in the case of propositions with infinite names; for we
257,1 say that some are affirmative, others negative. The table below
shows us which are simple affirmatives, which [simple] negatives,
and which are affirmative with an infinite name and which nega-
tives. And we have attached them all to their proper determinations
5 and even put the indefinite for each type of proposition, but have
excluded simple propositions with a singular subject. The simple
indefinite propositions are: ‘man walks’, ‘man does not walk’; opposed
to these those with an infinite name: ‘not man walks’, ‘not man does
not walk’; the universals with a simple name as subject are: ‘every
10 man walks’, ‘no man walks’; opposed to these the universals with an
indefinite name: ‘every not man walks’, ‘no not man walks’; the
particulars with a finite name as subject: ‘some man walks’, ‘some
15 man does not walk’; and against these those with an infinite name:
‘some not man walks’, ‘some not man does not walk’. The table below
shows this.

20

25

258,1

So when devising these divisions and forming a proposition about

propositional types with two terms, he assembled all the propositions
5 from the point of view of their subject name and subdivided only
those beginning with an infinite name. His main division then is this:
some propositions have a finite name, and others have an infinite
name. If he had wanted to make a comprehensive list of every
10 different proposition he ought to have taken infinite verbs as well as
names. But since he knew that an infinite name kept intact his model
proposition, so that if it was said in an affirmative proposition it
would keep the statement affirmative, e.g. ‘not man walks’, and if it
15 was said in a negative proposition, negative e.g. ‘not man does not
walk’, and that when infinite verbs are included in the proposition
they effect the negation and not an affirmation, he said nothing about
them, because infinite verbs are relevant only to one quality of
20 proposition, namely the negative. For from an infinite verb a nega-
 Translation 19
tive always comes about. Thus he put all this together with the words
but because an affirmation is what signifies, i.e. predicates, some-
thing of some subject; this means that every proposition consists of
subject and predicate. But the subject is a name or what has 25
received no name. What has received no name is that which when 259,1
proposed undermines a name, e.g. ‘not man’. For the name ‘man’
differs from an infinite name by the privation seen in ‘not man’ and
for this reason he also called it what has received no name. And he
indicated what kind of proposition he ought to be dealing with when
he said that what is affirmed must be one thing and about one thing, 5
i.e. that a proposition ought to consist of two terms. Aristotle also
recalls that he had said above6 what that which has received no name
is, that he does not call the phrase not man a name, but while not 10
calling it simply a name, with the addition of this ‘infinite’ he calls it
an ‘infinite name’, because it signifies a single, but infinite thing; for
‘not man’ is one in that it abolishes the signification of what we call
‘man’ and, while it takes away one signification in its own right, there 15
are many things still left for the mind to understand. He also recalls
that he had earlier7 called ‘he does not run’ an infinite verb and not
a verb simply. Then because an affirmation is something of some-
thing, and the subject has to be either a name or what has received 20
no name, i.e. an infinite name, two kinds of proposition become
apparent. For ‘every affirmation’ is ‘composed of a name and a verb
or an infinite name and a verb’, and negation too in the same way.
For you will never find an affirmation without a corresponding 25
negation. But if there are two kinds of affirmation, there will also be
two kinds of negation. He recalls here too what he had said above.8 260,1
For although a predicative, i.e. categorical, affirmation and negation
is formed from a name and verb, or from what is not a name but an
infinite name and verb (for it is not possible for there to be an 5
affirmation or a negation without a verb or what signifies the same
as a verb whether as understood or in some other form), he also sets
out the verbs which in almost every proposition either occur as actual
verbs or have the same function. For ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’, ‘becomes’ or 10
any other things of this kind which additionally signify time are
verbs, as we can learn from what has previously been laid down and
granted, when verbs were defined as what additionally signifies
time.9 So if these additionally signify time they are indubitably verbs. 15
But there can be no proposition without these or their equivalent. So
it has been rightly said that a predicative proposition cannot be
formed without verbs. But someone might seem right to bring for-
ward as an objection the question why, when he has already said that
there is no way in which statements can be formed without verbs, 20
does he now repeat the same thing as though he had said nothing
about this before. But it need not appear superfluous; for since an
infinite name is a finite name with a negative particle, it might
 20 Translation
25 perhaps be thought that when we say ‘not man’ it is a negation. But
if this is a negation, ‘man’ is an affirmation. To prevent anyone
slipping into this error, it was appropriate for him to repeat and say
that there cannot be a statement without a verb; which is the
261,1 equivalent of saying that no one should think that an infinite name
is a negation or a name an affirmation, for an affirmation and
negation cannot in any way be formed without a verb. Here he also
5 recognised that an infinite verb signifies both a negation and an
infinite verb. For ‘does not walk’ is both an infinite verb and a
negation, but if it is said simply on its own without any other
additions it is an infinite verb; but if it is expressed with a name or
10 with an infinite name, it is no longer understood as an infinite verb,
but as a negation; so that the negative particle ‘not’ when joined with
‘does walk’ forms the infinite verb ‘does not walk’, but in the proposi-
tion ‘man does not walk’ it signifies that man does not walk. And so
15 he says that in propositions either names or infinite names can act as
subjects, but that there can be no other predicatives than verbs. For
whether someone is joining one thing to another in an affirmation,
the predicate is without a doubt a verb, or if in a negation, it is not
an infinite verb but simply a verb which with the addition of the
20 particle ‘not’ changes the entire quality of the proposition from
affirmative to negative. Therefore he was right not to create a special
class of propositions out of infinite verbs. For infinite verbs are
infinite only then when they are on their own. But if they are joined
with an infinite name or a name, they are no longer infinite but finite
25 verbs, but are understood with the negative in the proposition as a
whole. Then if negations, as the Stoics would have it, are to be placed
with names so that ‘not man walks’ is a negation, when we say ‘not
262,1 man’ it could be ambiguous whether it is an infinite name or a finite
name joined to a negation. But since Aristotle thought that negatives
should be joined to verbs, it is rather infinite verbs that are of
ambiguous meaning, i.e. whether they are to be taken as infinite or
5 are finite with a negation. And so the distinction is made between an
infinite verb taken with a name which becomes a negation and a
negative proposition, e.g. ‘man does not walk’, and said by itself in
which case it is an infinite verb, e.g. ‘does not walk’. And so he
10 admitted only one distinction in propositions, that of names and
infinite names, but not that of infinite verbs, because he was talking
about combinations, i.e. about names or infinite names and verbs. In
this combination, what is on its own called an infinite verb is a
negation. For it must not be the case that every proposition consists
15 of either a verb or an infinite verb in the way it must have a definite
or an infinite name. For there are no infinite verbs in propositions,
but, as we have said, whenever such a thing is put there, the verb is
finite, but the addition of a negation deprives and does away with the
20 proposition as a whole. And an infinite verb joined to names must
 Translation 21
form a negation, whereas an infinite name joined to verbs need not
form a negation. For ‘not man walks’ is an affirmation and not a
negation. Therefore, because a negation ought to signify something
of something and an indefinite name is something, whenever we say
‘not man walks’ we predicate walking, which is something, of ‘not 25
man’, i.e. of something. But if we say ‘does not walk’ we do not so
much predicate something of something as from something; for to
say ‘man does not walk’ is to remove walking from man, not to 30
predicate it of man. Therefore it is a negation rather than an affirma- 263,1
tion. For if it were an affirmation, i.e. if the verb were infinite, it
would predicate something of something. But in fact it removes
something from something; therefore it is not an infinite verb, but 5
rather a negation, so long as it is taken in the proposition as a whole.
In fact he himself gives the number of propositions as we have also
described them above where we gave the indefinite propositions first
and then their contraries. But if anyone either looks back or pays
attention here he will, with care, recognise the difference between 10
our arrangement and Aristotle’s. For we proposed both contraries
and subcontraries, whereas Aristotle proposed only those that con-
tradicted each other when opposed and placed against each other.
But Aristotle said that the same proposed differences between
propositions are found not only in the present, but also in the other 15
times too which are external; he calls the times besides the present,
i.e. past and future, ‘external times’.10

19b19-31 But when ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing, 20

oppositions are expressed in two ways. I mean, for example,
‘man is just’; I mean that ‘is’ is joined as a third thing, name or
verb, in the affirmation. Therefore there will be four proposi-
tions, two of which will be related in sequence to affirmation and 25
negation as the privations are, but two which will not be like
this at all. I mean that ‘is’ will be joined to ‘just’ or ‘not-just’, and
also the negation. Therefore there will be four. We understand
what is meant from the following list. ‘Man is just’; its negation 264,1
‘man is not just’; ‘man is not-just’; its negation ‘man is not
not-just’; for ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are here joined to ‘just’ and ‘not-just’. 5
These then are arranged in this way as has been said in the
‘Analytics.’11
Another reading12 is handed down as follows: I mean that ‘is’ will be
joined to ‘man’ or ‘not man’, and also the negation for ‘is’ and ‘is not’ 10
are here joined to ‘man’ and ‘not-man’. These then are arranged in this
way as has been said in the ‘Analytics.’
What is meant is very unclear and is explained carelessly by many
people whose views I will record with an appropriate critique. After 15
he has explained propositions which consist of two terms and have as
 22 Translation
subject either a name or, using his own expression, what has received
no name, i.e. an infinite name, he now moves over to those in which
20 ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing, two things being predicated
of one subject; e.g. in ‘man is just’, ‘man’ is the subject, and ‘just’ and
‘is’ are both predicated. So here there are two predicates and one
subject. And perhaps someone might ask why he expressed it in this
25 way: but when ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing. For it is not
predicated as a third thing, but as a second; for there are two things
that are predicated and one subject. But it was not meant as though
265,1 ‘is’ in the proposition ‘man is just’ is a third predicate, but that it is
joined as a third thing and is predicated. Therefore ‘third thing’ refers
to ‘joined’. Even though in the proposition ‘man is just’ ‘is’ is joined as
5 a third thing, it is not predicated as a third thing, but as a second.
And so as counted third it is joined, but as counted second it is a
predicate. This is what he is saying: when ‘is’ is predicated as a joined
third thing, not that it is predicated as a third thing, but that it is
10 predicated as being joined as a third thing, i.e. in the third place.
So he now considers the propositions in which ‘is’, the joined third
thing, is a second predicate. And just as in the case of propositions in
which only ‘is’ is predicated and was not predicated as joined, he
considered how the number of ways in which the subject could be
15 understood determined the different kinds of proposition (for the
subject is either a name or an infinite name), so now he speaks about
the predicate and deals with the different kinds of predicate. For in
propositions in which ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing when
20 sometimes a name is taken as predicate or at other times an infinite
name, this makes for differences in the propositions. I mean that
what is predicated in the proposition which says ‘man is just’ is ‘just’.
For this is predicated of man, whereas ‘is’ is not predicated, but is
25 predicated as a joined third thing, i.e. in the second place and joined
with ‘just’, but is predicated as third in the proposition as a whole,
not as a kind of particular part of the whole proposition but rather as
266,1 a demonstration of quality. For ‘is’ does not constitute the proposition
as a whole, but demonstrates what the proposition’s quality is, i.e.
that it is affirmative. And so he did not simply say is predicated as a
third thing but is predicated as a joined third thing. For it is not put
5 in and just predicated as a third thing, but as a joined third thing, it
is predicated in second place and in a way accidentally. It can be
understood in the following way. Aristotle said that ‘is’ is predicated
as a joined third thing in these propositions, because it can some-
10 times be predicated in itself, e.g. if someone says ‘Socrates the
philosopher is’ so that this proposition has the meaning ‘Socrates the
philosopher lives’; for ‘is’ stands for ‘lives’. If someone speaks in this
way, there are two subjects and ‘is’ is only predicated and it is not
15 joined as well. For because ‘Socrates (the) philosopher’ are both
subjects, only ‘is’ is predicated. But if someone were to say ‘Socrates
 Translation 23
is a philosopher’, meaning by the statement not that Socrates is a
philosopher and lives, but that he philosophises and is a philosopher,
then we have one subject and two predicates. For Socrates is the
subject, ‘philosopher’ and ‘is’ are the predicates. And of these ‘philoso- 20
pher’ is predicated primarily, whereas ‘is’ is itself also predicated and
joined with ‘philosopher’, but it is not predicated simply but joined.
There are other propositions of the following kind: ‘Socrates will read
in the Lyceum’; and these are composed of three terms. But he does 25
not deal at all with this kind, however, but only with those in which
‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing, e.g. ‘man is just’. But these
have two opposites. And so it is right to have two opposites in the four
propositions. This comes about as follows: when ‘is’ is predicated as a 267,1
joined third thing what is primarily predicated is a name or an
infinite name. And these propositions must be predicated either in
the affirmative or negatively. And so the affirmation of a simple 5
name and the negation of a simple name are one opposition and two
propositions. But it is not the subject but the predicate which is taken
to be finite or infinite, so that in ‘man is just’ ‘just’ is predicated. But
this will be either a name or an infinite name. Therefore two affirma- 10
tions arise from this: ‘man is just’, ‘man is not-just’; <and two
negations: ‘man is not just’, ‘man is not not-just’>. And this is the case
in indefinite propositions. But it will be demonstrated later13 that it
is also the case in propositions which have a universal or particular 15
determination. But now the diagram below shows their number and
opposition.

20

In the above diagram I have called simple propositions those in which

a name is predicated, e.g. ‘man is just’, ‘man is not just’, ‘with an 25
infinite’ those in which an infinite name is predicated primarily, e.g. 268,1
‘man is not-just’, ‘man is not not-just’. Whether ‘is’ is said first or later
is all the same and this is not affected by the fact that Aristotle said 5
‘is’ first whereas we have put it at the end. It is all the same.14 And
so we get two oppositions and four propositions. These four proposi-
tions have been reduced to the smaller number from six. For if we
had simple propositions with two terms as well, there would be the 10
following: ‘man is’, ‘man is not’, ‘just (man) is’, ‘just (man) is not,
‘not-just (man) is’, ‘not-just (man) is not’ and there would be these six
propositions. It could also be added here that there could arise
propositions concerning an infinite name as subject, e.g. ‘not-man is’,
‘not-man is not’. But he speaks about these later. And for now those 15
six simple propositions have been taken up in the four because when
 24 Translation
simple things are joined together they then make a smaller total. For
the actual combining reduces the number so that if there are ten
things and the individuals are joined to each other to make pairs, the
20 total combination comes to five. So too here there were six simple
propositions, as I showed above, but these have been joined together
and reduced by combining them. For the four propositions ‘man is’,
‘man is not’, ‘just-(man) is’, ‘just-(man) is not’, have been reduced by
25 combining to two; for when ‘man’ is joined with ‘just’ they have made
two propositions; ‘man is just’, ‘man is not just][. Again when an
269,1 infinite is predicated of the very same man, the other two proposi-
tions arise rationally from an infinite predicate: ‘man is not-just’,
‘man is not not-just’. These make two oppositions and four proposi-
5 tions. So then from the six propositions, i.e. ‘man is’, ‘man is not’, ‘just
(man) is’, ‘just (man) is not’, ‘not-just (man) is’, ‘not-just (man) is not’
(since there are six propositions, there will be three oppositions),
‘man’ subject to ‘just’ and to ‘not-just’ made only four and a double
10 opposition. Those who have said that the propositions arising from
those in which ‘is’ is predicated as joined are more numerous than
from those consisting of two terms, have clearly not understood the
15 way in which a larger number of propositions always reduces to a
more restricted and smaller number when combined.
And so when he says that in propositions in which ‘is’ is predicated
as a joined third thing, ‘third thing’ does not refer to predication but
rather to order, as he himself says I mean, for example, ‘man is just’;
20 I mean that ‘is’ is joined as a third thing, name or verb, in the
affirmation. He does not say that it is predicated as a third thing, but
joined as a third thing – in order, not in predication – so that it is
joined as a third thing, but so as to be predicated as joined, i.e. not
25 predicated simply. For there is no further term in the proposition.
And so if someone wants to resolve the proposition into its terms, he
does not resolve it into ‘is’, but into ‘man’ and ‘just’. And there will be
two terms: the subject ‘man’ and the predicate ‘just’, while ‘is’ which
270,1 is predicated as joined and as a joined third, is to be understood more
correctly as a quality of the proposition, as I have said, rather than
as a term. And it is for this reason that he says name or verb; for he
5 said that ‘is’ is added as a third name to show us that the first two
are, of course, ‘man’ and ‘just’, and he said ‘verb or name’ because
verbs are also names. This he first said with the words verbs uttered
by themselves are names.15
10 Then after he had said what he wanted to demonstrate with the
words ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing, that it refers to order
and not to predication, he later explained how many propositions
there were when he said Therefore there will be four propositions. But
15 he said that accident, which I will explain carefully a little later, 16 is
common to these four. This is what has happened. Since there are
four propositions, which he is going to posit later, ‘two’ of them will
 Translation 25
be consequently related to affirmation and negation as their priva-
tions, but two will not be like this at all. But I will explain a little later 20
this accident in the propositions. Now let us look at how he himself
says the four propositions arise. He says I mean that ‘is’ will be joined
to ‘just’ or ‘not just’; for there will be a twofold proposition, if ‘is’ is
joined to ‘just’ or ‘not just’ as follows: ‘man is just’, ‘man is not just’. 25
Therefore, he says, if ‘is’ is put affirmatively first with ‘just’ and then
with ‘not-just’, it makes twin affirmative propositions. Similarly too
if ‘is’ is combined with a negative, i.e. not, it will also make the twin 30
negations, ‘man is not just’, ‘man is not not-just’. 271,1
And this is what he means by I mean that ‘is’ will be joined to ‘just’
or ‘not-just’. For if it is joined to ‘just’, it makes the affirmation ‘man
is just’; if it is joined to ‘not just’ it makes the affirmation ‘man is 5
not-just’, and also the negation which when joined with ‘is’ makes ‘is
not’. Then the negation when joined to ‘just’ and ‘not-just’ will form
two negations in opposition to the propositions we have mentioned.
For if it is added to ‘just’, it makes the following negation ‘man is not 10
just’; if to ‘not-just’, ‘man is not not-just’. Why does this happen?
Because ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are joined to ‘just’ and ‘not-just’, ‘is’ with ‘just’
and ‘not-just’ making two propositions, ‘is not’ with ‘just’ and ‘not- 15
just’ another two. From these four there are two oppositions as he
says above: but when ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing, opposi-
tions are expressed in two ways. This then is the general sense.
But there is another reading of this passage as follows:

I mean that ‘is’ will be joined to ‘man’ or ‘not man’, and also the 20
negation. Therefore there will be four. We understand what is meant
from the following list. ‘Man is just’; its negation ‘man is not just’; ‘man 25
is not-just’; its negation ‘man is not not-just’.

Here ‘is not’ is joined to ‘man’. This confused the commentators and 272,1
they hesitated as to what could be meant when after saying I mean
that ‘is’ will be joined to ‘man’ or ‘not man’, in the example and list he
put ‘is’ not with ‘man’ or ‘not-man’ but with ‘just’ and ‘not-just’ when
he said

We understand what is meant from the following list. ‘Man is just’; its 5
negation ‘man is not just’; ‘man is not-just’; its negation ‘man is not
not-just’

and after he had put ‘is’ and ‘is not’ with ‘just’ and ‘not-just’ which he 10
has just said he was not going to do, but had proposed to join ‘is’ to
‘man’ and ‘not-man’, he then goes on: for ‘is’ is here added to ‘man’
after proposing that ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are added to ‘just’ and ‘not just’.
For this reason Alexander too thinks that the fault lies with the
reading and not with the philosopher who spoke correctly and that 15
the reading must be emended. But he ought not to have been con-
 26 Translation
fused when Aristotle introduced ‘just’ and ‘not-just’ in place of ‘man’
and ‘not-man’. For these are examples rather than the only proposi-
tions possible. For saying that ‘is’ is added to ‘man’ and ‘not-man’ he
20 understood it as the equivalent of man being predicated, e.g. ‘Socra-
tes is a man’ or ‘Socrates is not-man’. So wanting to take any
predicate at all, whether simple or infinite, he introduced ‘just’ and
‘not-just’, being indifferent as to whether ‘man’ and ‘not-man’ or ‘just’
25 and ‘not-just’ were predicated, provided that the predicate be in one
case taken as a name and in the other as an infinite name. Alexander
should not have been confused and this mode of writing with which
the philosopher wanted to make us think did not confuse others such
273,1 as Porphyry and Herminus who say that these are examples of a
finite and infinite predicate where any predicate ought to be equally
acceptable; just as it would equally well serve his purpose if after
saying that ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are added to ‘man’ and ‘not-man’, he had
5 then introduced ‘white’ and ‘not-white’; for this is to express the
predicate, whether finite or infinite, with any name you choose. And
because he said ‘is’ is added to ‘man’ and ‘not-man’ and then intro-
duced ‘just’ and ‘not-just’ and put man as the subject, we are not to
10 suppose that he had wanted to speak about subjects, ‘man’ and
‘not-man’, and then by mistake introduced the predicates ‘just’ and
‘not-just’, but rather that he understood ‘man’ and ‘not-man’ as
predicated of something else, e.g. (we gave these examples above)
15 ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘Socrates is not-man’. So here ‘man’ and ‘not-man’
are predicates. Again there is no difference between ‘man is just’ and
‘man is not-just’; for in the same way in one proposition a simple
[name] is taken as predicate, in the other an indefinite, just as we
have the same situation if I say that snow is white and snow is
20 not-white. Then we should not criticise the text because after propos-
ing to add ‘is’ to ‘man’ and ‘not-man’ it then brings in ‘just’ and
‘not-just’. There is no difference whether just and not-just or man and
not-man act as predicates, provided that the predicate is taken to be
25 sometimes finite and sometimes infinite when something is predi-
cated as a joined third thing. And so the philosopher who is highly
knowledgeable in all matters wanted to exercise our intelligence and
274,1 acumen, not to confuse us with faulty composition. But when he adds
in summary the words we have already cited: for ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are
here added to ‘man’ and ‘not-man’, he means that in the proposition
‘man is just’ which he had just posited, ‘just’ is predicated of ‘man’,
5 while ‘is’ in being added to ‘just’ is added also to ‘man’; and in the
proposition ‘man is not just’, that ‘just’ is predicated of ‘man’ and ‘is
not’ is added to ‘just’, so ‘is not’ will also be added to ‘man’. For this is
what he means by for ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are here added to ‘man’ and
10 ‘not-man’. For if ‘just’ is predicated of man and ‘is’ and ‘is not’ is added
to ‘just’, it will also be added to man, as we said. Alexander thinks
that this reading ought to be emended and should be put as we first
 Translation 27
cited it ‘for “is” and “is not” are here added to “just” and “not-just” ’. 15
But whether we accept one reading or the other the whole sequence
of ideas is clearly set out. For neither need be altered. One offers more
challenge, the other is easier to understand, while both lead to the
same meaning.17
It remains then to explain carefully the sentence: 20

Therefore there will be four propositions, two of which will be related in

sequence to affirmation and negation as the privations are, but two
which will not be like this at all.

for the passage has a very concise brevity and is rendered difficult by 25
its excess of both obscurity and sophistication. And we have already
run through and explained this passage in the first edition of this
work and accorded it the same very short treatment we gave other
subjects there. But now we ourselves are going to reveal what truth 30
there is in its meaning and what lies hidden in its concise format, as 275,1
far as we are able and let the reader pay attention as best he can. If
he then perhaps finds them a little more obscure, he can blame the
difficulty of the material, but if they appear clearer than he thought,
he ought to credit his intelligence.
But first I will try to explain as best I can what Herminus thought 5
about this passage. He said that propositions with an infinite name
can be expressed in three ways: (1) they have an infinite subject, e.g.
‘not-man is just’; (2) an infinite predicate, e.g. ‘man is not-just’; (3)
both an infinite predicate and an infinite subject, e.g. ‘not-man is 10
not-just’. Of these, he says, those which have an infinite name as
predicate term are similar to those which declare some privation.
Propositions which say ‘unjust man’ declare a privation. Therefore, 15
he says, propositions with an infinite predicate like ‘man is not-just’
agree with those like ‘man is unjust’. For, he says, for a man to be
unjust is the same as for a man to be not-just. But those which have
either an infinite subject, e.g. ‘not-man is just’, or both infinite, e.g. 20
‘not-man is not-just’ do not agree with the privative proposition ‘man
is unjust’. For there is no similarity between the propositions ‘not-man
is just’ and ‘man is unjust’, nor between ‘not-man is not-just’ and ‘man
is unjust’. For those that have an infinite name as predicate agree with 25
privative propositions, but the propositions which have either an infi-
nite subject or both subject and predicate infinite are very different from 30
privative propositions. This is what Herminus says. His introduction
here of propositions with both [terms] infinite or with an infinite subject
is very much at variance with the full meaning and sense of [Aristotle’s] 276,1
thought. And his explanation has made nothing clear about what
Aristotle means by in sequence or how the two relate in sequence as the
privations are and which ones do not. And the meaning is just as 5
obscure after Herminus’ explanation as before.
 28 Translation
Our opinion, following Porphyry and in agreement with that most
learned man, is as follows. There are four propositions, two of which
10 have finite names and two have indefinite names as predicates.
Those with finite names are as follows: the affirmation ‘man is just’,
the negation ‘man is not just’; those with infinite names as predi-
15 cates: the affirmation ‘man is not-just’, the negation ‘man is not
not-just’. But in the rest of our discussion we will call propositions
which have infinite names as predicates infinite propositions so that
the affirmation ‘man is not-just’ and the negation ‘man is not not-just’
20 are infinite without any further discussion, so that, as we were about
to say, a proposition with an infinite name as predicate we will name
infinite, but the two which have no infinite name either as subject or
25 predicate we call simple. Then the simple propositions are ‘man is
just’, ‘man is not just’. I call privative propositions those which have
a privation. Privative propositions are of the kind ‘man is unjust’ for
this will deprive the subject of justice, and again ‘man is not unjust’;
30 this will in turn deprive the subject of injustice. So since there are
two simple propositions, one affirmative, the other negative, and
277,1 since there are two privative, here too one affirmative, the other
negative, and there are also the other infinite affirmative and nega-
tive propositions, I maintain that the infinites will relate to simple
5 propositions, in the same way as privative propositions, affirmation
and negation, relate to simple affirmations and negations, i.e. accord-
ing to sequence. What I mean is something like this. First put down
the two simple propositions, i.e. the affirmation ‘man is just’, and its
10 negative ‘man is not just’. Under these arrange the privative: under
the simple affirmative, the negative privative and under the simple
negative, the affirmative privative, so that under ‘man is just’ is
15 placed ‘man is not unjust’, and under ‘man is not just’ is placed ‘man is
unjust’. Again under the privatives arrange the infinites: under the
affirmation an affirmation, under the negation a negation. Under the
20 privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’ put the infinite affirmation ‘man is
not-just’; under the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ put the
infinite negation ‘man is not not-just’. The following diagram shows this.
25

30
278,1

What I mean is clear from the diagram, that the infinite propositions,
5 affirmative and negative, ‘man is not-just’ and ‘man is not not-just’
will relate to the simple propositions ‘man is just’ and ‘man is not just’
 Translation 29
in the same way that the privative propositions, i.e. affirmative and
negative, ‘man is unjust’, ‘man is not unjust’, relate to the simple 10
propositions, ‘man is just’, ‘man is not just’, that is, in sequence. Let
us see what the sequence of simple and privative propositions is, so
that we can learn whether infinite propositions relate to the simple
propositions in the same way as privatives to the same simple 15
propositions. So simple propositions have been arranged in the first
line, the simple affirmation ‘man is just’ and the simple negation
‘man is not just’. Under these, i.e. under simple affirmation, are two
negations, one privative ‘man is not unjust’ and the other infinite 20
‘man is not not-just’. Under the simple negation ‘man is not just’ are
two affirmations, one privative ‘man is unjust’ and the other infinite
‘man is not-just’. You can also see on the diagram that the affirma- 25
tions and the negations relate to each other diagonally. For the
simple affirmation ‘man is just’ is diagonally opposite both affirma-
tions, i.e. infinite and privative, ‘man is not-just’ and ‘man is unjust’. 30
Again the simple negation ‘man is not just’ is diagonally related to
the two negations, infinite and privative. And a privative negation 279,1
does follow a simple affirmation in truth. For if it is true to say that
man is just, it is true to say that man is not unjust. For man who is
just is not unjust. And we can posit that as a continuous and com-
bined proposition: if man is just, man is not unjust. Therefore priva- 5
tive negation follows simple affirmation, so that if a simple
affirmation is true, the privative negation will also be true and the
truth of a privative negation follows the truth of a simple affirmation. 10
But it is not the case in reverse. For a simple affirmation does not
follow a privative negation. For if it is true to say that man is not
unjust, it is not at all true to say that man is just. For it can be said 15
truly of a horse that a horse is not an unjust man (for it isn’t a man
at all and so isn’t an unjust man), but it cannot be said of a horse that
a horse is a just man. So then because it is not true of horse that it is 20
a just man, the truth of a simple affirmation does not follow the truth
of a privative negation. And so a continuous and combined proposi-
tion cannot be formed starting from the privative negation; for ‘if man
is not unjust, man is just’ is not a true proposition. For with regard 25
to the horse, as we have said, it is true that it is not an unjust man,
but not true that it is a just man. Therefore a simple affirmation does
not follow a privative negation. It has been proved then that a
privative negation follows a simple affirmation, but that a simple 280,1
affirmation does not follow a privative negation. Let us see, too, what
the sequence is on the opposite side. For on the other side a simple
negation follows a privative affirmation, but a privative affirmation 5
does not follow a simple negation. For if it is true to say that man is
unjust, it is true to say that man is not just. For whoever is unjust, is
not just. And the simple negation ‘man is not just’ follows the truth 10
of the privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’. But this is not convert-
 30 Translation
ible. For a privative affirmation does not follow a simple negation.
15 For if it is true to say that man is not just, it is not at all true that
man is unjust. For it is true to say about a horse that it is not a just
man (for what isn’t a man at all, isn’t a just man), but it cannot be
said truly about the same horse that it is an unjust man. For what is
20 not a man cannot be an unjust man. Therefore the truth of a privative
affirmation does not follow the truth of a simple negation, whereas
the truth of a simple negation follows of necessity the truth of a
privative affirmation. And so it has been proved in both cases that a
25 privative negation follows a simple affirmation, but a simple affirma-
tion does not follow a privative negation; and again that a simple
negation follows a privative affirmation, but a privative affirmation
does not follow a simple negation. So with this established let us deal
30 with indefinite and privative propositions. For privative and infinite
affirmations agree with their affirmations, and the negations agree
281,1 with their negations as follows. The privative affirmation ‘man is
unjust’ agrees with the infinite affirmation ‘man is not-just’. For they
both, the privative affirmation and the infinite affirmation, signify
5 the same thing; and although in some speech they differ in the way
they are expressed, they never differ in signification, except only
insofar as whom the privative proposition posits as being unjust, the
other posits as being not-just. And again the privative negation ‘man
10 is not unjust’ agrees and is in harmony with the infinite negation
‘man is not not-just’. These too are the same because they agree with
each other. Now the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ follows the
simple affirmation ‘man is just’; therefore the infinite negation fol-
15 lows the very same simple affirmation, i.e. ‘man is not not-just’
follows ‘man is just’; for if the privative and infinite negations agree,
the infinite negation also follows what the privative negation follows;
20 but the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ follows the simple
affirmation ‘man is just’; therefore the infinite negation ‘man is not
not-just’ follows the same simple affirmation ‘man is just’.
25 Again the same happens on the other side. Because the simple
negation ‘man is not just’ followed the privative affirmation ‘man is
unjust’, the simple negation ‘man is not just’ also follows the infinite
282,1 affirmation ‘man is not-just’. For if a privative and infinite affirma-
tion agree, what follows the privative also follows the infinite
affirmation. But the simple negation ‘man is not just’ follows the
5 privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’; but the privative and infinite
affirmation signify the same thing and agree with each other; there-
fore the simple negation ‘man is not just’ follows the infinite
10 affirmation ‘man is not-just’. But the converse does not occur. For we
have now demonstrated that an infinite negation follows a simple
affirmation and a simple negation follows the truth of an infinite
affirmation; but the reverse is not the case, that a finite affirmation
15 follows an infinite negation and an infinite affirmation follows a
 Translation 31
simple negation. For if the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ and
the infinite negation ‘man is not not-just’ signify the same thing,
because the simple affirmation ‘man is just’ does not follow the 20
privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ as we proved above, that same
simple affirmation ‘man is just’ does not follow the infinite negation
‘man is not not-just’.
Again on the other side if the privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’
signifies the same as the infinite affirmation ‘man is not-just’, but the 25
privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’ did not follow the simple nega- 283,1
tion ‘man is not just’, then neither does the infinite affirmation ‘man
is not-just’ follow the simple negation ‘man is not just’. 5
But although the necessity and rationale of the sequences proves
this, nevertheless let us also communicate with examples what we
have demonstrated with reason. For I mean that the infinite negation
‘man is not not-just’ follows the simple affirmation ‘man is just’, just 10
as the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ follows the same simple
affirmation ‘man is just’. For if it is true to say that man is just, it is
also true to say of him that man is not not-just (for whoever is just is 15
not not-just), just as it was true to say that the same man who is just
is not unjust. Therefore the infinite negation follows the simple
affirmation, just as the privative negation also followed the same
simple affirmation. But this is not convertible. For it is not immedi- 20
ately true that whatever man is not not-just ( = whoever is not a not
just man) is also just. For a horse is not a not-just man (for it is not
a man at all; and what is not at all a man, could not be a not-just
man), but about the horse of which it is true to say that it is not a 25
not-just man, it is not true to say that it is a just man, just as it would
have been true to apply to the same horse the privative negation
which posits ‘man is not unjust’ ( = it/he is not an unjust man); for it 284,1
could also have been said of the horse. But it was established as not
true that the simple affirmation ‘man is just’ follows this privative
negation. Therefore the simple affirmation ‘man is just’ does not 5
follow the infinite negation ‘man is not not-just’, just as the simple
affirmation ‘man is just’ followed not even the privative negation
‘man is not unjust’ which agrees with the infinite negation. Then it 10
must be said in conclusion that an infinite negation follows a simple
affirmation, just as a privative negation follows a simple affirmation,
but a simple affirmation does not follow an infinite negation, just as
it did not follow a privative negation.
Again on the other side the same happens in reverse. For a simple 15
negation follows an infinite affirmation, just as the same simple
negation also followed the privative affirmation. For whatever man
is not-just, is also of necessity not just, just as also whatever man is 20
unjust, is of necessity not just. But if it is true to say that he is not a
just man, it is not at all necessary that he is a not-just man; for a
horse is not a just man (for what is not at all a man cannot be a just
 32 Translation
25 man), but no one can say of the same one that the horse is a not-just
man (for what is not a man cannot be a not-just man), just as when
we said ‘man is not just’, the privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’ did
30 not follow. For a horse is not a just man, but no one can say about the
285,1 same horse that it is an unjust man. Again then we must say in
conclusion that a simple negation follows an infinite affirmation, just
as it followed a privative negation, but not conversely. For an infinite
5 affirmation does not follow a simple negation, just as a privative
negation did not follow a simple negation.
So then there are four propositions, two simple and two infinite.
The two simple propositions are ‘man is just’ and ‘man is not just’;
10 the two infinite are ‘man is not-just’ and ‘man is not not-just’. Of these
four two, the infinite negation and the simple negation, follow the
two others, the infinite negation follows the simple affirmation, ‘man
15 is not not-just’ follows ‘man is just’, and the simple negation follows
the infinite affirmation, ‘man is not just’ follows ‘man is not-just’. The
other two, the simple affirmation and the infinite affirmation, do not
follow the infinite negation and the simple negation. This also hap-
20 pens in privative propositions so that a privative affirmation does not
follow a simple negation, though the simple negation follows it, and
again a privative negation does follow a simple affirmation, though
a simple affirmation does not follow a privative negation.
25 Hence it was right to say that of these four, the two simple and the
two infinite propositions, two of them follow the two others and have
a certain relationship of sequence to the others; thus infinite nega-
tion and simple negation follow simple affirmation and infinite
286,1 affirmation. Privatives are similar; for a privative negation too fol-
lowed a simple affirmation and a simple negation followed a
privative affirmation. Thus two have a relationship of sequence, i.e.
5 an infinite negation and a simple negation have a relationship of
sequence to a simple and to an infinite affirmation, like privatives too
(for privatives too behave similarly as I have often demonstrated
above), but two which will not be like this at all have no relationship
of sequence; for a simple affirmative does not follow an infinite
10 negation nor an infinite affirmation a simple negation, just as was
the case too with privatives. For in privatives the simple affirmation
did not follow the privative negation nor the privative affirmative the
simple negation. The meaning of the passage is then: ‘there will be
15 four’, i.e. propositions, from which he had said a double opposition is
formed. The four are the two simple propositions, the affirmative
‘man is just’ and the negative ‘man is not just’, and the two infinites,
the affirmative ‘man is not-just’ and the negative ‘man is not not-
20 just’. Two of these, he says, meaning the infinite negative and the
simple negative, will relate to affirmation and negation in sequence,
i.e. the two negations follow the two other affirmations, simple and
25 infinite, just as the privations followed them. ‘But two which will not
 Translation 33
be like this at all’, i.e. the simple affirmation and the infinite affirma-
tion, these two affirmations will not relate in sequence to the two
negations, infinite and simple, which they did not follow, just as the
privative affirmations too did not follow these negations. The phrase 30
to affirmation and negation is not to be understood as though there 287,1
were one affirmation or one negation, but that in the four proposi-
tions, in which two will be affirmations and two negations (the
affirmations are: simple ‘man is just’; infinite ‘man is not-just’; the 5
negations: simple ‘man is not just’; infinite ‘man is not not-just’),
because the two negations followed the two affirmations, the simple
‘man is just’, the infinite ‘man is not-just’ (the simple negation ‘man 10
is not just’ followed the infinite affirmation ‘man is not-just’ and
again the infinite negation ‘man is not not-just’ followed the simple
affirmation), because then, as we have said, the two negations,
simple and infinite, followed the two affirmations, simple and infi-
nite, and this also was the case in privations, this is why it was said 15
that two of these four propositions relate in sequence to affirmation
and negation, just as the privations also relate. He said ‘to affirma-
tion and negation’ because the two negations follow the two 20
affirmations, ‘but two which will not be like this at all’, i.e. because
the two affirmations do not follow the two negations. For the simple
affirmation did not follow the infinite negation nor the infinite af-
firmation the simple negation, just as they did not do so in the
privatives, as has often been demonstrated above. But no one should 25
think that we mean a negative and affirmative proposition from the
same genus. For we did not say that a simple negation follows simple
affirmation. For this is impossible. For a simple affirmation and a 288,1
simple negation never agree with each other; nor do an infinite
negation and an infinite affirmation. For it is impossible for the
negation ‘man is not just’ to agree with the affirmation ‘man is just’ 5
or for the affirmation ‘man is not-just’ to agree with the negation
‘man is not not-just’.
* * *18 For the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ follows the
simple affirmation ‘man is just’, but the simple affirmation ‘man is
just’ does not follow, they say, the infinite negation ‘man is not 10
not-just’. Therefore the simple affirmation ‘man is just’ does not
follow the infinite negation ‘man is not not-just’ in the same way as
the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’ does follow the simple 15
affirmation ‘man is just’. We must make the reply that they do not
properly understand this sequence and that there is no incongruity
in this kind of sequence. For how can they know that the finite 20
affirmative ‘man is just’ does not follow the infinite negative ‘man is
not not-just’? For they ought not to think that this is anything
surprising. For the simple affirmation ‘man is just’ does not follow
the infinite negation ‘man is not not-just’, because it did not follow 25
the privation before; for the simple affirmative ‘man is just’ did not
 34 Translation
follow the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’; and that is the
reason why it does not follow an infinite negation either. For an
289,1 infinite and a privative, as we have often said above, agree with each
other. Therefore there is no incongruity. For if a simple affirmation
did follow a privative negation, it would also follow the corresponding
5 infinite negation. But now since a simple affirmation does not follow
a privative negation, neither does it follow an infinite negation
either. But those who assumed that a privative negation follows a
simple affirmation and said that there was disagreement in that
10 sequence because a simple affirmation does not follow an infinite
negation, ought not to have assumed incongruity, but rather that if
an infinite negation did not follow a simple affirmation in the same
way as a privative negation a simple affirmation, there then would
15 be a discrepancy in the sequence. But now there is no discrepancy at
all. And on this side the propositions do not in any way disagree or
are discordant.
Let us now look at the other side where they say that there is a
discrepancy between what follows for simple propositions from infi-
nites and privatives, so that we can see whether there is any
20 discrepancy there too. For they say that the simple negative ‘man is
not just’ is in agreement and harmony with the privative affirmation
‘man is unjust’, and just as the simple negation follows the privative
affirmation, so the infinite affirmation ‘man is not-just’, they say,
25 does not follow the simple negation ‘man is not just’. For this does not
follow that. Again we give them the reply that the infinite affirmation
290,1 ‘man is not-just’ does not follow the simple negation ‘man is not just’
precisely because the privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’ does not
follow the simple negation ‘man is not just’. But if the privative
5 affirmation did follow the simple negation, without doubt the indefi-
nite affirmation would also follow the same simple affirmation. But
now since the privative affirmation does not follow the simple nega-
tion, neither does the infinite affirmation follow the simple negation.
10 For the privative affirmation and the infinite affirmation agree with
each other. But those who wanted to show a lack of agreement in the
implications of the infinite and privative with respect to the simple
proposition, with the argument that when a simple negation follows
15 a privative affirmation an indefinite affirmation does not follow the
simple negation in the same way, ought not to have concluded that
there was a discrepancy. But if, just as the privative affirmative ‘man
is unjust’ <does not follow the simple negation ‘man is not just’>, the
20 infinite affirmation ‘man is not-just’ followed the simple negation
‘man is not just’, then they really would have had to say that there
was some lack of agreement in the implications of the infinite and
privative with respect to the simple proposition. But now since an
25 infinite affirmation does not follow a simple negation in exactly the
same way in which a privative affirmation does not follow a simple
 Translation 35
negation, it is clear that there is no difference between these – in fact 291,1
they are alike in all respects –, and that the objectors have not said
anything right with the idea they want to add. In fact they involve
the already obscure meaning in even greater obscurities.
But we should really understand it in such a way that we take the
sentence two of which will be related in sequence to affirmation and
negation as the privations are, but two which will not be like this at 5
all as if he had said: of the four propositions, two simple, two infinite,
the two negations (simple and infinite) follow the two affirmations 10
(simple and infinite), just as the privations too (for in the privations
the privative negation followed the simple affirmation, the simple
negation the privative affirmation), which leaves two, i.e. the simple
affirmation and the infinite affirmation which have no relationship 15
of sequence to the negations (simple and infinite), just as with the
privations too (for the privative affirmation did not follow the simple
negation nor the simple affirmation the privative negation). So we
say as follows: ‘therefore there will be four propositions’, two simple,
two infinite, ‘of which’, i.e. the two simple and the two infinites, ‘two’, 20
i.e. the simple and infinite negations, relate to the simple and infinite
affirmations in sequence as the privations are, but two which will not
be like this at all, i.e. the simple and infinite affirmations in relation
to the two negations (simple and infinite); saying ‘will be related in 25
sequence to affirmation and negation’, i.e. that the negations follow
the affirmations; as the privations are, i.e. just as was maintained 292,1
with the privations too; but two means that the simple and infinite
affirmations will not relate in sequence to the two negations, the
simple and the infinite, just as the privations too did not relate in 5
sequence. For the privative affirmation did not follow the simple
negation nor the simple affirmation the privative negation.
There is another simpler interpretation which Alexander recorded
after the many other interpretations which he had considered. Since,
he says, there are four propositions, two of which are infinite and two 10
simple, the two infinite propositions have the same relationship to
the privatives in affirmation and negation, whereas the two simple
propositions do not have the same relationship to their corresponding
privative propositions. He means as follows: the infinite affirmation 15
agrees with the privative affirmation; for the infinite affirmation
‘man is not-just’ agrees with the privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’;
and the infinite negation ‘man is not not-just’ agrees with the priva- 20
tive negation ‘man is not unjust’; and these two, the infinite
affirmation and the infinite negation relate to affirmation and nega-
tion as the privations are, i.e. they affirm or deny the same things as
the privations affirm or deny. But two which will not be like this at 25
all means that the two simple propositions do not relate at all to
affirmation and negation as the privations do. For the simple af- 293,1
firmation has no bearing on the privative affirmation. For the
 36 Translation
proposition ‘man is just’ does not agree with the proposition ‘man is
unjust’. Nor again does the simple negation agree with the privative
5 negation. For the simple negation ‘man is not just’ disagrees entirely
with the privative negation ‘man is not unjust’. Therefore since there
are four, simple affirmation and simple negation, infinite affirmation
10 and infinite negation, two of these, infinite affirmation and indefinite
negation, affirm or deny something in the same way as the privations
(this is what is meant by saying that they relate to affirmation and
negation as the privations are), but two which will not be like this at
15 all. For the two simple propositions do not affirm and deny in the
same way as the two privatives. For the simple affirmation is at
variance with the privative affirmation and again the simple nega-
tion entirely disagrees and is at variance with the privative negation.
But this interpretation of Alexander is, as we have said, given as a
20 simpler explanation after many others. It is not, however, to be
rejected, but our previous interpretation seems to be truer, as Aris-
totle himself bears witness. For just afterwards he says ‘these then
are arranged in this way as has been said in the ‘Analytics’. For at the
end of the first book of the Prior Analytics (in Greek Analutika) he
25 arranged the sequence of privative and infinite propositions in rela-
tion to simple propositions in the way in which I have recorded it in
my interpretation above. And Porphyry says that some of his contem-
poraries interpreted this book, and because by singling out
30 individual interpretations from Herminus, Aspasius or Alexander
they found many contradictions and inconsistencies in those poorly
294,1 presented interpretations, thought that this book of Aristotle could
not be interpreted in a worthy manner, and that many men of this
period bypassed the entire contents of this book because they consid-
ered its darkness incapable of explanation. And we passed over this
5 passage very briefly in the first edition, but, what we there set out
briefly for the sake of simplicity of comprehension, here we have
interpreted the entire thrust and extent of the meaning at great
length. Then since I think we have supplied a worthy interpretation
10 above, let us look at the text and meaning of the next section.

19b32-6 There is a similar relationship also if an affirmation is

about a universal name, e.g. ‘every man is just’, ‘not every man
is just’; ‘every man is not-just’, ‘not every man is not-just’. But
15 it does not happen that the diagonals are true in the same way;
it does, however, happen sometimes.
After some preliminary remarks about indefinite propositions he
now says of propositions which are determined by the addition of
20 universality or particularity that they too relate in a similar way to
those opposed simple and infinite propositions which are said with-
out any determination. Some have understood the words there is a
 Translation 37
similar relationship also if an affirmation is about a universal name
referring his word similar to the number of opposites and proposi- 25
tions. For just as in the indefinite and undelimited propositions there
are two pairs of opposites, one of simple negation and simple affirma- 295,1
tion, the other of infinite affirmation and infinite negation, i.e. four
propositions in all as has been said above, so too in propositions with
a universal or particular determination four propositions and two 5
pairs of opposites are produced. For one pair of opposites consists of
a simple universal affirmation and a simple particular negation, e.g.
‘every man is just’, ‘not every man is just’. This is one pair of opposites. 10
The other consists of an infinite universal affirmation and an infinite
particular negation, e.g. ‘every man is not-just’, ‘not every man is
not-just’. Therefore here too, since there are two opposites, there will
without doubt be four propositions, exactly as in the case of those he had 15
mentioned above which were lacking in determination.
But others who have looked deeply into Aristotle’s thought say
that determined propositions relate similarly not only with respect
to the number of opposites and propositions, but also with respect to
their sequence. For the sequential relationship of negations to af- 20
firmations in simple and infinite propositions expressed without a
determination is exactly the same as in those expressed with a
determination. But because not everything is similar in every re-
spect, he added the remark but it is not the case that the diagonals 25
are true in the same way; it is, however, sometimes the case. The
complete meaning of the passage is as follows. He says the proposi-
tions which are expressed as infinite in accordance with their 296,1
determination relate to simple propositions and simple propositions
to infinites, just as indefinite propositions were said without any
determination. But they have a certain dissimilarity in that the
diagonal propositions which are said with determination are not true 5
in the same way as either infinite or simple propositions expressed
without any determination. Let us therefore first see whether there
is the same sequence between determinate propositions as there is
between indefinite ones, and afterwards see what difference there 10
may be in the diagonals.
Therefore let there be set out not only simple or indefinite propo-
sitions, but also privative ones. Let them be set out firstly in this way:
the simple affirmation and the simple negation; and these are both 15
indefinite, i.e. without the addition of universality or particularity.
Beneath these put the privative negation under the simple affirma-
tion and the privative affirmative under the simple negation; these
are also indefinite. Then under them put the infinite affirmation
under the privative affirmation and the simple negation, and put the 20
infinite negation under the privative negation and the simple af-
firmation; and these too are indefinite and indeterminate without
any universality or particularity. Then beneath these put those
 38 Translation
25 propositions which we call determined through either a quantity of
universality or particularity: first of all the simple universal affirma-
tion, and opposite this the simple particular negation. Then beneath
the simple universal affirmation put the privative particular nega-
30 tion; under the simple particular negation put the privative
297,1 universal affirmation. And now put the infinite particular negation
under the privative particular negation and the simple universal
affirmation and put the infinite universal affirmation under the
privative universal affirmation and the simple particular negation.
5

10

15

20

It is clear what the diagonals are in the diagram of propositions

25 which we have drawn above. They are affirmations to affirmations
and negations to negations. And in the indefinite propositions the
diagonal affirmations are as follows: the simple affirmation ‘man is
30 just’ is diagonally opposite the privative affirmation ‘man is unjust’
298,1 and the infinite affirmation which proposes ‘man is not-just’. Then
the simple negation that ‘man is not just’ is diagonally opposite the
privative negation which says ‘man is not unjust’ and the infinite
5 negation that ‘man is not not-just’. Likewise, if anyone looks at the
defined propositions, he will without any doubt find the same. For
the simple universal affirmation that ‘every man is just’ is diagonally
opposite the privative universal affirmation which states ‘every man
10 is unjust’ and the infinite universal affirmation, which proposes
‘every man is not-just’. Likewise, the simple particular negation that
‘not every man is just’ is diagonally opposite the privative particular
negation which says ‘not every man is unjust’ and the infinite par-
15 ticular negation which proposes ‘not every man is not-just’. Therefore
affirmations are diagonal to affirmations and negations to negations
both in the list of indefinite and defined propositions.
We have, therefore, to consider their sequence. For it was said
20 before that a privative and infinite negation would follow a simple
indefinite affirmation, but that a simple affirmation would not follow
them. Again, a simple negation follows an infinite affirmation and a
 Translation 39
privative affirmation, but these do not follow a simple negation.
Again if someone looks back at the list of defined propositions, he will 25
discover the same. For a privative particular negation and an infinite
particular negation follow a simple universal affirmation; for if the
simple universal affirmation which says ‘every man is just’ is true,
the privative particular negation which says ‘not every man is unjust’ 299,1
is also true. This is so because the proposition which says ‘not every
man is unjust’ can mean the same as a simple proposition and is
similar to the simple particular affirmation which proposes ‘some 5
man is just’. For if not every man is unjust, some man is just. But the
simple particular affirmation follows the simple universal affirma-
tion. For when the universal affirmation which says ‘every man is
just’ is true, the particular affirmation which proposes ‘some man is 10
just’ is also true. But the privative particular negation which pro-
poses ‘not every man is unjust’ agrees with the proposition which
proposes ‘some man is just’. Therefore the privative particular nega-
tion will also agree with the simple universal affirmation. Therefore 15
that privative particular negation ‘not every man is unjust’ follows
that simple universal affirmation ‘every man is just’. But the infinite
particular negation ‘not every man is not-just’ agrees with the priva-
tive particular negation ‘not every man is unjust’. For if it is true that 20
not every man is unjust, it is also true that not every man is not-just.
For to be unjust and to be not-just are the same. But the privative 25
particular negation follows the simple universal affirmation; there-
fore, the infinite particular negation follows the simple universal
affirmation and agrees with it, if the universal affirmation is already
true. Therefore the privative particular negation ‘not every man is 30
unjust’ and the indefinite particular negation ‘not every man is
not-just’ without a doubt follow the simple universal affirmation 300,1
‘every man is just’. And so here too the negations follow the affirma-
tion. But this is not convertible. For, since, as has been said, the 5
privative particular negation ‘not every man is unjust’ agrees with
the simple particular affirmation ‘some man is just’, but the univer-
sal affirmation does not follow this particular affirmation (for if it is 10
true that some man is just, it is not necessarily and automatically
true that every man is just), therefore the simple universal affirma-
tion ‘every man is just’ does not follow the simple particular
affirmation ‘some man is just’ (for if the particular is true the univer- 15
sal can be false), but the simple particular affirmation agrees with
the privative particular negation; therefore the simple universal
affirmation does not follow the privative particular negation. There-
fore the simple universal affirmation ‘every man is just’ does not 20
follow the proposition ‘not every man is unjust’. But the privative
particular negation agrees with the infinite particular negation;
therefore the simple universal affirmation does not follow the infinite
particular negation. So that simple universal affirmation ‘every man 25
 40 Translation
is just’ does not follow the infinite particular negation ‘not every man
is not-just’. Thus two particular negations, infinite and privative
30 follow the simple universal affirmation, just as it was in indefinite
301,1 propositions. For the two indefinite negations, infinite and privative,
followed a simple indefinite affirmation, but not conversely. For a
simple universal affirmation does not follow particular infinite
5 and privative negations, just as a simple indefinite affirmation too
did not follow privative and infinite negation. Thus in this one list
the defined propositions are similar to the indefinites; for the
negations are true whenever the affirmations are true, but the
10 truth of the affirmations does not follow true negations, nor does
it agree with them.
Let us now inspect the other side to see how the simple particular
negation follows the universal affirmations, both privative and infi-
15 nite. For the simple particular negation ‘not every man is just’ follows
the privative universal affirmation ‘every man is unjust’; for the
proposition ‘every man is unjust’ agrees with the simple universal
negation ‘no man is just’; for if every man is unjust, no man is just.
20 But the simple particular negation follows this. i.e. the simple uni-
versal negation; for if it is true that no man is just, it is true that not
every man is just. But a simple universal negation agrees with a
privative universal affirmation; therefore the simple particular ne-
25 gation ‘not every man is just’ follows the privative universal
affirmation ‘every man is unjust’. But this agrees with the infinite
universal affirmation; for ‘every man is unjust’ and ‘every man is
302,1 not-just’ signify the same thing. Therefore the simple particular
negation ‘not every man is just’ also follows the infinite universal
affirmation ‘every man is not-just’. Here too the simple particular
5 negation follows the universal affirmations, both privative and infi-
nite, but they are not convertible. For since the universal negation
‘no man is just’ does not follow the simple particular negation ‘not
10 every man is just’ (for if it is true that not every man is just, it is not
true that no man is just) while the simple universal negation agrees
with and signifies the same thing as the privative universal affirma-
15 tion, the privative universal affirmation ‘every man is unjust’ does
not, therefore, follow the simple particular negation ‘not every man
is just’, just as the universal negation did not follow the same
particular negation. But the privative universal affirmation agrees
with the infinite universal affirmation. Therefore the infinite uni-
20 versal affirmation ‘every man is not-just’ does not follow the
particular negation ‘not every man is just’. Therefore here too the
25 simple particular negation follows the two universal affirmations,
privative and infinite, just as also the indefinite negation followed
the two indefinite affirmations, privative and infinite, but the two
303,1 universal affirmations, privative and infinite, do not follow the
simple particular negation, just as also the two indefinite affirma-
 Translation 41
tions, privative and infinite, did not follow the indefinite simple
negation. Thus defined propositions are similar to indefinite ones
with regard to sequence.
But the diagonals do not correspond in the same way. For it
happens that the diagonals of indefinite propositions are true at the 5
same time. For if it is true that ‘man is just’, which is a simple
indefinite affirmation, is true, there is nothing to prevent the propo-
sition ‘man is unjust’ and again ‘man is not-just’, which are indefinite
affirmations, privative and infinite, from also being true. Again, it 10
happens that diagonal negations are also true, so that if the proposi-
tion ‘man is not just’ is true, there is nothing to stop ‘man is unjust’
and ‘man is not-just’ from also being true. Therefore in indefinite
propositions nothing stops the diagonals from agreeing with each 15
other in point of truth, but only in those terms which are things which
inhere as neither natural nor impossible, as we explained in book
two.19 For if someone says ‘man is rational’, its diagonals cannot be
true, i.e. ‘man is irrational’ and ‘man is not-rational’. For rationality 20
inheres naturally in man. The same too has to be said about things
which are impossible. But if the [terms] are such as to be neither
impossibly nor naturally inherent (e.g. in ‘man is just’, it is neces- 25
sary that justice is neither natural nor impossible in man), it is 304,1
clear that the diagonals always agree with each other in point of
truth. And it is right to say the same thing about the diagonal
negations as well. Thus it happens that in those terms which are
neither natural nor impossible those negations which are diagonal 5
to negations and the affirmations which are diagonal to affirma-
tions are always true at the same time. And this is the case with
those propositions which are indefinite.
But in those propositions which are defined and participate in uni-
versality and particularity it does not happen in the same way. For
whatever the terms are, whether possible, natural, or impossible, the 10
affirmations cannot agree in point of truth with the corresponding
diagonal affirmations, but the negations which are diagonal to nega-
tions will be able to agree in point of truth, though only when the
terms are neither natural nor impossible. We must first show how, 15
whatever the terms, affirmations which are diagonal to affirmations
cannot agree with each other. For ‘every man is just’ and its diagonal,
‘every man is unjust’, cannot be true at the same time. For ‘every man 20
is unjust’ does not differ at all from ‘no man is just’. But ‘every man
is just’ and ‘no man is just’, since they are contraries, cannot both be 25
true at the same time. But ‘no man is just’ agrees and is consonant
with ‘every man is unjust’. Therefore ‘every man is just’ and ‘every
man is unjust’ cannot be true at the same time. But the same
proposition which proposes ‘every man is unjust’ agrees, as we have 30
often said, with ‘every man is not-just’. In this case, therefore, this 305,1
proposition cannot agree in point of truth with the proposition ‘every
 42 Translation
man is just’. Thus the simple universal affirmation ‘every man is just’
in no way agrees at the same time with its diagonal universal
5 affirmations, privative and infinite, ‘every man is unjust’ and ‘every
man is not-just’, just as in the case of indefinite propositions the
affirmations could not agree in point of truth with the affirmations
diagonal to them nor the negations with the negations [diagonal to
10 them]. In the case of defined propositions, however, the diagonal
affirmations cannot be true at the same time. It was thus right to say
that the sequence of defined and indefinite propositions is similar in
all other cases. For the negations agree in point of truth with the
15 affirmations, but the affirmations do not entirely agree with the
negations; this similarity in sequence is in both, i.e. in defined and
indefinite propositions. But there is the difference that it does not
happen that the diagonals are true in the same way. It does happen
20 that in indefinite propositions the affirmations which are diagonal to
affirmations and the negations which are diagonal to negations are
true at the same time. But with propositions which are defined it
sometimes happens that the affirmations which are diagonal to
affirmations are not at all true. And this will be clear if someone
25 proposes examples both where the terms are natural and impossible,
and also where they are possible, not natural and not impossible. For
in all cases he will find that defined affirmations cannot be true at
306,1 the same time as the defined affirmations diagonal to them.
His addition it does, however, happen sometimes means that al-
though defined affirmations cannot be true at the same time as the
5 affirmations diagonal to them whatever their terms, it can neverthe-
less happen that negations which are diagonal to negations are found
to be true and that this is similar to indefinite diagonal propositions.
For just as there indefinite negations diagonal to negations could be
true at the same time where the [terms] were neither natural nor
10 impossible, so too here, that is in the diagram of defined propositions,
it happens that defined negations diagonal to defined negations are
true at the same time where they are neither impossible nor natural.
For the simple particular negation ‘not every man is just’ can be true
15 at the same time as the proposition ‘not every man is unjust.’ For it
can happen that some people are just and that some are not just; and
in this case both propositions are true, both ‘not every man is just’
20 because some are unjust and ‘not every man is unjust’ because some
will be able to be just. But the latter proposition agrees with the
infinite particular negation ‘not every man is not-just’. For to say ‘not
every man is unjust’ is the same as saying that ‘not every man is
25 not-just’. For which reasons these diagonal propositions too can be
true at the same time. For if some are just, some unjust, it is true to
say that ‘not every man is just’ because some are unjust; in turn it is
true to say that ‘not every man is not-just’ because some are just.
307,1 Therefore defined negations can be true at the same time as the
 Translation 43
negations diagonal to them and this is similar to indefinite proposi-
tions where negations agree in point of truth with the negations
diagonal to them, just as affirmations agree with the affirmations
diagonal to them.
The complete meaning of the passage is as follows: he says There 5
is a similar relationship, i.e. the sequence of propositions will be
similar to what it was in indefinite propositions also if an affirmation
is about a universal name, i.e. if defined affirmations and negations
are posited, as he showed with examples, saying that the simple 10
particular negation ‘not every man is just’ is opposed to the simple
universal affirmation ‘every man is just’. And next he opposed the
infinite universal affirmation ‘every man is not-just’ to ‘not every 15
man is not-just’. These propositions, he says, have a similar relation-
ship to indefinite propositions with respect to sequence. And he has
shown above how they relate to each other as regards sequence.20 But
it does not happen that the diagonals are true in the same way; for in 20
indefinite propositions the affirmations could be true at the same
time as the affirmations diagonal to them, but in defined propositions
they cannot be true at the same time; it does, however, happen
sometimes that in defined propositions the diagonals are true in a 25
similar way as in indefinite propositions; for defined negations agree
at the same time in point of truth with the negations diagonal to
them, as was found to be the case with those indefinite propositions
which we described above. This then is the complete meaning.
But Herminus explains this in another way. Four propositions, he 30
says, will make two oppositions in a similar way if there were two 308,1
simple and two infinite propositions, yet with the addition of a
determination. And he shows this as follows. He first proposes the
simple universal proposition ‘every man is just’, and opposite this the 5
simple particular negation ‘not every man is just’; beneath the simple
universal affirmation he puts the infinite universal affirmation
‘every man is not-just’, and opposite this, beneath the simple particu-
lar negation, the infinite particular negation ‘not every man is 10
not-just’.

every man is just not every man is just

every man is not-just not every man is not-just

In this arrangement, he says, two oppositions arise. For the proposi- 15

tion ‘not every man is just’ is ranged against ‘every man is just’. This
is because a simple universal affirmation and a simple particular
negation are opposed to each other as contraries. This is one opposi- 20
tion. Then the infinite universal affirmation ‘every man is not-just’ is
ranged against the same simple affirmation ‘every man is just’, and
this too as a contrary; for ‘every man is not-just’ signifies the same 25
thing and agrees with the proposition ‘no man is just’. But ‘no man is
 44 Translation
just’ is ranged against, as a contrary, the proposition ‘every man is
309,1 just’. Therefore ‘every man is not-just’ will also be the contrary of
‘every man is just’. Therefore there will be this second opposition too.
Thus there are two oppositions, just as there also are with indefinite
propositions. Although they were opposed in another way, there were
5 still two oppositions. But in their diagonals it does not happen that
they are true in a similar way, as he says himself. For the former,
since they were indefinite, happened to have diagonals that were
true at the same time all with each other. But if someone returns to
10 our descriptions of indefinite proposition,21 he will understand this
thoroughly. Here, however, with defined propositions, it is not the
same. He demonstrates this as follows: ‘Every man is just’ does not
15 agree with its contradictory ‘not every man is just’. Again ‘every man
is not-just’ does not agree in turn with ‘not every man is not-just’. For
the latter agreed with its contrary. Therefore when the simple uni-
versal affirmation ‘every man is just’ is true, the proposition ‘every
20 man is not-just’ is without doubt false. But if the latter is false, its
contradictory will be true. Thus the negation ‘not every man is
not-just’ is true. Therefore these two diagonal propositions, ‘every
man is just’ and ‘not every man is not-just’ are at different times
25 found to be true. Thus it happens sometimes that they are true, but
not, he says, entirely. For if you begin from an infinite particular
negation, it is not the same, i.e. the same truth does not come to light.
This can be proven as follows: if it is true that not every man is
310,1 not-just, ‘every man is not-just’ is false; for they are opposed as
contradictories. But if the latter proposition ‘every man is not-just’ is
false, ‘every man is just’ must not be entirely true for the reason that
5 these two propositions are opposed as contradictories. And we dem-
onstrated above,22 however, contrary propositions can be false at the
same time. Therefore if ‘every man is not-just’ is false, it is not
necessary for the proposition ‘every man is just’ to be true. But if this
10 is not necessary, it can come about that both are false. Thus it
sometimes happens that when the proposition ‘not every man is
not-just’ is true, the proposition ‘every man is just’ is false. Therefore
15 the diagonal propositions do not agree with each other in point of
truth in a similar manner. And with this incorrect explanation
Herminus confuses the list. If someone examines carefully what
Herminus says and what we said above, he will recognise that there
is a great difference in interpretation, and judging the interpretation
20 mentioned previously to be better he will, if he gives any credence to
us, rightly agree with it.

19b36-20a3 These then are two pairs of opposites, but there are
others if an addition is made to ‘not-man’ as a kind of subject,
25 e.g. ‘not-man is just’, ‘not-man is not just’, ‘not-man is not-just’,
 Translation 45
‘not-man is not not-just’. But there will not be more oppositions
than these. And these will be on their own and separate from
the previous ones in that they use ‘not-man’ as a name.
He had already said above23 that every subject consists either of a 311,1
simple and definite name or, on the other hand, of an infinite name;
and he showed that they had two pairs of opposites and four propo-
sitions, two having a simple name as subject and two an infinite
name. After these when ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing, there 5
too, he said, a pair of oppositions is generated, when, that is to say,
the subject is predicated as a <definite>24 or an infinite name. And he
demonstrated how they were related to each other in a sequence, the 10
privative to the corresponding simple propositions with which propo-
sitions with an infinite name were compared. Moreover this whole
variety of propositions is produced in such a way that when ‘is’ is
predicated as a joined third thing either both subject and predicate
are definite or the subject is definite, while the predicate is infinite 15
(he mentioned these when he demonstrated their sequence) or they
have an infinite subject but a definite predicate or both an infinite
subject and predicate. Examples of propositions with both a definite
subject and predicate are ‘man is just’, ‘man is not just’; with a 20
definite subject and an infinite predicate, ‘man is not-just’, ‘man is
not not-just’. Their sequence has been shown above. There are,
however, others which have an infinite subject and employ an infinite 25
name as a sort of name, e.g. ‘not-man is just’, ‘not-man is not just’; for
these propositions use the subject, i.e. ‘not-man’, as a name, and ‘just’ 312,1
as predicate. This is what he means when he says but there are others
if something is added to ‘not-man’ as subject. For if someone puts
‘not-man’ as subject and predicates of this either a definite name, e.g. 5
‘just’, or an infinite, e.g. ‘not-just’, he will again form two pairs of
opposites with either procedure. These are the four propositions:

not-man is just not-man is not just

not-man is not-just not-man is not not-just 10

In all four propositions, then, ‘not-man’ acts as subject of the two

pairs of opposites, but in the first pair of opposites a definite name,
‘just’, is predicated, <in the second pair an infinite name, ‘not-just’.> 15
But those propositions, he says, which have an infinite predicate but
a definite subject or in which the predicate and subject are definite,
are related to each other in some sequence, whereas those which we
spoke of afterwards, i.e. those which had an infinite subject but a 20
predicate that was either definite or infinite, have no sequential
relationship to those propositions which consist of either a definite or
infinite predicate and a definite subject. This is what he means when
he says and these will be on their own and separate from the former,
 46 Translation
25 i.e. those that retain an infinite subject in the list of propositions have
no sequential relationship to the propositions mentioned earlier
which consist of a definite subject. Then after having listed both
those consisting of two definite [terms], i.e. both subject and predi-
313,1 cate, and those with a definite subject but an infinite predicate, he
added also those which had an infinite subject and a definite predi-
cate, as well as those which were seen to consist of both a subject and
a predicate that were infinite. Thus having listed them, he said but
5 there will not be more oppositions than these. For every pair of
opposites, as we have already said above,25 consists either of two
definite [terms], e.g. ‘man is just’, ‘man is not just’, or a definite
subject and an infinite predicate, e.g. ‘man is not-just’, ‘man is not
10 not-just’, or an infinite subject and a definite predicate, e.g. ‘not-man
is just’, ‘not-man is not just’, or both an infinite subject and predicate,
e.g. ‘not-man is not-just’, ‘not-man is not not-just’. It is absolutely
impossible for a fifth pair of opposites to be found. Let this then be
15 what is said on the topic of propositions with ‘is’ predicated as a
joined third thing.

20a3-15 In cases where ‘is’ is not appropriate, e.g. ‘to run’ or ‘to
walk’, when the verbs are posited in this way, the same effect is
achieved as if ‘is’ were added, e.g. ‘every man runs’, ‘every man
20 does not run’; ‘every not-man runs’, ‘every not-man does not
run’. For one must not say ‘not every man’, but must add the
negation ‘not’ to ‘man’. For ‘every’ does not signify a universal
25 but that it is taken universally. This is clear from ‘man runs’,
‘man does not run’, ‘not-man runs’, ‘not-man does not run’; for
314,1 these differ from the previous ones in that they are not taken
universally. Thus ‘every’ or ‘no’ signify nothing in addition other
than that a proposition affirms or denies something of a name
5 taken universally. Thus the rest ought to be added unchanged.
There are certain propositions in which ‘is’ is predicated as a joined
third thing and is understood by its own sound and utterance and
there are others where the predicate verb is such as not to be
10 predicated as a joined third thing but still has and contains within it
the verb ‘is’. If this kind of predicate, where the predicate, which,
when previously expressed by the verb alone, was predicated as a
second thing, is resolved into a participle and a verb, ‘is’ will be
predicated in the third place and the proposition becomes like one
15 that also has the verb ‘is’ actually uttered in it. For if someone says
‘every man runs’, in this proposition the first element is the subject,
the second the predicate; for ‘man’ is made subject and ‘runs’ is
20 predicated. We cannot be of the opinion that there are three terms in
this proposition, for the reason that ‘every’ is not a term but the
determination of the subject term; for when it says ‘every man runs’
 Translation 47
it signifies that a universal thing, i.e. ‘man’, is taken universally as
the subject of ‘running’. For no man is excepted when the determina-
tion is present that every [man] runs. Thus when we say ‘every’ it is 25
not put in the position of a term, but rather is the determination of
the term which is the subject. Therefore in the proposition ‘every man 315,1
runs’ there are two terms, ‘man’ and ‘runs’. Therefore in the same
proposition, although the verb ‘is’ is not predicated in utterance, it is,
nevertheless, contained in the signification of the verb ‘runs’. For if 5
someone resolves the proposition ‘every man runs’ into a participle
and verb, he will make ‘every man is running’, and the participle plus
verb signifies the same as the verb signifies, which embraces both.
For when I say ‘every man runs’, I proclaim that the action is there 10
for every man; but if I in turn say the same thing in the form ‘every
man is running’, it proposes that the same action is again present to
man. Thus the verb ‘runs’ has the same signification as ‘is running’.
And in the proposition ‘every man runs’, although ‘is’ is not uttered, 15
it is, nevertheless, predicated potentially as a third thing. And this is
discerned if the entire proposition is resolved into a participle and
verb. For which reason an affirmation cannot be produced from an
infinite verb in the same way as it comes from an infinite name as 20
subject, but the force of a negation is soon recognised in the former.
For we cannot say that an affirmation is produced when we propose
‘every man does not run’ in the same way in which we make an
affirmation when we say ‘every not-man runs’, where we treat ‘not-
man’ as an infinite subject. For the former proposition is now a 25
negation. Thus wherever there is ‘does not run’, ‘does not work’, ‘does
not walk’, or ‘does not read’, in all of these there is a negation,
wherever an indefinite verb is predicated.
However, although an affirmation can never be produced from an
infinite verb, but it is always a negation which is produced from this 30
kind of predicate, someone will be in doubt whether if this same 316,1
proposition, too, is resolved into a participle and verb, an affirmation
could arise from an indefinite participle. In the proposition ‘every
man runs’ one who proposes it thus, ‘every man does not run’, cannot 5
make an affirmation, but without doubt only a negation; but if the
same proposition, too, is resolved into a participle and verb, so that
one says ‘every man is running’, and if the infinite ‘not-running’ is
produced, and ‘every man is not-running’ is said, the question is
whether this is an affirmation or definitely a negation having the
equivalent force of saying ‘every man is not running’. But there were 10
some who inferred this both from many other sources and also from
a syllogism in Plato, and the definition which they drew from it they
acknowledged on the authority of the most learned men. For a
syllogism cannot in fact be produced from two negative propositions. 15
In one of his dialogues26 Plato argues a syllogism of this kind: the
senses, he says, do not have contact with the definition of a sub-
 48 Translation
20 stance; what does not have contact with the principle of a substance,
does not have contact with the idea of truth itself; therefore the
senses do not have contact with the idea of truth. It appears that he
has made a syllogism from all negatives, which is impossible, and so
they say that he put the infinite verb ‘does not have contact’ in place
of the infinite participle ‘not-having-contact’. For in many other
25 instances it is often possible to find an infinite verb put in the place
317,1 of an infinite name. Thus some people maintained that a verb always
makes a negation if it is proposed as an infinite, but that participles
or names, if they are infinite, can make an affirmation. And so
5 whenever an infinite verb and two negations are proposed by great
men in a syllogism, it is defended on the grounds that an infinite verb
is said to have been put in place of a participle and that the participle
is predicated in the proposition in place of a name. And this is what
Alexander of Aphrodisias and many others think. For they say that
10 an affirmation cannot be produced from an infinite verb since just as
the verb ‘is’, when it is an infinite verb, will immediately bring about
an entire negation, so too verbs which contain in themselves the verb
‘is’ will not make an infinite affirmation, but rather a negation. For
15 if someone says ‘man is not running’, no one would say this is an
affirmation. But if someone says ‘man does not run’, this proposition
too is not an affirmation since ‘run’ contained within it the verb ‘is’,
and just as the negative particle when joined to the verb ‘is’ does not
20 make an affirmation, but rather a negation, so too when the negation
is joined to the verb which contains ‘is’ within itself, it brings about
a full negation. Aristotle, however, does not seem to make this
distinction,27 but to think that it is similar whether one puts in ‘is’
318,1 with a participle or the verb which encloses and embraces the verb
‘is’ within itself without the participle. For this is what he says: in
cases where ‘is’ is not appropriate, e.g. ‘to run’ or ‘to walk’, when the
5 verbs are posited in this way the same effect is achieved as if ‘is’ were
added. And he gives as an example ‘every man runs’. For in the
proposition ‘every man runs’ it is not appropriate to put in the verb
‘is’; in the same way, if one says ‘every man walks’ here, too, it is not
10 appropriate to put in the verb ‘is’; but these are such as they would
be if ‘is’ were added. This he showed with an example; for just as
‘every man is running’ is an affirmation showing the presence of
running, so, too, the affirmation ‘every man runs’ has the same force
15 and signification. He next lists the affirmations with simple subjects
where it is not appropriate to say ‘is’ when he says ‘every man runs’
(currit omnis homo), putting the determination ‘every’ (omnis) in the
middle between the predicate ‘runs’ (currit) and the subject ‘man’
20 (homo). Opposite this he ranges the simple negation ‘every man does not
run’. In addition he forms an affirmation from an infinite name, ‘every
not-man runs’, to which he opposes a negation with an infinite name
as subject, ‘every not-man does not run’. And he proposed these to
 Translation 49
show that the same thing happens in propositions where it is not 25
appropriate to predicate ‘is’ as in those where ‘is’ is predicated as a
joined third thing. But when he said ‘every not-man does not run’ as 319,1
a negation with an infinite name as subject, someone could have said
that the proposition ‘every not-man does not run’ does not form the
correct negation of the affirmation ‘every not-man runs’, but that the
opposites ought rather to have been ‘every not-man runs’ and ‘not 5
every man does not run’. And it is for this very reason that he
demonstrates that the negation should be formed in the way he set
it out; for he says for one must not say ‘not every man’, but must add
the negation ‘not’ to ‘man’. The meaning of this is that whenever we 10
form the negation of the affirmation ‘every not-man runs’, the nega-
tive particle ‘not’ must not be attached to ‘every’ but rather to the
subject, i.e. the name ‘man’. For when we say ‘every not-man runs’,
the negation must be formed as ‘every not-man does not run’. For we 15
must not say ‘not every man does not run’, and the negative particle
‘not’ is not to be attached to ‘every’, but rather to ‘man’. The reason
for this is that the determination ‘every’ is not classed as a term, but 20
rather with its own force, that is, as a determination. For ‘every’ does
not in itself signify something universal, but ‘man’ signifies the
universal, while ‘every’ is a determination, since one predicates what
is universal, i.e. ‘man’, universally. Thus the determination ‘every’
does not signify something universal, but rather that a universal 25
name is predicated universally. And so whenever a negation of such 320,1
propositions is produced, the negation ought to refer to the subject
name and not to the determination. But in case anyone is in doubt,
let him say that opposites should be produced here as elsewhere. For
in propositions which have a finite subject, when we say ‘every man 5
runs’, if the contradictory negation is ranged against this, the nega-
tive particle must be placed against the determination, so that ‘not
every man runs’ is ranged against ‘every man runs’. But with propo- 10
sitions which are produced with an infinite name as subject, whether
in affirmation or negation, the negation must not be separated from
the subject name. This is very easily understood if the determina-
tions are removed for a moment and the consideration turned to 15
indefinite propositions with an infinite name as subject. Take the
indefinite affirmation ‘not-man runs’. Ranged against this will be the
negation ‘not-man does not run’. Then if these propositions have been
made in universal terms (for ‘man’ is a universal term), but do not 20
have the determination added, [indicating] that they are predicated
universally, i.e. ‘every’, and the negative particle in both affirmation
and negation is kept with the subject (for it was always of necessity
infinite), even when something which determines is added the nega-
tion is attached not to the determination but rather to the subject 25
name. One must take care that whatever was infinite in an affirma-
tion, remains infinite in the negation. For just as in indefinite propo-
 50 Translation
321,1 sitions an indefinite28 and simple term ought to be preserved in the
affirmation and the negation, so that we say ‘man runs, man does not
run’, so too in a pair of opposites formed with an infinite name as
5 subject one has to ensure that what is the subject in the affirmation
is also kept as subject in the same form in the negation. But if this
happens in indefinite propositions, why should the same thing not
also seem to have to happen in defined propositions? For defined
propositions differ from indefinite propositions in only one respect,
10 that while indefinite propositions predicate universals without a
universal determination, determined and defined propositions predi-
cate that same universal with the additional signification that it is
predicated universally. Therefore ‘every’ and ‘no’ have no other sig-
nification than that what is stated as a universal is predicated
15 universally. Thus all the same things that were posited in an indefi-
nite affirmation and negation, must also be kept the same in the
same determined propositions. For ‘every’ and ‘no’ are not terms, but
determinations of a universal term.
20 Then after Aristotle’s treatment of these issues, let us also bring
in Syrianus’ (we have already referred to his having the surname
Philoxenus)29 very relevant and useful compilation of all the proposi-
tions weighed up in the discussions of this book. And we must first
25 see how many of the categorical propositions are indefinite. For there
322,1 will be as many universals and particular propositions and proposi-
tions involving singulars as there are indefinite propositions. And
first let us look at the affirmations as follows: there are four kinds of
proposition; for propositions are either undefined, universal, particu-
5 lar, involving singulars and individuals. Then if we investigate how
many indefinite affirmations there are, if I multiply these by four, I
will get the number of affirmations. If I double this, I will in this way
also get the number of negations. For ‘is’ is predicated either on its
10 own or certainly as a third thing joined with another. And if ‘is’ is
predicated on its own, it must be predicated of a simple finite name
or of an infinite. From these arise two affirmations: ‘man is’, ‘not-man
is’. But whenever ‘is’ is predicated as a joined third thing, there will
15 be four affirmations: (1) when the subject alone is infinite, ‘not-man
is just’, (2) when the predicate alone is infinite, ‘man is not-just’, (3)
when both are finite, ‘man is just’, (4) when both are infinite, ‘not-
20 man is not-just’. But more propositions than these cannot be found,
as Aristotle himself says.30 Since there are six affirmations, two in
which ‘is’ is predicated, four where it is added, if I multiply them by
25 four, the result will be twenty-four. If I multiply them again by two,
my total will increase somewhat to forty-eight. That then will be the
number of whatever affirmations and negations have ‘is’ either as
predicate or predicated as a joined third thing. Then since there are
323,1 three other qualities of propositions – necessary, contingent and
signifying that something is merely inherent – and all the former
 Translation 51
propositions are expressed according to these three attributes, if we
multiply our forty-eight propositions by three, i.e. the attributes of 5
the propositions, the total number of predicative propositions dealt
with in this book will rise to one hundred and forty-four. I have at
this point added below a list of the forty-eight propositions with their
negations, excluding the tripling of the attributes. If I multiply them 10
by the attributes, – necessary, contingent, signifying something –, the
result will be one hundred and forty-four.

15

20

25

324,1

10

So we have also arranged by name the propositions which Syrianus

computed with calculations, since credence will more easily be given 15
to the count if examples are given and also, at the same time, since a
person badly instructed in these propositions used to dispute in the
most perverse way, putting affirmations in place of negations and 20
negations in place of affirmations and mixed up the whole list.
Therefore, so that his discourse does not lead anyone astray from the
truth of right reason, I have made this arrangement to help the
memory to be more retentive.

20a16-20 Since the contrary negation of ‘every animal is just’ is 25

that which signifies that ‘no animal is just’, it is clear that these 325,1
will never be true at the same time or of the same thing, but that
 52 Translation
5 their opposites sometimes will, e.g. ‘not every animal is just’
<and> ‘some animal is just’.
This too has been carefully proved above, that contraries sometimes
divide the true and false between them, namely when they are
10 proposed in relation to either natural things or impossibilities, but
that sometimes they can be found to be false at the same time, when
they predicate things that are neither natural nor impossible. And it
has been said that contraries are whatever propositions make a
15 universal declaration either affirmatively or negatively. Thus he now
says that propositions which are contraries cannot be true at the
same time. And he said this with a certain determination of the
things; for he says since the contrary negation of ‘every animal is just’,
20 meaning the affirmation, is that which signifies that ‘no animal is
just’, meaning the negation, it is clear, he says, that these, since they
are contraries which cannot be true at the same time, will never be
25 true at the same time or of the same thing. But never be true at the
same time means that nothing prevents the possibility of a universal
326,1 affirmation and negation being proposed truly at different times.
Thus if someone says ‘every man is just, if it were said of the golden
age, the proposition would be very true. But if someone, on the other
hand, says ‘no man is just’ and says this of the iron-age, the proposi-
5 tion will be true. Therefore it happens that both the universal
affirmation and negation, which are clearly contraries, are true but
not at the same time. For one is in the golden age, if that happens to
be the case, the other in the iron-age. But these times are different
and not simultaneous. Therefore he was right to say in addition that
10 it is clear that these will never be true at the same time. The addition
or of the same thing applies to another determination of the same
thing. For a universal affirmation and negation can be true at the
15 same time and together, but only if they are not predicated of the
same thing, e.g. if someone says that ‘every animal is rational’, the
affirmation is true if it is predicated of men; but if someone says that
‘no animal is rational’, if he says this of horses, the universal negation
when made in opposition to the universal affirmation will be true at
20 one and the same time, but not of the same thing; for the affirmation
was made about men, the negation about horses. Therefore he was
right to say that contraries can never be true at the same time or of
25 the same thing, i.e. at one and the same time or about one subject.
But since in these a particular negation was opposed to a universal
affirmation and a particular affirmation to a universal negation, and
we said31 these are called subcontraries because they permit different
30 things, so to speak, from contraries, it is clear that just as contraries
cannot be true at the same time but sometimes do divide between
327,1 themselves truth and falsity, in the same way subcontraries also
sometimes divide true and false between them, when the contraries
 Translation 53
too have made this division; they can, however, be found to be
simultaneously true when the universals and contraries are simulta-
neously false, but it can on no account of the matter happen that they 5
are simultaneously false. Thus no one will ever find contraries to be
true at the same time and of the same subject; but it is possible for
subcontraries to be found to be true in relation to each other when
opposed to universals and contraries. So in the example which he 10
himself gave, ‘not every animal is just’ is true, and again ‘some
animal is just’ is also true. Therefore contraries cannot be true at the
same time, but nothing prevents subcontraries from being found to
be true at the same time.

20a20-3 These propositions follow from each other: ‘every man 15

is not-just’ follows ‘no man is just’,32 and its opposite ‘not every
man is not-just’ follows from ‘some man is just’; for there must
be someone [who is just].
He has said enough above about the sequence of simple and indefinite 20
propositions, but now his intention is not to show what particular
affirmation or negation follows what universal affirmation or nega-
tion, which he has already shown above, but what universal negation 328,1
follows a universal affirmation or what particular negation agrees
with a particular affirmation. He posits these four propositions,
saying that a simple universal affirmation and an infinite universal
affirmation follow from each other and agree with each other, and it 5
is the same with their opposites, i.e. a simple particular negation and
an infinite particular negation follow from each other both in truth
and in falsity and do not in any way disagree with each other. Set out
these four propositions: first the infinite universal affirmation ‘every 10
man is not-just’; underneath and agreeing with it the simple univer-
sal negation ‘no man is just’; now on the other side, ranged against
the infinite affirmation, put the simple particular affirmation ‘some 15
man is just’; beneath this the infinite particular negation ‘not every
man is not-just’.

every man is not-just some man is just

no man is just not every man is not-just

Then when they have been arranged in this way, if the infinite 20
universal affirmation ‘every man is not-just’ is true, the simple
universal negation ‘no man is just’ is also true. This is better under-
stood in examples closer to the truth. Suppose that it is true that
every man is a non-quadruped; then it is also true that no man is a 25
quadruped. But if one of these is false, the other will also be false. For
if it is false that every man is not-just, insofar as it is actually false,
then the simple negation ‘no man is just’ has also made a completely 30
 54 Translation
329,1 false predication. Therefore an infinite universal affirmation and a
simple universal negation agree with each other, so that when one is
true, the other is necessarily true; and the falsity of one follows from
the falsity of the other as well. The same also happens on the other
5 side [of the list]. For if it is true that some man is just, it is also true
that not every man is not-just; for there is someone [who is just]. For
‘not every’ is the equivalent of saying ‘someone is not’. This will be
seen more clearly in another example too. If someone says that not
10 every man is just, this is the same as saying that someone is not just.
Thus ‘not every’ signifies ‘someone [is] not’. If, therefore, someone
proposes that ‘some man is not not-just’, he confirms that the man he
says is not not-just is just. So the man of whom it is said that he is
15 not not-just will be just. Hence it happens that ‘not every man is
not-just’ agrees with ‘a certain man is not not-just’. But this agrees
with ‘a certain man is just’. Therefore this proposition agrees too with
20 the proposition ‘not every man is not-just’. But since this perhaps
seems to some extent rather obscure, their mutual implications
should be taken in this way. Suppose that an infinite universal
affirmation and a simple universal negation agree with each other,
25 so that the truth or falsity of the one follows from the truth and falsity
of the other. If the infinite universal affirmation ‘every man is
330,1 not-just’ is false, the infinite particular negation ‘not every man is
not-just’ which is opposed to this will be true. But when the infinite
universal affirmation is false, the simple universal negation ‘no man
5 is just’ is also false. But if this is false, the particular affirmation
‘some man is just’, which is opposed to this as a contradiction, is
necessarily true. Therefore when an infinite universal affirmation is
false, the infinite particular negation is true; and when the simple
10 universal negation is false, the simple particular affirmation is true.
But the infinite universal affirmation and the simple universal nega-
tion are simultaneously false and agree with each other in their
falsity. Therefore the simple particular affirmation and the infinite
particular negation will be simultaneously true.
15 Again if the infinite universal affirmation is true, the infinite
particular negation will be false; for it is opposed to it as a contradic-
tion. If, on the other hand, the simple universal negation is true, the
simple particular affirmation is false. But the infinite universal
20 affirmation and the simple universal negation are simultaneously
true. Therefore the simple particular affirmation and the infinite
particular negation will be simultaneously false. Thus these proposi-
tions too, i.e. the simple particular affirmation and the infinite
particular negation, agree with each other in truth and falsity, and
25 each follows the truth and falsehood of the other. Thus both the
universal affirmation and the universal negation, one simple, the
other infinite, follow each other and agree with each other; and the
particulars, i.e. the simple affirmation and the infinite negation
 Translation 55
opposed to the universals, also agree with each other. So the list is 30
correct in making the infinite particular negation agree with the
simple particular affirmation, just as the simple universal negation 331,1
agrees with the infinite universal affirmation.

20a23-30 And it is clear that in singular propositions too if,

when questioned, it is true to deny something, then it is also 5
true also to affirm something, e.g. do you think that Socrates is
wise? No. Then Socrates is not-wise. In universals, however, a
similar [affirmation] is not true, but the negation is true, e.g. do
you think that every man is wise? No. Then every man is
not-wise. This is false, but ‘then not every man is wise’ is true. 10
This is the opposite, the former is the contrary.
While discussing the implications of propositions and how they agree
with each other, he has left that topic for a short while and has 15
proposed to show what things happen in an answer about singulars,
if the negative particle has been attached to their predicate, and then
what things take place in universal propositions when the negative
particle has been attached to the predicate. For one ought not to form
the statements in the same way. For what happens in each type of 20
predication is not the same. And this is clear from the following
considerations. If someone, when asked a question about an individ-
ual, makes a denial, the questioner can make <an affirmation> with 25
an infinite name as predicate by attaching <to the predicate> the
negation which the respondent previously denied, and this predica-
tion he will make truly. But it will be evident that the same truth
cannot come about with universals if an affirmation is made from 332,1
them. For if someone asks another person ‘do you think Socrates is
wise?’, if he replies ‘no’, the questioner comes to the right conclusion,
saying ‘then Socrates is not-wise’. Let us make this clear with an- 5
other more obvious example and question someone in this way: ‘is
Socrates a Roman?’ Suppose he replies ‘no’; we can correctly conclude
‘then Socrates is not-Roman’, making from the negation in his reply
and the name predicated in our proposition an affirmation with an 10
infinite name: ‘Socrates is not-wise’ or ‘Socrates is not-Roman’. For it
was shown above that these affirmations have an infinite name. So
if someone asks the same sort of question about universal subjects,
saying ‘is every man wise?’, we will certainly reply ‘no’. He then states 15
his conclusion in the same manner. For he says ‘then every man is
not-wise’. Therefore no man is wise; for it has been demonstrated
that ‘every man is not-wise’ agrees with ‘no man is wise’. It will 20
appear then that a false conclusion has in some way been inferred
from a true answer. To this we say [however] that we gave a negative
reply not so that the negative should be attached to the predicate, but
to the determination. For we did not want to take away wisdom from 25
 56 Translation
every man when we replied ‘no’ to the question whether every man
333,1 is wise, but we wanted rather to remove wisdom from ‘every’, i.e. the
determination, meaning that one person has wisdom and another
does not have it, so that when we said ‘no’ it was the equivalent of
5 our saying ‘not every’. Therefore if our negation is attached to the
name, i.e. wise, it forms the universal affirmation ‘every man is
not-wise’, which agrees with the universal negation ‘no man is wise’.
But this is the contrary of the question. For the question was ‘is every
10 man wise?’ This contains a universal affirmation, whose contrary is
a universal negation, with which in turn the infinite universal af-
firmation agrees. Thus the conclusion ‘every man is not-wise’ is the
15 contrary of the simple universal affirmation located in the question
‘is every man wise?’ But if the conclusion says ‘not every man is wise’,
it is both true and is the opposite of the question. For if the answer
‘no’ was given to the question ‘is every man wise?’ and the negative
20 was attached to ‘every’, the particular negation ‘not every man is
wise’ is produced and this is the opposite of the universal affirmation
proposed in the question. This is what he means by this is the
25 opposite, the former is the contrary. The meaning, word for word,
334,1 should be taken as follows: And it is clear, he says, that in singular
propositions, e.g. Socrates and anything individual, if, when ques-
tioned, it is true to deny something, i.e. if when someone is asked a
question he gives a true denial, e.g. when someone is asked whether
5 Socrates is a Roman, and he denies it, it is true also to affirm [the
denial], so that the questioner forms an infinite affirmation from the
negation and the predicated name. And an example of this is do you
10 think that Socrates is wise? The reply is No. The conclusion is then
Socrates is not-wise. But it is not a similar situation with universals,
as he now demonstrates when he says in universals, however, a
similar [affirmation] is not true, i.e. an infinite affirmation formed
from the predicated name and the respondent’s negation is not
15 true. But it is rather the negation which is true, not the affirma-
tion. An example of this: the question is do you think that every
man is wise? The answer is No. The false conclusion is then every
20 man is not-wise. This is false, and is similar to what we predicated
above of a singular subject, whereas it should rather be ‘then not
every man is wise’, so that the respondent’s negation is attached
to ‘every’ and a particular negation is produced; for this is true.
This is the opposite; for when the universal affirmation ‘every man
25 is wise’ has been put as a question, ‘not every man is wise’ is
produced as a conclusion from the negative particle, and they are
335,1 opposites. For the former is a universal affirmation, the latter a
particular negation. The former is the contrary; for if the negative
‘not’ is attached to the predicate, an infinite universal affirmation is
produced, which agrees with the finite universal negation. But this
5 is in opposition to the finite universal affirmation which is contained
 Translation 57
in the question. Therefore the infinite universal affirmation will also
be a contrary.
We must, however, enquire what is the reason why in singular
propositions an affirmation with an infinite name or a finite negation
agree with each other, whereas in universals a universal affirmation 10
with an infinite name does not agree with a finite particular nega-
tion. For if someone says ‘Socrates is not-wise’ and ‘Socrates is not
wise’, it is the same thing and these two agree with each other; if,
however, someone says ‘every man is not-wise’ and again ‘not every 15
man is wise’, these two do not agree with each other. But the
explanation is that in singular subjects there are not two opposites
but only one, i.e. what makes a negation, whereas in universals
predicated universally there are two opposites, one contrary, the 20
other contradictory. Therefore if there is an affirmation of the kind
‘Socrates is wise’, there is only one opposite to this, ‘Socrates is not
wise’. If, therefore, someone says ‘Socrates is not-wise’, this will have
no meaning other than ‘Socrates is not wise’. For we have said that 25
there is only one opposite in singular propositions. Therefore what-
ever others there are they will concur in the same signification. In 335,1
universal propositions predicated universally, however, it is not the
same. For if there is a universal affirmation ‘every man is wise’, there
stands against it both ‘no man is wise’ and also ‘not every man is 5
wise’. The former is a contrary, the latter a contradictory. These two
opposites cannot then agree with each other. For the universal
negation takes away everything, the finite particular negation takes
away part. But the universal negation agrees with the universal 10
affirmation that has an infinite name. Therefore this too will be
different from the definite particular negation. Then since there are
two opposites in universals, one in singulars, it is correct that the
same truth and falsity does not occur, though there is a similarity of
predication. 15

20a31-40 Those negations, however, which are opposite be-

cause they have infinite names and verbs, e.g. ‘not-man’,
‘not-just’ will appear to be, in a manner of speaking, negations
without a name or a verb. But they are not. For a negation must
always be either true or false. But one who has said ‘not-man’ 20
was, if nothing is added, no more true or false concerning ‘man’,
but even less so. ‘Every not-man is just’ does not signify the
same as any of the above nor does its opposite ‘every not-man is 25
not just’. But ‘every not-man [is] not-just’ signifies the same as 337,1
‘no not-man [is] just’.
We know that propositions can be produced from infinite names. So
in analysing these Aristotle next takes an infinite name as an expres-
sion and debates concerning it, <whether>33 if it is set against a finite 5
 58 Translation
name, this appears to be a kind of opposition that makes a statement.
For if someone takes ‘not-man’ and ranges ‘man’ against it, it will
perhaps seem to some extent to form an opposite. For since every
10 negative particle when added to a verb that which it contains as a
proposition it makes a negation, if ‘not’ is predicated as another mode
of proposition, as must be demonstrated later, the addition of the
15 negative particle seems to make a kind of negation, so that if the
particle ‘not’ is attached to ‘man’, it will make ‘not-man’. This is what
he means when he says those negations, however, which are opposite
because they have infinite names or verbs, e.g. ‘not-man’, ‘not-just’
20 appear to be, in a manner of speaking, negations without a name or a
verb. For if someone says ‘does not run’, this produces a negation
without a name. But if someone says ‘not-man’, this too is a negation,
without a verb. These expressions because of their infinite name and
verb are opposed to the definite verb or name, ‘runs’ and ‘man’. Thus
25 these will seem to be negations because of their infinite name or verb,
338,1 which are predicated, but they are not. For the greatest proof shows
that they are not negations: every negation is either true or false, but
when we say ‘not-man’ or ‘does not run’, although the simple and
5 finites ‘man’ and ‘runs’ also signify nothing true or false, their
infinites in fact indicate something much less true or false. It is not
because the simple expressions signify something true or false that
we say that the infinite expressions indicate truth or falsity less than
the simple ones, but because the simple name or verb proposes
10 something definite even though they designate nothing true or false,
so that there is something finite and a single species in ‘man’. But
when someone says ‘not-man’, he does away with the species that is
15 present, but by proposing nothing gives us to understand an infinite
number of other species. Thus although finite verbs or names cannot
in themselves be true or false, except when they are combined with
others, yet infinite names or verbs are much less capable of truth or
20 falsity. They do not even posit the very thing which they signify, but
they cancel it, and do not by themselves establish in their meaning
any other thing. In sum, finite expressions are nearer to the under-
standing of truth or falsity. Thus an expression consisting of an
infinite name is less true or false than one consisting of some simple
25 and finite word.

20a36-40 ‘Every not-man is just’ does not signify the same as

339,1 any of the above nor does its opposite, ‘every not-man is not
just’. But ‘every not-man [is] not-just’ signifies the same as ‘no
not-man [is] just’.
5 After having spoken at sufficient length about propositions which
have an infinite predicate and having shown their oppositions and
demonstrated their implications and in the midst of this having
 Translation 59
briefly noted concerning infinite names that they are not negations,
he now returns to propositions which have an infinite subject, but 10
whose predicate is finite or infinite. And he first of all teaches us
whether the propositions with an infinite subject are the same and
signify the same thing and whether they have some sequential
arrangement, as those which have an infinite predicate or those
which have both [terms] finite. For he says that the two propositions, 15
‘every not-man is just’, ‘every not-man is not just’, do not signify the
same thing as any of those that have either both [terms] finite or an
infinite predicate.
Let us arrange in order those propositions which have both [terms] 20
finite or an infinite predicate. First of all put in place the simple
universal affirmation; under this, the universal negation with an
infinite predicate and which agrees with the simple affirmation
above it. On the other side, put the simple universal negation and 25
under this the universal affirmation with an infinite predicate; it is
agreed that these agree with each other, but the universal affirma-
tion with infinite predicate takes precedence.

every man is just no man is just 340,1

no man is not-just every man is not-just

Once affirmations and negations which have a simple subject but an

infinite or simple predicate have been arranged in this way, Aristotle 5
now says that propositions which have an infinite subject do not
signify the same things as any of those we have set out above. For
‘every not-man is just’ does not agree with ‘every man is just’ nor with 10
‘every man is not-just’ nor with ‘no man is just’ or ‘no man is not-just’.
For these all have ‘man’ as subject, whereas it has ‘not-man’. Nor
therefore will the negation of this, i.e. the particular negation of a
universal affirmation with an infinite subject, be able to agree with 15
any of the propositions which have a finite subject. For ‘every not-
man is not just’ agrees neither with ‘every man is just’ nor with ‘every 20
man is not-just’ nor with ‘no man is just’ or ‘no man is not-just’. But
he is not saying that propositions with an infinite subject are differ-
ent from those which have either a finite or an infinite predicate, but
a finite subject. For predications can be different, but sometimes still 25
have the same signification. For instance, although ‘every man is
unjust’ is different from ‘no man is just’, they still sometimes signify
the same thing, if the privative affirmation has preceded; for it has
been said that negations without doubt follow from preceding af- 30
firmations. Therefore he is not saying that propositions with an 341,1
infinite name as subject and a finite or infinite predicate are different
<from those with a finite or infinite predicate> but whose subject is
finite, but that they entirely neither agree with each other nor signify
the same thing, i.e. they are dissimilar in the entire quality of the 5
 60 Translation
proposition. And this is what he said about propositions which have
a finite subject and an infinite predicate.
He now comes to the implications of propositions which consist of
10 an infinite name as subject. And just as before he showed us the
implications of propositions with both [terms] as finites or with an
infinite predicate, so too conversely he points out the implications of
propositions which consist of both [terms] as infinite names or have
15 an infinite name as subject. These are his words: but ‘every not-man
[is] not-just’ signifies the same as ‘no not-man [is] just’. He points out
only these two propositions, namely the affirmative universal with
both [terms] infinite, ‘every not-man [is] not-just’, [which] agrees
20 with the universal negation with only the subject infinite, ‘no not-
man [is] just’. In these propositions the particle ‘is’ is understood, so
that the complete proposition is ‘every not-man is not-just’ and again
‘no not-man is just’. For just as in propositions where the subject was
25 finite but the predicate infinite or finite, the simple universal nega-
342,1 tion consisting of both [terms] finite, ‘no man is just’, followed the
affirmation formed from a finite subject and an infinite predicate,
‘every man is not-just’, so too the same thing occurs in propositions
where the subject alone has been changed. For just as in the former
5 case the universal negation with both [terms] finite followed the
universal affirmation formed from a finite subject and an infinite
predicate, so too in the latter case a universal affirmation with both
[terms] infinite is followed by a negation which is itself also universal
10 formed from an infinite subject. And he included only the sequence
of these two propositions, but made no effort to run through the rest,
as he thought they were easy to understand. But we add them here
so that nothing might appear to have been ignored. The sequence is
as follows:

15 every not-man is not-just some not-man is just

no not-man is just not every not-man is not-just
every not-man is just some not-man is not-just
20 no not-man is not-just not every not-man is just

343,1 If one looks carefully at these two comparative lists, they will show
a sequence and agreement which is very suited to the two [of them].

BOOK 5
5 I have now covered most of the work and although what follows
presents numerous problems I will tackle it with greater confidence
and spirit. Small details ought not to deter us from our undertaking
to explain and publish the doctrine of the whole treatise. And so I
10 have continued on exactly from where we left off.
 Translation 61

20b1-12 When names or verbs are transposed they signify the

same thing, e.g. ‘man is white’, ‘white is man’. For if this is not
the case, there will be many negations of the same thing. But it
has been shown that there is only one of each; for the negation
of ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’ and the negation of ‘white 15
is man’, if it is not the same as ‘man is white’, will be either
‘white is not not-man’ or ‘white is not man’. But one of these is
the negation of ‘white is not-man’, the other of ‘man is white’. 20
Thus there will be two negations for one affirmation. Then it is 344,1
clear that if the name or verb is transposed the same affirma-
tion or negation is produced.
He now informs us that if verbs or names are transposed and one is 5
predicated first, the other after it, there is no doubt that they keep
the same signification. For if someone says ‘man is white’ (est homo
albus) or ‘white is man’ (est albus homo)34 or changes the order of
predication in any other way, the same signification will doubtless 10
remain. And this may be seen in oratory and poetry in a different way
than in philosophical treatises. For oratorical compositions it makes
a great difference in what order verbs and names are expressed. For 15
when Cicero wrote ‘For this madness nature gave you birth, your will
prepared you, fortune saved you’ it makes a difference that it was
said in that way or as ‘for this madness, what gave you birth was
nature, what prepared you your will, what saved you fortune’.35 Said 20
like this the impact of the sentence is less and what is prominent in
the combination and reveals itself to our minds and ears even with-
out our wanting it now shines out less clearly. Again when Virgil said
‘and on peace to lay tradition’36 he could have kept the metre if he had 25
said ‘and tradition to lay on peace’ but the sound would have been
weaker and the line would not be so brilliantly composed with the
change of metrical beat. Thus a change in the order of verbs and
names has a different impact in oratory and poetry. For when you
look at combination you will find a great deal of artistry in word 345,1
order. But in philosophical treatises where attention to style is not
relevant and it is truth alone that is being questioned it is of no
importance if the order of verbs and names is in any way changed so 5
long as they retain the same force in their signification. But in them
too the same emphasis and signification is not always preserved in
every respect when the order is altered. For the negative particle ‘not’
has considerable force and achieves different effects if added in 10
varying positions. For if you say ‘man is not white’ you will make a
simple indefinite negation, if ‘man is not-white’37 an indefinite af-
firmation with an infinite predicate; but if someone proposes ‘not-
man is white’, he will make an indefinite affirmation with an infinite 15
subject. Again, if one says it in this way, ‘every man is not-just’, this
agrees with ‘no man is just’, but if the negative is put with the
 62 Translation
20 determination of the universal, so as to say ‘not every man is just’, it
is no longer a universal affirmation with an infinite predicate agree-
ing with a simple universal negation, but a simple particular nega-
tion. Then do you see how many differences are created by connecting
the negative particles with different predications of names. But
25 although this is the case, it is still possible for the same words when
put in different positions, to retain the same force and signification.
346,1 For if the particle ‘not’ placed with its universal is moved around with
this same universal, there is no doubt that the same signification is
retained. For if one says ‘not-every man is white’, it is a simple
5 particular negation. But if someone says ‘man not-every is white’, the
signification is the same; nor if ‘man white not-every is’ does this
depart from the previous signification; nor if you change it a bit more
to ‘man white is not-every’ does this disagree with the previous
10 signification. Similarly whatever changes are made, so long as the
determination remains with its universal, whatever other changes of
order are made, the same signification is necessarily retained. Similarly
the same signification is kept if the same particle ‘not’ is often moved
15 around joined to another name or verb, as when we say ‘man just is-not’,
‘man is-not just’, ‘is-not man just’. For this reason if the negative particle
is moved around on its own and not predicated in the same order, it will
produce a number of different propositions. But if it is, as we have said,
20 moved around quite frequently when joined to another name, the same
signification will remain in all the transpositions.
Then after making these points we should look at Aristotle’s
argument that names and verbs when transposed always have the
25 same force and signification. For he says ‘when names or verbs are
transposed they signify the same thing, e.g. “man is white”, “white is
man”’; for this keeps the same signification when the names and
verbs have been transposed; for in one ‘white’ is first and ‘man’ comes
after, in the other ‘man’ is first and ‘white’ comes after. But if this is
30 false and they are not the same but are different from each other
347,1 something impossible and improper is happening. For a single af-
firmation will have two negations, which is impossible. For it is clear
that one negation belongs to one affirmation. Then let us now see, if
5 the affirmations ‘man is white’ and ‘white is man’ are not the same
but different, how one affirmation has two negations. First of all put
them down like this:

man is white
10 white is man

Then the negation of ‘man is white’ will be ‘man is not white’; for
you cannot reasonably find any other which could serve the pur-
pose. Then put them down again as before, the first one with its
15 negation.
 Translation 63
man is white man is not white
white is man

Then if ‘man is not white’ is the negation of ‘man is white’, if ‘white

is man’ is to be different from ‘man is white’, its negation will be 20
different. Then you should make it either ‘white is not not-man’ or
‘white is not man’. Again then put down the two primary affirmations
separately. Then opposite the first put the negation we agreed upon
and opposite the second write down the two negations we mentioned. 25

man is white man is not white

white is man white is not not-man
white is not man 30

Now in this list ‘white is not not-man’ cannot be the negation of ‘white 348,1
is man’, for it is the negation of ‘white is not-man’ which has an
infinite subject. Similarly too if you suggest any other negation, it 5
will certainly be found to have a different affirmation. So it happens
that ‘white is not man’ is the only negation left for it. Thus the
negation of ‘white is man’ is ‘white is not man’. But ‘white is not man’ 10
is also the negation of ‘man is white’. This is proved by the fact that
they make a distinction of true and false, for if it is true that man is
white, it is false that white is not man. But if truth is found in any 15
proposition, it is known through the definition of the proposition
rather than through the form of the negation, so they are opposed
more by their determination than by their quantity. This is demon-
strated by the fact that if ‘every man is not white’ is opposed to ‘every 20
man is white’, it is clear that they distinguish between truth and
falsity; for one must be true, the other false. So too if the determina-
tions are removed, the same opposition remains although it is indefi-
nite. For just as when ‘every’ and ‘not every’ are removed from ‘every 25
man is just’ and ‘not every man is just’ we are left with the opposed
affirmation and negation ‘man is just’ and ‘man is not just’, so too
where ‘every’ and ‘not every’ has been removed we have ‘man is white’ 349,1
opposed to ‘white is not man’, for if you add the determinations one
is always true, the other always false. But we said that the negation
of the affirmation ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’. Then the 5
affirmation ‘man is white’ has two negations, ‘man is not white’ and
‘white is not man’. This is the case if the negations ‘white is not man’
and ‘man is not white’ are different from each other. And this depends 10
on the fact that we laid down before that ‘man is white’ is different
from ‘white is man’. But if it is impossible that one affirmation should
have two negations and it is clear that the affirmation ‘man is white’
has opposed to it two negations, ‘man is not white’ and ‘white is not 15
man’, these are not different from each other, agree with each other,
and differ only in the change of position of a name but are in every
 64 Translation
other respect identical. But if these negations are identical, their
20 affirmations are also identical. Then it was right to say that when
verbs and names are transposed they keep the same force and
signification.
This is the continuous meaning of the passage, following the order
of his own words: When names or verbs are transposed they signify
25 the same thing and he gives as an example ‘man is white’, ‘white is
man’. For here the names have been transposed. For if this is not the
case, i.e. if the transposed verbs and names do not signify the same
thing, it is something impossible and improper; for there will be many
350,1 negations of the same thing, i.e. there will be many negations of the
same affirmation. But this is impossible, for it is clear that one
affirmation has one negation. Then that two negations are opposed
5 to a single affirmation, if the transposed verbs and names do not
signify the same thing, he proves as follows: for the negation of the
affirmation ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’ (this negation is
correctly opposed to the affirmation) and the negation of ‘white is
10 man’, i.e. of the other affirmation if it is not the same as ‘man is white’,
i.e. if it is different from the first proposition ‘man is white’ and is not
the same as it, the equivalent of saying if it does not agree, will be
15 either ‘white is not not-man’ or ‘white is not man’ or any other
negation one may propose that can be shown not to be the negation
[of the given affirmation ‘man is white’] by the one argument by
which this one is refuted. But this is refuted as follows: But one of
20 these is the negation of ‘white is not-man’, the other of ‘man is white’;
for of the posited negations ‘white is not not-man’ and ‘white is not
man’, ‘white is not not-man’ is the negation of the affirmation with
25 the infinite subject ‘white is not-man’, whereas the other ‘white is not
351,1 man’ is the negation of ‘man is white’. For it distinguishes true and
false along with this proposition. Thus one affirmation has two
negations. But this is impossible. Then it is clear that if the name or
5 verb is transposed the same affirmation or negation is produced, thus
confirming with this concluding sentence the previous argument. He
made this syllogism in the second hypothetical mode which he calls
10 undemonstrable, as follows: if a, then b; but not b; therefore not a, i.e.
if propositions do not remain the same when verbs and names have
been transposed, one affirmation has two negations; but this is
impossible; therefore propositions are not different when verbs and
names have been transposed.

Chapter 11
15 20b12-22 But to affirm or deny one thing of many or many of
one, is not one affirmation or denial, if it is not one thing
composed of many. I mean one not in the sense that one name
is given but that there exists one thing composed of many, e.g.
 Translation 65
man is perhaps animal, two-footed and tame, but one is pro- 20
duced out of these, but one thing is not produced from white,
man and walking. Therefore if someone affirms some one thing
of these, it is not a single affirmation, but is one spoken sound,
but many affirmations, nor is it one affirmation if affirmed of
one thing, but in the same way more than one affirmation. 25
The obscurity of this passage is such as to cause so much confusion
that many were unable to follow properly and explain what Aristotle
meant. But we have already said above38 that the leaders of the 352,1
Peripatetic school took great pains to distinguish a single from a
multiple affirmation or negation. For these are not recognised by the
sound of the spoken utterance or the number of terms. For it is 5
possible for one thing to be predicated of a single thing and not to be
a single affirmation. And it can happen that several things are
predicated of one or one of several, but that a single affirmation is
produced from all of these. They took great care that where a clear
rule occurred it should not be left concealed. For if someone says ‘a 10
dog is an animal’ it is not a single statement; for a dog signifies many
things. But if someone says that a man is a rational mortal or that a
man is a rational, mortal animal, these are single statements because
some one single thing can come to be out of many. For man as a single 15
thing is made from animal, mortal and rational joined together at the
same time. And there are other things which are predicated as plural,
from which some one thing cannot be made or constituted. A single
affirmation or negation is produced neither if they are predicated of 20
something nor if another thing is predicated of them, but as many
statements are made as there are things which are either predicated
of one or of which one thing is predicated, e.g. when we say ‘the bald
philosopher Socrates is walking’, no one thing is formed from bald-
ness, philosophy and walking, in such a way that these, as it were, 25
form the species of something. Thus whether these are predicated of
one thing or one thing of them, it cannot be a single statement. And
this interpretation applies in general to any proposition. Let us now
turn to Aristotle’s words. He says: but to affirm or deny one thing of 353,1
many or many of one, is not one affirmation or denial, if it is not one
thing composed of many. If, he says, you predicate many things of
one, e.g. Socrates is a snub-nosed bald philosopher’, or when you 5
predicate one thing of several, e.g. ‘Socrates the snub-nosed philoso-
pher is bald’, if some one thing is not produced from the several things
which you predicate or attach, in the way that one thing can come
about from what we predicate as a living sensible substance, i.e. an
animal, then a single negation or a single affirmation is not produced, 10
when several things are predicated or attached without any single
species coming into existence from their combination. But if someone
predicates one thing of one thing where the single name signifies
 66 Translation
15 more than one thing and where some one thing is not produced from
the plurality, again there is not a single affirmation or negation. For
if someone says ‘a dog is an animal’, the name ‘dog’ signifies the kind
that barks, the constellation and the sea-dog39 and when these are
joined together no one thing is produced. Thus because some one
20 thing cannot be formed from a plurality of this kind, so too a single
affirmation and a single negation does not come about from a single
name which when it is predicated or attached signifies a number of
things that cannot form a single thing. This is what he means when
he says I mean one not in the sense that one name is given but that
25 there exists one thing composed of many. For it can happen that one
name is predicated of one thing, but if the one thing signifies a plurality
from which a single thing is not produced, then we don’t have a single
affirmation or a single negation. For a single spoken sound does not
30 make a statement, but the simplicity of what is signified, even if it is a
354,1 plurality, has the power to make some one single thing from what is
gathered together. The example of this which he added has deceived a
number of people, e.g. man is perhaps animal, two-footed and tame, but
5 one is produced out of these, but one thing is not produced from white,
man and walking. Now some thought that he spoke this way to show
that he had given this sort of definition as an example, in case anyone
should think he had meant this as some kind of exact definition of man
as a two-footed tame animal. And, they maintain, he said man is
10 perhaps animal, two-footed and tame in case anyone should think that
he, Aristotle, thought that the definition of man was like this. But others
do not accept that this is how it was meant, but that it was meant to be
taken in conjunction with a reading of Aristotle’s sentence as ‘e.g. man
15 is equally animal, two-footed and tame, but one is produced out of these’
which is to be understood as meaning that man is in himself just as
much ‘man’ as he is a two-footed tame animal. Thus if to say ‘man’ is
identical and the same as saying ‘two-footed tame animal’, then when-
ever this plurality is predicated of one thing, i.e. two-footed tame animal
20 of man, because it equals ‘man’ and man is one, it must be the case that
you predicate some one thing although you seem to be predicating three
spoken sounds.
25 But none of these understood the passage at all. Porphyry’s inter-
pretation is better. Aristotle, he says, intending to show what is and
is not a single affirmation, first of all said that to predicate several
things of one or attach several things to one does not lead to a single
statement, unless some single thing comes to be from the plurality.
30 Then seeing that so far it looked as if several affirmations were being
made even when there was a plurality of predications out of which a
355,1 single thing could be produced, he then said man is perhaps animal,
two-footed and tame. And this I take to mean that it is clear that, if
several things are predicated of one and these cannot form one thing
or if several things are attached to one and these cannot form one
 Translation 67
thing, there isn’t a single affirmation or negation. But now let us deal 5
with a plurality from which some one thing can be formed; for we will
find that in these too several and not one statement is sometimes
found because of the way in which we make the statement, although 10
some one thing could be formed from the plurality. For if someone
says ‘man is a mortal rational animal’ joining together mortal ra-
tional animal at the same time, because it was said continuously and
some one thing is formed from them, there is a single affirmation. But 15
if there is an interval between them so that one says ‘man is a mortal’
then ‘rational’ and after a little pause ‘animal’, it is not a single
affirmation or negation. For the intermissions create several state- 20
ments. Again if ‘man is a mortal and rational and animal’ is said with
conjunctions, then we again have many statements. Nor does saying
it with pauses or with conjunctions separating the words differ at all
from saying ‘man is an animal, man is rational, man is mortal’ and
these are clearly several propositions. Aristotle then, seeing this, said 25
man is perhaps animal, two-footed and tame. He says perhaps at this
point with the meaning: one thing is formed from man, two-footed
and tame, but it is perhaps sometimes the case that there are several
propositions when their actual conjunction in a sense separates and 30
parts them; for perhaps there will be ‘man’ and ‘animal’ forming one 356,1
proposition, [‘man’ and] ‘two-footed’ a second and [‘man’ and] ‘tame’
a third. But out of these some one thing is formed so that when they
are expressed continuously there is a single proposition because some
one thing is created from them. But the same does not happen in all 5
of them. For one thing is not produced from white, man and walking.
For if someone says ‘The white man Socrates is walking’, it is not a
single affirmation, because a species cannot at all be formed from
man, whiteness and walking. Thus the conclusion is that there is no 10
single affirmation even if some one thing is predicated of a plurality
which does not form one thing. E.g. because a barking land dog, the
constellation and a sea-dog do not form one thing and one thing is
predicated of them, namely ‘dog’, which is the sort of name which
signifies several things which do not form one thing (if it is predicated 15
of something else or attached to another) a single affirmation or
negation is not formed, but there will be a single spoken sound and
several affirmations. For if one thing is predicated of several things
which do not form one thing, or several things of this kind are
predicated of one, or if one thing is predicated of one thing which 20
when predicated signifies several things which do not form a single
thing, or if that one thing is added as a predicate to another, there is
no possibility of there being a single affirmation or negation. The
whole is as follows. There is a single affirmation if either two terms
signify single things or if more terms are so predicated of one thing 25
or attached to one thing that a single thing can be formed from them,
or if one name which when either predicated or attached signifies the
 68 Translation
kind of plurality which can somehow come together as a whole to
form a single species.

357,1 20b22-30 Then if a dialectical question requires as an answer

either the proposition or one side of a contradiction, whilst the
proposition is part of a single contradiction, there will be no
single reply in these cases; nor will the question be one even if
5 it is true. These things have been discussed in the Topics.40 It is
similarly clear that ‘what is it?’ is not a dialectical question
either. For the question ought to allow one to choose which part
10 of the contradiction one wishes to express because the ques-
tioner ought to decide whether man is this or not this.
Whoever employs a dialectical question either asks a simple question
putting just one proposition in his question so as to evoke a single
15 reply or puts his question in a double form to which there is no simple
reply but a single whole proposition forms the reply. For if someone
puts the question ‘is Socrates an animal?’, the answer is either ‘yes’
20 or ‘no’. But if you put the question in the form ‘Is Socrates an animal
or not?’ there is no single reply. For if you reply ‘yes’, it remains
unknown to which you are assenting, the affirmation or the negation.
Again if you reply ‘no’ it is unclear what you are want to deny, the
25 affirmation or the negation. Thus to questions of this kind the whole
proposition has to be given as a reply, i.e. one side of the contradiction
358,1 or the entire affirmation or entire negation, so that you say either
‘Socrates is an animal’ or, if this is not your view, you reply that
‘Socrates is not an animal’.
Then when a question is formed from multiple statements which
5 do not form a single thing, a single answer is open to criticism. For
anyone making a question from things that cannot form a single
thing, is asking a number of questions. If a simple reply is given, even
if that particular reply is true, yet it is rightly open to criticism. For
10 there ought to be a multiple reply to a multiple question. For if you
put the question ‘Is Socrates a philosopher and does he read and go
for walks?’, because it can happen that he is a philosopher and reads
but does not go for walks or goes for walks but does not read or it can
15 happen that he both reads and goes for walks, there can be no single
answer to this kind of question. For anyone who put the question in
the form ‘Is Socrates a philosopher and does he read and go for
walks?’ either framed his question awkwardly or as a trick. If Socra-
20 tes does happen to be a philosopher and reads and goes for walks, if
‘yes’ is given as an answer to the question, this reply too can be
criticised. For a single answer should not be supplied to several
questions even if the single reply gives a right answer, as here, if in
25 fact he is a philosopher and both reads and goes for walks. Thus if a
dialectical question requires an answer by which a proposition is
 Translation 69
produced, e.g. when someone asks ‘is it day?’ and the answer ‘no’ is
given, then from this the negation ‘it is not day’ is produced or of
course one side of a proposition when the question is put in the form
‘is it day or not day?’. Thus, it is appropriate to reply that it is day, or 359,1
that it is not day, which is a whole proposition. Questions that are
composed of a plurality and so put that they do not form a single
thing, are not simple questions. Therefore a simple reply must not be 5
given to them. Aristotle recalls that he had spoken about these in the
Topics.
Again, because a dialectical question requires as an answer (as we
explained above ) either the proposition or one side of a contradiction,
which will be explained a little later, it is a mark of ignorance to put 10
the question in the form ‘what is an animal?’ or ‘what is the soul?’. If
you want to ask a dialectical question you must give in the question
the choice to the respondent whether he wants to give an affirmation
or negation in answer. But someone who puts the question such that 15
he wants the respondent to say what something is, is not asking a
dialectical question. And this is how some people put questions: ‘do
you think the soul is fire?’ When the reply is ‘no’ he will add, ‘do you 20
think there is something between fire and air, a median body which
is soul?’ When the reply to this is also ‘no’, he continues ‘perhaps you
think the soul is water or earth?’ When he agrees that the soul is
neither earth nor water, then tired out by the questions they put the
question in the form ‘what then is the soul?’ But this is not a
dialectical question, but rather the kind of question that a student 25
who wants to learn something puts to his teacher. For someone who
wants to learn something asks the person who can teach him about
the thing he is unsure of. But the dialectician, as we have said, ought 360,1
to put a question in a way that a choice is given to the respondent to
reply in an affirmation or negation as he wishes. And one ought to
know that every question requires an answer, but the dialectical 5
question requires not any answer but what stands as a choice on
either side. Therefore ‘what is this?’ is not a dialectical question. For
one ought to put the question in such a way that the respondent can
choose one side of the contradiction from the question. For the
questioner ought to define in precise terms whether what is being 10
said is or is not, e.g. ‘is man an animal or not?’ Then the reply must
be either an affirmation or a negation. When he says that the
dialectical question requires as an answer either the proposition or
one side of a contradiction, he means that whoever puts a question in 15
the affirmative form expects his listener either to make the same
reply or a contradiction. For example, if someone put the question ‘is
man an animal?’, if the answer is ‘yes’ a proposition is given in
answer, the one proposed in the question. But if someone asks
whether man is an animal and the reply is given that he isn’t, it will 20
appear that a contradiction has been given as a reply. For the
 70 Translation
question was put in the affirmative, but the reply was a negation,
which is a contradiction. Again if a question is put in the form of a
negation and the reply is a negation, the same proposition will be
25 given in reply as the questioner had put in his question. But where
one person asks in the negative and the reply is an affirmation then
the response is a contradiction. This is then what he means when he
says that a question requires a response and explains ‘response’ with
361,1 either the proposition, if the reply is the same as the question, or one
side of a contradiction if a negation is given as reply to an affirmative
question or an affirmation is given as reply to a negation in the
5 question.
According to the Peripatetics there are two kinds of question. A
question is either dialectical or not dialectical. And there are two
kinds of non-dialectical question according to the teaching of Eude-
10 mus.41 One kind is where we take an accident and ask what it belongs
to, e.g. when we see Cicero’s house, if we ask ‘who lives there?’; or
when we take the actual subject and thing, then ask what is happen-
ing to it, e.g. if someone sees Cicero himself and asks where he is
15 going off to. This is one kind, a non-dialectical accidental question.
The other kind is when we put forward a name and ask what is its
genus or difference or definition. For example, if someone asks what
an animal is or when we take a definition or one of the things just
20 mentioned and ask what they belong to, e.g. if someone asks what
the definition ‘mortal rational animal’ belongs to.

20b31-21a3 Since of things predicated separately some are

predicated in combination so that the entire predicate is one,
25 others not; what is the difference? For it is true to say of a man
that he is separately an animal, separately two-footed, and as
one; and man and white, and these as one. But if he is a
362,1 lyre-player and good, he is not also a good lyre-player. For if
because each of two is the case, both together are also the case,
there will be many absurdities. For it is true to say of a man that
he is a man and white, therefore the whole too [is true]. And
5 again if white, then the whole too. Therefore there will be a
‘white white man’ and so on to infinity. And again there will be
a ‘walking white musician’; and the same things compounded
many times. Further if Socrates is Socrates and a man, then
10 Socrates will be a man Socrates, <and if a man> and two-footed,
he will be a two-footed man.
There are many things which are true when predicated on their own
and which continue to be predicated truly if they are joined together
15 and predicated. But there are others, which are true if they are
predicated for themselves and unconnected, but if they are said
jointly, become untrue in predication. One ought then to know the
 Translation 71
difference between these. For if someone says Socrates is an animal,
he has said something true. If again someone says in predication that
Socrates is two-footed, this too is true. And if these are joined and 363,1
expressed as ‘Socrates is a two-footed animal’, there is no departure
from the appropriate truth. And this is here said of the genus and
Socrates’ substantial differentia. But it can happen just the same
way if it is also said of an accident. For if someone says ‘Socrates is a 5
man’, it is true, and again ‘Socrates is bald’, this is also true. If the
two are joined as ‘Socrates is a bald man’, a true predication is
produced from the combination. And here what was said truly when
separate, is also predicated truly when combined. But there are other 10
things which are predicated truly when separate, but lose their
quality of truth when combined. E.g. if you say ‘Socrates is good’, it
is true, and again ‘Socrates is also a lyre-player’, suppose this to be
true as well. It does not follow of necessity that these belong together 15
to make it true that Socrates is a good lyre-player. For he can be a
good man and though a lyre-player, not good at it, but good in another
respect and with respect to the former only knowledgeable in lyre-
playing but not perfect in it. And this will become clearer in the 20
following example. If you say that Tiberius Gracchus is bad, it is true;
and again that Tiberius Gracchus is an orator, this too is true. If you
join them and say ‘Then Tiberius Gracchus is a bad orator’ you are
wrong, because he was an excellent orator. But in case someone 25
should think that in putting it this way we are forgetting that the
definition of an orator is a good man skilled in speaking,42 our words
are meant in a different context, as an example rather than referring
to reality. And this is what is put forward by Aristotle, whose actual 364,1
words are to be understood as follows: since some are predicated
linked and in combination so that a single predicate is formed from
what was said truly when separate, but others which when said
separately and apart are truly predicated but when combined do not 5
amount to a true predication, we must ask what the difference
between them is. Examples are then given. The following is an
example of what is truly predicated when separate and does not lose 10
its truth when combined. It is true to say of a man that he is both an
animal and two-footed; and it is again true to say of the same man
that he is a two-footed animal, e.g. of Socrates. Of the same Socrates
too it is true to say that he is separately a man and white, if that is
the case, and to predicate of him that he is a two-footed animal does 15
not depart from the truth. And these are predicated truly when said
separately and apart, and they are true when combined. But if you
predicate of someone that he is a lyre-player, and it is true, and again
that he is good, and it is true, it is not necessarily true to say that he 20
is a good lyre-player. For he can be just a lyre-player but a good man.
That is how he explained things so far. But because some people
seemed to think that everything predicated truly when separate, is
 72 Translation
25 also said correctly when combined, he gives them the answer that
there will be many absurdities and impossibilities if someone main-
tains that everything predicated truly when separate is predicated
truly when combined. For it is true to say of a man that he is a man.
365,1 For it is true to say of Socrates who is a man that he is a man. Again
it can be truly said of him that he is white. Thus if you also combine
the two and predicate them as one, it is true to say of a certain man
5 that he is a white man. But it is true to say of the man who is white
that he is white. Therefore if you combine this too, you will get the
predication Socrates is a white white man. For it was true to say of
Socrates that he is a white man. But it is true to say of a white man
that he is white. When these are joined they make ‘a white white
10 man’. But if you want white to be predicated again of the same white
man, it is true. Thus if you combine them again, you will have the
predication ‘[Socrates] is a white white white man’ and so on to
infinity. Again suppose you say of a certain man that he is a musical
15 man, that this is true and you add that the same man is walking,
then it is true if you combine them to say that he is a walking musical
man. But if it is true to predicate of a certain man that he is a walking
musician, and it is true to say of the walking musician that he is
20 musical, that man will be a walking musical musical man. But it is
true to say of the same man that he is walking. Therefore it will be
true to say of him that he is a walking walking musical musical man.
Moreover Socrates is Socrates and also a man. Therefore Socrates
25 will be a man Socrates. But he is also two-footed. Then Socrates will
be a two-footed man Socrates. But it is true to say of Socrates that
Socrates is a two-footed man. But when I referred to him as a man, I
366,1 have already called him two-footed; for every man is two-footed.
Therefore it is true to say of him that he is two-footed. But it was true
to say that Socrates is a two-footed man Socrates. Therefore that
Socrates is a two-footed two-footed man will be a true predication.
5 But I have said ‘man’ again and have named a further ‘two-footed’
(for every man is two-footed). Therefore Socrates is a two-footed
two-footed two-footed man. And by extending this to infinity one
produces a superfluous chain of chatter. Then it cannot happen that
whatever is said separately is in every case also truly predicated
10 when combined.

21a5-18 It is clear that many absurdities happen to be said if

one lays down that compound [predicates] come about without
qualification. We explain now how it should be put. Whenever
15 predicates and what is predicated are said by accident either of
the same thing or one thing of another, they will not be one, e.g.
‘man is white and musical’, but ‘white’ and ‘musical’ are not one;
20 for they are both accidents of the same thing. Nor, if it is true
 Translation 73
to say that the white is musical, will the ‘musical white’ form
some one thing; for the musical is white accidentally and so the
white will not be musical. Therefore neither will a lyre-player
be good without qualification, but an animal will be two-footed 25
[without qualification]; for he is not so accidentally. Further
whatever is in another will not be [one]. Therefore ‘white’ is not
repeated nor is man an ‘animal man’ or ‘a two-footed man’; for 367,1
‘two-footed’ and ‘animal’ are in ‘man’.
He now gives more specific and clearly argued details on the subject
matter of the previous section. He mentions only those predicates
which are truly predicated when separate but cannot form a single 5
true predicate if they are combined and which are accidents of the
same thing or one is accident of the other in the sense that one
accident is predicated of that as an accident. For if someone says of
Socrates that Socrates is a lyre-player and again that Socrates is
good, if both predicates are true, he has predicated two accidents of 10
the one subject, Socrates. Thus it is not possible for these to make a
single predication so as to give ‘Socrates is a good lyre-player’. Again
if ‘musician’ is predicated of Socrates (let us assume that Socrates is
musical) and if ‘white’ is predicated of ‘musician’, and this is also true, 15
it is not, however, necessary that ‘musician’ is white. For if Socrates
is a musician and if white is predicated of the same musician,
‘musician’ is predicated of the subject ‘Socrates’, and ‘white’, one
accident, is predicated of ‘musician’ which is an accident. Therefore 20
we don’t have here a single true proposition declaring that ‘Socrates
is a white musician’. For it can be that he is not always a white
musician, but it is the nature of accidents to come and go. So if the
man who is a white musician should stand in the sun and the heat
tans his skin, he will not be white though he is a musician. Therefore
the predication was correct neither at the time when Socrates was 25
truly described as being a white musician nor when he was tanned.
For an accident does not have that permanence of nature that
permits it to be always truly predicated. 30
He expresses the argument as follows. If someone says that com-
binations occur without qualification in any way one wants, i.e. what 368,1
you had proposed separately, you now propose combined and joined
together, many absurdities happen to follow. For many impossibili-
ties are involved as he demonstrated above when he reduced the 5
constant repetition of the same names to excessive pleonasm. For
these reasons we are now saying how it should be put, i.e. we are now
saying, says Aristotle, how what is said truly when separate ought to
be predicated when combined. Everything, he says, which is predi- 10
cated of another thing and also the things of which the others are
predicated are of two kinds. They are either accidents or substances.
Some predications are accidental, whenever either two accidents are
 74 Translation
15 predicated of a substance or an accident of an accident belonging to
a substance; another type is not accidental wherever something is
said substantially of something. Then where things are said acciden-
tally, if there are either two accidents and they are predicated of the
same thing or one accident is predicated of another accident, they
20 cannot form a single proposition nor can they be one if they are
joined. For a man is both white and musical, but ‘white musical’,
since they do not coalesce in one form, do not make a single proposi-
tion; for ‘white’ and ‘musical’ are not the same. Both of these are
25 accidents of the same thing, but are not themselves the same. Nor, if
we predicate ‘white’ of ‘musical’, i.e. one accident of another, even if
this is true, is it necessarily the case that what is ‘musical’ is ‘white’.
For it is not some one thing; for what is musical is accidentally white.
369,1 For ‘musical’ is said to be ‘white’ because that of which ‘musical’ is an
accident is white. And ‘white musical’ is not one thing. Then for the
same reason it holds that [the words] ‘good lyre-player’ cannot be one
thing and when joined to form one body do not make some single
5 thing, although they are truly predicated when separate.
But if someone predicates something substantially and says two
things separately, what is truly predicated substantially when sepa-
rate and apart, can be reduced to one proposition. For since a man is
10 both an animal and two-footed, he is a two-footed animal and one
proposition is formed from them. For neither ‘animal’ nor ‘two-footed’
is accidental to ‘man’. He demonstrates this with the words but an
animal will be two-footed; for he is not so accidentally. He also adds
15 that incorrect predication occurs when the predicates are concealed
or contained in the expression of any of the terms which have been
posited in the proposition. For ‘white’ should not be said of ‘white
man’ so as to produce the predication ‘white white man’, because ‘white’
20 is already contained in ‘white man’. And again ‘two-footed’ ought not to
be predicated of ‘man’ because even though it is unexpressed, neverthe-
less whatever is a man is also two-footed. But if someone does predicate
‘two-footed’ of ‘man’, he predicates ‘two-footed’ of a thing which has two
25 feet and of the differentia that it is ‘two-footed’. In this case too then man
will be ‘two-footed two-footed’; for ‘man’ contains ‘two-footed’ within
itself and when you say ‘man’ you say it with its differentia. If then you
predicate ‘two-footed’ of it, you have predicated ‘two-footed’ of a thing
which has two feet. A man will then be ‘two-footed two-footed’. But one
30 should not predicate in this way, for ‘two-footed’ is contained in ‘man’
370,1 and if you predicate ‘two-footed’ again of it, you will create an extremely
awkward repetition. This is what he means by further whatever is in
another will not be [one]. They are contained either in the expression,
5 e.g. ‘white man’ (white is contained in it, because it has already been
mentioned in the expression) or potentially and by the force [of the
signification], e.g. where ‘two-footed’ is contained in ‘man’, although
it is not actually mentioned at all.
 Translation 75

21a18-24 But it is true to speak of a someone even without

qualification, e.g. that some man is a man or some white man is 10
white; though not always, but when in the addition there is
some opposite which yields a contradiction, it is not true, but
false; e.g. to call a dead man a man. But when there is no
opposite in it, it is true.
This problem is the opposite of the previous one. For there the 15
problem was whether separate predicates remain always the same
when they are predicated as combined and joined together, whereas
here the same problem occurs in reverse, whether what is truly
predicated when combined can be truly predicated when separate.
For after Socrates’ death we can say that this corpse is a dead man 20
and by joining ‘man’ and ‘dead’ make a single true predication out of
them. But it is not true that the corpse is just a man. Again it is true
to say of Socrates when he is alive that he is a two-footed animal and 25
it is true to say separately that he is an animal. Then the problem is 371,1
what is the difference in predication here that when things are said
in combination and predicated truly of subjects, some can also be said
truly when separate, whilst others are false if they are said on their 5
own without being combined. And he said this as though in doubt.
For it ought to be read as though expressing a doubt: is it true to say
something combined and joined together about an individual, e.g.
about a man that he is a man or about someone white that he is white,
in such a way that any of these things can also be predicated without 10
qualification or at least sometimes? And he gives us a rule by which
to recognise whether what is said truly in combination can also be
said at all separately. For whenever things that are predicated with
another are such that they do not contain in themselves a contradic-
tion when predicated, they can be truly said separately as well. But 15
if things that are truly predicated and stated when in combination do
contain some contradiction in themselves they cannot be truly predi-
cated separately. <For> when someone says a corpse is a ‘dead man’
he speaks truly whereas he cannot truly say just ‘man, because 20
previously he has predicated in combination when he said ‘dead
man’; and ‘dead’ which is attached in addition to the predicate ‘man’
(for ‘dead’ is a predicate along with ‘man’) stands in contradiction to
‘man’; for man is an animal, but ‘dead’ is not an animal; therefore 25
‘dead’ and ‘man’ contradict each other; for one is an animal, the other
not an animal. Therefore, because there is a certain contrariety
between them, ‘man’ when separated is not said on its own of ‘dead 372,1
man’. It is the same too when you say that a statue has a marble
hand. This is true, but it is false to say that what the statue has is
just a ‘hand’. For a ‘hand’ is able to give and receive, but a ‘marble 5
hand’ cannot. Thus there is a certain contradiction between ‘hand’
and ‘marble hand’, because one can give and receive, the other
 76 Translation
cannot; for these are contradictory opposites. Therefore wherever
10 there is a predication like man of corpse where something is joined
and added to form a contradiction with the predicate (as here ‘dead
man’ is added and predicated simultaneously of ‘corpse’ so that it
makes a contradiction with ‘man’ itself and contains the contradic-
15 tion in itself) one predicate cannot be separated off to be said on its
own. But if there is no contradiction of that kind, it can be separated;
e.g. in ‘Socrates is a two-footed animal’ there is no contradiction
between ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’. Thus ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’ can
20 be said of it separately and without qualification. This is the sense,
but the order [of the text] is as follows, for he spoke in a questioning
way: but it is true to say of a someone jointly in combination and
without qualification, e.g. that some man is a man or some white
[man] is white or that they are sometimes, but that when in what is
25 added, i.e. what is said additionally in predication with something,
there is any opposition which is followed by a contradiction, i.e.
where a contradiction immediately follows the opposition, as the
opposites ‘man’ and ‘dead’ are followed by the contradiction ‘animal’
30 and ‘not animal’, in these circumstances, it is not true to predicate
373,1 without qualification, but it is false; e.g. you can predicate ‘dead man’
truly when they are combined, but if you predicate the same ‘man’
separately it is false. But when this kind of opposition is not present
in the predicates, what you predicated in combination you can also
5 rightly predicate without qualification. But an addition has been
made where this sort of opposition sometimes occurs, as in ‘dead
man’ where ‘dead’ is added to ‘man’; for otherwise it is not possible
for ‘man’ to be properly predicated of ‘corpse’.

10 21a24-30 Or even when it [opposition] is present, it is always

not true, but when it is not present, it is not always true; e.g.
Homer is something, a poet; then is it the case that he always
is or not? For ‘to be’ is predicated accidentally of Homer; <for>
15 it is because he is a poet, not in its own right, that the ‘is’ is
predicated of Homer. Therefore insofar as in predicates there is
no contradiction if definitions are put instead of names, and
predication is for itself and not accidentally, in these cases it will
20 be true to predicate without qualification. But it is not true to say
that what is not, because it is thought about, is something; for
what is thought about it is not that it is, but that it is not.
He had said before that when there is a contradiction in what is
25 added it is not true to predicate without qualification, but when there
is no contradiction it is true to say without qualification what was
374,1 said in combination. But since it now appeared that this is not true
in certain cases, he modifies it accordingly. For he says that what he
had said before is true, that whenever there is some contradiction in
 Translation 77
the addition, it is not true to predicate without qualification what 5
was said in combination, but that when there is no contradiction it is
not always true to predicate without qualification what was said
truly in combination, but that it is sometimes true and sometimes
false. An example of this is when I say ‘Homer is a poet’; here I have 10
predicated ‘is’ and ‘poet’ together of Homer. But if I say ‘Homer is’, it
is false, although there is no contradiction between ‘is’ and ‘poet’ and
in ‘is’ there is no opposition of the kind which is followed by a
contradiction. The reason why this occurs is that we predicate ‘poet’ 15
primarily of Homer when we say that Homer is a poet, but ‘is’ we
predicate primarily of ‘poet’ and in the second place of ‘Homer’; for we
don’t predicate ‘to be’ because Homer is, but because he is a poet.
Then if we remove what was predicated primarily [of Homer], i.e. 20
‘poet’, then although ‘is’ which is attached to ‘poet’ does not stand in
contradiction to ‘poet’, we do not make a true predication when we
say ‘Homer is’; for it is predicated accidentally, not primarily. And
when the primary predicate is removed, what was predicated acci- 25
dentally is immediately found to be false.43
The next sentence Therefore insofar as in predicates there is no
contradiction if definitions are put instead of names, and predication
is for itself and not accidentally, in these cases it will be true to 30
predicate without qualification has the following import. He gathers 375,1
together in one formula what he has said above, by saying that
whatever is predicated in such a way that it contains no contradiction 5
in the names or in the appropriate definitions, is predicated truly
when apart and without qualification, e.g. ‘dead’ and ‘man’ in ‘dead
man’; these have no contrariety or contradiction in their names, but
if the definitions are taken in place of the names, contradictory 10
opposition is immediately recognised; for if you give the definition of
man, you say ‘mortal rational animal’, and of ‘dead’ you say that it is
to be a body which is deprived of life and inanimate; and from this
the total force of the contradiction becomes apparent. Therefore if
definitions are taken in the place of names and there appears to be a 15
contradiction in them or if something is predicated accidentally, as
‘is’ of Homer, since it is predicated primarily of ‘poet’, then what was
predicated in combination will not be correctly predicated without
qualification. But if there is no contradiction and predication is not 20
accidental but in itself, then whatever is said truly in combination is
predicated truly without qualification.
But since there were some who claimed that what ‘is not’ is and
composed a complete syllogism with the following propositions: what
is not, is thought about; but what is thought about is; therefore what 25
is not is, he says the following: if it is true to predicate of what is not 375,1
that it is thought about, we are predicating ‘is’ of what is thought
about; but we predicate ‘is’ accidentally of ‘what is not’; for since what
is not is thought about, we predicate ‘is’ in the second place of ‘what
 78 Translation
5 is not’. Therefore we cannot say without qualification that what is not
is; for it is thought about because it ‘is not’ since if it ‘existed’ it would
be knowable rather than thought about, just as Homer is said ‘to be’
because he ‘is a poet’, not because he ‘is’ in itself. But of course Homer
10 is said to be a poet because his poetry exists and survives, just as we
say that some people often live in their children. Then what is not is
said to be thought about because its being thought about ‘is’, but not
because what is not can be something in itself.
15 Then with these preliminary constructs and ordered definitions he
turns the treatment and discussion of propositions to modal proposi-
tions, a most useful topic for dialectic. It remains now to discuss the
modes of propositions and oppositions. For there has been a great
20 deal of doubt and discussion as to whether propositions posited
non-modally are the same type as those which are determined by
their own modes. And he begins his own questioning about these
matters as follows.

Chapter 12
21a34-7 Having cleared up these points we must consider how
25 negations and affirmations about the possible to be and not possi-
377,1 ble, the contingent and not contingent,44 the impossible and
necessary relate to each other; for there are some queries here.
Every statement is expressed either non-modally and simply, e.g.
5 ‘Socrates walks’, ‘it is day’ or whatever is predicated simply and
without any qualification. But there are others that are expressed
with their proper modes, e.g. ‘Socrates walks quickly’. For a mode has
been added to Socrates’ walking when we say that he walks quickly.
For our predicating ‘quickly’ of his walking signifies how (in what
10 mode – quomodo) he walks. And similarly if someone says that
Socrates was well taught, he has shown how he was taught and has
not said simply that he was taught, but attaches also the mode of
15 Socrates’ schooling. But because there are other modes according to
which we say that something can be, something is, it is necessary for
something to be, something happens, the enquiry concerns how
contradictory opposites are formed in these as well. For it is easy to
20 recognise the point of contradiction in propositions which are predi-
cated without qualification and non-modally. For the negation of the
affirmation ‘Socrates is walking’, if it is put with the verb as ‘Socrates
does not walk’ has, when the opposition has been correctly formed,
separated ‘walking’ from Socrates. Again if you put the negation of
25 the proposition ‘Socrates is a philosopher’ with the verb ‘is’, you will
form a perfect negation saying ‘Socrates is not a philosopher’. For it
cannot happen that in simple affirmations the negation is put with
378,1 anything other than the verb which contains the force of the entire
 Translation 79
proposition. For if someone maintains that the negation of ‘man is
white’ is not ‘man is not white’ but man is not-white’, this is shown
to be false as follows. If a stone is put in the proposition and the 5
question is put whether that stone is a white man and if he denies it
using ‘is a not-white man’ as the negation of ‘is a white man’, let it be
said to him: if ‘is white man’ is not a true affirmation about this stone, 10
then the negation ‘is not-white man’ will be true. But this too is false;
for a stone is in no way a man and so ‘is not-white man’ cannot be
predicated of it. But if neither the affirmation nor the negation
concerning it is true and it is impossible for contradictory affirma- 15
tions and negations when predicated of the same thing to be both
false, it is clear that ‘man is not-white’ is not the negation of ‘man is
white’, and ‘man is not white’ is. Thus in propositions predicated
without qualification and non-modally the negation must never be 20
put anywhere other than with the verb which contains the whole
proposition. But we have already said enough about this above.
But in modal propositions the question is whether the negative
particle is put with the modal word or keeps its place with the verb, 25
as was in fact the case with simple and non-modal propositions. For 379,1
if the negative particle maintains its position of being placed with the
verb, that which makes a contradiction falls away and does not
distinguish true and false. For whenever we say it is possible for
something to be or necessary to be or things of this kind, there is a 5
mode of doing something. Thus if someone says that I can walk and
forms its denial by putting the negative with the verb ‘walk’ and says
that I can not-walk, the contradictory affirmation and negation will
be found to be true about the same subject at the same time. For it is
clear that I can both walk and can not-walk. But if in this modal 10
expression of possibility the negative particle is not rightly joined
with the verb and even in propositions where it makes no difference
whether the negative is put with the modal word or the verb, one
should keep the kind of opposition which belongs to the type of
proposition that is expressed modally. <For> in the proposition ‘Soc- 15
rates walks quickly’ it will appear to be almost the same whether you
make the denial by putting the negative with the verb, ‘Socrates does
not walk quickly’ or by attaching the negative particle to the modal
word, ‘Socrates walks not quickly’. For in whatever way the negation 20
is applied it distinguishes truth and falsity when taken with the
affirmation. But because there are many modal forms where if the
negative particle is joined to the verb, you don’t get the negative of 25
the previously stated affirmation, one ought to keep the opposition in
all forms of modal proposition, so that all their opposites may be said
to come about in one and the same way, so that in simple sentences 380,1
the negation denies the fact, in modal sentences it denies the modal-
ity, e.g. in ‘Socrates walks’ that the proposition ‘Socrates does not
walk’ should deny and abolish the actual fact, that he walks, but in 5
 80 Translation
modal sentences it upholds the fact and denies the modality, e.g. in
the proposition ‘Socrates walks quickly’ the negation says ‘Socrates
walks not quickly’, so that it makes no difference whether he is
10 walking or not, but the negation established in opposition removes
the modality, i.e. of walking quickly. However this is not the case in
some instances where the thing, too, perishes together with the
modality; e.g. in ‘Socrates can walk, Socrates cannot walk’, when the
15 negative particle is attached to the modality it destroys both the
modality and the thing. But this happens only in those cases where
something is said not to come about and the modality of its activity
is added but the modality of doing something in the future, e.g. if
someone says that Socrates can walk, not because he is walking now,
20 but because it is possible for him to walk. If the negative is joined to
this possibility, it will appear to do away with the very thing of which
the possibility is predicated. But if someone says that Socrates walks
quickly, he is saying that he is doing something and attaches the
25 modality to the action so that anyone can know how he is doing the
thing which he is said to be doing. Here the thing survives, but the
modality is destroyed, as we said above. Or shouldn’t it be much more
381,1 correct to say that propositions of this kind always remove the
modality, but do not destroy the thing of which the modality is
predicated? It is clear that, both where a fact is stated, e.g. ‘Socrates
walks quickly’, and where the present action is itself predicated as
5 happening and being performed, the modality is done away with but
the thing which is said to happen continues, as when we say ‘Socrates
walks not quickly’, that he walks is not removed, but the negation
just disconnects speed from the walking. But in propositions which
10 posit through modality the possibility of doing something in the
future, no action is posited at all, but only modality. When the
negative is attached to this modality it destroys the modality but the
thing of which the modality was predicated does not endure, because
even then at the time when it was predicated, it was not proposed
15 that something would come to be or be done along with the modality.
Thus if someone says that it is possible for Socrates to walk, a
modality has been posited, but the thing has not been established in
action. For it has not been said that he is walking, but that it is
20 possible for him to walk. Then the negation removes the possibility
in the proposition ‘it is not possible for Socrates to walk’, but in the
same proposition the thing of which the modality was said does not
survive either. And this happens because the thing of which the
modality is predicated is not even stated in the affirmation. And so
25 the thing has not been removed by the negation, because the nega-
tion did not find it posited there in the first place, but only the
modality which was constituted by the affirmation. But it makes a
great difference whether the negation is put with the modality or
with the verb. For if I put it with the verb, the predicate is separated
 Translation 81
from the subject, as in ‘Socrates does not walk’; for he is not walking
because the predicate has been divided from the subject, Socrates. 382,1
But if it is put with the modality, the predicate is not divided from
the subject, but rather the modality is separated from the predicate,
as in ‘Socrates walks not quickly’, the proposition has not separated 5
walking from Socrates, but speed from walking, i.e. the modality
from the predicate. And this is seen more easily and clearly, whatever
is predicated * * *45 and to come about.
But we ought to define what the possible, the necessary and ‘to be’
are and to show their significations because it will help us to under- 10
stand the subtleties of the passage we are dealing with, what was
said earlier about contingents will become even clearer and it will
make accessible to us in the clearest light the meaning of the Ana-
lytics. In On Communication Aristotle distinguished four modalities. 15
For it is said that something either is, happens to be, can be or is
necessary to be. Of these ‘to happen to be’ and ‘to be possible to be’
signify the same and there is no difference between saying that ‘it is
possible for there to be races tomorrow’ and ‘there happen to be races 20
tomorrow’, except only where what is possible can be removed by
privation, whereas this does not happen to the contingent at all. For
both the negation of possibility, ‘not to be possible’, and the privation,
‘to be impossible ‘, are sometimes set against what is said to be
possible; for ‘to be impossible’ is the privation of possibility. But in 25
the case of the contingent, although it has the same meaning, only
the negation is set against it and no privation is found. Thus in the
case of the contingent, if we want to do away with it, we say that it 383,1
does not happen and this is the negation, but no one would say
‘incontingent’ which is the privation. Then although to be contingent
and to be possible signify the same thing, there is, according to 5
Porphyry, a great difference between necessaries, which signify sim-
ply ‘to be’, and contingents or possibles. For what is said ‘to be’
something is judged by the present; for if something is now in
something else, ‘is’ is predicated; but what ‘is’ in such a way that it is
always and never changes, is said necessarily to be, like the move- 10
ments of the sun and the eclipses of the moon when the earth
intervenes. But where things are said to be contingent or possible, we
do not regard their occurrence in terms of the present or of chan-
gelessness of any kind, but we regard them only to the extent the 15
proposition of their contingency promises. For what is said to be able
to be or to happen, is not yet, but could be. And the proposition is said
to be contingent or possible, because something can be whether it
occurs or does not occur. For propositions of this kind are not judged 20
by the event, but rather by their signification. For example, if some-
one says that there can be races tomorrow, the affirmation is possible
and contingent. But if there are races tomorrow, it is not that
anything has been changed in the action of the contingent or possible 25
 82 Translation
affirmation, so that what the former promised as a possibility seems
to have been necessary. And again if the races do not take place, still
nothing has changed at all so that it might seem to have been
necessary that they would not take place. For these things, as we
384,1 said, are not determined by the outcome, but rather by the promise
in the actual proposition. For what does someone mean when he says
that ‘there can be races’? I think he is saying that whether they take
5 place or not, they are not however precluded by any necessity from
taking place. Therefore two of the four modalities, the contingent and
the possible, are the same, but they differ from the remaining two
and the remaining two also differ from each other. For a possible and
10 contingent proposition differs from one which says that something
‘is’. For the former makes an affirmative proposition with respect to
possibility in a future time, but the other with respect to action in the
present. But both, the one which signifies that something ‘is’ and the
one which signifies that something can or happens to be, differ from
15 a necessary proposition. For necessity requires that something not
only is present, but is also unchangeably present, so that what we
say is cannot ever not be. Thus the implications of the list are quite
clear. For what is necessary cannot be said without what is or
20 happens to be or can be; for whatever is necessary both is and can be,
or if it cannot be, would not be at all. But if it were not, it would not
be said to be necessary. Therefore everything necessary both is and
is possible. But not everything that is, is necessary (for there can be
25 some things where it is not necessary for them to be, e.g. that
Socrates walks or the other things expressed with separable acci-
dents). Nor again what happens to be or is possible to be, necessarily
385,1 is. Thus ‘to be’ and possibility follow necessity, but necessity does not
follow ‘to be’ and ‘possible to be’. Again ‘to be able’ follows every
instance of ‘to be’; for what is can also be; for if it could not be, then
5 doubtless it would not be. But being does not follow possibility; for
what is possible, can also not be, e.g. it is possible for me to go out
now, but this is not actually occurring for I am not going out. Thus
gradually we have the whole range of implications. For being and
10 possibility follow necessity, possibility follows being, but neither
being nor necessity follow possibility. It remains then that there are
two kinds of possibles, one which closely follows necessity, the other
which necessity itself does not follow. For when I say it is necessary
15 that the sun is now moving, this is also possible, whereas when I say
it is possible for me to pick up this book now, it is not necessary. Thus
Aristotle was right to question a little later whether what agrees
with necessity is also possible. But when we come to that passage,46
20 we will learn what these two similar kinds of possibility mean or how
they can be distinguished. But now since we have explained the
implications of affirmative propositions, let us explore the implica-
25 tions of the negations.
 Translation 83
For the four propositions formed from ‘to be’, ‘necessary to be’,
‘possible to be’ or ‘happen to be’, the four negations are ‘not to be’, ‘not
necessary to be’, not possible to be’ or ‘not happen to be’. But just as
the affirmations ‘happen to be’ and ‘possible to be’ were the same and 386,1
similar in signification, their negations too are the same. For there is
no difference between saying ‘it is not possible’ and announcing ‘it
does not happen that’. And the implications for the affirmatives are
as follows. Possible propositions and those signifying that something 5
is follow necessary propositions; those saying something is are fol-
lowed by the same possibles, but neither do propositions signifying
that something is nor those that are necessary agree with the possi-
bles. But in negatives it is the reverse. For the negation of a necessary 10
proposition and of one signifying that something is follow negation of
possibility, but neither the negation of what is nor the negation of
what is possible to be follow the negation of a necessary proposition.
Arrange them all in the following fashion: 15

possible to be not possible to be

happen to be not happen to be
to be not to be
necessary to be not necessary to be

We must briefly recap the implications of the affirmations to make it 20

clearer how the converse occurs in the negations. Possibility and
contingency follow ‘to be’, but ‘to be’ does not follow possibility and
contingency; ‘to be’, possibility and contingency follow ‘necessary to 25
be’, but neither ‘to be’ nor necessity follow possibility and contin-
gency. The reverse occurs in the negations. ‘Not to be’ follows ‘not
possible to be’ and ‘not happen to be’, for what cannot be is not; but
‘not possible to be’ does not follow ‘not to be’, for what is not is not 387,1
altogether precluded from being possible to be. For I don’t now see
the Forum of Trajan, but it is not necessary that I do not see it. It can
happen that I will go nearer to it and see it. Again ‘not to be’ and ‘not
necessary to be’ do not follow ‘not possible to be’ and ‘not happen to 5
be’, for it does not seem that one can rightly say of what cannot be
that it is not necessary that it is, but rather that it is necessary that
it is not. But neither ‘not to be’ nor ‘not possible to be’ follows the 10
negation of necessity, i.e. it is not necessary to be; for when I walk, it
is not necessary that I walk; for it is not of necessity that someone
walks. Nor again is it the case that what is not necessary cannot be.
For when someone walks, it is not necessary for him to walk, but he 15
can walk. And so what is not necessary to be is not at all precluded
from being able to be. The same argument applies to contingents.
Then negative convertibility differs from that in the affirmations. For
in the affirmations being and possibility followed necessity, and 20
possibility also followed being, but being or necessity did not follow
 84 Translation
possibility nor necessity being; but in the negations ‘not to be’ and
‘not necessary to be’ follow ‘not possible to be’, but neither does ‘not
25 to be’ follow ‘not necessary to be’ nor does the negation of possibility,
which proposes that something cannot be, follow either of these. Or
should we rather say that it is the same in the negations as in the
affirmations, as Theophrastus very acutely observed? For the impli-
388,1 cations in the affirmations were that possibility and ‘to be’ follow
necessity, but ‘to be’ and necessity do not follow possibility. The same
too will appear in the negations if you consider them deeply. For
5 when a negation comes along in something necessary and makes a
negation declaring ‘it is not necessary to be’ it breaks the force of
necessity and leads the entire proposition to what is possible. For
when the rigour of necessity is broken what is not necessary to be is
brought to possibility. But neither ‘to be’ nor necessity followed
10 possibility. Then neither ‘not to be’ nor ‘not to happen to be’ rightly
follow necessity when it has been broken and led to possibility and
means ‘it is not necessary to be’. Again the man who says ‘it is
possible to be’, if the disjunction of the negative is added to it,
15 removes the possibility, and the negative form, ‘it is not possible’,
recalls the entire proposition back to the permanence of necessity.
For what cannot come into being is not able to be, but what cannot
come to be so that it is, must necessarily not be. Thus the proposition
20 in which we say that something cannot be contains a certain neces-
sary force. But being and possibility followed necessity. Yet ‘not
necessary to be’ looks to possibility. Then it is right that ‘not neces-
sary to be’, which already involves possibility, follows the proposition
25 ‘it cannot be’, which involves necessity. Thus there the propositions
have a different arrangement but the same force, so that everything
follows necessity, but necessity does not follow possibility.
389,1 But here arises a little problem. For if possibility follows necessity
and ‘not necessary’ is related to possibility, why does ‘not necessary’
not follow necessity? For if possibility follows necessity and ‘not
necessary’ follows possibility, what we predicate as ‘not necessary to
5 be’ ought to follow necessity. The solution is as follows. Although ‘not
possible to be’ has the force of necessity, it does differ from necessity
in that the latter has an affirmative specification, the former a
10 negative. ‘Possible to be’ and ‘not necessary’ also are different, simply
in that one is affirmative, the other negative, though the force of their
signification is the same. But the affirmation of possibility and
contingency followed necessity. Yet although ‘not necessary to be’
15 imitates possibility and agrees with it, it is still a form of negation.
Then it is right that the negation in which we state that it is not
necessary for something to be does not follow the affirmation that it
is necessary to be. This is the solution to the problem reported by the
most learned Theophrastus.
20 But now we have cleared this up let us proceed to what follows.
 Translation 85
For there are many problems here, as Aristotle himself says. But first
of all we give the entire text of the argument. Although it is long, I will
find no difficulty in citing it so that the meaning will not be cut short. 25

21a38-b32 For if of combined expressions those are the contra-

dictory opposites of each other which are arranged in
accordance with ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’; for example the negation
of ‘to be a man’ is ‘not to be a man’ and not ‘to be a not-man’, and 390,1
of ‘to be a white man’ is not ‘to be a not-white man’ but ‘not to
be a white man’; for if there is in every case either an affirma- 5
tion47 or a negation, it will be true to say that a log is a not-white
man; and if this is so, even where ‘to be’ is not added, what is
said instead of ‘to be’ will have the same effect, e.g. the negation
of ‘a man walks’ is not ‘a not-man walks’ but ‘a man does not 10
walk’; for there is no difference between saying that a man
walks and a man is walking; then if this is so in every case, the
negation also of ‘possible to be’ is ‘possible not to be’ and not ‘not 15
possible to be’. But the same thing seems to be ‘possible to be’
and ‘possible not to be’; for everything which can be divided or
walk, can also not walk and not be divided. But the reason is 391,1
that everything which is possible in this way is not always
actual and so the negation will also attach to it. Therefore what
is capable of walking can also not walk and what is capable of
being seen can also not be seen. But it is impossible for opposite 5
expressions about the same thing to be true. Then this is not the
negation; for it follows from the above that either they affirm
and deny the same thing at the same time about the same
subject or that the opposed affirmations and negations are not 10
produced in accordance with ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’. Then if the
former is impossible, we must choose the latter. Therefore the
negation of what is possible to be is ‘not possible to be’. And the
same argument applies also to what happens to be; for its 15
negation is ‘not happens to be’. And it is the same in the other cases
too, i.e. with what is necessary and what is impossible. For just as
in the previous cases ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ are additions whilst the
subject matter is ‘white’ and ‘black’, so here too the subject is ‘to be’ 20
whilst ‘to be able’ and ‘to happen’ are additions which determine
the possible and not possible in the case of ‘to be’ just as in the 392,1
former ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ determine the truth.
In this subtle discussion by Aristotle one ought to recognise that
there is a great difference between defining the force and nature of
possibility itself or embracing it within the specific characteristics of 5
its own epistemological level and deciding what sort of thing a
possible statement ought to be. For in recognising what is possible it
is noted only whether what is said to be possible can come about when
 86 Translation
there is no external circumstance to prevent it. But even if something
should happen to occur, it does not affect the previous state of
10 possibility. Discerning a statement of real possibility is, however,
much different, as can be seen straightaway from the actual discus-
sion of statements of possibility. For just as it is not the same to give
as the answer to a question the definition of man and to include that
15 definition in another defining term, similarly it is not the same to
deal with a statement of possibility and what is in reality possible.
Hence it happens that, although the possible and the contingent are
the same in their significations, there seems to be a difference in
20 their statements. For above we laid down that possibility and contin-
gency had the same signification, so that what happens to come
about is the same as what can come about, what is possible the same
as what happens. But a possible statement is not the same as a
contingent statement. For if someone proposes a possible affirmation
and puts a contingent negation as its opposite, he will not form a
25 correct contradictory. For if someone says that something is possible
and another says in answer that that thing does not happen, al-
though it cancels out the previous possibility as far as the significa-
tion is concerned, one cannot say that it is a contradictory in which
393,1 the terms expressed in the affirmation and negation are different; for
a possible affirmation ought to have a negation of possibility not of
contingency. The same too applies in contingents. For if someone
should say that something happens, a negation of possibility should
5 not be set as its opposite, although it is the same thing that is possible
and contingent. Thus we can agree that there is a considerable
difference in principle between discerning the modality itself and its
statement, which is predicated with the modality and its quality.
10 Hence it happens that, although possibility and contingency are the
same in signification, they are expressed by Aristotle as somehow
different in the arrangement of their modality. And we should not
forget that the Stoics thought that there was a more universal
difference between the possible and the necessary. For they divide
15 statements as follows. Some statements are possible, others are
impossible; of possible statements, some are necessary, others not
necessary; again of those that are not necessary, some are possible,
others are impossible. Thus in a foolish and reckless manner they
make the possible both the genus and a species of the not necessary.
20 And Aristotle recognised both the possible that is not necessary and
the possible that can be necessary. For you cannot apply to them in
the same way that it is not possible for a transition to be made
sometimes from truth to falsity or from falsity to truth. Just as when
25 someone says now, that it is day, he has said what is true, and if he
makes the same statement at night time, it is false, and the truth
here has been transformed into falsity; so too there are certain
possibilities, that happen to be and not be, where what has a change-
 Translation 87
able nature is not described in the same way as those which we call 30
necessary. For example if someone says that the sun moves or it is 394,1
possible for the sun to move, this can never be changed from truth to
falsity. But now we must say no more about this disagreement
between Aristotle and the Stoics.
The only thing we have to look at carefully is where the negation 5
is to be placed in propositions where a modality is predicated of
something to produce a statement of possibility. Possible, contingent
and necessary propositions, and any with modality, are properly said
to be modal propositions where in the signification a quality is found
of the existence of the thing which is predicated. E.g. when I say 10
Socrates speaks well, a modality of speaking is attached to Socrates.
Thus, just as in propositions which express the substance of some
thing, the negation is put with the substance itself (for example,
when we say ‘Socrates is’ the negation is attached to ‘to be’ to form 15
the negation ‘Socrates is not’), so too in propositions which express
the modality of a substance the negation should be put with the
modality which seems to be attached to the substance. E.g. when we
say ‘Socrates speaks well’, the modality of the thing itself is ‘well’; 20
then the negation should be put with this modal word and quality.
And we say those propositions are possible or contingent in which the
modality is itself evident and is said of ‘to be’, rather than ‘to be’ of 25
the modality. For when we say ‘possible to be’, we say something ‘is’,
but then there is added how it is, i.e. possible, so that it does not need
to be described in any other way than in accordance with possibility.
Thus ‘to be’ is the subject, and the predication is the modality, 395,1
whether contingent, possible, necessary or whatever else. And modal
propositions are defined as those in which there is no question about
the substance, but the concern is solely about the modality and
determiner. But if the modality is made the subject and ‘to be’ is 5
predicated, then the question concerns the substance of the thing and
not the modality. E.g. if someone says that ‘it is possible’, meaning
that the possibility itself is in the things, no modality has been added
to this proposition. For when we say ‘possible to be’ possesses modal- 10
ity, we do not mean that it has it in itself, but as a phrase separated
from its proposition. For we regard it as a modality as if it were joined
with a proposition. When we have joined it to its appropriate propo-
sition, the modality of its predication also becomes clear. For when
we say ‘it is possible’ the particle ‘is’ forms part of the predication in 15
order to signify the modality. If we make a proposition by adding this
to its own body we then know what the modality is expressing. Then
let us now add ‘it is possible’ to the other predicates and so produce
a single statement; let us say ‘it is possible for Socrates to walk’. Don’t 20
you see the modality of possibility in the proposition, so that anyone
can see that whether Socrates is walking or not walking, he still can
walk in accordance with the actual modality of the proposition? Then
 88 Translation
by removing in this way the part, we regard it as being a possible
25 statement as though it were a whole proposition, just as is our
practice with words which quantify a plurality, where we hesitate
whether to put ‘no’ or ‘not every’ as the opposite of ‘every’, we regard
these words, which are clearly determinations, as though they were
396,1 integral propositions. We must, then, in conclusion say that in propo-
sitions in which a modality is predicated everything else acts as
subject matter, whether ‘to be’, ‘to walk’, ‘to read’, ‘to speak’ or
anything else which is said to come about with some modality; but
5 where the modality itself <is the subject and ‘to be’> is predicated so
as to make a complete proposition,48 the proposition is not with a
modality, but in this case concerns only the existence of the modality.
E.g. if someone says ‘it is possible’, he is saying that something in the
10 things is possible, if he says ‘it is contingent’, he is saying that there
is something in the things that is contingent, and if he says ‘it is
necessary’, he is saying that there is something in the things that is
necessary. Here the concern is not with the modality, but only with
its being. Therefore whenever ‘to be’ is the subject and the modality
15 is the predicate, e.g. when we say ‘it is possible for Socrates to walk’,49
the negation must be added to the modality, whereas when the
modality is the subject and ‘to be’50 is a predicate, the negation must
be put with ‘to be’. E.g. when we say ‘it is possible’, because we mean
the equivalent of ‘there is a possibility’, and when we say ‘it is
20 contingent’ the equivalent of ‘there is a contingency’, the negation
must be placed with ‘to be’ and we must say ‘it is not possible’ which
has the same force as saying ‘there isn’t a possibility’. It is the same
with contingency. But if you don’t look at it carefully it looks as if the
25 subject ought always to be the same as is said to be found in the first
place, the predicate identical with what is predicated in the second
place. For it is true in some cases, but in others we draw our
conclusions as to what is the subject, what the object term, rather
397,1 from the signification of the propositions. For when I say ‘man is an
animal’ I must first say ‘man’ and afterwards predicate ‘animal’; and
5 so ‘man’ is said as subject whilst ‘animal’ is predicated. But where a
modality is added, e.g. when we say ‘Socrates speaks well’ it has the
same force as saying ‘Socrates is speaking well’ and here ‘well’ is said
10 first and ‘is speaking’ second;51 and ‘well’ appears to be the subject,
‘is speaking’ the predicate. But this is wrong. And because of this
anyone hearing the sentence ‘Socrates is speaking well (Socrates well
is speaking)’ could well understand it as meaning everyone knows
that Socrates is speaking, whereas the modality contains the force of
15 the proposition as a whole. For the mind should concentrate on this
and not on whether he is speaking. For this is not in doubt; for if you
say he is speaking well, you admit that he is speaking. Thus the mind
must concentrate on the modality, on the word ‘well’. For unless ‘well’
occurs in the sentence, ‘is speaking’ is not adequate to express what
 Translation 89
is said in ‘Socrates is speaking well’. Thus the modality contains the 20
whole proposition. But the predicate contains the proposition. There-
fore the modality is rather the predicate in these propositions. Then
the universal conclusion is drawn that every modal contradiction
occurs not with respect to the verb nor the verb containing ‘to be’ as 25
part of itself, but rather with respect to the modal expression.
‘Speaks’ is an example of a verb which is said to contain ‘to be’ as part
of itself; for it is the equivalent of saying ‘is speaking’. Thus with any 30
propositions which contain any modality in themselves, there can be
no doubt that it is not correct to attach the negation to the subject but 398,1
that it should be put rather with the modality in which something is
expressed as being or coming to pass. For every modal affirmation is
such that the listener ought not to concentrate on what it is said to 5
be but on how it is said to be. E.g. when we say ‘Socrates speaks well’
we should not look at ‘speaking’, but the attention should be directed to
how he is speaking; for this seems to contain the whole proposition.
Thus the negation ‘ not possible to be’ and not ‘possible not to be ‘is the 10
opposite of ‘possible to be’. In the same way the negation ‘not happen to
be’ and not ‘happen not to be’ is the opposite of ‘happen to be’. It seems
that the same should be done in the case of necessities and impossibles, 15
which Aristotle in his accustomed brevity has omitted.
But since the virtue of a commentary is not only to express the
impact of the meaning in general but also to join that to the wording
and order of the text itself, everything that has been said above in a 20
disorganised way let us now organise in the order presented by
Aristotle’s own words. Having cleared up these points we must con-
sider how negations and affirmations about the possible to be and not 25
possible, the contingent and not contingent, the impossible and neces-
sary relate to each other; for there are some queries here.52 We must
consider, he says, how affirmations and negations seem to be opposed
in modal propositions, e.g. in propositions that are possible, contin- 399,1
gent, necessary, impossible, true, false or where anything is
predicated as well or badly or by some quality. For there are some 5
queries here he says, and he immediately adds what the queries are.
For if of combined expressions those are the contradictory opposites of
each other which are arranged in accordance with ‘to be’ and ‘not to
be’. The meaning of this is that in the whole series of propositions the 10
relevant opposition is that determined by ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’, e.g.
when we say ‘a man is’ the negation is ‘a man is not’, and not ‘a
not-man is’. And again the negation of the proposition ‘there is a 15
white man’ is ‘there is not a white man’ and not ‘there is a not-white
man’. This issue, that the negative of ‘there is a white man’ is not
‘there is a not-white man’ but ‘there is not a white man’, he proves as
follows: For if there is in every case either an affirmation or a negation, 20
it will be true to say that a log is a not-white man. It is expressed
concisely, but I think it can be explained as follows. Take a log, he
 90 Translation
says, as the subject of a proposition about which two statements are
25 to be made. And suppose it is clear to us that in every case if the
affirmation is true, the negation is false, and its contradictory, if the
negation is true, the affirmation is false. Then suppose we say of this
log, ‘this log is a white man’. This is false. Then if this affirmation is
400,1 false, its negation ought to be true. Then if the negation of the
affirmation ‘there is a white man’ is ‘there is a not-white man’, then
the correct negation to be predicated of the log would run ‘this log is
5 a not-white man’. But this cannot be the case; for it is clearly false
that a log is a not-white man. For what isn’t even at all a man cannot
be a not-white man. Therefore both are false, the affirmation which
10 says that the log is a white man and the negation which says that it
is a not-white man. But if they are both false, this is not the negation
of this affirmation. Then we will have to find another to distinguish
true and false with it. In this respect the only other opposite to be
15 found to ‘there is a white man’ is ‘there is not a white man’. For if
‘there is a not-white man’ is the negation of the affirmation ‘there is
a white man’, it will be the case that where the affirmation about the
20 log was false the negation is true and it will be true to say of the log
that this log is a not-white man; but this is impossible. Therefore we
agree that the proposition ‘there is a not-white man’ is not the
negation of the affirmation ‘there is a white man’ and ‘there is not a
25 white man’ is the negation of the same affirmation ‘there is a white
man’. Don’t you see then that in virtually everything affirmations
and negations are produced in accordance with ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’?
For one said that white ‘is’, the other denied ‘white’ saying ‘it is not’.
30 Again one says that man ‘is’, whilst the other denies it, saying that
man ‘is not’. And it is the same way with the others. And if this is so,
401,1 even where ‘to be’ is not added, what is said instead of ‘to be’ will have
the same effect, e.g. the negation of ‘a man walks’ is not ‘a not-man
5 walks’ but ‘a man does not walk’. For there is no difference between
saying that a man walks and a man is walking. And this doesn’t only
happen, he says, in propositions arranged with ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’,
10 but also in those contained in the kind of words that have the force
of ‘to be’, e.g. in ‘a man walks’, ‘walks’ contains ‘to be’ in itself; for
‘walks’ is the same as ‘is walking’. Then the negation is to be attached
to verbs which contain ‘to be’. For if every contradiction is formed
15 with ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ and these verbs contain ‘to be’ in their own
signification and because these verbs are placed just as though ‘to be’
itself were being placed, it is clear that the negation ought to be
placed with the verbs which contain ‘to be’ in accordance with their
20 similarity to propositions which, in the way we explained above, are
opposed to each other in terms of ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’. Then once this
has been said in preamble he follows up any peculiarity which follows
as a consequence. Then if this is so in every case, the negation also of
‘possible to be’ is ‘possible not to be’ and not ‘not possible to be’. But the
 Translation 91
same thing seems to be ‘possible to be’ and ‘possible not to be’; for 25
everything which can be divided or walk, can also not walk and not
be divided. It has been shown above how oppositions are formed with 402,1
‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ in combined statements. Now he says that if the
contradictories of every proposition are to be stated with ‘to be’ and 5
‘not to be’, then, too, in propositions which state something possible
to be, the negation will have to be posited not to form ‘not possible to
be’, but will have to be arranged on the modal of ‘not to be’ so as to
produce ‘possible not to be’ as the negation of ‘possible to be’. But if 10
we say this, he says, the contradictory affirmation and negation do
not distinguish true and false between them; for everything which
can be, can also not be; for what can be divided, can also not be
divided and what can walk, can also not walk. He now draws the 15
consequences from this to explain what sort of possibility it can be
whereby when something is said to be capable of coming about, it still
remains that it can also not come about: but the reason is that
everything which is possible in this way is not always actual and so
the negation will also attach to it. Therefore what is capable of 20
walking can also not walk and what is capable of being seen can also
not be seen. But it is impossible for opposite expressions about the
same thing to be true. Then this is not the negation. The reason, he
says, why what is said to be able to be, can also not be, is that we 25
pronounce everything we declare possible, to be not always actual,
i.e. it is not necessary. For everything which is always actual is
necessary, e.g. the sun is always moving; therefore its movement is
always taking place. But if someone says that I can walk, since my 30
walking motion is not always taking place and it is in me sometimes 403,1
not to walk, it also belongs to me that it may be truly said of me that
I can not walk, although it is true to say that I can walk. Therefore
whatever is not always actual possesses the capability of being and 5
not being. Then both what is capable of walking, i.e. what can walk,
can not walk, and what is capable of being seen, can not be seen. Then
it seems that ‘can not be’ is not the negation of ‘can be’, because both
are true where, he says, things are not always actual. For one of two 10
conclusions follows that either they affirm and deny the same thing at
the same time about the same subject, with the consequence that the 15
affirmation and negation are the same and agree with each other, if
a contradiction is formed in every case with ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’, e.g.
‘to be able to be’ and ‘to be able not to be’ (for both are the same and
agree with each other and if someone says that it is a contradiction 20
he is saying that the contradiction agrees with itself) or that the
opposed affirmations and negations are not produced in accordance
with ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ in all negations; i.e. that a contradiction is not
formed in every negation by placing ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ or verbs that 25
contain ‘to be’. Then if the former is impossible, we must choose the
latter. He had postulated above two consequences of the arguments
 92 Translation
he gave there, either that they affirm and deny one and the same
404,1 thing of the same thing at the same time, i.e. the affirmation and
negation have been predicated identically of the same thing at the
same time and agree with each other, or that a contradiction is not
formed with ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’. But both seem to be as it were
5 somewhat absurd, since while one of them is impossible, that an
affirmation and negation should agree, the other, that opposites are
not formed with ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’, is out of line with other
propositions in which contradiction is clearly formed in this way. So
10 now he says that both are awkward, but one of them will have to be
chosen and that we must choose the one that is less impossible. But
it is less impossible that opposites are not formed with ‘to be’ and ‘not
to be’. For there is nothing to stop this, but that an affirmation and
15 negation should agree is more impossible. Then our choice will have
to be that modal propositions do not have opposites formed on the
model of ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ but opposites where the modal word is
20 qualified. But he didn’t mean is more impossible in the sense that the
alternative is also impossible, but he adverted rather to the fact that
both are awkward but that one of them is without doubt impossible.
He then gives a particular example of modally expressed propositions
25 which are put in the negative form, when he says therefore the
negation of what is possible to be is ‘not possible to be’, where he adds
405,1 the negation, of course, not to the verb ‘to be’ but to the modal word
‘possible’. He says that the same argument also applies to contin-
gents. For the negation of ‘happen to be’ is ‘not happen to be’. He says
he thinks the same occurs with the necessary and the impossible.
5 What the nature of this opposition is which has formed the subject of
our long discussion has been expressed briefly but very correctly by
Aristotle. But if anyone looks more deeply into it, he could accompany
his own understanding of the passage with my exposition which
10 proceeds step by step.

21b26-32 For just as in the previous cases ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’
are additions while the things which are subjects are ‘white’ and
‘black’, so here too the subject is ‘to be’ while ‘to be able’ and ‘to
15 happen’ are additions which determine the possible and not
possible in the case of ‘to be’ just as in the former ‘to be’ and ‘not
to be’ determine the truth.
He calls predications ‘additions’. Thus he says that in non modal
20 propositions ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ or verbs which contain ‘to be’ are
always predicated, whilst things act as the subjects of which they are
predicated, e.g. ‘white’, when we say ‘white is’, or ‘man’ when we say
‘man is’. And so because in these cases the predicate contains the
25 whole proposition and the predicate determines truth and falsity,
and ‘to be’ or something containing ‘to be’ is predicated, contradicto-
 Translation 93
ries are in these cases rightly posited with ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’. But
where a modality is predicated, ‘to be’ or verbs containing ‘to be’ are
the subject, whilst the modal word alone in a sense acts as predicate. 30
For where something is said just ‘to be’ without any modality the 406,1
substance of the thing itself is expressed and the question somehow
is whether it ‘is’; thus its affirmation lays down that it ‘is’, whilst the
negation says that it ‘is not’. But where there is a modality, we do not 5
say that something is, but with what quality it is, so that neither the
affirmation nor the negation cast any doubt about the being, but its
quality, i.e. how it is, then becomes a subject of doubt. And so whilst
one person lays down that ‘Socrates generally speaks’, the negation
does not claim that ‘Socrates does not speak generally’ but that 10
‘Socrates does not generally speak’53 because the listener’s mind is
drawn not to ‘to be’ or verbs containing ‘to be’ which do not form the
proposition as a whole, but to the modal word, when an affirmation
proclaims that something is. Then if these contain the force of the 15
proposition as a whole and if what contains the force of the proposi-
tion is predicated and always forms opposites with respect to what is
predicated, the force of the negation is correctly put only with the
modal words.
Once he has established this by argumentation he next explains
that not only is ‘to be able to be’ and ‘not to be able to be’ not a 20
contradiction, but also that modal propositions have negations at-
tached to ‘to be’ though they are not really negations but
affirmations. For other negations can be found for them. For he says
the negation of ‘what is possible to be’ is ‘not possible to be’. There is, 25
he says, no contradiction between ‘possible to be’ and ‘possible not to
be’ insofar as ‘possible not to be’ is proved not to be a negation but 407,1
rather an affirmation. But an affirmation is never contradictorily
opposed to an affirmation. But ‘possible not to be’ seems to be an
affirmation because a negative is found for it, ‘not possible not to 5
be’. At the same time he adds that although there seem to be two
negations of the proposition ‘something can be’, namely ‘possible
not to be’ and ‘not possible to be’, which of these is the contradic-
tory of the affirmation ‘possible to be’ is recognised in that the one 10
which together with it distinguishes truth and falsity, can be its
contradictory rather than the one that agrees with it. But ‘able not
to be’ agrees with ‘able to be’ as I have already shown;54 if ‘not able
to be’ is false, ‘able to be’ is true; if the latter is false, ‘not able to 15
be’ is true; therefore these distinguish truth and falsity, which
could easily be shown in individual examples. For suppose some-
one says I can walk and he told the truth, if someone then says I 20
can’t walk, he has told a lie. Again if someone says the sun can
stand still, he is telling a falsehood; but if he says the sun cannot
stand still, no one would doubt the truth of the statement. Thus
‘able to be’ and ‘not able to be’ distinguish truth and falsity, 25
 94 Translation
whereas ‘able to be’ and ‘able not to be’ imply each other. Therefore
propositions which agree are not contradictories, whereas those
which distinguish truth and falsity between them, are to be consid-
408,1 ered more likely to be contradictories. This is what he means by
therefore they seemed to imply each other.55 He tells us which propo-
sitions follow each other for it is possible for the same thing ‘to be’ and
‘not to be’. He then shows why they follow each other by adding for
5 they are not contradictories of each other. For if they were contradic-
tories, they would never follow each other. But he declares what
contradictories are when he says but ‘possible to be’ and ‘not possible
to be’ are never simultaneous. And he does not pass over in silence
10 why they are never simultaneous with the explanation for they are
opposed. For they are never simultaneous and distinguish truth and
falsity because they are opposed. He also lays down that ‘not able not
to be’ is the negation of ‘able not to be’. This point can be made from
15 the following words: but ‘able not to be’ and ‘not able not to be’ are
never simultaneous which show that the former is the affirmation,
the latter the negation. For wherever what one affirms universally,
the other removes from the same thing, provided that one is an
20 affirmation, the other its negation and no equivocation or determina-
tion of the universals stands in the way, they are found opposed to
each other in a contradictory way.
The rest are now, he says, so self-explanatory that there is no
need of a long exposition, except that some things are mixed
25 together in their order to show more clearly the self-evident. For
he deals with the rest of the modalities in a similar way explaining
409,1 which propositions are and are not the negations of which affirma-
tions. And in order to demonstrate that the propositions he says
are not negations are affirmations, he adduces other negations as
opposites. And similarly, he says, the negation of ‘necessary to be’
5 is not ‘necessary not to be, but rather ‘not necessary to be’. 56 For the
former is an affirmation as he proved by immediately citing its
negation. He goes through everything in the same way, explaining
10 that the negation of ‘necessary not to be’, which as he had said
above is not the opposite of ‘necessary to be’, is ‘not necessary not
to be’. For propositions which have a negation attached to ‘to be’
are to be considered to be affirmations, if they are modal. The
15 negation of what is ‘impossible to be’ is not ‘impossible not to be’
but ‘not impossible to be’. For the former does not have the nega-
tive particle attached to the modal word and the latter with the
affirmation distinguishes true and false. The negation of the
20 proposition ‘impossible not to be’ which has the negative particle
attached to ‘to be’ and which is clearly an affirmation, is ‘not
impossible not to be’. He also briefly concludes what he has just
proved by saying:
 Translation 95

22a8-11 And universally, indeed, as has been said, one should 25

put ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ as subjects and add these to one 410,1
[subject]57 to make a negation and an affirmation; and one ought
to consider these as opposite expressions
We say universally, he says, as has already been said above, in 5
propositions with modal additions ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ act rather as
subjects, whilst the modal expressions are predicated and so affirma-
tion and negation always ought to be produced with respect to any
‘one’ modality, i.e. in one respect, e.g. just as the predicated modality 10
contains the affirmation, so too the negative particle when attached
to the modality contains the whole negation. And he sets out what he
thinks are the opposed expressions in the following way:

possible not possible

contingent not contingent 15
impossible not impossible
necessary not necessary

The addition true/not true is relevant to including all the modalities;

for ‘truly’ is a modality just as are well, quickly, happily, gravely, and 20
any other modalities; the contradictory is formed as follows: it is true,
it is not-true, but not it is not true; to walk quickly, to walk not quickly,
but not not to walk quickly. To sum up then, the negation must 25
always be attached to the modal word. For propositions which have
negative particles attached to their predicates are always opposed to
each other, as has already been said. And the predicates in these
sentences are modalities, as we have already demonstrated above.
Thus the negative when attached in these propositions to the modal- 411,1
ity creates a perfect contradictory force.
Having dealt with modal opposites a careful and useful treatment
of the implications and agreement of the propositions will be given.
Thus if ‘possible to be’ is said in an unqualified way, there would 5
appear to be a simple and easy agreement of propositions and no
mistake could be made in their implications. But since it is now
expressed in a double sense, the implications of the propositions are
not the same with respect to the different modalities. What I mean is 10
as follows. The possible has two aspects. One which can be whenever
it is not, the second which is predicated as being possible because it
already is. The first one belongs to the corruptible and changeable.
For Socrates can be amongst mortals when he was not, just like 15
mortals themselves who now are what they formerly were not. For a
man can speak when he is not speaking and walk when he is not
walking. Thus this aspect of possibility is stated in terms of what is
not yet, but can be. The other aspect is stated in terms of what 20
already is something not potentially but actually and is appropriate
 96 Translation
to both natures, both eternal and mortal. For what [actually] is in
eternals, can be, and again what is in mortals does not lack this
possibility of existing either. The only difference is that what is
25 eternal does not change at all and must necessarily always be, whilst
a mortal thing could both not be and need not necessarily be. For
when I write, writing is in me and therefore it is possible for me to
412,1 write, but because I am a mortal this possibility of writing is not
necessary; for I do not of necessity write. But when we say there is
5 movement in the heavens, there is no doubt that it is necessary that
the heavens move. Thus when some mortal thing is, it both can be
and it is not necessary that it is, whereas amongst eternals, what is
necessarily is and, because it is, it is possible for it to be.
Thus the possible has in principle two aspects, one whereby some-
10 thing can be when it is not, the other which is said of what already is
something actually and not just potentially. And the latter kind of
possibility which is already actual yields from itself two species: one
which, though it is, is not necessary, the other which, though it is,
15 has also the characteristic that it is necessarily so. And it is not just
Aristotle’s subtle mind that discovered this. In fact Diodorus also
defined the possible as ‘what is or will be’. Hence Aristotle thinks that
Diodorus’ ‘will be’ is the aspect of possibility which can be when it is
20 not, and his ‘is’ is what is said to be possible because it already
actually is. We have laid down that this latter kind of possibility has
two aspects, one we called necessary, the other we described as not
25 necessary. But the not necessary kind also has two aspects, one
which moves from potentiality to actuality, the other which was
always actual from the first moment of existence of the thing which
possesses possibility. And the one which moves from potentiality to
actuality is open to contradiction on both sides, e.g. I, who am now
30 writing, have moved from potentiality to actuality and whilst actu-
413,1 ally writing can write. For before I was writing, the potentiality of
writing was in me, but I came from the potentiality of writing to the
actuality of writing. Thus both, not writing and writing, fit my
situation; for I can not write and I can also write, which is a sort of
5 contradiction. And so whatever has come from potentiality to actual-
ity, can both do and not do, be and not be. E.g. take a man who
speaks; because he was able to speak before he does speak and now
can speak because he is speaking, he both can speak and can not
10 speak. But the other kind of possibility, which was never in potenti-
ality beforehand but always actual from the first moment of
existence of what is said to be something potentially, is suited for one
thing only. E.g. fire was never potentially hot so that it afterwards
was felt to be actually hot, nor was snow potentially cold before, and
15 then actually so afterwards, but fire was actually hot from the time
it came into being, and snow actually cold from its first existence.
Therefore these possibilities are not suited to both; for fire cannot
 Translation 97
inflict cold nor snow make anything hot. Then from the outset a
division of the following kind should be made: one type of possibility 20
is where something can be when it is not, the other where what
actually is, is for this reason said to be possible; for if it were not
possible, it wouldn’t be at all. This kind of possibility which is stated
modally in terms of what already actually is, may be subdivided into
two types: one in terms of what we say is of necessity, the other when 25
we think of something as not being of necessity though it is. And non
necessary possibility has two further subdivisions: one which, be- 414,1
cause it moves from potentiality to actuality, possesses the capacity
of being or not being, the other, because it never ceases being in act
from the first moment of the existence of what is said to be possible, 5
is suited and possible in respect of one side only, namely that aspect
which its activity always puts into effect, e.g. heat in fire, cold in
snow, hardness in adamant, liquidity in water. But no one should
think that where we say that certain activities were never potentially 10
in certain things, e.g. heat in fire, these are to be included in the class
of necessary possibility; for fire itself can be extinguished, whereas
in necessaries not only ought the quality never leave the subject 15
thing, which seems to the case even in fire, which never loses its own
quality of heat, but the very subject should apparently be an immor-
tal substance, which is not the case with fire. For the Peripatetic
school considers the sun and the other bodies of this universe which
are above in the heavens to be immortal and so is self-consistent in
saying that the sun necessarily moves, because not only does move- 20
ment never leave the sun, but not even the sun itself ever ceases to
be. Then after these preliminary remarks we must now turn to what
they served as an introduction, to the careful examination of the
implications of the propositions.

Chapter 13
22a14-23 The implications find orderly expression if they are 25
put as follows: ‘happen to be’ follows ‘possible to be’, and the
reverse, and ‘not possible to be’ and ‘not necessary to be’[follow 415,1
these]; ‘not necessary not to be’ and ‘not impossible not to be’
follow ‘possible not to be’ and ‘happen not to be’; ‘necessary not
to be’ and ‘impossible to be’ follow ‘not possible to be’ and ‘not 5
happen to be’; ‘necessary to be’ and ‘impossible not to be’ follow
‘not possible not to be’ and ‘not happen not to be’. But what we
mean may be seen from the following table. 10
This is what Aristotle now adds concerning the implications of propo-
sitions in accord with what we have said in our introductory remarks.
And although they are obvious if you look at them carefully, we will
run through them with a very brief explanation so that we will not
 98 Translation
15 appear to have made no contribution to this passage also. First of all
he wanted to show that whatever is said about possibility can also
very properly be said in the same form of contingency. And so he says
that ‘happens to be’ follows ‘possible to be’. And so that there would
20 not seem to be anything discordant between them, he adds and the
reverse to help us understand that whatever is possible, is contin-
gent, and whatever is contingent, is possible. Thus any propositions
which are convertible with each other, are equal and identical. Then
whatever can be said to be within the possible, can be described as
25 being within the contingent. Then these, the possible and the contin-
gent, he said are followed by those which say ‘not impossible to be’
and those which deny necessity, i.e. predicate of something ‘not
416,1 necessary to be’. For he says ‘ ‘happen to be’ follows ‘possible to be’,
and the reverse, and ‘not possible to be’ and ‘not necessary to be’
which is the equivalent of saying that contingency follows possibility
5 and these are convertible, but ‘not impossible to be’ and ‘not neces-
sary to be’ follow these. No one is unaware that this has been put
correctly. For what is possible to be and happens to be, is not
10 impossible to be. For if it were impossible, it would not be said to be
possible for it to be, because the meaning of impossibility would
compel it not to be. Therefore what can be, is not impossible to be.
Similarly what is said to be able to be, must not necessarily be. And
15 this occurs because what we predicate as being possible, turns easily
in either direction. For it can come about that it is or that it is not.
But necessity and impossibility are bound in with one or the other.
For what is impossible can never be. But further what is necessary
20 can never not be. Therefore what we say is not impossible to be, we
make agree with possibility. And to what we say is not necessary we
again assign a force of possibility. To put it more clearly, it should be
25 stated as follows. What is possible, could both be and not be; again
what is impossible, cannot be; what is necessary cannot not be. Thus
if we break a statement of impossibility by the addition of a negative
to say ‘not impossible to be’, we attach to it the type of possibility
417,1 whereby something is said to be able to be. But if we lessen the rigour
of a necessary proposition with a negative to say ‘not necessary to be’,
it turns out that we attach the necessary proposition also to a type of
possibility, the one whereby something can not-be. Therefore ‘not
5 impossible to be’ follows possibility because what is possible can come
about. Again the proposition ‘not necessary to be’ follows possibility
because what is possible, could also not be. We can say the same in a
10 different way. It is not true to say of what is possible that it is
impossible, because it can be. Again it is not true to say of what is
possible that it necessarily is. For what is possible to be can also not
be. Therefore if it is not right to predicate impossibility and necessity
15 of possibility, their negations, ‘not impossible to be’ and ‘not neces-
sary to be’, will agree with possibility. But we should recall that the
 Translation 99
same applies in every case to the contingent and the possible, of the
possible that when it still is not, it yet could be or not be. The rest of 20
the implications he describes as follows: ‘not necessary not to be’ and
‘not impossible not to be’ follow ‘possible not to be’ and ‘happen not to
be’. He said that these implications too are due to the same cause. For 25
he says that ‘to be not necessary not to be’ and ‘to be not impossible
not to be’ agree with ‘possible not to be’ and ‘happen not to be’. And
this is so because what can not be, can also be, and again what 30
happens not to be, happens also to be. But in fact what is necessary 418,1
not to be, cannot be, and what is impossible not to be, could not not
be. Therefore both depart from possibility. For because possibility
promises that something can be, that which declares that it necessar- 5
ily is not has the contrary sense. Again because possibility has in
itself the power to bring it about that what can be can also not be, it
differs from and disagrees with the proposition that it is impossible
not to be. But if ‘it is necessary not to be’ and ‘it is impossible not to 10
be’ disagree with possibility, it is surely right to think that their
negations agree with possibility. And I mean by propositions of
possibility those which either in affirmation or negation indicate
some possibility where one side is not excluded, e.g. ‘it is possible not 15
to be’ is not excluded by ‘it is possible for something to be’ or if
someone says that it is possible for something not to be this does not
prevent it from being able to be. And so I call an affirmation of
possibility one which predicates ‘to be able to be’ and equally one 20
which says that something can not-be. And in the propositions stated
by Aristotle in the form ‘possible not to be’ he does not seem to be
speaking as though he meant to say that he wanted it to mean that
something is ‘impossible to be’ when what he says is ‘possible not to 25
be’. For he puts the proposition in this form not to remove it from
possibility, but to say that it is possible for something not to be. For
one has to understand and add to ‘possible’ the verb ‘to be’, so when 419,1
he says ‘possible not to be’ we understand ‘is possible not to be’, i.e. it
is possible that it is not.
The third implication he mentions is where he says ‘necessary not
to be’ and ‘impossible to be’ agree with ‘not possible to be’ and ‘not 5
happen to be’. This is so clear as not to require an explanation. For
what is not possible, cannot be; what cannot be, necessarily is not,
and what necessarily is not, is impossible to be. Thus it is right to say
that ‘something cannot be’ and ‘does not happen to be’ are followed 10
by those propositions which deny being in combination with ‘it is
necessary’ and affirm impossibility. The final implications, in which
‘necessary to be’ and ‘impossible not to be’ follow ‘not possible not to 15
be’ and ‘not happen not to be’, do not present any obscurity. For what
is not possible not to be, is impossible not to be. For what we say is
‘impossible to be’ has the same force as saying ‘not possible to be’. For 20
what the negative does in the communication ‘not possible’, the
 100 Translation
25 privation does in ‘impossible’. But it is quite clear that what is
impossible not to be, necessarily is. Therefore what is not possible not
to be, clearly is necessary to be. The same too must be said about the
420,1 contingent as well. He puts them in a table as follows so that they
may be understood not only by the mind and reason, but also might
be easier to understand by being put before the eyes. And we will put
5 them in two columns to make our explanation clearer. In the first
column we have put the leading propositions and in the second those
which follow so that there is plenty of opportunity for those who look
at the table to understand what follows what, even if they don’t
understand just by their reasoning.
10

15

20

Then when we have made this table, Aristotle’s general and univer-
sal treatment of propositions should not be unclear to anyone looking
at it with care. But because we do not want to exhaust the reader,
25 the rest of his discussion about their individual implications will be
the subject matter of book six.

BOOK 6
421,1 This sixth book brings to an end my long commentary which will
reach completion after considerable labour and expenditure of time.
For many people’s ideas (sententiae) have been gathered here to-
5 gether and I have spent almost two years sweating continuously over
my commentary.58 And I do not think, as some wrongly interpret,
that it was done out of vainglory so that in the desire to display my
learning I stretched out what could be said in a few words, not so
much assisting the reader’s understanding as wearing him out with
10 my prolixity. I would say in reply to them that they would not
interpret my work so falsely if they were to read through the short
first edition. For the troublesome lack of clarity of [Aristotle’s] ex-
tremely concise expressions could not be explained in fewer words
15 and it becomes clear how much is missing for a full understanding of
this book. But I think that one could very easily work out what each
 Translation 101
edition could usefully provide its readers from the fact that as soon
as someone has laid hands on the second edition he is thrown into
confusion by the wide variety of the subject matter so that he longs
for the brevity and simplicity of the first edition when he is unable to 20
concentrate on the more extended treatment. But if the reader goes 422,1
to the two books of the first edition, he will think that he has gained
some understanding, but will understand how many things he did not
comprehend in the first edition when he finally gets to know the second
edition. And a long work should not deter men from reading it because 5
of the labour involved when it did not stop me from writing it!
But lest our introduction appear to be too long drawn out as well,
let us return to Aristotle’s order of the text and his careful explana-
tions of the implications of propositions. In the above descriptions of
the propositions themselves he has laid out in a general and universal 10
way the considerations that were to be made about all propositions and
their mutual implications; he now deals in a careful treatment with the
individual features in each case. This is what he says.

22a32-7 Therefore ‘impossible’ and ‘not impossible’ follow ‘con- 15

tingent’, ‘possible, ‘not contingent’ and ‘not possible’
contradictorily but conversely; for the negation of ‘impossible’
follows ‘possible to be’, and the affirmation the negation; for
‘impossible to be’ follows ‘not possible to be’; for ‘impossible to 20
be’ is an affirmation, ‘not possible to be’ a negation.
The implications of the propositions have been made, as the previous
table shows, in terms of the possible and the necessary. And it also 25
followed that contingent and impossible propositions and their impli- 423,1
cations had to be discussed. For since a contingent agrees with a
proposition of possibility in direct modality, the impossible must also
agree in converse order, as we will show a little later. Therefore he 5
considers how a possible contingent and an impossible relate to each
other or what implications they have and lays it down as follows
when he says: ‘impossible’ and ‘not impossible’ follow ‘possible’ and
‘not possible’ contradictorily, but conversely. This means that we 10
know that ‘impossible to be’ is a privative affirmation whose negation
is ‘not impossible’ and again that ‘possible to be’ is an affirmation of
possibility whose negation is ‘not possible to be’. Thus the negation of
impossibility follows the affirmation of possibility. For what is possi- 15
ble is the same as what is not impossible. Otherwise, if ‘it is not
impossible’ does not follow possibility, the affirmation follows, i.e.
‘impossible to be’. Then what is possible is impossible, which cannot
be the case. But if impossibility does not follow possibility, ‘not 20
impossible to be’ follows possibility. But the affirmation of impossi-
bility follows the negation of possibility. For what is not possible, is
impossible. For the negation in a proposition has the same force as
 102 Translation
25 the privation. And it is the same with the contingent. For what
happens is not impossible. For if the contingent and the possible
follow each other and ‘possible’ and ‘not impossible’ agree, then the
contingent and ‘not impossible’ designate the same thing. Again the
424,1 ‘not contingent’ and ‘impossible’ could appear the same, if you look at
it, because ‘not contingent’ and ‘not possible’ mean the same. But ‘not
possible’ agrees with impossibility. Therefore ‘not contingent’, too,
5 also denotes that something is impossible. It happens then that an
affirmation of impossibility follows the contradiction of possibility,
but not that the affirmation follows the affirmation, nor that the
negation follows the negation, but conversely, i.e. that the affirma-
10 tion agrees with the negation, the negation with the affirmation. For
the negation of impossibility ‘not impossible to be’ follows the af-
firmation ‘possible to be’ and the affirmation of impossibility ‘impos-
sible to be’ follows the negation of possibility ‘not possible to be’. And
the same can be said of the contingent. For the negation of impossi-
15 bility follows the affirmation of the contingent, the affirmation of
impossibility follows the negation of the contingent. For in every
respect what is proposed of possibility holds also for contingents.
Then lay them out as follows. First the affirmation of impossibility
20 and opposite it the negation of impossibility; and underneath the
affirmation of impossibility are to be placed the negations59 of the
contingent and possible, which impossibility itself follows; under the
negation of impossibility, the possible and contingent propositions
with which the negation of impossibility agrees, as follows:
25

425,1

5
It is obvious then that the contradictories agree with other contradic-
tories. And in this respect it is clear that the affirmations agree with
the negations, the negations with the affirmations.
That is the general meaning, but the details of the wording are as
10 follows. ‘Impossible’ and ‘not impossible’, which form a contradiction,
follow the two contradictions, ‘contingent’, ‘possible, ‘not contingent’
and ‘not possible’ contradictorily (for the single contradiction of im-
15 possibility follows two contradictions, contingent/not contingent,
possible/not possible) but although one contradiction follows another,
they agree, however, with each other conversely. For the negation of
20 ‘impossible’ follows ‘possible to be’, as the diagram above shows, and
the affirmation of impossibility the negation of possibility. For what
is not possible agrees with what is impossible. And the affirmation of
impossibility is ‘impossible to be’. And although the form of expres-
 Translation 103
sion is complicated, if you return to Aristotle’s actual words in the 25
light of our explanation and make up from it what is missing, the 425,1
meaning is crystal clear and logical.

22a38-b2 But we must consider how the necessary [behaves].

It is clear that it is not the same but contraries follow, and the 5
contradictories are separated. For ‘not necessary to be’ is not the
negation of ‘necessary not to be’; for they both happen to be true
of the same thing; for what is necessary not to be, is not 10
necessary to be.
By our comparison of the impossible and the possible we have just
laid down that the negation of impossibility follows the affirmation
of possibility and the affirmation of impossibility agrees with the
negation of possibility. So now when he asks about the implications 15
of possible and necessary propositions, he says they do not turn out
the same way as the implications which arose from the comparisons
of possible and impossible propositions. For in the latter, opposing
contradictions followed opposing contradictions, so that affirmation 20
followed negation, negation affirmation. But in the case of the for-
mer, i.e. necessary and possible propositions, it is not the same, but
contraries follow, whereas contradictories and opposites are separate
and do not follow.
And let us first set out what are the contraries and the contradic- 25
tories. The proposition ‘not necessary to be’ is the contradictory of
‘necessary to be’, but ‘necessary to be’ is not the contrary. E.g. if
someone says that it is necessary that the sun moves, the opposite 427,1
contradictory is that it is not necessary that the sun moves, but the
contrary is that it is necessary that the sun does not move. Thus the
contradictory of necessity follows a proposition of possibility, whereas 5
necessity does not follow the contradictory of possibility (which would
happen if in these propositions opposites followed each other), but
rather the contrary of necessity. Well then let us see what of necessity
agrees with the proposition ‘possible to be’. ‘Necessary to be’ cannot 10
agree with it; for what is possible can be and not be, but what is
necessary could not not be. Therefore if necessity does not follow possi-
bility, the contradictory of necessity does follow it. Thus ‘possible to be’
is not followed by ‘necessary to be’. Therefore the proposition of possibil- 15
ity is followed by the contradictory of necessity, ‘not necessary to be’.
But necessity does not agree with the contradictory of possibility.
For we cannot say that ‘not possible to be’ is followed by ‘necessary to
be’, but rather by the contrary of necessary, ‘necessary not to be’; for 20
when something is not possible, it is necessary that it is not. Then set
out the propositions which follow each other and put the proposition
of necessity under these. Then label which is a contradictory, which 25
a contrary.
 104 Translation
428,1

5 No one can doubt that the negation of necessity follows the affirma-
tion of possibility, and that the contrary of the necessary rather than
the necessary follows the negation of possibility. For since the con-
tradictory of necessity, i.e. ‘not necessary to be’, follows ‘possible to
10 be’, then the contradictory of possibility, ‘not possible to be’ is not
followed by necessity itself but by its contrary ‘necessary not to be’.
That then is the general sense whereas the actual word order is as
follows. But we must consider how the necessary [behaves], i.e. what
15 implications it has. He first of all states the conclusion: it is clear that
it is not the same, where we have to understand, as in the case of
possible and impossible propositions, but contraries follow, and the
contradictories are separated and do not follow. For the contradictory
20 of possibility was not followed by the contradictory of necessity, but
as we explained above, by its contrary. For in implications of neces-
sity a contradictory did not agree with a contradictory. For ‘not
25 necessary’ followed possibility, and ‘necessary not to be’, not ‘neces-
429,1 sary to be’ followed ‘not possible’. But again ‘to be necessary not to be’
and ‘not necessary to be’ are not contradictories, but ‘not necessary
5 to be’ is the negation of the necessary, whereas ‘to be necessary not
to be’ is the contrary of necessary. But contradictories are not op-
posed to each other; for they can be found in one and the same thing
at the same time. And this is what he means by for they both happen
to be true of the same thing; for what is necessary not to be, is not
10 necessary to be. For example, because it is necessary that a man is
not four-footed, it is not necessary that he is four-footed. For if this is
false, it will be necessary that a man is four-footed, since it is
necessary that he is not. Therefore it is clear that the propositions
15 ‘not necessary to be’ and ‘necessary not to be’ can sometimes be found
together. Since this is so, they are not contradictories.
In giving the reason why the same could not occur in the case of
necessary propositions as in the comparison of posssible <and impos-
sible> propositions where the implications were rendered in terms of
20 contradictories, he says the following:

22b3-10 The reason why the implications are not the same as
the rest is that impossible and necessary have the same force
when applied in a contrary way. For if it is impossible ‘to be’, it
is necessary for this not ‘to be’ but ‘not to be’. And if it is
25 impossible ‘not to be’, it is necessary for this ‘to be’. Thus if the
former follow in the same way the ‘possible’ and ‘not possible’,
 Translation 105
these follow in a contrary way; for necessary and impossible 430,1
signify the same thing, but, as we have said, in a contrary way.
The reason, he says, why the implications are given in this way, is
that the necessary always agrees with the impossible in a contrary 5
form. For what is impossible to be, is necessary not to be, and again
what is necessary to be, is impossible not to be. Therefore there is a
contrariety. For when impossibility has ‘to be’, necessity has ‘not to
be’, and when necessity has ‘to be’, impossibility has ‘not to be’. 10
Therefore impossibility and necessity have the same force given in a
different way; if necessity is given in terms of ‘to be, then impossibil-
ity is in terms of ‘not to be’; if impossibility is in terms of ‘not to be’,
then necessity is in terms of ‘to be’. Thus their agreement occurs in a 15
contrary way because where it is impossible to be, there it is neces-
sary not to be; but ‘impossible to be’ and necessary not to be’ agree;
therefore ‘not possible to be’ and ‘necessary not to be’ agree. Thus no
one can doubt that ‘necessary not to be’ follows the negation of 20
possibility because impossibility which follows the negation of possi-
bility agrees with ‘necessary not to be’. And this is so because
impossibility and necessity have the same force, as I have said, if they
are proposed in a contrary way. Thus what is said is as follows. The
reason why the implications are not the same as the rest, i.e. proposi- 25
tions formed with possible and impossible is that impossible and
necessary have the same force, i.e. impossibility has the same force as 431,1
necessity when given and expressed in a contrary way. For if it is
impossible ‘to be’, it is necessary for this not ‘to be’ but necessary for it
‘not to be’, i.e. it is impossible for it to be. Thus no one would say that
it is necessary to be, but rather that it is necessary not to be, which 5
is the equivalent of saying: if it is impossible to be, it is necessary for
this not to be, but one should not think that ‘necessary to be’ is
‘impossible to be’. Again if it is impossible for something not to be, it
must be. Thus impossibility has the same force as necessity when 10
rendered conversely and in a contrary manner. But if impossibility is
related in implication to the possible by a similar contradiction and
convertibility of contradictories, and impossibility and necessity have
the same force when predicated in a contrary manner, no one can 15
doubt that the implications in this case are quite rightly contraries
and not opposites. Then it is to be explained as follows. Because in
the implicational relationship of propositions of the impossible and
not impossible to those of the possible and not possible, ‘something is 20
impossible’ followed ‘not possible’, and the impossible has the same
force as the necessary in a contrary way, it is clear that if they are
similarly related, i.e. in the way said, the impossible following the
possible and not possible, the impossible is in agreement with the ‘not 25
possible’ and that what has the same force in a contrary way, i.e.
‘necessary not to be’ follows the proposition which impossibility also
 106 Translation
432,1 followed. And ‘necessary not to be’ has the same force as impossibility
in a contrary way and impossibility follows ‘not possible to be’. And
5 ‘necessary not to be’ therefore follows ‘not possible to be’, so that the
sense is as follows. Since the impossible can be the same as the
necessary in a contrary way, then the relational implications of the
impossible to the possible and not possible stand in a similar rela-
tionship, i.e. in the way explained.
* * * 60

10 22b10-28 Or perhaps it is impossible for the contradictories in

the case of necessity to be placed in this way? For what is
necessary to be, is possible to be (for if not the negation would
follow; for one must either affirm or deny; then if it is not
15 possible to be, it is impossible to be; therefore what is necessary
to be, is impossible to be, which is absurd). But ‘not impossible
to be’ follows ‘possible to be’, and ‘not necessary to be’ [also
follows]. Thus it happens that the necessary to be is not neces-
20 sary to be, which is absurd. But in fact neither ‘necessary to be’
nor ‘necessary not to be’ follow ‘possible to be’; for with this both
may happen. But whichever of the others is true, these will not
25 be true. For it is at the same time possible to be and not to be;
but if it is necessary to be or not to be, both of them will not be
433,1 possible. It remains then that ‘not necessary not to be’ follows
‘possible to be’. For this is true of ‘necessary to be’ also. For this
is the contradictory of what follows ‘not possible to be’; for it is
5 followed by ‘impossible to be’ and ‘necessary not to be’ whose
negation is ‘not necessary not to be’. Therefore these contradic-
tories, too, follow in the way stated and there is nothing
impossible when they are placed in this way.
10 The conversion of the propositions has been set out in such a way
above that the negation of necessity follows a proposition of possibil-
ity. And if they are placed in this way, it does not happen that a
contradiction follows a contradiction nor that they follow when re-
versed, which did happen where we were considering the implica-
15 tions of possible and impossible propositions, because the
contradiction of necessity, i.e. ‘not necessary to be’, followed the
proposition of possibility, and not necessity but the contrary of
necessity followed the contradiction of possibility. Now wanting to
20 change this, his intention is to devise the implications in such a way
that a contradiction agrees with a contradiction in a similar way, but
conversely. And he sets it out in this way when he says: I probably
made a mistake in that I traced the consequence of the necessary and
possible from the possible and not from the necessary as a measure
25 of their agreement. For he put ‘possible to be’ as the leading proposi-
tion and ‘not necessary to be’ as agreeing with it. And this is what he
 Translation 107
did first, but now he changes his mind and asks whether, perhaps, 434,1
he had succumbed to an error when he established the consequences
by putting ‘possible to be’ first and then adding as a consequence the
negation of necessity, ‘not necessary to be’. Is it not more true to put 5
necessary first and then attach possibility as agreeing with it? For it
seems that possibility follows every necessary proposition. But if
someone denies this, we will have to declare that the negation of 10
possibility follows necessity. For in all propositions there is either an
affirmation or a negation. Then if possibility does not follow a neces-
sary proposition, the negation of possibility follows. Then the correct
sequence is expressed as follows: what is necessary to be, is not 15
possible to be. But we have only just said that impossibility agrees
with ‘not possible to be’.61 But ‘not possible to be’ follows necessity,
and therefore impossibility follows necessity. Therefore the correct
sequence of propositions will be: if something is necessary to be, it is 20
impossible for it to be; but this cannot be the case; then if impossibil-
ity does not follow necessity, and the proposition that indicates
something cannot be follows a proposition of impossibility, then the
negation of possibility ‘not possible to be’ does not agree with the 25
proposition of necessity. But if this does not agree with the statement
of necessity, the affirmation will agree. Therefore possibility follows
necessity. The correct implication of the propositions will be as 435,1
follows: if it is necessary to be, it is possible to be.
But again other problems arise from this. For if someone says that
a possible proposition agrees with necessity, then because ‘not impos- 5
sible to be’ and again ‘not necessary to be’ agree with possibility, as
our previous arrangement has already shown, it will turn out that
‘not necessary to be’ agrees with the proposition of necessity. Then
the correct implication will be: if it is necessary to be, it is not
necessary to be. But this again is impossible. But if this is so, 10
something in the propositional implications of possibility has to be
changed so as to establish self consistency. And so either the initial
statement that the negation of necessity followed a possible affirma-
tion, i.e. that ‘not necessary to be’ follows ‘possible to be’, was wrong, 15
or we were not right to think that the necessary agrees with a
possible proposition. But because this is absurd (for no one would say
that possibility is the contrary of necessity; for it would happen that 20
what is necessary, could not be) and the appropriate consequence
would be ‘if it is necessary, it is possible’, it happens that the negation
of necessity does not follow a possible proposition. But when this is
said, it can be understood that possibility follows necessity so that 25
what is necessary is said also to be possible, but what is in itself
possible is not in every case necessary. For if it is necessary, it cannot
be the case for it not to be, but what is possible, can also not be.
Therefore what is possible is not necessary. But I mean that the 436,1
proposition which is the complete contrary of necessity does not
 108 Translation
follow possibility. For ‘necessary not to be’ is the contrary of neces-
sity. No one would force this proposition to agree with possibility. For
5 what is necessary not to be, cannot be, but what is possible, can both
be and not be. Therefore necessity in the proposition which is predi-
cated with ‘to be’ does not follow possibility because possibility can
10 also not be, whereas necessity predicated with ‘to be’ cannot not be.
Again necessity which is predicated with ‘not to be’ is different from
possibility and does not follow it, because the necessity which is said
with ‘not to be’ cannot be, whereas the possible can both be and not
15 be. Then possibility is followed neither by the opposed negation of
necessity, ‘not necessary to be’, nor by the necessary affirmation
‘necessary to be’, nor by its contrary ‘necessary not to be’. But there
20 will be clearly four in this list; for the necessary affirmation ‘neces-
sary to be’ is opposed to ‘not necessary to be’ and the necessary
affirmation ‘necessary not to be’ is again opposed to necessity, and to
this is opposed the proposition ‘not necessary not to be’, as the
25 following table makes clear.

is not necessary to be is necessary to be

is necessary not to be is not necessary not to be

Then if neither what is necessary to be nor its opposite ‘is not

30 necessary to be’ nor its contrary whose meaning is ‘is necessary not
437,1 to be’, agrees with possibility, it remains that the fourth proposition
‘is not necessary not to be’ agrees with it. This fourth proposition
agrees to some extent also with necessity itself, whereas necessity
5 does not agree with possibility. For everything which is necessary to
be is also capable of being and it is not necessary that it is not. And
the proposition ‘is not necessary not to be’ agrees with necessity
10 because ‘is necessary not to be’ is the contrary of necessity, and ‘is not
necessary not to be’ is the opposite of ‘is necessary not to be’. There-
fore the contrary proposition agrees with its opposite affirmation.
This is easy to understand if you look carefully at and return to what
15 we have written above. Thus if ‘is possible’, as we have said, is
followed by the proposition ‘is not necessary not to be’, the negation
of possibility is followed by its opposite ‘necessary not to be’ and the
consequence will be as follows: if it is possible, it is not necessary that
20 it is not; again, if it is not possible, it is necessary that it is not. Thus
this is the reverse of the consequence which was contradictory but
converse, as given above in the case of possibles <and impossibles>.
For here the negation ‘is not necessary not to be’, predicated with ‘not
25 to be’, which cancels out necessity, follows a possible affirmation, and
a necessary affirmation predicated with ‘not to be’ follows the nega-
tion of possibility. Thus, there is here the same conversion, so that a
contradictory follows a contradictory, but conversely, so that an
30 affirmation agrees with a negation, a negation with an affirmation.
 Translation 109
I think that this will become clearer if it is presented visually and the 438,1
arrangement of the diagram impresses on us in the clearest way the
meaning of the subject matter.

The meaning as a whole and the way in which it is expressed is as 10

follows. After saying about the consequence of possible and impossi-
ble propositions that contradictories agree with contradictories, but
conversely, i.e. that the affirmation agrees with the negation, the
negation with the affirmation, we must see, he says, how the same
consequence occurs in necessary propositions. Then after considera- 15
tion, he does not find the same situation in necessary propositions.
For although he had said that the negation of necessity agrees with
possibility, a necessary affirmation does not agree with the negation
of possibility. In giving the reason for this he argues that impossibil- 20
ity when stated in a contrary manner has the same force as necessity.
This is what he says in his wish to change this: Or perhaps it is
impossible for the contradictories in the case of necessity to be placed
in this way? so as to say that the negation of necessity agrees with 25
possibility. And he adds a doubt which is self-evident. For what is 439,1
necessary to be, that, without doubt, is possible to be; for if not, i.e. if
what is necessary is not possible, the negation of possibility would
follow; for one must in every case either affirm or deny; for in all 5
things either the affirmation or the negation is true. Then if it is not
possible to be, i.e. if what is necessary to be, is not possible to be, and
the proposition ‘is not possible to be’ is followed by ‘is impossible to 10
be’, something becomes impossible, in his words what is necessary is
impossible to be. But this is absurd. Thus he shows here that possi-
bility followed necessity. But he now adds something else. Because 15
he said above that the negation of a necessary affirmation agrees
with a possible proposition, he now expresses a doubt, saying But ‘not
impossible to be’ follows ‘possible to be’. For what is possible, is not 20
impossible, but what is not impossible to be, is not necessary to be.
Therefore, if ‘not impossible to be’ follows possibility, and ‘not impos-
sible’ is followed by ‘not necessary to be’ and a possible proposition is
followed by ‘not necessary to be’, then no one can doubt that if 25
possibility follows necessity, the negation of necessity follows a nec- 440,1
essary affirmation. Thus it happens that the necessary to be is not
necessary to be, which is absurd. Therefore, it is agreed that a 5
possible affirmation is not followed by the negation which is the
opposite of a necessary affirmation, because it has to be rejected.
 110 Translation
Either, as we said above, the negation of necessity should not follow
an affirmation of possibility, or possibility should not follow neces-
10 sity. What should be rejected, as it is completely impossible, is that
the negation opposed to necessity follows a possibility. Therefore, ‘is
not necessary to be’ does not follow possibility. And because he had
passed over all of these in silence in the middle of the argument, he
15 adds to what he said above but in fact neither ‘necessary to be’ follows
‘possible to be’ including in the formulation that the necessary does
not agree with possibility, and not only this but nor ‘necessary not to
20 be’. He shows clearly what the situation is with this. For with this,
i.e. the possible, both may happen, i.e. to be and not to be. But
whichever of the others, i.e. the necessary with ‘to be’ and the neces-
sary with ‘not to be’, is true, these will not be true. This he explains
25 himself. For he says of both aspects of the possible: for it is at the same
time possible to be and not to be (namely with this both may happen);
441,1 but if it is necessary to be or not to be, i.e. if it cannot not be and cannot
be both of them will not be possible, so that if it is necessary to be, it
could not not be, or if it is necessary not to be, it could not be.
Therefore the three propositions ‘not necessary to be’, ‘necessary to
5 be’ and ‘necessary not to be’ do not follow possibility. It remains then,
i.e. the fourth proposition which, stated as the opposite of the neces-
sary that is affirmed with ‘not to be’, follows possibility, namely that
10 ‘not necessary not to be’ follows ‘possible to be’. But because the
possible agrees with the necessary, this too agrees with the neces-
sary. For this is what he means when he says for this is true of
‘necessary to be’ also. For what is necessary, must not not be. Thus
15 the proposition ‘is not necessary not to be’ is the contradictory of the
affirmation which follows the negation of possibility, ‘not possible to
be’. For since the affirmation ‘possible to be’ is followed by the
negation of necessity with ‘not to be’, ‘is not necessary not to be’, the
20 negation of possibility, ‘is not possible to be’, is followed by the
necessary affirmation with ‘not to be’, ‘is necessary not to be’, and ‘not
possible to be’, which is the negation of possibility, is followed by the
25 affirmation of impossibility, ‘impossible to be’. This is what he means
by for this is the contradictory of what follows ‘not possible to be’. For
since a possible affirmation is followed by the negation of necessity
442,1 with ‘not to be’, ‘is not necessary not to be’, this necessary negation
with ‘not to be’ is the contradictory of the proposition which follows
the negation of possibility. For it, i.e. the negation of possibility, is
5 followed by what is impossible. For since the negation of possibility
is ‘not possible to be’, it is followed by ‘is impossible to be’ with which
‘is necessary not to be’ agrees. Thus the negation of a possible
10 proposition is followed by ‘necessary not to be’ whose contradictory is
‘is not necessary not to be’. Then it happens here too that a contra-
dictory follows a contradictory, but conversely. This is what he means
when he says therefore these contradictories, too, follow in the way
 Translation 111
stated, i.e. so that an affirmation follows a negation, a negation an 15
affirmation, and there will be nothing absurd or impossible if the
consequences are stated in this way, so that a possible affirmation is
followed by the negation of necessity with ‘not to be’, and the neces-
sary affirmation with ‘not to be’ agrees with the negation of possibil- 20
ity. Once he has explained these things he again throws in other
questions.

[22b29-36 Someone will raise the question whether ‘possible to

be’ follows ‘necessary to be’; for if it does not follow, the contra-
dictory ‘not possible to be’ follows. And if someone says that this
is not the contradictory, one must say that ‘possible not to be’ is.
But both are false of ‘necessary to be’. On the other hand the
same things seem capable of being cut and not being cut, of
being and of not being; and ‘necessary to be’ will be ‘to happen
not to be’; but this is false.]
He arranged the consequences above in such a way that possibility
followed necessary preceding it. He now has doubts about this. For
whether someone makes the possible agree with the necessary, or
denies it, either seem odd, since if someone says that possibility does 25
not agree with necessity, he is saying that the negation of possibility 443,1
agrees with the proposition of necessity. For if someone denies that
‘possible to be’ agrees with the proposition that something is neces-
sary, he cannot then deny that the negation of possibility agrees with 5
necessity; and the full implication will be: if it is necessary to be, it is
not possible to be, seeing that the sequence ‘if it is necessary to be, it
is possible to be’, is false. But if it cannot be the case that the negation
of possibility agrees with the affirmation of necessity, then it is true 10
that the affirmation of possibility agrees with necessity. But here
lurks an even greater difficulty. For everything which is possible to
be, is possible also not to be. But if possibility follows necessity, it will
be the case that what is necessary can be and can not be according to 15
the nature of possibility which agrees with necessity itself. But this
is impossible. Therefore possibility does not follow necessity. But if
possibility does not follow necessity, the negation of possibility ‘not
possible to be’ follows and there again occur the absurd consequences 20
which we mentioned just now when dealing with the passage. But if
someone wants the negation of possibility to be ‘is possible not to be’
rather than ‘not possible to be’, although he is not attaching the
affirmation to the negation in the correct arrangement and we have 25
said above that in modal propositions the negation ought always to
be put with the modality rather than with the verb, we must,
nevertheless, yield to it so that when we have demolished their
argument as false, after making a concession which could appear to
some useful for its defense, the truth is established with greater 444,1
 112 Translation
depth and profundity. Thus if ‘possible not to be’ is, as they want, the
5 negative of possibility, it, too, still does not agree with necessity. For
if someone says that ‘possible to be’ does not follow the necessary,
then the contradictory of possibility follows necessity. But if someone
makes ‘is possible not to be’ the contradictory of the possible and
10 thinks that it agrees with necessity, the appropriate implication
according to him will be: if it is necessary to be, it is possible not to
be. But this cannot be the case; for what is necessary to be, cannot
not be. Then if possibility does not follow necessity (for what is
15 necessary will be contingent, for the contingent and the possible have
the same force), the negations of possibility, whether ‘not possible to
be’ or the idea ‘is possible not to be’, follow necessity. But both of these
are impossible. But if these do not follow, their affirmation, i.e.
20 possibility, follows. But this is also not possible as we have often
demonstrated. Then this question is solved by him in the following
passage.
Since that is the nature of the question as we have given it, let his
25 own words and order of argument appear for itself. This is what he
says. Someone will raise the question whether ‘possible to be’ follows
445,1 ‘necessary to be’, i.e. if possibility agrees with necessity. For if it does
not follow, i.e. if someone denies that possibility follows necessity, the
contradictory follows, i.e. the contradictory of possibility. For because
5 possibility does not follow, the contradictory of possibility ‘not possi-
ble to be’ follows. And he omits to say that it cannot follow. But it is
the case that if possibility does not follow necessity and the contra-
dictory of necessity agrees, the appropriate implication is: if it is
10 necessary, it cannot be, which is absurd. And if someone says that this
is not the contradictory, i.e. if someone says that ‘not possible to be’
is not the contradictory of possibility, one must say that the contra-
15 dictory of possibility is ‘possible not to be’. But both are false of
‘necessary to be’. For of what is necessary it cannot be the case that
it cannot be and again of what is necessary it cannot be the case that
it is possible for it not to be. On the other hand the same things seem
20 capable of being cut and not being cut. For possibility is common to
affirmation and negation. For what is said to be possible is capable
both of being and of not being. But this is false, i.e. as predicated of
what is necessary. For if it is necessary, it could not not be; if it is not,
25 it does not happen at all. But if someone says that possibility follows
necessity, this possibility agrees with the contingent and ‘necessary
to be’ will be ‘to happen not to be’; i.e. ‘necessary to be’ will be
446,1 contingent. For if what is possible, can not be, and what can not be,
happens not to be, there can be no doubt that if possibility follows
necessity, then its consequence also follows it. But we can say of a
5 contingent in negation that it happens not to be. Therefore, what is
necessary, happens not to be. But this is false. And the sequence of
ideas here is involved and concise. For the external form of the
 Translation 113
statements is one thing, another is what is missing that gives the 10
implicit and unobvious meaning. But the meaning of his thought will
become more completely clear if anyone should connect our orderly
exposition with Aristotle’s words, separate out with the distinctions
and analysis of our exposition what in the text is confused because of
the external form and make up from our commentary what is lacking
in Aristotle’s text. But now since he has put a question, he follows it 15
up straightaway in the following words.

22b36-23a6 But it is clear that not everything capable of being

or walking is also able to do the opposite. But there are cases 20
where this is not true, firstly where things are capable in a
non-rational way, e.g. fire can heat and has a non-rational force.
Thus the same rational capabilities are capable of more things,
even of contraries, but not all irrational powers [are like this] 25
but, as has been said, fire is not able to heat and not [heat], nor
are the other things that are always active. But some things 447,1
even with irrational capabilities are at the same time capable of
opposites. But this has been mentioned because not every capa-
bility is for opposites, not even those which are said to be of the 5
same kind.
Since he had raised a question about the implications of the possible
and necessary, and since, if possibility <did not agree> with neces-
sity, <impossibility> did, which was absurd, or, if again possibility
followed necessity, necessity itself, with which possibility agreed, 10
took to itself to be and not to be, he has now solved this inconsistent
ambiguity with a rational argument, by saying: I was not afraid that
possibility, in following necessity, would cancel the very nature and 15
rigour of necessity so that what was necessary would be turned into
contingency. For not everything that is possible to be, is also possible
not to be. For there are many things which have only one force and
are in no way fitted for its negation, as in the capabilities which an 20
irrational activity effects. For although it is possible for fire to heat,
it is not possible that it should not heat. Thus this capability cannot
do the opposite. For if any capability can do the opposite, it both can
be and not be, act and not act, whereas what cannot do the opposite, 25
is capable of only one thing, which just allows the affirmation and 448,1
rejects the negation. Then, if someone makes possibility agree with
necessity, that is no reason why it is immediately necessary that
necessity is changed to contingency, which agrees, of course, with 5
possibility. For, he says, not every thing that is capable is capable of
both, i.e. both to be able to be and to be able not to be; and thus not
everything possible agrees with contingency. He lays this down
where he says that where things are capable in a non-rational way, 10
the capability mentioned is not able to do the opposite, e.g. that fire
 114 Translation
heats is due to something irrational. For there is no reason why fire
heats; for there is no reason in any of the things that come about
naturally. Then things whose capability is irrational cannot do the
15 opposite, as fire cannot heat and not heat. For if they can do both,
they can do the opposite; for to heat and not to heat are opposites.
Then, since irrational capabilities do not have the capacity to do
opposites, those with reason will be able to be led equally to effect
20 either opposite, so that whatever has been devised as a result of will
and reason can go in either direction, e.g. it is possible for me to use
a medicine and it is possible that I will not or similarly with walking.
For what anyone wants through rational thought or desire, is said to
25 occur as a result of reason. And in all of these there is the capability
that can apply itself to both, i.e. to affirmation or denial, so that
something is or is not. But with irrational capabilities, although it
449,1 can happen only in them that the irrational capability is not also able
to do the opposite, yet not every irrational capability is not able to do
the opposite, e.g. water both freezes and is moist; thus it can easily
5 freeze and be liquefied, but when it is changed into hot water it
cannot then have the power of freezing, though it cannot lose the
power of becoming liquid so long as it remains water. Thus not every
capability can do the opposite, but a capability that achieves its
10 action by reason can do the opposite, whereas a capability that
cannot do the opposite is found only in irrational capabilities, though
not in all. For there are irrational capabilities which can do both, e.g.
what we have said about water freezing. That is the general meaning
of the passage. We now explain the way in which it is expressed. But
15 it is clear that not everything capable of being or walking is also able
to do the opposite. What is here said to be clear is not that we are to
think that everything which can walk or which can be could not do
20 the opposite, i.e. could not not be; for the passage seems to declare
this, but should not be understood by anyone in this way, but rather
seems to say that it is clear that not everything is capable of doing
the opposite, in the frequent usage of the word ‘capable’ when we say
25 ‘capable of walking’. For it is not the case that every capability agrees
with its affirmation and negation, but there are some which can do
only one, as we have already said above. And this is more clearly
understood if we say it is clear that not everything possible also
450,1 achieves its opposite, because we often predicate ‘possible’ of being
and walking. If you consider it this way it is easier to understand the
meaning of the actual text, though you must also patiently and
5 sympathetically add as support to the obscure meaning what you
expect is required to express the sense of the writer even though it is
not there in the actual argument. When this is done it is clear that
not all capabilities can effect the opposite, but that there are some
10 where this is not true to say, that they effect the opposite. He gives as
an example firstly where there is an irrational capability, i.e. not in
 Translation 115
accordance with any reason, where an explanation of the capabilities
cannot be given because their nature is such that an explanation
cannot be given, e.g. that fire makes things warm, for this is natu- 15
rally present in it. And this capability of fire does not effect the
opposite since it is irrational whereas the capabilities that are ra-
tional and in accordance with reason are capable of more things, even
of contraries. For the nature of things where reason is dominant is 20
suited to both opposites so that the same capabilities are capable of
more contraries. Thus if it is possible for me to walk, since this
depends on my reason and will, it is possible for me not to walk and
this is a capability for effecting not one but many things and their 25
contraries. For although ‘to walk’ and ‘not to walk’ are somehow an
affirmation and a negation, nevertheless they are arranged by Aris- 451,1
totle as contraries. And it is clear in the case of all rational capabili-
ties that they are capable of more contraries and effect the opposite,
whereas those that are irrational, though they do have things which 5
count as opposites, they cannot however effect all of them. For though
water has the capability of freezing, which is irrational, it has also
another capability of warming when it has itself been heated. But
this is not found in all irrational capabilities. For fire, as we have
said, seems to have just the one capability of heating. This is what he 10
means by: but not all irrational powers can effect opposites but, as
has been said, fire is not able to heat and not. And the general rule is
given that those things that always contain a single capability in act 15
are not capable of their opposite, e.g. fire always heats, the sun
always moves etc. He says this with the words nor are the other things
that are always active. But even some irrational capabilities can
effect an opposite, as with our example of water. But he tells us that 20
he has said this so that we might know that no contrary occurs if
someone says that a possibility agrees with a necessity. For since not
every capability effects its contrary, the capability which does not
effect an opposite but always does one thing, agrees with necessity. 25
This is what he means by: but this has been mentioned because not
every capability is for opposites, not even those which are said to be of
the same kind. The words not even those which are said to be of the 452,1
same kind mean: not only is not everything which is said to be
possible capable of producing contraries, but also some things which
are of the same kind are not capable of opposites, e.g. those which 5
have irrational capabilities. For since all irrational capabilities con-
stitute a single kind insofar as they are irrational, not even in all of
these, however, can an identical capability for opposites be found, e.g.
in fire as we have already explained above. For though its power is
irrational, it is not capable of being transferred to an opposite effect. 10
Then it has been rightly said that not even those of the same kind
could have the capability of effecting opposites. For although fire is a
capability of the same kind, i.e. an irrational capability, along with
 116 Translation
15 all the other irrational powers, it can, however, never lose its power
of opposites. And he has said in advance that this, which could deal
with the whole question, does not resolve the problems in the strong-
est way; but he goes straight on to say what primarily causes the
20 problem and creates the ambiguity.

23a6-18 Some capabilities are equivocal. For ‘possible’ is not

said in an unqualified way, either because it is true as being in
act, e.g. it is possible [for it] to walk because it is walking, and
25 it is generally possible to be because what is possible is already
in act, or because it might be act, e.g. it is possible [for it] to walk
because it will walk. This kind of capability is found only in
things that change, the former also in things that do not change.
453,1 In both it is true to say that to walk or to be is not impossible,
both what is already walking and what is going to walk. Thus
it is not true to assert without qualification the one kind of
capability of what is necessary, but of the other type it is true.
5 But since the universal follows the particular, what derives
from necessity follows ‘possible to be’, but not in every case.
What this idea which Aristotle now puts forward involves, we have
10 already carefully explained in book five and now will briefly explore.
For we have taken the trouble to explain this for a second time in the
interests of explanation and teaching and not for extending our
indulgence in lengthy discourse. Then the general meaning is that
the ‘possible’ which we frequently say is in things is not said without
15 qualification, and so because the possible has been rendered by
‘capability’, ‘capability’ too is also itself equivocal. This is clear from
the following, that some things are said to be capabilities not because
they are being done, but because nothing stops them from being done,
as when it is said of someone when sitting, if he has a healthy body
20 and all other potential impediments are removed, that he is capable
of walking, not because he is walking, but because nothing at all is
stopping him from walking. Whereas some capabilities are so called
because they are already in act and being performed, as when
25 someone says of a man walking that he is capable of walking. And so
the kind of possibility which is not said to be actualised in any way,
but is so called insofar as it can act if not prevented from acting, is
called a ‘possibility’ from the capability.62 But the type which is
454,1 already acting and is in act, act itself, is called ‘possibility’. Thus
there are two significations of ‘possibility’, one which designates
possibility which is potential and which is not in act, the other which
5 signifies possibility which is already in act. But the possibility which
is already in act is either changing from possibility to act or was
always naturally actual, e.g. when a man changes from sitting to
walking, he is able to walk and so changes from the possibility to the
 Translation 117
actuality, whereas when the sun moves, it does not change from 10
possibility to actuality (for there was never a time when it did not
fulfill this movement); nor does fire, so that now it heats, but some-
times does not heat. Thus the possibility which is said to be in act has
two sub-species, one which designates the kind of possibility which 15
may not not be and which is called necessary and never changes from
possibility to actuality, but remains naturally actual, the other which
may also not be and which is not necessary though it is actual. And 20
the kind of possibility which changes from possibility to act is found
only in things that have motion, i.e. which can move, and these are
corporeal. For we will mention a little later63 the reasons why incor-
poreals are shown not to have motion. But those which have always
remained in act because of their own natural quality, are found both 25
in things that have motion, like fire’s heat which is always in act and
was never potential, and in those that have no motion, the incorpo- 455,1
real and divine. Thus the possibility which has moved from possibil-
ity to act belongs only to what can decay and is corporeal, whereas
that which was always in act is common to divine and corporeal 5
things. Then to encapsulate the whole meaning in a few words we
should say that possibility is equivocal and signifies many things; for
there is one kind of possibility which though not in act, can however
be and thus be predicated as possibility and there is another which
is already in act. But the possibility which is already in act, is not 10
equivocal, but a genus; for it has as its own species, the possibility
which is in act but has changed from possibility, and the other which
is in act but has not changed from possibility. And the latter, which
has not changed from possibility, is called necessary and never 15
abandons its subject, while the former, which has moved from possi-
bility to act, is without any hesitation called not necessary because it
can sometimes abandon its subject. But these two, i.e. what are called
possibilities potentially and actually, could have a common predica- 20
tion if we said that they were both not impossible. For it is true to say
both of the man who can walk though he is not walking and of the
man who is already walking, that it is not impossible for them to do 25
that which they can do or are doing. Then since there are two things
under the signification of possibility, a possibility which is not actual
and another which is, and the possibility which is said to be potential
is not in conformity with necessity and sometimes cannot agree with
necessity, it remains for necessity to be placed under the kind of 30
possibility which is in act. But it too has a species in which there is a
change from possibility to act and which is not necessary. Then 456,1
necessity cannot be placed even in this. It remains then that, because
no one denies that what is necessary to be is possible and while what
is said to be potential comes under the possible, but necessity is not 5
put under the possibility which is actual and could abandon a subject,
necessity is put under the act which cannot abandon its subject, so
 118 Translation
that the possibility which is actual and never abandons its subject is
a necessity in that it has never come from potentiality to act. Thus
10 necessity is a kind of species of possibility if it is placed where there
is the kind of possibility which is always actual. But because a genus
follows a species and where there is a species there cannot fail to be
15 a genus, the appropriate genus, possibility, follows its own species,
necessity, but not every genus. The possibility which is only potential
and not also actual does not follow necessity, nor that which though
20 actual can abandon its subject, but only that which when actual could
never leave its subject. Therefore possibility follows necessity and
nothing impossible occurs here, but, as we have said, the kind of
possibility which is actual and whose nature is not to cease being in
its subject. That then is the general meaning of this passage.
The detailed meaning of the actual wording will be as follows.
25 Some capabilities, he says, are equivocal. This is said because not
every capability is equivocal; for there is the capability which is a sort
of genus, the one predicated in actuality. But how some capabilities
30 are equivocal he explains with the words: For ‘possible’ is not said in
457,1 an unqualified way, and this is then subdivided, either because it is
true as being in act, e.g. it is possible [for it] to walk because it is
walking, and it is generally possible to be because what is possible is
5 already in act. This could not be more clearly demonstrated than by
saying that what is already in act is possible. But if someone says
that it is not possible, he is saying that what is impossible is being
done and happening and being; but this exceeds all bounds of ration-
10 ality. He now gives the other part of the signification of capability
with the words because it might be actualised, with the example it is
possible to walk because it will walk. Not then because it is already
in act but because it might be in act, i.e. because nothing probably
15 stops it from being actualised. This kind of capability is found only
in things that change, i.e. the kind of capability which is said to be
potential and not actual. And by changing things he means, as we
have said, only bodies. The former, i.e. what is in act, are also in
20 things that do not change, i.e. in what is divine. And he makes the
addition also in things that do not change so that we do not think
that the capability of actuality is found only in divine things but also
in mortal and corporeal things. In both it is true to say that to walk
or to be is not impossible, both what is already walking and what is
25 going to walk. One predicate, he says, could fit both significations, so
that we can say that it is not impossible for what is already walking
458,1 to be walking or what can walk and is not walking to walk, the latter
expressed by what is going to walk. For what is going to walk is what
is not in fact walking but could walk. To this he adds thus it is not
5 true to assert without qualification the one kind of capability of what
is necessary, i.e. it is not true to predicate without qualification,
universally and generally of necessity the kind of possibility which is
 Translation 119
predicated equivocally; i.e. not every capability agrees with neces-
sity. But the other type of capability it is true, i.e. to predicate of 10
necessity the kind of capability which is said to be unchangeably
actual. But since the universal, i.e. the genus, follows the particular,
i.e. the species, what derives from necessity, which is a species of 15
capability, follows ‘possible to be’, i.e. capability but not in every case.
For the capability which is predicated in actuality and can abandon
its subject does not follow necessity, but only the capability which
when it is in act neither changes from potentiality to actuality nor 20
could abandon its subject. And the kind of things Aristotle meant are
what we picked out in our explanation that unchanging things are
divine. But that only bodies are called changing things must be
briefly demonstrated. It is clear that there are six kinds of motion, as 25
Aristotle has explained in the Categories,64 although he altered this
in the Physics.65 But let us now make our pronouncement as though 459,1
there were six in total. If reasoned argument has declared that divine
and incorporeal realities do not move according to any form of motion,
the logical consequence is that divine things do not move. Thus they
are not born, nor are they destroyed, nor do they grow bigger or 5
smaller, nor do they move from place to place, since they are present
everywhere in their entirety66 and none of these ought to be applied
to god, nor are they changed with any kind of affection. But if the
nature of divine things is not changeable in the sense of any of these 10
motions, it is clear that they are entirely unmovable and these
motions occur only in bodies. Let it be enough that we have reached
this clarity in our reasonings and arguments in the many things that
can be said about this problem. Now because he has told us that not 15
every capability agrees with necessity and has explained which does
agree with necessity, Aristotle adds for completeness what ought to
be put first, what second in their implications, in the following words:

23a18-26 And perhaps what is necessary and what is not

necessary are a principle of everything’s either being or not 20
being and one should look at the others as following from these.
But it is clear from what has been said that what is of necessity
is actual. Thus if the things that always are are prior, then what
is actual is prior to capability. And some things are actual67 25
without capability, e.g. primary substances, others with capa-
bility which are prior in nature, posterior in time, others are 460,1
never in act but only potential (potestate).68
After explaining what appears to be the case with the consequence of
possibility and necessity, he adds these remarks as a sort of correc- 5
tion of the arrangement previously given, so that where previously
he began with possibility and led all the other propositions back to
the possible and contingent and their agreement, he now has good
 120 Translation
10 reason to change this so that we must begin from necessity rather
than from possibility. For if you look more carefully at the previous
list, the possible and contingent is put first and the agreement of
everything else is related to them. But this now seems to have been
15 changed. For he says it is probably more correct to begin the conse-
quence of the propositions from necessity. And the general sense is
as follows. Because the things that always are are necessary and
what always is is the principle of all the other things that are not
20 always, what is necessary must appear to be prior to everything else.
Thus the consequences are also to be made in the same way so that
necessity is placed first, then possibility and the rest, and the se-
quence is as follows:

25 necessary to be not necessary to be

is not possible not to be is possible not to be

is necessary not to be is not necessary not to be

not possible to be possible to be

461,1 Do you not see, then, that ‘necessary to be’ and ‘not necessary to be’
are proposed first, then, in second place, the rest are related to the
agreement and consequence of necessity? This is what he meant by
saying that what is necessary is perhaps the principle of everything’s
5 either being or not being, so that the commencement of the consid-
eration of the propositions should be from necessity which estab-
lishes the sequential agreement of the other propositions as to being
or not being. And because ‘necessary to be’ is put first, ‘is not possible
10 not to be’ agrees with it. Thus necessity is the principle of the
proposition ‘is not possible not to be’ which denies ‘not being’ (for it
abolishes the modal ‘possible’), and without doubt agrees with it. And
15 again, because ‘is possible not to be’ agrees with ‘not necessary to be’,
‘not necessary to be’ is the principle of the proposition which estab-
lishes that something is, i.e. possible. Thus whether necessity is
20 proposed affirmatively or negatively, you see that it is a kind of
principle of the rest, and the rest ought to be judged as being in
agreement with these, i.e. with the necessary propositions. And this
is what he means by and one should look at the others as following
from these. Why this turns out so, he shows in the following explana-
25 tion. Because what is necessary is in actuality, as has frequently
462,1 been demonstrated, and what is necessary always is, and what
always is, is prior to things whose capabilities are not yet in act, it is
5 clear that things that are in act and do not come from potentiality to
act are prior. But we are talking about the actuality which does not
come from potentiality to act but always remains in act because of
the way in which its own nature is established, as in the case of fire
warming, the sun moving or the other things that are such as never
 Translation 121
to abandon their act and the act is never absent from them and they 10
never come from capability to this act. Then since they are such as
always to be and things that always are are prior to everything, they
will also by their own nature be prior to capability. But things that 15
are always prior and necessary, are in act, and it is necessary that
what is in act is prior to what is potential.
After this Aristotle makes the following division of things. Some
things are always in act, of the kind that does not come from potency,
and these are the things that do not have potencies but are always in 20
act. Others move from potency to act and their substance and act is
posterior in time to their potency, while it is prior in nature. For in
everything, what is actual is prior to and nobler than what is poten- 25
tial. For what is potential is still hastening towards actuality, and
thus actuality is a perfection, while potentiality is still something 463,1
imperfect, which is only perfected when it has at some time reached
actuality. And it is clear that what is perfect is nobler and prior to
what is imperfect. For if things which have come to their actuality 5
from potentiality, were previously potential and then later actual,
then the actuality of these things is posterior to their potentiality, if
we are to make reference to time, but in reference to their nature it
is prior to their potentiality. And this is what he means when he says
that there are other things that have potentiality and actuality but
have actuality as posterior to potentiality in time, but prior in nature, 10
while there are some things, e.g. infinite number, in which there is
only potentiality, and never actuality. For number can increase to
infinity and whatever number has been mentioned, a hundred, a
thousand, ten thousand and the rest, must be finite. Thus an actual 15
number is never infinite because it can increase to infinity. And for
this reason infinite number is only potential. Time is the same. For
any time you mention is finite, but because time can increase to
infinity, we say that it is infinite because it is infinite potentially, not 20
actually. For nothing actual could be infinite. And where he said
above that things that are always actual are primary substances, one 25
should not think that he means primary substances as in the Cate-
gories where he calls individuals primary substances. But here he
calls things that are always actual primary substances, because, as
he has said, things that are always actual are the principles of the all 464,1
the other things and they must in this way be primary substances.

Chapter 14
23a27-32 Is the affirmation contrary to the negation and the 5
sentence to the sentence, the sentence ‘every man is just’ to the
sentence ‘no man is just’ or ‘every man is just’ to ‘every man is
unjust’? ‘Callias is just’, ‘Callias is not just’, ‘Callias is unjust’; 10
which of these are contraries?
 122 Translation
After dealing thoroughly with the consequences of propositions and
arranging them with a sophisticated investigation, a question arises
15 which is so useful in itself that it is brought right to the fore of the
readers’ attention. For although it is clear that an opposite negation
is at odds with its affirmation and a universal negation completely
cancels a universal affirmation and that it is not unknown that an
20 affirmation which affirms a contrary also cancels out the proposition
of the contrary, the question is which more effectively cancels out and
opposes an affirmation, a universal negation or the affirmation of the
25 contrary or of the privation. Suppose that the affirmation is ‘every
man is just’. Two propositions cancel this out, the universal negation
465,1 ‘no man is just’ and the one which predicates in affirmation the
privation of justice, ‘every man is unjust’. Then the affirmation ‘every
man is just’ is cancelled both by its own universal negation ‘no man
5 is just’ and by the privative affirmation ‘every man is unjust’. Then
since it is cancelled out by both and what is cancelled out seems to be
the contrary of what cancels it out, and it is cancelled out, as we have
said, by two, and there cannot be two contraries of one statement,
10 which of the two propositions which we mentioned above, the univer-
sal negation and the privative affirmation, is to be the contrary of the
universal affirmation referred to above? No one can be unaware of
the usefulness of the question raised here when he considers that had
the question not been raised and resolved by Aristotle, there would
15 be great doubt as to whether to accept that there could be two
contraries of a single statement, which clearly cannot be the case. For
since two cancel out one thing, who is there who would doubt that
one thing is opposed to two or that since two things cancel out one
20 thing the question should be asked, which of them seems more likely
to be the contrary? But we are now talking about contraries not in
the sense in which Aristotle explained them in the Categories,69 but
only in the sense that one thing cancels another, one proposition
cancels another proposition, so that the question is something like
466,1 this: what is more effective in canceling out a universal affirmation,
a universal negation or a statement that predicates the privation or
something else which embodies the force of a contrary from its very
5 opposition? Whence it should also not go unnoticed that no one
doubts what is a contrary opposite between a universal privative
affirmation and a universal negation. For it has already been said
above that a universal negation is the contrary of a universal affirma-
tion, but this is not what is meant here, as we have said, but rather
10 that which more effectively cancels a thing out. For what more
effectively cancels something out will appear in the same way to be
a more effective contrary. And so not only did he make propositions
about universals, but lest anyone might suspect that he is saying the
15 opposite of what he said in the Categories or of what he said above
about universal affirmation and negation, he adds propositions about
 Translation 123
particulars which do not have affirmations and negations of their
contrary opposite. For if we recall what we correctly understood
above a universal affirmation and a universal negation were said to 20
be contraries. Not only this but also in the case of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’
he decided the problem that state and privation are more than any
contrariety. Thus, as we said, it has to be understood that the
question now is which proposition most closely and effectively de- 25
stroys and cancels out which proposition. The way he tackles this
question is as follows.

23a32-b2 For if what is in spoken sound follows what is in the

mind, and there the belief of the contrary is contrary, e.g. ‘every 467,1
man is just’ is contrary to ‘every man is unjust’, it must be the
case that the same holds for spoken affirmations. But if the
belief of the contrary is not contrary there, the affirmation will 5
not be contrary to the affirmation, but rather the negation we
have mentioned. So we must enquire what kind of true belief is
contrary to a false belief, the belief of the negation or the belief 10
that there is an opposite. This is what I mean; there is a true
belief about the good that it is good, and a false belief that it is
not good, and a further that it is bad. Which of these is the
contrary of the true belief? And if they are one belief, according 15
to which is it a contrary?
This investigation of what is more effectively the contrary of a
universal affirmation, a universal privative affirmation or a univer-
sal negation, starts here from the fact that almost every property
that must occur in spoken sounds comes from the beliefs which the 20
sounds themselves signify. Then what is to be sought in spoken
sounds must firstly be seen in the beliefs. For it cannot happen that
the properties of the spoken sounds will not first be found in beliefs,
since the significance of the spoken sounds comes from the beliefs
which the spoken sounds themselves signify. Thus the enquiry must 25
ask how those things are related in beliefs, so that what has been 468,1
found in the beliefs can be logically transferred to the spoken sound.
The enquiry into beliefs is first made as follows. If the belief of a
privative universal affirmation is a more effective contrary of the 5
simple universal affirmation than is the belief of a universal nega-
tion, it is clear that a privative universal affirmation more effectively
cancels a simple universal affirmation than does a universal nega-
tion. But if the argument should hold more weight that the belief of 10
a negative universal more effectively cancels the belief of a universal
affirmation than does the belief of a privative universal affirmation,
it is then agreed that a universal negation is a more effective contrary
of a universal affirmation than is a privative affirmation. But in order 15
to find this out, one must proceed as follows. A particular true belief
 124 Translation
should be posited, and against it two false beliefs, one of which should
be a privative affirmation, the other a universal negation. Then
whichever of the two false beliefs the argument shows to be the more
20 false will be declared to be the more effective contrary of the true
belief. Then let there be three beliefs, one true and two false; and let
the true belief be the one which thinks that what is good is good,
which Aristotle gives as the belief about the good that it is good. Then
25 one of the false beliefs is that what is good is not good, which Aristotle
469,1 gives as the false belief about the good that it is not good, and the
other that what is good is bad, which Aristotle gives as the belief
about the good that it is bad. Then the question is which of these
three, one true, two false, is the more effective contrary of the true
5 belief. But because it often happens that both a negation and a
privation signify one thing and especially in contraries where no
median is found, he adds and if they are one belief, according to which
is it a contrary? And the meaning of this is that in contraries where
10 there is no median the negation has the same force as the privation,
whereas in those where there is a median a privative affirmation and
a negation do not share the same signification. Take ‘to be born’ and
‘to be unborn’ as the kind of contraries that are without a median.
15 Then in contraries without a median the privative affirmation has
the same force as the negation, but in those which do have a median
the force is not the same. For it is not the same to say of someone that
he is bad and that he is not good. For though ‘good’ is denied, the
20 listener’s mind can suppose that there might be something in be-
tween. But when ‘bad’ is posited, any supposition of the listener to
the contrary is thrown out; and so they do not signify the same thing.
But because, as has been said, privation or contrariety agree with
negation, whenever the kind of propositions are found in which a
25 privative affirmation does not disagree at all with a negative, the
question must be raised, as Aristotle appears to do, in respect of
470,1 which statement or belief the statement or belief is contrary to the
true affirmation or belief. For although they sometimes signify the
same thing, they employ the propositions in a different way. For in
5 positing a negation you say of what is that it is not, while in positing
a privation you say of what is not that it is. Then since propositions
with the same signification somehow have a different starting point
and thrust, you have to ask which of them is more effectively contrary
to the true proposition and through which mental movement the true
10 proposition is more effectively cancelled. This is what he means by
and if they are one belief, according to which is it a contrary? For he
does not say that a negation and privation are in every way identical,
but in those cases where they are the same, that is in contraries
without a median, even when they signify the same thing, because
15 they do not declare the single signification with one mental move-
ment when they propose a contrary or privation and when they
 Translation 125
propose a negation, in respect of which one is the contrary proposition
more effective, the privative or the negative proposition? After this
he explains what the nature of the contrariety is. 20

23b3-7 For it is false to think that contrary beliefs are distin-

guished by being of contraries. For [the belief] of the good, that
it is good, and of the bad, that it is bad, are perhaps the same
and true, whether they are one or more than one. But they are 25
contrary things. Yet it is not through being [beliefs] of contrary
things that they are contrary, but rather because they are in a
contrary manner.
The meaning is expressed very concisely but is bound up with the 471,1
most important element of truth in the argument. For since he is
talking about contraries, he explains in the very first place how there
can be contrary beliefs. For there is a view that contrary beliefs are
those which have some contrary thing as their object, but this is 5
proved to be false. For if good and bad is a contrary and someone
thinks about good and bad, it is not automatically necessary that
contrariety follows. For imagine that someone thinks about good that
it is good and thinks also about bad that it is bad. Then although he
thinks about good and about bad, that this is good, that is bad, they 10
are still not contrary beliefs. For to think that what is good is good
and what is bad is bad is not a contrary; for both are true, whereas
contrariety of beliefs is recognised in falsity. But how can beliefs of
this kind be contrary, when they arise somehow from the same
mental state, i.e. they are beliefs which know that they are true?
Thus it is not when someone has a belief of contrary things and has 20
a belief about contraries that contrariety must automatically follow
in those beliefs. Therefore contrariety of beliefs is not found in the act
of thinking which has contraries as its object and is concerned with
contraries, but contrariety occurs in beliefs whenever anyone thinks
about one and the same thing in a contrary manner. For example, 25
suppose something good is proposed. If someone thinks in a contrary
manner about it that it is good and about the same thing that it is 472,1
bad, the belief which considers what is good to be good is true, while
the other belief which considers what is good to be bad is false; and 5
true and false are contrary. Thus we are right to say that beliefs
which truth and falsity distinguish are contrary and not of contrar-
ies, but have been formed in a contrary manner about one and the
same thing. Thus it was right to say that one ought not to distinguish 10
contrary beliefs because they are beliefs of contrary things, but
rather because they consider the same thing in a contrary manner.
The way in which he expresses it is as follows. For to think that
contrary beliefs are distinguished by being of contraries, i.e. because
they are beliefs about contraries, is false. He then declares how it is 15
 126 Translation
false. For [the belief] of the good, that it is good, and of the bad, that
it is bad, are perhaps the same, i.e. they are not beliefs contrary to
20 each other, but they are both the same. He then himself adds how
they are ‘the same’ with the words and true; for they are ‘the same’
because they are true, whereas contrariety lies, as we have ex-
plained, in truth and falsity. Thus if they agree, they will appear to
be ‘the same’ in truth and falsity. Number does not make a difference
25 either; for whether they are one or more than one, because they are
true, they are ‘the same’. But they are contrary things, i.e. what is
478,1 found in beliefs. Yet it is not through being of contrary things, i.e. that
they are beliefs about contrary things that they are found to be
contrary beliefs, but their contrariety arises from the fact that the
5 beliefs are about one thing in a contrary manner. This is what he
means by but rather because they are in a contrary manner. For in a
contrary manner is here an adverbial expression, the equivalent of
saying that they are contraries rather insofar as the beliefs operate
in a contrary manner; and we have to complete the meaning with
‘about the same thing’. For if beliefs are not about the same thing in
10 a contrary manner, but about separate things, they could not be
contraries. Everyone will easily see this if he looks at it carefully.

23b7-15 Then if there is a belief about the good that it is good,

and that it is not good, and that it is something else, something
that it is not and cannot be (none of the other [beliefs] is to be
15 taken, that it is what it is not or is not what it is; for both are
infinite [in number], the belief that it is what it is not and that
20 it is not what it is. But [we must take only those] in which there
is deception. And these are the ones from which comings-into-
being arise; but comings-into-being are from opposites; then
cases of deception are also [from opposites])
474,1 He has expressed in very few sentences an important idea whose
force, to put it briefly, is as follows. Anyone who sought to know about
contrariety in propositions, ought first to have established which of
5 the propositions is not infinite and then attach to it the force of
contrariety. For in all contraries one is contrary to one. But if there
is an infinity in the propositions, the total infinite number of propo-
sitions could not be contrary to one proposition. He begins the whole
10 structure of his argument with this assumption and says that in
propositions one should expect not only that the false is contrary to
the true, but that under all the false propositions the proposition that
is one and not infinite is contrary to the true one. But there can be
15 an infinite number of propositions which are also false, but it can only
be a finite and false proposition which may be logically posited as a
contrary of a true proposition. Therefore since he wanted to establish
that the contrary of an affirmation is its negation rather than the
 Translation 127
affirmation which posits a contrary, he says that there is a belief
which thinks what is of a certain thing is of that thing. There is 20
another which thinks that a thing is what it is not, a third which
thinks that a thing does not possess what the proposed thing pos-
sesses in itself, and a fourth which thinks that the proposed thing is
not the very thing it is. And that this might become clear through a
common example, he took the proposition that something is good to 25
serve as the belief to be considered. So, if someone thinks this good is
good, he will think truly. If he thinks that this good is what is not 474,1
good, he will think falsely. Thus, if someone thinks that the good does
harm, that it is useless, that the good is unjust, he will be thinking
of the good, things which are not, and this is false. Again if someone 5
thinks that the good does not have what it does have in itself, he will
think that the good is not useful, the good is not just, the good is not
to be sought; and he too says what is false. But if there is someone
who thinks that what is good is not good, so that he does not think 10
that the good is bad, i.e. what it is not, nor that it should not be
sought, i.e. what it has in itself, but that the good is not what it itself
is, such a man thinks that the good is not good. Thus all the other
beliefs are infinite; for we can collect a large number of things which 15
though they do not hold we can nevertheless say of one particular
thing, e.g. in the case of the good I can say that it is bad, that it is
base, that it is unjust, that it ought to be avoided, that it is dangerous,
and the rest of the things that no one will find in the good; and these 20
are infinite in number. I can also say that what the good has are not
in the good, e.g. if I were to say that the good is not useful, that the
good is not to be sought, that the good is not something that causes
increase; and these things are also infinite in number. But when a 25
belief does away with what a thing is, it can do this only once; for
nothing else can be brought about by what is good being belief not to
be good. Then the rest of the propositions which either consider the
good to be what is not or consider it not to be what it has in itself, are 476,1
false but infinite in number. He is now using ‘good’ as the equivalent
of ‘goodness’. If someone thinks that goodness is not a good, he is both
wrong and wrong in a definite way. But falsities that are definite and 5
numerically one seem to be more effective and precise contraries of
truths; for one thing is always contrary to one thing. Therefore the
denial of what is, is rightly regarded as more a contrary than the
denial of what a thing has in itself or the affirmation that it doesn’t 10
have it in itself. To demonstrate this he does not use a direct expres-
sion but distorts his argument to say something different, which has
caused some problems. For when he said that we should not prefer to 15
put infinites as contraries of a true belief, he added but [we must take
only those] in which there is deception. And this deception comes from
those from which comings-into-being also arise. The idea embraced
here is that beliefs in which there is a starting point for deception are
 128 Translation
20 the ones which ought to be put as contraries to true beliefs. But
deceptions arise from the same beliefs which give rise to comings-
into-being; and comings-into-being are found in opposites. What this
means is that every instance of coming-into-being arises from a
25 change in what a thing was. For there cannot be coming-into-being
unless something has ceased to be what it was before. For everything
which comes to be, changes into some other sort of substantial form.
Thus when something is no longer what it was, it then comes into
being and is something other than what it was; and the deception
477,1 occurs when someone thinks that something is not what it is. For you
are deceived if you think that what is good is bad; but it is not possible
for it to become bad unless it were not good; and the same applies to
the rest too. Thus deception and the starting point of deception is
5 where someone thinks that something is not what it is. And this
deception takes its start from where comings-into-being arise. For
every instance of coming-into-being, as I have said, arises from
destruction, so that what becomes sweet does not become sweet from
white, but from not sweet, and again what becomes white does not
10 become white from hard, but from not white, and all the other
instances of coming-into-being arise rather from their negations; and
from this arises the first deception. But if the most complete and
precise falsity of a true belief occurs where the first deception is
found, and these turn out to be opposites, i.e. affirmations and
15 negations, there can be no doubt that the belief of a negation is more
a contrary than the belief which in its conception affirms a contrary.
That then is the general meaning of the passage. The form of
words runs as follows. Then if there is a belief about the good that it
20 is good, which is in fact true, and that it is not good, which is false
and definite, and that it is something else, something that it is not and
cannot be, i.e. the belief which lays down that something is what it is
478,1 not, none of all the other [beliefs] is to be taken, that it is what it is not,
i.e. the belief that the proposed thing is what it is not, or is not what
is, i.e. the belief that denies that the proposed thing has what it does
5 have. He explains in the following words why these are not to be
taken as contraries: for both are infinite [in number], the belief that
it is what it is not and that it is not what it is. But what should be put
in their place? [We must take only those], he says, in which there is
10 deception, i.e. in which there is a starting point for deception. But
where does the starting point for deception arise? It takes its start
from those from which comings-into-being arise; but where do com-
ings-into-being arise? From opposites. For every instance of
15 coming-into-being, as has been said, is from a thing not being what
it was; and this of course comes close to being a negation. Then cases
of deception are also [from opposites] and the starting point for
deception is found in opposites, where comings-into-being, from
which the actual deception arises, are also found.
 Translation 129

23b15-21 Then, if what is good, is good and is not bad, the 20

former in itself, the latter accidentally (for it is accidental to it
to be bad), the truer belief about each thing is the one about
what it is in itself, and the false one too, if this is so of a true
belief. Thus the belief that what is good is not good is a false 479,1
belief about what is in itself, whereas the belief that it is bad is
a belief about what is accidental. Therefore the belief of the
negation will be more false than the belief of the contrary. 5
Although we explained all this most diligently in the careful commen-
tary of the first edition, we will repeat the same explanation here too,
so that the explanation in this book will not seem short. The argu-
ment starts like this. If when a true proposition is proposed there are 10
several false propositions which cancel it, the one among them which
is the more false will be the more contrary to the true proposition.
Thus we must look for what is the more false under the many false
propositions, so that it might be seen as more contrary to the true 15
proposition. But we must say what happens in the case of truth. For
since something can be said truly both in itself and accidentally, what
is said in itself rather than what comes accidentally possesses the
nature of truth to the greatest extent. Thus if someone thinks about 20
the good that it is good, he possesses a true belief according to the
thing itself; but if someone thinks that the good is useful, he will
think something true, but that truth about the good is accidental to
the good. For it is accidental to the good that it is also useful. Thus 480,1
the proposition which considers the good to be good is true in itself,
i.e. it is true in its very self, whereas that which considers the good
to be useful is true accidentally. Thus the proposition which considers 5
the good to be good is nearer to the nature of goodness than that
which considers the good to be useful. But if this is so, the proposition
which is true in itself is truer than the one which is true accidentally.
Then once we have established this we must say the same about 10
falsity too. For the false proposition which is contrary to a proposition
which is true in itself, is more false than the one which cancels a
proposition which is true accidentally. For if a proposition which
considers some truth about the nature of the thing itself is truer, then
the one which cancels the truer proposition will be more false. But if 15
the one which makes a statement about the accident of a thing,
although it is true, is however less true, the one which cancels a less
true proposition will also be less false.
Once we have established this let us now see what holds in the 20
beliefs or propositions which we have been dealing with. We will use
the same example. As we said above, what is good is both good and
not bad, but that it is good is according to itself, that it is not bad is
accidental to it. For that it is good is good by its nature, that it is not 25
bad is a secondary and in a way accidental. Thus the belief of the good
 130 Translation
that it is good will be truer and closer to its nature than the idea of
481,1 the good that it is not bad. Then if this is so and the proposition which
cancels a truer belief is more false than the one which cancels a
proposition which, though true, is less true, it is clear that a negation
5 is more false than the affirmation which posits a contrary. For the
negation says that what is good is not good, the affirmation that what
is good is bad. The negation, what is good is not good, cancels the
10 essential belief, the good is what is good, whereas the affirmation of
the contrary, that the good is bad, cancels the true belief, which holds
accidentally of the good, that what is good is not-bad. It is agreed then
15 that the belief that the good is not good is more false than the belief
that what is good is bad. But if this is more false, it is more contrary.
Thus the belief of a negation is more contrary than that of a contrary
affirmation.
Then having dealt with the meaning, we must discuss the actual
20 wording. Then, if what is good, is good and is not bad, the former in
itself, i.e. that the good is good, the latter accidentally, i.e. that the
good is not good, (for it is accidental to it to be bad), the more true
25 belief about each thing is the one about what it is in itself; for what is
482,1 according to the nature of a particular thing is closer to the thing
according to whose nature it is; thus the truth of the thing in itself,
because it is closest to the thing, is truer than the truth which is
accidental. And this is what he means by the more true belief about
5 each thing is the one about what it is in itself. But if this is so the false
one too, i.e. the falsity which cancels a belief or proposition which is
true in itself is more false, if the belief true to the nature of the thing
itself is truer than one which is true accidentally; this is what he
10 means by if this is so of a true belief. He confirms this exposition with
an example: thus the belief that what is good is not good is a false
belief about what is in itself, i.e. the belief that what is good is not
15 good is opposed to the belief which was true in itself. This is demon-
strated by the words thus the belief that what is good is not good is a
false belief about what is in itself, i.e. the belief which denies that the
20 good itself is good is in itself a false belief of the true proposition, i.e.
it is opposed to it; for falsity is opposite to truth. Whereas the belief
that it is bad is a belief about what is accidental. This is the false
belief which considers that what is good is bad and which fits the
25 proposition which is true accidentally, i.e. which considered the good
483,1 to be bad. Therefore the belief of the negation will be more false than
the belief of the contrary, i.e. the negation of the contrary is more
contrary than the affirmation of the contrary, if when both are
5 predicated of the good, the negation is found to be more false. But to
say that it is accidental to the good that it is not bad, must not be
understood in the way we are accustomed to say that something is
an accident to a substance. For this can not come about, whereas to
10 be accidental here is to be understood as meaning ‘secondarily’. For
 Translation 131
what is good is said to be good primarily, but said to be not bad
secondarily. And this is derived from the similarity of the substance
and the accident. For each substance is primarily a substance, and
secondarily either white, two-footed, lying or whatever can be an 15
accident to substances.

25b21-5 But he who holds the contrary belief is more wrong in

each case; for contraries belong to those things which differ
most with regard to the same thing. But if one of these is
contrary, yet the belief of a contradiction is more contrary, it is 20
clear that this will be the contrary.
The force of the whole argument in brief is that every true thing is
true either in itself or accidentally. Therefore everything false must 25
be false either in itself or accidentally. But it is agreed that the truth
which is so in itself is truer than that which is so accidentally. Then
whoever holds a belief about anything that is contrary to the thing 484,1
itself, must be most wrong. For there is a contrariety of beliefs
whenever there are beliefs about one and the same thing which differ
greatly from each other. Then what is more false will also be a 5
contrary falsehood. For what is more distant from the truth will be
more a falsehood. But beliefs which differ very greatly from each
other are contrary. In beliefs, then, the one which is most false is the
contrary. And the one which is most false, as we have said, is the one 10
which is false in itself, i.e. which cancels a proposition which is true
in itself. Therefore, for this is a negation, a negation is the contrary
of an affirmation rather than an affirmation positing the contrary.
This is the meaning expressed in the words but he who holds the 15
contrary belief is the more wrong in each case. For although anyone
can be wrong, even if he does not have a contrary belief about the
same thing, he is more wrong, however, who does have a contrary
belief. He explains how this happens: for contraries belong to those
things which differ most with regard to the same thing. For the main 20
reason why contrary falsehoods are held is that contrariety is found
only in things that have the greatest disagreement. But if one of these
is contrary, i.e. but if it is necessary that one of the propositions which 25
is false in itself or accidentally is a contrary, yet the belief of a
contradiction is more contrary, i.e. a negation is more false (this is
what he means by more contrary where the sense is the equivalent of 485,1
saying that the belief of a contradiction is more false, i.e. a negation is
more false); he then concludes that if what has been said is the case it
is clear that this, i.e. the belief of a contradiction, will be the contrary. 5

23b25-7 The belief that the good is bad is complex, because the
same person must perhaps believe that it is not good.
 132 Translation
10 After he has proved that the negation is rather the contrary, because
this is more false than the affirmation of the contrary, and has shown
that the proposition and belief which denies what has been proposed
is the contrary because of the way it distinguishes falsity, he now
15 tries to prove the same thing from simple and complex propositions
and beliefs. For he says that an affirmation which posits a contrary
is complex and not simple. And it is complex because the belief that
what is good is bad must also automatically involve the belief that
20 what is good is not good. For a thing cannot be bad unless it is not
good. Thus whoever thinks that what is good is bad, thinks both that
a good thing is bad and that the very same thing is not good. The
25 belief about the good that it is bad is, then, not simple; for it contains
within it the belief that it is not good. But the person who thinks that
what is good is not good, must not also think that it is bad. For
486,1 something can be both not good and not bad. And this comes to an
end where a median state can be found. This, too, he added in a very
cautious way. Then once it is established that the belief of a contrary
5 is not simple, whereas that of a negation is simple, a simple belief must
appear to be the contrary of simple belief. But the simple belief about
the good that it is good is true, while the simple belief about the good
10 that it is not good is false. Therefore the contrary of the simple belief
about the good that it is good is the belief of the negation that it is not
good. The general force of this argument is derived from the fact that
whenever there is any true proposition and two propositions which can
15 cancel it, if one of them cancels the true proposition without requiring
anything else, but the other cannot cancel the same true proposition
without the first, then the one which is self-sufficient and does not
require anything else to be able to cancel the proposed proposition, must
be said to be more its contrary. And only the self sufficient belief that
20 what is good is not good can cancel the true proposition about the good
that it is good and leads to its destruction. The one that considers it to
be bad is not sufficient on its own, unless the belief that what is good is
25 not good comes to its aid. For the latter contrary does away with it
because it brings the negation along with it. It is clear that the one
487,1 which is sufficient of itself to destroy the true proposition is rightly seen
to be its contrary rather than the one which is not in itself sufficient
unless the force of the negative proposition is added to it.

5 23b27-32 Further if the same thing holds in other cases, it will

seem that we have given the right explanation here; for the
belief of contradiction is [the contrary] either everywhere or
nowhere. But where things have no contraries, there is a false
belief about them which is opposite to the truth, e.g. he who
10 thinks a man is not a man is wrong. Then if these are contraries,
so too are other beliefs of the contradiction.
 Translation 133
If what we say about these propositions, he explains, is found in
everything, then what we are saying ought to be firm. For it is
unlikely that negations are contraries in some propositions, but in 15
others affirmations proposing a contrary. But if it is found in all
propositions and contradictions that a contradiction is more the
contrary, i.e. a negation, than a proposition holding a contrary, there
is no doubt that this schema exists everywhere. But if in some the 20
proposition of a contrary is more a contrary than a negation, it is clear
that here too the same is the case. For wherever contrariety can be
found there is a doubt as to what the contrary is, whether the 25
affirmation of a contrary or the negation of the proposition. Thus
where there is no doubt, one must enquire why this is so. And there 488,1
is no doubt where there is no contrariety, as with substances. For
here the only contraries are negations. Thus if the belief about a man
that it is not a man is opposed to the belief about a man that it is a 5
man, it is clear that in other cases too where contrariety is found, the
negation takes the place of the contrariety.70 For what use is it when
we say of man, because it does not have a contrary, that the negation
is the contrary, but when of the good, because it does have a contrary, 15
that it is not in the negation but rather in the belief that proposes a
contrary? For whatever is converted by a negative ought in every case
to keep its own force. Then what is said by Aristotle, to put it briefly,
is as follows. If in other cases the negation is the contrary, it is clear 20
that the negation is the contrary here too. But if in other cases it is
not so, the same applies in the cases which he mentioned above. But
in all the other cases where contrariety is not found, contradiction
takes the place of contrariety, and in those where some contrariety 25
is found, it will take the same and no other place. He explains this in
the following words. Further if the same thing holds in other cases, it 489,1
will seem that we have given the right explanation here; for if it must
be so in all the other cases, what we have said to hold in the cases
mentioned above and what we said there will seem to be right. For 5
the belief of contradiction is [the contrary] either everywhere or no-
where. * * *71 in one place a contrary is found, in another it is not. But
where things have no contraries, e.g. in substances where there is no
contrary (The Categories showed us this, if we remember correctly), here 10
is a false belief about them which is opposite to the truth, i.e. in these is
found a false belief which is opposite to the true belief, but it is clear
what it is. For where there is not contrariety, it remains that the belief
of a contradiction is the contrariety, e.g. he who thinks a man is not a 15
man is wrong. For this is the only contrariety to be found of the true
proposition. Then if these are contraries, so are also those others which
are beliefs of the contradiction, i.e. if in those which do not have a
contrariety, their negations are contraries (for there must be some 20
contraries), in all the others, too, where there is some contrariety, e.g.
in good and bad, the negation takes the place of the contrary.
 134 Translation

23b33-24a3 Further the belief about the good that it is good and
25 about the not good that it is not good are similar; and in addition
490,1 to these that about the good that it is not good and about the not
good that it is good. What then is the contrary to the true belief
about the not good that it is not good? For it is not that which says
5 it is bad; for this will sometimes be true at the same time; but a
true belief is never contrary to a true one; for there is something
not good which is bad; therefore they both happen to be simulta-
neously true. Nor is it the belief that it is not bad; for these too will
10 hold at the same time. It remains, then, that the belief about the
not good that it is good is the contrary of that about the not good
that it is not good. Therefore the belief, too, about the good that it
is not good is the contrary of that of the good that it is good.
15 He now confirms what has been said just before with a stronger
argument by ratio. Ratio is in fact the mutual similarity of things to
each other. Then if four propositions are made, two of which precede,
20 the other two following, and the first is related to the second as the
third to the fourth, it is necessary that the first relates to the third
491,1 as the second to the fourth. We can understand this very easily and
concisely when expressed in numerals. Make the first number II, the
second VI, then begin again with IV as three and XII for four.

II VI
5 IV XII
So in the diagram the leading propositions are two and four, the
following ones six and twelve. Four is to twelve is as two to six. For
10 just as two is a third of six, four is a third of twelve. Therefore just as
the preceding four relates to its sequent, so the other preceding
number will relate to its sequent. But two is half of the preceding
15 four, and six is half of twelve. Thus one should notice in every ratio
that, if with four proposed things, the third is be to the fourth as the
first to the second, then the second will be to the fourth as the first
to the third. Then transfer the numerical ratios to the force and
20 nature of propositions and put two propositions first, of which one
precedes, the other follows, and then another two, one of which
precedes, the other follows in the same way, and let there be a
similarity. For the first is to be about the good that it is good, then
492,1 follows that of the good that it is not good. Then make the leading
third the proposition about the not good that it is not good, and
following this the fourth about the not good that it is good.

5
 Translation 135
Then work out the similarity of ratio in these. The first, about the
good that it is good, is to the second, about the good that it is not good, 10
as is the third, about the not good that it is not good, is to the fourth,
about the not good that it is good. For just as the proposition about
the good that it is good is true, but that about the good that it is not
good is false, so too the proposition about the not good that it is not
good is true, but that about the not good that it is good is false. But 15
if this is so and the belief about the good that it is not good relates in
the same way to that about the good that it is good, as the belief about
the not good that it is not good relates to the belief about the not good
that it is good, the first will relate to the third as the second to the 20
fourth. Then just as the belief about the good that it is good relates
to that about the not good that it is not good because they are both
true, so will that about the good that is not good relate to the belief 25
about the not good that it is good, because they are in fact both false.
For the latter are both simultaneously false, as the former are
simultaneously true. Therefore the second is to the fourth as the first 493,1
is to the third. Then now that we have demonstrated these ratios,
arrange the same propositions without changing their order [of ra-
tio]. The proposition about the not good that it is not good should be
put first and following it that about the good that it is good; then 5
under these in the leading position as third, about the not good that
it is good and following this as fourth that about the good that it is
not good.

10

Then, as has been demonstrated above, the belief about the not good
that it is not good relates to that about the good that it is good just as 15
that about the not good that it is good relates to that about the good
that it is not good. For just as the former are both simultaneously
true, the latter are simultaneously false, and there is the same ratio.
Thus the first, about the not good that it is not good will relate to the 20
third, about the not good that it is good, as the second, about the good
that it is good, to the fourth, about the good that it is not good. Then
we must now ask what is the relationship of the first to the third so
that we can work out that of the second to the fourth. I mean that the 25
belief that what is not good is good is contrary to the belief that what
is not good is not good. Then place, if it is possible, the belief that what 494,1
is not good is not good opposite the belief that what is not good is bad.
But this is not possible; for contrary beliefs are never both simulta-
neously true, but these two can be simultaneously true. For if 5
someone thinks that parricide, which is not good, is not good, and also
thinks that parricide, which is not good by nature, is bad, he has a
 136 Translation
true belief in both. Therefore the belief that what is not good is bad
10 is not the contrary of the belief that what is not good is not good.
Again put the belief that what is not good is not bad opposite the
belief about the not good that it is not good. This too is sometimes the
15 case; for it can happen that what is not good is also not bad. For not
all things that are not good are automatically bad, but it can happen
that some things are not good, but are nevertheless not bad either. If
someone, for example, thinks that a stone that is lying there to no
20 purpose, which is in itself not a good thing, is not good, he will have
a true belief; and if the same man thinks that the stone lying there,
which is not a good thing, is not bad, nothing false enters his belief.
And so because the belief about the not good that it is not good is
found sometimes to be true both with that about the not good that it
25 is bad and with that about the not good that it is not bad, it is the
495,1 contrary of neither. It remains then that the belief about the not good
that it is not good is the contrary of the belief that what is not good
is good, i.e. about the not good that it is good. Thus the belief about
5 the not good that it is not good is the contrary of that about the not
good that it is good. But the belief about the not good that it is good
related to that about the not good that it is not good as the belief
about the good that it is good related to that about the good that it is
10 not good. But the first and the third are contraries; then the second
and the fourth, because of the similarity of their ratio, are doubtless
also contraries. It can also be more simply understood in the follow-
ing way. If the belief about the good that it is good and about the not
15 good that it is not good are similar in being true, and that about the
good that it is not good and about the not good that it is good are also
similar in being false, should one of the true beliefs be found to be
contrary to one of the false ones, the remaining false one will be
20 contrary to the other true one; and this is brought about by their
similarity alone. But in fact one of the false beliefs is shown to be
contrary to one of the true ones, as we explained above, i.e. the belief
that what is not good is good is contrary to the belief that what is not
25 good is not good. It remains then that the belief that what is good is
not good is contrary to the belief that what is good is good. Thus we
496,1 conclude that a negation is the contrary of a true affirmation rather
than an affirmation stating the contrary.
We have explained, then, this complex idea in what we have said
above; the actual wording is as follows. Further the belief about the
5 good that it is good and about the not good that it is not good, which
are both true, are similar; and in addition to these that about the good
that it is not good and about the not good that it is good, both being
false. What then is the contrary to the true belief about the not good
10 that it is not good? This is put in the form of a rhetorical question. For
it is not that which says it is bad; because it could sometimes be
simultaneously true. But this is not the case with contraries. For a
 Translation 137
true belief is never contrary to a true one. But how can it happen that 15
they are both true at the same time? Because there is something not
good which is bad; therefore they both happen to be simultaneously
true. Nor is it the belief that it is not bad; for these too will hold at the
same time, i.e. they can sometimes both be true at the same time, 20
especially where it is a question of good and bad. It remains, then,
that the belief about the not good that it is good, which is false and
cannot be found to be true at the same time is the contrary of that
about the not good that it is not good, which is true. Therefore, he 25
returns to the similarity of relationship stated above, the belief, too,
about the good that it is not good is the contrary of that of the good
that it is good. But if anyone looks carefully at what was said above, 497,1
he will not make a mistake about the structure of the doctrine as a
whole or about any detail of the arrangement.

24a3-6 But it is clear that there is no difference even if we state

the affirmation universally. For the universal negation will be 5
contrary to it; e.g. the belief that none of the things that are good
is good [is the contrary] of the belief that everything that is good
is good.
In the previous argument all the explanations concerned indefinite 10
propositions. But because someone could perhaps have imagined that
the same pattern could not be found in definite propositions and that
there could be some difference as to whether the same argument
applies to definite propositions, he added the comment that it makes
no difference with them whether one uses the same argument that 15
he had applied above to indefinite propositions, in the case of univer-
sal propositions, which are of course already definite. For if someone
arranges definite propositions in the order he gave for indefinite
propositions and considered them with regard to their predication, 20
he would find that the contrary of the belief of a universal affirmation
is none other than the belief of a universal negation. For there is no
difference between indefinite and definite propositions other than
that indefinite propositions are without a determination, while defi- 25
nite propositions have the addition of a determination, whether it is 498,1
universal or particular. This is what he means by there is no difference,
even if the affirmation is stated universally. For a universal negation is
the contrary of a universal affirmation, e.g. the belief that none of the 5
things that are good is good, i.e. the belief of the universal negation is
the contrary of the belief that everything that is good is good, i.e. the
belief of the universal affirmation. He then shows why this occurs. 10

24a6-b1 For the belief about the good that it is good, if it is good
universally, is the same as the belief that whatever is good is
 138 Translation
15 good. <And this> does not differ from the belief that everything
that is good is good. And it is the same in the case of the not
good.
He has gradually brought the indefinite proposition into similarity
with the universal. He says that an indefinite proposition becomes a
20 universal if the everyday expression ‘whatever’ is added to it, so that
it is in no way different from the proposition which predicates ‘every’
of the thing in affirmation. For example, the belief or proposition
about the good that it is good is that the good is good. If we add
25 ‘whatever’ to this to give ‘whatever is good is good’, it is no different
from the belief that everything good is good. Therefore the validity of
499,1 the previous argument in the case of indefinite propositions applies
also to universals, which differ only to the small extent that it applies
not to the quality or the force of the proposition but to its quantity.
5 For it is the universality of quantity that is stated.
That is the general meaning; the wording is as follows. He had
stated above that there is no difference whether a proposition is
indefinite or universal. Why there is no difference he explains as
10 follows: for the belief about the good that it is good, i.e. an indefinite
affirmation, if it is good universally, i.e. if ‘good’ is expressed univer-
sally, is the same as the belief that whatever is good is good, i.e. there
15 is no difference from the belief that good is good. And this belief does not
differ from the belief, which is clearly stated universally, that everything
that is good is good. And it is the same in the case of the not good, i.e. we
speak of the not good in the same way. For the proposition or belief that
what is not good is not good, if universality is added to it, does not differ
20 at all from the proposition that whatever is not good is not good. And
this does not differ at all from the universally stated proposition,
everything that is not good is not good.

25 24b2-6 Therefore, if this is how it is with beliefs, and spoken

500,1 affirmations and negations are symbols of those72 in the soul, it
is clear that a universal negation about the same thing is
contrary to an affirmation, e.g. the contrary to ‘every good is
5 good’ or ‘every man is good’ is that ‘no [good is good]’ or ‘no [man
is good]’, while ‘not every’ [man] or ‘not every’ [good] are opposed
contradictorily.
He brings all the previous arguments together and steers the entire
10 thrust of the enquiry to a conclusion. For he had previously said
above that negations and affirmations and their contrary relation-
ships should be considered as concerned with beliefs, while now,
since he has found the universal negation to be a contrary in beliefs,
15 he applies the same [principle] to propositions, which, it is clear,
designate the affections of the soul, because they are spoken sounds
 Translation 139
and significant. For at the beginning of the book he rightly told us
that significant spoken sounds reveal the affections of the soul; and
now, as though to prove it, he thinks, that because with beliefs the
contrary to a universal affirmation has been found to be a universal 20
negation rather than the affirmation of the contrary of a universal
affirmation, the same too occurs in spoken sounds, i.e. that it is not
the affirmation stating the contrary to a universal affirmation that 25
is its contrary, but the universal negation, while when there is a
universal affirmation and a particular negation, they are contradic- 501,1
tories. And this is said very clearly and there is no error in the
wording. But let us follow the exact wording here too, just as we left
nothing ambiguous in the rest of the text. Therefore if this is how it 5
is with beliefs, i.e. that the belief of a negation rather than an
affirmation stating a contrary is found to be contrary to the belief of
an affirmation, and spoken affirmations and negations are symbols 10
of those in the soul, (for just as there is affirmation and negation in
spoken sound, so also is there in belief, when the soul itself affirms
or denies something in its thinking, as we have explained carefully
elsewhere); therefore because the affirmations and negations in spo- 15
ken sound are symbols of the affirmations and negations in the soul
it is clear that a universal negation about the same thing is contrary
to an affirmation. He adds about the same thing so that we do not say 20
that disconnected affirmations and negations are contraries, but that
an affirmation and negation universally affirm and deny of one and
the same thing; and instances of these are e.g. the contrary to ‘every
good is good’ or ‘every man is good’ is that ‘no [good is good]’, which is 502,1
contrary, or ‘no [man is good]’, while ‘not every’ [man] or ‘not every’
[good] are opposed contradictorily, i.e. ‘not every man is good’ is 5
contradictory to ‘every man is good’ and ‘not every good is good’ is
contradictory to ‘every good is good’. Thus it is agreed that among the
propositions which he stated above the contrary of the affirmation 10
‘every man is just’ is ‘no man is just’ rather than ‘every man is unjust’.

24b6-9 And it is clear that it does not happen that a true belief
or contradiction is the contrary of a true one. For contraries 15
embrace their opposites and it is possible for the same person to
say the truth about the same opposites, but it is not possible for
contraries to be in the same thing at the same time.
After this he brings the book to an end by a discussion and demon- 20
stration with which he tries to prove that two true propositions are
not contraries, although this is true and clear to all. The argument
starts as follows. Things that are contrary are opposites; but oppo- 25
sites cannot be present at the same time in the same thing; thus
contraries cannot be present at the same time in the same thing. But
things about which something true can be said at the same time, can
 140 Translation
be present at the same time in the same thing, whereas those which
503,1 cannot be present at the same time in the same thing cannot be the
subject of simultaneously true propositions, an affirmation and a
negation. But contraries cannot be in the same thing at the same
time. Therefore, statements which say the truth at the same time are
5 not contraries because what can be both affirmed and denied as true
at the same time, are in the same thing at the same time. Therefore,
statements that are both true at the same time are not contraries.
This is the meaning; the wording is as follows. And it is clear that
it does not happen that a true belief or contradiction is the contrary of
10 a true one, i.e. that two true propositions cannot be contraries. If a
true belief is not the contrary of a true belief, much less so is a
contradiction which arises from beliefs. He has put ‘contradiction’
here for contrary, as the question here is not about contradiction. For
15 contraries embrace their opposites, i.e. every contrary is an opposite,
and it is possible <for the same person> to say the truth about the same
opposites, because there can be a simultaneously true negation and
affirmation only about what can be in the same thing at the same
20 time, but it is not possible for contraries to be in the same thing at the
same time. Then the conclusion is that because things about which
there is a simultaneously true affirmation and negation, can be in the
same thing at the same time, and contraries cannot be in the same
thing at the same time, statements that are true at the same time
25 cannot be contraries.
Our task, too, has now come to rest in a tranquil harbour. For I do
not think that anything has been left out which would lead to a full
504,1 understanding of this book. Then if we have achieved our aim with
dedication and application, it will be of use to those who will be
gripped by the desire to understand these things properly. But if we
5 have fallen short of our aim to sort out the very abstruse ideas in this
book, our work will not be blamed for harming others, even if it does
no good.
 Notes

1. Note the quite different interpretations of this sentence advanced by Shiel

and Ebbesen. Shiel p. 361 (Sorabji, 1990): ‘The textual sequence is obscure and it
is supplemented by extremely obscure scholia’; Ebbesen ibid. 376 n. 15: ‘the
doctrines of this book are very obscure, and on top of that the manner of presenta-
tion is obscure’. These reflect the differing views of the two about the sources
available to Boethius, Shiel arguing that he had only scholia, Ebbesen that he had
access to full commentary editions, particularly of Porphyry.
2. Shiel (Sorabji, 1990) p. 365 thinks that he is referring here to his Introduction
to Syllogisms.
3. 61-3.
4. cf. 115.
5. Literally ‘what can do the same thing’.
6. Int. 16a30-1.
7. Int. 16b11-15.
8. i.e. of verbs at 16b6-7.
9. Int. 16b6-7.
10. cf. 128,13f.
11. An. Pr. 1.46, Int. 19b31f.
12. A reading rejected by Alexander but either found in the text or reported by
Herminus and Porphyry with whom Boethius agrees that it makes no difference
to the sense.
13. See the full list in 323-4 and the discussion in 294ff.
14. This refers just to the position of the Greek esti (is) which in Greek may
naturally be positioned at the beginning of these propositions, whereas the Latin
est would have a different meaning if put first and so has to be put at the end of
the sentence to translate Aristotle correctly.
15. Int. 16b19. Cf. 71ff.
16. cf. 368f.
17. It should be noted that the reading given here in the lemma is also the one
adopted in the translation and there is no mention of the more ‘demanding’ variant
in the short commentary.
18. Meiser suggests a lacuna here. What follows gives an objection raised by
some unspecified people that the relationship of the following propositions is
different and that there is therefore no consistency in them: a privative negation
follows a simple affirmation, a simple affirmation does not follow an infinite
negation. This objection requires a little more introduction than is given in the MS.
19. cf. 177.
20. 288-302.
21. 276-94.
22. 149.
23. Int. 19b11-12; cf. 256.
24. Added by Meiser.
25. 311.
142 Notes to pages 47-93
26. Theaetetus 186B-C.
27. i.e. between ‘is not’ and ‘is not x’; i.e. ‘is’ as an indefinite verb and ‘is’ as
definite with the negative attached to the participle.
28. I have changed the MSS correction finitum ‘finite’ back to the uncorrected
indefinitum ‘indefinite’.
29. 18,26.
30. Int. 20a1.
31. 150,27f.
32. The order of these two propositions in the Greek text is reversed in
Minio-Paluello’s edition. Boethius’ order is found in cod. Ambrosianus (saec. ix)
and Ammonius.
33. Added by Meiser.
34. Boethius gives two further word orderings which, though possible in Latin,
would be even more misleading in English (‘man white is’, ‘white man is’: homo
albus est, albus homo est); I have therefore omitted them from the translation.
35. Cic. in Catilinam 1.10 §25 ad hanc te amentiam natura peperit, voluntas
exercuit, fortuna servavit. Alternative version: ad hanc te amentiam perperit
natura, exercuit voluntas, servavit fortuna.
36. Virgil Aeneid 6.852 pacique imponere morem. Alternative version:
moremque imponere paci.
37. The word order differs in Latin – homo albus non erat, homo non albus est.
38. 178,9f.
39. For the latter see Pliny 9,35.55 canis marinus, and in mythology of the dogs
of Scylla Lucretius 5.890 and Virgil, Aeneid 3.432.
40. cf. Top. ch. 8.
41. Eudemus: an emendation of Meiser for the MS audivimus. Courcelle
emends to Ammonius, but Shiel p. 357 (Sorabji, 1990) has confirmed the emenda-
tion ‘Eudemus’. The point is important as it would remove the only direct evidence
that Boethius had access to the works of Ammonius. For Eudemus of Rhodes, a
pupil and friend of Aristotle, see Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles 8 (2nd edition
1969), Fr. 25.
42. A standard concept developed, for example, by Cicero in the context of the
political realities of Republican Rome.
43. The idea contained in these two sentences is also found in Ammonius in Int.
212,2-6.
44. Ackrill (1963) p.149 translates Aristotle’s endekhomenon with ‘admissible’
to avoid the ‘misleading’ connotations of the traditional translation ‘contingent’. I
have, however, retained the latter to echo Boethius’ translation of the Greek word
as contingere.
45. Meiser suspects a lacuna in the text at this point.
46. Int. 22b29f.
47. Here dictio.
48. I have followed S2. in deleting the words non enim propositionis.
49. We have to understand to walk and to be here as equivalents, as he has
explained above.
50. To be here refers to is in is possible.
51. i.e. in the Latin order which cannot be so well reproduced in English.
52. Int. 21a34-7; Boethius 376.
53. The Latin is Socrates speaks well but this does not display his point in
English.
54. 402,12f.
 Notes to pages 94-138 143
55. Int. 21b35f.
56. Int. 22a3-4.
57. The Greek text reads to be or not to be. Boethius has neither of the infinitives
(M-P’s apparatus notes the omission of the second infinitive in an eighth-century
Syriac translation).
58. Note the quite different emphasis and interpretation of Shiel’s translation
of this sentence (Sorabji, 1990) p. 361: ‘For there are scholia of numerous points
heaped up all together and so I have spent almost two years in a constant sweat
of writing comments.’
59. Adding negationes with F2.
60. Lacuna as Meiser thinks.
61. 423,21-4.
62. The Latin terms possibilitas (possibility) and potestas (capacity) are related.
63. 458,24f.
64. Cat. 15a13ff.: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration,
motion.
65. Phys. 260a26-b7 where motion, alteration and increase are listed.
66. cf. Porphyry Sententiae 31 and 32.
67. Thus in Boethius, the Armenian text and cod. Marcianus (saec. x). Minio-
Paluello reads ‘actualities’.
68. Thus in Boethius, the Armenian text and cod. Marcianus (saec. x). Minio-
Paluello reads ‘never actualities but only potentialities’.
69. Cat. chs 10-11.
70. I have followed Meiser in deleting several lines here.
71. Meiser notes a possible lacuna here.
72. Either earum ‘of those’ with reference to the affirmations and negations or
eorum ‘of things’. Meiser adopts the former reading, although the MSS all give the
latter, based on the continuous translation where two MS give earum. This is
confirmed by Boethius’ own paraphrase, 501,11-17. The Greek, which is ambigu-
ous, is interpreted by Ackrill as ‘of things’.
This page intentionally left blank
 Select Bibliography

Greek text of Aristotle De Interpretatione:

Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford
1949.

Latin text of Boethius’ second commentary on De Interpretatione:

Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis PERI ERMHNEIAS, pars posterior, rec.
Carolus Meiser, Lipsiae 1880.

Latin text of Boethius’ first commentary and translation of De Interpretatione:

Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis PERI ERMHNEIAS, pars prior, rec.
Carolus Meiser, Lipsiae 1877.
Aristoteles Latinus I.1-5, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges 1961.

Ackrill, J.L., Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford 1963.

Arens, H., Aristotle’s Theory of Language and its Tradition: Texts from 500 to 1750,
Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1984.
Chadwick, H., Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philo-
sophy, Oxford 1981.
Courcelle, P., Les lettres grecques en occident, Paris 1948 (2nd edn).
Ebbesen, S., ‘Porphyry’s legacy to logic: a reconstruction’, in Sorabji 1990, 141-72.
Ebbesen, S., ‘Boethius as an Aristotelian commentator’, in Sorabji 1990, 373-92.
Hadot, I., ‘Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs
néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens’, in M. Tardieu (ed.) Les règles de
l’interprétation, Paris 1987.
Heinze, R., Xenokrates, Leipzig 1892 (reprint Hildesheim 1965).
Magee, J., Boethius on Signification and Mind, Philosophia Antiqua LII, Leiden
1989.
Shiel, J., ‘Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’, in Sorabji 1990, 349-72.
Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990.
Sorabji, R., ‘The ancient commentators on Aristotle’, in Sorabji 1990, 1-30.
Tarán, L., Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related
Texts and Commentary, Leiden 1981.
Usener, H., Review of Meiser, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 370, 1880.
Wehrli, F., Die Schule des Aristoteles 8, Basel 1969 (2nd edn).
This page intentionally left blank
 English-Latin Glossary

addition: adpositio privation: privatio

affection: passio property: proprietas
affirmation: adfirmatio proposition: propositio
belief: opinio proprium: proprium
capability: potestas quality: qualitas
category: praedicamentum relation(ship): habitudo
combination: conplexio, conpositio sense-perception: sensus
combined: conpositus sentence: oratio
communication: interpretatio separation: divisio
concept: conceptio sign: nota
conjoined: coniunctus significant: significativus
conjunction: coniunctio signification: significatio
convention, by: positione, secundum signify: significare, signare
placitum signify, additionally: consignificare
defined: definitus simple: simplex
definite: definitus single: singulus
denote: designare singular: singularis
determination: determinatio sound: sonus
disposition: adfectio speech: oratio
division: divisio spoken sound: vox
element: elementum state: habitus
equivocal: aequivocus statement: enuntiatio
equivocation: aequivocatio statement-making: enuntiativus
essence: esse subject: subiectum
expression: dictio substance: substantia
finite: finitus term: terminus, vocabulum, verbum,
image: imago nomen
imagination: imaginatio, imago thing: res
indefinite: indefinitus, indeterminatus thought: intellectus
individual: individuus univocal: univocal
infinite: infinitus utter: profero
intellect: intellectus utterance: locutio prolatio
name: nomen verb: verbum
negation: negatio will: voluntas
particular: particular word: sermo, verbum, vocabulum,
particularity: particularitas nomen, particular
 Latin-English Index
* indicates that the listed Latin word is used by Boethius for the marked Greek
word in his translation of de Interpretatione or Categories or is specially glossed
by him.
adfectio, disposition, 11,25
adfirmatio (*kataphasis, phasis),
affirmation, 13,27
adpositio (prosthesis), addition,
391,18
aequivocatio, equivocation, 39,28
aequivocus (*homonumos),
equivocal, 16,12
conceptio, concept, 8,1; conception
21.13 = intellectus
coniunctio (*sundesmos),
conjunction, 5,7: connecting, 16,31
coniunctus, conjoined, 5,10
conplexio (sumplokê/), combination,
173,8
conpositio (*synthesis), combination,
43,30
conpositus (*sunthetos), combined,
5,10
consignificare, additionally signify,
65,29
contradictio, contradiction, 99,29
(contradictory)
contradictorius, contradictory,
199,22
contrarietas, contrariety, 158,1
contrarius, contrary, 19,30
definitio, definition, 4,26
definitus, definite, defined, 62,3
(opposite of indefinitus)
designare, denote, 5,17
determinatio, determination, 138,12
dictio (*phasis), expression, 5,7
divisio (*diairesis), division,
separation, 43,30 = separatio
elementum (stoikheion): element,
4,24 (written letter, sound of a
letter, 21,6)
enuntiatio (*apophasis), statement,
13,27
enuntiativus (*apophantikos),
statement-making, 9,13
esse, essence, 17,31
finitus, finite, 256,8
habitudo (skhesis), relation(ship),
46,6
habitus (hexis), state, 17,17
imaginatio (*phantasia,
phantasma), image, mental image,
mental imaging, 28,1
imago, image, 35,6
indefinitus (= indeterminatus),
indefinite (opposite definitus),
138,3
indeterminatus, 144,17 =
indefinitus
individuus, individual, 179,7
infinitus (*aoristos), infinite
(opposite of finitus), 61,7
intellectus thought 8, 1(*noêma) =
conception; intellect, 7,16;
comprehension, 9,4
intelligentia, mind, 29,2; thought,
136,9
interpretatio, communication, 6,3
locutio (*lexis), utterance, 5,4 =
prolatio
negatio (*apophasis), negation, 13,26
nomen (*onoma), name, 8,11; word,
12,27; term, 7,2
nota (*sumbolon, sêmeion), sign, 25,7
opinio, belief, 467,2
oppositio, opposition, 160,26
oratio (*logos), sentence, 8,11,
speech, 13,6
particula, word, 48,12
particular, particular, 69,14
particularitas, particularity, 69,4
passio (*pathêma), affection, 25,7
 Latin-English Index
positione (*thesei): by convention,
23,5
potestas, capability, potentiality,
446,24
praedicamentum (*katêgorêma),
category, 4,14
privatio (sterêsis), privation, 17,18
profero, utter, 47,4
prolatio, utterance, 18,10 = locutio
propositio, proposition, 12,19
proprietas, property, 138,29
proprium, proprium, 18,32
qualitas, quality, 7,22
res (*pragma), thing, 20,16
secundum placitum (*kata
sunthêkên), by convention, 52,29
sensus (aisthêma, aisthêsis): sense
perception, faculty of sense
perception, a sense perception,
24,17; meaning, 36,24
separatio = divisio, 49,22
sermo, word, 5,6
149
significare = signare (sêmainô,
dêloô), signify, 6,14
significatio, signification, 6,24
significativus (*sêmantikos),
significant, 5,23
simplex, simple, 7,23
singularis, singular, 135,24
singulus, single, 86,8
sonus (*psophos), sound, 4,26
subiectum (hupokeimenon), subject,
18,6; what underlies, 136,2
substantia, substance, 17,31
terminus, term, 100,5
universalis, universal, 15,28
univocus (*sunônumos), univocal,
16,14
unus, one, 5,9; single, 48,28
verbum (*rhêma), verb, 8,11; word,
13,24; term, 12,6
vocabulum, term, 6.7; word, 56,10
voluntas, will, 34,7
vox (*phônê): spoken sound, 4,18*
 Index of Names

Alexander, 272,14.28; 274,13; 292,8; Lyceum, 266,25

293,19.30; 317,9 Peripatetics, 352,2; 361,6
Aristotle, passim with reference to de Plato, 316,13.17
interpretatione Porphyry, 272,29; 276,7; 293,27;
Analytics, 264,6.12.; 382,13 354,25; 383,6
Categories, 458,26; 465,31 Roman, 332,7f.; 334,5
Topics, 359,6 Socrates, 253,1f.; 254,1.4; 256,10;
Aspasius, 293,29 266,10f.; 273,14.15; 332,f.; 334,2f.;
Callias, 464,9.10 335,13f.; 352,23; 353,5.6.;
Cicero, 361,12.14 357,18.20; 358,2f.; 362,9f.; 363,4f.;
In Cat., 344,16 364,13f.; 365,7f.; 366,3f.;
Diodorus, 412,16.18.19 370,20.24; 377,5f.; 381,3f.; 382,1;
Eudemus, 361,9 384,26; 394,11f.; 396,15; 397,7f.;
Gracchus, Tiberius, 263,22.24 406,9; 411,14
Greeks, 250,21; 293,27 Stoics, 261,27; 393,13; 394,3
Herminus, 273,1; 275,5.6.31; 276,7; Syrianus, 321,21; 324,15
293,29; 307,29; 310,16.17 Theophrastus, 387,28; 389,19
Homer, 373,12f.; 374,10f.; 375,17; Trajan, 387,2
376,8 Virgil, 344,23
Latins, 250,21
 Subject Index
actuality/potentiality, 412,9f.; 462,1f.
affections of soul, 500,16f.
affirmation, 315,19f.
beliefs (opiniones) signified by spoken
sounds, 467,17f.; 501,12
contraries, 325,7f.; 474,1f.; 502,20f.
dialectical question, 357,13f.
‘every’, 314,15f.
falsity, degrees of, 484,24f.
first and second edition, 250,20f.;
274,25; 421,1f.; 479,6
name, infinite, 256,3; 259,1f.; 275,6f;
337,3f.
name, universal and singular, 256,9
negations
position of ‘not’, 319,10f.; 345,9f.;
394,5f.
relative strength of, 464,13f.
two negations cannot produce a
syllogism, 316,10f.
possibility and contingency, 392,17f.
predication
and contradiction, 373,24f.
connected and unconnected ,
362,12f.
of ‘is’ as a joined third thing, 314,6f.
propositions
difference in quality and quantity,
252,10f.; 256,20
indefinite as universals, 498,18f.
indefinite categorical, 321,24
infinite (propositions with an
infinite subject), 311,24f.; 341,9f.
infinite (propositions with infinite
names as predicates), 276,16
modal and simple, 377,4f.
modal: capabilities/possibilities,
453,9f.; contradictories, 422,24f.;
433,10f.; four types, 382,9f.
necessity, priority of, 460,4f.
negative, 378,24f.; 394,5f.
possible and necessary, implications
of, 447,7f.
predicative, total number of,
323,10f.
privative, 276,26
sequence of, 298,19f.; 307,30f.
(Herminus’ interpretation); 328,1f.
simple and privative, sequence of,
278,11f.; (Alexander’s
interpretation )292,8f.
simple categorical with an infinite
name, 252,1f.
simple categorical, every subject is
a name or equivalent, 255,20
universal, particular and indefinite
propositions, 256,16f.; 294,17f.
with ‘is’ predicated as a joined third
thing, 264,19f.
with finite and infinite name, 258,8f.
with infinite subject, finite or
infinite predicate, 339,20f.
singulars, 331,15f.
single and multiple
affirmation/negation, 351,26f.
statement, simple
verb always predicated, 255,15
subcontraries, 326,29
transposition of names and verbs,
344,5f.
verbs, infinite, 261,15f.