Stud East Eur Thought

DOI 10.1007/s11212-014-9200-7

SPECIAL SECTION ARTICLE

International argument: regarding the history

of the development of international philosophical
communication in the nineteenth century

Vitaly Kurennoy

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract This article examines the internationalization of scientific and scholarly

communication in the period before World War I, taking philosophy as an example.
In the first part of the article, several general trends in internationalization during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries are examined. This includes the importance of
international experience for Russia’s policies today towards science and education.
The main part of this article is devoted to the concept of the ‘‘international argu-
ment’’ and provides an analysis of three types of appeal to the international com-
munity: the pragmatic, the reputational, and the communicative. The increasing
importance of international communication during this period is shown on the basis
of examples drawn from German philosophical discussions that took place between
the first third and the end of the nineteenth century (the case of Friedrich Eduard
Beneke and Hermann Ebbinghaus). The last part of the article examines the impact
on German science and philosophy of the cessation of international communication
during World War I.

Keywords International communication in science
Internationalization

of knowledge
Philosophical argumentation
Friedrich Eduard Beneke

Hermann Ebbinghaus
World War I
The journal Logos

This article was prepared in connection with a fundamental research program at the National Research
University—Higher School of Economics—2013 Project of the Research Laboratory on Culture of the
Center for Fundamental Research of the National Research University—Higher School of Economics:
‘‘State Policy and Ideology in the Field of Culture.’’.

V. Kurennoy (&)
Cultural Sciences Department, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Building
7, 8/2 Maly Trjokhsvjatitelskij Pereulok, 123022 Moscow, Russia
e-mail: kurennoj@gmail.com

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 V. Kurennoy

In what follows we will examine several aspects of the internationalization of

knowledge and of the structure of communication by means of an analysis of
concrete examples from the sphere of philosophy. At the present time, there are
numerous individual investigations and surveys devoted to various aspects of
internationalization (Boli and Thomas 1999) and, to use Jürgen Osterhammel’s
term, the formation of ‘‘internationalism’’ (Osterhammel 2009, 723–735) in the
social and political life of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the sphere
of scientific communication, various studies have been devoted to the disruption and
breakdown of these processes during World War I (Rüegg 2004, 514–544), although
it has also been noted that ‘‘our knowledge of these events is still inadequate and
must be significantly enhanced’’ (ibid. 516).
On the basis of these and other studies, we can say that the general dynamics of
the internationalization of knowledge in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
had a multi-dimensional character. The rapid increase in internationalization in this
sphere proceeded in many respects in close connection with the internationalization
of other areas of social and political life. However, there were also periods of
extreme weakening in international scientific communication.1 The start of World
War I was the most striking example of such disintegration in communication: ‘‘In
fact,’’ notes the German historian Wolfgang Mommsen, ‘‘after 1918 nothing was the
same as before 1914’’ (Mommsen 2004, 8). The war, in particular, led to the almost
complete isolation of Russia from the spontaneous international communications
network during the entire Soviet period. The accession of the National Socialists in
Germany and World War II changed the landscape of international communications
in the most significant way. Germany, in particular, lost its position as the world’s
leading scientific and university center. The formation of international organizations
unfolded with particular intensity in the mid-nineteenth century.2 In the United
States, the movement for women’s rights became a stable organization; in Geneva
in 1863 the Red Cross became an active organization; and in London in 1864 the
First International was established with the personal participation of Karl Marx.
In science, the internationalization process was furthered by the idea of a
community of scientists and scholars as a res publica literaria inherited from the
rationalistic universalism of the Enlightenment and was ever present in the culture
of contemporary science (cf. Israel 2001). The increase in international scientific
relations coincided with the formation of modern institutes of knowledge and, above
all, of contemporary ? what is the difference between ‘modern’ and ‘contempo-
rary’? models of the university. Humboldt’s model of the research university (1810)

1
For a broad historical and regional perspective on this process of alternating intensification and crisis of
international relations among the sciences cf. Kolčinskij (2003).
2
It was at just this time that Marx and Engels in the ‘‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’’ announced a
general trend towards the globalization of contemporary capitalism: ‘‘In place of the old local and
national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence
of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual
nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and
more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature’’
(Marx and Engels 1976, 488).

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played a leading role in the latter as did the stabilization of scientific communication
through the emergence of scientific journals and international conferences. At the
turn of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the number of organized
international scientific and scholarly conferences grew exponentially: in 1889, the
first international psychological congress took place in Paris; in 1897, the first
international congress of mathematicians was held in Zurich, and in 1900, the first
international philosophy congress convened in Paris. Of particular importance in the
development of international relations with regard to knowledge was the interna-
tional mobility of students. The connection with German universities played a
decisive role for Russia during the period from the end of the seventeenth to the
beginning of the twentieth century. The number of Russian students in Germany
was consistently significant (in comparison with the total number of students in
Russia), increasing rapidly at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This was
followed by a sharp decline in their numbers, ending with their complete suspension
in 1850, which is accounted for by the ‘‘dark 7 years’’ (1848–1855) in the aftermath
of the revolutionary events at the end of the 1840s.3
On the other hand, these processes, including the strengthening of national
research and educational institutions, developed during the rise and consolidation of
the nation-state model in Europe (Norrback and Ranki 1996). Science and education
began to be seen all the more clearly as an element in international competition, a
striking example of which was the widespread opinion that in the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870–1871 Prussia defeated France thanks to the superiority of its school
and university system. At the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries various
international venues formed that included the element of competition and
demonstrated the achievements of individual states. The most important of these
was the Olympic Games (Athens 1896), the first world fair in Paris (1900), and the
establishment of the Nobel Prize (1901), which to this day is the most famous
theatricalized demonstration of the successes of a nation’s science. Over the past
century, many different forms of such competitions have appeared. In the sciences
and education, these competitions today include the number of citations in
international scientific journals. State measures, in particular, focus on raising the
level of these citations in order to stimulate the effectiveness of scientific
institutions in today’s Russia. The world ‘‘ranking of universities’’ plays a no less
significant role here. To raise the level of Russia’s universities in these rankings is
seen today as one of the instruments to promote the ‘‘competitiveness’’ of the
nation’s science and education.4 These policy initiatives with respect to contem-
porary science and education show that the state plays a significant role in them,
seeking to stimulate the level of ‘‘competitiveness’’ of the nation’s science and
education (at least in the case of a country whose development is still ‘‘catching
up,’’ such as Russia). A second area of state activity in these matters is the
3
According to Andreev, the number of Russian students in Germany from 1698 to 1849 was 926. From
1698 to 1810, there were 637, and from 1811 to 1849, 289 (Andreev, 2005).
4
According to the Russian Presidential Decree of 7 May 2012, No. 599, ‘‘Measures for the
Implementation of State Policy in Education and the Sciences,’’ these measures are to ensure, in
particular, ‘‘the entry by 2020 of no less than five Russian universities into the top 100 leading
universities, according to the world ranking of universities.’’

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encouragement of international standardization and the homogenization of scientific

and educational institutions, including the signing of relevant international
agreements.5 We should also note that a segment of the scientific and educational
community sees these measures as being at odds with that nation’s science and
education. In any case, in Russia at the moment there is a constant and enormous
stream of public criticism of both educational reforms on the basis of the Bologna
accords and the emphasis put on the number of international citations and
publications in international scientific and scholarly journals.
Against the backdrop of these general processes and trends, let us look at several
historical cases in order to show how these internationalization processes took place
in the specific discipline of philosophy prior to World War I. Our interest is in the
development of internationalization of communication within the philosophical
profession. To do this, we will analyze the emergence and development within
philosophy of the communicational form that we call the ‘‘international argument.’’
The expression ‘‘international argument’’ is understood here to be an explicit
reference to the state of scientific knowledge outside one’s national frontiers, the
reference being employed with a polemical intent. The use of such an argument
will, then, be examined in selected examples from discussions in philosophy and the
humanities that took place in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We
should note that our analysis of the philosophical discussions is framed at present as
a separate epistemologically productive approach to investigations in the history of
philosophy and, more broadly, investigations in intellectual history.6 However,
neither the importance of the international setting nor the corresponding argumen-
tative techniques have yet been examined in this particular context. We should also
add that an appeal to an international communicational community has so far been
one of the most enduring forms of argument both in contemporary domestic
scholarly discussions and discussions of policies directed at reforming research
institutes, particularly in countries with economies trying to catch-up to the
developed Western economies, Russia being a prime example. This form of
argument can be broken down analytically into three types:
1. the pragmatic: Appeal to foreign experience and international scientific
communications is necessary, as they are more effective than domestic
measures in enhancing the ‘‘competitiveness’’ of the latter (an argument of this
kind is put forward constantly today in Russian state policy directives for
reforming education and scientific research).7

5
Russia joined the Bologna Process in September 2003 at the Berlin meeting of European ministers of
education.
6
See, in particular, the three volumes devoted to the analysis of the three ‘‘great disputes’’ in nineteenth
century German philosophy (Bayertz et al. 2007) and the analysis of the ‘‘psychologism dispute’’ (Kusch
1995; Rath 1994; Kurennoy 2010b). For a general classification and analysis of a number of fundamental
discussions in German academic philosophy see Kurennoy 2010a.
7
As can be expected, an orientation towards the various measures of communicational activity, viewed
pragmatically as the absolute benchmarks of scientific activity, acquires a particularly acute, one might
say, fetishized, character in countries that are trying to catch up or that are undergoing imitative
modernization. Aleksandr K’osev, analyzing the specifics of university policy in such countries remarks:
‘‘The university in its present form—in Germany, France and the USA—is based on the idea of truth, the

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2. the reputational: Foreign centers of knowledge and education are the most
authoritative and influential in a particular field of knowledge. Therefore, we
should follow their example. As part of a unique early twentieth century
international project, the Russian edition of the yearbook for the philosophy of
culture, Logos, settled precisely on this type of argument in 1910 to defend its
position in its manifesto, ‘‘From the Editorial Staff,’’ published in its first issue.8
We shall return to this case below.
3. the communicational: Scientific activity is a special kind of communication
based on norms governing general rational discussion and argument. Therefore,
self-isolation violates the norm of open communication within the scientific
community.
Next, let us take a closer look at the third type of international argument, the
communicational. In our view, it is of the greatest interest in terms of its role in the
actual formation of an international, self-regulating community of scientists and
scholars, since it possesses an autonomous regulatory significance.9 The formation
of such a sphere of autonomous self-regulation and communication points at the
same time to the on-going professionalization of scientific knowledge as a
discipline, since a necessary attribute of a profession is the presence of autonomous
norms of self-regulation (Jackson 1970; Parsons 1968). The other two types of the
international argument, on the contrary, are not autonomous, since they are either
subordinate to heteronomous aims (the pragmatic type) or are are based on a latent
recognition of authority or appeal to it (the reputational type).
We can fix the formation and development of the communicational type of
international argument in philosophy and the humanities by noting its use within

Footnote 7 continued
unity of knowledge and freedom, i.e., on the fundamental principle of reason. However, in the Romantic
and Enlightenment interpretation, ‘‘reason’’ means, among other things, that very ‘‘universality’’ which
lies in the very word ‘‘university,’’ the universe of knowledge and culture. As it turns out, however, in the
strange processes of modernization, it, the ‘‘universal university,’’ constantly produces its non-universal
counterparts—local, provincial educational institutions, which arise in its image and likeness and which
transform the central questioning into generally well-known theses, into ‘‘prestigious’’ quotations for the
provinces’’ (K’osev 2002, 96).
8
Cf. ‘‘Now as before, we, wishing to be philosophers, must be, above all, Westernizers. We must
recognize that however significant and interesting individual Russian phenomena may be within the scope
of scientific philosophy, philosophy, being initially Greek, is presently primarily German. This is shown
not so much by contemporary German philosophy itself, but by the indubitable fact that all contemporary
original and significant philosophical thought in all countries bears the obvious stamp of German
Idealism. On the other hand, all attempts at philosophical creativity that ignore this legacy are unlikely to
be recognized as truly significant and genuinely productive.’’ ‘‘From the Editorial Staff,’’ Logos:
Meždunarodnyj ežegodnik po filosofii kul’tury, 1910, #1. Reprinted edition, M: Territorija buduščego,
2005, 13.
9
K.-O. Apel has explicitly formulated a communicational-interpretive conception of scientific
knowledge (see Apel’ 2001). This conception allows us to impart a meaningful and normative character
to a communicational international argument, although in terms of its meaning this normativity cannot be
reduced to a factual state including international scientific communication. (We cannot exclude the
possibility that the factual state of international communications at a particular moment can conflict with
the situation of an ‘‘ideal communicational community of scientists and scholars’’). However, although
such a possibility cannot be ruled out, it can be considered extremely unlikely under the current historical
conditions.

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major philosophical debates. By doing so and analyzing cases of its actual use in
nineteenth century German philosophy, we minimize the impact of the ‘‘catching-
up’’ economy, where we find the communicational type of international argument
most often used. As our starting point, let us take the case of the intense polemics
Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798–1854) aimed at post-Kantian German absolute
idealisms.
Beneke’s position in nineteenth century German philosophy is paradoxical. On
the one hand, in a polemic against Kant and German absolute idealism he proposed
a philosophy based on the retrospective empirical study of consciousness. This
project has to be seen as one of the most influential of its kind in view of its long-
term effects within nineteenth century German philosophy.10 All major critics of
psychologism, including W. Windelband and E. Husserl, recognized Beneke as the
founder of a radical version of psychologism. Beneke’s influence in pedagogy was
no less significant. At the same time, his direct polemic against classical German
philosophy, despite its sharp tone, anticipated many of the subsequent forms of such
criticisms, though it found no success in his own day. In fact, we never encounter
Beneke’s name in historical surveys devoted to the ‘‘collapse’’ of Hegel’s
philosophy. Moreover, his criticism had the effect of arousing a negative reaction
from the philosophical community, both from Hegel himself as well as from other
representatives of German academic philosophy, who accused him, for example, of
being ‘‘unscrupulous’’ (Karl Rosenkranz). This reaction had quite negative
consequences for his university work: on two occasions his right to teach at a
university (venia legendi) was withdrawn.11 In connection with this, Beneke, who
contributed significantly to introducing British psychology and the ideas of the first
positivists into the German philosophical context, sought to utilize an international
argument in his polemical works. A striking example of this is his Kant und die
philosophische Aufgabe unserer Zeit, which was published to mark the fiftieth
anniversary of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Beneke presents a detailed critical
analysis of Germany’s isolation Germany in from international scientific activity at
the beginning of the 1830s. Proposing to analyze the influence of Kant on German
philosophy from this point of view, Beneke notes:
… as a consequence of the hegemony of Kantian philosophy and the
philosophical themes arising from it, a complete split has occurred in
philosophical research between us and all other nations. Even in the middle of
the previous century, we see how all nations cooperated with each other both
in the sciences as well as in philosophy. … Such cooperation still exists at
present between other philosophically educated nations. Only we Germans are
excluded from this union as if insurmountable barriers separated us from all
other nations. … Not for twenty or perhaps thirty years have we come out with

10
Here, however, it is only a matter of an anticipation of psychologism, rather than of its direct influence,
which he never had on the chief representatives of psychologism in the second half of the nineteenth
century.
11
For a presentation of the various accusations against Beneke and an analysis of the role of his works in
nineteenth century German academic philosophy, see Köhnke (1986, 69–88).

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a single translation or even any detailed examination of a foreign philosoph-

ical work (Beneke 1832, 7–9).
We can take this criticism of one national philosophical scene, isolated from the
international communication network, as the first use of the international
communicational argument in philosophical polemics. Beneke appeals neither to
the pragmatic nor to the reputational aspects of the international scene, focusing his
attention solely on the actual state of the connection between the German and the
foreign communication networks in philosophy at a time when the res publica
literaria of the Enlightenment was already in the past. Beneke does not stop with the
split between the German and the international communication network but points
out that the existing situation has a progressively negative impact on philosophical
communication within Germany itself. In particular, it leads to a fragmentation of
domestic communication and as a consequence comes at a cost to philosophy’s very
reputation.
The esteem in which philosophy is held is lower with us than anywhere else.
… For twelve years already not a single journal devoted exclusively to
philosophy has survived beyond its first issue; philosophical articles almost
never appear in other journals, and should it happen … they are set aside
unread. In philosophical works (the number of which is ever declining), an
author, in the best case, cites the works of the school to which he belongs, but
for him the others do not exist. The situation has already deteriorated to the
point that no polemics are even possible between the opposing parties. Any
common ground between them has been lost. For one, what is white is for the
other black, beginning with the most fundamental concepts and theses. The
language of one school is absolutely unintelligible to the others. Soon the
point will be reached where everyone will start talking only to oneself (Beneke
1832, 10–11).
Beneke concludes, ‘‘Therefore it is high time that we become aware of the havoc
that for so long already has prevailed with the Highest and Holiest among us, under
the pretext of presenting the inner essence of all things in its purest truth’’ (ibid, 11).
Despite the fact that Beneke gives the most striking example of the commu-
nicational type of international argument, his use of it, as we have already noted,
had significant negative consequences, including the accusations of lacking
patriotism for his homeland. Klaus Christian Köhnke cites in this connection a
snide remark occurring in a German work on the history of philosophy from 1851
according to which ‘‘the birth of this sensualist in a German city was a mistake’’ and
that his sympathies were not at all connected with Germany or Berlin, where he was
born (Köhnke 1986, 72). The situation, however, changed at the end of the
nineteenth century, which change, on the whole, correlates with the rapid
internationalization of scientific communication at the turn of the nineteenth–
twentieth centuries, as described above. A striking example of the effectiveness of
the communicational type is its use by Hermann Ebbinghaus in his polemical work
‘‘Über erklärende und beschreibende Psychologie’’ (Ebbinghaus 1984 (1896)),
aimed against Wilhelm Dilthey’s project for a ‘‘descriptive and analytic psychology

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(Dilthey 1990 (1894)). Dilthey did not respond to this criticism, and there was an
interruption for many years in his creative work. Disciples and contemporaries alike
saw this as marking a definite break with his previous work. The point here
obviously lies not only in the personal reaction keenly felt by Dilthey.12 His trauma,
by the way, was so intense that he refused even Theodor Lipp’s invitation to speak
at the Third International Congress of Psychology (Munich 1896) owing to his
unwillingness to meet Ebbinghaus there.13 In the eyes of the professional
community, Ebbinghaus actually scored a well-reasoned victory in this dispute.
The opinion of Edmund Husserl, who in an early period developed his own version
of a ‘‘descriptive psychology,’’ is important. In his lectures on phenomenological
psychology, he calls Ebbinghaus’s objections to Dilthey’s work ‘‘brilliantly
written’’ and states the outcome of this polemical attack: ‘‘In any case, success
was at first on the side of experimental psychology—even in the eyes of non-
participant philosophers’’ (Husserl 1968, 20/14).
Ebbinghaus’s argument has a comprehensive and multi-dimensional character,
which can only be summarized here. He devotes the first part of his study work to a
detailed explication of Dilthey’s reasoning and basic critical arguments addressed to
‘‘explanatory psychology.’’ Only at the end of his summary does Ebbinghaus make
a few critical remarks, which will play a key role in his own argument further on:
• The project of a descriptive psychology does not simply supplement, but
replaces explanatory psychology.
• Descriptive psychology has a privileged epistemological status with respect to
explanatory psychology: ‘‘It strives for something else—something fundamen-
tally different and better’’ (Ebbinghaus 1984, 55).
• The project of establishing a certain quite new science is proposed: Dilthey,
according to Ebbinghaus, ‘‘at a single stroke completely alters the bounds of his
science. With this, we get too many frames (sehr viel Rahmen) but unfortunately
very few panels’’ (ibid., 56).
In the fundamental part of his work, Ebbinghaus develops and details his critical
argument against this descriptive psychology as well as other orientations as
follows:
• Psychology is developing along with the other sciences and is part of this
development Dilthey has nothing new to say in the field of psychology regarding
the need to abandon the old model of associative psychology, which rests on
mechanical metaphors taken from physics and chemistry. According to
Ebbinghaus, this model has been rejected and replaced with models drawn
from contemporary biology. Psychology, therefore, has a history of improve-
ment and is developing along with the other sciences, but this feature hardly
testifies against it.

12
In his exhaustive presentation of the circumstances surrounding this dispute Frithjof Rodi notes
Ebbinghaus’s ‘‘extraordinarily vehement polemic’’ (Rodi 1987). For a selection of materials concerning
this discussion, see also Rodi and Lessing (1984).
13
Dilthey wrote to Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg (3 March 1896) that he did not want ‘‘under any
circumstances to be in the same room with him’’ (Dilthey and von Wartenburg 1923, 210).

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• We must turn our attention to the current and thereby international state of
scientific research In part of his criticism of the old model, Dilthey contrasts
associative psychology with only one German school, namely, that of Herbart
and his disciples. He not only ignores its present state, which by no means
coincides with Herbartianism, but, bearing in mind the Herbartian model,
neglects the international character of rigorous psychological research. ‘‘Herbart
has certainly been of importance in Germany. However, his metaphysical
subtleties, his groundless fictions and his mythologies have always proved to be
an obstacle abroad. English associative psychology, on the other hand, has
acquired an international character’’ (ibid, 62). Therefore, for Ebbinghaus, a
reference to foreign science and to the state of international research in this
field is an effective technique of critical argumentation.
• Science and the scientific frame of mind are incompatible with infallibility Since
Dilthey’s project is aimed at achieving a fundamentally different standard of
validity in psychology, either it is not scientific or hopes to achieve what cannot
be achieved. (Sparing Dilthey, Ebbinghaus, by the way, chooses precisely this
version of the mitigated argument.) In fact, we are dealing here with one
formulation of the specific criterion for the falsifiability of scientific knowledge.
‘‘Dilthey’s filling in the gaps in experience is no more and no less hypothetical
than the constructions of the explanatory psychologists. On this important point,
there is not the slightest difference. Thus, again we see that filling in the gaps is
‘guesswork.’ However, where there is a guess, there can also be an incorrect
guess. No one has an advantage in guessing correctly’’ (ibid, 76). Ebbinghaus
develops the central point of his argument in connection with the central
substantive point of the discussion, namely, the question of the structure of
psychic life. The ligaments of this structure which, according to Dilthey, are
constructed by explanatory psychology, are assumed by him and must be
analytically explained.
Therefore, abstracting from the details of Ebbinghaus’s polemics with Dilthey and
considering only the key elements of his polemical strategy, it boils down to this:
Dilthey’s project for a descriptive and analytic psychology contradicts the three
fundamental characteristics of scientific knowledge: its gradual historical develop-
ment, its collegiality, which has an international character, and falsifiability
entailing the normative rejection of a privileged epistemological access to empirical
reality. This argument corresponds, on the whole, to today’s fundamental models of
demarcating science, which is understood as being historically alterable, interlinked
by means of communication, and thereby as a limited sphere of knowledge with
respect to the validity of its results (in particular where empirical reality is
concerned). Thus, the part of Ebbinghaus’s argument that includes an international
argument has neither a pragmatic nor a reputational component. It merely points out
how weak Dilthey’s position is as a result his isolation from a broader international
communicational context and his seclusion from the context of German science.
Ebbinghaus’s critique proved successful owing to one more factor having to with
one of the points in Beneke’s argument that we discussed earlier. The latter noted
that isolation from the international communicational community impacts an

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environment closed to communication, resulting in increased fragmentation even

within its own national cultural and linguistic context. In this regard, we should add
that the fact that no one sided with Dilthey in this discussion can be seen as the
result of a fragmentation similar to that which Beneke already observed. Moreover,
in the last third of the nineteenth century several basic versions of descriptive
psychology appeared that were attempts by philosophers and philosophizing
psychologists to present an approach to the study of consciousness distinct from
those of experimental psychologists drawn to naturalistic models of explanation.
Dilthey’s project is but one of these. Another is connected with Franz Brentano’s
work Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1973 (1874)), but also
with the works of his numerous students and disciples (including Karl Stumpf and
the early Husserl). Finally, a third version was elaborated in the ‘‘Munich School of
Psychology’’ of Theodor Lipps and his many students. It was the last of these which
later formed the basic skeleton of the early phenomenological movement (see Smid
1982). In other words, it was a matter of a very broad trend, Dilthey’s project being
just one version of a broad philosophical program for a ‘‘descriptive psychology’’
that prospered at the end of the nineteenth century. That Dilthey went one on one
with Ebbinghaus’ vehement criticism can be explained by the fact that he was
ignorant of the existence of similar programs in Germany and Austria. This, in turn,
illustrates, just as Beneke had indicated, the progressive fragmentation of
communication as a result of rejecting the international horizon of communication
within the sciences.
Thus, we can see at the turn of the nineteenth–twentieth centuries the presence in
the German philosophical and humanities scene of the conditions under which the
communicational type of international argument became a very effective instrument
of polemics and argument.
This conclusion is not simply one more historical illustration of the general
process of internationalization both in science and in other spheres of social life in
addition to those described at the beginning of this article. It forces us to adopt a
more critical attitude towards the commonly held thesis concerning the continuous
development of German philosophy in the period from the nineteenth century to the
rise of National Socialism in 1933. Let us present a few examples of this thesis.
H. Schnädelbach completes his analysis of German post-Hegelian philosophy at
precisely 1933 (Schnädelbach 1991). Fritz Ringer sees the problem of periodization
in a similar fashion, constructing his conception of the ‘‘German Mandarins’’ within
the period 1890–1933 (Ringer 2008). A standard contemporary German philosophy
textbook, edited by H. Schnädelbach, gives the following comment with regard to
the significance of World War I: ‘‘That 1918 in general does not present a
philosophical break can possibly be explained by the fact that following the political
disasters the Germans tried even more intensively to associate with their own
tradition, which formed them as a cultured nation’’ (Martens and Schnädelbach
1991, 13). This thesis, in our view, is true only in the sense that the German defeat
in the War also led to a distinctive mobilization of national culture around its own
tradition. However, this simply contradicts the trend towards the internationalization
of scientific communication in pre-War university science and philosophy, which

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actively and productively appealed by way of polemics to the international scientific

and philosophical context.
The disintegration of international communication on the philosophical scene
during World War I has been well documented. The active involvement of
intellectuals who formed an advocacy group in each of the belligerent countries
played in fact a significant role. ‘‘Pure philosophy goes to war’’ is how Martin
Kusch described this event.14 Rhetoric fully comparable to that found in Germany
can be found in Russia during this time (see Ern 1915). In terms of Russian–German
relations, the publication of the international yearbook on the philosophy of culture,
Logos, a unique German–Russian project, ceased production at the start of the
War.15 On the other hand, the victorious countries in the post-War period also
deliberately took steps to exclude Germany from re-establishing international
scientific relations. For example, at a conference of international scientific
organizations in London in 1918, it was decided to exclude German scholars from
international activities for twenty years (Rüegg 2004, 520). The combination of
these factors associated with World War I led to a significant lowering of
international integration of German scientists and philosophers that, in our view,
should be regarded as a critical factor in the isolation of a significant segment of
German academic science as described by F. K. Ringer among others. At the same
time, the general trend within German universities before the start of the War was
going in the directly opposite direction and was aimed at increasing the importance
of international communication. Therefore, in this respect the thesis of the
continuous development of German philosophy in the first third of the twentieth
century cannot be sustained.

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