REVISITING MAGELLAN occurred because he ignored the urgings of the six or eight men who had Stayed on to fight beside him. Faced by the onslaughts of a vastly more humerous enemy, it could be expected that at least some of them would have voiced the wisdom of withdrawing to the boats because further com tbat was pointless but, seeing him unresponsive, they then decided to save themselves. It is also entirely possible that whether fighting mad or in his right mind, he urged or ordered them to withdraw while he endeavoured to sver their retreat. The latter ppear to match more closely Pi gafeti's account because Magellan was fighting alone at the time he was struck down and according to Pigafetta “had it not been for that unfortu- nate captain, not a single one of us would have been saved in the boats, for while he was fighting, the others retired to the boats” (Pigafetta 1969: 46) In this extract from the Ambrosiana Codex text, Pigafetta must have been one of “the others Conclusion: A Local Perspective Thave argued that all the available evidence from various is contradictory and throws doubt on how Magellan met his end at Mactan Island. Most of the commentators were not present at the Mactan action and the views of others were recorded long after the battle had taken place. Pigafetta, however, seems to have been in the thick of the action. Assum- ing that Magellan did fall in the shallows at Mactan Island, not on the beach, and using Pigafetta’s own data — albeit in the form of distances measured in terms of crossbow flights ~ it appears that no European pre sent that day was close enough to the felled Magellan to witness his death of indeed to ascertain if he was in fact dead. However, itis possible that Pigafetta overestimated the distances of the long boats from the beach in terms of crossbow flights and/or underestimated the distance of Mage Jan's last stand from the shore, so that the boats were in fact closer to Ma- gellan than Pigafetta indicated. But if he was near enough to have seen Magellan felled by a blow from behind, it remains extremely difficult to understand how he or any other European observers were close enough to ‘witness what happened to Magellan after he had fallen face-down into the ‘water, or indeed to ascertain if he was in fact dead. For Nicholas of Naples (referred to above) or Pigafetta to have gained this intelligence, they ‘would of necessity have been in close proximity to the warriors milling around the fallen Magellan and exposed to their wrath. With reference to Pigafetta, he was not near Magellan because, according to the differentPHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CULTURE & SOCI interpretations of his narrative, he was either withdrawing towards the boats, in a boat or on board a ship. Nicholas of Naples* location is n known. Having argued that there is no clear evidence to indicate that any Europeans witnessed Magellan's end from close proximity, I will now ex- ine his fate from a local perspective. Unfortunately, despite legends and modem dramatic portrayals of hand-to-hand combat (asdang) and a duel (bulu) between Magelian and Lapulapu there is no evidence that the took place, Lapulapu remains an intriguing figure, the subject of uncor roborated heroic legends, folk tales and myths but sadly, not of written records, in the absence of which there is only silence fom Lapulapu’s camp. However, I will still endeavour to present a local perspective on the Mactan battle Inthe sixteenth century the capturing and ransoming of prisoners particularly valuable enemy leaders ~ were important and normal objec tives of warfare in the Visayas. Sometimes captives were sacrificed to the local gods and spirits with which the islands were believed to teem. There fore, itis possible that a wounded Magellan was not killed but captured by Lapulapu’s warrior crificial purposes. If this proposition is incor- rect, itis difficult why the warriors took so long to kill Mag particularly when, heavily outnumbered, he was facing them alone afte the withdrawal of all his men. Instead, Lapulapu's warriors waited until he was defenceless'(he haul lost his lance and was unable to draw his sword because of an arm wound, according to Pigafetta) and then they rushed him and wounded him from behind, They were certainly not cowards as various accounts refer to the determined ferocity of their attacks, so a pos: sible explanation was that they saw an opportunity to capture the powerful leader of their enemies and took it because was more valuable to Lapulapu alive rather then dead Unlike Magellan, Lapulapu seems t have made thorough preparations for the battle even though, according a legend, he knew fom a prophecy from his late father that he would beat Magellan. His warriors attacked in formation at least initially and were well equipped with large numbers of weapons with which they were able to keep up a withering bombardment of Magellan and his men. On the Mactan beach, according to Pigafetta, the Visayans were “covered by their shields. And thus defending themselves they fired at us s0 many arrows, and lances of bamboo tipped with iron, and pointed sticks hardened by fire, and stones that we could hardly defend ourselves" (Skelton 1969: 87). After being hit in the right leg by a poisoned arrow, Magellan ordered aREVISITING MAGELLAN Mactan Island. Zula said Lapulapu was preventing him from paying trib- tute to Hurmabon and requested Magellan to send him a boat and some men to fight against Lapulapu. It is not known if this was a ruse to induce Ma gellan to lose a boat and some men in an ambush, or if Zula’s request was genuine, but Magellan decided to send not one boat but three ba‘els, long boats, and a force of sixty men (including himself) to attack Lapulapy Furthermore, he decided that he would do this without the assistance of his ally the Christian king of Sugbu and apparently without Zula’s help, too. This decision was greeted by the combined opposition of Magellan’s offi cers who tried unsuecessfully to persuade him to change his mind. Events were to prove that Ma isastrously overestimated the efficacy of his own strategy and tactics against Lapulapu while fatally underestimating the odds against him Magellan set out from Sugbu for Mactan Island at midnight ji three long boats, with fifty-nine men wearing helmets and steel corselets. These corselets protected their abdomens and backs but not their legs. Their weapons included swords, lances, crossbows and hackbuts (a primi tive form of musket). The Christian king came too with a force of his war riors in local ef lan insisted that they were to take no part in the forthcoming action. to Oliveira (2002; 98), Magellan said that with divine favour there would be enough Christians “to beat all that scum.” Europeans frequently cemented alliances with new allies by de- ploying fire power against their troublesome neighbours, but with the benefit of hindsight it was very unwise of Magellan to have forbidden the Christian king from providing him with the armed assistance of his warr os and failing to co-ordinate his landing with support from Zula Magellan's force reached the shallaw waters of the big cove now called Magellan Bay at Mactan Island three hours before dawn, Their ob- jective was to compe! Chief Lapulapu of Mactan Island to obey the king Of Spain, pay tribute and accept the rule of the Christian king of Sugbu Herrera (1601: 6) states that Magellan wished to attack immediately but the Christian king, advised him to wait for daybrcak because he knew that Lapulapu's warriors had been digging trenches in which they had planted sharpeneéd sticks and he thought that the Europeans should not run the risk of attacking at night. These holes, but without the sharpened sticks, and dug between houses, are also mentioned by Pigafetta in the Ambrosians Codex. Pigafetta recorded that Magellan would not fight at that hour and instead sought to enter into negotiations with the Mactan Islanders by sending a message to Lapulapu saying that if he and his people wouldREVISITING MAGELLAN REFRENCES CITED ‘Aguas, Neves 1986 Estudos os, No 224 Lira, Portugal: Publ America Argentola, Leon de 1603 Conquista de as islas Maluccs. Fist elton. Madsid Bensavde, Joaquim 1950) The Attacks agains Portugal's Merime History. Lisbon, lair EH. and JA. Robetson (eds. nd tans ) 1909 Th ne Islands [493 ~ 189% Volume 1. Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company Blazquez y Delgado Aguilera, Anti 1922 Libro que trata del Descubrinie Correia, Gaspar THSE-1806 Lendas de Jada. Frst edition, Lisbon Feminder de Ovieda y Valdes, Gnd 1352 Segunda Porte de fa natural y gene Geis, Damino 1566, ssimo Ret Dom Manuel. First edition. Coimbra Gomara, F. Lopez de 1353 Histor Guilemaed, FH. HL 1890 Ferdinand de Mgalanes a he. Landon: George Philip and Hareta y Tordesillas, Antonio 1601 Historia Gene Madrid King of Castile 519 Latter to Ferdinand de Magalhdes and Ruy Falco,” in Blair, Helen and James Alexander Robertson (eds)PHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CULTURE & SOCIETY ing through the shallows where, by which time, Pigafetta records, he had fought for more than an hour, despite his leg wound from the poisoned arrow. Pigafetta wrote that he himself was unable to go ashore in Sugbu on 1 May 1521 because of a swelling caused by a face wound from a poi: soned arrow, suffered five days earlier during the Mactan action. Pre- sumably this facial wound did not impair Pigafetta’s observation of the Mactan battle on 27 April. Clearly then, poisons but not deadly poisons were applied to some or all of the weapons used by t ryan warrior so they may have been seeking to weaken and incapacitate some of their European foes with a view to overwhelming and capturing them as slaves and sacrifices. If Magellan was captured still alive and wounded, why then did not Lapulapu ransom him? Pigafetta tells us that after the battle ‘he Christian king (with our consent sent to tll Cose of Mattan that if ‘would give us the bodies of the captain and dhe other dead men, we would give dhem as mich merchandise desired And they ansvcred that they would not give up such a man, as we supposed, and that they would not give him up forthe greatest riches inthe world, but they intended 1 keep him asa perpetual memorial (Skelton 1969: 89), “They would not give up the body of such a man, as we supposed did that mean that Lapulapu understood that the Europeans supposed Magellan was dead when in fact he was alive? It is u1 that th Visayans would have risked ransoming as determined a foe as Magellan for fear that he would initiate another attack on th might have sacrificed him to their spirits as was their custom with some captured enemies, thereby rendering him a perpetual memorial in terms of their own culture. A leader of the obvious status, spirit and bravery of Ma- gellan would have been a very powerful offering to placate and please the deities who had given the victory to Lapulapu and his warriors. Another reason for sacrificing Magellan would have been as an act of revenge be cause of his earlier destruction of the settlement ¢ quent attack on the Mattan settlement, an act k Buillaia and his subse- aggression that resulted in -l loss of life, the burning of buildings and perhaps the cutting down of coconut palms. According to William Henry Scott, “retaliation for injuries was not only 2 matter of revenge but a preventive measure to discourage repetition of the offence. Failure to take revenge not only suggested a ti midity which invited further enemy action, but ran the risk of supernatural punishment by the spirits of unavenged relatives” (Scott 1994: 153). As aREVISITING MAGELLAN ‘men that had later fled from the beach when Magellan ordered a with- drawal, it may be assumed that after transporting them back to the ships the boats had returned to the shallows at approximately the same distance from the shore as the original dawn disembarkation point ~ about two crossbow flights from the beach (using the Skelton/Ambrosiana data men- tioned above in this paragraph). My reasoning here i that according to Pigafetta even at a distance of about a mile from the beach the water only reached the knees of Magellan's party. Pigafetta never mentioned or hinted that subsequently the boat crews attempted to row their craft clo to Magellan's position, so it is unlikely that the boats were able to ap- proach Magellan's position because the sea was too shallow. Furthermore, the seabed was littered with hidden hazards in the forms of irregular rocky and probably coral protuberances that could have grounded or damaged the boats.* In addition to these underwater dangers, a further factor influ encing the position of the boats was that their crews would of necessity have stayed well out of range of the attacking Visayans’ long-range weap ons — particularly their arrows as well as their stones and spears, There fore, if Pigafetta's account ig accurate (in the R.A Skelton edition), the men who were with Magellan in the shallows must have reached the ships and not the long boats by the time the Captain-General was struck down, which meant that they and Pigafetta were well over half a mile from their leader when he fell. This was because the ships were in deeper water fur ther away from’ Magellan’s position than the long boats. Even in a long boat, Pigafetta would have been positioned at a distance of around half a mile or slightly less from Magellan. Therefore, it would have been ex tremely difficult if not impossible for Pigafetia and the other survivors to have seen exactly how Magellan died, particularly as there was a crowd of attacking warriors milling around him in the water. An accurate picture conveyed from a careful analysis of Pigafetta’s data and envisioned from his location, is of a melée of distant warriors, attacking someone lying in the water. A different and somewhat contradictory impression is given in the Ambrosiana Codex text in which Pigafetta’s (1969: 46) account of the fi nale of Magellan's last stand is recorded as. “When they wounded him, he tured back many times to see whether we were all in the boats. There- upon, beholding him dead, we wounded retreated as best we could to the boats which were already pulling off” In the first sentence, Pigafetta may have meant that Magellan was looking back to check if his men where withdrawing to the boats but he did not say this. Instead, Pigafeta’s firstPHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CL obey the king of Spain, recognize the Christia tribute, then they should be friends. Interestingly as no menti baptism The tribute was three pigs, three goats and three sacks of ri There was 4 sting in the tail of Magellan’s message because accordin Pigafetta, that if Lapulapu and his people acted otherwise “the would learn by experience how our lances pricked” (Skelton 1969: 8 Again according to Pigafetta, the reply from Mactan Island was “that th had bamboo lances hardened in fire and stakes dried in fire and th were to attack them when we would” Thus, Lapulapu was provided with forewarning of the 1g attack by Magellan. Furthermore, Magellan’s hips had not yet arrived from Sugbu so the landing would take place without supporting cannon fire, but Magellan would not wait. He c the attack to commence at daybreak on 27 April without the advant surprise and at low water pout two crossbow flights from the shore ut a mile"? — the became too shallow and rocky for the long boats to proceed furthe A crossbow flight is the dis a crossbow bolt (or arrow) covers fi the point it is fired until it falls to the earth. This distance, the shallow wa. and the underwater obstacles are important to the argument pi below. Leaving eleven men to guard the boats, Magellan with the rem: ing forty-eight men leapt into the sea. Their objective was to att settlement of Mattan on Mactan Island (written as Matan and Mattan I land in Pigafetta’s text but as Mattam on his maps). As they waded slow ashore (for more than two crossbow flights in the Ambosiana Codex), probably stumbling over rocks, coral and unevenness on the seabed, the ‘would have been in full view of watchers on the shore who kn Magellan was attacking them, Eyewitness accounts of that followed differ. For example, Bautista, believed by w why ¢ clash of arms some to be the ‘Genoese pilot” (although Leon Pancaldo is another candidate) say number of attacking warriors were three or four t considerably more than stated by Pigafetta in different versions of his text ‘one thousand and fifty persons (R.A Skelton edition) and 0% hundred warriors (Ambrosiana Codex text). As rly impossible and it was (and is) not unusual in warfare for eyewit nesses to exaggerate the strength of their enemie estimated by Bau caution. However, wh: warriors considerably outnumbere: he ousand strong. Thi n accurate tally was the number of warriors nd Pigafetta should be treated with number, it is likely that Lapulapu’s Magellan's small forcePHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CULTURE & SOCIETY sentence indicates that the wounded Magellan was still alive after his re ‘eating companions reached and boarded the boats. However, the second sentence states he was dead before they reached the boats. This opens the possibility that some or all of Magellan’s companions could have been lose enough to see him struck down as they retreated towards the boats. Thus there appears to be a contradiction between the two sentences. Does this ambiguity reflect difficulty Pigafetta encountered when describing the events around Magellan's end in terms that would be acceptable to hi readers? Other crises that could have attracted criticism of the Captain: General's conduct such as the mutiny at Port San Julian and his decision 28 26 April to launch the raid on Mactan Island, received scant mention or were glossed over by Pigafetta who seems to have viewed Magellan through rose-coloured spectacles. urther doubis may be shed on the accuracy of Pigafetta’s account because he was writing as a Renaissance courtier in an epic-heroie style in the tradition of chivalric romance, so Magellan's death is presented as no ble and heroic as he stands “firmly like a good knight” fighting brav alone to the last. Resil B. Mojares (2002) describes Pigafetta's text in terms of “its epic-heroic intention to elevate and heighten the action, a ‘mode that connects it to the tradition of the chivalric romance.” Tt would have added credibility to Pigafetta's romantic and heroic version of Magellan's last stand ifthe last six or eight of his companions were de picted as fleeing for their lives or abandoning him to his fate ~ even if Magellan had ordered them to leave him. ‘Similarly, it would have been embarrassing for Pigafetta to have admitted that he did not know exactly how his revered leader had met his end, alone in the shallows at Mactan Island ‘There is also the matter of Magellan's psychological state during the fight at Mactan Island, where a significantly larger force of Visayan warriors had forced the Europeans onto the defensive, then compelled ‘most of them to flee, while six or eight men with the Captain-General withdrew more slowly from the beach into the shallows where he made a last stand, Magellan may have been an exceptionally brave and stubborn ‘man but he was exhibiting irrational behaviour by trying to prevail against hopeless odds. He might also in the mental state known as fighting mad” ~ a condition in which combatants have been observed to fight extremely fiercely, sometimes oblivious of their wounds and unde- tered by the strength of the opposition they encounter. If a fighting mad Magellan was left alone in the shallows at Mactan Island, this might haveISITING MAGELLAN 317 llan not perished at Mactan Island but had returned to Spain having achieved the main objectives of the 1519 expedi umely having confirmed the location of at least some parts of Asia as Spanish territory with reference to the Treaty of Tordesillas — particularly the Spice Islands ~ and having yielded a substantial profit in the form of a cargo of spices and made Christian converts), these successes would have provided the rationale for a further voyage or voyages. Regarding the objectives of 4 future expedition to the Philippines, it may be speculated that in addition exploration, trade and missionary activity, Magellan could also have proposed to the Spanish king the territorial occupation and settlement Cebu as the hub of these activities. The islands that he had “discovered Charles V in the archipelago would have given Magellan the opportu y to stake his claim to two of them, rich in wealth and opportunities for himself, with Cebu as one of these. Protection for his interests could have een provided by a Spanish military presence and a network of alliances with local rulers, such as Rajahs Humabon of Cebu and Colambu from Mindanao with both of whom he was already kast-hasi — a blood brother If Cebu was selected by Magellan for his own and or Spain's ambi ms, what was his view of the significance of Mactan Island? Was this the second island chosen by Magellan? Given its small size, lack of trad ing facilities, absence of mineral wealth and infertility it is unlikely that he would have wanted it for himself’ However, the immediate proximity of Mactan Island clearly posed a challenge to the position Magellan had e ablished on Cebu ~ particularly in the trading por of Cebu, and to his ally, Rajah Humabon. Therefore, Magellan probably viewed Lapulapu's sistance on Mactan Island as a challenge that must be resolved in crdes © achieve his own plans for Cebu and possibly to set a decisive mili Precedent to deter other chiefs elsewhere who might have considered op posing him and Spain for teritoral, political, religious or economic ree It is imteresting to speculate that had he survived, where would Magellan have looked for his second island — perhaps Mindanao? Incen tives already existed there for exploration because he had been informed Of the existence of much gold on this island and he was the blood brother of Rajah Colambu of Butuan The Location of the First Mass With regard to the location of the first Mass in the Philippines, theREVISITING MAGELLAN first Mass held in the Archipelago of San Lazaro. While it is clearly stated by Pigafetta that a Mass was held on M zava on Sunday 31 March 1521, he does not indicate that it was the fis Mass to be held in the Archipelago of San Lazaro. A Mass would have taken place earlier to give thanks for the safe arrival of the three ships after the hardships of the voyage across the unexpectedly vast Pacific. Further: more, it is clear from Pigafetta’s account that Magellan took his religious ‘observances seriously and the presence of a priest ~ father Pedro Val derama ~ with the expedition and the availability of a portable altar would have made possible the holding of frequent Masses. Therefore, it would have been normal for Magellan to attend Mass at any opportunity if not daily, as he did at Cebu. Regular religious observances were the expected and assumed norm, but in addition it is important to note that the atten dance at Mass on Sabbath days was compulsory for Roman Catholics in order to avoid committing a mortal sin. Therefore, the first Mass must have taken place before the end of March because two Sabbaths occurred between Magellan's landfall in the Archipelago on Saturday 16 March 1521 and the Mass recorded by Pigafetta over two weeks later, on Sunday 31 March 1521, at Mazaua. These Sundays fell on 17 March and 24 March respectively. On 17 March Magellan landed on Acquada, the pre sent day Homonhon Island where for a week he went ashore daily to at tend to his sick crew members. A Mass or Masses would have been heard for the sick so it is extremely likely that Masses were held frequently, per haps daily during the weck spent on Homonhon, which the Europeans called the “Watering-place of good signs.” Mass would certainly have been held on Sunday 24 March, the day before the fleet sailed for Lima- awa. Had Mass not been held for some extraordinary reason during the ‘week on Homonhon, Pigafetta would surely have recorded this for poster ity. For example, he noted departures from usual Roman Catholic obser- vances, notably eating meat on Good Friday, 28 March 1521 at Limasawa Given the omnipresent place of religion in the lives of sixteenth century Europeans, Magellan's practice of regularly attending Masses, the desire to give thanks for the safe landfall after the hardships of the Pacific voyage, and the compulsory nature of Sabbath divine worship, the first Mass would have taken place in the two week period between 16 March and 31 March 1521. Therefore, my conclusion is that the first Mass to be held in the Archipelago of San Lazaro was on board ship, shortly after the expedition’s landfall on 16 August 1521 off Samar, or when the members of the expedition from the three ships could be first assembled ashore onREVISITING MAGELLAN slow withdrawal and Pigafetta wrote: “thus for the great number and stones that they threw against us we could not resist” (Skelton 1969 88), Most of Magellan's men fled in the face of this furious onslaught but his decision to fight on with a handful of others and then alone, would have improved the Visayan warriors’ chances of capturing Magellan alive One of the ways of doing this would be by the infliction of an incapacitat ing wound — such as a thrust in the back of the leg. It is possible that Lapu lapu delivered this thrust (probably with a kampilan or perhaps a large and not with a javelin or scimitar as European translators thought) al- though there is no evidence to indicate the warrior was Lapulapu, as the name of the individual who struck the blow is unknown, Whether or not Lapulapu felled Magellan, he could have included Magellan’s capture in his battle plans because according to Sebastian del Cano, the Mactan chieftain “was great! smed as a fine man in the arts of war” (Fernan ez de Ovieda y Valdes 1552). It seems Lapulapu had prepared well for the conflict and he could have had, as an objective, the seizure of the leader of his enemies With reference to Lapulapu wishing to capture Magellan (and per haps some of his men), there is also the matter of the poisons with which the Visayans coated their weapons. According to William Henry Scott weapons such as the kris and the kampilan were “coated with poison be- fore going into battle" (Scott 1994 148). Arrows and spears could be simi: larly treated. Some of these poisons were deadly and could kill or incapacitate within a short time. For example, hulit was a snake venom ison. Other herbal po 10 dangerous that even a small scratch from a weapon could kill a man, Obto or Ubto (“high noon") was sc named because the life expectancy for a wounded opponent would not ceed half a day. There ig no reason to assume that Lapulapu and his Visayan warriors were unfamiliar with such poisons and yet S Pigafetta were both able to remain in action after being wounded by poi: soned weapons. Furthermore, many of the survivors of the landing party were also wounded. Of the forty-eight men — not including M involved in the Mactan Island landing, six, seven ot eight were killed, ac cording to different accounts, and many of the survivors were wounded. Assuming that at least some of these wounded men were struck by po: soned weapons, they were still able to escape, As for Magellan, according to Pigafetta the Captain-General was wounded in the right leg by a poi soned arrow while on the beach at Mactan Island. Yet Magellan was still able to continue fighting until he was finally struck down after withdraw:REVISITING MAGELLAN Seat, William Hear 1994 Barangay: Siaterth Century Philipine ety, Quezon City: Ateno de Manila University Press 1992 coking for the Prehspanic Filipina, Quezon City: New Day Publish tion, RA. (tans. and e 1969 Magelian’s Voyage: A Narrative Account tion. New Vork: Dover Publication Tomo Sanz, Leandro A Viagem de Pertao de Magallates © Quesidao das Moluceas,” AcPHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OP CULTURE & SOCIETY iling fom Spain to the Philippines was remarkable when viewed in terms of the inaccurate geographical/cartographical data and the primitive navigational technology available in 1519. However, his expedition was not entirely a journey into the unknown because he had the advantage of first-hand experience of some of the waters of Southeast Asia, and Tancisco Serrdo, based in the Moluccan Spice Islands, served him as a Portuguese source of information Magellan believed that the Moluccas lay wi pain’s global sphere of influence as defined by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. Ac cording to Leon de Argensola (1603), Magellan used a world map made by Pierre Regnel and letters from his friend Francisco S in the Moluccas to convince the Spanish king of the validity and viability of Spain’s claim to the Spice Islands. Argensola’s reference to Pierre Regnel’s world map may be erroneous with regard to its existence at that time, as the cartographical reference used by Magellan was probably tha of Martin Behaim. In addition to theoretical knowledge from (inaccurate) maps and globes, Magellan could claim practical experience of Southeast Asia obtained from his voyages to the great trading port of Malacca and to the Moluccan Spice Islands. In 1508 he sailed to Malacca from Cochin on India’s Malabar Coast, Later, in 1511 he was a member of Alfonso de Al uquerque’s expedition which gained control of Malacca. After this, Ma. gellan made @ voyage to the Mohiceas in 1511-1512. There is conjectare that Magellan algo visited the Philippine archi at this time. Some nmentators clearly thought Magellan was fa with the Philippine gion. Charles Parr (1953) theorised that Magellan “probably cesste about the Philippine Archipelago” during his time in Malacca According to Ginés de Mafra, a sailor with Magellan's 1519 expedition, the Captain General's arrival in the Philippines was not a coincidence because Ine Knew about the culture existing in the archipelago and the local geogra, “William Henry Scott observed that in 1519 Magellan mt Jef Spain with instructions to find a new route tothe Spice Islands, i covered the strait which bears his name, and headed across the Pactne on course of northwest by west. When he came to the equator he Strangely didnot veer west in search ofthe Moluccas he Knee te tae that fine, rather he continued on and only changed course whee fe ‘cached the lati of Luzon and ten headed forthe Philippines (Sen 1992: 32PHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CULTURE & SOCIETY arguments advanced by the prospective proponents of the Limasawa ver sus Butuan camps focus on differing interpretations of maps and different translations of Antonio Pigafetta’s Relation of Magellan's voyage. Peter Schreurs has written extensively on this subject and concludes: “for any body guided by the proper translation of the Pigafetta text and the proper bibliographic and cartographic information, the controversy between Ma: zaua/Limasawa and Masao/Butuan is irrefutably decided in favour of Li masawa” (Schreurs 2000a: 33; also see Schreurs 1998). While agreeing with Peter Schreurs that a Mass was held on Limasawa in March 1521, a case that Limasawa was not the location of the first Mass in the archip ago is presented below. Regarding the date of the first Mass, I am aware of the point regarding the difference of a day in the dates given by Pigafetta because the concept of the International Date Line was not understood at the time of Magellan’s expedition, but a day's difference does not chal: lenge my argument In reconsidering the location of the first Mass in the Archipelago of San Lazaro, it is clear from Pigafetta’s account that he was not a con prehensive but a selective chronicler of the events that occurred on Magel an’s voyage and he did not record chronologically the occurrence of Masses. The holding of a Mass per se would not have been deemed wor- thy of special attention because it was a familiar and regular event in the ves of Magellan and his crew. Regular religious observances were tl expected and assumed norm and were usually recorded by Pigafetta in the context of noteworthy events germane to his narrative. For example, he notes daily attendance at Masses at the church of Our Lady of Barrameda where Magellan ordered all members of the expedition to confess them selves before the fleet's departure from Spain in September 1519 records the Mass on Mazaua which was held on ai date, Sunday 31 March 1521, Easter day d he important religious With regard to the latter, the Mass is also significant in the context of two other noteworthy religious events namely, the attendance and behaviour of the two Rajahs ~ Colambu and Siaui - at the Mass and the subsequent erection of a cross. It may be deduced that it was not the Mass per se that induced Pigafetta to record these events in his account of what transpired at Mazaua. Pigafetta also ‘mentions Masses in the context of the baptisms and conversions that took place in Cebu in April 1521, where Magellan went ashore daily to attend Mass. This daily religious observance is a clear statement of the regularity with which the Captain-General attended divine service and is directly relevant t0 a point that is developed below regarding the location of thePhilippine Quarterly of Culture & Society REVISITING MAGEL! TO THE PHILIPPINES Richard J. Field Introduction The purpose of this paper is to examine Magellan’s reasons for be in the archipelago and to present new perspectives on two issues cen: to the history of Magellan's voyage to the Philippines, namely: the location and date of the first Mass and Magellan's fate at Mactan Island ir April 1521 Magellan’s Reasons for Being in the Archipelago of San Lazaro Ferdinand Magellan is widely regarded as having been an out standing seaman and navigator, Various commentators present this view of whom Admiral Morison (1974)! and Fernando Oliveira (2002)? are ex: amples Magellan benefited from Portugal’s maritime heritage for as Joa quim Bensaude observed: “the intensive navigation of the Southern Seas after 1471, and the genesis of the nautical sciences in 1484, are exclu sively Portuguese results and have enabled the circumnavigation of the globe by Fertlao de Magalhiies” (Bensaude 1950: 4). However, Magellan did more than follow in the footsteps of earlier Portuguese mariners be cause he ventured into uncharted waters by sailing not eastwards, but westwards to Asia, To put his achievement into context, his voyage over vast distances through some of the stormiest seas on earth and actoss the world’s largest ocean was an epic feat of exploration. His seamanship in Richard ) Field gained a master's degree in international history atthe Univer sity of London and was subsequently employed ia the Diplomatic Service He ta worked in academic publiding and as a history teacher. In 2006 he wrote sixteenth century history. He can ber pone. He specializes in research on at richard 6a freeuk comThe resulting landfall presented Magellan with explore the islands north of the Moluccas a pine archipelago. It would have been a c ered an island or islands rich in spices t seemed to have been looking for sc journ on Homonhon, Magellan sh cloves, cinnamon, pepper, ginger he sailed through the Philip up for Magellan had s qual those in the Moluccas. He ces of spices because during his s wed some local visitors samples of nutmeg and mace. According to Ante nio Pigafetta, the “visitors made signs to us that the above said article grew in the place where we were going (Pigafetta 1969; 24-25) * Thi place may have been the Moluccas but the visitors could have ring to the availability of spices in the Philippine arch Whether or not Magellan was deliberately sailing for the Philip pines in 1521, he may have heard of the archipelago during his Southeast Asia or later when he had an in situ source of regional inform tion in the person of his friend, Francisco Serrio. Magellan certainly took imto account the existe ¢ of unknown or unclaimed islands ning his voyage westwards from Spain in 1518. This is revealed by the ‘agreement which he and Rui Falero (spelt Ruy Faleiro and Rui Faller i some documents) made with the king of Spain in 1518 stated that if the expedition discovered more than would select six of them for himself two from which they would enjoy when plan This agreemen ix islands, the k d Magellan and Falero could chose uubstantial revenues.® Alt agreement did not mention it, these two islands w cated in the Moluccan Spi ugh the wuld not have been k e Islands because they and 1 lands were already claimed, although mostly unoccupied, by the Portuguese.” This meant that even if Portugal's claim to the Moluccas was refuted as a result of Magellan's voyage, their existence would already have been known to the Spanish crown, leaving Magellan and Falero with no basis for claiming two of the Spice Islands (in the unlikely event that their claim would anyway have been politically and practicably feasible) However, fiom his earlier Southeas’ ighbouring is. Asian experience in the service of Portugal and with Francisco Serrio based in the Moluccas as a source of information, Magellan was well placed to establish the names and loca tions of the islands already claimed by the Portuguese. Furthermore, any new islands that Magellan found would be, by definition, Spanish territory assuming his voyage confirmed their positions within Spain’s sphere of global interest. Therefore, Magellan was no doubt fully aware that any hopes of territorial gain for himself would have been over islands other than the Moluccas and moreover that were unknown to the Spanish crown,PHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CULTURE & SOCIETY am quite well assured by those actually been there that the ‘Maluco Spice Islands ae tic in spices ~the chic article sought by the said fleet, | order you, the Said Ferdinand de Magalldins to pursue a direct course 1 the above mentioned lands, exactly as | have told and commanded you, and | ocd you all individvally and collectvely...hat frst and foremost, before sailing elsewhere, you proceed without f {o the said Malco Islands, for inthis wise do you perform our service. After ‘may seck other suitable things in accordxce with your crders and none of you shall act, ntraryto this our will, in any manner, under penalty of loss of property and life” (eter to Magellan and Faleo of Charles V, king of Castile, 19 April 1519, see Blair and Robertson 1909: 254 * igafea stated that gold and ginger were avilable on Cebu but he did not enton cinnamon. However, he gives 4 local word for cinnamon (mana) in th lists immediately fllowing his account ofthe events in Cebu (Pigafeta 1969: 48), Pre sumably, then, cianamou was sown of known and traded in " Recording the landing on Homention afer the landfill st Sama on 16 March 1521, Pigafeta wrote: "The Caplain-Goneral decided 10 land on aniber island which ‘uninlabited in oder tobe more secure and to get wate and ave some rest” (Pigafetia "Writing of the marooning on Patagonia, Corea sid “Then he put two priest (on land who ad taken part in the muti "magellan and forty-eight of is men lesped into the water knee to thigh deep, and slowly waded toward shore ‘The other eleven Spaniards guarded ood by, distant fom the beach ‘two ressbow Might" 4 ile over a mie 1974: 429). Manuscript 5,650, die National Library, Pais, quoted in no in Pigateta (1906) “au dayoceak we advanced more than thee throws ofan arow before re ing the shoreline” (Levesque 1980: 60), This source isa translation from carly French manuscripts 5.6 ibliodieque Nationale, Paris and f 1.103 Sup Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan aly when day came, we leapt into the water, being forty-nine went a distance of two crossbow flights before we could ‘could not come farther inshore becanse of the rocks ands (Skelton 1965 87). i the boats stones that were in the waterREVISITING MAGELLAN form of trop! fat Mactan Island, a captured Magellan could thus have been sacrificed for reasons of revenge and to placate the wrath of the spirits. In this way, Magellan would have been more valuable to Lapulapu as a sacrificial captive than as a corpse ENDNOTES Admiral Morison gives a deuiled account of Magean’s voyage with high ‘raise for Magellan's seamanship and maritime experince “Olivera says Magellan was “a man well versd in the art of navigation and osmography’" (200 Par put forward a theory that Magellan had visited the Philippines previously sad bad understanding withthe Spanish king regarding exploring and claimin the Philipines for himself and Spain (Parr 1953: 126, 380-354) “According to Ginés de Matra, Magellan's “utival inthe Philippines was not 2 caincidence, he kxew about the culture existing in the Philippines and the geographi «eal condition of the place to where he sil his ships” (Schreurs 2000b: 102) Schreurs sites Tomo Sanz (1979), showed them all his merehan- , cinnamon, pepper, singe, nutmey, mace, gold and all dhe things in the ip. They made signs to us thatthe abave said articles grew in the place where we w ‘oing.” [These articles must have been brought fom Spain for this moment - 6) To help you more, i is our will hat of thes islands that you discover afte first choosing six for ws, om the rest you may pick two from which you may ge th fifteenth pat of all the profits and interests in rentals and taxes, afer deducting cost (Cicuanan and Mira 1990: 4 se also Gois 1655: 96-97) Agrecmant entered into by th King of Spain nd Fernando de Magellaes and Ruy Falcir for the Voyage tothe Spice Islands, March 1518, Valladoli Referring tothe capture of Martin de Ayamonte and Bartolome de Saldala who deserted the Viciora at Timor in February 1522, Peter Schreurs wrote “Tidore (Ta doce in Pigafetta) is a small island in the northom Moluccas in today’s Indonesia. “The hole area, including Timor and the Moluccas (Maluco) was Claimed, though (except for Ternate) not yet occupied by Portugal. The exmander ofthe Portguese fort at Malaccs on the Malayan Peninsula, Jorge de Albuquerque, obviously considered i pat of his ju isdiction, and therefore intuding Spanish competitors were absolutely ot welcome there!" (Seieurs 20006, 91)PHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CI men and put them in the boats that were already leaving. And the ‘Christian king, knowing tha the captain was dead, caused the remain. der of our men, both sound and wounded to withdraw, and we were ‘constrained to Leave there the dead body of the captain-general with our other dead is reference to the boats is somewhat confusing following Pi gafetta’s earlier statement, mentioned in the paragraph above, that “we were all at the ships.” Possibly he meant boats or in the boats en route to the ships, but it is not known of course what Pigafetta stated in his original missing account. Perhaps Pigafetta meant that the boats had picked up the six or eight wounded and unwounded men (or a smaller number of surv vors), who had been with Magellan, but had not yet rowed out to the ships and only did so at the urging of the Christian king (who may have pro- vided a protective screen of his warriors to deter further attacks from Lapulapu’s warriors). Regarding these wounded survivors, Pigafetta must have been referring only to those who had retreated into the shallows with Magellan — six or eight men, or a lesser number if some were subsequently killed while fighting beside Magellan or when withdrawing to the boats His reference would not have included the other members of the landing party, wounded earlier in the fighting on the beach and perhaps in their flight back through the shallows to the boats. This is because according to Pigafetta, Magellan and the six or eight men remaining with him were ting in the shallows for well over an hour after the earlier flight 0 most of the landing party. Therefore, the wounded who fled earlier would have had ample time to wade or be carried through the sea to the long boats and be transported back to the ships, before the culminating drama of Magellan’s last stand and the withdrawal of the handful that stood with Assuming that Magellan fell in the sea where Pigafetta claims 1 Captain-General had “stood fast,” Magellan’s position was a “good cross bow flight from the shore” according to the R.A Skelton edition; the Am. brosiana Codex version describes the withdrawal as “for more than a good crossbow flight from the shore.” So Magellan's position was about half a mile, or a little over half a mile from the shore, but the long boats were approximately another half mile away because according to Pigafetta, Ma. gellan’s party had originally disembarked from the long boats at a distance (of more than two crossbow flights from the beach ~ about a mile. Another ‘account gives the disembarkation point as three arrow flights from the shore." Although no version mentions the subsequent evacuation of thePHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CULTURE & SOCIETY (hird time, the natives had armed themselves very well and when Femio de Magathies and his men had gone ashore, a great number of people attacked them. Seeing this they tried fo go back to the sea but ome fe into the fossi and all of them were killed, a total of tweat ‘men, among them Fernlo de Magalhies (Aguas’ 1986, quoted in Schrears 20008) Volume thirty-three of Blair and Robertson contains a translation ‘of manuscript 5,650 that presents a different picture as follows: “Finally having been driven quite down to the shore and while our captain was fighting bravely although wounded in the leg with an arrow, one of the Indians hurled a poisoned lance in his face laid him out stiff and dead.""" The efficacy of the poisoned weapons used in the Mactan Island action is discussed below. Another version an’s demise was pre ited to the author of this paper in an interview in C 2 with Jovito S. Abellana, who said that Magellan never reachec in Island because he was thrown over the side by his crew in the Pacific. Gas Correia’s account also had Magellan dying elsewhere, at the Sugbu on 1 May 1521 (Correi None of the accounts in the paragraph above tell exactly the same story of Magellan’s end and there ct other sources. Most arc the views of men who were not present at t Mactan battle. For example, Oliveira's version originates from an anony ‘mous survivor of Magellan’s expedition. None of the acca the slow retreat through the shallows of Mactan Island follow death in the sea which alone is Pigafetta's version. If Magellan was lled on the beach as most of the other versions appear to indicate, the a's account was a work of fiction. However, it seems unlikely that ricated his story because had he done so, after the contents of his known, he would have risked exposure from other veter- ‘ans of the Mactan action and subsequent disgrace in the eyes of the Eurc pean elite, includin n he presented an original of his Relation. Assuming a an’s with drawal through thi of Mactan Island, what then is the signif. ‘cance of the statement in manuscript 5,650 that Magellan was laid and dead on the shore because of a face wound from a poisoned lance? Pigafetta’s original diary was lost and of the existing accounts, the text in Htalian inthe Ambrosian Library in Milan is widely regarded as an original version, but this Ambrosiana Codex does not include the reference to Ma- sellan dying on the shore because of a stab from a poisoned lance. MorePHILIPPINE QUARTERLY OF CULTURE & SOCIETY Sunday 17 March at Homonhon Island, or during the week thereafter on the same island. Sunday 17 March at Homonhon Island was an ideal time and location” for holding the first Mass on land for a congregation assem- bled from the three ships of the expedition. By then, Father Valderama ‘was the only priest surviving to officiate at the Mass ~ Pero Sanchez de Reina and possibly Bernard Calmette having been marooned earlier in Patagonia (Correia 1858-1866: 630)."" Magellan's Fate at Mactan Island in April 1521 1 outline below the background and main events about the clash of farms between Magellan and Lapulapa at Mactan Island, Several accounts ff Magellan's end are discussed with particular emphasis on an analysis of differing versions which can be credited to Antonio Pigafetta’s text. Dis- tances, water depth and the accuracy of Pigafetta’s narrative are central to analysis. For the purposes of this paper, the Ambrosiana Codex ver: sion of Pigafetta will be regarded as the most accurate but reference is also made to the accounts based on the French translations where these mirror the Ambrosiana Codex and where significant differences merit comme: The writer concludes by presenting a local perspective on the events surrounding Magellan's fate Magellan spent three weeks (7 - 27 April) in and around Sugbu port on Cebu Island. During this time he made an ally and Spanish vassal of Rajah Humabon ~ christened the “Christian king” and the ruler of Sugbu port and of other chiefs. By so Lapulapu on nearby Mactan who appears to have coi not the Christian king, as the paramount local ruler. According to S tian det Cano, who commanded the Victoria when she completed her cir cumnavigation of the world in September 1522: “There was an island called Mauthan {Mactan}: the king of which was greatly esteemed as a fine man in the arts of war and was more powerful than all his neighbours, who responded to the envoys [of Magellan] that he was unwilling to come and do reverence to one whom he had been commanding for so long, a time” (Femandez de Ovieda y Valdes 1522). When Lapulapu refused to pay homage to the Christian king (Humabon) and pay tribute, Magellan made a first attack on Mactan Island where he destroyed the settlement of Bullaia (perhaps modern-day Buaya) and erected a cross. However, Lapu- lapu still refused to comply and on Friday 26, April 1521 Magellan re- ceived a request for help from Zula, a subordinate chief of Lapulapu of