The Importance of Un Security Council Resolutions in Peacekeeping Operations

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The Importance of UN Security Council Resolutions in Peacekeeping

Operations*
Article in Journal of Conflict Resolution · February 2022

DOI: 10.1177/00220027211044205
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The Importance of
UN Security Council Resolutions
in Peacekeeping Operations*
Michelle Benson
University at Buffalo, SUNY
Colin Tucker
University at Buffalo, SUNY
Abstract:
The influence of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in civil conflict has received important
consideration in a growing body of literature. Little research, however, has focused on UN Security
Council (UNSC) resolutions and their ability to determine and affect peacekeeping. New data on
UNSC resolutions coded to UCDP/PRIO internal conflicts with peacekeeping operations (PKOs)
is presented here. The data illustrate that resolutions vary importantly across conflicts and missions
regarding their timing, sentiment towards rebel and government factions, level of action, mandates,
authorized force levels, and substantive policies. Through a series of negative-binomial regressions
using conflict-month replication data (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 2013), we demonstrate that
PKOs with both higher troops levels and a higher intensity of anti-rebel resolutions experience a
significant reduction one-sided rebel violence against civilians. In short, UNSC resolutions differ
importantly before and during peacekeeping operations and may have an important impact on PKO
effectiveness in civil conflict.
*We would like to thank the Folke Bernadotte Academy for generous support of this data collection
project.
Introduction
Of the 210 civil conflicts which began after the establishment of the United Nations in 1946, 38
(approximately 18%) received a UN peacekeeping operation.1 The determinants of which conflicts
are ultimately selected to receive United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has
received important examination in recent literature (Gilligan & Stedman 2003, Fortna 2004b,
Mullenbach 2005, Beardsley & Schmidt 2012). Less research, however, has attempted to explain why
some conflicts receive greater attention, energy, and commitment from the UN than others.
For instance, why do some conflicts receive peacekeeping quickly, as in the case of the Ivory Coast
(with MINUCI in the early 2000s), while others languish for years until an operation is deployed, as
with Burundi (with ONUB in the late 1990s)? Why are some conflicts’ peacekeeping missions
authorized with high levels of forces, for example in Liberia (with UNMIL, carrying almost 15,000
personnel), while others are mandated half that amount, as in Sudan (with UNISFA’s total force of
4,250)? Why do some operations have multidimensional mandates that, for example, provide
security and protection of women and children specifically, while others receive no such mandate?
Why are some conflicts the focus of resolutions that rebuke or laud conflict disputants while other
conflicts receive largely sentiment-free resolutions?
These questions, and many other important issues related to the establishment and
preconditions for peacekeeping missions, often cannot be addressed in a generalized manner
without data on the content of UNSC resolutions as they relate to civil conflicts. This paper aims to
help remedy this lack through the presentation of original datasets of UNSC resolutions on UN
peacekeeping operations from 1946 to 2015. These data, which we title the “UN Peacekeeping
Resolutions” (UNPR) dataset, are coded to UCDP/PRIO civil conflicts and are operationalized at
the conflict-month and conflict units of analysis.2
1
Included in these data are variables on the number and timing of UNSC resolutions prior to
and during the establishment of UN peacekeeping operations, whether they state pro-government,
pro-rebel, anti-government, and anti-rebel sentiments, as well as the level of action that they
prescribe (e.g., “low-level” or “high-level”). The dataset further includes information on each
mission’s total authorized numbers of troops, police and observer forces; as well as their substantive
mandates. These mandates include security provisions, DDR implementation, ceasefire facilitation,
peace agreement implementation, monitoring of elections, protection of women and children,
training of domestic forces, and observation of conflict hostilities. The datasets are mergeable with
both the UCDP/PRIO datasets and other UN peacekeeping datasets, such as Kathman’s (2013)
troop deployment data.
Using these data, we provide a descriptive analysis of how the UNSC has addressed conflicts
which receive peacekeeping operations. We show that there is important variation in the timing of
resolutions, the number of resolutions, the level of resolutions, and the sentiment expressed in
resolutions both before and during peacekeeping operations. Using some of these new variables, we
employ Hultman, Kathman and Shannon’s replication data (2013) to illustrate that high levels of
troops, when paired with resolutions that condemn rebels’ actions, are associated with a decrease in
rebel one-sided violence against civilians. We suggest that much of the information contained in
UNSC resolutions on peacekeeping operations can and should be used as key variables in much of
the current research on civil conflict, peacekeeping presence, peacekeeping effectiveness, and
peacemaking.
UN Peacekeeping in Civil Conflict
The importance of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping as a global and regional tool of conflict
mitigation has only grown since the end of the Cold War as the number and intensity of UN
peacekeeping operations, especially in civil conflicts, has expanded rapidly (de Jonge Oudratt 1996,
2
Diehl 2008). Not surprisingly, the effectiveness of such peacekeeping efforts has received important
consideration in both the policy and academic literature (Diehl 2008, Diehl 1994, James 1995). While
some suggest a relatively poor record for the UN (Jones 2001, Diehl, Reifschneider & Hensel 1996,
Jett 1999, Boot 2000), others have found a mixed or more positive impact of peacekeeping missions
on civil conflict outcomes (Fortna 2004a, Fortna 2008b, Doyle & Sambanis 2006, Gilligan &
Sergenti 2008, Hultman, Kathman & Shannon 2014, Fjelde, Hultman, & Nilsson 2019, Cil et. al.
2020). A separate body of work on UN peacekeeping or peacemaking focuses on particular case
studies (Neack 1995, Howard 2008, Jakobsen 1996, von Einsiedel, Malone & Ugarte 2016). These
case studies have allowed for a necessary examination of the conflict trajectories, UN responses, and
relative successes or failures of operations. Building on this body of literature, generalized empirical
studies have attempted to distinguish the patterns that lead to peacekeeping deployments.
Undoubtedly, the nature of peacekeeping and the location of deployments has changed
dramatically over the history of the UN. The UN has evolved from an organization almost
completely focused on addressing international conflict, where there was often a clear “aggressor“ or
conflict initiator, to an organization that is increasingly focused on civil conflict (Goulding 1993,
Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Diehl 2008). However, not all peacekeeping operations are created equally.
They vary importantly with regard to their resources, attention, and mandate. The determinants of
all of these lies largely with the UNSC and their willingness to address and provide continued
support to missions. As such, the aggregate UN Security Council (UNSC) and Permanent Five (P5)
interests are key determinants of UN PKO action and effectiveness (Mullenbach 2005, Werner &
Yuen 2005, Beardsley & Schmidt 2012, Benson & Satana 2008, Benson & Kathman 2014, Allen &
Yuen 2014).
3
UNSC Resolutions in Civil Wars
No substantive UN military action is possible without the explicit support of the UN Security
Council, as expressed through a resolution. Given the institutional format of the UNSC, the process
of arriving at UNSC consensus in addressing civil war can be a long and arduous one paved by
substantial bargaining and logrolling behind the scenes. Conversely, agreement can be reached
relatively quickly given either the scope of the conflict or the absence of competing interests among
the Permanent Five (P5) member-nations (Beardsley & Schmidt 2012, Allen & Yuen 2014). The
position of the UNSC as to how to address a conflict is almost entirely and publicly expressed by
UNSC resolutions. The resolutions themselves can differ importantly in their approach toward the
conflict actors and may also differ substantially in their distribution across conflicts and within
conflicts across time. Resolutions (and their associated Secretary-General reports) may provide
important information about the level of attention to a conflict prior to peacekeeping, the
“preferences” or sentiment towards specific conflict actors, as well as the activities to occur during a
peacekeeping operation.
In determining where UN peacekeepers go, empirical work has focused largely on conflict
attributes such as the duration of the conflict, the type of civil war, the capacity of the state, and the
level and intensity of casualties (Gilligan & Stedman 2003, Fortna 2004b, Mullenbach 2005, Fortna
& Howard 2008, Beardsley & Schmidt 2012). Conflict attributes such as these, however, can only
determine part of the reason why the UN would choose to send forces to a conflict. There are
numerous conflicts, for example, with extremely high levels of both civilian and military fatalities
which have received either no, or much delayed, responses from the UN (e.g., Sri Lanka, Cambodia,
Rwanda). Meanwhile, other conflicts receive relatively quick responses with lower-levels of casualties
(e.g., the Ivory Coast).
4
The interests of UNSC member-nations weigh heavily on peacekeeping efforts. Voeten
(2001) argues persuasively that the UN is more likely to send troops when P5 members have a
strong interest in a conflict state and a credible threat of taking unilateral action towards a conflict.
Other empirical work has provided evidence that some parochial security interests to individual P5
members are associated with higher-levels of UN actions such as peacekeeping (Mullenbach 2005,
Benson & Satana 2008, Beardsley & Schmidt 2012, Allen & Yuen 2014).
Empirical study of the UNSC decision-making process, however, is largely clouded by two
factors: (1) the secrecy of the pre-resolution negotiating process and (2) the limited data available on
UNSC resolutions relating to civil conflicts. While the confidential pre-resolution decision-making
process is currently outside the realm of possible generalized, academic research, resolutions can be
coded uniformly in association with civil conflicts. Beardsley (2013) made important strides in
coding this data by creating datasets at the UNSC resolution unit of analysis from 1946-2008. The
first of these identifies the yes and no votes on a resolution by specific UNSC members. The second
codes UNSC resolutions for their target states, as well as their level of action.3 We argue that pairing
UNSC resolutions to UCDP/PRIO conflicts provides a useful extension to the body of data given
the prevalence and widespread use of the data within the conflict processes literature. In addition,
we suggest that the deep and often, complex, content of UNSC resolutions is equally useful to
researchers.
Coding UNSC Resolutions to Civil Conflict
As noted above, while prior work has coded UNSC resolutions to target countries, none has
specifically coded resolutions to conflicts. This pairing may be complicated, but we believe it is
especially important to do so for the following reasons:
• Much recent research on peacekeeping focuses on the UCDP/PRIO civil conflict rather
than conflict host-countries.
• UNSC resolutions may address a conflict spanning multiple states.
5
• UNSC resolutions may address multiple conflicts within or across states.
• UNSC resolutions may address a single, specific conflict within a state where multiple
concurrent conflicts are active between the government and different rebel factions.
In short, it is important to note that resolutions may apply to a single conflict or quite often to
several concurrent conflicts either within or across states. We code these latter resolutions as
“umbrella” resolutions and also identify when peacekeeping operations overlap as regards to their
location, conflict, and temporal range.
Coding the raw data of UNSC resolutions is a time-intensive process.4 UNPR uses several
indicators to pair UNSC resolutions with their respective UCDP/PRIO armed conflicts, including
resolution subject-lines denoting their country of origin; the dates of resolutions and the time
periods of civil conflicts; in-resolution text referencing conflict-unique factions, leaders, and UN
operations; as well as third-party reporting on resolutions by other credible sources. To ensure that
all UNSC resolutions were accurately paired with conflicts and coded for content, resolutions were
independently coded by two graduate students, drawing support from other knowledge-bases when
needed – like UCDP’s conflict encyclopedia and official UN mission websites. Any (relatively rare)
disagreements were resolved by a three-person team.5 The conflict-month dataset, a portion of
which is used here, includes 10,330 conflict-month observations, cataloging resolutions passed both
before and during all 46 peacekeeping operation for years 1946 to 2015.
After pairing resolutions with their respective UCDP/PRIO armed conflicts, each resolution
was manually read to identify and code resolution content. The language of resolutions exhibits an
explicit and standardized vernacular over time that allows relevant information to be easily identified
and coded with a high degree of confidence. In many instances, we utilized UN Secretary-General
reports and UN peacekeeping websites (websites created by the UN) to corroborate and supplement
our data-generation process. The conflict-month version includes 16 identifying variables, 11 PKO
establishment variables, 8 force-level variables, 10 mandate variables, and 36 resolution variables.
6
The UNPR codebooks provide detailed information on each variable’s description and coding
values.6 We provide some examples of the coding of variables in our discussion of the distribution
of UNSC resolution data below.
The Distribution of the Data
Resolutions Before and During Peacekeeping
An examination of UNPR data reveal that approximately 3 out of every 10 civil conflicts that began
after 1988 received a UNSC resolution.7 We also find considerable variation in the number of
resolutions taking place prior to and during peacekeeping operations. Prior resolutions in particular
can help researchers foresee if the UNSC moves immediately towards peacekeeping or attempts to
address a conflict over time using other tools at its disposal. The number of prior resolutions ranges
from 0 resolutions (e.g., prior to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African Republic) to 63
resolutions (e.g., prior to MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Further, we also code
the level of action prescribed by UNSC resolutions, as “high-level” resolutions can incur significant
costs to the UN and its member-nations, potentially providing an instrument to measure the UN’s
commitment. We define high-level resolutions as those involving the imposition or maintenance of
economic sanctions, embargoes, blockades, and outside authorizations for the use of military force.8
Meanwhile, low-level UNSC resolutions include general position statements, demands towards
conflict actors, and calls for diplomatic action and hostility restraint. While some conflicts receive no
high-level attention by the UNSC prior to the establishment of a PKO (e.g., ONUCA in Central
America), others have received extensive attention and action before their PKO’s establishment
(e.g., MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo).
Actor Sentiment in UNSC Resolutions
This dataset also allows for the examination of sentiments expressed within UNSC resolutions in
favor or against conflict actors. Specifically, it captures the presence of explicitly pro-government,
7
anti-government, pro-rebel and anti-rebel statements within resolutions. The UN employs a
standard dictionary of phrases and language within resolutions denoting lauding would include
words such as: “applauds, welcomes, commends, approves, affirms, acknowledges, notes with
appreciation, pays tribute to”; while statements condemning the actions of a disputant would
include: “deplores, condemns, denounces, deeply disturbed by, expresses concern by.” In drafting
UNSC resolutions, the government or rebel factions and their leaders are often explicitly identified
by name, allowing sentiments to be distinguished without ambiguity. Below is example of this
sentiment being displayed in UNSCR 2164, addressing one of Mali’s civil conflicts:
Pro-Government Sentiment:
“Welcoming the appointment by the Malian President on 23 April 2014 of a High-
Representative for the Inter-Malian Inclusive Dialogue and his initial efforts to consult with
national and international actors on the peace process,”
Anti-Rebel Sentiment:
“Condemning strongly the violent clashes in Kidal on 17 and 18 May 2014 in the context of
the Malian Prime Minister’s visit, which resulted in the death of Malian Defence and Security
Forces personnel, as well as eight civilians, including six Government officials, the
unacceptable seizure by the armed groups, notably the Mouvement National de Libration de
l’Azawad (MNLA), of administrative buildings,”
These sentiments are not mutually exclusive; indeed, resolutions will often laud the actions of both
parties in a conflict (e.g., while moving toward a peace agreement or period of election
implementation) or condemn both sides (e.g., for violence against each other and/or civilians). Of
high interest is when the UN, fairly or not, appears to take sides by condemning one party and
lauding the other. It is also important to note that for some conflicts, no sentiment is expressed.
Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate this point clearly by providing the number and content of resolution
sentiments prior to and during peacekeeping operations in civil conflict. For example, the data
shows that the conflict in Angola received a large number of both anti-government and anti-rebel
sentiments within resolutions prior to the establishment of MONUA, but both DRC conflicts
received primarily pro-government sentiment within resolutions before the establishment of
8
MONUSCO. In contrast, some conflicts received no expressions of sentiment prior to the
establishment of their respective peacekeeping operations.
[FIGURE 1]
[FIGURE 2]
The Timing of Peacekeeping Establishment
Beyond the number of resolutions or their expressed sentiments toward conflict actors, the
resolutions also reveal important information on the substance of peacekeeping operations. For
example, the timing of mission establishment varies greatly across conflicts. In Figure 3 below, we
graph the duration (measured in number of years) elapsed between conflict inception and
peacekeeping mission establishment for each mission. Conflict inception is defined as the date in
which a conflict endures its first casualty, as stipulated by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset.
[FIGURE 3]
The question as to why some conflicts achieve quick establishments, while others linger for
almost ten years, is an important theoretical and empirical question that has received little attention
within the literature. We should note that some of the change in response times may be due to the
“re-hatting” of regional peacekeeping operations to UN operations (e.g., AMIS to UNAMIS in
Sudan or AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali) or from conflicts inheriting previously established UN
operations that evolved from different conflicts (sometimes resulting in negative values for
establishment timing). Accordingly, our dataset includes variables describing when new
peacekeeping operations absorb previous operations. Further, our data also catalogs each instance a
9
peacekeeping operation is extended in time, as mandates are not indefinite and are capable of
expiring.
Authorized Force Levels in Peacekeeping Operations
The impact of force levels on a wide variety of conflict outcomes has been well-noted in the
literature (e.g., Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014). An important and related concept is
the number of forces mandated by the UN for conflicts. While the difference between mandated
and deployed force levels has been examined at the peacekeeping-level of analysis, it has not been
examined at the conflict-level of analysis to the best of our knowledge. As with establishment times,
authorized peacekeeping force levels and personnel type vary greatly conflict to conflict. While
deployed force levels may not reach or may exceed mandated force levels, they are nevertheless an
important indication of the willingness of the UNSC to commit to either conflict resolution or
mitigation. These data are coded through UNSC resolutions and Secretary-General reports. Figure 4
shows the total, initially authorized force levels for each peacekeeping mission. Importantly, the
underlying data (not shown here) also disaggregates these forces by personnel-type, including
military troops, police officers, and military observers/liaisons. Further, it tracks changes in the
authorized force levels over a conflict’s lifetime, noting force reductions and expansions. To our
knowledge, this is the first dataset to provide such information.
[FIGURE 4]
Substantive Mandates in Peacekeeping Operations
An important and little studied process in the quantitative literature on UN peacekeeping is the
construction of peacekeeping mandates and their substantive policies. These mandates are either
explicitly noted in the UNSC resolution that establishes the PKO or directly referenced within the
10
Secretary-General reports. We identify eight, non-mutually exclusive categories of mandates, which
include the (1) the provision of security, whether for refugees, civilians, and/or humanitarian aid
distribution, (2) the protection of women and children, (3) the general implementation of peace
agreements, (4) the implementation of cease-fires, (5) the implementation of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, (6) the implementation of elections, (7) the
training of domestic forces, including police and military personnel, and (8) the observation and fact-
reporting of conflict hostilities.
Figure 5 shows that, not surprisingly, 75% of UN peacekeeping operations have an initial
security mandate. This is followed by DDR, training, and cease-fire policies – encompassing
approximately half of initial mandates. Meanwhile, a third of initial mandates involve peace
agreement implementation. Taken together, this figure clearly illustrates a predominant peace-
making role, rather than peacekeeping role, that has come to define the majority of recent UN
peacekeeping operations. The data also provides information on additions to mandates as
peacekeeping operations evolve following their establishment. Notably, mandates are especially
likely to add DDR programs and protections for women and children in later stages.
[FIGURE 5]
As illustrated here, there is considerable variation in the number, timing, and substance of UNSC
resolutions that address civil conflicts, especially prior to the establishment of peacekeeping
operations. We contend that this variation can help researchers better study a variety of
peacekeeping and peacemaking outcomes.
11
Do UNSC Resolutions Matter? An Initial Assessment
It is conceivable that UNSC resolutions are “cheap talk” and carry little bearing on future,
meaningful UN action. While it may be reasonably argued that some UNSC resolutions satisfy this
narrative, especially those which do little more than recognize the presence of an ongoing conflict or
urge restraint from all parties involved, other resolutions are clearly more assertive and meaningful.
Such resolutions can call for or elicit specific courses of action at the highest thresholds of
intervention. Resolutions of this type may send a powerful signal to the international community,
bearing potential costs to the UN’s reputation if success is not achieved. Likewise, in choosing to
“name-names” in its resolutions through resolution sentiment, the UNSC signals its desire for
concrete changes with regard to the actions of specific conflict participants.
A UNSC resolution is a necessary condition for the establishment of a peacekeeping
operation, however, the portfolio of resolutions regarding specific conflicts varies considerably
across conflicts that receive peacekeeping operations. For the UNSC to propose sending
peacekeepers to a civil conflict, it must overcome a substantial hurdle of consensus amongst P5
members in addition to agreement from another four non-permanent Security Council Members.
Crossing the threshold to get to UNSC agreement on the UN’s role in a civil war can be an
undertaking that requires considerable bargaining within the Security Council (O’Neill 1996, Voeten
2001, Kuziemko & Werker 2006, Allen & Yuen 2014). The relative degree of UNSC consensus on a
specific conflict, we argue, is represented by the ease of passing resolutions. The number, type, and
speed of resolution adoptions on a conflict is related not only to the seriousness of a dispute, but
also the implicit consensus on the nature and mechanism of UN conflict intervention.
Consensus amongst the P5 and other required non-permanent members is clearly not a
foregone conclusion given that less than 3 out of every 10 civil conflicts receive a UNSC resolution.9
Given that the UN’s attention to conflicts is limited, the deployment of peacekeepers to a civil
12
conflict is even more limited. While there is some overlap of peacekeepers to more than one
UCDP/PRIO conflict, we can say that 2 out of every 3 conflicts that the UN chooses to address will
receive a peacekeeping mission.10
We contend that UN attention prior to and during peacekeeping operations, provided by the
cataloging and examination of UNSC resolutions, can capture important dimensions of variation
across time, conflicts, and missions. For example, the willingness of the P5 to commit high-level
actions to a conflict, to provide robust peacekeeping forces through troop-level mandates, and to
provide for specific tasks for peacekeepers through substantive mandates (e.g., the protection of
women and children) can all have important potential impacts on mission effectiveness. It is also
important to recognize that there are many high-level actions that often precede this ceiling of
action, including the imposition or maintenance of economic sanctions, embargoes, blockades, and
the outside authorizations of military force. Such non-peacekeeping actions can have a meaningful
impact on conflict-states and may impose significant costs on UNSC members. Once these
resolutions have been passed, it is clear that a threshold of involvement has been established,
possibly pushing the UN closer to peacekeeping.11
Above and beyond the level of action prescribed by the UNSC to civil conflicts, resolutions
can also play the important role of indicating the level of consensus between P5 states. While a base
level of agreement between permanent five members is required for the passage of any UNSC
resolution, there may still be important disagreements as to the nature of the conflict or the role of
specific actors in either ameliorating or promulgating the civil conflict. For example, if the Security
Council can resolve which conflict actors are and are not conducive to peace with consideration of
their actions, it should be more likely to agree to pursue more intrusive action, ceteris paribus. Such
identification of malefactors might also lead to the more effective use of peacekeepers in active
conflicts.
13
We should note, of course, sometimes the UN explicitly decides not to identify conflict
actors (as is the case in the civil conflict in North-Yemen or the international conflict in Cyprus),
while other times they identify one or more particular conflict actors. Given that UN language is
intentional, when specific actors are identified with respect to whether their actions are or are not
conducive to peace, it suggests that a basic threshold of agreement has been reached in the UNSC as
to the necessity of addressing the conflict and as to the relevant actors and actions in a conflict. Such
agreement, should for example, be associated with an increased likelihood of reaching consensus to
deploy a peacekeeping operation (given a specific set of conflict conditions). Or, as we argue, such
language in resolutions should allow for a more directed use of peacekeeping forces within
operations.
UN Resolution Sentiment and Peacekeeping Effectiveness
This lack of UN impartiality (and some say neutrality) has not gone unrecognized by many scholars
of the UN (Neack 1995, Beardsley & Schmidt 2012, Benson & Satana 2008, Dominick 2002).
Certainly, preferential treatment of particular actors in a conflict or “biased” mediation may not
always lead to poor outcomes (Regan 2002, Kydd 2003, Favretto 2009). Indeed, the term
“neutrality” of UN peacekeepers is often suggested in the popular literature and media as a core
component of UN peacekeeping operations (Gorur 2014, Olapido 2017). Diehl (2008, 7) specifies
the more appropriate notion of UN “impartiality“ to refer to one of the key components of
peacekeeping operations, where:
“...impartiality indicates that the peacekeepers are not intended to favor one combatant over
another; there is no designated aggressor and the peacekeeping forces are to implement their
mandate without discrimination. In contrast, military interventions are usually biased, as
soldiers and equipment are sent to alter the balance of power in the conflict by supporting
one actor against another.”
We consequently posit that even if the UN’s assessment of conditions on the ground might
be impartial, the desire to not identify specific actors may be firmly tied to security and economic
14
relationships between the conflict state and P5 members. The ability of P5 and other UNSC
members to reach consensus on either lauding or condemning particular actors in a conflict should
be strongly associated with important variables indicating UN conflict effectiveness. Resolutions
which identify specific negative actions by actors, whether they be violent or non-violent, represent
the UNSC’s explicit acknowledgement of past actions and are more likely to be associated with
continued scrutiny of conflict actions by those actors.
Important work has been done on the ability of “naming and shaming” to affect the actions
of combatants during conflict (Krain 2012 , DeMeritt 2012, Burgoon et. al. 2015). The UN’s ability
to name and shame is exhibited primarily through the passage of its resolutions. As noted above, in
some conflicts, the UNSC never identifies specific conflict actors despite the presence of atrocities
or bad-faith actors (e.g., as in Uganda). In contrast, the UNSC may specifically and repeatedly
rebuke or laud specific parties in other conflicts (e.g., as in Angola). The standardized use of
language with sentiment in UNSC resolutions is described above and its patterns and use are clearly
shown in Figures 1 and 2. In addition to the explicit identification of actors, UNSC resolutions with
sentiment can catalog evidence of war-crimes, acknowledge the abrogation of ceasefire agreements
by specific parties, and identify various forms of civilian violence and/or abuse.
UNSC resolutions are public knowledge and of course have the potential to impact conflict
actors by turning the tide of public opinion (Chapman & Reiter 2004, Boettcher 2004, Murdie &
Bhasin 2011) and depressing economic investments (Murdie & Davis 2012; Barry, Clay, Flynn 2013).
However, their most important short-term effect might be in their potential impact on peacekeeping
effectiveness. As noted by Burgoon et. al. (2015), the effects of naming-and shaming may be even
more pronounced in the presence of a peacekeeping operation. In short, we posit that UN
peacekeepers should be better able to protect civilians against one-sided violence when they are
paired with targeted UNSC resolutions.
15
There are two mechanisms by which UNSC resolutions make peacekeeping more effective
in preventing violence against civilians. First, resolutions may act as a deterrent to malefactors for
perpetrating or allowing civilian victimization. When peacekeepers are deployed in concert with
UNSC resolutions condemning conflict actors, the credibility of the UNSC and its member-nations
in imposing future costs on human rights abusers is enhanced by virtue of the resources it has
already committed, i.e. its “sunk-costs.” The UN has consistently demonstrated a sunk-cost
tendency, whether it be the fact that it is more likely to intervene in states where previous UN
involvement took place (Mullenbach 2005, Binder and Huepel 2015), increasing peacekeeping force
levels as peacekeeping forces endure casualties (Bove & Elia 2011), or increasing peacekeeping force
levels when the UNSC’s preferred side in civil conflict sustains battle-losses (Benson & Kathman
2014).
Thus, when the UN explicitly labels bad actors in the presence of peacekeepers, it is
signaling a commitment to counteract their transgressions in the future, whether it be increasing
peacekeeping force levels, expanding a mission’s mandate in time or scope, or incorporating more of
the UNSC’s arsenal of peacekeeping tools – such as the imposition of sanctions and embargoes, and
the authorization of outside uses of military force. As others have noted, peacekeepers have the
ability to impose substantial military and political costs on conflict actors, providing sound reason
why for why condemned actors would want to avoid being labeled a target (Hultman, Kathman and
Shannon 2013, 2014, Fjelde, Hultman, & Nilsson 2019, Cil et. al. 2020). This stands in contrast to a
situation, for example, where peacekeepers are present, while resolutions condemning actors’ abuses
are absent. Under such circumstances, the notion of neutrality stands, providing some flexibility to
disputants to carry out transgressions in pursuit of their agendas. Meanwhile, when resolutions
condemn actor abuses without the presence of peacekeepers, the UN’s commitment to intervene
militarily is cast in doubt, allowing disputants greater latitude to wage war how they see fit.
16
Second, the presence of UNSC resolutions which employ anti-rebel or anti-government
sentiment often identifies the date, extent, or location of conflict atrocities and/or at-risk
populations. For example, UNSC Resolution 1180 regarding Angola states:
“Expressing its grave concern at the deterioration of the security situation in Angola as a
result of the reoccupation by UNITA of localities where State administration was recently
established, attacks by armed elements of UNITA, new minelaying activities, and banditry,”
Such explicit recognition by the Security Council members can provide troops with a
roadmap and justification for a variety of specific actions including new military operations and
patrol routes, as well as the establishment of bases and civilian protection camps. In short, the
presence of resolutions may facilitate the ability of UN troops to separate conflict actors and protect
civilians from combatants — tactics that have widespread empirical support in decreasing violence
against civilians and battlefield deaths (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014, Fjelde,
Hultman, & Nilsson 2019, Cil et. al. 2020).
Sustained and persistent identification of “bad actors” in a conflict should therefore help to
clarify the peacekeeping mission as regards to protecting vulnerable civilians. Without this
clarification, peacekeepers may be limited in their abilities to deploy to critical locations or intervene
militarily through restricted rules of engagement, forces, or military equipment. As Yuen & Allen
(2014) have found, when the preferences of the P5 align, they are more likely to pass resolutions
with high specificity that provide peacekeepers with specific tasks and policies to address a conflict.
Thus, we would anticipate that if the UNSC are able to label bad actors, they are more likely to give
peacekeepers the tools to make them more effective in preventing future instances of civilian abuse.
Given these two mechanisms, we anticipate that there is a multiplicative effect between
peacekeepers deployed to a conflict and UNSC resolutions condemning conflict actors. We turn to
Hultman, Kathman and Shannon’s (2013) models estimating one-sided violence as an initial test of
17
the relevance of some of our UNSC resolution variables on civilian victimization. As their work
suggests, more robust missions are associated with a reduction of violence against civilians. We
expect that robust missions, when paired with a UNSC consensus that there are specific actors
contributing negatively to the conflict, should lead to a reduction in violence by those conflict
actors. We therefore posit a greater intensity of resolutions condemning conflict actors, paired with
high levels of troops on the ground, should reduce one-sided violence against civilians.
The UN, however, often does not have the ability to equally impact government versus rebel
actions against civilians. Given that UN peacekeeping most often requires the consent of the
government, peacekeepers may be inhibited in reducing governmental violence against civilians. We
consequently expect that while robust peacekeeping paired with resolutions targeting conflict actors
should generally reduce one-sided violence against civilians, the effects should be more pronounced
when resolutions target rebels rather than the government. Given our theoretical expectations, we
propose the following hypotheses:
H1: A higher intensity of UNSC resolutions condemning rebels, in conjunction with high levels of
peacekeeping troops in a civil conflict, will be associated with greater reductions in rebel one-sided violence.
H2: A higher intensity of UNSC resolutions condemning the government, in conjunction with high levels of
peacekeeping troops in a civil conflict, will be associated with greater reductions in government one-sided
violence.
Data and Research Design
We make use of the replication data provided by Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013), which
examines 36 civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in the years 1991 to 2008.12 We choose this article
given its deserved importance as one of the most cited articles in the recent peacekeeping literature.
The dependent variables are counts of the number of civilians killed by either rebel or government
forces in instances of one-sided violence during civil conflict. One-sided violence is considered an
instance where civilians are deliberately killed, thus excluding fatalities that are unintentional, e.g.
18
from battle-related combat (Eck & Hultman 2007). These data are recorded at the conflict-month
level using UCDP/PRIO conflicts (Melander, Pettersson & Themnér 2016). Because our dependent
variables are counts with evidence of over-dispersion, we employ Negative Binomial regression as an
estimation technique.
Independent Variables
While UNSC resolutions are capable of both lauding and condemning conflict disputants and their
actions, we focus on the latter for the purposes of testing our theory. As such, our independent
variables capture resolutions with anti-rebel/government sentiment – those that condemn the rebel
and government factions of a civil conflict. Further, to account for the timing and magnitude of
resolutions, we consider two empirical operationalizations to capture the “intensity” of
condemnation: (1) the rate of anti-rebel/government resolution sentiment (Anti-Rebel/Government
Resolution Rate), measured as the cumulative number of resolutions with anti-rebel/government
sentiment divided by the number of months that have transpired since conflict inception, and (2) the
cumulative number of resolutions with anti-rebel/government resolution sentiment since conflict
inception (Cumulative Anti-Rebel/Government Resolutions) . Collectively, these two measures capture the
intensity of the UN’s spotlight on a conflict and conflict actor over the span of a conflict. The first
of these places higher values on resolutions immediately after they have been passed. As time goes
on with the same cumulative number resolutions, the magnitude of impact of the number
resolutions decreases. The second measure allows for an examination of whether there is a direct
effect from the accumulation of a body of anti-rebel/government resolutions over the span of a
conflict. Both of these variables are lagged one month to ensure temporal causality.
Because we hypothesize that peacekeepers are better able to reduce one-sided violence in the
presence of more anti-rebel/government resolutions, we interact the anti-rebel/government
sentiment variables with Hultman, Kathman and Shannon’s (2013) primary explanatory variable: the
19
lagged number of UN peacekeeping troops (UN Troops) deployed in a conflict-month. These
interactions (UN Troops*Anti-Rebel/Government Resolution Rate; UN Troops*Cumulative Anti-
Rebel/Government Resolutions) are our primary, theoretical independent variables.
We also include a lagged variable capturing the presence of any anti-rebel or government
resolution a conflict month (Anti-Rebel/Government Resolutions Dummy). This variable allows for the
examination of the more immediate effect of resolutions with sentiment on one-sided violence
levels. While we expect that a greater rate and a sustained UNSC focus on malefactors should be
most important in driving troop effectiveness, it is also possible that very recent resolutions could
have an effect on reducing one-sided violence. These dummy variables are interacted with UN troop
levels as a robustness check for the conditional effect of UNSC resolutions with sentiment on one-
sided violence (see Appendix A for results).
Control Variables
In replicating Hultman, Kathman and Shannon’s (2013) analysis, employ their identical control
variables. These include the counts of the number of battle-related deaths sustained by the rebel and
government factions as well as counts and dummy variables measuring the level and presence of
one-sided violence against civilians by the rebel and government factions. Additional controls
include conflict episode duration (measured in number of months), the conflict’s issue
incompatibility (specifically, whether the conflict was fought over government control as opposed to
territorial independence), and the conflict host-country’s population.13
Estimation Results
Table 1 estimates the effects of the rate of resolutions with anti-rebel/anti-government sentiment.
Models 1 and 2 evaluate rebel one-sided violence, while Models 3 and 4 assess government one-
sided violence. Model 1 provides a base model without any interaction effects. The coefficients for
UN troop levels in Table 1 largely support prior research in that three out of four models, high
20
levels of troops have a negative and statistically significant effect on reducing one-sided violence.
The presence and rate of anti-rebel resolutions has no independent, significant effect on one-sided
violence either in Model 1 or as a base variable in Model 2 . However, as expected in Hypothesis 1,
higher rates of anti-rebel resolutions when paired with higher levels of UN troops significantly
decrease rebel violence against civilians in Model 2. The presence of a resolution in the preceding
conflict-month does not significantly affect rebel violence. This suggests, that for rebel violence,
there is little immediate effect of resolutions. Rather, a more frequent, sustained body of targeted
anti-rebel resolutions, paired with high troop levels, is more likely to have an impact on rebel
victimization of civilians..
[TABLE 1]
In contrast, Model 3 suggests that governmental violence is more likely to be reduced
through the additive effect of monthly anti-government resolutions. In both Models 3 and 4,
however, a high rate of anti-government resolutions is significantly associated with an increase of
government violence against civilians. The rate of such resolutions when interacted with higher
levels of troops, while in the expected direction, is not statistically significant. We expected there to
be a more limited effect of anti-governmental resolutions on conflict but did not expect this
decidedly mixed effect. In short, Models 3 and 4 do not provide empirical support for our second
hypothesis. They do provide support for prior research pointing to the limited ability of UN troops
to reduce governmental violence (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019) and also suggest that a higher
rate of anti-government resolutions absent the presence of troops may perversely be associated with
a worsening of government attacks against civilians.
Figure 6 illustrates the relative impact of higher rates of anti-rebel resolutions on the
predicted counts of rebel-led civilian violence. These counts are estimated with boot-strapped
21
standard errors across a realistic range of anti-rebel resolution rates for two different troop scenarios
– one with no troops deployed to a conflict and one with an average sample-level of troops
(approximately 5,870). All other variables are set at their mean or modal values.
The predicted counts in Figure 6 illustrate that absent any anti-rebel resolutions (i.e., a value
of 0 for the rate of sentiment), there is no significant difference between the predicted counts of
civilian fatalities between a scenario with zero peacekeeping troops and a scenario with an average
level of peacekeeping troops. However, among those missions with an average level of peacekeeping
troops, as the number of anti-rebel resolutions increases from a rate of zero anti-rebel resolutions to
about one resolution every 10 months (or a value of 0.10), there is a significant and important
decrease in the number of monthly civilian deaths resulting from rebel one-sided violence. In
contrast, increasing rates of anti-rebel resolutions in conflicts without peacekeeping forces very
slightly increases levels of one-sided violence. These results provide support for our first hypothesis
and imply an interactive effect where anti-rebel resolutions decrease rebel one-sided violence when
paired with robust peacekeeping operations. In summary, anti-rebel resolutions made without the
support of peacekeepers does not appear to mitigate rebel one-sided violence.
[FIGURE 6]
Table 2 provides an examination of the effects of additional measure of resolution
intensity—namely, the cumulative count of targeted resolutions across a conflict. Models 5 and 6
estimate effects on rebel one-sided violence, while Models 7 and 8 focus on government one-sided
violence. The results are virtually identical to those in Table 1 with one exception. In Model 8, the
interaction between the cumulative number of anti-government resolutions in a conflict and troop
levels is significantly and negatively associated with government anti-civilian violence. However,
22
predicted counts of violence levels suggest that there is no statistically significant difference between
higher levels of anti-government resolutions with an average level of troops and no troops. We thus
continue to find little support for our second hypothesis. As with Table 1, we find support for
Hypothesis 1 where greater levels of UN Troops and a greater number of cumulative anti-rebel
resolutions conjointly decrease rebel one-sided violence. In Figure 7, we calculate the predicted
counts across cumulative anti-rebel resolution levels as above.
[TABLE 2]
These counts illustrate that from zero to three cumulative anti-rebel resolutions, there is no
significant difference between the predicted counts of civilian fatalities between a scenario with zero
peacekeeping troops and a scenario with an average level of peacekeeping troops. However, as the
cumulative anti-rebel resolution count reaches four, there is a significant difference in the predicted
number of monthly rebel-led civilian deaths between missions with zero peacekeeping troops and
missions with average levels of peacekeeping troops. We also find that once the average number of
anti-rebel resolutions is reached (i.e., approximately seven resolutions), the predicted number of anti-
rebel one-sided violence approaches zero among those peacekeeping missions with average troop
levels.14
[FIGURE 7]
Conclusions and Implications
It is important to note that UN decisions on why and how to directly intervene in civil
conflicts are often made long before the UN has taken direct action or deployed troops to a conflict.
As such, the speed, number, and nature of resolutions prior to peacekeeping should be of great use
23
to future researchers. Furthermore, the information included in UNSC resolutions, including
sentiment expressed towards conflict actors, the implementation of other high-level actions, and the
authorized force-levels and policies of peacekeeping mandates for peacekeeping operations, can lead
to a better understanding of UN successes, failures, timing, and even inaction.
We present here a new dataset which enables researchers, for the first time, to examine the
distribution and variation of UNSC resolutions in civil conflicts. Using these data descriptively or in
multivariate analyses, it would be possible to provide evidence for or against the oft-stated notion
that the UN is a strongly status-quo organization that has an easier time reaching consensus over
rebel atrocities versus government atrocities committed against civilians. In addition, these data,
allow for the examination of a wide variety of empirical research questions that have previously been
hampered by lack of data including, for example, whether UNSC resolutions (prior or during
peacekeeping) help or hinder peacekeeping effectiveness, mediation, conflict duration or peace
duration, foreign investment, or public support for unilateral or multilateral military action outside
of UN auspices.
To demonstrate the potential use of these new data, we present descriptive information
confirming that there is important variation of UNSC resolutions across and within peacekeeping
missions in civil conflicts. We further employ Hultman, Kathman and Shannon’s (2013) replication
data to examine if the presence of resolutions with explicit anti-rebel or anti-government sentiments
have an impact on decreasing violence against civilians. These multivariate analyses provide support
for the proposition that the nature of UN attention to civil conflict can have important influences on
UN peacekeeping effectiveness. When paired with at least average levels of peacekeeping troops, the
intensity of UNSC resolutions against rebel groups is significantly related to decreasing rebel
violence against civilians.
24
Our findings suggest, in contrast, that anti-government resolutions may have either a limited
or a deleterious, positive association with civilian victimization. This is perhaps not surprising given
the infrequency of anti-government resolutions in conflicts compared to anti-rebel resolutions,
despite the fact that there are occasionally high-levels of government one-sided violence against
civilians (e.g., as in Rwanda, which received only one anti-government resolution). Furthermore, as
shown in prior research, the UN peacekeeping is often hampered in its efforts to decrease
governmental violence due to its dependence on host-country support for its operations (Fjelde,
Hultman, Nilsson 2019).
The policy implications of these illustrative findings, we suggest, are important for those
actors advocating for peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts. Generally, the efforts of civilian
groups, NGOs, governments, or other conflict actors should continue to identify and lobby for the
UN Security Council to explicitly name actors committing atrocities in civil conflicts when there are
active peacekeeping operations with a significant number of boots on the ground. More importantly,
our findings imply that the UN Security Council should be encouraged to quickly act upon
consensus regarding bad actors by both deploying troops and passing resolutions identifying
atrocities by the rebel groups. By doing so, the UN Security Council can both provide a credible
deterrent to those actors for continued transgressions, as well as a means to better clarify and focus
peacekeeping forces to make them more effective.
It is our hope that the UNPR dataset presented here be used to further clarify mechanisms
of UN actions in peacekeeping and be used by future researchers to examine important issues such
as why some civil conflicts receive attention sooner than others, why some peacekeeping operation
are mandated higher levels of troops, why some receive more resolutions with explicit pro/anti-
government or rebel sentiment, why operations receive specific mandates over others, and whether
or not these factors are associated with more or less successful outcomes in UN peacekeeping.
25
Notes
1Since the post-Cold War period, 19 out of 91 (approximately 21%) UCDP/PRIO civil conflicts that began after 1988,
but before 2016, received a peacekeeping mission.
2 The data and codebooks can be accessed at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/unscresolutions.
3 Beardsley’s UNSC resolution data may be obtained at https://sites.duke.edu/kcbeardsley/research/unsc-data/.

4UNSC Resolutions are made publicly available by the United Nations at
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0. We thank the Folke Bernadotte Academy for a generous
grant to support our work in coding these resolutions and producing this dataset.
5 There was a 96.8% level of inter-coder reliability in pairing UNSC resolutions to UCDP/PRIO civil conflicts and a
95.0% inter-coder reliability in coding variables detailing each resolution’s substantive actions. All discrepancies were
resolved by the coding team collectively.
6
The data and codebooks can be accessed at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/unscresolutions.
7More specifically, 27 out of 91 (approximately 30%) UCDP/PRIO civil conflicts that began after 1988, but before
2016, received a UNSC resolution.
8Outside authorizations for the use of military force include operations carried out by other member-nations (e.g.,
France) or other regional intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the European Union and African Union).
9 More specifically, 58 out of 210 (approximately 28%) UCDP/PRIOR civil conflicts that began after 1946, but before
2016, received a UNSC resolution. Since the post-Cold War period, 27 out of 91 (approximately 30%) UCDP/PRIO
civil conflicts that began after 1988, but before 2016, also received a UNSC resolution.
10More specifically, 38 out of the 58 UCDP/PRIOR civil conflicts that received a UNSC resolution and began after
1946, but before 2016, received a UN peacekeeping mission. Since the post-Cold War period, 19 out of 27
(approximately 70%) UCDP/PRIO civil conflicts that received a UNSC resolution and began after 1988, but before
2016, also received a UN peacekeeping mission.
11One only need to look to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, where articles 39 through 43 establish an increasingly more
assertive sequence of actions the UNSC can carry out, provided it declares a threat to international peace and security.
12Our sample employs all of the active conflicts from Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013). However, while they
analyze an additional two-year period following conflict episodes, our dataset limits us to a 6-month period following a
conflict’s termination, as coded by UCDP/PRIO. Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson (2019) similarly focus on a sample of
African civil conflicts.
13UCDP/PRIO armed conflicts are coded as either being fought over (1) control of a country’s government, (2) control
of territory, or (3) both. The models utilize a dichotomous variable, capturing whether the conflict is being fought over
government control.
14 As a robustness check, we also examine the interaction between the presence of anti-rebel/government resolutions in
a conflict-month and UN troop levels, controlling for the cumulative number of resolutions. These results are provided
in the appendix in Table A1. The predicted probabilities in Figure A1 illustrate that once a threshold of 5,000 troops is
reached, the presence of an anti-resolution in a conflict-month is associated with significantly fewer predicted civilian
fatalities than when there are no anti-rebel resolutions.
26
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30
Number of Resolutions Number of Resolutions
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
1958 UNOGIL (Lebanon-260)
UNYOM (Yemen-230)
UNYOM (Yemen-230)
UNIFIL (Israel-426)
UNIFIL (Israel-426)
UNTAG (South Africa-298)
UNTAG (South Africa-298) 1980 UNAVEM I (Angola-327)
1980 UNAVEM I (Angola-327)
ONUCA (Guatemala-233)
ONUCA (Guatemala-233)
ONUCA (El Salvador-316)
ONUCA (El Salvador-316)
ONUCA (Nicaragua-336)
Pro-Gov
Anti-Gov
Pro-Gov
ONUSAL (El Salvador-316)
Pro-Rebel
Anti-Gov
Anti-Rebel
ONUSAL (El Salvador-316)
Pro-Rebel
Anti-Rebel
1990 UNAVEM II (Angola-327) 1990 UNAVEM II (Angola-327)
UNAMIC (Cambodia-300)
UNAMIC (Cambodia-300)
UNPROFOR (Serbia-385) UNPROFOR (Serbia-385)
UNPROFOR (Croatia-390) UNPROFOR (Croatia-390)
UNTAC (Cambodia-300) UNTAC (Cambodia-300)
UNOSOM I (Somalia-337) UNOSOM I (Somalia-337)
UNPROFOR (Bosnia-389) UNPROFOR (Bosnia-389)
ONUMOZ (Mozambique-332) ONUMOZ (Mozambique-332)
UNOSOM II (Somalia-337) UNOSOM II (Somalia-337)
UNOMUR (Rwanda-374) UNOMUR (Rwanda-374)
UNOMIG (Georgia-392) UNOMIG (Georgia-392)
UNOMIL (Liberia-341) UNOMIL (Liberia-341)
UNMIH (Haiti-381) UNMIH (Haiti-381)
UNAMIR (Rwanda-374) UNAMIR (Rwanda-374)
UNMOT (Tajikistan-395) UNMOT (Tajikistan-395)
1
1995 UNAVEM III (Angola-327) 1995 UNAVEM III (Angola-327)
UNCRO (Croatia-390) UNCRO (Croatia-390)
UNMIBH (Bosnia-389) UNMIBH (Bosnia-389)
31
UNMIBH (Bosnia-397) UNMIBH (Bosnia-397)
UNTAES (Croatia-390) UNTAES (Croatia-390)
UNSMIH (Haiti-381) UNSMIH (Haiti-381)
MONUA (Angola-327) MONUA (Angola-327)
UNTMIH (Haiti-381) UNTMIH (Haiti-381)
MIPONUH (Haiti-381) MIPONUH (Haiti-381)
Figure 1
Figure 2
UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone-382) UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone-382)
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone-382) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone-382)
with Establishment Date

UNTAET (Indonesia-330) UNTAET (Indonesia-330)
MONUC (DRC-265) MONUC (DRC-265)
2000 MINUCI (Ivory Coast-419) 2000 MINUCI (Ivory Coast-419)
UNMIL (Liberia-341) UNMIL (Liberia-341)
UNOCI (Ivory Coast-419) UNOCI (Ivory Coast-419)
During Peacekeeping Operations

MINUSTAH (Haiti-381) MINUSTAH (Haiti-381)
Prior to Peacekeeping Operations
ONUB (Burundi-287)
Peacekeeping Operation (Country - UCDP Conflict ID)

ONUB (Burundi-287)
Number of Resolution with Sentiment

2005 UNMIS (Sudan-309) UNMIS (Sudan-309)
Number of Resolutions with Sentiment
2005
UNMIS (Sudan-11344) UNMIS (Sudan-11344)
UNAMID (Sudan-309) UNAMID (Sudan-309)
MINURCAT (Chad-288) MINURCAT (Chad-288)
MINURCAT (CAR-416) MINURCAT (CAR-416)
2010 MONUSCO (DRC-265) 2010 MONUSCO (DRC-265)
MONUSCO (DRC-283) MONUSCO (DRC-283)
UNISFA (Sudan-11344) UNISFA (Sudan-11344)
UNMISS (South Sudan-11345) UNMISS (South Sudan-11345)
UNSMIS (Syria-299) UNSMIS (Syria-299)
MINUSMA (Mali-372) MINUSMA (Mali-372)
MINUSMA (Mali-11347) MINUSMA (Mali-11347)
MINUSMA (Mali-13611)
2014 MINUSCA (CAR-416)
2014 MINUSCA (CAR-416)
Total Force Level Duration from Conflict Start to
(Troops + Police + Observers) PKO Establishment (Years)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0
3,000
6,000
9,000
12,000
15,000
18,000
21,000
24,000
27,000
30,000
1978 UNIFIL (Israel-426) UNYOM (Yemen-230)
1991 ONUSAL (El Salvador-316) UNIFIL (Israel-426)
UNAVEM II (Angola-327) 1980 UNTAG (South Africa-298)
UNAMIC (Cambodia-300) UNAVEM I (Angola-327)
UNPROFOR (Serbia-385) ONUCA (Guatemala-233)
UNPROFOR (Croatia-390) ONUCA (El Salvador-316)
UNTAC (Cambodia-300) 1990 ONUSAL (El Salvador-316)
UNOSOM I (Somalia-337)
UNAVEM II (Angola-327)
UNPROFOR (Bosnia-389) UNAMIC (Cambodia-300)
UNPROFOR (Bosnia-398) UNPROFOR (Serbia-385)
UNPROFOR (Bosnia-397) UNPROFOR (Croatia-390)
ONUMOZ (Mozambique-332) UNTAC (Cambodia-300)
UNOSOM II (Somalia-337) UNOSOM I (Somalia-337)
UNOMUR (Rwanda-374) UNPROFOR (Bosnia-389)
UNOMIG (Georgia-392) UNPROFOR (Bosnia-398)
UNPROFOR (Bosnia-397)
UNOMIL (Liberia-341)
ONUMOZ (Mozambique-332)
UNMIH (Haiti-381)
UNOSOM II (Somalia-337)
UNAMIR (Rwanda-374) UNOMUR (Rwanda-374)
UNMOT (Tajikistan-395) UNOMIG (Georgia-392)
1995 UNAVEM III (Angola-327) UNOMIL (Liberia-341)
UNCRO (Croatia-390) UNMIH (Haiti-381)
UNMIBH (Bosnia-389) UNAMIR (Rwanda-374)
UNMIBH (Bosnia-397) UNMOT (Tajikistan-395)
UNTAES (Croatia-390) 1995 UNAVEM III (Angola-327)
UNCRO (Croatia-390)
UNSMIH (Haiti-381)
UNMIBH (Bosnia-389)
MONUA (Angola-327)
32
UNMIBH (Bosnia-397)
UNTMIH (Haiti-381) UNTAES (Croatia-390)
MIPONUH (Haiti-381) UNSMIH (Haiti-381)
UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone-382)
Figure 4
Figure 3
MONUA (Angola-327)
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone-382) UNTMIH (Haiti-381)
UNTAET (Indonesia-330) MIPONUH (Haiti-381)
MONUC (DRC-265) UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone-382)
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone-382)

MONUC (DRC-283)

UNTAET (Indonesia-330)
MONUC (DRC-429)
2000 MONUC (DRC-265)
MINUCI (Ivory Coast-419)
MONUC (DRC-283)
UNMIL (Liberia-341) MONUC (DRC-429)
UNOCI (Ivory Coast-419) 2000 MINUCI (Ivory Coast-419)
MINUSTAH (Haiti-381) UNMIL (Liberia-341)
ONUB (Burundi-287) UNOCI (Ivory Coast-419)
2005 UNMIS (Sudan-309) MINUSTAH (Haiti-381)
ONUB (Burundi-287)

Initial Authorized Peacekeeping Force Levels
UNMIS (Sudan-11344)
UNAMID (Sudan-309) 2005 UNMIS (Sudan-309)
UNMIS (Sudan-11344)
MINURCAT (Chad-288)
UNAMID (Sudan-309)
MINURCAT (CAR-416)
MINURCAT (Chad-288)
2010 MONUSCO (CAR-265) MINURCAT (CAR-416)
MONUSCO (CAR-283) 2010 MONUSCO (CAR-265)
UNISFA (Sudan-11344) MONUSCO (CAR-283)
Duration From Conflict Inception to Peacekeeping Establishment
UNMISS (South Sudan-11345) UNISFA (Sudan-11344)

UNSMIS (Syria-299) UNMISS (South Sudan-11345)
MINUSMA (Mali-372) UNSMIS (Syria-13042)
MINUSMA (Mali-372)
2014 MINUSCA (CAR-416) 2014 MINUSCA (CAR-416)
13
6,652
Average
Average
Figure 5
Substantive Peacekeeping Mandates
100%
90%
Percentage of PKO Mandates Initial Mandate
80% 82%
Full Mandate
75%
70%
69%
60% 61%
54%
50%
49% 49% 49%
40% 43%
39%
30% 33% 33%

30% 30%
28%
26%
20%
10%
0%
Security
DDR
Training
Cease-Fire
Peace Agreement
Observation
Election
Women & Children
33
Table 1
Negative Binomial Regression of Rebel One-Sided Violence using Resolution Rate
Rebel OSV Rebel OSV Gov OSV Gov OSV

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Anti-Rebel Resolution Rate (t-1) -0.333 1.583

(1.666) (1.842)
UN Troops (t-1) * Anti-Rebel Resolution Rate (t-1) -5.443***
(0.684)
Anti-Rebel Resolutions Dummy (t-1) 0.005 0.026
(0.688) (0.660)
Rebel One-Sided Violence Dummy (t-1) 2.456*** 2.431***
(0.348) (0.356)
Government One-Sided Violence (t-1) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Anti-Government Resolution Rate (t-1) 216.735*** 225.129***
(42.340) (56.850)
UN Troops (t-1) * Anti-Government Resolution Rate (t-1) -3.706
(18.290)
Anti-Government Resolutions Dummy (t-1) -2.685*** -2.419
(0.641) (1.838)
Rebel One-Sided Violence (t-1) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Government One-Sided Violence Dummy (t-1) 1.599*** 1.602***
(0.310) (0.312)
UN Troops (t-1) -0.114*** 0.029 -0.210*** -0.202***
(0.036) (0.056) (0.062) (0.076)
Rebel Battle Deaths (t-1) 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Government Battle Deaths (t-1) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Conflict for Government Control 3.640*** 3.577*** 2.216*** 2.209***
(0.604) (0.593) (0.846) (0.849)
Conflict Episode Duration -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(Population) 0.569** 0.546** 0.694** 0.693**
(0.254) (0.247) (0.327) (0.328)
Constant -10.570*** -10.225*** -9.031** -9.005**
(2.704) (2.642) (4.315) (4.329)
Observations 3,112 3,112 3,112 3,112

AIC 8954 8944 6282 6284
BIC 9027 9022 6355 6363
Log-Likelihood -4465 -4459 -3129 -3129
X2 141.2*** 1109*** 153.9*** 160.3***
Robust standard errors (clustered on conflict) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
34
Table 2
Negative Binomial Regression of One-Sided Violence using Cumulative Resolution Count

Cumulative Anti-Rebel Resolutions (t-1) -0.004 0.005

(0.014) (0.015)
UN Troops (t-1) * Cumulative Anti-Rebel Resolutions (t-1) -0.055*
(0.030)
(0.697) (0.609)
(0.349) (0.357)
Government One-Sided Violence (t-1) -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Cumulative Anti-Government Resolutions (t-1) -0.962 -0.044
(1.544) (1.090)
UN Troops (t-1) * Cumulative Anti-Government Resolutions (t-1) -0.868***
(0.332)
Anti-Government Resolutions Dummy (t-1) -0.135 0.109
(1.058) (0.659)
(0.004) (0.003)
Government One-Sided Violence Dummy (t-1) 1.268*** 1.576***
(0.405) (0.447)
UN Troops (t-1) -0.115*** 0.039 0.972 1.507***
(0.036) (0.118) (0.724) (0.549)
Rebel Battle Deaths (t-1) 0.003 0.004 -0.004* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Conflict for Government Control 3.640*** 3.565*** 2.597** 2.397**
(0.604) (0.593) (1.154) (0.987)
Conflict Episode Duration -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
Ln(Population) 0.570** 0.536** 0.152 0.435
(0.254) (0.249) (0.689) (0.433)
Constant -10.574*** -10.150*** -3.686 -6.416
(2.707) (2.677) (8.071) (5.556)
Observations 3,112 3,112 3,112 3,112

AIC 8954 8948 6424 6386
BIC 9027 9027 6496 6464
Log-Likelihood -4465 -4461 -3200 -3180
X2 126.9*** 682.5*** 158.5*** 170.9***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
35
0.03 7.000331 2.424491 4.57584 2.424490 9.424821 3.183681 1.795568 1.388113 1.795568
0.04 7.112063 2.610016 4.502047 2.610016 9.722079 2.349851 1.4025062 0.9473448 1.402506
0.05 7.225579 2.847344 4.378235 2.847341 10.07292 1.734407 1.1730695 0.5613375 1.173069
0.06 7.340907 3.130188 4.210719 3.130183 10.47109 1.280153 0.9855872 0.2945658 0.985586
0.07 7.458075 3.453357 4.004718 3.453355 10.91143 0.9448708 0.8205870 0.1242838 0.8205872
0.08 7.577114 3.813069 Figure 6
3.764045 3.813066 11.39018 0.697402 0.6772148 0.0201872 0.677215
Predicted Count of4.206887

0.09
7.698052 Civilian 3.491165
Fatalities from Rebel11.90494
4.206888 One-Sided Violence
0.514747 0.5554592 -0.0407122 0.555459
0.10 7.820921 by Anti-Rebel Resolution Rate
4.633531 3.18739 4.633529 12.45445 0.3799309 0.4539016 -0.0739707 0.4539016 0
25
20
from Rebel One-Sided Violence
Average Peacekeeping Troops

Predicted Civilian Fatalities
Zero Peacekeeping Troops

Table 2, Model 2
15 (Cumulative Anti-Rebel Resolutions)
No Troops (0) Average Troops (5.87)

Res Rate Prediction LB Error LB UB Error UB Prediction LB Error LB UB Error
10
0 6.583899 2.192857 4.391042 2.192856 8.776755 8.29062 11.234347 -2.943727 11.23435
1 6.614219 2.177049 4.43717 2.177048 8.791267 6.04703 5.280273 0.766757 5.28027
2 6.644679 2.220682 4.423997 2.220681 8.86536 4.410595 2.979076 1.431519 2.979076
5
3 6.675279 2.318204 4.357075 2.318203 8.993482 3.217009 1.928137 1.288872 1.928136
4 6.70602 2.461748 4.244272 2.461748 9.167768 2.346428 1.4631457 0.8832823 1.463146
5 6.736903 2.642990 4.093913 2.642990 9.379893 1.711443 1.2696381 0.4418049 1.269638
0
6 6.767928 2.854460 3.913468 2.854459 9.622387 1.248296 1.1838416 0.0644544 1.183841
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
7 6.799095 3.090110 Anti-Rebel
3.708985 3.090111
Resolution Rate 9.889206 0.9104844 1.1377063 -0.2272219 1.1377066
8 6.830407 3.345373 3.485034 3.345373 10.17578 0.664091 1.108885 -0.444794 1.108885
9 6.861862 3.616959
Figure 3.616958
3.244903
7 10.47882 0.484376 1.0914454 -0.6070694 1.091446
10
Predicted Count of Civilian Fatalities from Rebel One-Sided Violence
6.893462 3.902608 2.990854 3.902608 10.79607 0.3532952 1.0842376 -0.7309424 1.0842378
11 6.925208 by4.200847
Cumulative Anti-Rebel
2.724361 Resolutions
4.200852 11.12606 0.2576872 1.0871102 -0.829423 1.0871098
25
20
Average Peacekeeping Troops

Zero Peacekeeping Troops

15
10
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Cumulative Anti-Rebel Resolutions
36
Table A1
Negative Binomial Regression of Rebel One-Sided Violence using Resolution Dummy


(0.697) (0.726)
UN Troops (t-1) * Anti-Rebel Resolutions Dummy (t-1) -0.862***
(0.174)
Cumulative Anti-Rebel Resolutions (t-1) -0.004 -0.004
(0.014) (0.014)
(0.349) (0.350)
Government One-Sided Violence (t-1) -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Anti-Government Resolutions Dummy (t-1) -0.135 0.707
(1.058) (1.052)
UN Troops (t-1) * Anti-Government Resolutions Dummy (t-1) -1.135
(0.849)
Cumulative Anti-Government Resolutions (t-1) -0.962 -0.884
(1.544) (1.490)
(0.004) (0.003)
Government One-Sided Violence Dummy (t-1) 1.268** 1.292**
(0.405) (0.401)
UN Troops (t-1) -0.115** -0.107** 0.972 1.018
(0.036) (0.038) (0.724) (0.696)
Rebel Battle Deaths (t-1) 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Conflict for Government Control 3.640*** 3.636*** 2.597* 2.591*
(0.604) (0.604) (1.154) (1.129)
Conflict Episode Duration -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln(Population) 0.570* 0.575* 0.152 0.184
(0.254) (0.254) (0.689) (0.654)
Constant -10.574*** -10.624*** -3.686 -4.021
(2.707) (2.710) (8.071) (7.710)
Observations 3,112 3,112 3,112 3,112

AIC 8954 8950 6424 6423
BIC 9027 9029 6496 6502
Log-Likelihood -4465 -4462 -3200 -3199
X2 126.9*** 440.6*** 158.5*** 844.1***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
37
3 69.44972 31.42604 38.02368 31.42608 100.8758 33.53016 41.959883 -8.429723 41.95988
4 65.83863 30.43856 35.40007 30.43856 96.27719 20.67959 26.499179 -5.819589 26.49918
5 62.4153 29.77726 32.63804 29.77726 92.19256 12.75405 17.017528 -4.263478 17.01753
6 59.16997 29.39290 29.77707 29.39290 88.56287 7.866011 11.161791 -3.29578 11.161789
7 56.09338 29.23826 26.85512 29.23827 85.33165 4.85133 7.514995 -2.663665 7.51500
8 53.17677 29.27009 Figure A1
23.90668 29.27008 82.44685 2.992038 5.213195 -2.221157 5.213196
Predicted
9 Count
50.4118 of 29.45022
Civilian Fatalities
20.96158 from Rebel79.86202
29.45022 One-Sided Violence
1.845328 3.731493 -1.886165 3.731492
10 47.7906 by29.74622
Anti-Rebel Resolution
18.04438 Dummy
29.74622 77.53682 1.138098 2.753048 -1.61495 2.753049
400
350
300
Presence of Anti-Rebel Resolutions

Absence of Anti-Rebel Resolutions

250
200
150
100
50
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Peacekeeping Troops
(1000s)
38
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The Importance of UN Security Council Resolutions in Peacekeeping

Article in Journal of Conflict Resolution · February 2022

Michelle Benson Colin Tucker

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(approximately 18%) received a UN peacekeeping operation.1 The determinants of which conflicts

conflicts receive largely sentiment-free resolutions?

preconditions for peacekeeping missions, often cannot be addressed in a generalized manner

the conflict-month and conflict units of analysis.2

peace agreement implementation, monitoring of elections, protection of women and children,

troop deployment data.

UN Peacekeeping in Civil Conflict

2020). A separate body of work on UN peacekeeping or peacemaking focuses on particular case

(e.g., the Ivory Coast).

Coding UNSC Resolutions to Civil Conflict

especially important to do so for the following reasons:

location, conflict, and temporal range.

disagreements were resolved by a three-person team.5 The conflict-month dataset, a portion of

establishment variables, 8 force-level variables, 10 mandate variables, and 36 resolution variables.

of UNSC resolution data below.

The Distribution of the Data

Resolutions Before and During Peacekeeping

commitment. We define high-level resolutions as those involving the imposition or maintenance of

(e.g., MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo).

Actor Sentiment in UNSC Resolutions

by name, allowing sentiments to be distinguished without ambiguity. Below is example of this

received primarily pro-government sentiment within resolutions before the establishment of

establishment of their respective peacekeeping operations.

The Timing of Peacekeeping Establishment

“re-hatting” of regional peacekeeping operations to UN operations (e.g., AMIS to UNAMIS in

Sudan or AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali) or from conflicts inheriting previously established UN

Authorized Force Levels in Peacekeeping Operations

knowledge, this is the first dataset to provide such information.

Substantive Mandates in Peacekeeping Operations

agreements, (4) the implementation of cease-fires, (5) the implementation of disarmament,

reporting of conflict hostilities.

peacekeeping operations. The data also provides information on additions to mandates as

peacekeeping and peacemaking outcomes.

concrete changes with regard to the actions of specific conflict participants.

A UNSC resolution is a necessary condition for the establishment of a peacekeeping

peacekeepers to a civil conflict, it must overcome a substantial hurdle of consensus amongst P5

receive a peacekeeping mission.10

possibly pushing the UN closer to peacekeeping.11

UN Resolution Sentiment and Peacekeeping Effectiveness

peacekeeping operations, where:

be strongly associated with important variables indicating UN conflict effectiveness. Resolutions

continued scrutiny of conflict actions by those actors.

more pronounced in the presence of a peacekeeping operation. In short, we posit that UN

paired with targeted UNSC resolutions.

signaling a commitment to counteract their transgressions in the future, whether it be increasing

populations. For example, UNSC Resolution 1180 regarding Angola states:

Hultman, & Nilsson 2019, Cil et. al. 2020).

government, peacekeepers may be inhibited in reducing governmental violence against civilians. We

propose the following hypotheses:

Data and Research Design

resolutions, we consider two empirical operationalizations to capture the “intensity” of

condemnation: (1) the rate of anti-rebel/government resolution sentiment (Anti-Rebel/Government

Resolution Rate), measured as the cumulative number of resolutions with anti-rebel/government

interactions (UN TroopsAnti-Rebel/Government Resolution Rate; UN TroopsCumulative Anti-