G.R. No.

126175 May 29, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO ROMUA, accused-appellant.

Trial court found the accused Armando Ramua guilty of rape against the retarded daughter of Jaban,
Lolita sentenced him aoolying thr ISLAW is sentenced penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months.. Accused appealed but decision was affirmed by CA but modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua.

Issue

Won ISLAW is applicable thus penalty be lowered.

Held

No. offenses in which the law prescribes single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, it is the first
paragraph of article 63 of RPC and NOT the ISLAW which applies. In all cases which the law prescribes
single and indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that have attended the commission of the crime.

G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995

PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.

Facts

Petitioner, as President and general manager of ASPAC was accused g separate informatins of of
multiple grave oral defamation and found guilty thereof sentenced him of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and
8 months of prison correccional each crime committed.

Petitioner elevated the case to RTC, but was affirmed the conviction but appreciated mitigating
circumstance ogf analogous to passion or obfuscartion and sentenced him straight 8 penalty of 8
months in each case.

Warrant of arrest was issued , but before his arrest he files an application for probation where MeTC
denied, one of the grounds is, Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after
conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal
has been taken

Issue
whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC
which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
NO. no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction,"

Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of
the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction."

No. Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal.

Here The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital way
beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for
probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost
two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates
22

against the instant petition.

[G.R. No. 125108. August 3, 2000.]

ALEJANDRA PABLO, Petitioner, v. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding

Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, First and Judicial Region, Dagupan
City and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, Respondents.2

Facts

On January 12, 1994, petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with a violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, in three
separate Informations, for issuing three bad checks in the total amount of
92,334.00 each to complainant Nelson Mandap.

On June 21, 1995, Branch 41 of the said lower court rendered judgment in Criminal
Case No. 944199-D, convicting petitioner of the crime charged and imposing upon
her a fine of P4, 648.00.

On November 28, 1995, Branch 43 promulgated its decision in Criminal Cases Nos.
94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, finding petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, and
sentencing her to pay the amount of P4,668.00 and to serve a prison term of thirty
(30) days in each case. chanrob1e

Petitioner applied for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-
D. Her application was given due course and the probation office was required to
submit a post-sentence investigation report.

On March 25, 1996, the probation office arrived at a favorable evaluation on the
suitability of petitioner for probation. However, the recommendation of the local
probation office was overruled by the National Probation Office. It denied
petitioner’s application for probation on the ground that the petitioner is disqualified
under Section 9 of P.D. 968 (Probation Law). Respondent judge denied petitioner’s
application for probation in the Order dated March 25, 1996. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but to no avail. The same was denied on April 29, 1996.

he National Probation Office denied petitioner’s application for probation under

Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because a prior conviction

petitioner assails the denial of her application for probation; invoking the ruling of
this Court in several cases favoring liberal interpretation of the provisions of P.D.
968 so as to afford first offenders a second chance to reform in consonance with
the avowed purpose and objective of the Probation Law. She theorized that
"previous conviction" under Section 9 paragraph (c) should not be literally and
strictly interpreted but should rather be understood as referring to a situation
wherein the accused was previously convicted of a crime that arose differently, or
was done on a different date, from the conviction of a crime for which probation is
applied for. It is contended by petitioner that Section 9 paragraph (c) should not
refer, as in her particular case, where several crimes arose out of a single act or
transaction.

ISSUE

whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s application for probation on the ground of disqualification from
probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968.
HELD

No. Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a
person who was previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than
two hundred pesos, is disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law
is definitive and unqualified.
Here, petitioner was previously convicted of a crime though by the same act but it will not alter the
prohibition of application of prohibition.

[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity

as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor’s
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988,
Allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.

The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

he petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, the denial was sustained by the responded judge.

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month
statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge
against her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.

the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Agreeing with the respondent judge,
ISSUE

WON the period of prescription is suspended upon filling of the information with the office of the
provincial prosecutor.

HELD

No. Prescriptive period is not suspended.

Prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission
on May 11 1990 andd ended two minths later.

Issue

Won the crime has prescribed

HELD

YES. Act No. 3326 Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after
two months.

Here crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on
May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990,
Thus, crime has prescribed since it was filed more than two minths the commission of the crime.