the cci has jurisdiction in the scenarios

because the section 60 provide the jurisdiction over it the act

It is humbly submitted before the court that the CCT has jurisdiction through
Section 60 of the Act grants the CCT power to have decision made which
have e ect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any
other law for the time being in force.It means decision of CCI have overriding
e ect and decision made will be contained supreme as compared to other
law for time being except done by higher court NCLAT and Supreme
courtCCI has taken decision in various matter of which are under preview
TRAI,PNGRB ,CERC who are also responsible of ensuring fair competition in
the responsible for ensuring fair competition in the respective sector.

Section 26 - Power to Impose Penalties: The CCT, under Section 26, is

authorized to impose penalties on entities found in violation of the Act. This
power extends to those found guilty of anti-competitive practices that have
implications for data privacy.
Anti-Competitive Practices and Data Privacy: It is imperative to recognize
that anticompetitive practices often intertwine with data privacy concerns.
Competition issues may arise when companies engage in practices that lead
to the misuse or abuse of user data, which in turn a ects competition in the
market

The Comprehensive Nature of the Competition Act: The Competition Act is

deliberately designed to be comprehensive, ensuring that the CCT has the
authority and tools necessary to address all aspects of anti-competitive
behavior, including those related to data privacy. The Act does not explicitly
limit the CCT's jurisdiction when data privacy is a component of anti-
competitive practices.

It is submitted before the honourable court that the sectoral regulators which
SEBI, TERI, PNGRB CERC, by contrast, will not be as experienced in
conducting competition analysis as the competition authorities. Being
susceptible to regulatory capture, the day-to-day interactions between
industry o cials and regulatory agency may lead to a commonality of
interests that can interfere with the perspective necessary to evaluate
competitive harms and to construct remedies that will protect competition
for the bene t of the economy as a whole. While the sector speci c
regulators typically impose and monitor various behavioural conditions, the
competition agencies are more likely to opt for structural remedies which
would lead the sector to evolve to a point where su cient new entry is
induced thereby promoting genuine competition.
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Telefonica SA v. European Commission (2014), C-295/12 wherein it was
held that the European Commission could intervene in the
telecommunications market, even though the entry was regulated through a
sectorial regulator. He pointed out that this decision of the General Court
was upheld in appeal by the European Court of Justice vide its judgment
dated July 10, 2014.
The CCI is within its powers to exercise jurisdiction over CRAs and any other
securities market related body to the extent of their anti-competitive conduct
in market. Thus, the CCI has attempted to avoid any foreseeable con ict
with SEBI by giving it the leeway to proceed under the CRA Regulations,
while probing the alleged anti-competitive conduct by the CRAs.
This means that the CCI’s powers also traverse sectors governed by special
laws and regulated by specialized ‘sectoral regulators’, invariably leading to
an apparent jurisdictional con ict. Confronted with this issue, the CCI has
attempted to resolve the overlap of jurisdiction with the Securities and
Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) in In Re: Brickwork Ratings India Pvt. Ltd.
and CRISIL Ltd. and Others (decided 29 December 2020.

In Monsanto Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. CCI (2020), Delhi High Court reiterated
the decision of Ericsson that the CCI has jurisdiction when patent rights are
abused. Hence, it is the exercise of the rights or the conduct which is to be
examined by CCI and not the subject matter of those rights which is the
domain of the expert body. However, the Court held that the Bharti Airtel
judgement is not applicable in the present matter concerning patent rights
and Controller of Patents, as the role of Controller is ‘materially di erent’
from that of a regulator, TRAI.

WhatsApp
Further, the Commission is of the considered view that in a data driven
ecosystem, the competition law needs to examine whether the excessive
data collection and the extent to which such collected data is subsequently
put to use or otherwise shared, have anti-competitive implications, which
require anti trust scrutiny.
The reliance of WhatsApp on Vinod Kumar Gupta and other cases is also
misplaced as the Commission has only observed that breach of the
Information Technology Act does not fall within its purview. However, in
digital markets, unreasonable data collection and sharing thereof, may grant
competitive advantage to the dominant players and may result in exploitative
as well as exclusionary e ects, which is a subject matter of examination
under competition law. It is trite to mention that the provisions of the Act are
in addition to and not in derogation
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Second issue
MATRIX has entered into anti-competitive agreements with AGK as they
have an appreciable adverse e ect on competition; and they result in unfair
competition in the market. Firstly, agreements entered under this scheme
have the e ect of driving existing competitors out of the market and crate
barriers to new entrants in the same.
As there is no bene t accruing to consumers and there is no improvement in
the provision of services or promotion of technical and scienti c
development as a result of agreements under the scheme, cannot avail the
defence of ameliorating factors under Section 19(3) of the Competition Act
and is hence regarded to have an appreciable adverse e ect on competition.
Hence, it is submitted that they are in violation of Section 3(4) of the same.
Secondly, the agreement results in unfair competition the action of exploiting
the goodwill of a competitor to further ones ends amounts to commercial
immorality and is regarded as an unfair free riding on the fame of well known
works. Consequently, agreements entered into under the scheme have
deleterious e ects on competition and are hence in contravention of the
Competition Act.

It is humbly submitted that the agreement between Matrix and Agk had an
appreciable adverse e ect on the relevant market i.e., on the market of cab
services. The word "appreciable" has not been de ned in the Act, rather it
has been de ned in Black's Law Dictionary as, Capable of being estimated,
weighed, judged of, or recognized by the mind, capable of being perceived
or recognized by the senses." It is purely in the realm of estimation and is
subjective.
Whether the adverse e ect on competition is appreciable or not, will vary
according to facts and circumstances of each case.

In Ashton v. C. of I.R.SO their Lordship said that if an arrangement has a

particular purpose, then that would be its intended e ect and that if it has a
particular e ect; it will be its intended purpose. Adverse e ect should be the
consequence of the agreement, though that consequence may not be
intended.
The approach to determine the AAEC on competition is akin to the rule of
reason. Black's law dictionary de nes the rule of reason in antitrust law as a
'judicial doctrine holding that a trade practice violates the Sherman Act only
if the practice is an unreasonable restraint of trade, based on economic
factors.'! The presumption is that such horizontal agreements and
membership of cartels lead to unreasonable restrictions of competition and
may, therefore,
The Apex Court in the case of Tata Engineering (TELCO) v. Registrar of
Restrictive Trade Agreement (1977 AIR 973, 1977 SCR 2 685) observed
that any agreement restrains and binds persons or place or prices. Any such
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agreement would not be per se' bad. The question is whether the restraint is
such as to regulate and thereby promote competition or suppress
competition. It will be bad, if it destroys competition. Hence: (a) facts
peculiar to the business (b) condition before …
The test to whether a certain agreement appreciably e ects competition
within the relevant market or not has been given us 19 (3) of the act. The
rules include-
• Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market;
• Driving existing competitors out of the market;
• Foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the
market;
• Accrual of bene ts to consumers;
• Improvements in production or distribution of goods or
provision of services;
• Promotion of technical, scienti c and economic
development by means of production or distribution of goods or
provision of services.
• Tying arrangement causes AAEC. Tying in is not
considered per se illegal. Thus, it has to be shown that any kind of
tying in agreement would cause AAEC based on the factors
mentioned in Section 19(3). Tying arrangements deny competitors
free access to the market for the tied product not because the
party imposing the trying requirement has a better product or a
lower price but because of his power leverage in another market.
• Issue with e ective price competition - by making a tie in
arrangement with other party there is price margin of both party is
included and provided with combined price which is giving
discount which could not be o ered by the other companies
which is directly a ecting the price range in the market loss of
choice of consumer - the consumer are forced to avail the
services of both the company matrix and ask , they could o er a
price which is not justi ed by the quality o ered , this does not
lead to actual bene t, rather has a detrimental e ect on the
interest of the consumer and is thus is anti competitive,
Thus deal will cause AAEC in the market forcing the customer to avail
expensive services i as they are connected by arrangement the consumer
has no choice to take the other services also that leads to deprivation of
consumer choice.

Data Sharing and Alpha Al: One of the key elements under scrutiny is data
sharing between Matrix Tech and AGK through the Alpha AI tool. The sharing
of data by itself does not constitute an anti-competitive agreement. To prove
an anti-competitive agreement, it must be shown that the data sharing
arrangement had an AAEC on competition in the relevant market.
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User Data Sharing and Competition: User data sharing, when undertaken
with the objective of improving services or innovation, can be a legitimate
business practice. In the case of Matrix Tech and AGK, the sharing of user
data was primarily for enhancing the functionality of the Alpha AI tool to
provide better educational services.

Ameliorating factors" such as those speci ed in sub sections (d) to (f) of the
section are inapplicable and hence insu cient defences to hide behind, as
there is no improvement in production or distribution of goods and neither is
there any promotion of technical and scienti c development. While the
respondent may argue that there is an accrual of bene ts to consumers, it is
submitted that as the consumers are being misled into believing that their
most appropriate search response is something other than what it actually is
and that their results are not they are actually looking for - they do not
receive any bene t under this scheme either.
Driving Existing Competitors out of the market
Be existing competitors in the market are likely to be driven out as the
purpose with which they provide their services to customers through an
online intermediary which is happening due to tie in arrangement between
the matrix and ask which have provided it undue advantage because of
control of information through alpha AI the other companies cannot compare
to such powerful alliance.This results in their potential customers being
poached and hence may lead to them being driven out of the market.
Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market
Moreover, barriers are created to new entrants into this market as it is being
polarized in favour of the person with whom Matrix entered into an
agreement under the agreement scheme. Even if a new entrant tries to enter
into the market he does not have the information advantage of AGK through
the data collected by ask and new theme brought by new competitor will be
eaten because of utilization of data like what happened with small apps like
tik devour by reels in Instagram or the application of google option taken
from small app loss of choice of the consumer is also need to be taken
account when two complementary product are brought out

together not free product like free tooth brush with colgate these type of tie
in product destroy the presence of the other product and customer are
indirectly forced in buying it.
Northern Paci c Railway Co. V. United States,
The Court observed that, “They (tying arrangements) deny competitors free
access to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing
the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of
his power or leverage in another market. At the same time, buyers are forced
to forgo their free choice between competing products”. For these reasons,
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tying arrangements fare harshly under the laws forbidding restraints by
competition commission.