Professional Documents
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Mann CivPro Fall 2023
Mann CivPro Fall 2023
Professor Mann
Fall 2023 Midterm
Plaintiff wants stove, money, declaratory injunctive relief (she wants to keep stove during the
proceedings), declaratory and injunctive relief against prejudgment replevin.
Issue: are replevin statutes constitutional under 14 amendment?
Ruling- SCOTUS ruled seizing property without hearing allowed for deprivation of property w/o
due process by being denied right to stake a claim. Issue isn’t value but just the fact it was
taken. Doesn’t have to be full ownership to trigger due process. The probabilty of winning
doesn’t matter. Contracts cannot waive constitutional rights. Constitutional rights are activated
by state action, not private.
*Qui Bono*
-Fuentes, plaintiffs, Just - yes. Speedy - no. Cheap - no.
Why weren’t procedures enough? Bond (self-interest was involved), counterbond (after
seizure and was 2x value of stove) 3 day wait (still taken without DP)
-Dissent: what about seller’s interest and property rights? creditor unlikely to bring false claims
as not in economic best interest. expensive decision. can easily be avoided by a change to the
contract
Optional Reading: Orin S. Kerr, How to Read a Judicial Opinion: A Guide for New Law
Students, Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. (2005)
Class 2: Introduction and Due Process (cont.)
Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (excerpt)
Impact of Lassiter
-NC and many other states amended statute to make representation required for termination of
parental rights
-Some states cited their state constitution as requiring representation for parental termination
hearings
-State constitutions can provide more (but not less) protections than US Constitution
-SCOTUS has ruled there is no federal requirement for representation if being charged for
contempt for failure to pay child support (even if there is a significant barrier)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 3
States that the first step in action is filing a complaint
Rule 4(a)-(c)
Details contents of a summons: form that informs of a lawsuit and a date to appear in court.
Summons comes after filing a complaint. Clerk signs/seals. Plaintiff is responsible for having
complaint and summons delivered in speecfic time - MA it is 90 days after complaint filed or else
it will be dismissed.
Serving: plaintiff can request US marshal, deputy marshall, or someone from court to serve. If
someone doesn’t have resources to file summons, sometimes the court will if they are allowed.
, 8(a), (d)-(e)
Rule 8: Commencing an Action
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the
claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
9(b)
Pleading special matters: burden falls on the plaintiff for proving fraud/mistake. Show time,
place, events for allegation. Narrow range for evidence in complaint.
Back up accusations of someone breaking law they are being accused of and courts are pretty
strict on 9b and will dismiss if can’t prove.tt
Jack H. Kane Friedenthal et al., A Survey of the Civil Action, in Civil Procedure: Cases and
Materials 1-4, 127 (13th ed., West Academic Publishing 2022)
Mock Complaint for Divorce
Complaint in William Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corporation, No. 02 CIV 10220, U.S. District Court
S.D.N.Y, (2003) (Note to students: skim this- it is being assigned as it is illustrative of how long
complaints can be and still not be adequate).
Party Joinders
Readings:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 19, 20, 21, 42
-Rule 20: permissive joinder - same claims, same transaction, same facts. Sometimes case can
grow much bigger than intended
-Rule 21: misjoinder: not a reason to dismiss. Parties can be added/dropped at any time
-Rule 42: gives more discretion to the court. Allows court to join issue, actions or separate
issues
-Rule 18: umbrella rule for joinder, allowing parties to join claims from the same event.
Independent and alternative claims can be joined. No limit to # of claims if they are
contingent/dependent on each other
-Rule 19: Mandatory Joinder Test - first consider subject matter jurisdiction, ability to serve.
Can there be complete relief?
What interest does the party possess and what would happen if they weren’t there?
**Required joinder: court can order parties joined to 1) protect interests 2) re-litigation 3)can
plaintiffs interests be protected. If refuse to join, can be forced to be defendant or plaintiff
*If plaintiff objects to joinder, can file motion to sever joinder
*Plaintiff can dismiss their own complaints, but Defendant’s claims still exist
*new party must be dismissed if they make the venue improper
*If a required party cannot join, must give reasons why they aren’t joined and the court decides
if to proceed.
*court uses "inequity and good conscience” as guiding principle to decide joinder, consider if
judgment would be adequate, and if parties would have another avenue to remedy? (Among
other considerations)
Insolia v Phillip Morris
-Plaintiff = 3 former smokers and their spouses
-Defendant = 3 tobacco makers and 2 trade organizations
-trial court denied motion for class action, plaintiffs are trying to join together
-Defendant: wants to sever claims into 3 diff actions under Rule 20 bc no the same transactions.
Plaintiff wants damages and to stay together.
-District Court granted motion to sever bc plaintiffs couldn’t satisfy a1A = diff transactions
-Court says individual issues will be decided by fact specific decisions on case by case basis
-Court is defining “same transaction” very narrow.y
-Plaintiffs say same transaction bc it is the same principle and same information/ads
Pulitzer-Poster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986) (excerpt)
Original suit: niece, mom, and sister saying they want to
' recover individually and on behalf of the company bc Uncle was “mismanaging” and excluding
them from the benefits of the company
Federal court: niece files against D for breaching fiduciary duty to vote in best interest of
company.
District Court - dismisses under Rule 19 bc there is already an action in state court and they are
all mandatory parties. Niece is from CA and everyone else from LA, so diversity jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals: they need to decide if the cases should be joined and if the case should go
forward. They give deference to District Court because DC has more facts. They will answer:
did DC abuse discretion by dismissing? And do mom, niece, sis all need to be joined?
Court looks at R19 (19a1Bi), and sees that niece will be able to get complete relief from state
court. Rules mandate that joinder is a fact-based decision
-Court says other parties need to be here to protect their interests
-Plaintiff says her decision in court won’t affect other parties bc her mom and sis have damages
in state court
-says that having a state and a federal case is not duplicative because LA doesn’t recognize
collateral estoppel
-Court says under Rule 19 could create prejudice in case of Mom and sister. A1bi focuses on
absent parties’ interests
,m,m
-efficient but fairness is questionable bc state court takes too long, but that is not considered
under Rule 19
Qui Bono
D bc saves $ on litigation
Courts win bc they get to exercise discretion
Lower courts in bc they are respected to analyze the facts of the case
Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1986) (excerpt)
Plaintiff = Shepard Claims Service, Inc.
Defendant = William Darrah & Associates
Relief plaintiff is seeking
Seeking entry of the defendant’s default
Defendant’s attorney made an “honest” mistake and filed their answer late
Relief the defendant is seeking
Def wants court to set aside default and allow them to late-file an answer
Procedure
District Court denied Defendant’s motion to set aside default
Interlocutory appeal
You’re allowed to appeal an aspect of the case while the case is ongoing
Issue
When an entry of default is made, but the plaintiff isn’t prejudiced by the delay and the
defendant has a meritorious defense, should the entry of default be side aside if it was just a
result of carelessness?
Holding
Yes. An entry of default can be set aside for good cause shown.
Court reversed and denied motion to dismiss entry of default.
The court of appeals found that the district court abused its power of discretion.
Reasoning
Factors/rules they laid out
No Prejudice
Meritorious defense
Good cause (?)
To be treated as culpable, the conduct of a defendant must display either an intent to thwart
judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of its conduct on those proceedings.
Discussion questions
Purpose of requiring a willful failure of the moving party to appear and plead when evaluating
a Rule 55(c) motion
Importance of plaintiff having their day and court
The client should not be punished for their attorney’s incompetence/legal malpractice
Rationale of the existence of default judgments
Pros
Incentive for parties to actually show up
Speedy and inexpensive
Cons
Harsh sanction for good faith accidents (ex: going to the wrong room in the the courthouse and
defaulting)
Plaintiff is Shepard; Def is Darrah Associates
Plaintiff seeking upholding of entry of default (reflects fact that def never showed up to court).
Def is hoping court will set aside the entry of default and allow late filing of answer w/ affirmative
defenses.
Def filed an interlocutory appeal (an appeal prior to a final judgment on all the issues of the
case).
Now in the U.S. Court of Appeals
District Court denied ability to late file an answer and declined to void the entry of default.
Reasoning: the attorney engaged in culpable conduct; didn’t review the letter from assistant.
Facts: Def is an independent insurance broker; plaintiff is claims adjuster and alleges Def did
not pay him. Def’s lawyer’s secretary asked for a 45-day extension, the beginning point of which
caused some confusion (a “misstatement”). There was no answer filed by the expiration of
extension (unknown to Def’s lawyer), and so the court made an entry of default.
Court’s holding: district court abused its discretion. Court considered 1) whether plaintiff will be
prejudiced, 2) does Def have a meritorious defense, and 3) did Def’s culpable conduct lead to
the default? First two factors aren’t an issue; outcome hinges on third factor. Held that negligent
failure isn’t the same as willful failure. Def wasn’t trying to thwart judicial proceedings and didn’t
act with bad faith. Court was a bit more lenient in considering the third factor because the first
two factors were very clear, and there wasn’t a clear disregard for judicial proceedings. Bright
line rule highlighted by Prof Mann: “Where the party in default satisfies the first two
requirements for relief and moves promptly to set aside the default before a judgment is
entered, the district court should grant the motion if the party offers a credible explanation for
the delay that does not exhibit disregard for the judicial proceedings.”
What is the purpose of requiring a willful failure of the moving party to appear and plead when
evaluating a Rule 55(c) motion? Try to help the clients in civil suits; can file sanctions on
attorney w/o punishing client.
Why do default judgments exist/how do courts benefit? How does this help the plaintiffs/any
downside of default judgments? Need to incentivize people to show up bc case would go on
forever otherwise (common in housing court, for example); advantage for courts bc it serves as
a speedy, inexpensive adjudication to many cases; disadvantages certain plaintiff groups more
than others (e.g., pro se and doesn’t know which courtroom to go to).
The Defendant wants court to set aside entry of default and allow me to late file an answer.
Interlocutory appeal (you’re allowed to appeal prior to judgment) from the district court’s denial
to set aside an entry of default
What was the district court’s decision
Denied motion to set aside and later denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration. They allow
interlocutory appeal.
Their reasoning was that the attorney engaged in culpatory conduct.
What is the holding?
The court of appeals rules that the district court abused its discretion.
The factors were that
1) whether P will be prejudiced, 2) whether D has a meritorious defense, and 3) whether the
culpable conduct of D led to a default.
They answer in the affirmative for the first two. The third is under question, they rule that there
wasn’t enough of an error by the attorney that the client should suffer.
The court is comfortable saying that there is a meritorious defense and that they plaintiff will be
prejudiced, therefore they’re
The court does not believe it was appropriate to attempt a precise definition of “culpable
conduct.” Where the party in default satisfies the first two requirements for relief and moves
promptly to set aside the default before a judgment is entered, the district court should grant the
motion if the party offers a credible explanation for the delay that does not exhibit disregard for
the judicial proceedings.
What is the purpose of requiring a willful failure of the moving party to appear and plead when
evaluating a Rule 55(c) motion?
It’s unfair to punish the client to hire a negligent attorney. Additionally there are values to punish
attorneys separately through malpractice bar complaints.
Why do default judgments exist?
You need to incentivize people to engage in the legal system.
It’s speedy and inexpensive.
However, downside is the punishment of people who aren’t in disregard of court rules, but due
to situations outside of your control, mistakes, or not knowing the procedure.
Marilyn J. Berger et al., Strategic Pleading, in Pretrial Advocacy: Planning, Analysis, and
Strategy 213-217 (6th ed., Aspen 2022)
Defenses and Counterclaims
Readings (cont.):
Wigglesworth v. Teamsters Loc. Union No. 592, 68 F.R.D. 609 (E.D. Va. 1975) (excerpt)
-P = Wiggle D = Teamster and Union President
-relief for plaintiff: dismiss counterclaim based on SMJ
-relief D: counterclaim libel and slander
-Holding: had to determine compulsory vs permissive.
Compulsory means can be solved w/ same evidence and related to same incident
The Rule: for a compulsory counterclaim = same transaction/occurence
Holding: decided claim was permissive and court does not have jurisdiction (same state and
state law cases)
-to be compulsory, connected cases (libel/slander occurred at meeting ex.)
-two types of claims for efficiency and speediness.
-Teamsters can file in state court
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)-(c), 13, 15(a)
Discovery
Rule 26: Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery
Parties may obtain discovery regarding,
Any nonprivileged matter
That is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
And proportional to the needs of the case,
Considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
The amount in controversy,
The parties’ relative access to relevant information,
The parties’ resources,
The importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
Whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit
Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable
Breakdown of the rule
Sets the scope for discovery
“Nonprivileged matter” and “relevant”
“Proportional”
Trying to prevent extraneous information, and “fishing” for a case
Trying to curb attorneys from doing discovery that is excessive
This can be overwhelming quantities of information, which leads to burying people
Ensure that the court is not given information that we don’t need,
Sense of balance that should govern the process
If we didn’t have proportionality, it would allow the plaintiff to have uncontrolled access to find
any issue to sue over, which would lead to abusive, overzealous litigation
Abusing the weaker litigant with less financial backing
“Within the scope”
Allows parties to object to the various elements of the rule
Rule 26(a)
A party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties:
(i) The names/addresses/phone numbers that parties may use to support its claims or defenses,
unless the use would be solely for impeachment
Individuals who have information
If you want to use it at some point, you need to disclose it
Impeach- impeachment of a witness/testimony (if there is a contradiction in party’s own
testimony, you don’t need to disclose that specific information)
Why would you use something you are going to impeach?
Can maybe use it to leverage a better deal in a settlement
Maximum exposure by showing that the other party has a negative piece of information
(ii) A copy of all documents it has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support
its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment
(iii) A computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party
(iv) Any insurance agreement
Discovery: ● Purpose of Discovery:
○ Gather sufficient evidence to…
■ Leverage a favorable settlement
■ Survive a summary judgment motion
● How do facts fit into discovery through summary judgment by way of affidavits, depositions,
etc.
● Key Considerations of Discovery:
○ The rules that govern discovery, which are the FRCP Rule 26 - Rule 37 ○ How do we discover
information and admissible evidence - look to the Federal/State Rules of Evidence
*For purposes of this class, we only look to the FRCP*
○ Persuasive evidence that is favorable to your client
○ Find weakness + strategic disclosures
Formal Discovery
Mandatory Initial Disclosures - phase of discovery where both parties must disclose, without any
specific instruction or request, certain information
These elements are listed in Rule 26(A)
Notes on Rule 26(A):
(i) Names and contact info of those likely to have information the disclosing party may use to
support its claims/defenses, with the exception of information that would be used solely for
impeachment
“Impeachment of a witness refers to the process of discrediting or undermining the credibility of
a witness during a trial, by presenting evidence or asking questions that contradict their
testimony or reveal a bias, inconsistency, or falsehood in their statements.” (Cornell Law
School, Legal Information Institute)
(ii) All documents, electronically and tangible things that the disclosing party may use to support
its claims/defenses, with the exception of information that would be used solely for
impeachment
(iii) Computation of damages claimed
(iv) Insurance agreement under which all or part of possible judgment etc. may be satisfied
Party-controlled Discovery
Tools:
Written interrogatories - written questions for parties, under oath, useful for details, low cost
Production of documents and things - paper documents requested from parties
Depositions/Subpoenas - oral interview of a non-party, recorded, transcript provided,
multidimensional
Request for admission
Talking
Discovery Plan Review
Sequencing is important
Who you ask in what order matters
The relevance standard is broad in discovery but narrow in court.
Readings:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(1)(A), (b)(1)
Rule 26a - lawyers must exchange core info without waiting for discovery request
Rule 261a - requires disclosure of witnesses/docs that disclosing party may use as support,
claimed damages, insurance
Rules of mandatory initial discovery meant to streamline discovery, reduce abuse, encourage
settlements by disclosing relief sought early in process
Mandatory disclosure because no reason to request, wait, or fight about key witnesses
Rule 26a1c: made within 14 days after serving or 60 days after D has appeared
Sequence: 26f1-discovery conference and mandatory disclosures, 16b addresses scheduled
conferences and order
If not disclosed, could be basis for barring use during trial
Rule 26a1b-exemptions of proceeding from mandatory initial disclosures
Rule26e-requires adding new info that would have been subject ot mandatory disclosure
Rule 26a2D-almost immediate sanctions for failing to disclose
*two more stages of mandatory disclosure - identification of documents and witness 30 days
before trial*
Deposition: question witnesses/parties under oath, usually orally recorded, thought of as most
important part of discovery process
Rules 27-32 - give specific conditions of depositions
Must be scheduled in writing
Noticing party schedules locations. Any party can attend. Counsel can object but only sustained
if question form is inappropriate or reveals privileged info
5 Advantages: chase to question in trial conditions (could help assess demeanor), questions will
have degree of spontaneity, opportunity to ask followup questions, anything recorded can be
used in trial, and non parties may be deposed
Disadvantages: costly, so usually limitations. Could reveal case theories.
Rule 33 - written questions can be submitted and must answer in writing in time period
3 advantages of written questions: most useful for obtaining detailed info, especially personal
contact info, it’s inexpensive, and you can use for trial as a statement from other party
Disadvantages: crafted to contain as little useful info as possible. Not spontaneous. No
opportunity for follow-up.
Avista Mgmt. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 6:05-cv-1430-Orl-31JGG, 2006 WL
8439368 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2006) (excerpt)
Facts: The parties were trying to get depositions scheduled but were unable to come to an
agreement on the location for the depositions. (Motion to Designate Location)
■ The disagreement was very trivial, as the parties’ locations were in the same building but on
different floors.
■ Parties were constantly bickering throughout the discovery process.
● FRCP Rule 26:
○ Sets the scope of discovery and what we can discover
○ Parties may obtain discovery:
■ Any non-privileged matter
■ Relevant to any party’s claim or defense
■ Proportional to the needs of the case
● Balance that governs the process of discovery - if there were no
limitations then a party with more resources/financial backing
would be able to abuse the discovery process.
○ Information within the scope of discovery is not necessarily admissible in evidence.
○ Possible Objections: relevance standard (broad in discovery, narrow in court), _________,
_____________.
Judge was frustrated with the bickering between the attorneys over the location of the
deposition
The system is generally adversary
This case is perhaps an example of the judge encouraging a “rising above” of the
petty/adversary attitudes and behaviors of the attorneys involved
Outcome: the attorneys did decide on a location and moved to vacate this order
Subrin et al., Thinking Like a Trial Lawyer, Pleadings, and Joinder, in Civil Procedure: Doctrine,
Practice, and Context 421-27, 434-44
2 stages formal discovery: mandated initial disclosure and party-controlled disclosure.
7. Summary Judgment
Professor Madeline H. Meth will join us as a guest lecturer.
-Rule 56 a and c *anyone can move for SJ
*why move for SJ? Avoid trial costs, force non-moving party to show their cards and learn more
about the party
Readings:
Colotex Corp v Catrett
*Petitioner = defendant, respondent = widow of asbestos death
-Procedure: D moves for SJ bc P failed to prove evidence of causation
-plaintiff needs to show exposure happened in DC
-plaintiff had burden of proof @ trial, celotex had burden @ SJ stage bc they are the moving
party
Issue: does p have enough for SJ, or do they have to prove they did no cause injuries. Celotex
says it’s impossible to prove no exposure but they have burden of persuasion
Court reversed and SJ denied -D needs to show no evidence of a claim on part of the plaintiffs
Matsushita v Zenith
A key SJ point that’s not in the reading:
A court CAN grant a motion for SJ when there are disputed facts!
ONLY IF when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (usually P),
the moving party (usually D) is STILL entitled to judgment as a matter of law
“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”
Assume the facts that the non-moving party (usually P) has supported with evidence are TRUE,
and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor
-M moved for SJ initially
-issue being appealed: is there a genuine dispute here? Z wants courts to infer normal behavior.
M wants courts to infer conspiracy
-court has to decide if conspiracy is plausible from the evidence
-Ruling: court says makes no “economic sense” and moving party needs to prove more
persuasive evidence.
-SJ first granted, Court of Appeals reversed, Supreme Court reversed and affmd the first
decision
-even if there is a dispute, the moving party may still be entitled to judgement as matter of law
-facts will be viewed in light most favorable for nonmoving party
Anderson v Liberty Lobby
-to avoid SJ, must be able to prove you COULD win @ trial
-standard for SJ and DV are same (Rules 56 and Rule 50)
Worksheet Questions
● Facts
○ Meghan wallace suing for sex discrimination title 7 of act
○ Part of her job she was hired as a helper on a construction site, helping crafts people (welders
etc), was another job which was lower on the pay scale, (ot typically working on elevation)
○ Moving party was construction company
● Legal Standard for Proving Sex Discrimination under title 7 of sex discrimination act ○
Understanding this legal standard is necessary for applying sum jud here
● Whether employer discriminating based on sex, facts material facts
○ 2 facts:
■ 1. Comment that supervisor made to female staying ground
■ 2. Crude language supervisor used
● Would it create issue of material fact if said crude language was to all "bc of her tits and her
ass she had to stay on the ground” if directed to all workers
○ would not create genuine dispute of facts, just discriminatory overall not targeted just to her in
this instance
● . What about if the employer presented evidence that Wallace generally was a liar/lacked
credibility? ○ With just her testimony if employer says she was a big liar, then there would be a
genuine dispute of material facts bc credibility determinations made by jury judge doesn't weigh
credibility
● Would it create a genuine dispute of material fact on the question of discrimination if the
employer pointed to evidence that it didn’t have harnesses that fit women and that is why
women could not work at elevation?
○ This would not create genuine dispute bc discrimination element is if employer treat her
differently if she is a women, doesn't matter if employer is sexist or misogynist, all that matters is
treating her differently bc she is a woman, this is just further admission to show sex
discrimination towards woman
○ statement abt reasoning does not dispute, this would just be a third reason that is sex based
● Would it create a genuine dispute of material fact on the question of discrimination if the
employer pointed to evidence that working at elevation is really dangerous and Wallace didn’t
have experience working at elevation? ,
○ It does dispute question of whether wallace had experience,
○ if wallace were moving for MSJ based on her lacking experience, argument employer makes
could be diminish claim relating to decision, could argue real reason is that she didn't have
experience working at high elevations, jury could find in company favor not wallace, bc this is
valid reason,
● If the construction company pointed to evidence that suggested it prohibited Wallace from
working at elevation because of her lack of experience and the dangers of doing so, would the
construction company be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of discrimination?
○ No, bc reasonable jury could find evidence of discrimination
● Turning to the next element of Wallace’s claim—whether the discrimination was with respect
to the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment—what facts are material to this
element? ○ 1. Fact that she previously worked in elevation, and training happens on the job, she
wasnt able to do it, D didn't move for summary judgment on discrimination element, here
wallace cites her own testimony, to advance needs to have experience on the job, District court
says She provides no basis for this information other than “common knowledge” at the site and
no evidence relating to specific comparators who advanced as a result of their wider range of
skills or desired promotions that she was denied.1 , these allegations do not give rise to a claim
under Title VII.
○ Can argue that: she had prior experience and had done training before, at basic level, you
have sense of working someplace how to advance, way to advance is to learn on the job
● Did the district court properly apply the summary judgment standard assuming the employer
was the moving party?
○ They did not, bc section 4 of rule 56 talks about an affidavit, ,ust be made on personal
knowledge, she had prior knowledge and job experience for this, no reason why affidavit was
not enough ○ Wallace is non moving party, district court should be viewing facts in light most
favorable to her and making inferences in favor of her, which they did not do
● At the time that this case was being litigated in the Fifth Circuit, the circuit’s law required
plaintiffs bringing Title VII discrimination claims, not only to demonstrate that the discrimination
impacted the terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment, but also that they suffered a
so-called “adverse employment action.” The Court narrowly defined this phrase to include only
“ultimate employment decisions” such as “hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, granting leave,
and compensating.” In light of this (unjust) standard, what is the employer’s best argument for
why it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law? What is Wallace’s best argument for why
summary judgment should not be granted?
○ Employer argument: did hire her, never chose to not promote her, did not fire her for it, no
definitive decision that was made or not made based on her sex, they are entitled to judgment
bc
no ultimate employment decision, so dont worry abt facts not in dispute/ in dispute just entitled
to judgment, her job was limited and it was available to her, the and clause was that she was
hired, no opportunity to promote, so no satisfaction of the 2nd clause,
○ Wallace argument:
■ Sum jud should not be granted bc she was prevented from getting promotion bc wasn't
allowed to work on heights therefore could not ever work up to advance/ get a promotion ●
Case resolve
○ Wallance won in 5th circuit, reversed district court decision, this case reversed ultimate
employment decision precedent
8. Claim Preclusion / Issue Preclusion
Readings:
-res judicata includes both types of preclusion
-Focus either on transaction or on primary rights invaded:
-Restatement - considers all rights to relief with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of transactions, out of which the action arose.
- Pragmatic approach - are facts connected closely in time, space, origin, motivation and form a
convenient unit for trial and if would be consistent with the expectations of parties and
businesses
-Primary rights theory j- claimant has a separate claim (and therefore can file a separate case)
for each right violated by defendant.
Subrin et al., Finality and Preclusion, in Civil Procedure: Doctrine, Practice, and Context 987-
1002
-claim preclusion (res judicata) = affirmative defense (entire case is dismissed)
-issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) - only one part of claim is dismissed
-claim preclusion prevents litigating more suits bc of same event/claim/transaction. It would be a
waste of money, unfair to defendant, would allow P to keep trying until they win, risk conflicting
judgements from the same claim. One benefit is interest of finality (issue is closed)
-claim preclusion require assert all matters from same event against the same parties in one
suit.
Not res judicata if: doesn’t involve same facts/evidence, wouldn’t cause unfair harassment
(successive suits), wouldn’t risk diff results fro same event
Broad definition of “claim” - more inclusion and less preclusion
-for CP, plaintiff must include all matters that might be part of the claim. Any future litigation
must pass the transaction test
-collateral estoppel: different breach and couldn’t be predicted earlier -> not res judicata
-issue preclusion: once issue judged, cannot be re-judged with the same parties
-claim preclusion -> prevents 2nd litigation by SJ
-issue preclusion -> partial SJ prevents trying only an issue
-Defense requirements for CP: prior suit w/final valid judgement. Present suit arises from same
claim. Parties are the same
*know difference between transactional test vs primary test*
-to determine, pay attention to the subsequent transactions (according to the restatement)
-some states have compulsory counterclaims. Must be made or rights to make counterclaim are
waived
-most states use transactional test
-Validity: SMJ and personal jurisdiction correct. Must be a final judgement. Includes summary
judgment, default judgment. Dismissal bc of jurisdiction is not a preclusioin.
Including Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986)
-D wants to be out of court (dismissed)
-important to identify relief sought - has a federal claim and a state claim
-district court dismissed fed claims
-Case 1 was dismissed bc no legal basis found and affirmed
-District Court dismissed Case 2, now in Appeals court (creates transaction vs primary test)
-CofA affmd dismissal based on res judicata, based on transaction test it came from the same
core events/facts (page 997)
-Car Carriers says that diff events and use primary test, but court dismissed. They also say they
discovered new info, but court says it is not new info bc it was accessible at the time of the prior
suit)
*Qui Bono*
-Ford and courts win bc of efficiency
-CC
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (excerpt)
Relief sought - treble damages. The US was prosecuting at the same time, made plaintif
confident
Defendant wants motion dismissed
Case 1 - decision by District Court to except from res judicata. SCOTUS reversed bc they could
have appealed the original case. SCOTUS says there are exceptions, but this one is too broad
Dissent says court went too far. Another dissent says that it never should have been in federal
court.
Qui Bono: courts win, corporate defendants win
9. Claim and Issue Preclusion (cont.)
Readings:
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (excerpt)
-Relief by P: seeking to have request ordered by court
-Relief by D: does not want to comply w/ request to provide documents
-(in Herrick) District court says about Herrick: no trade secret exemption and granted SJ to FAA,
10th Circuit affmd
-(in Taylor) District Court: says precluded bc T was represented in previous case. Circuit Court
affirms DC court, developed 5 factor test for claim preclusion of non-parties
-issue in front of SCOTUS: was expansion of virtual representation appropriate?
-SCOTUS reverses and remands, T was not represented. Decided that four out of 6 exceptions
did not apply.
Reason 1: emphasizing fundamental nature of the general rule person isn’t bound by judgment
if non-party
Reason 2: there are limitations regarding nonparty preclusion based on adequate
representation
Reason 3: expanding claim preclusion would cause more work for the courts up front deciding
on preclusions
*5 factor test of virtual representation*
Parties share interest
Adequate representation
And at least one of these
“a close relationship between the present party and his putative representative,” “substantial
participation by the present party in the first case,” or “tactical maneuvering on the part of the
present party to avoid preclusion by the prior judgment.”
Claim preclusion minimums: 1. Parties have aligned interests. 2. Involved party understands
they represent nonparty or the court takes extra care. 3. Notice of original suite to the nonparties
*in class action, rule 23 provides implementation of these rules
*Qui Bono*plaintiffs, small plaintiffs, and attorneys win
Parklane Hoisery, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (excerpt)
Petitioner = original Ds, respondent = original P
P wants partial issue preclusion (offensive preclusion)
Prior litigation - Case 1 - Plaintiff was SEC v PL. Sought injunctive relief. Circuit Court affirmed.
Case 2 - District court said claim should be dismissed and denied a SJ. They say allowing case
would violate 7th amendment rights
Appeals Court sasys they deserve trial
SCOTUS - now appealing. Issue is if non-party can use issue precluision
Holding: affirm use of issue preclusion by nonparty.
-Shore couldn’t have joined case 1. It wouldn’t have be oppressive to use issue preclusion bc
PL got to defend themselves
*dissent says 7th amendment is violated* Majority says amendment issue resolved bc PL had
full fact finding process in Case 1. Majority says strict reading doesn’t apply.
Fairness and efficiency? Compare to day in court in Taylor v Sturgell
What would happen if parklane won the first case against SEC? What would plaintiffs do? A:
they’d drop the offensive issue
Identifying and Understanding Standards of Review, Writing Ctr. at Geo. L. Ctr. (2019)
10. Party Joinders
Readings:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 19, 20, 21, 42
-Rule 20: permissive joinder - same claims, same transaction, same facts. Sometimes case can
grow much bigger than intended
-Rule 21: misjoinder: not a reason to dismiss. Parties can be added/dropped at any time
-Rule 42: gives more discretion to the court. Allows court to join issue, actions or separate
issues
-Rule 18: umbrella rule for joinder, allowing parties to join claims from the same event.
Independent and alternative claims can be joined. No limit to # of claims if they are
contingent/dependent on each other
-Rule 19: Mandatory Joinder Test - first consider subject matter jurisdiction, ability to serve.
Can there be complete relief?
What interest does the party possess and what would happen if they weren’t there?
**Required joinder: court can order parties joined to 1) protect interests 2) re-litigation 3)can
plaintiffs interests be protect. If refuse to join, can be forced to be defendant or plaintiff
*If plaintiff objects to joinder, can file motion to sever joinder
*Plaintiff can dismiss their own complaints, but Defendant’s claims still exist
*new party must be dismissed if they make the venue improper
*if required party cannot join, must give reasons why they aren’t joined and court decides if to
proceed.
*court uses "inequity and good conscience” as guiding principle to decide joinder, consider if
judgement would be adequate, and if parties would have another avenue to remedy? (Among
other considerations)
Insolia v Phillip Morris
-Plaintiff = 3 former smokers and their spouses
-Defendant = 3 tobacco makers and 2 trade organizations
-trial court denied motion for class action, plaintiffs are trying to join together
-Defendant: wants to sever claims into 3 diff actions under Rule 20 bc no the same transactions.
Plaintiff wants damages and to stay together.
-District Court granted motion to sever bc plaintiffs couldn’t satisfy a1A = diff transactions
-Court says individual issues will be decided by fact specific decisions on case by case basis
-Court is defining “same transaction” very narrow.y
-Plaintiffs say same transaction bc it is the same principle and same information/ads
Pulitzer-Poster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986) (excerpt)
Original suit: niece, mom, and sister saying they want to
' recover individually and on behalf of the company bc Uncle was “mismanaging” and excluding
them from the benefits of the company
Federal court: niece files against D for breaching fiduciary duty to vote in best interest of
company.
District Court - dismisses under Rule 19 bc there is already an action in state court and they are
all mandatory parties. Niece is from CA and everyone else from LA, so diversity jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals: they need to decide if the cases should be joined and if the case should go
forward. They give deference to District Court because DC has more facts. They will answer:
did DC abuse discretion by dismissing? And do mom, niece, sis all need to be joined?
Court looks at R19 (19a1Bi), sees that nice will be able to get complete relief from state court.
Rules mandate that joinder is a fact-based decision
-Court says other parties need to be here to protect their interests
-Plaintiff says her desicion in court won’t affect other parties bc her mom and sis have damages
in state court
-says that having a state and a federal case is not duplicative because LA doesn’t recognize
collateral estoppel
-Court says under Rule 19 could create prejudice in case of Mom and sister. A1bi focuses on
absent parties’ interests
,m,m
-efficient but fairness is questionable bc state court takes too long, but that is not considered
under Rule 19
Qui Bono
D bc saves $ on litigation
Courts win bc they get to exercise discretion
Lower courts in bc they are respected to analyze the facts of the case
ddfdE
Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (excerpt)
11. Party Joinders (cont.): Party in Interest, Impleader, Intervention
-the court cannot force 3rd party claims. Rule 14 is the impleader rule.
-a cross claim is Defendant v Defendant
-D may file a claim against a 3rd party if more than 14 days after sending answer, must get
court’s permission
-3rd party Defendant can assert claims and counterclaims and answers Defendant 1’s
counterclaims. Plaintiff can make claims against the 3rd party.
Rule 24 - intervention: can decide if want to join as defendant or plaintiff. Can intervene if there
is a federal statue (ex. Department of Education)c
Readings:
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973) (excerpt)
Clark v. Assocs. Com. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 629 (D. Kan. 1993) (excerpt)
Procedural Posture: District (Trial) Court, on ℼ’s motion to strike [or in alternative, motion for
separate trial]
ℼ seeking damages for tractor/broken leg; Δ brings in Bob Howard/Clark/Lett as the 3rd party
agents who committed actions w/o Associates’ knowledge - indemnification ; 3rd party seeking
dismissal
Issue: is impleader proper? [impleader: dragging in 3rd party per Rule 14]
Court denies 3rd party’s motion to dismiss, denies ℼ’s relief:
Rationale: if 3rd party is or may be liable, impleader is proper - based on the same legal issue,
and agency theory does not apply here
Why would ℼ not want 3rd party Δ involvement? Extra cost, more complicated - just wants to
deal with the company that they interacted with
Why do the Rules not allow Δ to implead a party that is liable only to ℼ- methodology separates
joinder and impleading
Just/Speedy/Inexpensive? Positionality influences. From ℼ’s POV, more just for Δ, but less
speedy and more expensive - however, in broader context of Rule 14, more
just/speedy/inexpensive than multiple litigation. Also, issue preclusion complications with
multiple litigations
Qui Bono? Courts, Δ
Clark v. Associates Commercial Corp
Parties
Plaintiff: Clark
Seeking tractor bc it was damaged, leg broken
Opposed to 3rd party def., believes should all be on assoc., different legal issue
Files one motion asking for
Strike complaint (not dismiss) as if it didn’t happen, or in alternative
Grant separate trial (def v. 3rd party def)
Def: Associates
Brings in howard and unnamed individual, grouped together as 3rd party def, claims they are
responsible
indemnification
3rd party defs
No valid claim of indemnity from assoc,
Proc post.
Dist. ct
Issue: Is impleader (Rule 14, drag you in) proper
Holding: allowed 3rd party to join
Proper impleading
Liable
Agency theory argument (is or may be liable—should be brought in)
Def can only plead someone liable to self, not to plaintiff
Qui Bono
In isolation may not seem just, speedy and inexpensive but is in larger scope
Fair to def., they get picked bc they might have resources for payment, should be allowed to
exert right to bring 3rd parties in
Plaintiff: Clark got tractor towed for collateral for loan
Defendant: loan collection agency, taking tractor as collateral for loan, hired people to take the
tractor
Plaintiff Relief: Suing defendant for damages for the tractor + property + leg broken
Third Party Plaintiff: Associates Commercial Corp (og defendant)
Third Party Defendant: Bob Howard + some other people who were subcontracted to handle the
repossession job against the original plaintiff
Relief in 3rd party complaint: Associates are trying to push blame into the third party defendant
through indemnification (admitting that all this happened, but wants to make the 3p def pay for it
through indemnification)
Third Party Def Response: No valid claim of indemnity from the 3rd party plaintiff/def, wants 3p
complaint dismissed
Plaintiff Response: Doesn’t want the 3rd party complaint to go through (move to strike)
2 alternatives:
Contract theory (UCC): 3rd party defendants have no duty under contract between the plaintiff
and Associates
Wants two separate trials. Plaintiff wants to only be in the trial with the original defendant, not
the third party.
Court: Federal district (trial) court
Issue: Whether the impleader (Rule 14) by the defendants/3p plaintiff is proper.
Holding: The impleader is proper, so the third party defendants are in the case.
Reasoning:
Why is third party MTD denied?
Agency theory: defendants can hold alleged agents liable for any amounts that the defendants
are liable for plaintiff
Implied indemnity based on agency principles is still allowed in Kansas
Employer can seek indemnity vs their own employees for liability resulting from employee’s
actions
Why is Plaintiff’s relief denied?
If the third party is or may be liable, they can still be in the case, even if the legal theory is
different.
Agency theory and the actual tort are different legal theories, but the liability is the same.
They want anybody who might be liable for the case to be brought into the case.
Note: court can’t just bring third parties in with its own discretion, so in some cases, defendant
will plan to indemnify later and try less hard in the initial case.
Purpose of Rule 14:
Accomplish something that can be handled in one proceeding, rather than separating related
claims into multiple lawsuits
Large Questions:
Why wouldn’t plaintiff want 3rd party defendants in the case?
Would draw out a case unnecessarily in their POV, want to simplify the case and make it more
manageable
The 3rd party defendants likely have less money, which is less appealing for the plaintiff
Why do rules not allow defendant to implead a party that is liable ONLY to plaintiff?
This is to distinguish b/w joinder and impleader (procedural issue, different standard)
(this is hard on people on pro se) because they might not understand the proper standard for
the different procedures
Just, Speed, Inexpensive + Qui Bono
Just to defendant, gives them opportunity to get paid if somebody else might be responsible for
payment
Inconvenient/unjust to plaintiff b/c it draws out the trial
Complex picture b/c in isolation, can seem less just, speedy, or isolation, but the rules itself
might contribute to just, speedy, inexpensive
Not speedy, not inexpensive b/c adds more trial/procedure
Issue preclusion might lead to separate trials being a bad idea esp for the defendants
From Defendant’s POV, it might be worth it to try impleading if you think you have a chance just
in case since if you don’t do it early enough, you might be barred later by issue/claim preclusion
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978)
(excerpt)
Kerr McGee and American Mining wish to intervene, claim that their interests are not adequately
represented by United Nuclear
District court’s decision being appealed: denied motion to intervene due to adequate
representation by United Nuclear
Holding: Kerr McGee and American Mining’s interest in case, licensing/future ability to renew
licenses at stake, is sufficient interest for intervention. The trial court’s interpretation (need for
direct interest) was too narrow an interpretation. Other company (United Nuclear) may be willing
to compromise on factors that Kerr McGee and American Mining may not, and therefore not
adequately represented.
Qui Bono? Corporations/general parties w/ private interest and sufficient resources.
Intervention is a better option for interested parties than amicus curiae (briefs which are easily
rejected from consideration on arbitrary requirements)