Equity, Equality and Egalitarianism

Equity, Equality, and Egalitarianism
Author(s): Sven Ove Hansson

Source: ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of
Law and Social Philosophy , 2001, Vol. 87, No. 4 (2001), pp. 529-541
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23681506
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Franz Steiner Verlag is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy
This content downloaded from

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Sven Ove Hansson, Stockholm
Equity, Equality, and Egalitarianism
Abstract: Distributional policies can be characterized by means of a value-theoretical

analysis of both the distribuendum (object of distribution), and the comparandum (object
of comparison). Value-theoretical tools are used to specify the différences between egal
itarian and non-egalitarian equity, between différent versions of egalitarianism, and be
tween political and legal discourse on equality. Both egalitarians and non-egaiitarians
advócate equal distributions, but they differ in their choices of distribuenda to be equally
distributed.
1. Introduction
One of the liveliest debates in recent political philosophy has centred around the ques
tion "Equality of what?". The discussants have ventilated a sizable number of propos
ais for what should be distributed equally or equitably, including primary social goods
(Rawls),1 welfare,2 opportunity for welfare (Arneson),3 resources (Dworkin),4 and ca
pabilities (Sen).5 Although the policy proposais put forward by these authors all aim at
achieving more equality, they would lead to quite différent types of social and legal
arrangements.
Unfortunately, this debate has been lacking in value-theoretical précision. Often,
no distinction has been drawn between the various reasons why a commodity or other
entity is not a proper object of equal distribution, such as:
- it is not a good for individuáis,

- it is a good for individuáis that society should not attempt to distribute,
- it is a good for individuáis that society should distribute according to non-equity
criteria, and
- it is a good for individuáis that society should distribute according to equity criteria,
but these criteria require a non-equal distribution.
In this paper, value-theoretical analysis will be used to draw these and other distinc
tions and to identify conditions that must be satisfied for something to be a proper
object of equal distribution.6 Surprisingly much can be learned about distributive jus
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1972. Rawls's proposai dlffers from the others listed here in
referring to a fair distribution rather than to an equal one.
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1 : Equality of Welfare, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.
10,185-246,1981
RJ Arneson, "Equality and equal opportunity for welfare", Philosophical Studies, vol. 565, 77-93,
1989
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
vol. 10, 283-345, 1981
Amartya Sen, Equality of What, 353-369 in: Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement,
1982; Amartya Sen, Rights and Capabilities, in: Ted Honderich (ed.) Moratity and Objectivity, Lon
don 1985
'Object' is, of course, taken in its abstract sense and does not necessarily referto material objects.

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
530 Sven Ove Hansson
tice from studying the

objects in terms of wh
be thrown in this way
and egalitarianism. Fur
discourse on equality c
2. The key concepts
The words "equity", "eq

ings in common usage
fined these words and
nately they have done
basic concepts that are
Perhaps the most imp
fied by a particular dist
to how it apportions
"equity", "fairness" an
they are all found in v
to evalúate distribution
tional goodness. Furthe
ponent of equity in thi
"Justice" is often used
butional considérations
tant contemporary ex
devoted to distribution
sense of "justice".
The most obvious inte
ments. In this sense, e
objective", whereas equ
basically subjective".8
used to denote a partic
ians do not want to dis
care according to need
society closer to equa
To distinguish between
shares" and "equal dist
tribution" for the seco
cation of equity, equa
reasons unrelated to eq
among their leading sta
The question "equality
sion: "What objects sho
answer this question, w
7 Julian Le Grand, Equit

Harper Collins Académie
8 Martin Bronfenbrenner,
cial Science, vol. 409, 9-23,9

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
Equity, Equality, and Egalitarianism 531
1 proper objects of distribution,

2 among these, objects to be distributed in accordan
3 among these, objects to be distributed equally acco
The last two of these questions can be asked eithe

specified version such as egalitarian equity.
3. Distribution formats
The term "distribution" has two distinct meanings. In one sense, a distribution is con
stituted by the shares held, at a particular moment, by ail the individuáis involved. We
know, in this sense, the distribution of teaching tasks among the members of a univer
sity department when we know each member's share, and can relate it to her other
characteristics (such as type of position, external grants etc.). I will use the term distri
bution state to refer to this first sense of the word.
In the second sense, distribution is a process, namely "the action of dividing and
dealing out or bestowing in portions among a number of récipients" (OED). In this
sense, in order to know the distribution of teaching tasks we need to know how the
distribution state comes about. I will use the term distribution process to refer to this
second sense of "distribution".
To characterize a distribution state, we need to specify three key variables: (1 ) the
distributees or récipients among whom the distribution occurs (often but not always
natural persons), (2) the distribuendum or object of distribution, that is distributed
among the distributees, and (3) the distribution pattern, such as equal distribution,
distribution according to merit, random distribution, etc. For a concrete example, con
sider the following:
Dividends are paid to the shareholders in proportion to their holdings of shares.
Here, the dividends form the distribuendum, the shareholders are the distributees and
proportionality to holdings is the distribution principie. More generally, the following
format can be used to characterize a distribution state:
F1 A is distributed among Y according to P,
where A is the distribuendum, Y the set of distributees, and P the distribution pattern.
A distribution process may be driven by natural phenomena (such as when rain is
distributed among countries). However, in justice-related discussions the focus is mainly
on distribution processes that are driven by human agency. To characterize them, we
need at least one more variable in addition to those used for distribution states, name
ly the distributor, or agent of distribution. The following format can be used:
F2 X distributes A among Y according to P,
where Xis the distributor. The following are examples of this format:
- The headmaster awards scholarships to students according to their scholarly

achievements.
- The social welfare office grants allowances to applicants according to their needs.
When a less incomplète characterization of distribution processes is needed, other

factors will have to be specified in addition to those included in F2: the means by
which the distribution is achieved, the time used to achieve it, etc.

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
4. Distribuenda
Let us now turn to the basic task of characterizing the objects that can serve as dis
tribuenda. In a first, fully general, approach, no assumption will be made about the
purpose with which the distribution process is undertaken. Indeed, many distribution
processes have a purpose différent from that of equity; they may for instance aim a
maximizing productivity or total income. To take just one example, the distribution of
tasks and responsibilities in a Company is supposed to be directed at maximizing the
company's total proceeds.
Something is a proper distribuendum if it can reasonably have that role in at least
one distribution State or distribution process. The following, minimal criterion must
then be satisfied:
C1 A distribuendum (object of distribution) must have parts that can be assigned to

distributees in a socially relevant way.
It is not possible to divide the air that surrounds us into parts that can be assigned to
individual humans in a meaningful way. Therefore, atmospheric air is not a distribuen
dum in any distribution process.
For distribution processes with human distributors, C1 can be sharpened. Height
can certainly be assigned to persons, but since no one can transfer it from one person
to another, it cannot serve as a distribuendum. Generally speaking:
C2 The distribuendum of a distribution process with a human distributor must have parts
that the distributor can transfer to or from distributees.9
To transfer means to "take from one place, person, etc. to another" (OED). The recent
debate on equality has largely been couched in terms of goods, such as capabilities,
total resources, and welfare (as a State of mind), that do not satisfy C2. Therefore,
they cannot be distribuenda in human distribution processes, but they can be used as
criteria for the distribution of other, transferable entities such as material resources.
(See Section 7.)
Conditions C1 and C2 apply irrespective of the purpose with which the distribution
is undertaken. For distributions that aim at equity (henceforth: equity-based distribu
tions),10 the following condition can be added:
C3 The distribuendum of an equity-based distribution process must have positive or
negative (i.e., not neutral) value to at least one of the distributees.
Here and in what follows, by "value" is meant value according to some underlying
value System, the nature of which will be left open. In particular, the value System may
be more or less paternalistic, so that "value to" a distributee may reflect either the
distributee's own évaluation, an external (ideally impersonal) évaluation, or some com
bination thereof.
As an example of when C3 does not hold, consider the number of odd digits that
each of us has in her social security number. Presumably, this number is completely
inconsequential to all of us. Therefore, the distribution between persons of odd digits
in their social security numbers is not a matter of equity.
Objects of an equity-based distribution may very well have positive value to some
distributees and negative or neutral value to others. For an example, suppose that we
9 This criterion is related to Aristotle's requirement that objects of justice be divisible. (NE v:ii:12)
10 I will assume that all equity-based distribution processes have a human distributor.

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
have a bag of cherries to share out among a grou

cherries whereas the others do not. The standard solution is to divide the cherries
equally among those to whom they have positive value. This is generally conceived
as an équitable (fair) procédure, even in the iimiting case when only one child likes
cherries, and consequently receives the whole lot.
Although C3 is a very weak condition, I propose tentatively that it contains all the
restrictions that can be made, in general, on objects of equity-based distributions in
addition to those that apply to all objects of human distribution processes. Further re
strictions are possible, however, on equaldistributions that are equity-based. (This group
includes both equal distributions recommended by egalitarians and equal distributions
- such as equal opportunity - that are more typically favoured by non-egalitarians.)
From the viewpoint of value to individuáis, there are two major catégories of ob
jects that one may, for reasons of equity, wish to distribute equally. One of these
consists of benefits, such as votes, income, access to healthcare, educational oppor
tunités, etc. They are ail assumed to be of positive value to ail distributees. The other
category consists of burdens, such as administrative tasks in a group of researchers,
housework in a marriage, fees in a road association, and military service. These are
taken to be of negative value to ail distributees.
Many objects of value are good for some people but bad for others. From the
viewpoint of equity, they are unsuitable for equal distribution. No reasonable concep
tion of equity requires insulin shots to be distributed equally among a population that
contains both diabetics and non-diabetics. Similarly, no sensible version of equity
requires equal distribution of pork in a population that contains both persons who
abstain from pork for religious reasons and persons who consider it a delicacy.11
Objects of value that have positive value for some distributees and neutral value
for others are not either suitable for equity-based equal distribution. Suppose, for
instance, that a Company has bought a certain number of parking hours in a near-by
car park, and wishes to distribute these for free among its employées. This commod
ity is of positive value for car-owners, but of neutral (i.e. neither positive nor negative)
value to employées who do not have access to a car.12 To distribute parking hours
equally among ail employées does not, therefore, seem to be a reasonable applica
tion of equity.
These arguments lead up to the following criterion:
C4 The distribuendum of an equity-based equal distribution must either have positive
value to ail distributees, or negative value to ail distributees.
Since the positive or negative value mentioned in C4 derives from the value System of
the proponent of equal distribution, we can reasonably assume that she prefers, ceteris
paribus, as much (respectively little) of that positive (respectively negative) value as
possible. Henee, we can safely assume that out of two equal distributions with différent
levels of a positively valued distribuendum, she prefers that with the highest level. A
proponent of equal opportunity will prefer a society with high and equal opportunités to
a concentration camp where everyone's opportunités are equal to nil. Similarly, a pro
ponent of equal wages will prefer equal high wages to equal low wages, etc.
The following example shows that we can go one Step further than C4 in value
theoretical spécification. We have a stock of oranges to distribute among a crew.
11 Respect for individual preferences for or against pork is assumed here.

12 This argument présupposés that the parking permits are non-transferable and thus cannot be trad
ed.

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
Some of its members s

are a cure for scurvy
members, their value i
fore, in spite of their p
be inéquitable by any s
rive at the following cri
C5 The distribuendum
the same positive valu
distributees.
As noted above, equity-based equal distributions must be distinguished from egalitar

ian distributions. Before we can characterize the latter, socially more important con
cept, we have to pay close attention to the nature of distribution patterns.
5. Comparanda
Distribution patterns ("P" in F1 and F2) are often expressed by comparing each dis
tributee's share of the distribuendum to her holdings of some other entity, which can
be called the comparandum. In typical cases, each distributee's allotment of the dis
tribuendum is either an increasing or a decreasing function of her holdings of the
comparandum. We may distribute, for instance:
- scholarships according to scholarly achievement,

- taxes according to income,
- health care according to health care needs,
- salaries according to the value of the work performed, and
- food stamps in relation to income.
In the first four of these examples, each distributee's share of the distribuendum is an
increasing function of her holdings of the comparandum, and in the last example a
decreasing function.14
In ail these examples, the comparandum refers to conditions that hold prior to the
distribution process. (It is, for instance, the health care needs before, not after, health
care has been distributed that should determine its distribution.) In other cases, the
distribution process aims at a certain distribution of the comparandum after the distri
bution has taken place. We may, for instance:
- distribute total economic resources so as to assure that each distributee obtains a
predetermined, minimal resource level,
- distribute total economic resources so as to raise the minimum resource level as
much as possible,15 or
Again, it is assumed that trading does not occur.

More precisely: non-decreasing in the first example, increasing in the following three, and non
increasing in the last one.
This criterion of justice is usually associated with John Rawls, but already in 1794 Condorcet ex
pressed very much the same idea: "[Cjette inégalité... doit-elle continuellement s'affoiblir pour faire
place à cette égalité de fait, dernier but de l'art social, qui, diminuant même les effets de la dif
férence naturelle des facultés, ne laisse plus subsister qu'une inégalité utile à l'intérêt de tous..."
(Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain, Paris 1794, 329)

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
- distribute total economic resources so as to

distributed among the distributees.
These distributions make use of posterior comp

anterior comparanda mentioned above.
Equal distributions are a limiting case in whi
tween anterior and posterior comparanda. If we di
a set of distributees, then the comparandum ¡s ju
utees, which applies equally to each of the dist
distribution.
In order to be useful in determining a distribut
satisfy a condition analogous to C1 :
C6 A comparandum must have parts that are assig
Clearly, a comparandum does not have to satisfy a

ability criterion). We can use scholarly achieveme
comparanda, although they cannot be transferred
Some of the comparanda used in equity-based di
of C5, i.e. they have roughly the same, non-neut
ing to the underlying value System. This applies,
quently used both as an anterior and a posterior c
is not difficult to find equity-based distributions
even that of C4. One such example is the amount
distributing rémunération. If you and I have prod
an arms factory, then it makes no différence for
the work and the product, whereas the other loat
value of the work, not to the distributees but to t
equity-based distributions can (contrary to their d
values that do not directly concern the respective
The comparandum may also be value-neutral
unrelated to its value (such as age). Henee, the ana
6. The subversion of distribution processes
Distribution processes are undertaken with a pur

efficacious with respect to that purpose. Some of t
mechanisms that prevent or impede fulfilment o
tivity is not a property of a distribution process
distribution process and a purpose with which it
Before entering upon the somewhat complex task
esses that are counterproductive with respect to
the simpler case when a distribution is pursued
variable such as productivity.
Suppose that we have to distribute, among a gro
that everybody wants to have performed but nobo
ple solution, that may be successful in the very sh
ing to willingness to undertake them, so that t
signed the largest work-share. Then each distribu
by maximizing her résistance. Many of us have e
mechanism in poor voluntary associations that hav

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
(In more affluent organ

bers, other distributiv
ment or other rewards,
Another, better known
counterproductive with
level of) revenue.
Two factors combine t
A distributee
(i) has (at least partial) control over her own holdings of the comparandum, and
(¡i) has incentives to change her own holdings of the comparandum in a way that runs
counter to the purpose with which the distribution is undertaken.
Both of these conditions must be satisfied for counterproductivity to occur. (i) but not (ii)
is satisfied when, in order to maximize production, wages are set in proportion to work
performed. This is in typical cases not at all a counterproductive regime, (ii) but not (i)
is satisfied when unwanted tasks are distributed among a group of boy scouts accord
ing to age. Some of the boys would gain from being transferred to another age group,
but since they can do nothing about their age, counterproductivity does not arise.16
After this preparatory discussion, we can now turn to counterproductivity in equity
based distributions. First, let us consider equity-based distributions with an anterior
comparandum, such as the following:
- Social allowances are granted according to the size of the recipient's debts.
- Crop damage compensation is granted in proportion to last year's decrease in
crop yield.
- Paid vocational training is granted to those with the longest period of unemployment.
- Free language courses abroad are accorded to the students that are most in need
of language training.
In the first of these examples, what makes the distribution pattern problematic is that
it induces the distributees to incur debts. This is, generally speaking, an undesirable
effect, but its general undesirability is not what concerns us here. We need to show
that it is, more specifically, counterproductive with respect to the purpose of an equity
based distribution. To see that this is so, note that a person who increases her indebt
edness thereby draws resources (portions of the distribuendum) to herseif, so that
less will be available for other distributees. As was indicated in Section 4, if the propo
nent of a distribution pattern takes the distribuendum to have positive value for all
distributees, then we can safely assume that she aims at providing each distributee
with as much of the distribuendum as possible without being unfair (inéquitable) to the
others. Therefore, any avoidable drainage of a positively valued distribuendum should
be reckoned as a counterproductive effect.
An inverted effect appears at the other end of the value-scale. Here, the distribuen
dum has negative value to all distributees. If a distributee can decrease her own share,
thus shoving a larger portion to the others, then this is counterproductive in the same
way as drainage of a positively valued distribuendum. To exemplify this, we merely
need to modify the first example given in this section (distributing workload according
to willingness to work) and assume that the mode of distribution was chosen for rea
sons of equity.
16 The satisfaction or non-satisfaction of (i) is independent of the purpose with which the distribution is
undertaken. Therefore, the purpose need not be specified in this example.

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
In summary:
C7 An equity-based distribution process exhibits c

extent that there are distributees such that
(i) they have at least partial control over their own holdings of the comparandum,
(iia) if the distribuendum has positive value to all distributees: the distribution proc
ess induces them to modify their holdings of the comparandum in a way that
decreases the shares available to others, and
(iib) if the distribuendum has negative value to all distributees: the distribution proc
ess induces them to modify their holdings of the comparandum in a way that
increases the shares that have to be imposed on others.
The severity of type I counterproductivity in various concrete cases is an empirical

issue. Distribution processes with expectedly very severe counterproductive effects
(such as social allowances in proportion to debts) hardly have any proponents, but
less severe effects (such as the vocational training example) are often accepted.
We can now turn to equity-based distributions with posterior comparanda. C7 is
equally applicable to them. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical System that distrib
utes subsidies to farmers so that they all obtain a certain minimal total income level (=
income from farming + subsidies). This system will decrease the farmers' incentives
to eam money by doing actual farm-work, and is therefore a clear case of type I
counterproductivity.
In addition, distributions with posterior comparanda can also be counterproductive
by another mechanism. In many cases, the effect that an allotted portion of the dis
tribuendum has on a posterior comparandum is far from automatic. The second type
of counterproductivity arises when distributees can manipúlate the conversion of dis
tribuendum into posterior comparandum. Suppose that a hypothetical social welfare
office pays out cash allowances according to the criterion that each récipient should
reach a certain standard in terms of basic goods such as food, housing, and clothes.
In other words, everyone is entitled to more money until she has reached the intended
level of basic goods. The self-destructive nature of this arrangement is obvious. Per
sons who use only a small proportion of their income for the necessities of life will be
enriched at the sacrifice of those with more "Maslovian" priorities. Distributees can
manipúlate this system by adjusting their consumption habits. We can call this coun
terproductivity of type II and define it, in more general terms, as follows:
C8 An equity-based distribution with a posterior comparandum exhibits counterproduc

tivity of type II to the extent that there are distributees such that:
(i) they have at least partial control over the effect that the portion of the dis
tribuendum allotted to them has on their holdings of the comparandum,
(iia) if the distribuendum has positive value to all distributees: the distribution proc
ess induces them to modify the effects of the distribuendum on the comparan
dum in a way that decreases the shares available to others, and
(iib) if the distribuendum has negative value to all distributees: the distribution proc
ess induces them to modify the effects of the distribuendum on the comparan
dum in a way that increases the shares that have to be imposed on others.
One case of type II counterproductivity is well known from a paper by Kenneth Arrow
in which he compared the social resources that will be necessary to achieve a good
life for two persons, one of whom is satisfied with very little whereas the other is
unhappy unless he can live a life in luxury.17 Just like counterproductivity of type I,
17 Kenneth Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice, Journal of Philoso
phy, vol. 70, 245-263, 1973

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
that of type II comes in

type II counterproductivi
mentioned above:
- Food is distributed in order to ensure that no one is undernourished.

- Remedial teaching is apportioned according to the criterion that every pupil should
achieve a certain level in basic skills.
Equitarians difter among themselves in how much counterproductivity (of type I or

type II) they tolérate, but the most severe forms of counterproductivity are so thor
oughly self-defeating that no serious equitarian can be in favour of accepting them.
7. Reduced form
In Section 3 we introduced two fairly versatile formats for characterizing a distribution

State and a distribution process, namely F1 and F2. Forsome purposes, the following
simpler formats are also useful:
F3 Zis distributed equally among Y.

F4 Zis distributed equally among Y by X.
F1 and F2 will be called extensive form and F3 and F4 reduced form for distribution
states, respectively distribution processes. The reduced form reports an equal distri
bution. Given an extensive form for a distribution, it is often quite easy to obtain its
corresponding reduced form. Let us first consider a distribution with an anterior com
parandum. For each distributee /', let d(i) be her share of the distribuendum and c(i)
her holding of the comparandum. Then there is a function f such that d(i) = f(c(i)). If
d(i) 0 for ail /, then d(i)/f(c(i)) = 1, and it follows that d(i)/f(c(i)) should be equal for ail
distributees.18 For a concrete example, consider payment in proportion to the number
of working hours performed. In this case, f(c(i)) is equal to kxc(i) for some positive
constant k, and d(i)/c(i) is equal for ail distributees. In other words, using F3:
Payment per hour is equal for ail distributees.
Unfortunately, important information is lost in the transformation from extensive to

reduced form. To see this, let m be a positive constant and let f be a function such
that for ail c(i), f'(c(i)) = mxf(c(i)). Then the distribution based on fand that based on f
can be distinguished between in extensive form but not in reduced form. More con
cretely, the différence between paying all workers 6 1.00 per hour and paying them
all É 35.00 per hour cannot be expressed in reduced form.
Next, let us turn to the transformation into reduced form of an extensive form with
a posterior comparandum. To begin with, consider the case when the posterior com
parandum is required to be equal for all distributees. Then the comparandum can take
the place of Zin F3 and F4. For an example, suppose that scarce food is distributed
among a group of persons, with the aim of achieving the same nutritional status. This
can be expressed in reduced form as follows:
Nutritional status is distributed to be equal among the distributees.
18 We can deal with the zéro case by ¡nterpreting constancy of d(i)/f(c(i)) to mean that d(¡) be propor
tionate to f(c(i)).

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
Again, information that relates to the exécution o

quently to efficiency or counterproductivity, is lo
reduced form. The reduced form given above is, f
the following three extensive forms that differ widely
- Money is distributed among the distributees in

nutrition.
- Food stamps are distributed among the distributees in order to achieve an equal
level of nutrition.
- Food is distributed among the distributees in order to achieve an equal level of
nutrition.
It remains to treat the more general - but perhaps less common - case of distributions
with a posterior comparandum that is not the same for all distributees. Such distribu
tions seem to be in most cases reconstructible into distributions with equal comparan
da. For a concrete example, suppose that in a drought-ridden rural district, relief food
is distributed according to the criterion that each farmer should obtain a total level of
food supply (own produce plus relief) that corresponds to the size of his family. Then
the comparandum (total stock of food) is a function of family size. We can easily
reconstruct this distribution so that it refers to another comparandum, namely food
supply per (a suitable measure of) family size, that is allotted equally to ail distrib
utees.
The notion of an equal distribution has considerable rhetoric force. Consequently,

reduced form is generously invoked by proponents of various forms of equity.19 It is a
distinguishing characteristic of egalitarians that they demand social resources to be
distributed in equal shares to ail members of society: equal wages, equal wealth, etc.
Non-egalitarians who oppose such radical reforms nevertheless tend to emphasize
other equal distributions that they advócate, such as equal opportunities. Henee, egal
itarians differ from proponents of non-egalitarian equity, not in advocating equal distri
butions - the others do that as well - but in their choices of distribuenda for equal
distributions.
The reduced format has the considerable advantages of simplicity and of facilitat
ing comparisons between différent distributions. On the other hand, it has the disad
vantage of leaving out important information. The distribuenda in reduced form (Xin
F3 and F4) are in many cases not "true" distribuenda for equity-based distributions,
since they do not satisfy C2. We can call them distribuenda pro forma. Since the
reduced format refers to them without mentioning the associated actual distribuenda
(nutritional status versus food stamps, etc), it may create the misleading impression
that the pro forma distribuendum can be distributed directly, by fiât.
For distributional policies to be at all implementable in a legal system, they must
be expressible with a distribuendum that satisfies C2. Therefore, even when reduced
form is preferred in political discourse the extensive format will often have to be used
in legal discourse. As a conséquence of this, the translation of a policy from political to
legal language will often involve a shift from an equal distribution to an unequal distri
bution (of a différent distribuendum). As an example of this, in order to achieve the
political goal of "equal chances of educational achievement", legislators may have to
introduce unequal (compensatory) rights to remedial teaching.
19 It has, in a sense, the furiction of a "normal form" for distributions, but this terminology will not be used
due to the severe losses of information involved in transformations from extensive to reduced form.

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
8. Conflicting principie
Confiicts between the m

monly expressed as conf
ties, equal resources, or
equal distributions, the e
would prefer to have rea
form abstracts from the
tarian must also take int
consider (1) its desirabili
extent to which it is self
duced form is an excellen
supplemented by extensiv
Since counterproductiv
procédure suggests itself
C9 Among a set of confli
1 excludes those that sh
2 among those remainin
(under the assumption
Alternatively, counterpr
in a single décision step.
essentially the same resu
The essential différence
be localized to the desirab
tarians in the way they
realizability).
C10 When comparing distributions in reduced form, under the assumption that they can
be realized, an egalitarian prefers the distribution whose (pro forma) distribuendum
is most directly valuable to the distributee herseif.
A non-egalitarian equitarian may prefer equal opportunity to obtain economic resources,

rather than equal economic resources. An egalitarian will prefer the latter, since the
money itself is of more direct value to distributees than the opportunity to obtain that
money. For the same reason, she will prefer equal social status to equal opportunity
to achieve social status, etc. (The non-egalitarian may, of course, invoke various in
direct effects to prove that her choice is, totaliter, better for all distributees.)
Egalitarians differ among themselves in their views on what is directly valuable to
individuáis. A major factor is their degree of paternalism. An egalitarian with paternal
ist leanings wishes to distribute various special commodities equally: food, good hous
ing, cultural expériences etc. that she considers to be valuable to the distributees.21 A
non-paternalist egalitarian prefers to distribute convertible resources (money) equal
ly, thus leaving more freedom to the distributees in choosing howto use the resources
allotted to them. Egalitarianism and paternalism are independent variables, and there
20 To simplify the discussion, ties (between distributions that are equally préférable) are abstracted
from. They can easily be reintroduced, but nothing important for our présent purposes is lost by
excluding them.
21 James Tobin, On limiting the domain of inequality, Journal of Law and Economies, vol. 13, 263
277, 1970

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC
are no conceptual reasons to believe that paternali

less, egalitarian than non-paternalist egalitarians.
Besides variations in their degrees of paternalism,
that créâtes différences among egalitarians: their at
ity. The impact of this latter factor can be clearly see
proposais in the "equality of what" literature. In thi
mostly been characterized only in reduced form. Th
be more precisely specified as the choice of a pro
distribution. Four such proposais are indicated in th
Extra resources -> Total resources -* Capabilities -> Good life
"Extra resources" are the resources transferred to the individual distributee thr
redistribution policies. What matters to the individual is the total amount of reso
at her disposai, rather than the fraction of it that was obtained through redistrib
Henee, according to C10, equal distribution of total resources is, from an egalita
point of view, more désirable than equal distribution of extra resources.22 By a s
reasoning, capabilities in Sen's sense are more directly valuable to individuái
still more valuable is fulfilment of the ultímate goal of a good life (that may be d
in terms of happiness, self-realization, etc.). If desirability (factor 2 in C9) was ai
mattered, then some measure of a good life would be the (pro forma) distribuen
that egalitarians preferred to distribute equally. However, as should be clear fro
Arrow's example, discussed in Section 6, if goodness of life is used as a distr
dum, then devastating counterproductivity of type II will ensue. A rational egalit
will therefore have to retreat leftwards in the diagram. Capabilities give rise to
but certainly not negligible - type II counterproductivity, and also to type I coun
ductivity. At the level of total resources, we have less serious counterproductivity
only of type I, and at the level of extra resources there is no counterproductivity
In practice, the egalitarian's choice among the four options in the diagram w
either total resources or capabilities, depending on how she judges the count
ductivity factor. A paternalist egalitarian, who prefers to distribute several goo
arately, may choose total resources for some commodities and capabilities for o
Author's address: Sven Ove Hansson, Philosophy Unit, Royal Institute of Technology, S-100 4
holm, Sweden
22 It gives rise to a distribution of extra resources according to need. See David Miller, Social Justice
and the Principie of Need, 173-197 in: Michael Freeman and David Robertson (eds.), The Fron
tiers ofPolitical Theory, 1980

3.7.228.102 on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 06:15:53 UTC

Equity, Equality and Egalitarianism

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Equity, Equality and Egalitarianism

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Equity, Equality, and Egalitarianism

Author(s): Sven Ove Hansson

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23681506

This content downloaded from