Legal Profession

Case Digest

MICHELLE YAP v. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI, AC. No.11156, 2018-03-19

Facts:
The instant case stemmed from the complaint of Michelle Yap against respondent Atty.
Grace C. Buri for refusing to pay her monetary obligation and for filing a criminal case of
Estafa against her based on false accusations.
Complainant Michelle Yap was the vendor in a contract of sale of a condominium unit,
while Atty. Grace C. Buri, Yap's close friend and her daughter's godmother, was the
vendee. Buri made an offer to purchase the property but asked for the reduction of the
price from P1,500,000.00 to P1,200,000.00. After consulting with her husband, Yap
agreed. Of the total amount of purchase price of P1,200,000.00, P200,000.00 remains
unpaid; Buri insisted that she would just pay the balance on installment starting in but
without specifying the amount to be paid on each installment. Because she trusted the
respondent, Yap gave Buri the full and immediate possession of the condominium unit
upon completion of the P1,000,000.00 despite the outstanding balance and even
without the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale. However, when Yap finally asked for the
balance in January 2011, Buri said she would pay it on a monthly installment of
P5,000.00 until fully paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said she would just cancel the
sale. Thereafter, Buri also started threatening her through text messages, and then later
on filed a case for estafa against her.Buri alleged in the criminal case that when she
found out that the sale of the condominium unit was made without the consent of Yap's
husband, Yap cancelled the sale and promised to return the amount of P1,000,000.00
initially paid. Despite several demands, however, she failed and refused to return the
money. Thus, Buri was constrained to file a case for estafa against Yap. Said case was
later dismissed.
Yap then filed an administrative complaint against Buri for the alleged false accusations
against her.
On July 2, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended Buri's suspension to wit:[1]WHEREFORE, in view of all
the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner recommends to impose the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months upon the
respondent, Atty. Grace C. Buri, and for her to pay the complainant the amount of
PhP200,000.00 upon execution by complainant and spouse of the Deed of Absolute
Sale of the condominium unit subject of the sale between the parties.
On January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-062,
[2] which adopted the foregoing recommendation but with modification,
thus:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A," finding Respondent's violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, Atty. Grace C. Buri is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year. The order to pay P200,000.00 is deleted without prejudice to the
filing of proper action by Complainant in Court.
Here, instead of paying Yap the remaining balance of the purchase price of the
condominium unit, Buri opted to simply threaten her and file a criminal case against her.
Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate Yap and prevent her from collecting the
remaining P200,000.00. When given a chance to defend herself, Buri chose to stay
silent and even refused to file an answer, attend the hearing, or to submit her position
paper, despite due notice.
Issues:
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
The Court finds no sufficient reason to overturn the findings and recommendation of the
IBP that Buri must be disciplined accordingly.
Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation despite frequent demands clearly reflects
her lack of integrity and moral soundness; she took advantage of her knowledge of the
law and clearly resorted to threats and intimidation in order to get away with what she
wanted, constituting a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.
Buri indubitably swept aside the Lawyer's Oath that enjoins her to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. She forgot that she must not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same. She also took for granted the express commands of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
CPR.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
While Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The foregoing canons require of Buri, as a lawyer, an enduring high sense of
responsibility and good fidelity in all her dealings and emphasize the high standard of
honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the practice of the legal profession, but
in her personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety,
and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers
of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses
upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in
their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct,
whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them
unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[5]
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that a lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the public, and takes part in the
administration of justice, one of the most important functions of the State, as an officer
of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Time and again, the Court has stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
The Court sustains the modified recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. The
Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one (1) year-suspension from the practice of
law.[10] The Court likewise upholds the deletion of the payment of the P200,000.00
since the same is not intrinsically linked to Buri's professional engagement. Disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent lawyer's
administrative and not his civil liability. Thus, when the claimed liabilities are purely civil
in nature, as when the claim involves money owed by the lawyer to his client in view of
a separate and distinct transaction and not by virtue of a lawyer-client relationship, the
same should be threshed out in a separate civil action.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Grace C.
Buri from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS her that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Principles:

ARNOLD PACAO v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, AC. No. 11246, 2016-06-14

Facts:
Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of
BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by
BHF.
Thereafter, the case was filed... before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.
To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a
possible settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty.
Limos, where the latter represented that she was duly authorized by BHF.
negotiations,... Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to
be paid in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the
complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos,
who will then deliver to the... complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a
compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve compromise agreement for filing
with the court.
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty.
Limos, who in turn, signed an Acknowledgment Receipt[4] recognizing her undertakings
as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the terms of their agreement.
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio,
who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized
to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF.
This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter[7] to Atty. Limos to return the
P200,000.00 initial settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so.[8]
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD
required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file any responsive pleading.
On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner... found enough evidence on record to
prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to the
latter's... prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the material fact that she no
longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of
BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records
to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this
Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a
possible amicable settlement with her client BHF.
"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with... conditions."
Issues:
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar
Atty. Limos from the practice of law?
Ruling:
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law,
by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos[15] and Wilkie v. Atty.
Limos.
Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this
Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a
possible amicable settlement with her client BHF.
Her blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor
did she return the same to the complainant,... despite due demand. Furthermore, she
even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized to
enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement as counsel
of BHF had already ceased.
The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense.
It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty.
Limos had... planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of
money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.
The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27,[18] Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the
penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender. Considering
the... serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior misconduct
which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of
disbarment is warranted.
Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence
obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in
accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member
of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination,
is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let
other copies be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their... information and guidance.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with... conditions."

MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants)
filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren
for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty.
Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses
relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made
after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent
documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration,
original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and
original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional
payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997
to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say
that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the
case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed
to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be
deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship

between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case
pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of

P10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the
lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of P1,000.00 and P6,000.00;
that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants
fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of
the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit
betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the
complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty.
Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,[1] dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants' lot and despite the
acceptance of P7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to
elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from
the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,[2] the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty.
Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct
of Atty. Guaren, except as to the penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
[3]

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00
as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation
to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty.
Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective
from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters;
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO L. CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, GR No. 100113, 1991-09-03

Facts:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been... candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does... not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his... professional license fees as a lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group
(1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries,
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of... an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod's,... work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accredition hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal... knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a guasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia-Munoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
Issues:
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod...
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged... power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court... interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance... of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.
Principles:
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a... lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor - verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement - that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least... ten years.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that
"No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself... with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of
reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin?
Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the... agreement.

HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS v. ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN, AC. No.

11494, 2017-07-24
Facts:
Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E. Carlos (Juan) who presently seek
to disbar respondent Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan
Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them to sign pleadings and
documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City in cahoots with
complainants' estranged mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he divided
his share in the subject property as his supposed attorney's fees to his wife and
children, all in violation of his oath as lawyer.
For purposes of recovering the subject property from Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed
wife, Felicidad), and from Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It
appears that Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed the following cases: (a) a case[1] against
Felicidad which was settled with the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half interest and
ownership over the property; (b) a case against Pedro which was concluded on
September 12, 1997; and (c) another case[2] against Felicidad, albeit filed by another
lawyer who acted under the direct control and supervision of Atty. Linsangan. In this
case against Felicidad, it appears that the other half of the property was adjudicated to
Juan, as Teofilo's sole heir. Said adjudication was appealed to the CA.
During the pendency of the above cases, or on September 22, 1997, Atty. Linsangan
and Juan executed a Contract for Professional Services[9] enumerating the above
cases being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan
However, it was not only Juan who went after the property, but also Bernard Rillo and
Alicia Carlos, a sister-in-law
This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was eventually divided in the case filed by
Juan against Felicidad (which Atty. Linsangan admits[13] to have filed albeit through
another lawyer who acted under his control and supervision), through a Compromise
Agreement wherein 7,500 square meters of the subject property was given to the heirs
of Juan while the remaining 2,500 square meters thereof was given to Felicidad.
a Supplemental Compromise Agreement[17] dated December 16, 2009 was submitted
by the heirs of Juan and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among them the 7,500 square meter-
portion of the property as follows: 3,750 square meters to the heirs of Juan and 3,750
square meters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the Contract for Professional Services.
Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[20] with a certain Helen S. Perez
(Helen) covering the entire 12,331 square meters of the subject property for a purchase
price of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (PhP150,000,000). Atty. Linsangan sold the
entire property
Helen issued several checks[27] in varying amounts either made payable to Cash or to
Jaime S. Linsangan or Lorna O. Linsangan... complainants allegedly requested from
Atty. Linsangan for their shares in the proceeds and for the copies of the Special Power
of Attorney as well as the case records, but that Atty. Linsangan refused.
complainants wrote a letter[33] to Atty. Linsangan revoking the Special Power of
Attorney which they executed in the latter's favor.
Complainants, however, recognized Atty. Lisangan's services for which they proposed
that the latter be paid on the basis of quantum meruit instead of fifty percent (50%) of
the subject property.
complainants filed the instant administrative complaint[35] against Atty. Linsangan
accusing the latter of forcing them to sign pleadings filed in court, copies of which were
not furnished them; of selling the subject property in cahoots with their mother;
Atty. Linsangan avers that the Supplemental Compromise Agreement was never
questioned by the complainants until now[38] and that they had never requested for a
copy thereof from him.
Issues:
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of violating his
lawyer's oath.
Ruling:
After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court finds that respondent
committed acts in violation of his oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's
exercise of its disciplinary power.We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege.[41] Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him
unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. The
avowed purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is not to punish the lawyer, but
to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and
thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice.[42] The
lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action.
The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the
subject property were still pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan
entered into a Contract for Professional Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees
shall be that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a portion thereof, that
may be recovered. It is likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon
himself, and to his wife and children, half of the property awarded to complainants as
heirs of Juan, through a Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly, such
Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered into by Atty. Linsangan and the
heirs of Juan concurrently with the pendency of several cases before the CA and this
Court[44] involving the very same property. What is more, Atty. Linsangan, probably
anticipating that he may be charged of having undue interest over his client's property in
litigation, caused another lawyer to appear but all the while making it absolutely clear to
Juan that the latter's appearance was nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's "direct
control and supervision."
Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)[45] of the Civil Code
which forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has
been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's
oath, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Decision. Let copies of
this Decision be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance,
and spread in the personal record of Atty. Linsangan.

Ventura vs. Atty. Samson, A.C. No. 9608 – Case Digest

  Post published:November 27, 2012
 Reading time:4 mins read

FACTS

Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for “grossly immoral
conduct.” Ventura alleged that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight,
she was sleeping in the maid’s room at Atty. Samson’s house when Samson
entered and went on top of her. Atty. Samson then kissed her lips, sucked her
breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and
found bloodstain in her panty. She stated that another incident happened on
March 19, 2002 at Samson’s poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur. Atty. Samson asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old
shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, Atty. Samson gave her five
hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened, or he
would kill her and her mother.

Atty. Samson in his answer alleged that the sexual intercourse with Ventura was
consensual and he did not violate any immoral conduct for having sex with
Ventura with just compensation once does not amount to immoral conduct.

Then after, Ventura and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and
executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance. Ventura stated that what
happened between Atty. Samson and her in March 2002 was based on mutual
understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against
Samson before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against Atty. Samson was
dismissed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the act of Atty. Samson constitutes a grossly immoral act.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that that act of Atty. Samson constitutes a grossly
immoral act and is in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 6, Rule 6.0 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court further stated that the
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe
the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe
the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer may be it in the
lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in
moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment.
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Samson himself, we find that Samson’s act of engaging in sex with a young
lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct
that warrants sanction. Atty. Samson not only admitted he had sexual intercourse
with Ventura but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he
did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife
manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own
marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a
very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low
regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession. Atty.
Samson has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by Ventura, then a
13-year-old minor, who for a time was under his care. Whether the sexual
encounter between Samson and Ventura was or was not with the latter’s consent
is of no moment. Atty. Samson clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral,
and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of
morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
Due to the seriousness of the offense, the Court is compelled to wield its power
to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE,
respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED.

A.C. NO. 12156

PAULINO LIM V. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA

20 June 2018
FACTS:

 On 09 March 2015, an administrative complaint was filed by Paulino Lim

(complainant) against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera (respondent), praying
that the latter be meted disciplinary sanctions for defrauding the former by
issuing a worthless check as guarantee for the payment of respondent's loan.

 Sometime in June 2014, complainant met respondent in the hallway of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then
inquiring about the status of a case. The two (2) became acquainted after striking
a conversation with each other.

 In July 2014, respondent borrowed from complainant the amount of P75,000.00,

which the former needed immediately.

 Since respondent will issue a guarantee check to ensure payment of the loan,
complainant did not think twice in lending money to respondent and issuing in his
favor BDO Check No. 03565553 dated July 3, 2014 for P75,000.00.

 Subsequently, respondent made several other loans in the amounts of

Pl50,000.00, Pl0,000.00, and another Pl0,000.0, for which he no longer issued
any guarantee checks.

 Complainant claimed to have been taken by respondent's sweet talk and

promises of payment considering the millions he expects to receive as contingent
fee in one (1) of his cases.

 However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check No. 0003405780, it

was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would
not take or return complainant's calls nor respond to the latter's text messages.
He completely avoided complainant.

 On 15 October 2014, the complainant’s lawyer wrote a demand letter for the
payment of respondent's indebtedness in the aggregate amount of P245,000.00,
but to no avail. Thus, complainant was constrained to file an administrative case
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

 In an Order dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed respondent to submit his
 answer to the complaint within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said
Order, failing which the case shall be heard ex parte. However, respondent filed
no answer.

 On 13 November 2015, a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing was

scheduled and was sent to respondent. However, respondent did not appear.

 In a Report and Recommendation dated November 14, 2016, the IBP

Investigating Commissioner (IC) found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year and be ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest reckoned from July 19, 2014. The other
loans alleged by complainant were not duly proven.

 The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the issuance of a
worthless check in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING:

Yes. The Court finds the respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera guilty of violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's
Oath, and is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

The Court concurs with the findings and adopts the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors, except for the return to complainant of the amount of P75,000.00 with
legal interest.

The Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross
misconduct that a lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his professional or in his
private capacity. Good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and
continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-
professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action.

In the case at bar, It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from
complainant for which he issued a post-dated check that was eventually dishonored and
had failed to settle his obligation despite repeated demands. It has been consistently
held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations.

They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the IBP
IC correctly ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which explicitly states:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
In Enriquez v. De Vera, the Court categorically pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing
a worthless check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious
misconduct penalized by suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which
no conviction of the criminal charge is even necessary.

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of, or was nonetheless presumed to know,
the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly violated the
law and thereby "exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act
to public interest and public order."

In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to
appear at the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence of
his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his
oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

In the cases of Lao v. Medel, Rangwani v. Dino, and Enriquez v. De Vera, the Court
imposed the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law for deliberate
failure to pay just debts and for the issuance of worthless checks.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges, which his license and the law confer to him, for
which he must suffer the consequence.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ v ALBERTO MINA

G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007
FACTS
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a formal
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where
his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on
the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for continuation of trial.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse the
Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10,
1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior
courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and contended that the
court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when they patently refused to heed to the clear
mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar matter no. 730,
providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts (MTC’s).

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party litigant

HELD

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his
appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without
the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is
different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.There is really no problem as to the
application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of
a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the
latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act
as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the
basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance
before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is
a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under
the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

TERESITA P. FAJARDO v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, AC. No. 9018, 2016-04-20

Facts:
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to
defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health.[2] He asked for
P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.[3] However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his
appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.[5] Atty. Alvarez
said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances... working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against
Teresita dismissed.[6]
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal
complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively.[7]
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she
gave.[8] Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to
fulfill this promise.[9] Teresita sent a demand letter to
Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
Issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is
authorized to engage in the private practice of law;
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable
under the principle of quantum meruit.
Ruling:
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this
case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized
practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National
Center for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.[58]
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman
and against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of
interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the
requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and
the Philippine government as a whole
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of
government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against
the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore
to serve.
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it
appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who
could help them get a favorable decision... in complainant's case.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules
1.01, and 1.02[78] prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.[79] Respondent's act of ensuring that the case... will be dismissed
because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the
Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7[80] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity... of the legal
profession."
In relation, Canon 13[81] mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or
her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable
outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the
records, we rule that there is... enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence
peddling.
Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)...
year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with
legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.
Principles:
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their
profession.[76] Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a
favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff... in
the Office where the case was pending.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATT Y. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
FACTS:
Ruthie Lim-Santiago filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor. The
complainant is the daughter of one of the stockholder and former President of Taggat
Industries Inc where the respondent worked as a Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel before his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint. They alleged
that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death
of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1
April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was
assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to
Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Complainant contends that
respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat
very well and should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the
case filed by Taggat employees.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice
of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to
prove that respondent received retainer's fee.
On the other hand, respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, he is
no longer part of Taggat. He contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. He points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.
Respondent asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing
Taggat employees or the complainant and he was merely performing his official duty as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, after their investigation found that respondent is
guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating
the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding the labor case filed against the complainant.
2. Whether or not respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor

HELD:
1. The court found no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in
the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages. Clearly, respondent was no
longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be
presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he
was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. The fact alone that
respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and
the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor related is not a sufficient
basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests.
A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon
the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of
evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03
of the Code.

2. The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to
Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as
alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed
acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the
same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant
while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the
payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat
fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to
one year. The court finds this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the court finds that respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Bansig vs. Celera

FACTS: In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and
Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced
by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted

another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba),
as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. Bansig stressed that the marriage between
respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted
his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or
rendered void by any lawful authority. Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of
contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly
immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to
continue his membership in the Bar.

ISSUE: won the certified xerox copy of the marriage certificate is sufficient.

HELD: Yes. The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. — When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of
two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this
disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders
him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.

EUGENIO E. CORTEZ v. ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES March 12, 2018 A.C. No.
9119 Contingency Fee, Quantum Meruit
MARCH 23, 2019

FACTS:

Eugenio E. Cortez engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal
dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that
he and Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by
way of attorney’s fees.

The case was decided in favor of complainant. PEC was ordered to pay complainant
the total amount of One million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1, 100,000) in three
staggered payments. PEC then issued checks all payable in the name of complainant,
as payment.

Atty. Cortes however, claimed that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as
attorney’s fees.

Complainant then offered to pay ₱200,000, and when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered
the third check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty. Cortes still insisted on the 50% of the
total award.

A complaint was filed by Eugenio against respondent Atty. Cortes for grave misconduct,
and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the six-month suspension of Atty.
Cortes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on the part of Atty. Cortes,
which would subject him to disciplinary action.

RULING:

We rule in the affirmative.

We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. It is

generally recognized as valid and binding, but must be laid down in, an express
contract.

The case of Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez discussed the same succinctly, thus:

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as

valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of
contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will
be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers.

In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express contract as regards the
payment of fees. Complainant alleges that the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a
handshake agreement, while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%.

The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent handled was
merely a labor case, his attorney’s foes should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under
Article 111 of the Labor Code.

Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We do not agree that
the 10% limitation as provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.

Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer Agreement
which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers compensation.

In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on the basis of quantum
meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Courts may ascertain also if
the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances.
In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall charge
only fair and reasonable fees.” Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following
factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;

(h) The contingency or’ certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j)The professional standing of the lawyer.

We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under
the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable.

Respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 20 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months, (considering that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and
that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was able to get a favorable outcome) and is
ordered to return to complainant Eugenio E. Cortez the amount he received in excess of
the 12% allowable attorney’s fees.
Tomas P. Tan, Jr., complainant vs Atty. Haide V. Gumba, respondent
[A.C. No. 9000.October 5, 2011] [Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.] Facts:  Tomas Tan Jr., a
self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in Naga City, filed a verified Complaint
against Atty. Gumba before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines  That respondent
borrowed ₱350,000.00 from the complainant. Respondent assured him that she would
pay the principal plus 12% interest per annum after one year. She likewise offered by
way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of land located in Naga City registered in her
father’s name.  Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
executed by respondents parents, and verbally assured complainant that she was
authorized to sell or encumber the entire property.  Complainant consulted one Atty.
Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid.
Thus, complainant agreed to lend money to respondent.  Respondent, however,
defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite complainants
repeated demands.  Complainant manifested that he had lent money before to other
people albeit for insignificant amounts, but this was the first time that he extended a
loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed
fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Issue: WON a lawyer may be
subject under disciplinary action for deception when she acted in her private capacity
and not as a lawyer. Held: Yes  Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.  Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.  Here, respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into
lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and
taking advantage of her education and complainant’s ignorance in legal matters. By her
misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant’s perception of the legal
profession but the public’s perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct
for which she may be disciplined.  However, that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Considering the circumstances of
this case, the Court believes that a suspension of six months is sufficient. After all,
suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the
public and the legal profession

FERGUSON v. ATTY. RAMOS

Nenita De Guzman Ferguson Vs. Atty. Salvador P. Ramos
A.C. No. 9209

April 18, 2017

FACTS:

On November 25, 2007, the complainant purchased a house and lot located in San
Rafael, Bulacan for ₱800,000.00. Without her knowledge, the seller obtained a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to transfer the title of the said property to
her name, but the seller was unaware that the said CLOA was void ab initio as the
subject land was not an agricultural land and there existed a 10-year prohibition to
transfer the subject land.

In 2009, the complainant filed a petition for the cancellation of the CLOA before the
DAR Office, represented by Atty. Ramos, who was the Chief Legal Officer of DAR-
Provincial Office in Bulacan. The complainant withdrew the petition before the DAR and
filed the case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos City (RTC).

Upon receipt of the Answer, complainant found out that it was strikingly similar to the
one filed by the defendants in the DAR, which was prepared by Atty. Ramos; that
complainant discovered that the Deed of Sale, dated April 24, 2009, which became the
basis of the transfer of title was fraudulently altered as it only covered the sale of the
land, not the house and• lot, and the price indicated was only ₱188,340.00, not the
amount of ₱800,000.00 that complainant actually paid.

Complainant’s signature and her husband, Douglas Ferguson were forged. Atty. Ramos
notarized the deed of Sale without their presence. The complainant and her husband
neither appeared, executed nor acknowledged any document before Atty. Ramos as
they never met him in person.

Atty. Ramos denied that he represented the defendants in• the case before the DAR but
he admitted that he notarized their Answer. With respect to the charge of falsification of
the April 24, 2009 Deed of Sale and the notarization of the aforementioned deed, Atty.
Ramos likewise denied any participation and countered that his signature as a notary
public was forged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Salvador P. Ramos is guilty of violating the Rule on Notarial
Practice.

HELD:

Atty. Ramos is guilty of violating the law on notarial practice. Section1, Public Act No.
2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states, the acknowledgment shall be before
a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is• his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal,
and if not, his certificate shall so state.

The importance of the affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section
2 (b), Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which specifically provides that a
person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document - (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

The afore-quoted rules clearly mandate that a notary public, before notarizing a
document, should require the presence of the very person who executed the same.
Thus, he certifies that it was the same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what were stated therein. The presence
of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant.

A.C. No. 10783, January 31, 2018

ATTY. BENIGNO BARTOLOME, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A.
BASILIO, Respondent.

FACTS: On October 14, 2015, the Court suspended Basilio from the practice of law for
one (1) year, revoked his incumbent commission as a notary public, and prohibited him
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately,
after finding him guilty of violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Decision was circulated to all
courts for the information and implementation of the order of suspension. Basilio, thru
his counsel, Atty. Edward L. Robea, claimed to have received a copy of the Decision on
December 2, 20I5, hence, his suspension from the practice of law, as well as the
revocation of his notarial commission and prohibition from being commissioned as a
notary public should have all effectively commenced on the same date.

However, on 2016, Atty. Rambayon inquired from the Court about the status of Basilio's
suspension, alleging that the latter still appeared before Judge Ovejera of the MTC of
Paniqui, Tarlac on April 26, 20I6. The OBC informed Rambayon that the Decision had
already been circulated to all courts for implementation, and that Basilio's motion for
reconsideration had been denied with finality by the Court. In another letter, Rambayon
informed the Court that in the schedule of cases before Judge Fajardo of the RTC of
Paniqui, Tarlac that there were five (5) cases where the litigants were supposedly
represented by Basilio.

Complying with the show cause order, Basilio explained that he did not immediately
comply with the suspension order because he believed that his suspension was held in
abeyance pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision, following
the guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios, wherein it was stated that "unless the Court
explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has fifteen (15) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration
thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory." On this
score, he maintained that what was immediately executory was only the revocation of
his notarial commission and the two (2)-year prohibition of being commissioned as a
notary public.

The OBC recommended that Basilio be meted with an additional penalty of a fine in the
amount of P10,000.00 for his failure to immediately comply with the Court's order of
suspension from the practice of law. Likewise, it recommended that the lifting of the
order of suspension from the practice of law be held in abeyance pending his payment
of the fine.
ISSUE: Whether or not he should be fined for his failure to immediately comply with the
order of the Court

HELD: Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at the end of the
enumerated series of penalties to indicate that the same pertained to and therefore,
qualified all three (3) penalties, which clearly include his suspension from the practice of
law. The immediate effectivity of the order of suspension - not just of the revocation and
prohibition against his notarial practice - logically proceeds from the fact that all three (3)
penalties were imposed on Basilio as a result of the Court's finding that he failed to
comply with his duties as a notary public, in violation of the provisions of the 2004 Rules
of Notarial Practice, and his sworn duties as a lawyer, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, with the Decision's explicit wording
that the same was "effective immediately", there is no gainsaying that Basilio's
compliance therewith should have commenced immediately from his receipt of the
Decision on December 2, 2015. On this score, Basilio cannot rely on the Maniago ruling
as above-claimed since it was, in fact, held therein that a decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof if the decision so indicates, as in this case. All told, for
his failure to immediately serve the penalties in the Decision against him upon receipt,
Basilio acted contumaciously, and thus should be meted with a fine in the amount of
P10,000.00, as recommended by the OBC. Pending his payment of the fine and
presentation of proof thereof, the lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of
law is perforce held in abeyance.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257 July 17, 2012

CRISELDA C. GACAD, Complainant, vs. JUDGE HILARION P. CLAPIS, JR., Regional

Trial Court, Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, Respondent.

FULL TEXT

Facts:

Criselda C. Gacad (Gacad) filed a Verified Complaint1 dated 9 June 2010 against
Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. (Judge Clapis), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt
Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations of
Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct relative to Criminal Case No. 6898 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Rodolfo Comania."
The following day, Arafol informed Gacad that he filed a complaint for murder against
the suspect but the Provincial Governor kept on pressuring him about her brother’s
case. Arafol suggested that they see Judge Clapis so he would deny the Motion for
Reinvestigation to be filed by the accused Rodolfo Comania (accused). Arafol, further,
told Gacad to prepare an amount of P50,000 for Judge Clapis.

On 23 November 2009, Arafol told Gacad that they would meet Judge Clapis at the
Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City. Thus, Gacad, together with her husband Rene
Gacad and their family driver Jojo Baylosis (Baylosis), proceeded to the Golden Palace
Hotel. Inside the hotel, Gacad joined Arafol and his wife at their table. After a while,
Judge Clapis joined them. Arafol told Judge Clapis, "Judge sya yong sinasabi kong
kapitbahay ko may problema." Judge Clapis replied, "So, what do you want me to do?"
Afarol answered, "Kailangang madeny ang reinvestigation ni Atty. Gonzaga and we
proceed to trial kasi palaging tumatawag si Governor." Arafol paused, and continued,
"Wag kang mag-alala judge, mayron syang inihanda para sa iyo." Gacad felt terrified
because she had not yet agreed to Arafol’s demands. Hence, when Arafol asked her,
"Day, kanus a nimo mahatag ang kwarta?" (When can you give the money?), Gacad
could only mumble, "Paningkamutan na ko makakita ko ug kwarta... basin makakita ko
sir." (I will try to look for money, maybe I can find, sir.) Judge Clapis excitedly nodded
and said, "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it all to me, we
shall crush them.)

The following day, Arafol instructed his nephew Baldomero Arafol (Baldomero) to go to
Gacad’s house to accompany Baylosis. In Gacad’s house, Gacad gave P50,000 to
Baylosis in the presence of Baldomero. Baylosis then drove with Baldomero to Jollibee
in Tagum City. Upon their arrival, Baldomero alighted and Arafol got into the passenger
seat. Arafol directed Baylosis to drive to Mikos Coffee Bar. Along the way, Arafol took
the money from Baylosis. At Mikos Coffee Bar, Arafol alighted, telling Baylosis to wait
for him. Then, Arafol went inside Mikos Coffee Bar to join Judge Clapis.

On the second week of January 2010, Arafol showed to Gacad a copy of Judge Clapis’
Order dated 4 January 2010 denying the Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the
accused. Subsequently, Arafol told Gacad that Judge Clapis was borrowing P50,000
from her for his mother’s hospitalization. Arafol handed to Gacad a postdated BPI check
allegedly issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment. However, Gacad failed to
produce the P50,000.

Thereafter, Judge Clapis set a hearing for a petition for bail on 29 March 2010, which
Gacad came to know only inadvertently since she received no notice for the hearing.
During the 29 March 2010 hearing, Public Prosecutor Alona Labtic moved that the
petition for bail be put in writing. However, the counsel for the accused manifested that
he was not prepared for a written petition because it was only right before the hearing
that the accused informed him of Arafol’s agreement to bail. Thus, Judge Clapis
calendared the case for speedy trial. He set a continuous hearing for the petition for bail
on 12 April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010.

On 8 April 2010, the accused filed a Petition For Bail while Gacad filed a Motion For
Inhibition of Judge Clapis. On 18 May 2010, Judge Clapis granted the accused’s
Petition For Bail. On 24 May 2010, Judge Clapis issued a Notice of Preliminary
Conference set on 2 December 2010. On 1 June 2010, Judge Clapis inhibited himself.

Ruling:

We, however, find Judge Clapis liable for gross misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio,8 the
Court held that while the respondent judge, in that case, may not be held liable for
extortion and corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should be made
accountable for gross misconduct.

In the present case, the Investigating Justice found Gacad’s narration, that she met and
talked with Judge Clapis in the Golden Palace Hotel, as credible. Gacad categorically
and unwaveringly narrated her conversation with Judge Clapis and Arafol. On the other
hand, Judge Clapis merely denied Gacad’s allegation during the hearing conducted by
the Investigating Justice, but not in his Comment, and without presenting any evidence
to support his denial. It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are
generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.9 The rule which concedes due
respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in
civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases.10

Thus, the acts of Judge Clapis in meeting Gacad, a litigant in a case pending before his
sala, and telling her, "Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila" (Okay, leave it all
to me, we shall crush them.), both favoring Gacad, constitute gross misconduct.

In Sevilla v. Lindo,11 where the respondent judge tolerated the unreasonable

postponements made in a case, the Court held that such conduct proceeded from bias
towards the accused, rendering such acts and omissions as gross misconduct.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or

standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of official functions and
duties.12 For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should
be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of
well-known rules.13 The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment.14

Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the
circumstances on record. First, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to Gacad only after
the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an
application for bail and granted bail without affording the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary
conference seven months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of
speedy trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to
his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order
and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the judge’s
responsibility.15

The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his
impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly:

CANON 2. INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO THE PROPER DISCHARGE

OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE BUT ALSO TO THE PERSONAL DEMEANOR OF
JUDGES.

Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.

It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to
be impartial at all times.16 Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both
written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.17 Needless to state, any gross misconduct seriously undermines the
faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary.
Festin v. Zubiri

Facts:
 Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013 elections. His opponent, Villarosa,
filed an election protest against him before the RTC. After deciding in favor of
Villarosa, the RTC issued an Order (First Order) granting his motion for execution
pending appeal.

 Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari before the COMELEC,

seeking a TRO against the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal.
COMELEC issued a TRO (COMELEC TRO), directing the RTC judge, in her
official capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from
enforcing the Order. Accordingly, the RTC issued another Order (Second Order),
pertinent portion of which reads:
o In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ
of Execution in accordance with the [January 15, 2014] Order until further
notice. Despite the TRO and the RTC's Third Order, respondent, as
counsel of Villarosa, filed five (5) manifestations addressed to the COC
insisting on the writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these
manifestations to the other party.
 In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's
First Order on January 18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day
period ended on February 12, 2014. Since the COMELEC only issued the
Second Order on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer had any effect.
Respondent further asserted that the TRO was addressed only to the RTC
Judge, and not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For
these reasons, respondent insisted that the COC could legally issue the writ of
execution pending appeal.
 The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the
sheriff. However, complainant only found out about respondent's manifestations
when the sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him. Soon thereafter, complainant
filed the disbarment complaint.
 In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties
when he misled and induced the COC to defy lawful orders - particularly, the
COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's Second Order. As a result, respondent
allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.
 In his answer, respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been
transmitted to the COMELEC, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case;
therefore, it had no more power to issue the Second Order. Respondent put
forward the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC instead of
the RTC Judge. Second, the manifestations contained no misleading statements
or factual deviations. He merely stated in his manifestations his honest belief that
the twenty-day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO;
hence, it no longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing of
 manifestations to highlight his position did not violate any rule. Third, he allegedly
filed those manifestations pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to
represent his client with competence and diligence.

Issue: W/N respondent should be held administratively liable? YES

Held:
 After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that
respondent should be held administratively liable for his violations of the CPR.
However, the Court finds it proper to impose a lower penalty.
 Contrary to the CPR, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as
"manifestations" to sidestep the requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In
effect, he violated his professional obligations to respect and observe procedural
rules, not to misuse the rules to cause injustice, and to exhibit fairness towards
his professional colleagues.

 The difference between a manifestation and a motion is essential in determining

respondent's administrative liability.
 A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless
otherwise indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement
to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an
application for relief from the court other than by a pleading and must be
accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party,
unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. Settled is
the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of
paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to
receive it. The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other
party to agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in
keeping with the principle of due process.
 In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC
praying for affirmative reliefs. The Court agrees with the IBP that these
"manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs were prayed for from the court
- particularly, the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling
them as manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped the requirement of a
notice of hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose his
arguments. Moreover, the fact that he submitted these manifestations directly to
COC, instead of properly filing them before the RTC, highlights his failure to
exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter completely unaware
of his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his professional
obligations under the CPR.
 He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client
with competence and diligence. However, respondent should be reminded that a
lawyer is ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the court, his
 colleagues, and society. His obligation to represent his client is not without limits,
but must be "within the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR.
Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and honest means to attain
their clients' objectives.
 Respondent further argues that his filing of the manifestations with the COC is
justified considering that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case and
the COC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. His argument fails
to persuade. The Court has ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a
writ of execution when the judge directs its issuance. In this case, however, the
RTC Judge had issued the second explicitly directing the COC "NOT TO ISSUE
a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the COC in this case did not have a ministerial
duty to issue the writ of execution.

ACHERNAR B. TABUZO v. ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, AC. No. 12005,

2018-07-23
Facts:
Before the Court is a Verified Complaint[1] filed by Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo
(complainant) against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (respondent)[2] who was then a
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for allegedly committing the
following acts: 2.1 Violation of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court and Republic Act 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
[O]fficials and Employees; 2.2 Violation of Canon[s] 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions of the Commission on Bar
Discipline; 2.3 Nonfeasance in deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action for
serious violations of duties owed to the Courts and the Legal Profession committed by a
lawyer, despite repeated notice, and contrary to the mandate of his office and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; 2.4 Gross Ignorance of the Law; 2.5 All the foregoing
were aggravated by: a) pattern of misconduct; b) multiple offenses; [c)] substantial
experience in the practice of law; and [d)] betrayal of the trust of his office as
Commissioner of the Honorable Commission on Bar Discipline.[3]
On August 15, 2014, the respondent issued a Report and Recommendation[4]
recommending that complainant be reprimanded for the impropriety of talking to Sillo,
without her counsel, prior to the calling of their case for mediation conference, and for
the abusive, offensive or improper language used in the pleadings she filed in the said
case.
Complainant alleged that respondent violated the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure
of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission), Rule 139-B of the Rules Court
and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713[6] when he failed to act on her pleadings with
dispatch and for issuing his report and recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174
days from the submission of the last pleading
Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to an inexperienced
lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her pleadings in CBD Case No. 12-3457;
and that he maliciously cropped and pasted portions of complainant's statement in her
position paper to give the wrong impression before the IBP-Board of Governors (Board)
that the introductory heading was an act of name calling against respondent, thereby
violating Rules 1.01[8] and 1.02[9] of Canon 1 and Rules 3.01,[10] 3.02,[11] and
3.04[12] of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[13]
She alleged that as early as December 2013, respondent was aware that Atty. Alan R.
Bulawan committed forum shopping and other grave malpractices but respondent
refused to institute disciplinary action reasoning that there should first be a verified
complaint before he could act on it.
omplainant posited that respondent was grossly ignorant of the rules on privileged
communication, on evidence, on the crime of perjury, and on forum shopping when he
failed to dismiss the present administrative case outright because it had no merit and
when he ignored the perjury and forum shopping committed by Sillo.
espondent denied the allegations and contended that they were not only false and an
unfortunate misappreciation of the laws, facts and circumstances but also an act of
harassment.
If complainant felt aggrieved by the report and recommendation, she could have filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Board's January 31, 2015 Resolution... omplainant
claimed that the only proof that the report and recommendation was adopted and
approved by the Board was the Notice of Resolution; and when she asked for a copy of
the transcript and resolution of the case, she was informed by the head of the records
section that it was confidential and that she should file a manifestation to secure a copy.
the Commission recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
Due to this peculiar manner of creation, it now becomes reasonable for the Court to
conclude that the IBP is a sui generis public[33] institution deliberately organized, by
both the legislative and judicial branches of government and recognized by the present
and past Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal profession.
This was aptly described in Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada[35] where the Court declared
that:The [IBP CBD] derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints
against lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and
control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated
power to entertain administrative complaints against lawyers, the [IBP-CBD] should be
guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court. (emphasis supplied)...
the IBP-CBD's delegated function of entertaining complaints against lawyers is public in
nature; but the responsible officer performing such function is a private individual—not a
public officer.
Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively
liable for violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar
and to the practice of law.
the Court evinces its observation that the complainant's charge of delay in the resolution
of the subject unsanctioned pleadings of the complainant appears to be a mere
retaliation on the adverse Resolution No. XXI-205-074 dated January 31, 2015 in CBD
Case No. 12-3457. The Court had already declared that an administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where
a judicial remedy exists and is available.[
The respondent's comment, that the complainant "must have thought so highly of
herself that...she finds it necessary to declare that [Sillo's words] are not words a
graduate of the only Pontifical University in Asia and a law school ran by monks would
use," is merely a fair and realistic observation.
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
(emphasis supplied)
Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal profession and even
their non-lawyer adversaries with utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly,
the primary purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings against delinquent
lawyers is to uphold the law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from being
corrupted by unscrupulous practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is
the reason why lawyers should always set a good example in not using the law and the
rules as weapons or tools of malicious vindication during petty squabbles as it degrades
the credibility of the legal profession and tarnishes its integrity
Issues:
(1) whether respondent may be held administratively liable in the same manner as
judges and other government officials
(2) whether respondent may be held administratively liable for rendering an alleged
adverse judgment in his capacity as an investigating commissioner of the IBP.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court AGREES with the Report
and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Committee on Bar
Discipline adopted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Board of Governors, and
DISMISSES the administrative complaint filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso M.
Gomos.Furthermore, the Court STERNLY WARNS Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo and her
collaborating counsel Atty. Gaudencio A. Barboza, Jr. to REFRAIN from abusing the
disciplinary proceedings thru filing and maintaining frivolous administrative complaints
against fellow members of the Bar. A repetition of the same or commission of similar
acts will be dealt with more severely
Principles:
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 181[29] was enacted formally creating the IBP and
vesting it with corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the law states:Section 2. The Integrated
Bar shall have perpetual succession and shall have all legal powers appertaining to a
juridical person, particularly the power to sue and be sued; to contract and be
contracted with; to hold real and personal property as may be necessary for corporate
purposes; to mortgage, lease, sell, transfer, convey and otherwise dispose of the same;
to solicit and receive public and private donations and contributions; to accept and
receive real and personal property by gift, devise or bequest; to levy and collect
membership dues and special assessments from its members; to adopt a seal and to
alter the same at pleasure; to have offices and conduct its affairs in the Greater Manila
Area and elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent
with the laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 139-A thereof;
and generally to do all such acts and things as may be necessary or proper to carry into
effect and promote the purposes for which it was organized. (emphasis supplied)

HENRY SAMONTE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, respondent. A.C. No.
3452. June 23, 2014. Facts: Complainant filed an administrative complaint against
respondent for falsification of documents, dereliction of duty, gross negligence and
tardiness in attending scheduled hearings and dishonesty for not issuing official receipts
for every cash payments made by complainant. Respondent denied the charge of
falsification of documents, clarifying that the filing of the complaint could be made but
complainant had not given enough money to cover the filing fee. He asserted that the
charge of dereliction of duty was baseless. He countered that it was Samonte who had
been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00
in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance
fees in addition to the filing fees. Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the lawyer’s
oath “I will do no falsehood. . . . “ Held: The IBP CBD found respondent negligent in
handling certain aspects of his clients’ cause. Resorting to falsehood and being late in
submitting formal offer of exhibits for Samonte. Although his negligence did not
necessarily prejudice his client’s case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an
attorney, and his resort to falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter. It
has to be noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first being when he tried to
make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite the court
records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and
the second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the
reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different
from the trial court. Every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and
trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession. By the Lawyer’s Oath is every
lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to
conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE v. ATTY. RIZAL P. BALBIN, AC. No. 7088, 2018-
12-04
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a case entitled FELMAILEM,
Inc. v. Felma Mailem
Shortly after securing a favorable judgment for his client,... herein respondent-as
counsel for the defendant, and on appeal-started intimidating, harassing, blackmailing,
and maliciously threatening complainant into withdrawing the case filed by his client.
According to complainant, respondent would make various telephone calls and send
text messages and e-mails not just to him, but also to his friends and other clients,
threatening to file disbarment and/or criminal suits against him.
Further, and in view of complainant's "high profile" stature, respondent also threatened
to publicize such suits in order to besmirch and/or destroy complainant's name and
reputation.
Initially, respondent moved for an extension of time to file his comment,... which was
granted by the Court.
However, respondent failed to file his comment despite multiple notices, prompting the
Court to repeatedly fine him and even order his arrest.
Eventually, the Court dispensed with respondent's comment and forwarded e records to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and
recommendation.
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infractions in the future shall
merit more severe sanctions.
The Investigating Commissioner found that instead of availing of the procedural
remedies to assail the adverse MeTC ruling in order to further his client's cause,
respondent resorted to crudely underhanded tactics directed at the opposing litigant's
counsel... by personally attacking the latter through various modes of harassment and
intimidation.
IBP Board of Governors adopted the Investigating Commissioner's report and
recommendation in toto.
Issues:
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be administratively
sanctioned for the acts complained of.
Ruling:
Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
To this end, Canon 8 of the CPR commands, to wit:CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other
lawyers with courtesy, dignity[,] and civility.
A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their
relations with their professional brethren.
Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and
demeanor toward each other.
Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not
only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action."
In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in violation of
Canon 8 of the CPR.
Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating, harassing, and
blackmailing complainant with purported administrative and criminal cases and
prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the inconvenience
suffered by his client.
His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to him and his
client, specially considering that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to
the parties according to law, not to harass them.
More significantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and despicable
behavior towards a colleague in the legal profession, and constituted conduct
unbecoming of a member thereof.
also violated Canon 19 and Rule 19.01 of the CPR.
Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless
criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a
leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer's client.
Court notes that respondent initially moved for an extension of time to tile comment but
did not file the same) prompting the Court to repeatedly fine him and order his arrest.
Such audacity on the part of respondent - which caused undue delay in the resolution of
this administrative case - is a violation of Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, and Rule
12.04 of the CPR
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.x x x xCANON 12 - A
lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.x x x xRule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.Rule 12.04 - A
lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes.
Verily, respondent's acts of seeking for extension of time to file a comment, and
thereafter, failing to file the same and ignoring the numerous directives not only
indicated a high degree of irresponsibility, but also constituted utter disrespect to the
judicial institution.
The orders of the Court are not to be construed as a mere request, nor should they be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively; and the obstinate refusal or failure
to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in the lawyer's character, but
also underscores his disrespect to the lawful orders of the Court which is only too
deserving of reproof.
Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers made personal attacks
against an opposing counsel in order to gain leverage in a case they were involved in,
the Court has consistently imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rizal P. Balbin is found guilty of violating Canon 8,
Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04, Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Principles:
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Complainant vs. ATTY. LAURO G. NOEL,
Respondent A.C. No. 3951, June 19, 2018

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. However, once he agrees to take up the
cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Respondent's conduct shows inexcusable negligence. He grossly neglected
his duty as counsel to the extreme detriment of his client. He willingly and knowingly
allowed the default order to attain finality and he allowed judgment to be rendered
against his client on the basis of ex parte evidence. He also willingly and knowingly
allowed said judgment to become final and executory. He failed to assert any of the
defenses and remedies available to his client under the applicable laws by his failure to
file an answer to the complaint and his subsequent failure to file a comment to the
application for preliminary injunction. This constitutes inexcusable negligence
warranting an exercise by the Court of its power to discipline him. FACTS: Complainant
retained the legal services of respondent in a case for injunction and damages with writ
of preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order (LMWD case) filed
by Leyte Metro Water District (LMWD) before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte.
Respondent, on behalf of complainant, attended the hearing in connection with the
LMWD case. During the said hearing, respondent promised to file a comment on the
application for preliminary injunction within ten (10) days. Respondent failed to file the
promised comment. Respondent also failed to file an answer to the complaint. LMWD's
counsel, Atty. Francisco P. Martinez, moved to declare complainant in default. The
motion to declare complainant in default was granted and LMWD was subsequently
allowed to present evidence exparte. The decision in the said case was served on
complainant. It referred the said decision to respondent, who assured complainant's
Branch Manager in Tacloban, Mr. Francisco Cupin, Jr., that he need not worry since
respondent would take care of everything. A writ of execution was then served on the
manager of complainant's Tacloban Branch. The writ of execution was referred by
complainant's Branch Manager to respondent, who once again reassured him that
everything was alright and that he would take care of it. The sheriff enforced the writ of
execution. Complainant was forced to open a savings account in the name of said
sheriff to satisfy the judgment. Hence, complainant filed herein complaint for disbarment
against respondent. ISSUE: Whether respondent committed culpable negligence in
failing to file an answer on behalf of complainant in the LMWD case for which reason
complainant was declared in default and judgment rendered against it on the basis of ex
parte evidence. (YES) RULING: Canon 17 of the Code provides that "a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." Canon 18, in turn, imposes upon a lawyer the duty to serve his client
with competence and diligence. Further, Canon 18 expressly states that "a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.” It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser
or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code. However, once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. Respondent's conduct shows inexcusable negligence. He
grossly neglected his duty as counsel to the extreme detriment of his client. He willingly
and knowingly allowed the default order to attain finality and he allowed judgment to be
rendered against his client on the basis of ex parte evidence. He also willingly and
knowingly allowed said judgment to become final and executory. He failed to assert any
of the defenses and remedies available to his client under the applicable laws by his
failure to file an answer to the complaint and his subsequent failure to file a comment to
the application for preliminary injunction. This constitutes inexcusable negligence
warranting an exercise by the Court of its power to discipline him.

TERESITA P. FAJARDO v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, AC. No. 9018, 2016-04-20

Facts:
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to
defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health.[2] He asked for
P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.[3] However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his
appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.[5] Atty. Alvarez
said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances... working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against
Teresita dismissed.[6]
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal
complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively.[7]
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she
gave.[8] Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to
fulfill this promise.[9] Teresita sent a demand letter to
Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
Issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is
authorized to engage in the private practice of law;
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable
under the principle of quantum meruit.
Ruling:
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this
case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized
practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National
Center for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.[58]
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman
and against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of
interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the
requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and
the Philippine government as a whole
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of
government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against
the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore
to serve.
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it
appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who
could help them get a favorable decision... in complainant's case.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules
1.01, and 1.02[78] prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.[79] Respondent's act of ensuring that the case... will be dismissed
because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the
Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7[80] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity... of the legal
profession."
In relation, Canon 13[81] mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or
her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable
outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the
records, we rule that there is... enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence
peddling.
Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)...
year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with
legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.
Principles:
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their
profession.[76] Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a
favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff... in
the Office where the case was pending.