A - Final EPQ

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How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?
How beneficial are the re-education

camps in Xinjiang to China?
Index
Introduction ………………………………….……….. 3
2
Abstract …………………………………………….…….. 4
Literature Review …………………………………………... 5

Xinjiang and its history
What are the re-education camps?
The conditions in these camps
The mastermind behind the camps
The violence between the Uyghurs and the Chinese
The effect of re-education camps on China
The tension between the Han Chinese and Uyghurs
Previous detention systems
Discussion …………………………………………... 16
Tension
Crime
Social
Economic
International Effects
Conclusion
Evaluation ………………………………………..…. 21
Bibliography ………………………………………..…. 23
Introduction
I chose to do this dissertation about East Turkistan (Xinjiang) because my family is from
there and I had a very strong Uyghur influence when growing up. I knew about the constant
repression of the Uyghurs but I felt that the re-education camps were a mechanism worth
having its own discussion about, especially since they have been the most controversial
topic about Xinjiang recently. When these re-education camps started to emerge, I saw the
effect it had on my family and other Uyghur people that had family there. The camps have
existed for two years and yet nothing much has happened. I was curious as to how such
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violation of human rights could be justified and why there was hesitation from the rest of the
world to do something about it. For these camps to have been set up in the first place, there
must have been a justified reason for doing so, which I wanted to explore and judge. I
wanted to find out what the camps entailed. I also wanted to understand the effect it would
have overall on China and its people. I knew the re-education camps were a negative thing
for the Uyghurs but I did not know about the potential effects it could have on the rest of the
Chinese population. I also realised that effects could be expanded into international relations
and so I wanted to explore how the re-education camps could affect China’s international
partners.
Furthermore, there is a lack of awareness about the Uyghurs and this lack of knowledge
becomes clear during conversations I have with people about my ethnicity. I thought that it
would be a good idea to fill that gap by giving information not only generally about the
Uyghurs but by also making it relevant to current situations and by giving insight on the
political situation in Xinjiang.
I am passionate about human rights and the freedom of choice. I would like to be more
involved in promoting human rights in the future and I thought this question would be a
perfect choice because it explores the idea of freedom and human rights. I wanted to learn
about the legislations around human rights and explore an area where it was not being
followed properly such as in China. With the Uyghurs being predominantly a Muslim
population, most media coverage highlights the religious repression. Although religion has a
major role to play, the culture of the Uyghurs and the idea that they are inherently different to
the Han Chinese is an extremely important factor too. I aimed to give attention to all these
aspects that are being targeted by the Chinese Communist Party rather than just focussing
on the religious side. I was aware that there would be biased sources that may involve
propaganda and I wanted to develop the skill to identify when there is propaganda and how
to choose my sources wisely so that I write an accurate dissertation. I believe that these
skills would be very beneficial to me, especially for university, and I hope that by having
already acquired these skills I would be put at an advantage for when applying to university.
Abstract
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is an autonomous region in the northwest
of China and takes up one-sixth of China’s land. Xinjiang is also called East Turkistan by the
Uyghurs. In 1933, Kashgar, a city in Xinjiang, declared independence of Republic of East
Turkistan but it soon collapsed after three months.1 East Turkistan became a province called
Xinjiang in the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and became an autonomous region in
1955.2 In this dissertation, ‘benefits’ are subjective and can influence the dissertation but
both sides of the argument will be presented in the Literature Review and in the Discussion,
1 "A Brief History of the Uighurs - TIME." 9 Jul. 2009,

http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909416,00.html. Accessed 31 Oct. 2018. The
information given is a historical fact so it is a reliable source.
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and the idea that best describes ‘benefits’ will be adopted. There is a strong case against the
re-education camps coming from Uyghurs themselves and Human Rights advocates.
However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) say that the re-education camps are
necessary. Reasons for this are detailed to be to combat extremism, achieve social stability,
and offer vocational training. This dissertation will also question these agendas and judge if
they really do benefit China. There also certain aspects other than the re-education camps
that are being used to achieve the goal the Chinese Communist Party have set up. For
example, ‘Unity Villages’ and state orphanages for children whose parents get sent to re-
education camps. This dissertation will mention them as they are linked with the re-
education camps and give greater insight into the situation in Xinjiang.
Literature Review
Xinjiang and its history
China has 56 ethnic groups recognised by China. The largest being the Han Chinese
population. The third largest are the Hui and the fifth largest are the Uyghurs. 3 The Hui and
Uyghurs differ in the sense that the Hui speak Chinese and are ‘Chinese Muslims’ whereas,
although Uyghurs also are Muslim, they have a different culture and language and are of
Turkic origin, and see themselves as culturally closer to central Asia rather than the Chinese.
The Hui people and Uyghurs are not to be confused.
Xinjiang is mainly populated by the Uyghurs. According to an article:
“In the early 1800s, the population under the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty was roughly 60%
Turkic and 30% Han. In 1953, a People’s Republic of China census registered 4.87 million of
which were 75% Uyghur and 6% Han. In 1964 the census documented 7.44 million of which
were 54% Uyghur and 33% Han. After the beginning of the economic reforms, Xinjiang
2 "Xinjiang - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang. Accessed 27 Oct. 2018. This source is

likely to be accurate because it was edited very recently so the data is not out of date.
3 "List of ethnic groups in China - Wikipedia."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ethnic_groups_in_China. Accessed 29 Nov. 2018. This source is
reliable as it is only stated facts and does not include any speculation or opinions.
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registered 13.08 million of which were 46% Uyghur and 40% Han. In terms of the 2000
census, Xinjiang’s 18.46 million people are 45.21% Uyghur and 40.57% Han.”4
This article suggests that demographics of Xinjiang have been changing steadily over time to
dilute the Uyghur population and make it more inclusive to the Han Chinese. This method
allows Xinjiang to fit into the rest of China because the Uyghurs have a vastly different
culture to the Chinese and they have a different language that is Turkic. By changing the
demographics of Xinjiang, it is becoming more and more like the rest of China, rather than
being secluded culturally.
What are re-education camps?

These re-education camps have been introduced into Xinjiang in spring 2017.5 They are
camps where people that need to be ‘re-educated’ are sent. The re-education camps have
been shrouded in secrecy and its existence often denied. However, recent satellite images
have surfaced, providing proof of large camps being constructed. These satellite images
surfaced when researchers were looking for evidence of the re-education camps on Google
Earth.6 Eva Pils, Professor of Law, says that the Chinese are still not admitting the fact of
mass detention. Rather, they refer to the term as ‘vocational training.’7
Chinese official, Hu Lianhe, claimed that “the argument that 1 million Uighurs are detained in
re-education centres (made by a UN panel8) is completely untrue,” although he did also say
“those deceived by religious extremism ... shall be assisted by resettlement and education.”
Here, Lianhe is denying the existence of these re-education camps but also stating that
actions will be taken through “resettlement and education” for those that hold a religious
threat.
4 "Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after ... - Semantic Scholar."

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/431a/96153009b330bfea29a2fadd980750a6edf9.pdf. Accessed 11
Oct. 2018. This source is non-reviewed and unedited so this source may be biased. However, the
statistics given are from the country’s census data so it must be accurate.
5 "'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude': China's ...."
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997. Accessed 1 Nov. 2018. The
author studies in the European School of Culture and Theology so he knows a large amount on this
particular subject and is therefore reliable.
6 "China's hidden camps - BBC News." 24 Oct. 2018,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/China_hidden_camps. Accessed 8 Nov. 2018. Although
there is loaded language used here, they provided photographic evidence so therefore it must be
reliable.
7 Lecture at King’s College London, Strand Campus, 08/11/2018. Eva Pils, a Professor of Law at
King’s College London https://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/tli/about/people/affiliated-staff/pils.aspx
This source is reliable as she has written academic publications on this topic and she is well educated
in this area.
8 "Concluding observations on the combined fourteenth to ... - OHCHR." 19 Sep. 2018,
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d
%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhslsns7vAyg8M3uDZ7rn5ZZMW4psIG8%2FevE
%2FZXWBEvcRTevsX4htmWQRmXdLs%2FC29wCxsvSRzNMUUMc2kVpwgZMtPy7CP
%2BLMBCCgcm%2FXghtaV49BfVszv5rtIelug%2F%2FhbhA%3D%3D. Accessed 1 Apr. 2019. This
source is completely reliable because it is coming directly from the United Nations Human Rights
report.
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Potential aims
Hu Lianhe suggested that some sort of reformation is happening in order to prevent religious
extremism. Signs of religious extremism can be identified using the “75 types of behaviour
that suggest religious extremism.”9 This includes wearing a hijab, growing an ‘abnormally’
long beard, having Muslims names, and praying, or refusing to listen to state television and
radio. All of these crimes are enough to detain people and put them into re-education camps.
With the majority of the Uyghurs being Muslim, this has resulted in one million Uyghurs
being put into these camps, as a United Nations human rights panel suggests, although, a
Hong-Kong based human rights group estimates it to be around two million to three million,
adding up to 30% of the Uyghur population.10 The Uyghurs are the main people that
populate these camps but there are also other ethnic minorities such as Kazakhs. It is
estimated that 73 re-education camps have been built, nearly all of them in places where the
majority of the population consist of Uyghurs.11
The Chinese give an impression that there is only one way to be Chinese and that is the Han
Chinese way. For example, the Chinese Communist Party says that it must stop the
“penetration of extremification” within society, as supported by the XUAR Regulations on De-
extremification (2017). Article 4 stated one of its targets as “making religion more Chinese.” 12
Mehdi Hassan, a political journalist, questioned the motive and said that the radical Uyghur
muslims are weak and pose little threat to the Chinese state.13 Some say that the idea of
reducing terrorism is only an excuse to hide the fact that the main reason is to culturally
cleanse the population.14 A recent video released by the Chinese state highlights the theme
of ‘vocational training,’ where the Chinese state claims that it is a school for the ethnic
minorities who can not speak Mandarin and do not have the necessary skills to earn a well-
paid job and that it is a way to educate these people on the laws too.15 Hu Lianhe claimed to
9"75|| _." 24 Dec. 2014,

http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141224/42785382_0.shtml. Accessed 24 Mar. 2019. This source is reliable
because it is the llist of the original 75 signs of extremism.
10 "Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re ...." 3 Aug. 2018,
https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-
re-education-programs/. Accessed 6 Nov. 2018. The authors are all part of the Chinese Human
Rights Defenders so they are experts within this particular subject and are researchers in the topic so
their information is very reliable.
11 "New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign in ...." 15 May. 2018,
https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/.
Accessed 6 Nov. 2018. This is a detailed source, written by a lecturer, whose research focus is
China’s ethnic policy in Xinjiang and Tibet. Therefore it is reliable.
12 "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification." 31 Mar. 2017,
http://www.iuhrdf.org/content/xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-regulation-de-extremification.
Accessed 28 Feb. 2019. This source is reliable because it lists the Articles without adding any
personal opinions.
13 "One Million Muslim Uighurs Have Been Detained by ... - The Intercept." 13 Aug. 2018,
https://theintercept.com/2018/08/13/china-muslims-uighur-detention/. Accessed 26 Feb. 2019. This
resource is reliable because it was written by Mehdi Hassan himself. Although the article was laced
with his opinion, it does not matter here because I am presenting his argument.
14 "Islam in Xinjiang: “De-Extremification” or Violation of Religious Space ...." 15 Jun. 2018,
http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/06/15/islam-in-xinjiang-de-extremification-or-violation-of-religious-
space/. Accessed 28 Feb. 2019. This source is informative and well supported by facts so it is
reliable.
15 "China releases footage of 'vocational training centres' for Muslims in ...." 18 Oct. 2018,
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6291509/China-releases-footage-vocational-training-centres-
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have identified a scientific ‘theory of stability’ where it required blending different ethnic
groups into one ‘state-race.’16 China believed the revival of Islam in Xinjiang was a threat to
its stability, therefore initiating the ‘75 types of behaviour that suggest religious extremism.’
Experimental villages called ‘Unity Villages’ have been set up where locals and Han
migrants are paid in starting a family that is interethnic.15 This makes it frank that the
Chinese are trying to hollow out any other types of cultures that may be present in China and
only implement the Chinese culture. This is made apparent when detainees in re-education
camps are made to sing Red songs and praise the CCP.12 The ultimate goal that is being
achieved out of this is essentially a harmonious society in which no groups of people seclude
themselves from the rest of the community.
From this, it is clear that the ideal the Chinese are striving for is a certain state race where
there is cultural monotony. Professor Paul Reynolds detailed six tactics the Chinese
government do to project power,17 one of them being the silencing of any objections made,
such as the cultural obstacle of the Uyghurs, hence making it easier for the Chinese
government to assert their power onto the people, an apparent benefit for the Chinese
Communist Party. This strive has stemmed from the fear of separatism. Shagun Sharma,
PhD Doctoral Candidate in Chinese Studies, concluded in her research that the Uyghurs
have a goal for increased autonomy.18 This is troubling for the CCP as it goes against the
agenda of monotony.
The conditions in these camps

The re-education camps violate the international human rights law that prohibits arbitrary
detention. Article 37 of Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that “No citizen
may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people’s procuratorate or by
decision of a people’s court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ.”19 Article
9 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also forbids any form of arbitrary
detention.20 However, China published a new law stating that “Officials at or above the
Muslims-Xinjiang.html. Accessed 3 Mar. 2019. This source is presenting the perspective of the
Chinese authorities. It does not talk about the opposing side, however, it is supported with quotes
from notable Chinese officers so it is reliable.
16 "Hu the Uniter: Hu Lianhe and the Radical Turn in China's Xinjiang Policy." 10 Oct. 2018,
https://jamestown.org/program/hu-the-uniter-hu-lianhe-and-the-radical-turn-in-chinas-xinjiang-policy/.
Accessed 8 Nov. 2018. This source is an academic source with no bias therefore it is reliable.
17 Professor Paul Reynolds, a foreign policy and international economics specialist, gave a speech at
an event (13/02/2019), hosted by the Cordoba Foundation, where he detailed six tactics the Chinese
use to project power. This source is reliable because he is a specialist in this area. However, this is
his opinion and is not fact based.
18 "Ethno religious separatism in Xinjiang and Kashmir - International ...."
http://www.allresearchjournal.com/archives/2017/vol3issue7/PartC/3-7-17-609.pdf. Accessed 7 Mar.
2019. The author is a PhD Doctoral Candidate in Chinese Studies so the work produced is academic
and reliable.
19 "Constitution of the People's Republic of China."
http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474982987458.htm. Accessed
4 Apr. 2019. This source is very reliable because it is taken directly from the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of China.
20 "OHCHR | International Covenant on Civil ...."
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. Accessed 31 Jan. 2019. This source
is very reliable because it is the original content that is being referred to.
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county level may set up vocational education and training centers, and other re-education
institutions and management departments, to carry out the educational transformation of
those affected by extremism."21 Many activists believe that the change in law still does not
justify the camps that the ethnic minorities are forced to attend due to the arbitrary use of
them.22
One prisoner named Omir Bekali, from Kazakhstan, was detained in 2014 and sent to
prison. He details the conditions the detainees faced there. When he refused to follow
orders, he was made to stand at a wall for five hours at a time. When sent to solitary
confinement, he was deprived of food for 24 hours and within 20 days he said he wanted to
commit suicide. In an interview with the Associated Press he said, “For four days they strung
me up like this (Bekali raises his hands above his head). My toes just barely brushed the
ground. I was hanging like this (he keeps his hands raised and bows his head). For four
days they did not let me sleep.” He also added “They wanted me to confess that I was
threatening national security. Also that I was organizing terrorism, inciting terrorism,
informing terrorists.” After nearly seven months, he was sent to a re-education centre. 23 He
was sent to a room, the size of a bedroom, and was forced to share it with 45 other people. It
was so crowded they had to take turns sleeping.11
Azat is another eyewitness from the re-education camps. He was allowed to visit a loved one
that was inside the camp and there he saw around 1200 people singing pro-Chinese songs
in order to get food. Azat knew people in the camp but he says they looked like they were
missing their soul. He described them like “they were someone who lost their memory in a
car crash.”24
There has been a large amount criticism of the re-education camps. Nicholas Bequelin,
Amnesty International’s East Asia Director said “The Chinese government must not be
allowed to continue this vicious campaign against ethnic minorities in northwest China.
Governments across the world must hold the Chinese authorities to account for the
nightmare unfolding in the XUAR.”25
21 "China Xinjiang authorities okay Uighur re ... - Business Insider UK." 10 Oct. 2018,
http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-xinjiang-authorities-okay-uighur-re-education-camps-in-new-law-
2018-10. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018.This source is likely to be reliable because they received this from
the Announcement of the Standing Committee of the 13th People's Congress of Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region. However, the meaning may have been lost in translation but that is unlikely.
22 "Uyghur crisis: Xinjiang 're-education camps' legalized after China ...." 11 Oct. 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/10/asia/xinjiang-china-reeducation-camps-intl/index.html. Accessed 8
Nov. 2018. In this article, very little words were used that suggested any bias. Both sides of the
argument was presented so the source may be reliable.
23 "China's mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution - AP News." 17 May. 2018,
https://www.apnews.com/6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. The report
is factual and not biased. Omir Bekali is an eye witness of how prisoners are being treated and is
therefore reliable. However, it is impossible to verify his account.
24 "BBC Two - Newsnight, Is China brainwashing Muslim Uyghurs?." 30 Aug. 2018,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p06jvzh2. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. The story is impossible to verify
but his descriptions are very similar to that of other people that have been inside the re-education
camps. This source does suggest a strong opinion, however, Nicholas Bequelin is Amnesty
International’s East Asia Director so it is reliable.
25 "China: Families of up to one million detained in mass “re-education ...." 24 Sep. 2018,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/china-xinjiang-families-of-up-to-one-million-detained-
demand-answers/. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019. This source has minimal bias and is factual. This makes it
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The mastermind behind the camps

Chen Quanguo was the main catalyst that initiated the creation of the re-education camps. In
2011 he became the party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region. During this position,
he introduced a new security system for Tibet called convenience police stations under his
“grid style social management”. This allowed effective systematic surveillance of activities in
all of Tibet. Chen was commended for his success in Tibet and was made to govern Xinjiang
in 2016 to implement the same type of management.26 27 Xinjiang has seen a rise in latest
high-tech being used for surveillance. There are checkpoints in places such as Bazaars
where the residents of the region are scanned with metal detectors and facial recognition or
iris scan machines. All ethnic minorities have been forced to download an app that scans for
any content that may be justified as illegal. Cars must have GPS trackers, and anyone that
wants to use a kitchen knife must have identification details. Passports have been taken
away and confiscated and any overseas contact can be signs of extremism. The ‘becoming
family’ policy ensures that nothing is left unchecked by bringing in the Han Chinese to stay
with a family and report any signs of extremism.28
Since the riots that happened in 5th July 2009 in Urumqi, security has tightened massively in
Xinjiang. The riots began as a peaceful protest but later became violent, resulting in 197
deaths of Han Chinese people and Uyghurs, the majority being Han Chinese.29 This fuelled
the already existing resentment between the Han people and the Uyghurs. It is said that the
riots were inspired by the events in Guangdong.30 The Guangdong unrest, also known as the
Shaoguan incident, happened as a result of a rumour that a group of Uyghur employees had
raped two Han women. This resulted in a riot on 26th June where subsequently two Uyghur
men were left dead. The person that started the rumour was arrested but it did not stop the
formation of the protest that later turned into a riot on 5th July. The Chinese government
a very reliable source.

26 "Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization ...." 21 Sep. 2017,
https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-
in-tibet-and-xinjiang/. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. This was written by Adrien Zenz and James Leibold.
James Leibold is an Associate Professor in Politics and Asian Studies at La Trobe University in
Melbourne Australia, and an expert on ethnic policy and ethnic conflict in contemporary China. He is
the author and co-editor of four books and over twenty peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, and
a frequent contributor to the international media on these topics. Therefore this sources is very
reliable.
27 "Chen Quanguo - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen_Quanguo. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018.
This article only has a small amount of references so the information written may be biased or wrong.
However, they do align with the information written by The Jamestown Foundation.
28 "The plight of Xinjiang’s Muslim population by Rachel Harris ...." 07 Nov. 2018,
https://www.soas.ac.uk/blogs/study/plight-xinjiangs-muslim-population/
Accessed 8 Nov. 2018. Dr. Rachel Harris is a reader in the Music of China and Central Asia in
SOAS. This blog was posted on the SOAS website so it is academic however, there may be bias
because her husband is Uyghur.
29 "July 2009 Ürümqi riots - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2009_%C3%9Cr
%C3%BCmqi_riots. Accessed 6 Nov. 2018.This is a peer reviewed article that has been updated
recently so it is accurate.
30 "Ethnic violence in China leaves 140 dead | World news | The Guardian." 6 Jul. 2009,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/06/china-riots-uighur-xinjiang. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018.
The author has spent seven years as the Guardian’s China correspondent so she is experienced in
writing about the situations in China so the source is likely to be reliable.
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claim that the riot was provoked by Rebiya Kadeer, who lives in exile in the U.S but is an
influential Uyghur activist.31
Case Study
Kurbannisa Mahmud went on holiday to China in 2009. She arrived with her children at
Beijing on 3rd July 2009 and travelled to Urumqi on 4th July 2009. She details what she saw
on the 5th July. She stayed at her sister’s apartment, who lived on the 13th floor and was
able to see the events unfolding from the window. She describes how in the afternoon, there
was a group of around 40 unarmed young Uyghurs who were protesting and demanding
justice for the Shaoguan incident and for equal rights as the Han Chinese. There were only
around three ring-leaders that were actually voicing their opinion and the others were more
like supporters. Mrs. Mahmud did not take much notice of them. After around half an hour,
the group of protestors started to go elsewhere. Suddenly, after two or three hours later, she
heard loud sounds and realised they must have been gunshots or bombs. She saw large
black smoke arising as a result. Kurbannisa’s sister closed the curtains to prevent her from
looking outside but she managed to see a little child seriously injured. Closing the curtains
did not prevent her from hearing the screams of the people. After waiting around an hour,
her cousin, who was also with Kurbannisa Mahmud and her sister, looked outside the
window again and Mrs. Mahmud details how her cousin came back distressed and
described how there were soldiers sweeping up the dead from the floor with white trucks.
She details how at 1am, following this, she heard a tannoy blaring out “Allahu Akbar” and
thought they were people protesting but then realised that it came from speakers that were
attached to the trucks that were manned by the soldiers. When people heard “Allahu Akbar,”
she saw around five or six people come out of their house and immediately soldiers started
to fire at them. She says that she did not have the heart to watch any further. The “Allahu
Akbar” was repeated for several hours. After this, the streets were cleaned and left the
neighbourhood like nothing had happened. Electricity and telephone connections were cut
off.
Before all of this, in the morning, she was outside with her sister and she describes how the
streets were full of soldiers with rifles. Her sister, being a resident there, told Kurbannisa that
seeing soldiers outside was normal but that day there was something different. The soldiers
seemed a lot more alert and armed. Kurbannisa speculates that the violence must have
been staged and that the government foresaw the protest as a result of rising tension
amongst young Uyghur workers, following the Shaoguan incident. She says that after two
days, after people had been detained, Wang Le Chuang, who was the secretary of Xinjiang
at the time, called upon the Chinese to “do whatever you can against the Uyghurs. They are
your enemy.” She believes that at least 10,000 people died and that the claim that only
around 200 people died, the majority being Han Chinese, was fabricated by the Chinese
government. Upon returning to England, she was asked for an interview but she turned them
down because she was afraid of what would happen to her family who were still there.32
31 "Urumqi, China: After Deadly Riots, Ethnic Tensions Rise - TIME." 7 Jul. 2009,
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1908969,00.html. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018.The author
is a China based correspondent for TIME so the information he received is likely to be reliable.
32 Eye witness account of the Urumqi riots from Kurbannisa Mahmud, attained through discussion
(04/12/2018). This source is very reliable because it is an eyewitness account.
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Sources report that over 1000 Uyghurs were arrested and detained.33
The Violence between the Uyghurs and the Chinese
An Islamic extremist terrorist group called the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), as
used by the Chinese but referred to as Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) by the organisation
itself, was founded by Uyghur jihadists. Since 9/11, ETIM has been recognised as a terrorist
organisation by the European Union. After 9/11, China started labelling the attacks as
terrorism due to the rise of Islamaphobia. The main aim of the organisation is to establish
independence for East Turkistan, making it a separatist organisation. This goes against the
agenda that China is trying to achieve of being a standardised society. However, the World
Uyghur Congress has publicly questioned the existence of ETIM due to the fact that a large
amount of information could be traced back to Chinese sources. 34
TIP claimed responsibility for an attack on Tiananmen Square on 28 October 2013, where a
vehicle drove through a crowd of pedestrians, killing five pedestrians. Police identified the
driver to be Uyghur. Following this, the leader of the organisation, Abdullah Mansour posted
a clip warning the Chinese of more attacks.35
The effect of re-education camps on China

One effect the tight security has had on Xinjiang is the alienation of the local Han Chinese
population. The Jamestown Foundation interviewed an ethnic Han and found that the lack of
sense of freedom due to the security restrictions has encouraged Han Chinese people to
move elsewhere.12 Furthermore, re-education camps are not helping ease the tension but
are rather fuelling the feelings of frustration and resentment. This can be dangerous to the
economy as ethnic instability and violence in China threatens China’s economic growth, as
stated by Timothy Beardson in his book ‘Stumbling Giant.’36 However, Clifton W. Pannell and
Philipp Schmidt believe that violence in Xinjiang does not affect its economic growth.37
There has been an increase of 20 billion Yuan investment in security related construction,38
including the re-education camps, and a 356% increase in public security budget.39 200
million of the 20 billion yuan has been invested in Xinjiang to build or expand 45 orphanages
33 "July 2009 Ürümqi riots - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2009_%C3%9Cr
%C3%BCmqi_riots. Accessed 8 Nov. 2018. It is a well sourced document so it is likely to be reliable.
34 "Turkistan Islamic Party - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkistan_Islamic_Party.
Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. It has been updated recently so data is not out of date.
35 "Islamist group claims responsibility for attack on China's Tiananmen ...." 25 Nov. 2013,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/25/islamist-china-tiananmen-beijing-attack. Accessed 8
Nov. 2018. The author is an Asia correspondent, reporting from Beijing, so he has access to accurate
information, making his work reliable.
36 "Stumbling Giant: The Threats to China's Future on JSTOR."
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bh8f. Accessed 5 Feb. 2019. This is a scholarly and peer reviewed
piece of work so it is very reliable.
37 "How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth? by Ari Aisen ...."
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2277073. Accessed 5 Feb. 2019. This is likely to be reliable
because it an academic paper.
38 "China doubles spending on security-related building in Xinjiang ...."
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/06/china-human-rights-xinjiang-un-council. Accessed 7
Nov. 2018. The information provided has been verified and therefore is accurate.
12
to accommodate 5000 children.40 The majority of these children have parents in re-education
camps. This sets way for the children to grow up in an environment where they are taught
the Chinese language and culture and are the ‘state-race’ that the Chinese government is
striving for - children without separatist ideas, unlike their parents. However, this also means
that the children will grow up without a secure family unit. Conversely, the increase in
security related job vacancies have increased (there were around 90,000 security staff in
Xinjiang),41 which provides employment to both Han Chinese and Uyghurs and is currently a
large source for new jobs.
Jamestown organisation organised a different interview which involved a businessman from

the local area and they reported that a side effect of Chen’s security management is that
businesses are going bankrupt and that in turn results in employees leaving the area.42
According to China’s statistical yearbook, the GDP of Xinjiang is increasing (data shown for
2017-2018).43 However, Xinjiang lowered its growth target from 7% last year to 5.5% for this
year,44 a large difference compared to other provinces. Statista, a database company,
predicts that China’s overall GDP growth rate will decrease, continuing the pattern shown
from 2011.45
The tension between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs

With development projects having taken place in Xinjiang, it has attracted the economically
active Han Chinese people from eastern China.46 The unemployment rate for Han Chinese is
39 "Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State - Jamestown." 14 Mar. 2017,

https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2019.
Source has already been reviewed.
40 "China separates Uyghur kids from their families and treats them like ...." 21 Sep. 2018,
https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/09/21/china-separates-uyghur-kids-from-their-families-and-
treats-them-like-orphans.html. Accessed 4 Feb. 2019. This source is clearly being used to appeal to
the audience’s emotions so it is not entirely reliable. However, it is accurate.
41 "China's Xinjiang surveillance is the dystopian future ... - Engadget." 22 Feb. 2018,
https://www.engadget.com/2018/02/22/china-xinjiang-surveillance-tech-spread/. Accessed 3 Feb.
2019. The title shows some bias however, it is well sourced and is likely to be reliable.
in-tibet-and-xinjiang/. Accessed 4 Feb. 2019. Source has already been reviewed.
43 "China Statistical Yearbook 2018." http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm. Accessed 4
Feb. 2019. This sources is very reliable because it is coming from the Chinese government itself.
44 "Trade war sees China's provinces slash growth forecasts for 2019 ...." 16 Jan. 2019,
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2182384/trade-war-sees-chinas-provinces-
slash-growth-forecasts-2019. Accessed 25 Mar. 2019. This source is likely to be reliable because it is
well sourced.
45 "Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in China 2011-2023 - Statista."
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263616/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-china/.
Accessed 25 Mar. 2019. This source is reliable because it is using accurate data. The forecast is also
reliable, however, there is a certain element of uncertainty.
46 "Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs? - BBC News." 26 Sep. 2014,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014. Accessed 6 Nov. 2018. The BBC is seen as
the most impartial and trusted news provider in the UK. The detail given is quite broad and is not
specialised. However, it does given an unbiased perspective and is therefore reliable.
13
1% but for the Uyghurs it is 70% in Xinjiang.47 This is confirmed in the Compilation of UN
information:
“The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights remained concerned about
reports of the high rate of unemployment among persons belonging to ethnic minorities,
especially Tibetans, Uyghurs and Inner Mongolians, in part due to Han Chinese migration
into minority areas.”48
This has caused friction between the Uyghurs and Han Chinese population because
complaints rose that the job opportunities were getting filled by the Han population rather
than the Uyghurs that live there, therefore reducing the quality of life for the Uyghurs.
Furthermore, tight restrictions on religious practises were put in place for the Uyghurs, such
as not being able to fast during Ramadan, but were not enforced upon Hui people.49 This
repression of the Uyghurs has created an atmosphere of resentment between the Han
Chinese and the Uyghurs and has created a longing for independence between the
Uyghurs.
Prior to the existence of the re-education camps, many cultural influencers had been
arrested. For example, Ilham Tohti, an educated economist who has spoken out about the ill
treatment of Uyghurs, was arrested in 2014 on charges of separatism.50 Tohti is one of the
many public figures to have been arrested before the coming of the re-education camps.
During a round-table event, Eva Pils made a remark noting how it was convenient for all
these cultural influencers to be arrested before the re-education camps were made. Some of
these cultural influencers identified to be from singers to activists. Since the introduction of
re-education camps, there have been academics that have been taken to re-education
camps. For example, a well-known Uyghur author, Abdukerim Rahman, was taken to the re-
education camps in March 2018 for being “two-faced,” as a Chinese official described,
despite having spent the last four decades as a respected university lecturer.51 Rachel Harris
described the term “two-faced” to mean “somebody who doesn’t show sufficient loyalty to
China, somebody who is too interested in their ethnic identity and interested in Uyghur
culture. So that has been a particular issue for many of the academics who have been
detained.”52
47 "World Directory of Minorities." 19 Feb. 2014,

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/19/Overview_10.pdf. Accessed 7 Nov.
2018. This source is very detailed but it does not have any citations so there is small possibility that it
is unreliable.
48 "OHCHR | UPR UPR - China." https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNindex.aspx.
Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. This source is very reliable as it is from the United Nations Human Rights
Council.
49 "Islam in China: Why Beijing Oppresses Uighurs but Not the Hui | Time." 12 Aug. 2014,
http://time.com/3099950/china-muslim-hui-xinjiang-uighur-islam/. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. The author
is a journalist for TIME and she specializes in Asia so the source is reliable. However, the title does
suggest a bias.
50 "Five facts about Ilham Tohti, award-winning activist jailed in China ...." 20 Oct. 2016,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/10/five-facts-about-ilham-tohti-uighur-activist-
jailed-in-china/. Accessed 8 Nov. 2018. This is by the amnesty which is an organisation that focuses
on the Uyghur’s situation. This source is biased because the article clearly favours the Uyghurs.
51 "Uyghur Former Xinjiang University Vice President Detained For 'Two ...." 24 Sep. 2018,
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/professor-09242018164800.html. Accessed 8 Mar. 2019.
The source is factual and shows no bias. It is therefore reliable.
14
Previous detention systems

Chen Quangou governed Tibet from 2011 to 2016. Chen made it clear that their first priority
was to introduce social stability. He did this by decorating Buddhist temples with Chinese
flags and red propaganda, taking away from the religious value of the temples. The exact
same technique used when he came to govern Xinjiang.53 The grid-style management
started in Tibet and was then incorporated into Xinjiang but on a larger scale with an
estimate of 7500 convenience stations in Xinjiang compared to the 700 in Tibet.54 However,
Chen decided to take the risky step in introducing re-education camps only when he took
over Xinjiang.
As part of the ‘re-education through labour (RTL)’ programme, which was launched in the
1950s, people who committed minor offences were put into labour camps in order to reform
them. However, RTL did not agree with Article 9 of international law.55 On December 28
2013, the RTL system was abolished.56 Part of the reason for this is because the penalties
for the crimes could be covered with the existing law so the RTL system was unnecessary
and on top of that, it broke international law. The effect it had on crime was that in 1977 the
incidents of criminal case per 10,000 people was 5.8 but increased to 7.5 in 1988.57 The
OHCHR said:
“The Committee urges the State party to take all necessary measures to ensure the effective
implementation of the decision of the National People’s Congress on the abolishment of the
Re-education through Labour system throughout the State party, as well as to ensure that no
alternative or parallel system of forced labour is put in place, particularly at the local level.” 58
This suggests that the OHCHR did not agree with the RTL camps and demanded that it
becomes abolished. It could be argued that the CCP have ignored the part about not
introducing “parallel systems” because the current re-education camps in Xinjiang share very
similar properties as the RTL camps.
52 "Scholars targeted as Uighur purge engulfs universities." 28 Sep. 2018,

https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180928160408284. Accessed 8 Mar. 2019.
he source is factual and shows no bias. It is therefore reliable.
53 "The architect of China's Muslim camps is a rising star under Xi, East ...." 28 Sep. 2018,
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/the-architect-of-chinas-muslim-camps-is-a-rising-star-
under-xi. Accessed 12 Dec. 2018. This source was written from an unbiased point of view with only
facts being stated.
in-tibet-and-xinjiang/. Accessed 2 Feb. 2019. Sources has already been reviewed.
55 "OHCHR | International Covenant on Civil ...."
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. Accessed 31 Jan. 2019. This sources
has already been assessed.
56 "Re-education through labor - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Re-
education_through_labor. Accessed 31 Jan. 2019. It is well sourced so it is likely to be reliable.
57 "Crime in China - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_in_China. Accessed 31 Jan.
2019. It has accurate statistics so it is likely to be reliable.
58 "Concluding observations on the second periodic report of ... - OHCHR."
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW
%2BALqOml1btoJd4YxREVF2VW58oMDPLAMUILqfo6v
%2B47B8DRJbTAIMbcvgyEKXPdGsEnfi5eWE%2BWbfziSl6SiVeI%2FJnjrlrdBib9a4aoakRm.
Accessed 18 Mar. 2019. This is very reliable. See previous footnotes about OHCHR for full
assessment.
15
Discussion
Assessing the long term effects of the re-education camps on Xinjiang is impossible to do as
the camps have only recently been introduced and not enough data has been collected to
understand any possible effects the re-education camps may have had. However, it is
possible to compare this system of reform and detention with other previous systems and
use the current information to make an assumption on the effect of the camps on China and
thus assess how beneficial the camps are.
Tension
There is a repeating theme of resentment and frustration between the Uyghurs and the Han
Chinese. This is important to address because the re-education camps are another factor
contributing to the racial crossfire that in turn is most likely to harm society in a way that it will
create a longing for independence - a separatist crime according to the Chinese Communist
Party. It will also potentially increase the violence fuelled by angry Uyghurs who are fed up of
the repression. The notion of separatist ideas being a crime is actually harmful in itself. This
is because it is policing thoughts and adding extra shackles to the already caged Uyghurs -
the perfect recipe for rage. As Shagun Sharma already pointed out, the Uyghurs only want
more autonomy, which although may be seen as harmful by the Chinese, is actually
perfectly reasonable, considering how the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is the home
place of the Uyghurs. If tension remains as thick as it is now, it is unlikely that there would be
peaceful harmony between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese. Since re-education camps
already create further tension, it makes this motive of the camps, which is to acquire social
stability, void.
Crime
It would be best to compare Chen Quanguo’s (who is currently the Communist Party
Secretary of Xinjiang) management style in Tibet from 2011 to 2016 with his current
management style. Chen has been commended for the decrease in ethnic unrests and
violence in Tibet since the introduction of the convenience police stations. It is likely that the
convenience police stations would also decrease the amount of violence in Xinjiang too
since the same method is being implemented and on a larger scale. However, with regards
to the re-education camps, they are a new system that have been introduced into Xinjiang
and have not been tested elsewhere. It is becoming evident, with the number of residents
being admitted to the re-education camps (1 million), that the camps are the main method of
management in the region. With the introduction of this new factor in the management style,
it is possible that more turbulence is created rather than the desired outcome of stability.
This is most likely as it only fuels the resentment and feeling of isolation between the
Uyghurs are Han Chinese. Already, it has caused outcries for justice from Human Rights
Watch and former inmates.
Looking at the RTL system, it is fair to say it did not benefit China. This is proven with
statistics of crime rates. The RTL system was designed to reduce the number of criminal
cases but failed in doing so.59 The current re-education camps in Xinjiang have elements of
59 See footnote 57.
16
the old RTL system such as the arbitrary detention and the ideology of rehabilitation. Based
on this, it would be rational to say that the current re-education camps in Xinjiang will have a
similar effect. Although both the RTL system and current re-education camps in Xinjiang had
similar objectives of removing petty crime and those that participate in social disruption, the
criteria in doing so is different. In Xinjiang, religion, culture, and ethnicity has a larger part to
play than petty crimes.
Social
With ‘re-educated’ people being forced to ‘admit their crime’ as Omar Bekali described, it is
very likely that re-offending rates are going to be low since their psychology has been
tampered with and with the probable argument of not wanting to experience such harsh
environments again. The fact that this could be a possible reason for potentially low re-
offending rates is not ideal. It creates a cluster of people with ill mental health which can in
turn impact daily life negatively. This makes it easier to achieve the goal of law abiding
citizens because opposition results in incarceration and as Professor Reynolds suggested,
one way China is projecting power is through getting rid of opposition. In the eyes of the
Chinese government, this is a benefit as it allows the exercise of total control over its citizens
without the worry of an opposition. However, for many others, such as people from Amnesty
International, it is a negative thing as it restricts the freedom of its citizens. It must be said
that a society which promotes freedom and mental well being is the one that benefits its
people the most.
The motivations for the camps conveniently tie in with Uyghur culture and way of life.
Therefore it is most likely that the Uyghur culture is slowly being criminalised by arguing that
the best way forward is through conforming into the glorified state race - a race intolerant of
religion or the Uyghur culture. However, this ideology must be questioned because when
compared with the rest of the world, countries such as the UK, which are culturally diverse,
seem to thrive too. With this reason, criminalising the Uyghur culture does not benefit China
but rather stirs up resentment amongst the different ethnicities which has previously been
proven to be harmful to China.
There is also an argument that the tight security has caused alienation of the Han Chinese.
Although there is little evidence supporting this, if this was to be true, this would be a clear
negative. Not only would the re-education camps be affecting the Uyghurs, but it would also
be affecting the Han Chinese too.
Economic
With massive changes to the infrastructure of Xinjiang to better adapt to the new system of
reform, the investment in Xinjiang has heightened. Firstly, the actual camps themselves
have summed to a large amount. This dent to the economy is emphasised when looking at
the decline in the growth target for Xinjiang.60 China is being put under economic pressure
that could affect other aspects of the country negatively as less money is being spent on
other parts of the country. As proposed by the businessman that the Jamestown Foundation
interviewed, Chen’s management style is driving employees out of the area. This huge
investment has diverted attention from other sectors of employment such as manufacturing
60 See footnote 44.
17
and construction. On the flip side, the security related job vacancies have increased and this
allows unemployment rates to decrease. However, this source of employment is unreliable
and unsustainable because it means that in order to keep their jobs, they are going to need
more people going into the camps and more people to report. Not only will this enforce the
tension between Han Chinese and Uyghurs, but it will also create tension between the
Uyghurs themselves as it becomes ‘every man for themselves’ in a race to stay out of the
camps no matter the cost on the community.
Despite claims that the re-education camps are ‘vocational training centres’, it does not
make much sense that those that were already economically stable and educated, such as
Abdukerim Rahman, are being ‘re-educated.’ The internment of large public figures makes
the Uyghurs feel less safe and grows the resentment of the government amongst the
Uyghurs. Although Timothy Beardson stated that ethnic instability and violence in China
threatens China’s economic growth, Clifton W. Pannell and Philipp Schmidt are most likely
to be correct in saying that violence in Xinjiang does not affect its economic growth because
the GDP of Xinjiang is still steadily increasing,61 and there have not been massive changes
in the GDP despite the violent unrests.
There seems to be this idea that the higher the economy, the lower the social instability.
However, despite the continual economic growth in Xinjiang, there has still been cases of
ethnic unrests. A possible cause for this is the Han migration into Xinjiang over the years;
the Han Chinese were mainly the ones benefiting from the migration. As a result, the idea of
a ‘re-education centre’ helping the ethnic minorities to build employable skills seems
appealing but it is also economically unsustainable. However, that is not the only thing they
are being educated on; they are also being educated on the laws too. This argument that the
re-education camps are used to help build employable skills is also weak. Although this may
be the case for any unemployed people, it certainly is not for anyone else. Also, the main
grounds on which they are being deemed as in need of ‘re-education’ is due to their political
and religious affiliation. Economically, taking out skilled workers who do their jobs efficiently
but may have a different opinion, is damaging. The workforce is reduced and there are less
Uyghurs that are economically active for the period in which they attend re-education and as
a result, leaves gaps for Han Chinese to fill - going back to the idea of tension being caused
due to the Han population taking up the jobs.
International effects
With the breach of International law, China is standing on controversial grounds that can
result in increased pressure from other countries to close down the camps. This can
negatively impact the relationship of China with different countries and can prove to be
harmful to China by decreasing the trade deals. Especially since China’s biggest trade
partner is the EU.62 Notwithstanding, if the re-education camps do contribute to the economy
positively, it can also strengthen economic ties with other countries as China continues to
grow rapidly. Xinjiang has many Kazakhs too that are being put into the re-education camps
and some that go back to Kazakhstan have been pleading to not go back to China when
61 See footnote 43.

62 "China - Trade - European Commission." 16 Apr. 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/china/. Accessed 26 Feb. 2019. This is a very reliable source because it is from
European Commision which has very accurate data.
18
they get called back. They have stories about the re-education camps that reinforce what
Omir Bekali was saying. This has put Kazakhstan in a difficult position as they have financial
ties with China which they need but at the same time, their citizens are being mistreated by
them. This type of situation is unlikely to happen to countries that are not part of Central Asia
as they do not have to face the problem of their citizens being mistreated. Yet, there have
not been any vocal country leaders speaking about this issue. With the pressure rising from
organisations and the media, it is unlikely that countries will brush the topic away for much
longer. Every Uyghur person that have been spoken to have family in Xinjiang, whom they
have not heard from since the installation of the camps. This has caused these people to
speak up and encourage the government to take action. Such a loud commotion can not be
overlooked for longer.
Conclusion
The largest argument that the Chinese use for justification of the re-education camps is that
it is a way of achieving social stability. However, this argument is void. The reason for this is
because the tension between the Uyghurs and the Han people that has grown over the
years of repression is not being helped at all with the re-education camps, especially with the
reported use of torture. Instead, it is doing the opposite. The Uyghurs do not want to be
treated in this way and it is this that is forming the separatist movements in the first place.
Tension by no means increases social stability but rather it is an obstacle that is not being
confronted properly. One of the more subtle motives for the camps would be to achieve
cultural monotony. The re-education camps are only one factor in contributing to this. (The
Unity Villages would be another one). This ties in with the idea of creating tension between
the different ethnic groups because it makes it feel like the Uyghur culture is being engulfed
by the standard Han culture to create a ‘state-race.’ Solving this tension is important for
China if they want a harmonious society but re-education camps are not solving this and are
therefore not benefitting China.
Despite the current silence around the topic amongst country leaders, the growing pressure
for action is increasing and it is likely that it would become a problem that can not be
sidestepped. The biggest concern would be the arbitrary detention as it violates Article 9 of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It would be irrational to ignore the
growing concern from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organisations,
and the Uyghur population themselves, or to ignore the breach in international law. Once this
is handled, it is unlikely that the re-education camps would continue to exist in the way that it
does like the RTL camps.
Mehdi Hassan pointed out how scarce the radical Uyghurs are. For this reason, the
argument that re-education camps are a measure to tackle extremism is unviable. It is not
extremism that they are tackling but rather Islam as a whole. The biggest idea that suggests
this is the 75 signs of extremism where some of the so-called ‘signs’ are engaging in an
Islamic way of life such as marrying Islamically or refusing to smoke or drink alcohol. These
signs are not violent and do not invoke an extremist mindset. It is also unrealistic that all one
million of these people in the camps are extremists that are willing to commit violent acts.
Therefore it is more reasonable to argue that the re-education camps are stripping away
cultural identity, with this umbrella term encompassing the religion they practise.
19
Personal accounts of what happens inside the re-education camps makes people think that
the purpose of them is not to serve as ‘vocational training centres’ but rather something with
an ulterior motive. This idea is reinforced when there are academically able and
economically active people, like Abdukerim Rahman, who are being sent to be ‘re-educated.’
The only potential economic benefit would be the large amount of job vacancies since the
introduction of the re-education camps. However, as previously mentioned in the Literature
Review, this source for jobs is unsustainable and in the long run damages the community
further.
As a result, it can be concluded that re-education camps have minimal benefits with the only
potential benefit of increased job vacancies being unsustainable. The CCP may see cultural
monotony as a benefit, however, this has been proven to be harmful and it is unlikely that
the re-education camps will survive long enough for this to happen. There is too much
tension among the ethnic groups and only by resolving this can there be real benefits to
China. The re-education camps are not the answer and only creates more tension.
Evaluation
I believe that I have successfully met my aim of answering how beneficial the re-education
camps in Xinjiang are to China. This is shown because during the final parts of the
conclusion, I was able to give a definitive answer and say they had “minimal benefits” and
summarise why. I was surprised to find that I came to that conclusion easily as I thought the
answer would have been a lot more convoluted. However, I believe that part of the reason
for this is because the party in favour of the re-education camps do not have a very solidified
argument due to their long-held silence. Therefore, if I could take the research further, I
would like to speak to Chinese officials and interview them to gain more information on their
arguments about the re-education camps because their arguments have been implicit. I
would also speak to an economic analyst about how the re-education camps would affect
the Chinese economy because there were no sources that I found that directly link the re-
education camps with how it affects the economy.
What I found most difficult was to make sure I kept the writing specific to re-education camps
because there are so many other factors that are affecting the relationship between Xinjiang
20
and the rest of China such as the history of the repression of Uyghurs. It was particularly
difficult under the subheadings where I spoke about the tension between the Uyghurs and
the Han Chinese. The theme of tension was prevalent across the entire dissertation so it
was made more difficult. Therefore, if I was to do this again, I would adapt my question so
that it can encompass more than just re-education camps. It was also difficult gathering
evidence to support the party that believe re-education camps are needed because China
has, for some time, denied the existence of them and even now are saying minimal about it.
There is also a limit to scholarly articles available on this topic because re-education camps
are new so a lot of my sources were from newspaper journals where there was a possible
bias but I did try my best to avoid the bias and only extract the key bits of information. I
believe I did this successfully because I was able to differentiate between opinion,
speculation, and fact and use this to present arguments in a way that made it clear who was
arguing what point. On the other hand, I found difficulty in assessing sources on their
reliability. I developed the skill to detect language that made it clear it was supporting one
particular side, however, I believe I can still improve on other ways to detect reliability of
sources. For example, assessing the author by looking at generally what type of articles they
write.
Furthermore, I believe I could have compared the re-education camps to more detention
systems from around the world, such as the concentration camps from Nazi Germany. This
would allow me to accurately predict the long-term effects the re-education camps would
have on China, rather than just analysing the short-term effects.
For the presentation, I had to condense a large amount of information which was difficult
because there are so many key terms that are essential to clarify for the presentation to
make sense. Therefore, I had to only briefly explain the main arguments and I spoke about
only a few effects the re-education camps had. I did not have enough time to add a slide
dedicated to an evaluation so I did that throughout the presentation. For example, I spoke
about how I found the fact that the Han Chinese felt alienated, due to tight security,
surprising. I also spoke about how I had to be aware of propaganda and how I developed
the skill to extrapolate key information and identify propaganda when seen. Furthermore, I
had to go at quite a quick pace so to counter that I used simple slides so that there was not
an overload of information. In the end, I believe I was able to get the main points across and
achieve the aim of filling in a gap in people’s knowledge. I know I was successful in doing
this because my peers told me that they learned a lot.
21
Bibliography
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TIME Magazine 9. Jul. 2009.
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909416,00.html
After Deadly Riots, Ethnic Tensions Heat Up in Urumqi

Austin Ramzy. 07. Jul. 2009.
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1908969,00.html
Chen Quanguo
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1

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

Literature Review …………………………………………... 5

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

1 "A Brief History of the Uighurs - TIME." 9 Jul. 2009,

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

Xinjiang is mainly populated by the Uyghurs. According to an article:

2 "Xinjiang - Wikipedia." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang. Accessed 27 Oct. 2018. This source is

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

What are re-education camps?

4 "Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after ... - Semantic Scholar."

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

9"75|| _." 24 Dec. 2014,

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

The conditions in these camps

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

The mastermind behind the camps

a very reliable source.

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

The Violence between the Uyghurs and the Chinese

The effect of re-education camps on China

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

Jamestown organisation organised a different interview which involved a businessman from

The tension between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs

39 "Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State - Jamestown." 14 Mar. 2017,

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

47 "World Directory of Minorities." 19 Feb. 2014,

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

Previous detention systems

52 "Scholars targeted as Uighur purge engulfs universities." 28 Sep. 2018,

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

61 See footnote 43.

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

After Deadly Riots, Ethnic Tensions Heat Up in Urumqi

China doubles spending on security-related building in Xinjiang – report

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

China legalizes Xinjiang 're-education camps' after denying they exist

China Statistical Yearbook 2018

China’s Hidden Camps

China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution

China's Xinjiang surveillance is the dystopian future nobody wants

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?

Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949

Ethnic violence in China leaves 140 dead

Five facts about Ilham Tohti, award-winning activist jailed in China

How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Is China brainwashing Muslim Uyghurs?

Islam in Xinjiang: “De-Extremification” or Violation of Religious Space?

Islamist group claims responsibility for attack on China's Tiananmen Square

How beneficial are the re-education camps in Xinjiang to China?