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POSITION PAPER

Tripartite Summit, July 1940

From the Of ce of Mr. Ulano Dabry Sabini,

(Tripartite Of cer, Member of Executive Cabinet, Ambassador to the

Soviet Union, Plenipotentiary)
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Special Address by Mr. Ulano Dabry Sabini

Heads of States,

In this document I have outlined my policy, my beliefs, my problems, my relevant history for the moment
and possible solutions to help out the situation. It is here that I feel I should let the heads of state know a
bit about my relationship with Il Duce Benito Mussolini.

I first met Mussolini when he worked as a British Intelligence Agency in 1917. Back in the day Mussolini
had the job to keep up the pro-war campaigning. In fact I remember later reading an interview article in
‘THE 420’, in 1918 where Sir Samuel Hoare (an MP and MI5’s man in Rome) said that,
Mussolini would send Italian army veterans to beat up peace protesters in Milan and spread pro-war
propaganda.

It was under such situation where I had the first privilege of meeting him on one such afternoon on 15th
November, 1917 when I was sent to manage a team of public propaganda officials as an officer myself.
Mussolini was also leading from the front along with me and together we did a wonderful job. Time and
again till the mid of 1918 we met this way quite frequently and were now quite acquainted with each other.
We also started writing a few letters to each other discussing ways to curb the protests and new ways of
spreading propaganda. He had asked me to not reveal any information about these interactions to His
Majesty Victor Emmanuel 111 because of his difference of opinion and other personal political interests.

We gradually stopped communicating over letters with the end of World War 1. I finally got the chance to
meet him again in 1939 when his Majesty introduced me to him for my job at the Tripartite Summit. It
was only then when we secretly started sending letters back and forth to ensure my view at the Summit is a
homogenous mixture of interests from both His Majesty as well as the Duke.

I feel letting the heads of states know about this increases transparency and helps in understanding my
relations and interests in and with Italy. I request the Heads of State to trust me with the job and stay in
contact with me when needed.

Yours Sincerely,
Ulano Dabry Sabini.
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Problems

A. Italy

1. Territorial Factors : It is well established that the Fascist foreign

policy at this point is becoming more and more expansionist oriented by
the day. The main aim is to exert a radical and stern nationalistic feeling
in regions which will bene t Italy the most including but not limiting to
the countries in African continent.

Until the Ethiopian takeover, our policy was not obstructed by the
incompetent land of ‘poilu’ and ‘Tommy’. (French and British soldiers were
referred to by the aforementioned names). It was only in the case of the
Ethiopian clash that the two country heads decided to develop antagonistic
policies.

Our strategy in such a case was as simple as drawing in more power on our
side to avoid sanctions from the League of Nations. This was the driving force
behind Italy’s Monarch and Prime Minister agreed in deciding to move into
Hitler’s orbit early June and bring Italy closest to the Germans as ever.

However, the problem surfaced when this ulterior motive failed and our
policy was shattered by failing to help us gain more territorial control over
Africa. Multiple factors led us to get into this tight circumstance at present. A
few of them are :

• We were made the junior partner in the ‘Rome-Berlin Axis’ of the October
25, 1936.
• The Antikomintern Pact of 1936 which calls for mutual assistance in need.
• We had to accept German annexation of Austria leading to German Reich
coming right upto Italian border.
• The formal military alliance with Hitler, the “Pact of Steel” of May 1939
further reduced scope for manoeuvre. Not only were we committed to take
part in any con ict involving the other, defensive or otherwise, but each
leader in the pact was to consult the other before taking any military
action.

The problem lies in the fact that this makes us completely dependent on
Germany to follow their lead into the war and deprives us of the decision
power of our own.

2. Anti-Fascist fractions : A pressing issue of the present which was

not much of a big deal even 15 years back. Initially it began with the
communists who were few in number and had weak sources of funding
allegedly from the Soviet Union.
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The only note-worthy anti-fascist fraction was that of the ‘Roman Catholic
Church’. Back in February 1929, this fraction was rewarded for it’s loyalty to
Fascism with the Lateran Treaty, which settled the “Roman Question” at last.
To much disappointment, this fraction adopted anti-Fascist activities right
after the rati cation of the Treaty under the tag of ‘Catholic Action’. This set
the tone for other fractions to try their luck and play with the grit of the
Fascist leaders.

Moreover, increasing alliance with German powers coupled with pressure

from the actions of the Nazi Germany ignited our gradual fear of whether our
revolution was perceived as real by the Italian Citizens.

These events led to a series of discussions starting from 1937 between Benito
Mussolini, Nicols Sansenelli, King Victor Emmanuel III, Foreign Minister,
Count Galeazzo Ciano and me. Each of us had one vote in the matter with the
Majesty’s vote acting as a tie breaker. After multiple rounds of discussion
much under pressure, the Anti Semitic Laws were formally introduced and
signed by the King (with 3 informal votes for and 2 against).

These laws have been showered with a lack of consensus by Italians. However
they have de nitely led to increased resistance to Fascism which now poses
as a concern to be dealt with to avoid a civil war and internal con icts.

3. Economic Factors : The shaky Italian economy is because of three

main problems which have time again been highlighted to the King and
the Prime Minister. The rst blow came from the Great Depression of
1929. The de ationary processes were evidently unequivocally evident
from the impulsive decisions we were compelled to make overnight.

The Fascists have always showed their aggressive nationalism by considering

the growth of grains as a priority for symbolic purposes.They have time and
again emphasised need for self-suf ciency by grain production. This form of
aggressive nationalism also served as a major problem making the
agricultural policy one track oriented. This will gradually lead to poor quality
crops in the 3rd or 4th generation crops.

The third problem arose with the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations
after Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935–36. This led to more economic
pressure on the authority especially with a huge cost for maintaining our
Colonies in Eastern Africa. All this led to budget de cits, big tax increases,
and capital levies. To top it all off, the Italian citizens have also acquired the
belief that Fascism has built in corruption with members charging extra fee
from citizens for permits. There are no substantial evidence provided to the
Honourable His Majesty to back such claims.

It was only the other when in my discussion with His Majesty that we were
discussing how it would indeed be almost certainly be impossible to go into
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another war just after Germany moves into one herself, based on our present
economic condition.

4. Population Dynamics : The pressing economic factors has brought

about a new immigration trend where in we have noticed an increase in
number of civilians by 550,000 moving out by between 1914 and 1930.
Further, rural Italians moved to the cities especially from the south
failed to go abroad. This put a pressure on the main capital city, Rome.

The reduction in population numbers in general have led to lesser number of

people signing up for armed forces. This has led to Italian military taking a
signi cant toll. Both King Emmanuel and I are in agreement of the fact that
attacking France right now would not be a strategic bene cial move for us.

B. Tripartite Summit

1. Transparency Question : A major factor which will determine

whether the Summit succeeds its purpose of creation depends on the
transparency the countries succeed in showcasing. It is the rst time in
the history of Geopolitics that three countries with similar expansionist,
aggressive nationalistic and racial laws have come together to discuss
the course of action for the future. Mutual trust will only be shown after
con dence building measures take place and lead the way for the
diplomats to get accustomed with each other.

The extent of transparency maintained in the committee will determine the

level of coordination of expansionist plans and later war strategy as a kind of
fascist common plan. The aforementioned goal is the exact fear factor
expressed by British of cials since the early 1930s. The worst case scenario
shows a picture would lead the Summit to become a ground for power politics
guided by “sacro egoism(sacred egotism)”, as the Italian way of warfare was
called.

As the Tripartite of cer, this transparency question needs to be my lookout to

check, verify, question every claim, fact, belief and opinion put forward in
this Summit.

2. Interpretation of Tripartite Pact : The Pact which has been

deliberated upon and drawn up by the high contracting parties is
comprehensive enough for full functionality of the Summit. However,
there are multiple open ended statements and clauses which create
space for interpretation of respective countries based on their own
policy.
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Even a minute difference of opinion can lead to a con ict between the
members present at the summit which would ultimately lead to the pact
falling on its face.

A few examples of such vagueness in the pact would be :

• Clause 4 (d) (i) where in the Law mentions committing a crime but does
not go on to specify the nature of the crime. Whether it needs to be a crime
against the high contracting parties or the tripartite summit and it’s
members or the Allied forces or other forms of war crime has not been
speci ed leaving the triggering of this particular clause a doubtful factor.
• Clause 4 (g) gives ‘command’ over shared resources to the Executive Board
without any de ned limits, guidelines or targets set for the same under
which the command can be exercised.
• Clause 6 calls for united effort against third party aggressor without any
de nition of who a ‘third party’ is, thus leaving room for interpretation and
individual policy implementation
• Clause 8 (d) also counts as a matter of interpretation because of the use of
the word, ‘third party’ without any de nition of the same.
• Clause 8 (a) does not put any de nition or context for ‘invasion’ leaving it
upto the parties to decide what counts as an invasion and what does not
irrespective of the scale of force used.
• Clause 8 (b) mentions historic or ongoing con icts at the time of the
commencement of the Summit but does not include anything about fresh/
new con icts hence leaving more room for interpretation

And 27 other such ambiguities and vagueness.

3. Power Dynamics : Clause 1 of the Pact underlines German and Italian

government as the founding members and Japanese Delegation as an
honorary member. There are two problems with this fact.

Firstly, it raises a question over the distribution of power and judgement and
participation in the Summit. It begs to ask, how can equal spread of all
sources and other factors be achieved with a well de ned hierarchy having a
2:1 ratio. This distribution question becomes a problem under war/
emergency situations where in the pact can be misused to deprive Japan of a
major privileges.

Secondly, the use of the term ‘government’ without any speci c mention of
the government. This would not be a problem under present circumstances
given that the governments are steady, stable and strong as of now. However,
if there is a change of government in the future and thus a complete turn
over of policies for the party with context to the Tripartite Summit, then the
functionality of the Summit would become an obstacle. It would lead to
internal con icts within the Executive Cabinet and the Summit would
become self destructive in nature. Measures need to be taken to stop such a
possibility from ever arising in any of the three governments.
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Clause 3 further mentions ‘Heads of States’ without specifying the names of
the Heads of States. This has been done to ensure that the pact goes on even
after the death or change of a Head of any of the States. However, in the event
of a ght for power in any of the states or a misunderstanding of the real
Head of State of a country, the power given by this clause gets defeated.

For example, in case of Italy, Benito Mussolini is the il Duce and head of the
government while the real head of the state of Italy who controls all major
decisions, signing of documents, etc. is His Majesty, King Victor Emmanuel
III. Under such circumstances, the position of ex-of cio member becomes
questionable and disputed. Under war conditions, this becomes a major
problem to be dealt with.

4. Strategic Intimidation : While military cooperation and coordination

is a major goal, care also must be taken to not cross the threshold limit of
coordination level. Expressing excessive coordination in plans, strategy
while exhibiting synonymous policies will lead to the democracies failing
to recognise the threat of three separate nations bound together. The
democracies in any military will almost certainly consider the tripartite
summit to be a single threat source rather than a three fold threat.

5. Dispute Resolution Mechanism : The provisions of the present

pact throws very little light on the procedure, requirements and other
information needed to invoke dispute resolution between parties. To
ensure that the pact carries on for a longer duration of Time and does not
fail too quick, a strong consolidated dispute resolution mechanism is
essential. The absence of the same does not guarantee the safety of the
pact or the nations who are free to get away with a few light yet offensive
actions with no proper speci c guidelines in place.

6. Apolitical assurance : A major potential issue would rise up with

three separate government of cials all getting together to discuss the
present situation around the world. This issue would be to ensure that the
body remains apolitical when it comes to passing legal judgments binding
upon the nations party to the pact. With the judges and the others
members of the panel being made up of the very summit, there would be a
high possibility of the decision being politically bias to one party.
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Policy

A. Italy
My sole job with context to the Italian Government is to act as the thread
between His Majesty Emmanuel III and the Prime Minister. I have evolved
into the position where in, I am required to understand the opinions of the
King, communicate them to the Prime Minister and help him protect the
wishes of the king while also ful lling his personal interests.

The King and Mussolini have good public relations, however there is an inner
disapproval for each other which is quite safe guarded from the public eye to
prevent them from feeling an internal lack of unity. This is where I come in as
a trusted advisor to both the individuals. This was also the sole reason why
the heads of state rst put me in the Italian Delegation to the Lower House of
the Summit and then promoted me to the Executive Committee.

I will be representing the shared interests of the two individuals in question

with occasional bias towards His Majesty because I owe my life to his mercy
and have taken a pledge to be loyal to him.

With context to the military situation, I feel His Majesty is logically correct in
his perspective. We are not in an economic position nor in a military
stronghold to move into any engagements as of now. However, to respect the
commitments made by Mussolini to Hitler and their German powers, I feel
that the best option would be to take a neutral position and operate from
beyond the battle ground at least for now.

B. Tripartite Summit
My role in the Summit revolves around protection of the pact with the
powers vested in me. For this purpose I would be exercising the veto power
only in cases to ful l my protective duty successfully. The following are the
factors which I shall consider before exercising the veto power as well as any
document approved by the Lower Chamber :

• Whether a particular paperwork is motivated by personal interest or

collective good of the pact
• Whether the paperwork goes against the objectives of the pact
• Whether the sanctity, sovereignty and dignity of the summit is being
tampered with
• The future long term implications of the paperwork in contention
• Target group for any radical paperwork
• Extent of clarity and comprehensiveness of the paperwork. (Ambiguities
will not be looked upto)
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As the Ambassador to Soviet Union, my job is to keep constant
communications with the Soviet Union to ensure that they gradually
manoeuvre their policy towards the Axis powers. For that purpose,
transparency and clarity is not the main goal but selective and smart use of
power to ful l our needs. I would only be communicating that much which :
a) They would be absolutely needed to know
b) They would like to hear to incline themselves towards our interests

I shall use my powers as an Executive Cabinet very conservatively and

judiciously. As a tripartite of cer from Italy I would prioritise the former and
then the later before considering other factors laid down by other members
in order to take any decisions.

If a situation arises where there has to be a compromise between Italy and

the Tripartite Summit, I would try to use diplomacy to secure the best
possibility for both. However, as a major Tripartite Of cer I would be
compelled to prioritise the Summit in the worst case scenario. This is because
my role in Italy is just that of an advisor to both the King and the prime
minister and not a protector of the state.

I would not immediately look into proposing any changes to the pact because
I believe that the heads of state share a vision with the one which has been
rati ed at present. However, in the long run, depending on the Military,
political situation as well as the atmosphere of the upcoming summit, I would
be interested to make the pact more comprehensive, include more scope and
guidance for the members to help all nations collectively contribute to the
advancement against the allied powers. The changes would expand the
provisions present in the existing pact to include more possibilities such as
military cooperation on more levels, more engagements diplomatically
between the parties and legal means to develop more con dence between
parties.
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Solutions

• The internal Italian situation and problems can be dealt with in the
following way :
a) More con dence building measures and a proper political structure
to incorporate more coordination between the head of state and the
head of government
b) Proper hierarchy and guidelines de ning the control and
jurisdiction for all heads controlling departments of the government
c) More stern policies and measures to counter anti fascist movements
including but not limited to form and deploy special teams and
propaganda of cers adopting a similar approach to the one adopted
in World War 1.
d) A consolidated discussion with a small internal commission from
within the Italian government to discuss ways of implementing
better economic policies while putting the emphasis on an
agricultural economy.
e) A detailed review of the present legal engagements still valid to
assess and establish the international relations before formally
declaring a stance in a potential war situation
f) An assessment with the military heads to decide upon strategies,
weaponry and special but new and innovative tactics to combat
France
g) Draw up a plan for continuing expansionist policy abroad after
consulting His Majesty and a few government ministers to assess
presence of any loop holes in the existing treaties which can be used
to invoke a territorial expansion.
h) Gather tripartite backing to help in military as well as political
internal situation by portraying it to be a collective problem for the
summit as a whole.

• The problems of the Tripartite Summit need to be dealt with diplomacy

besides quick and impromptu decision making.

• The policy coordination for all parties upto the threshold limit as explained
before needs to be managed by setting up any of the ancillary bodies and
establishing a formal document underlying the speci c goals and guidelines
to achieve this objective in con icts

• The Power dynamics can be dealt with proper clear communication and
deliberation between the parties involved in the pact to establish a solid
understanding and standpoint of power possessed by all parties.

• The transparency issue can be dealt with, by using proper fact checking
information from time to time. For example, setting up for provision of
investigatory bodies in the pact and deploying the same to a speci c nation
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party to the pact only after a majority voting in the executive cabinet in
case of a dispute system.

• The dispute possibilities must be discussed and assessed in the summit.

Following which, a consolidated procedure and plan for smooth invocation
of the same must be decided and agreed upon before considering an
inclusion into the pact to ensure additional strength to the pact.

• A perfect plan for the action and goals of the summit must be drawn up for
each session here on to ensure maximum progress of the summit with very
little digression especially under emergency situations

• The apolitical standpoint in legally binding judgments can be maintained by

setting informal understandings to include judges and other members in
the panel from a third party not in dispute with each other. Until fresh
changes can be considered to be included in the pact post deliberations on
the best route to avoid the aforementioned problem.

Conclusion
All in all, I would be looking forward to utilise all my past experiences as an
orator and my knowledge as a legal writer to push for the best for both Italy
and the Summit. I will not hesitate to use my little hereditary knowledge of
alchemy if needed to boost the military strength of Italy.

I do not plan to uncover much about my personal life just yet, however I
promise to ensure that the Heads of States shall be intimated about all the
necessary details as and when required.

I would want to bring in a gun to the Summit if permitted, to ensure my

safety as an of cer with a lot of power and very little state sponsored
protection. My earnest request to the heads of state to share a cigar with me
once the rst day is over so that we can discuss how the Summit should be
guided and where the summit could gain momentum and improvement.

I will also be bringing a few of my interesting presents from Sabini Manor

which are essential for clearing out a few problems and obstacles to the pact.
My Mum who was British always used to ask me and my brother as a kid, to
ensure we never reveal our plans well ahead of any strategic battle. To
honour her words, I will not be sharing more details about the same right
now. However I will let the heads of states know more about my plans as the
summit unfolds.

I look forward to three days of intense thrilling deliberation to decide the future and
hope for the best. I hope Fascism reaches new heights, the King stays content with
the upcoming discussions, the prime minister feels con dent with the situation post
the summit and the Axis powers feel stronger than ever.
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