Professional Documents
Culture Documents
4.25 Mabini Colleges vs. Atty Pajarillo
4.25 Mabini Colleges vs. Atty Pajarillo
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR., AND MA.
PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA,Complainant,v.ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO,Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:
efore us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for
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allegedlyviolatingCanon15,Rule15.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitywhichprohibitsa
lawyerfromrepresentingconflictinginterestsandCanon15ofthesameCodewhichenjoinsalawyer
to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients.
I n1995,thecomplainant,MabiniColleges,Inc.,hadaBoardofTrusteeswhichwasdividedintotwo
opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M. Adeva,
Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban
Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.
nMarch29,1999,theAdevaGroupissuedanunnumberedBoardResolutionwhichauthorizedPilar
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I.Andrade,theExecutiveVicePresidentandTreasurerofthecomplainantatthattime,andLydiaE.
Cacawa,theVicePresidentforAdministrationandFinance,toapplyforaloanwiththeRuralBankof
Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant.
nMay12,1999,theLukbanGroupsentalettertoRBPtoopposetheloanapplicationbecausethe
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Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as
stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of
Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having financial difficulties.
n May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial
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capacity to pay the loan.
nJuly13,1999,RBPgrantedtheloanapplicationintheamountofP200,000whichwassecuredby
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a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.
n September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which
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nullifiedtheappointmentofLibradoGuerraandCesarEchanobytheAdevaGroupasmembersofthe
Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the
latter of the SEC Order.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.
n May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for
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Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.
n September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the
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respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests andforfailingtoexhibitcandor,fairness,
and loyalty.
espondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued
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that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the
complainantinthisdisbarmentcasebecausetheywerenotdulyauthorizedbytheBoardofDirectors
tofilethecomplaint.Second,respondentclaimedthatheisnotcoveredbytheprohibitiononconflict
ofinterestwhichappliesonlytothelegalcounselofcomplainant.Respondentarguedthathemerely
served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third,
respondent argued that there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant werepublicrecords.Thus,respondentclaimedthathecouldnot
have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant.
nFebruary14,2013,theInvestigatingCommissionerissuedaReportandRecommendation2 finding
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respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommending that respondent be
suspendedfromthepracticeoflawforatleastoneyear.TheInvestigatingCommissionernotedthat
respondent appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filedbyhisformerclient,the
complainant herein. The Investigating Commissioner cited cash vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001
showing that respondent was paid by complainant for his retained legal services. According to the
InvestigatingCommissioner,thesevouchersdebunkrespondent'sclaimthatthecomplainantmerely
appointed him as its corporate secretary. The Investigating Commissioner also held that the
personality of complainant's representatives to file this administrative case is immaterial since
proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar ofthePhilippines(IBP)upontheverifiedcomplaintof
any person.
n June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-7704 which
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affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed apenaltyofsuspensionfrom
the practice of law for one year against respondent.
n May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which
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denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.
he issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interestswhenhe
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entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by
complainant against RBP.
e rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
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Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770andXXI-2014-290oftheIBPBoardofGovernors.
I ndeed,respondentrepresentedconflictinginterestsinviolationofCanon15,Rule15.03oftheCode
ofProfessionalResponsibilitywhichprovidesthat"[a]lawyershallnotrepresentconflictinginterests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
his ruleprohibitsalawyerfromrepresentingnewclientswhoseinterestsopposethoseofaformer
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client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing
conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigantsbeencouragedto
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.7 InMaturan v. Gonzales8 we further explained the rationale for the prohibition: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
hereasonfortheprohibitionisfoundintherelationofattorneyandclient,whichisone
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oftrustandconfidenceofthehighestdegree.Alawyerbecomesfamiliarwithallthefacts
connectedwithhisclient'scase.Helearnsfromhisclienttheweakpointsoftheactionas
well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
care.Noopportunitymustbegivenhimtotakeadvantageoftheclient'ssecrets.Alawyer
must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
eanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence of conflict of
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interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
hereisconflictofinterestwhenalawyerrepresentsinconsistentinterestsoftwoormore
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opposingparties.Thetestis"whetherornotinbehalfofoneclient,itisthelawyer'sduty
tofightforanissueorclaim,butitishisdutytoopposeitfortheotherclient.Inbrief,if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him whenhearguesforthe
other client." This rule covers not only cases inwhichconfidentialcommunicationshave
beenconfided,butalsothoseinwhichnoconfidencehasbeenbestowedorwillbeused.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
whichherepresentshimandalsowhetherhewillbecalleduponinhisnewrelationtouse
against his first client any knowledge acquired throughtheirconnection.Anothertestof
theinconsistencyofinterestsiswhethertheacceptanceofanewrelationwillpreventan
attorneyfromthefulldischargeofhisdutyofundividedfidelityandloyaltytohisclientor
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
heruleprohibitingconflictofinterestappliestosituationswhereinalawyerwouldberepresentinga
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clientwhoseinterestisdirectlyadversetoanyofhispresentorformerclients.10 Italsoapplieswhen
the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly or
indirectly,tothesubjectmatterofthepreviouslitigationinwhichheappearedfortheformerclient.11
Thisruleappliesregardlessofthedegreeofadverseinterests.12 Whatalawyeroweshisformerclient
istomaintaininviolatetheclient'sconfidenceortorefrainfromdoinganythingwhichwillinjuriously
affecthiminanymatterinwhichhepreviouslyrepresentedhim.13 Alawyermayonlybeallowedto
represent a client involving the same or asubstantiallyrelatedmatterthatismateriallyadverseto
the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.14 chanrobleslaw
e also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction
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between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letterdatedMay14,1999toRBPtoassurethe
latterofthefinancialcapacityofthecomplainanttopaytheloan.ButascounselforRBPinthecase
for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his former
client.
ontrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and information in
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connectionwiththeloantransactionbetweenRBPandthecomplainantwerepublicrecords.InHilado
v. David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal pronouncements: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
heprinciplewhichforbidsanattorneywhohasbeenengagedtorepresentaclientfrom
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thereafterappearingonbehalfoftheclient'sopponentappliesequallyeventhoughduring
the continuance of the employment nothing ofaconfidentialnaturewasrevealedtothe
attorneybytheclient.(Christianvs.WaialuaAgriculturalCo.,30Hawaii,553,Footnote7,
C. J. S., 828.)
here it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
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represented theadversepartywithrespecttothesamematterinvolvedinthelitigation,
the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his
formerclientduringthatrelationship,beforerefusingtopermittheattorneytorepresent
the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
I norderthatacourtmaypreventanattorneyfromappearingagainstaformerclient,itis
unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's
affairs might have a bearing on the mattersinvolvedinthesubsequentlitigationonthe
attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7;51Nev.,
264.)
his rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on
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terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the
same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S,
181.)
hus,thenatureandextentoftheinformationreceivedbythelawyerfromhisclientisirrelevantin
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determining the existence of conflict of interest.
inally,weagreewiththeInvestigatingCommissionerthatacomplaintfordisbarmentisimbuedwith
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public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legalstanding.UnderSection1,Rule139-Bofthe
RulesofCourt,"[proceedingsforthedisbarment,suspensionordisciplineofattorneysmaybetaken
by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verifiedcomplaintofanyperson."Thus,inthepresentcase,wefindthatMarcelN.Lukban,AlbertoI.
arciaJr.,andMa.PamelaRossanaA.Apuyacaninstitutethecomplaintfordisbarmentevenwithout
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authority from the Board of Directors of the complainant.
HEREFORE,premisesconsidered,ResolutionNo.XX-2013-770andResolutionNo.XXI-2014-290of
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the IBP Board of Governors imposing apenaltyofsuspensionfromthepracticeoflawforoneyear
against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.
Endnotes: