The Neypes Rule

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STATEMENT OF THE RULE

The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the “Fresh Period Rule,” states that “a party litigant
may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or
file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.” (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 September
14, 2005)

PURPOSE OF THE RULE

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra)

The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the
Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus,
the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-
day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus
Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES

Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that an appeal should be taken
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file an
appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not have the
full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the
notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are:

Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however,
that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x

SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period
for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel
at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE

`Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution. (Neypes, supra)

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule
41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a
"fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes
no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP
129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize
any distinction.17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section
6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the
same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this
situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases
under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil
case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs
to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by
certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to
the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
 Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why
the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and
criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to
the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where
a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a
situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts
have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law
– Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege. 18 (Judith Yu versus Hon.
Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when
Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.17 Amendments to procedural
rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but
only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.18

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the
quested retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in
order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they
may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within
which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower
court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied
to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if
not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in
the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in
1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders
issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the
lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.19

Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same
month as the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent
from that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia,
G.R. No. 173942, 25 June 2008)

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT

 This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The
use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another.
It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or"
in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)

NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED

Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty.
Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the
commission of which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or
offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at
the promulgation of the judgment.

To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on
25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light
offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. In
case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the
failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies available in the
Rules against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of
the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies
against the judgment, the MTCC should not have entertained petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion
for Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion
instead of immediately denying it. xxx

Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to
filing his Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would have been the proper
opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing
on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have
been allowed to avail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a motion for
reconsideration. xxx
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is also applicable
to criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to this case, considering that petitioner’s Motion for
Probation was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the Phils., G.R. No.
192164 October 12, 2011)
Posted by Jay Claver Ariño at 6:33 AM

NEYPES v. COURT OF APPEALS: A Critical Analysis

MANUEL R. RIGUERA

Professor of Law, Far Eastern University, University of Perpetual Help-Dalta,

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasay, and Philippine Christian University. Bar Reviewer,
Jurists Bar Review Center.

In its en banc decision in Neypes v. CA, G.R. 141524, 14 September 2005, the
Supreme Court held that if a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order in a
civil case is filed and the same is denied, the movant has a fresh 15-day period within
which to file the notice of appeal. This comment seeks to examine the decision as well
as to take into account its ramifications and effects on other provisions of the Rules of
Court

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However an appeal in habeas
corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) The third paragraph of the above section provides
for the effect of the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the appeal period. Unlike its
counterpart in criminal cases (Section 6, Rule 122), the above provision does not
expressly provide within what time the movant should take his appeal in case his motion
for reconsideration is denied. More specifically put, does the movant have a fresh
appeal period or does the movant only have the balance of the appeal period?

Pre-Neypes rule
Prior to Neypes, the hornbook law was that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final order interrupts the running of the reglementary period to appeal, i.e.,
upon receipt of denial of the motion, the movant would have only the balance or the
remaining period within which to take his appeal. De las Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 200; Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 145911, 7 July 2004; Apuyan v.
Haldeman, G.R. No. 129980, 20 September 2004. The pre-Neypes rule may be
illustrated by the following hypothetical problem (assume that all dates are working
days): Plaintiff filed a collection case against the Defendant before the Regional Trial
Court. The plaintiff received on April 1 a decision of the RTC dismissing his claim for
lack of merit. On April 10 the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff
received the order denying his motion for reconsideration on June 1. Until when may the
plaintiff take his appeal? Prior to Neypes, the answer would be that the plaintiff could
take his appeal until June 8. When the plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration on
June 10, he had only 6 days remaining or until June 16 within which to take his appeal.
Under Section 2 of Rule 22, “the day of the act that caused the interruption shall be
excluded in the computation of the period.” Otherwise put, the day on which the motion
for reconsideration was filed forms part of the remaining period, counted from notice of
the denial thereof. Hence June 10 is excluded from the computation of the period and
added to the remaining 6 days. Thus the plaintiff has 7 remaining days or until June 8
within which to his appeal. De las Alas v. Court of Appeals, supra; JOSE Y. FERIA,
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 73 (1997).

On the same principle, if the plaintiff had filed his motion for reconsideration on the last
day or on April 16 and he receives the order denying his motion for reconsideration on
June 1, the plaintiff would have until the next day within which to take his appeal. Lloren
v. De Veyra, 4 SCRA 637 (1962).

The foregoing rule had crystallized into hornbook doctrine as evidenced by the number
of cases which followed it and the comments of eminent authorities on remedial law.
See JOSE Y. FERIA, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 73 (1997); 1
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 192-94 (7th rev. ed., 3rd
printing, 1999). It was applied as recently as the 16 May 2005 case of Fernandez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, just four months prior to the promulgation of
Neypes.

In Fernandez, the petitioner had received a copy of the adverse decision of the RTC on
28 June 1994. On 12 July 1994 or 14 days after receipt of the decision, the petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner received a copy of the order denying
his motion for reconsideration on 29 November 1994 and on 9 December 1994 he filed
a motion for new trial. The Supreme Court held that the judgment had become final and
unappealable since the petitioner only had 2 days or until 2 December 1994 (30
November being a holiday) within which to file a motion for new trial. It should be
remembered that under Section 1 of Rule 38, a motion for new trial may be filed “[w]ithin
the period for taking an appeal.” Clearly implicit from the ruling therefore is that appeal
could have been taken only until 2 December 1994.

Then on 14 September 2005, like a thunderbolt from a clear sky, came the en banc
decision of the Supreme Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

Summary of the case

The pertinent facts of Neypes are as follows: The petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court an action for annulment of title and reconveyance against the private
respondents. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription. The trial court issued an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case. The petitioners received a copy of the dismissal order on 3 March 1998 and on
the 15th day thereafter or on 18 March 1998 they filed a motion for reconsideration. The
trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order which was received by
petitioners on 22 July 1998. On 27 July 1998, the petitioners filed with the trial court a
notice of appeal. The trial court denied the notice of appeal stating that petitioners only
had up to 23 July 1998 within which to file the notice of appeal. The petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied. Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari and mandamus assailing the trial court’s dismissal order. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence the petitioners went to the Supreme
Court on a petition for review on certiorari. The issue was whether the petitioners’ notice
of appeal was filed on time.
The Supreme Court held that the notice of appeal was filed in due time. It cited Section
1, Rule 41, which states that “[a]n appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order.”
The high court held that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is a final order as
it finally disposes of the case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or”
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in
the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Thus in respect of the hypothetical problem earlier given, and taking into account the
Neypes ruling, the answer would be June 16 and not June 8.
The Supreme Court invoked its plenary power to “[p]romulgate rules concerning …
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts” in laying down the “fresh period rule.”
The high court cited the need to standardize the various appeal periods and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. The Supreme Court also held that
henceforth the “fresh period rule” applies not only to Rule 41 but also to Rule 40 (appeal
from MTC to RTC), Rule 42 (petition for review from RTC to CA), Rule 43 (appeal from
quasi-judicial bodies to the CA), and Rule 45 (appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The Neypes statement that the “fresh period rule” would henceforth apply not only to
Rules 40 and 41 but also to Rules 42, 43, and 45 is not altogether precise. Even prior to
and independently of Neypes, specific provisions in Rule 42 (Section 1), Rule 43
(Section 4), and Rule 45 (Section 2) already provided that the 15-day period is
computed from the receipt of the judgment or final order or from receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration. Hence Neypes brought nothing to the table in
respect of Rules 42, 43, and 45.

Critical analysis
The holding in Neypes flies in the face of the explicit provisions of Section 1(a), Rule 41,
which states that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, and Section 9, Rule 37 which provides that “[a]n order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal
from the judgment or final order.” Section 3 of Rule 41 in lucid terms provides for the
effect of a motion for reconsideration: “The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.” The word “interrupt” means to “break the
continuity of.” Oxford American Dictionary (1980). It is synonymous with “suspend”
which means “to discontinue temporarily, but with an expectation or purpose of
resumption.” Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged 5th ed., 1983). As the word is used in the
Rules of Court provisions on appeal, it means the same as to “toll,” or to “suspend.” This
is discernible from Section 2 of Rule 22.

SEC. 2. Effect of interruption. - - Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the
running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on
the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.
The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded. (n) It is also evident
from a reading of Section 3 of Rule 41, in conjunction with Section 1(a) of Rule 41 and
Section 9 of Rule 37, that the filing of the motion for reconsideration does not obliterate
the appeal period which had already lapsed but merely discontinues its running. Hence
upon the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the movant only
has the balance or the remaining period.

The Neypes holding cannot be reconciled with Sections 1(a) and 3 of Rule 41 and
Section 9 of Rule 37. There is thus a cogent need for the amendment of these
provisions in order to bring them in line with the Neypes ruling and avoid confusion and
misapprehension.
Inconsistency with Section 6, Rule 122 The Neypes ruling also results in a lack of
harmony or inconsistency between the pertinent rule in civil cases and criminal cases.
Under Section 6 of Rule 122 providing for the rule in ordinary appeal in criminal cases,
an accused who files a motion for reconsideration of a judgment in a criminal case
which is later denied only has the balance of the period within which to take his appeal.
SEC. 6. When appeal taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served
upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
(6a) The Neypes rule has led to a somewhat anomalous situation wherein a defendant
in a civil case has a better right of appeal than the accused in a criminal case. Justice
Jose Sabio in his work on Criminal Procedure opined that the rule in Neypes should
also be applied to criminal cases. Neypes however did not expressly extend its
application to Rule 122. In the absence of a definite pronouncement from the Supreme
Court, it would appear that a trial judge has no choice but to apply the clear provisions
of Section 6 of Rule 122. Applicability to appeals requiring a record on appeal While
Neypes provided for a “fresh” 15-day rule, it is not altogether clear if a “fresh” 30-day
period is also provided for in appeals where a record on appeal is required. It is
submitted that the ruling should also be extended to such cases. There appears to be
no valid reason to distinguish between an appeal taken by mere notice of appeal from
one taken by a record on appeal. In fact the reason for the Neypes ruling would find
greater force considering the difficulty and greater time needed in preparing a record on
appeal.

Outline of application of Neypes rule In light of the Neypes, the rules regarding its
application may be outlined below:
The following are the instances where the Neypes rule applies:
1. Rule 40.
2. Rule 41.
3. Rule 42.
4. Rule 43.
5. Rule 45.
On the other hand, the following cases are not covered by the Neypes rule:
1. Rule 122, Section 6, on ordinary appeal in criminal cases. However, if the appeal
would be under Rules 42, 43, and 45, the Neypes rule would apply.
2. Rule 64, Section 3. In a petition to review the judgment of the COMELEC or the COA,
the petitioner has 30 days from receipt of the judgment or final order to file the petition
for review. If a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the movant has
only the remaining period but not less than 5 days within which to file the petition.

Proposals/Proposed amendments to the Rules

The writer humbly proposes the following modifications or amendments to the Rules of
Court. This is in line with the avowed purpose of Neypes to standardize the appeal
periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. Further, the
amendments would also avoid any misapprehension or confusion on the part of litigants
and lawyers. First. Section 2, Rule 40, and Section 3, Rule 41, should be amended to
make it clear that the appeal period is counted from the receipt of the judgment or final
order or of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, if one was filed.

Second. Section 6 of Rule 122 should be similarly amended. This will synchronize the
rule on appeal in civil and criminal cases and avoid the somewhat unfair situation of an
accused in a criminal case having a lesser period to appeal than a defendant in a civil
case. Section 3 of Rule 64 should also be amended in like manner. This will harmonize
Rule 64 with Rule 65, which after all are both considered as special civil actions for
certiorari under the Rules.

Finally Section 9 of Rule 37 and Section 1(a) of Rule 41 should be deleted. The two
provisions have become obsolete in the light of the “fresh period rule” laid down in
Neypes.