Alex Nemec

Metaphysics [W0W22a]

Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer

Approaches to Mind and Soul: Materialist Objections

Contents
Introduction...............................................................................................................................3
Hylomorphism.......................................................................................................................3
Cartesian Dualism.................................................................................................................4
Panpsychism..........................................................................................................................5
Materialism............................................................................................................................5
Discussion...............................................................................................................................6
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................8
Bibliography..............................................................................................................................9
Introduction

Within the tradition of philosophy and metaphysics, there are perhaps no more two important
concepts than those of ‘mind’ and ‘soul’. It seems that no matter the time nor space,
geographical location, or cultural background, humans are almost naturally led toward their
consideration. Over the course of human history, people have accumulated vast amounts of
rich literature concerning the discussion of mind and soul and their seemingly intricate
relationship. From Plato and Aristotle, through Aquinas and Descartes, to Nietzsche and
Schopenhauer, this discussion has stimulated the great minds of the history of philosophy and
led to the creation of numerous schools of thought, defined by their answers to fundamental
questions concerning the concepts. Some hold that minds are the defining part of the human
soul—in other words, they are what makes us human—but do not deny the souls of animals or
plants. Then some argue that only minds can be considered souls and thus reject the souls of
entities other than humans. And finally, there are those to whom I belong, who argue that we
should get rid of such ancient terminology and begin to consider the topic through modern
scientific language and methods. Without a doubt, this complexity of the discussion has
contributed to the general confusion that surrounds the topic, with soul and mind being
perhaps the least clear parts of it. Thus, in this work, I limit the scope to what I consider the
four main schools of thought when it comes to the discussion of soul and mind—
hylomorphism, Cartesian dualism, panpsychism, and materialism. I do this to show their
advantages, along with what I consider their fatal shortcomings. Consequently, after this
introduction, the body of this work is divided into five parts. In the first four, I deal with the
mentioned schools of thought. In the fifth I dedicate to an extensive discussion concerning the
positives and the negatives of each of them, finishing it off with arguments of my own as to
why I prefer materialism. This is then followed by a short conclusion to the paper.

Hylomorphism
This tradition begins with Aristotle who attributes the soul to all organic matter—that is to say
to plants, animals, and human beings.1For Aristotle soul constitutes the form of the living
object, or in other words, making it essentially what it is. At the same time, the soul is what
gives the object life—it is the actuality within the potential matter. But of course, Aristotle, a
man who is often credited with the title of the father of natural science as such, had good
1
I like the explanation of W. A. Hammond, who in his introduction to Aristotle’s Psychology: A treatise on the
principle of life writes: “In other words, it is to all organic bodies that Aristotle applies the term; to him, the word
‘soul’ is synonymous with the word ‘life’ (1902, p. xv).
reasons to believe this. Even though today we might be sceptical when somebody mentions
the word essence, in Aristotle’s view it was much more tied to the empirical. Consider for
example a tiger. When a female tiger is pregnant, we know that the offspring will also always
be a tiger. The same goes for any plant or animal, humans included. It seems to be somewhat
of a natural law. Pregnancy would be much more terrifying if there was some chance that
instead of a human child, the woman would suddenly give birth to an elephant. Thus, the soul
in Aristotle essentially distinguishes one kind of organic life from another, while at the same
time, it also distinguishes each member of any given species from one another.

Now, with that said, it is time to come back to the original question, this being the relationship
between mind and soul. Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of souls,2 but the only one
of interest here is the rational kind. Aristotle believed that reason must be a quality of souls,
and not of bodies. He wrote: “It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that reason itself is mixed
with the body. For in that case it would have certain qualitative distinctions such as warm or
cold, or it would be a sort of instrument, like a sense-organ. But in point of fact it is nothing of
the kind”.3 Consequently, reason is immaterial, somehow detached, or, at the very least not
mixed with the body. This is important because Aristotle uses mind, reason, and intellect
almost interchangeably.4 Thus, within the hylomorphic tradition, mind becomes a part of the
soul.

Cartesian Dualism
Sometimes also referred to as ‘substance dualism’, this philosophical doctrine was made
famous by Descartes, and it focuses on completely separating the mind and the body from
each other. Famously, Descartes began doubting everything in the world to see what was truly
substantial. He found that everything physical can be doubted and thus concluded that it is not
real. This led him to say that it must be the mental, the thinking that he cannot doubt, for he
cannot doubt that he thinks. Thus, the famous “Cogito ergo Sum (I think, therefore I am)”.5
For Descartes too, mind and soul can be treated as synonyms,6 immaterial and outside of the
physical body. However, for Descartes, the challenge is to explain the causal relationship
2
The others being vegetative (plants) and sensitive (animals).
3
Aristotle, Aristotle’s Psychology: A Treatise on the Principle of Life, trans. William Alexander Hammond
(London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1902, 429a 4).
4
Christopher Shields, “Aristotle’s Psychology,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/#:~:text=7.-., Mind, para.1.)
5
René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies, trans. John
Cottingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
6
Justin Skirry, “Descartes, Rene: Mind-Body Distinction | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d., https://iep.utm.edu/rene-descartes-mind-body-distinction-dualism/#:~:text=On
%20the%20one%20hand%2C%20Descartes., Why a Real Distinction?, para. 1.)
between the mind and the body, since nothing immaterial can influence that which is material.
His answer to this problem is the pineal gland, an organ within the brain where he thought the
interaction takes place. But of course, thanks to contemporary biology and medicine, today
we know that this idea is utter nonsense.

Panpsychism
As the name suggests, where "pan" stands for "all" and "psyche" for "mind" or "soul",
panpsychism is a theory that claims that everything is conscious and thus alive to a greater or
lesser extent. Perhaps the best-known panpsychism theory is that of Leibniz, for which he
argued in his Monadology. According to Leibniz, everything that is is composed of monads.
Monads are indivisible units of reality that are immaterial and cannot causally interact with
one another. Furthermore, there are four kinds of monads,7 and they are differentiated by their
levels of perception and appetition. The reality as we perceive it is then an appearance, where
the observed causal interactions do not really take place but are provided by God because he
has introduced preestablished harmony into things. As far as mind and soul are concerned, for
panpsychism, literally everything is mind and soul.

Materialism
And finally, we come to the last theory of mind and soul, it being materialism. As the name
suggests, the emphasis is placed on the material aspect of reality, or rather, it is argued that
everything is material and thus caused by material causes. This also holds for minds and
consciousness, where materialists point to underlying physiological causes to explain the
phenomena. Consequently, materialists do not give much thought to the souls as understood
by theologians or any of the before-mentioned schools of thought. Since everything is
material, for a soul to exist it would have to be present physically within the body; thus the
failure to identify the soul through such means leads to its rejection.

7
Bare monads (everything else), soul monads (animals), mind/spirit monads (human beings), and the Supreme
monad (God).
Discussion
So, as I have already hinted at in the introduction, my philosophical outlook is leaning
towards materialism. But to clarify my position, let us first go over each of the schools of
thought to see where I see the strengths and weaknesses of each of the positions. When it
comes to Aristotelean hylomorphism, I think that this would be the soundest theory out of all
of these. It is firmly rooted within one of the largest philosophical systems in the history of
philosophy, with an aim to be scientific and also to respond to human intuitions. As far as its
explanatory value is concerned, it does really well at delivering answers to problems of mind
and soul, such as, ‘What makes us human?’, ‘How are we different from animals?’, or ‘How
do we explain man as a part of nature but also above it?’. In this way, our intuitions are
satisfied and we remain within reach of the metaphysical comfort that makes our existence
secure. After all, according to hylomorphism, our souls are something higher than the souls of
mere animals and they are not mixed within the physical body, thus being securely out of the
way of diseases and injuries.

However, just like I admire the position for the metaphysical comfort it can provide while
keeping in touch with science, I also have to say that I cannot see how it can do all of this. In
my point of view, the idea that reason/mind is somehow part of the soul and thus not present
within the body seems unintelligible. It then almost makes it seem like the Cartesian problem
of how the immaterial can influence the material, and Aristotle’s “soul is the form” answer is
not enough for me. As I see it, it comes from the idea that there has to be something that
makes the life form exactly that specific life form, and that something is the essence.
However, I do not think this inductive argument is enough to justify this point of view to the
extent that it becomes necessarily true. For all we know, there is not much that makes us who
we are—mere contingency or chance—after all, we constantly hear from scientists about how
we share most of our genetic makeup with other species of primates. Thus, my second
problem with hylomorphism is exactly this—I suspect that it makes a greater deal out of
differences between species than there are.

Now, moving on to Cartesian dualism. I think there is very little one can say in terms of its
positives. It seems to me that the best it can do is to provide metaphysical comfort stronger
than that of hylomorphism since it takes the soul/mind to be the only real substance. I suppose
it also can support the intuitions of some religious people who believe in the ‘ghost’ kind of
soul which resides in the body and makes it do what it does.
Cartesian dualism is certainly a theory where the negatives outweigh the positives. First of all,
the way how one concludes that they are only a soul is quite incoherent. Let us imagine that
we are Descartes in his room in France during the 17th century, thinking really hard about how
everything physical can be doubted, yet not doubting the wood in the firewood that keeps us
warm or the food and water that keeps us alive. For all I know, nobody can truly live as a
substance dualist—it would simply result in death. Another problem is logic, where to doubt
something means at the same time that there are things we do not doubt. Thus, nobody can
truly doubt everything—at best they can falsely think that they do. For one to doubt
everything would mean to doubt the doubt itself, which is obviously incoherent. And the final
problem I wish to mention is the implications Descartes’ theory has for animals and animal
rights. According to Descartes, only humans possess souls and can think, leaving animal
minds in the realm of doubtable and thus the possibility that they are only machines that are
programmed to make sounds. Not only is the entire argument based on a faulty logical
foundation, but also it goes against common intuition when it comes to the position of the
animals in the world.

On the other hand, I see panpsychism8 as a positive alternative to Cartesian dualism, since just
like the latter, it goes on to assert that reality is immaterial, however, it sees life everywhere. I
think it is a sound theory, which can both satisfy our intuitions about the world and provide
metaphysical comfort in something higher. Additionally, it leaves space for science and free
agency, both of which make it a very thorough and appealing theory.

However, I cannot quite fully stay content with it. First, I am not convinced by the
panpsychist explanation of material interactions. It does not seem sufficient to say that
everything that appears to be happening was set up by God at the very beginning and now it is
basically playing out. I can understand it making sense, but I simply do not see the reasons for
such a belief. It seems to me to be an inductive argument based on the wonder of how
everything in the universe seemingly magically makes sense and how the natural laws are so
fine-tuned that life could emerge. But it is just as intelligible of an argument that the way how
the universe works only makes sense because it simply has to—there is no other way how it
could be for there to be something. And second, I have an issue with Leibniz’s immaterial
reality argument. I simply do not see why, no matter whether it makes sense, one should
accept such a proposition, upon something else than belief. I think that the basic argument,

8
Here I am referring mostly to Leibniz’s Monadology
that material things are divisible so there must be something indivisible and thus immaterial,
cannot hold up to a sceptical doubt of its basic premise.

Now, I believe that from my treatment of these schools of thought it is becoming quite
obvious as to what my position in this discussion is. I think that there are all reasons to treat
the physical reality as the reality that really matters, and the one which gives rise to whatever
we call the mind. The rejection of the immaterial and thus also of the soul is I think more than
well justified. Even in its more subtle forms, such as that of hylomorphism, I do not see one
reason to uphold the theories over material causes. A lot of people would argue that one of the
greatest flaws of materialism is its incapability to explain mental states or emotions, which, in
the above-mentioned theories would reside in the immaterial. But my answer to these
objections is that I think that there is no real problem to describe mental states or other minds
or emotions by means of materialism; the answers are just too uncomfortable and not
metaphysically satisfying. To describe the way how we feel in a certain moment, often it is
enough to point to a lack of a certain kind of chemicals and we can quite reliably identify
issues and relate them to one another. We constantly identify physical causes that influence
our mind—when we do not eat we get irritated and tired, when we drink alcohol we get dizzy
and slow, when we do not have oxygen, we experience some kind of hallucinations and
slowly die. But I think that among the physical causes, it should also be included in our social
dimension, the way how we interact with our friends and family, and our love life. Arguably,
we do not yet know enough to answer some fundamental questions such as those concerning
consciousness. However, I do not see any reason to believe that the answer lies anywhere
beyond the scope of materialism.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have treated the question of mind and soul within four different philosophical
traditions. I have begun with four rather short descriptions of hylomorphism, Cartesian
dualism, panpsychism, and materialism. Then I proceeded to the discussion where I treated
each on its own, considering their pros and cons in terms of being convincing, explanatory
value, and metaphysical comfort. I ended the discussion by tying my position with
materialism, where I argued for the position at length, making it explicit that I appreciate the
position for its massive explanatory value, while also arguing against certain possible
objections.
Bibliography

Aristotle. 1902. Aristotle’s Psychology: A Treatise on the Principle of Life. Translated by

William Alexander Hammond. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.
Leibniz, Gottried Wilhelm, and Nicholas Rescher. 2015. G.W. Leibniz’s Monadology : An
Edition for Students. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
René Descartes. 2008. Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections
and Replies. Translated by John Cottingham. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shields, Christopher. 2020. “Aristotle’s Psychology.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2020.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/#:~:text=7.-.
Skirry, Justin. n.d. “Descartes, Rene: Mind-Body Distinction | Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/rene-descartes-
mind-body-distinction-dualism/#:~:text=On%20the%20one%20hand%2C
%20Descartes.