Joint Inspection Group Operations Bulletin

Bulletin No. 1 June 2004

Aircraft Fuel Adaptors

During the fuelling of an Aircraft at an International Airport in September 2001, a Hydrant
Servicer fuelling hose separated from the Aircraft resulting in a spillage, a fire and a fatality. The
investigation into the causes of this serious incident found that the three attachment lugs on the
Aircraft fuel adaptor had failed during the incident.

In August 2003 at another International Airport, a Hydrant Servicer fuelling hose separated from
the Aircraft during fuelling resulting in a small spillage. All three attachment lugs on the Aircraft
fuel adaptor flange had broken off due to a downward force, possibly resulting from a fuel
pressure surge.

Investigations into these and several other incidents have led some fuel suppliers to issue
Technical Bulletins and revised fuelling procedures. The purpose of issuing this JIG Safety
Bulletin is to clarify and update the recommended JIG procedures that are applicable to under-
wing pressure fuelling of all aircraft types.

Fuelling Procedures – Aircraft Fuel Adaptor Condition Check

In addition to the aircraft fuelling procedures detailed in section 6.5 of the JIG Guidelines for Into-Plane
Fuelling Services, the following action shall be taken:

Immediately prior to connection of the fuelling vehicle coupling, the aircraft fuel adaptor shall be
checked to ensure that it appears to be in good condition with no missing or damaged lugs and
no signs of contamination. No connection shall be made to an adaptor with a missing lug.

Adaptors with cracks or showing signs of significant wear should be brought to the attention of
the airline representative and fuelling should not proceed until the representative has confirmed
that the adaptor condition is acceptable.

After connection and before commencing fuel flow, rotate nozzle handle to the locked position and
open poppet actuation lever. Check that the connection to the aircraft adaptor is secure by
attempting to remove the nozzle with the nozzle handle in the locked position.

On commencement of fuel flow the nozzle to aircraft adaptor connections should be checked to ensure
that there are no leaks.

At the end of each fuelling operation the aircraft fuel adaptors should be checked again to ensure that
there are no obvious signs of damage, contamination or missing lugs. Any damage found should be
brought to the attention of the airline representative. It is the airline’s responsibility to ensure that aircraft
fuel adaptors are in good condition and to take appropriate action when damage is reported.

An example of a badly worn adaptor is shown below.

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Bulletin No. 1 June 2004

An example of a badly worn adaptor – note rounded edges to slots.

(Image courtesy of Warner Lewis)

Fuelling Procedures using vehicle deck hoses

One possible cause of damage to aircraft fuel adaptor lugs is downward pressure resulting from a deck
hose becoming taut when lowering the fuelling platform. Adaptors can also be damaged by sideways
pressure.

When positioning the fuelling vehicle, care shall be taken to ensure that the aircraft fuelling point
is directly above the fuelling platform.

Section 6.2.2(e) of Guidelines requires that deck hoses be connected without exerting any
sideways pressure on the aircraft fuel adaptors. Once connected, hoses should hang freely and
vertically from the fuelling point.

Section 6.5.1(g) of Guidelines requires that where access to the aircraft fuelling point is from a
vehicle platform, it shall not be raised or lowered whilst fuel is flowing and, whenever possible,
the operator should control the fuelling from ground level and not from the fuelling platform.

Investigations into the two incidents referred to in this bulletin have indicated that in the first
incident the vehicle may have been positioned incorrectly, allowing the hose to drape outside the
fuelling platform and become trapped as the platform was lowered. In the second incident, poor
positioning and the use of a fuelling vehicle with hoses that were barely long enough to reach
the aircraft when the platform was fully lowered may have contributed to the incident. No single
cause has been proven for either incident.

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Bulletin No. 1 June 2004

APPLICATION

The procedures outlined in this Safety Bulletin shall be implemented with immediate effect. Any
necessary changes to the Joint Guidelines will be included in issue 10.

This document is intended for the guidance of Members of the Joint Inspection Group (JIG) and
companies affiliated with Members of JIG, and does not preclude the use of any other operating
procedures, equipment or inspection procedures. Neither JIG, its Members, the companies affiliated
with its Members nor the International Air Transport Association (IATA) accepts responsibility for the
adoption of this document or compliance with this document. Any party using this document in any way
shall do so at its own risk.

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