PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Offshore Temporary Refuges

PTS 11.20.01
August 2014

© 2014 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form
or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright
owner. PETRONAS Technical Standards are Company’s internal standards and meant for authorized users only.
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FOREWORD

PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) has been developed based on the accumulated knowledge,
experience and best practices of the PETRONAS group supplementing National and International
standards where appropriate. The key objective of PTS is to ensure standard technical practice across
the PETRONAS group.

Compliance to PTS is compulsory for PETRONAS-operated facilities and Joint Ventures (JVs) where
PETRONAS has more than fifty percent (50%) shareholding and/or operational control, and includes
all phases of work activities.

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Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers who use PTS are solely responsible in ensuring the quality of

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work, goods and services meet the required design and engineering standards. In the case where
specific requirements are not covered in the PTS, it is the responsibility of the

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Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers to propose other proven or internationally established
standards or practices of the same level of quality and integrity as reflected in the PTS.

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In issuing and making the PTS available, PETRONAS is not making any warranty on the accuracy or
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completeness of the information contained in PTS. The Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers shall
ensure accuracy and completeness of the PTS used for the intended design and engineering
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requirement and shall inform the Owner for any conflicting requirement with other international
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codes and technical standards before start of any work.

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PETRONAS is the sole copyright holder of PTS. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, recording or
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otherwise) or be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever, without the prior written
consent of PETRONAS.
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The PTS shall be used exclusively for the authorised purpose. The users shall arrange for PTS to be
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kept in safe custody and shall ensure its secrecy is maintained and provide satisfactory information to
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PETRONAS that this requirement is met.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Please be informed that the entire PTS inventory is currently undergoing transformation exercise from
2013 - 2015 which includes revision to numbering system, format and content. As part of this change,
the PTS numbering system has been revised to 6-digit numbers and drawings, forms and requisition
to 7-digit numbers. All newly revised PTS will adopt this new numbering system, and where required
make reference to other PTS in its revised numbering to ensure consistency. Users are requested to
refer to PTS 00.01.01 (Index to PTS) for mapping between old and revised PTS numbers for clarity. For
further inquiries, contact PTS administrator at ptshelpdesk@petronas.com.my

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Table Of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 6
1.1 SCOPE ............................................................................................................................ 6
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS..................................................................................................... 6
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES ............................................................................................... 9
2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................... 10
2.1 OBJECTIVES .................................................................................................................. 10

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2.2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................... 10

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2.3 BASIS OF DESIGN ......................................................................................................... 10

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3.0 TR CONFIGURATION ............................................................................................ 11

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3.1 PRIMARY TR CONCEPTS ............................................................................................... 11

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3.2 SECONDARY TR CONCEPTS .......................................................................................... 11
3.3 CAPACITY ..................................................................................................................... 12
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3.4 MUSTER SPACE ............................................................................................................ 12
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3.5 STAND ALONE/ INTEGRATED MONITORING ............................................................... 12

4.0 SYSTEMS ............................................................................................................. 13
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4.1 LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM ................................................................................................. 13

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4.2 STRUCTURAL SUPPORT SYSTEM .................................................................................. 13

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4.3 COMMAND SUPPORT SYSTEM .................................................................................... 14

4.4 ESCAPE AND EVACUATION SYSTEM ............................................................................ 14
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5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................ 18

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5.1 CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR INTEGRITY ..................................................................... 18

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5.2 ENDURANCE PERIOD ................................................................................................... 22

6.0 DESIGN PROCESS/TOOLS ..................................................................................... 25
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6.1 HAZARDS AND EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS ...................................................... 25

6.2 HUMAN FACTORS ........................................................................................................ 25
7.0 FACILITIES ........................................................................................................... 26
7.1 FACILITY PROVISION .................................................................................................... 26
7.2 EQUIPMENT FOR SURVIVAL, EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MEDICAL ........................ 26
7.3 SIGNS ........................................................................................................................... 27
7.4 ENTRANCES AND EXITS ................................................................................................ 27
7.5 WINDOWS (ENCLOSED TRS) ........................................................................................ 29
7.6 EMERGENCY POWER AND LIGHTING .......................................................................... 29
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7.7 COMMUNICATIONS ..................................................................................................... 30

7.8 HVAC ............................................................................................................................ 31
7.9 MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION .................................................................................. 31
8.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 32

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This PTS specifies requirements of the systems and subsystems which comprise the
Temporary Refuge (TR) and the associated means of escape and evacuation, their acceptance
criteria and provides the guidance and recommendations for the design and performance of
TR.

This PTS provides additional information over and above the available International standards
and guidance on TRs and the associated emergency response facilities; namely ISO 13702 and
ISO 15544.

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1.1 SCOPE

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1.1.1 This PTS is intended for use in all new and existing manned/not normally manned offshore oil

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and gas exploration and production facilities in Malaysian waters.

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1.1.2 For international waters, standard used is as per local rules and regulations applies.

1.1.3
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This standard is applicable to both fixed and mobile offshore facilities.
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1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1.2.1 General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations
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Refer to PTS Requirements, General Definition of Terms, Abbreviations & Reading Guide PTS
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00.01.03 for General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations.

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1.2.2 Specific Definition of Terms

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No Terms Definition
1 Acceptance criteria Measurement indicatiors to ensure any specific
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requirements are meeting its objective.

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2 Command structure Provided as an emergency controller.

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3 Complex An offshore installation comprises of series of two

or more bridge-linked
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4 Control point Provide facility for monitoring as well as main

5 Embarkation area
6 Emergency control point
communication functions during emergency.
7 Endurance period
8 Escape route
9 Evacuation route
installation control
Evacuation area
Provide control, monitoring, coordination and
Time period of which relevant conditions of
integrity shall be maintained.
Path from installation area to a muster area, TR,
embarkation area or means of escape to sea.
An escape route used for primary or secondary
evacuation from the installation to an embarkation
area
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No Terms Definition
10 Installation Fixed or mobile facility involved in offshore oil and
gas exploration or production activities.
11 Living quarters Permanently enclosed spaces e.g. cabins, dining
rooms, galleys, recreation rooms, sick-bay, offices,
change rooms, ablution areas and similar spaces
used for the accommodation and welfare of
personnel on board.
12 Manned/Not normally Manned – An installation on which people are

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manned/Unmanned routinely accommodated.

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installation Not Normally Manned – An installation which are

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connected by bridge to manned installation.
Unmanned – An installation where the people are

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not accommodated.

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13 Muster area Gathering point where personnel gather in
response to a plant/facility safety alarm,
instructions or a change in the installation safety
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status.
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14 Offshore installation manager Person in charge of an offshore installation.

15 Persons on board Total number of personnel on board at one time.
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16 Temporary refuge A place where personnel will be sufficiently

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protected from significant hazards while on board

due to major incident, and from where
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communications, monitoring and control

equipment is easily accessible toensure their
personal safety, and from where, if necessary, safe
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and complete evacuation can be effected.

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Table 1: Specific Definition of Terms

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1.2.3 Specific Abbreviations

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No Abbreviation Description

1 ACGIH American Conference of Governmental

Industrial Hygienists

2 AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Level

3 AIDA Air Infiltration Development Algorithm (model)

4 ALARP As low as reasonably practicable

5 BOP Blowout preventer

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No Abbreviation Description

6 CHIC Combustion Hazards in Compartments (model)

7 ECP Emergency control point

8 EER Escape, Evacuation and Rescue

9 ERPt Emergency radio point

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10 ESD Emergency shutdown

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11 HVAC Heating, ventilation and air conditioning

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12 HEMP Hazard and effects management process

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13 ICRP International committee for radiation
protection
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14 IDLH Immediately dangerous to life or health
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15 IMO International Maritime Organisation

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16 IRPA Individual risk per annum

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17 LED Light emitting diode

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18 LFL Lower flammable limit

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19 NFPA National Fire Protection Association

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20 OIM Offshore installation manager

21 POB Persons on board

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22 QRA Quantitative risk assessment

23 RPE Respiratory protective equipment

24 SPS Surface process shutdown

25 STP Standard temperature and pressure

26 STEL Short term exposure limit

27 TEMPSC Totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft

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No Abbreviation Description

28 TPS Total platform shutdown

29 TR Temporary refuge

30 WHO World Health Organisation

Table 2: Specific Abbreviations

1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES

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This PTS 11.20.01 replaces PTS 37.17.10.11 (December, 2011).

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2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 OBJECTIVES
2.1.1 The main purpose of the TR is to serve as a temporary muster point with protection against
fire, heat and explosions for a short period, until the platform can be safely evacuated. This
can be provided by partially enclosing the TR or by locating the TR away from the
consequences of possible hazardous events.
2.1.2 All offshore installations shall have at least one place designated as the TR. The TR shall have
the sufficient capacity to protect the maximum persons on board (POB) the installation.
2.1.3 The TR may be an enclosure, multiple enclosures, or only an area on open deck. However, for

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small platforms, a TR need not be integrated with the living quarters and need not be

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enclosed.

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2.1.4 During the period required for the evacuation process to be completed, the TR is required to
maintain the safety of personnel. This period includes the following times and activities:

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i. time required to complete the full muster at the TR;
ii.
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time required to account for personnel not reporting to their assigned muster
stations;
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iii. time required to evaluate the situation and make decisions;
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iv. time required to initiate responses to minimize the consequences and control the
emergency, if possible;
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v. time required to complete the evacuation (if required). This may be done in a phased
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manner, initially evacuating non-essential personnel; and

vi. contingency time required to allow for the unforeseen.
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2.2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

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The TR main function is to provide a location where the total POB can be mustered without
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unnecessary risk. The location should have proper access to the communications, monitoring
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and control equipment required to ensure their personal safety and safe evacuation can be
conducted. The functions are to secure means of escape to the TR and to provide a complete
evacuation from the TR.
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2.3 BASIS OF DESIGN

2.3.1 In order to meet the objectives and acceptance criteria, the measures required are installation
specific. This shall cover the range of major applicable incident scenarios. To identify and
manage the range of major incident scenarios, reference is made to the HEMP. The
acceptance criteria categories are defined as below:
i. The conditions required for integrity within documented optimal design;
ii. The period of time during which the conditions required for integrity shall be
maintained (Endurance Period)
2.3.2 Should HEMP Analysis indicate possible significant risk to offshore installation integrity and
passive means are not sufficient as improvement, protection of the TR and escape and
evacuation routes using active protection systems should then be considered.
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3.0 TR CONFIGURATION

The TR configuration concepts depend on installation and potential incident hazard scenarios.
The TR system may need to be distributed across several locations, as a result of HEMP
analysis. The primary TR shall be identified as one location to provide all main command
support functions, while the other locations shall form secondary TRs.

The following principles should be integrated in the design of a TR for a large installation:
i. Single location providing protection from process events, helicopter accidents
and falling structures such as derricks and flare towers

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ii. Minimal door openings to provide access for large numbers of personnel through

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air locks

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iii. Secure communication, command and control facilities of which assessment of
the event is possible without exposing personnel or opening doors

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iv. Adequate space for mustering, donning appropriate PPE and making way quickly
to the means of evacuation and treating casualties
v. Protected evacuation routes and systems
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3.1 PRIMARY TR CONCEPTS
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Though this concept is not exhaustive, on the manned installations,

Living
because of the compatibility between several of their respective
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quarters as TR
functions, all or part of the living quarters may provide the TR.
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Incident This concept is appropriate on floating installations where the planned

dependent response to loss of buoyancy may be different from that adopted in other
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variable TR circumstances. However, it should be avoided unless essential.

When installations are temporary linked (e.g. barges) in joint operations,
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Joint it is acceptable and may be necessary to have different TR configurations.

operations All likely modes of operation should be identified and assessed in the
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planning phase.
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3.2 SECONDARY TR CONCEPTS

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3.2.1 A secondary TR may be established, if it is demonstrated by HEMP that escape to the primary
TR may not be possible from a particular area. This is also referred to as a Protected Muster
Point (PMP). It should be subordinate to the main TR, with a reduced requirement for the
provision of communications, monitoring and control facilities. It shall have a secure means
of communication with the main TR and it should be possible to assess the ability to traverse
the evacuation route from the secondary TR. Secondary TRs shall have independent means of
evacuation and/or escape as determined by an EER assessment.
3.2.2 In order to avoid having to establish a secondary TR on an installation, all practical measures
e.g. steps to mitigate the effects of incidents and/or the provision of alternative escape and
evacuation routes should be taken. This would place an additional burden on TR facilities and
installation management.
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3.3 CAPACITY

Primary TR All personnel should go to the primary TR through the available access
Capacity routes. The primary TR shall have capacity for the maximum permitted POB.
The secondary TRs should not be assigned prior to any incident. For joint
operations, personnel accommodated on the mobile unit should muster at
the TR of the mobile unit.
Secondary All potentially isolated individuals from the primary TR shall be
TR Capacity accommodated by the secondary TR. This shall be derived by the EER
assessment. With consideration of the margin of error in the anticipated
numbers, the contingency shall be individually determined for each case.

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3.4 MUSTER SPACE

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3.4.1 As a guideline, an area of 1.25m2 should be provided if personnel are mustered in groups of
more than 20. This is based upon 50 percent seated and 50 percent standing, without baggage

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and allowing for cross-flows.

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3.4.2 An area of 0.8 m² per person should be provided if personnel are mustered in groups of 20 or
less, such as in multiple muster stations. This is based upon 25 percent seated and 75 percent
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standing, without significant cross-flows.
3.4.3 Heat stress, oxygen depletion and carbon dioxide build-up also affect the space requirement
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for enclosed TRs. The minimum volume of an enclosed TR is 1.4 cubic metres of air per person
per hour of TR endurance.
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3.4.4 Additionally, consideration should also be given to providing adequate space for stretcher
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cases by checking the resultant volume to confirm that there are no unintended consequences
resulting from thermal stress under external thermal loads.
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3.5 STAND ALONE/ INTEGRATED MONITORING

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3.5.1 There shall be an emergency control point (ECP) located in the primary TR, if the main
installation control point is not part of the primary TR. All the essential command support
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functions shall be available in either the ECP or the ERPt.

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3.5.2 Depending on whether they can be maintained from the main installation control point
following an incident, additional command support functions may be required in the ECP or
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the ERPt.
3.5.3 To facilitate effective management of incidents, the ECP and ERPt should be adjacent to each
other, or integrated with each other, and its command support functions should be secured
against unauthorised use.
3.5.4 To identify the major incidents by which the main installation control point may be threatened
and for which retreat to the TR may be necessary, the HEMP tools shall be used.
3.5.5 Consideration should be given to having a separate, but adjacent or nearby, space designated
as the emergency control point, if the main installation control point is part of the primary TR,
to provide the emergency response management team with a more suitable environment for
assimilating information and making complex decisions under stress than may be achievable
in the main control point.
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4.0 SYSTEMS

In order to meet primary objective of the TR, the main components of the system required
are life support, structural support, command support and escape and evacuation.

The acceptance criteria for the various systems are given in Section 5.

4.1 LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM

Function as a tool to maintain a non-hazardous environment for the personnel to ensure their
ability to take rational action.

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The life support system’s scope and extent will vary, from minimal or no specific provision
(with no environmental concern) to a purpose-designed enclosure incorporating specialist

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environmental control facilities.

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4.1.1 TR Leakage
It is essential to maintain the integrity of enclosed TRs by preventing smoke or gas ingress.

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Enclosed TR integrity is dependent on leak tightness if the HVAC system should shut down for
any reason.
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The leakage rate for new TRs should be as low as reasonably practicable.
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As for new designs, it should be possible to achieve a leakage rate of 0.1 air changes per hour
or lower whereby aximum acceptable air change rate should be stated as part of the TR
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performance standard.
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TR leakage rate can lead to a risk of rapid TR impairment if the seals around doors or
penetrations deteriorate or are damaged. In order to maintain the functionality of TR, regular
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testing and inspection should be conducted during its operating life to measure leakage rate.
If the tests show significant increase in the leakage rate above the design rate, the leak paths
shall be investigated in order to identify and repair the source of leakage.
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4.2 STRUCTURAL SUPPORT SYSTEM

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4.2.1 Components of the topsides and substructure essential for maintaining the structural integrity
of the TR and other means of escape and evacuation.
i. TR structure, inclusive of bulkheads and decks;
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ii. supporting structures, inclusive of bulkheads and decks;

iii. components providing for buoyancy, stability and station keeping (in mobile units).
4.2.2 All structures supporting escape and evacuation routes and survival craft embarkation areas
are covered as part of the escape and evacuation system.
4.2.4 Windows should not be installed facing towards the process and consideration given to
reflection and negative blast wave effects for windows on the side and back faces of any
permanent TR structure.
4.2.5 Adjacent structures which could collapse onto and significantly damage the TR or its systems,
or could obstruct escape and evacuation routes, should be assessed.
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4.3 COMMAND SUPPORT SYSTEM

Essential Loss or impairment are deemed to constitute direct loss of integrity of the
command TR, escape routes, evacuation routes or points of embarkation.
support Communications and monitoring which shall ensure that:
functions
a) sufficient quality, quantity and range of information is available to
allow necessary decisions to be taken, particularly those concerning
escape and evacuation;
b) an effective installation command structure (organisation) can be
maintained; and

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c) requests for, and communications with, outside assistance are

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possible.

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Additional Loss or impairment would not necessarily compromise the integrity of the
command TR, escape or evacuation routes, or points of embarkation but are

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support beneficial to the effective management of all incident scenarios.
functions
Secondary
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a) Means of communication with the primary TR, for the relaying of
information regarding the whereabouts and numbers of personnel
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command unable to reach the primary TR and to receive information regarding
support evacuation. This is intended to assist in accounting for personnel; and
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functions
b) Means of monitoring conditions on the designated evacuation route,
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which may be done visually.

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4.4 ESCAPE AND EVACUATION SYSTEM

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4.4.1 Evacuation and escape to sea

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Based on HEMP and/or legal requirements, the following means of evacuation and escape to
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sea should normally be provided on manned installations:

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i. Primary means of evacuation

The preferred method of installation evacuation;
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a) Bridge-link to an adjacent installation or the gangway to a mobile unit

when available.
b) Helicopter; where conditions are favourable the maximum utilisation of
the available helicopters should be pursued in any offshore evacuation.
However, helicopter availability, weather and helicopter access during
the type of incident for which a TR is required (e.g. an uncontrollable fire)
may make helicopter evacuation less reliable than the available survival
craft.
c) Survival craft; shall be distributed so that sufficient capacity for the
maximum permitted POB is readily and safely accessible from the TR
during any incident.
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If the EER analysis indicates personnel may be prevented from reaching the TR,
additional evacuation provision shall be made with consideration of
a) severe weather conditions in which the positions of certain craft may be
particularly vulnerable and further redundancy may be required;
b) reliability and availability of survival craft;
c) the evacuation of non-essential personnel first, and later evacuation of
remaining personnel if control measures fail; and
d) space for injured personnel (stretcher cases).
The required spare capacity shall be based on the results of the EER analysis,

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which as a minimum shall consider the above issues.

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ii. Secondary means of evacuation:

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Allows full control evacuation of the installation, exclusive of external assistance

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and without personnel directly entering the sea. Usually, the optimum means of
secondary evacuation is survival craft such as TEMPSC in accordance with IMO

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and other acceptable standards.
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iii. Tertiary means (for escape to sea):
Back-up systems chosen on the basis that they will ensure, so far as is reasonably
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practicable, escape from the installation without the need to enter the water
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should other evacuation arrangements fail.

A tertiary method for escape to the sea will create additional risks associated with
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immersion in water and the subsequent need for rescue.

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Life-jackets should be provided at suitable locations on the installation to

maximize the chances of survival of personnel entering the sea.
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The general principles in the provision of tertiary methods (for escape to the sea)
are:
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a) Likelihood of incident scenarios

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b) Weather conditions;
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c) Several escape locations option on the installation;

d) Easy launching life-rafts and ability to enter without the need to enter the
water in order to provide protection to personnel if the EER assessment
demonstrates these may be of benefit;
e) Easily accessible life raft
f) Effective training and procedures on tertiary methods.

The selection of tertiary method and its types, numbers and locations is based on
the likely demands derived from incident scenarios and the maximum personnel
distribution should be considere
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4.4.2 Evacuation and escape routes

Shall be as direct as possible and remain unobstructed and viable for as long as reasonably
possible. Safe use should be feasible through routing or direct protection rather than by
reliance on PPE.

The dimension should be adequate for the number of people who may be required to use
them, taking account of the maximum level of occupancy, required transfer times and casualty
treatment handling.

In general, escape routes should be greater than 1m wide and have adequate vertical
clearance. For routes which are unlikely to be used frequently (and then only by a small

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number of people), a reduction in width may be acceptable. External escape routes, escape

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routes used by personnel escaping from more than one area and evacuation routes should be

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a minimum of 1.2m wide and have 2.2m vertical clearance.
4.4.2.1 Escape routes to the TR

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To enable personnel to reach the TR following an incident on the installation a minimum of

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two routes, independent to the extent of being unlikely to be impaired by the same incident
scenario, shall be provided between each area of the installation and the TR.
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Should the two alternative escape routes appears to be impractical, an area may have a single
exit leading from it with consideration for provision of escape equipment including respiratory
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protective equipment in these areas and special access procedures should apply to such areas.
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Single exits may be acceptable from small access platforms, rooms and cabins with low
vulnerability.
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For bridge-linked installations,bridge connections should be accessible and passable under all
major incident scenarios, and/or the risk of loss of bridge integrity is acceptable, a single bridge
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may link platforms. Two routes should lead to such a bridge and, dependent on the likely
hazards, also lead from it.
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4.4.2.2 Evacuation routes from the TR

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Evacuation routes, to enable personnel to proceed from the TR to the points of embarkation
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for the purpose of platform abandonment, shall be provided by primary means and, if
applicable, secondary means.
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The evacuation routes should be sized for the maximum permitted POB with the condition of
a minimum of two evacuation routes, independent to the extent of being unlikely to be
impaired by the same incident scenario, shall be provided from the TR to each designated
point of embarkation.

4.4.2.3 Enclosed Routes

Escape and evacuation routes and points of embarkation should normally be open except for:
i. Based on justification of HEMP analysis; between the TR and survival craft
embarkation areas, where the distance is.
ii. on FPSOs and other ship-shaped installations which has an internal escape route
along the length of the installation, where either local regulations or design codes
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require it. If an enclosed route is provided, the EER analysis should indicate the
standards of performance and endurance time the system will achieve.

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5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The acceptance criteria is devided to two categories as below

i. Conditions required for integrity;
ii. Endurance period.

5.1 CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR INTEGRITY

Local regulations, mandatory guidance and industry standards acceptance criteria should be
used. The acceptance criteria that shall (PSR) be met by each of the four systems during the

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endurance period are:

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5.1.1 Life support

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Life support endurance is to be evaluated by analysing major incident scenarios.

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The life support acceptance criteria relate to potentially hazardous conditions as per PTS

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16.50.01. Any such redefinition of acceptance criteria shall be clearly substantiated.

The calculation of TR impairment times will depend on the assumptions made for the integrity
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and leakage of the TR following an incident. For TR design the anticipated wind-driven leakage
should be calculated using a model such as AIDA.
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i. Generation of smoke
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The acceptance criteria for the endurance period of the TR is as per UK HSE -
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SPC/Tech/OSD/30. Any such redefinition of acceptance criteria shall be clearly

substantiated.
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Generation of smoke/soot reduces visibility in which the absence of vision may

delay or prevent escape, mustering and evacuation. A visibility of 4 m to 5 m is
N

about the threshold of diminished performance.

O

ii. Generation of flammable gases

TR

The acceptance criteria for those gases or vapours that may be released and are
flammable at concentrations below the level at which they become an asphyxiant
PE

or toxic (e.g. methane, propane, ethane) is as per PTS 16.50.01.

iii. Generation of toxic vapours
A major by-product of production process is the toxic fumes. Hydrogen sulphide
is the most likely toxic gas to be released from hydrocarbon processes. The
acceptance criterion is that the AEGL-2 (Acute Exposure Guideline Level 2) for the
time corresponding to the defined TR endurance time should not be exceeded.
There should be provision for continuous internal monitoring of H2S
concentrations. The first alarm setting is as per PTS 14.12.07. Hence, at 10ppm
occupants of the TR will be aware that H2S is present and measures must be put
in place to ensure personnel do not take inappropriate action and that personnel
prepare for an orderly evacuation in the event that conditions deteriorate further.
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Limits have been set in the IMO FTP (Fire Test Procedure) code for hazardous
vapour generation from firewalls exposed to radiant heat.
However, the physiological response to some of these hazards suggests that lower
levels in areas where personnel may be mustered should be used.
iv. Oxygen deficiency and carbon dioxide accumulation
For an enclosed TR, if the air is entrapped for longer time, muscular coordination
disturbance occurs at an oxygen level below 17%. The acceptance criterion is
therefore a minimum internal oxygen level of 17% for 60 minutes.
At a carbon dioxide level of 20,000 ppm (2%), respiration increases. This is not

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harmful by itself, but will increase the effects of other toxins that may be present.

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The acceptance criterion for carbon dioxide accumulation is therefore a maximum

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carbon dioxide level of 20,000 ppm (2%).
v. Mixed exposure

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Personnel will be subjected to a mixture of hazards and the combined effect of
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and oxygen depletion.

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Mixed exposures of toxic gases and fumes may be additive and require careful
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assessment for their health effects, as the majority of STELs are for single
compounds or for substances containing a common entity. Medical advice should
therefore be sought for mixed exposure.
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vi. Heat stress

nt

As a screening criterion the maximum air temperature inside the TR should not
-I

exceed 70°C for 60 minutes. Norsok Z-013 provides an equation that may be used
to develop alternative times/temperatures. However at these elevated
AS

temperatures some equipment critical to command support may not function

correctly. Maximum ambient operating temperatures vary between 40°C and
60°C depending on the type of equipment: e.g. PA amplifiers, air/marine band
N

radios, F&G system processors, etc.

O

vii. Use of respiratory protective equipment (RPE)

TR

In certain circumstances (e.g. in open spaces and high H2S environments), the use
of RPE may be considered as a protection measure for personnel at the TR, and
PE

while using escape and evacuation routes.

Enclosed TRs should be designed so that RPE is not necessary while personnel are
within the TR.
5.1.2 Structural support

TR structural support should remain stable, usable and accessible condition during the
endurance period, hence, maintenance of the integrity of the supporting structure is required.

Mobile unit or floating vessel shall be able to remain on station and accessible during the
endurance period or for a sufficient time to enable all personnel to escape from the fixed
installation and muster in the TR.
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5.1.3 Command support

The acceptance criterion for command support is the availability and ability of the support
functions as described in the following table:

Essential command support functions Additional command support functions

(installation specific)
 Initiate general alarm conditions;  Person-to-person installation
 Communicate with all personnel at communications;
muster stations and embarkation areas;  Communication with land base;

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 Request outside assistance;  Communication with pipeline-

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 Two-way voice communications with a connected installations;
 Communication with gangway-

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secondary TR, for the endurance period of
the secondary TR; connected installations;

 Monitor fire, smoke and those toxic and
flammable gases which may occur, and to
monitor their propagation:
- in the TR;
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- on evacuation routes;
- at embarkation areas; and
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 Monitor fire in the major process areas,
e.g. Wellheads, gas compression, etc.;
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 Determine the physical condition of the
helideck and to detect fire, smoke and
gas in its immediate vicinity;
 Monitor and close TR boundary HVAC

- in modules and areas adjacent to the tr, fire dampers, where fitted;
 Initiate process / emergency shutdown;
nt

evacuation routes and embarkation

areas;  Close pipeline ESD valves (if not
-I

 Visually determine the physical condition integral with process / emergency

of: shutdown);
AS

- evacuation routes leading to  Operate BOPs;

embarkation areas; and
 Activate process blowdown;
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- embarkation areas;
 Monitor the running of the fire water
O

 Provision of emergency lighting though pumps.

the loss of individual luminaires will not
TR

The above additional command support

necessarily result in loss of integrity;
functions should be available on a manned
 Provision of (emergency) power e.g. from installation.
PE

batteries, for those systems necessary for

the fulfilment of essential command
support functions.

5.1.3.1 Secondary TRs

The acceptance criterion is the availability for the secondary TR endurance period of the two-
way voice communications with the main TR and its ability to monitor fire, smoke and those
gases which may occur on the designated evacuation route and visually determine the
physical condition of the designated evacuation route.
Emergency power and lighting, and any facility or system which is necessary to maintain the
integrity of the secondary TR to ensure life and structural support, shall be provided.
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5.1.4 Escape and evacuation

The conditions of integrity for escape and evacuation shall be maintained for their respective
endurance periods:
i. on at least one escape route to the TR(s);
ii. on at least one evacuation route from the TR(s) to the point of embarkation of the
primary and, as applicable, the secondary means of evacuation; and
iii. at sufficient embarkation areas, providing accessible survival craft (when
provided) with an aggregate capacity equal to or greater than the maximum
permitted POB.

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5.1.4.1 Fire

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Escape and evacuation routes and points of embarkation shall be arranged so that

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i. Personnel will not be affected by flame.
ii. Designed to remain passable by their position rather than by special protection.
iii.
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The structural integrity of escape and evacuation routes and points of
embarkation should not be considered in isolation which due regard should be
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given to the structural elements that support them.
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Fire protection should be considered to maintain the structural integrity of open walkways
and open decks which form escape and evacuation routes. Although these routes may not be
nt

passable whilst exposed to flames or radiation levels, fire protection may maintain their
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structural integrity for use after flames or radiation levels have subsided.
5.1.4.2 Thermal radiation (human exposure)
AS

There should be a recognised fire model to predict the level of thermal radiation in the fire
events. Acceptance criteria depend heavily on
N

i. time to exposure,
O

ii. clothing,
TR

iii. exposure of bare skin,

iv. and knowledge of a route to safety.
PE

For personnel with working PPE the following values are considered appropriate to the various
stages of the EER process.
i. Immediate fatality (unable to escape fire) : 35 kW/m2
ii. Escape route transit (1 minute) :6
iii. Emergency action e.g. closing valve, for 2 minutes :5
iv. Impairment of TEMPSC embarkation area :4
Where thermal radiation (and gas) can reasonably be predicted during an evacuation, the
default assumption should be that deluge protection on the TEMPSC and air purge to SOLAS
standards will enable evacuation from the area of immediate threat.
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The mitigation of thermal radiation can be achieved by screening with

i. solid barriers - interposed between radiating source and receptor to shield from
the heat flux.
ii. wire mesh - screening effect of wire mesh corresponds approximately to an
enclosed screen area. An important variable is the dullness/blackness of the
mesh.
iii. water spray; or
iv. provision of personal protective safety equipment.
5.1.4.3 Explosion

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The routes for escape and evacuation should remain passable, and free of obstructive debris,
in the event of potential explosions. These routes and survival craft embarkation areas shall

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be considered acceptable if this can be demonstrated on evaluation of such effects. It shall
also be demonstrated that any explosion shall not in any way adversely affect the operation

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of the primary and, as applicable, secondary means to evacuate the POB.

lU
The acceptance criterion for personnel in explosions is subjected by the likelihood of injury
caused by missiles and impact with structure, rather than the static overpressure. A simple
screening criterion distilled from various guidance for personnel in blast waves is 3 bar.
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5.1.4.4 Air quality
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The life support conditions also apply to escape and evacuation routes and points of
embarkation.
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5.2 ENDURANCE PERIOD

The endurance period of the TR is the duration which relevant conditions of integrity shall be
AS

maintained. It shall (PSR) be based on the following two criteria, whichever is the shorter:
i. Duration of maximum major incident; or
N

ii. Evacuation completion time

O
TR

From the time of "call to muster" (allowing for delays in calling), the endurance period shall
begin. The effect on the TR of an incident will not necessarily be present at the beginning of
the endurance period.
PE

5.2.1 Maximum major incident duration

TR shall (PSR) is designed to maintain its integrity until the immediate threat has been relieved
or has subsided. The integrity of the TR is no longer threatened when life support and
conditions external to the TR which are not harmful to personnel have been re-established.

A potential threat to the TR is an ignited hydrocarbon release. Under this scenario

consideration shall (PSR) be given to the inventory of hydrocarbons available to feed or sustain
an event and to the reliability of shutdown systems and emergency depressurisation facilities.

The adoption of this method for calculating TR endurance does not eliminate the requirement
to provide a means of evacuation from the installation.
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5.2.2 Time required completing evacuation

The TR shall be designed to maintain its integrity for the time required to complete the
evacuation process. This includes the following elements:

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D1 - Response time Time required to inform all personnel on the installation that a
to an alarm major incident has occurred and the response that is necessary.

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Personnel shall then act in accordance with the relevant
emergency procedures.

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D2 - Travel time to Time required for all personnel to travel from their place of work

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the TR or rest to the TR. This time includes an allowance for personnel to
respond to instructions.
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D3 - Time to muster Time required for all personnel on the installation to be accounted
and reach decision for. During this time the OIM shall be capable of assessing the
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situation and deciding upon the safest course of action.

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D4 - Evacuation The time required for evacuation of personnel from the installation
time by the most expeditious manner. This will include the donning of
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protective clothing and equipment.

AS

Response, escape, mustering and evacuation times may be affected by the result of different
incident scenarios and a factored time is required. The time estimates shall be developed in
consultation with competent Operations staff, and take account of specific practices and
N

procedures. On existing installations, the elements of the access and evacuation process shall
O

be validated by evacuation exercises, making allowance for realistic incident conditions.

TR

A minimum of ten minutes should be added to the total required time as a contingency to
reflect the level of qualitative assessment in above process. Experience from realistic drills on
PE

comparable existing installations shall be taken into account for new installations.

Calculation of evacuation times to be used for the determination of minimum and factored
endurance times is shown in the table given in the following page.

5.2.3 Secondary TRs

The secondary TR endurance period should allow sufficient time to:

i. Escape and muster at the secondary TR;
ii. Then, communicate with the primary TR; and
iii. if permissable, evacuate using the dedicated means of evacuation.
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EVACUATE TIME CRITERIA (5.2.2)

TIME INSTALLATION SPECIFIC MINIMUM FACTORED
ELEMENT FACTORS TIME TIME
ESTIMATE ESTIMATE
(MINUTES) (MINUTES)
D1 Initiate alarm Alarm and Public Address
Length of escape routes
D2 Escape to TR
Alternative TR locations

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Account for personnel
D3 Muster A

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onboard
Assessment and Availability of, and

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Evaluation B collation of information

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Communications C Internal and external
Automatic systems - ESD,

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Executive action D
BOP
Quantity and quality of
Decision making E
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information
Personnel don survival
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equipment
D4 Evacuation Travel to point of
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embarkation Embark and

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evacuate
TOTAL
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5.2.4 Escape routes to the TR

N

Escape routes have different endurance period due to TR shall be required to maintain the
conditions of integrity (5.1) only for the time that they may be used as well as those evacuation
O

routes from the TR to the points of embarkation.

TR

The endurance period required for escape routes to the TR shall enable to complete a full
muster in the TR from all installation locations. As a contingency plan, it should also consider
PE

i. the incident may occur at night or during a time when personnel are involved in
complex operations or activities;
ii. more than one route may have to be tried;
iii. the movement of personnel may be hampered by injury or the consequences of
the incident (e.g. smoke);
iv. the need to undertake a single search and rescue operation on the installation.
5.2.5 Evacuation routes from the TR

Endurance period is all thoughout is service lifetime

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6.0 DESIGN PROCESS/TOOLS

6.1 HAZARDS AND EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS

HSE Case shall be developed and maintained for all offshore installations and maintained

Major Accident Hazards and the barriers are required to prevent or manage these hazards
shall be identified and assessed. Barriers consist of one or more Safety Critical Elements
(SCEs).

Performance Standard shall be documented for each SCEs which describes the minimum

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functional specification. It shall also be used as a basis for verification throughout the lifecycle

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of the facility.

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6.1.1 Escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) assessment

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Refer to ISO 15544.

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Any shortcomings are identified from the Assessment, modifications shall be proposed and
implemented in accordance with the ALARP principle.
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6.2 HUMAN FACTORS
6.2.1 Behaviour under stress
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The design of the TR and its associated means of escape and evacuation shall limit physical
and psychological demands on personnel, whilst allowing for the inevitability of residual high
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levels of stress and based on what is normal and familiar in the daily routine.
6.2.2 Complex decision-making
AS

To minimise human error, consideration should be given to:

N

i. Automating as many suitable functions as possible.

O

ii. Optimising the provision of information to assist in those decisions that are not
TR

automated.
PE
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7.0 FACILITIES

7.1 FACILITY PROVISION

For enclosed TR systems where all or part of the living quarters is designated as the TR, general
materials and systems is according to PTS 11.22.04.

7.2 EQUIPMENT FOR SURVIVAL, EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MEDICAL

7.2.1 Personal equipment (survival pack)
i. a waterproof electric torch or flashlight with a capacity of at least 3 h, with a

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simple means of attachment to waist belt;

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ii. one pair of heat resistant gloves;

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iii. one life jacket;

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where applicable,
i.
ii. lU
respiratory protection sufficient to enable safe evacuation;
one immersion type survival suits similar to helicopter flying suit.
na
iii. in addition to communal stores of equipment held at key locations on the
installation (e.g. at survival craft stations).
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nt

The correct arrangement involves the storage and donning of equipment in the protected
environment of a muster point in close proximity to evacuation systems and personal survival
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packs shall be located in accordance with the installation mustering philosophy and
procedures.
AS

Additional personal survival packs should be located at secondary TR locations, areas such as
control rooms or other normally manned locations remote from the TR, and personal descent
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systems where provided.

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7.2.2 General equipment

TR

The provision, number and location of general survival and emergency response, medical and
welfare equipment should be separately determined taking account of TR configuration and
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endurance, likely hazards and the equipment provided to fulfil dual operational functions.

The following key equipment should be made available to personnel at the TR and any
secondary TR.
Survival equipment Medical equipment
1) Safety lamps and self-contained 1) First-aid medical kits (refer to
charging units; HSE Report 94023) plus additional
2) Portable gas detectors; capable of dressings and burns packs;
detecting, testing and measuring 2) Stretcher(s);
quantitative concentrations in air of 3) Portable automatic oxygen resuscitator(s);
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide,
4) Packs of eye wash; and
hydrogen sulphide, and oxygen.
5) Bottles of drinking water.
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7.3 SIGNS
7.3.1 Signs
i. Should be provided as necessary to allow personnel to identify escape routes,
including indication of the direction to muster areas, embarkation areas and
means of escape to the sea.
ii. Shall be different from those leading from the TR to embarkation areas to direct
personnel to the TR. The differences shall be readily and instantly distinguishable.
iii. Signs inside the living quarters shall be provided in accordance with PTS 11.22.04.
7.3.2 Safety information

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i. Diagrams showing the basic room/module layouts, evacuation routes, emergency

nl
escape equipment and locations/details of fire control arrangements shall be

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located in strategic areas around the installation.
ii. They shall be clearly visible and, if necessary, illuminated.

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7.4 ENTRANCES AND EXITS

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The protection, location and type of enclosed TR entrances and exits are critical factors in the
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fulfilment of certain TR objectives and can enhance safety by:
7.4.1 Flow and movement of personnel
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The location of entrances and exits should allows single directional flow of personnel during
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an incident, if possible avoiding crossflow and counterflow. This is also applicable for:
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i. escape to the TR;

ii. movement within the TR; and
AS

iii. evacuation from the TR.

The number and size of entrances and exits should be equal with the number of personnel
N

who may use them at any one time where minimum of two entrances and two exits which are
O

separate and offer a distinct alternative to one another.

TR

7.4.2 Protection
i. The number of entrances and exits should be restricted to only those needed to
PE

comply with the foregoing requirements concerning the flow and movement of
personnel.
ii. Where a TR has another operational function (e.g. accommodation) there will
probably be a number of additional external doors for operational reasons or for
escape from internal fire or other similar incidents however limited to the number of
external doors to the minimum practicable.
iii. Entrances and exits to the TR shall be protected against the ingress of smoke and gas
and against blast and radiant heat. Positioning of the entrances and exits in locations
naturally protected shall provide primary protection
iv. Entrances and exits should be located where they are least likely to be affected by
blast and impingement of smoke, gas, heat and flame. Only where it is unavoidable
should shielding be used to protect entrances and exits from blast and radiant heat.
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7.4.3 Doors
i. All TR external doors should resist smoke and gas penetration based on the
performance requirements.
ii. All TR doors and doorframes shall be capable of maintaining the fire and dynamic
overpressure integrity of the bulkhead in which they are placed.
iii. TR doors which serve escape and evacuation routes shall be designed to be usable
for the endurance period. The design shall account for the effect of potential
explosions and fire on the operation of the door.
iv. All doors should be clearly marked to indicate the circumstances under which they

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are to be used.

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v. All TR external doors exposed to potential explosion overpressures should be

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categorised according to the table below and designed to ensure the specified
function following an explosion.

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Category Door Condition Door Function

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after Blast

I Operable
The door shall remain operable after the blast event
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and maintain its specified integrity against smoke and
gas ingress and fire loading.
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This category should be specified if the door is a primary

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entrance or exit from the TR.

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II Inoperable The door may be rendered inoperable after the blast

event but it shall maintain its specified integrity against
AS

smoke and gas ingress and fire loading.

This category should only be specified if entrapment of
personnel is not a possibility.
N

The design shall account for the effect of potential explosions and fire on the operation of the
O

door. The doors should be clearly marked to indicate the circumstances under which they are
TR

to be used. 7.4.4 Airlocks

Where there is a likelihood of smoke and gas ingress, there should be at least one, but
PE

preferably a number of, airlocks or intervening spaces between the external environment and
TR muster and control points.

The design of entrances, exits and airlocks shall take account of the requirements of stretcher
access. In particular, airlocks should be sized to ensure that only one door needs to be open
at any one time.
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7.5 WINDOWS (ENCLOSED TRS)

7.5.1 General

i. Minimal usage

ii. Shutterless type, certified to the fire and blast ratings of the bulkheads in which
they are placed and capable of maintaining the fire, acoustic, dynamic
overpressure and thermal insulation integrity of the bulkhead.

iii. The external face should form a weather, smoke and gas tight barrier whereby
the internal face should form a sealed barrier to maintain internal air pressure,

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but be removable for cleaning and maintenance.

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7.6 EMERGENCY POWER AND LIGHTING
7.6.1 General

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This section applies primarily to manned installations. The provision of emergency power and

7.6.2
lighting should be in accordance with PTS 13.00.01.
Emergency power requirement lU
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Emergency power is required to supply the following personnel during an incident:
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i. communications;
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ii. monitoring and control; and

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iii. emergency lighting.

AS

In each instant, the duration of emergency power shall be determine where the minimum
duration shall be greater than the required TR endurance.
N

The duration of the emergency power system is inclusive of sufficient contingency to ensure
O

that premature abandonment does not occur.

TR

To indicate the design duration of all emergency power sources required for the TR functions,
a notice should be provided at the TR
PE

7.6.3 Emergency lighting

i. General

Emergency lighting systems shall be provided in the following areas, for the
endurance period:
a) at the TR;
b) on escape routes to the TR;
c) on evacuation routes from the TR;
d) at survival craft embarkation areas;
e) at personal descent systems if provided;
 PTS 11.20.01
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f) on the helideck if applicable; and

g) at boat landings where used for evacuation.

It shall be designed to provide an adequate level of lighting in the event of main

power failure typically in the form of fluorescent luminaires with integral battery
and inverter/charger power supply.
ii. Lighting at the TR
The duration for which lighting is required at the TR may exceed the length of time
that can be guaranteed from the standard emergency luminaires described
above, in which case some form of additional power may be required.

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iii. Lighting of escape routes to the TR

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All escape routes on the installation should be provided with emergency lighting
of the battery backed fluorescent type. If smoke may obstruct vision when the

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escape route is to be used, some form of illuminated low level route indication
should be provided.
iv.
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Lighting of evacuation routes from the TR
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Lighting of the evacuation routes from the TR shall be available when the platform
is evacuated. If smoke may obstruct vision when the evacuation route is to be
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used, some form of illuminated low level route indication should be provided.
High intensity LED based lighting is particularly effective in highlighting handrails
nt

and tops and bottoms of stairs.

-I

The power supply to the evacuation route lighting should be provided from within
the TR so that it can be manually switched on when it is actually required.
AS

Luminaires should be of the internal battery backed type as this will allow light to
N

be provided for some time if the power cabling is damaged.

O

Cabling for the evacuation route lighting circuits should be well protected and
TR

able to resist fire damage to the same standard required for the protection of the
evacuation route.
PE

v. Lighting of survival craft embarkation areas

Emergency lighting of the survival craft embarkation areas should only be
required for a short period of time. A relatively high lighting level will be required
and can be conveniently provided by a battery system located in the vicinity of
the embarkation area. Local switching (i.e. at embarkation areas) and manual
switching from the TR should be provided. Any manual light switches shall be self-
illuminating. Consideration should also be given to providing switching by means
of radio signals as a means of ensuring high integrity without dependence on
external cabling.
7.7 COMMUNICATIONS
The provision of communication facilities shall be in accordance with PTS 14.40.03.
Communication equipment should be able to continue functioning at the temperature
expected during fire conditions.
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7.8 HVAC
The HVAC system, if provided, is according to ISO 15138.

During the operation of the HVAC system, it should be able to maintain life support conditions
and provide protection through the:
i. maintenance of a supply of breathable air;
ii. prevention of heat build-up;
iii. prevention of smoke and gas ingress through positive pressurisation of the TR;

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iv. provision of sufficient airflow dilution and displacement of any leakage or other

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ingress (e.g. through the use of doors); and

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v. maintenance of visibility (in smoke).

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The design should maximise the duration of HVAC operation during an incident. A detailed
assessment should be made to establish the suitable number and location of air inlets.

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In the event of smoke or gas detection at the air inlets, HVAC system shall shut down
na
automatically and the TR shall be isolated.
Evaluation of the size of intake, air flow patterns, voting philosophy, should be conducted
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when deciding on the number of detectors. Also, it shall consider the speed of response of
inlet-gas detection and the time needed to stop the HVAC.
nt

In the event of a fire on the platform and the TR is close to the process area, it should be
-I

considered whether the integrity of the TR is better preserved by automatically closing the
HVAC dampers to the TR .
AS

It is required for the system to be design thus that it can be shut down and restart the HVAC
system from the TR.
N

Other design considerations includes;

O

i. minimization of leakage through penetrations in the event that pressurization is

TR

lost, for example due to smoke or gas being present at the air intakes;
ii. prevention / minimization of smoke spread within the TR;
PE

iii. boundary fire-damper position indication;

iv. air cooling to reduce heat stress; and
v. availability of power sources to drive the HVAC system during the incidents.
Ventilation ducts and penetrations shall not compromise the fire and blast rating of the
bulkhead through which they penetrate. Fire dampers shall be of such a standard that they
maintain the integrity of designated fire-rated barriers when penetrated by HVAC ducts. Fire
damper installations shall have a fire rating at least equal to that of the barrier they penetrate.
7.9 MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION
The selection and specification of materials used in the construction of the TR shall be
consistent with their function (fit-for-purpose). Materials used in construction and fit-out shall
be in accordance with PTS 11.22.04.
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8.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY
In this PTS, reference is made to the following other Standards/Publication. Unless specifically
designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any
supplements/revisions thereto:

PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Index to PTS PTS 00.01.01

Requirements, General Definition of Terms, Abbreviations & PTS 00.01.03

Reading Guide

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Fire, gas and smoke detection systems PTS 14.12.07

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Telecommunications for offshore platforms PTS 14.40.03

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Electrical engineering design PTS 13.00.01

Design of offshore living quarters

lU PTS 11.22.04
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Design Conditions : Temperature, Pressure & Toxicity PTS 16.50.01
er

Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore PTS 16.72.02

production installations (amendments/supplements to ISO
nt

13702:1999)
-I

Offshore production installations - Requirements and guidelines for PTS 16.72.03

emergency response (amendments/supplements to ISO
AS

15544:2000)
N

Electrical Engineering Guidelines PTS 13.00.01

O

Medical Emergency Guidelines for Health Case Professionals and HSE Report 94023
TR

First Aiders (PETRONAS Health Services)

BRITISH STANDARDS
PE

HSE Guidance Note: Workplace exposure limits: Containing the list HSE EH40
of workplace exposure limits for use with the control of substances
hazardous to health regulations

HSE Hazardous Installations Directorate Semi Permanent Circular: HSE

“Indicative Human Vulnerability to the Hazardous Agents Present SPC/Tech/OSD/30
Offshore for Application in Risk Assessment of Major Accidents”

Issued by:
Health and Safety Executive
Ferguson House, 15 Marylebone Road
London, NW1 5JD,
UK
 PTS 11.20.01
OFFSHORE TEMPORARY REFUGES August 2014
Page 33 of 33

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Petroleum and natural gas industries — Control and mitigation of ISO 13702
fires and explosions on offshore production installations —
Requirements and guidelines

Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production IS0 15544

installations — Requirements and guidelines for emergency
response

Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production ISO 15138

y
installations — Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning

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