Public Audit in Nigeria

J. Account.
Public Policy 42 (2023) 107052
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
J. Account. Public Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jaccpubpol
Full length article
Resisting institutionalized corruption: The case of public audit

in Nigeria
Zayyad Abdul-Baki a,⇑, Ahmed Diab b,c, Abdulraheem Olayiwola Kadir d
a
Department of Accounting, College of Business, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
b
Prince Sultan University, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
c
Faculty of Commerce, Beni-Suef University, Beni-Suef, Egypt
d
Accounting and Finance Department, Kwara State University, Malete, Kwara State, Nigeria
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: In a highly corrupt environment such as Nigeria, accounting practices have been perme-
Available online 15 December 2022 ated by corruption in the wider society. As such, several studies on the relationship
between accounting and corruption have unveiled a symbiotic association between
Keywords: accountants and corruption. Contrary to this popular viewpoint, this study shows that
Auditor-General for the Federation there are instances of resistance to corruption by accountants in such environments.
Nigeria This study adopts a multiple case study approach. We used two case studies to demon-
Logic of resistance
strate the consistency of the Auditors-General for the Federation (AuGFs) in resisting insti-
Public audit
Corruption
tutionalized corruption and one case study to show that AuGFs’ resistance is not
commonplace in Nigeria. Data were gathered from interviews, videos, and documents.
We found that AuGFs resist corruption through the disclosure of accounting irregularities
in their audit reports despite the severe consequences associated with exposing corrupt
practices in Nigeria. However, they hide this resistance through a number of strategies
to sustain the resistance and avert possible repercussions of corruption disclosure. Prior
studies of accounting and corruption in developing countries often find accountants
enabling corrupt practices through their silence or through active participation in such
practices. However, this study shows how accountants also resist corruption in a highly
corrupt developing country, which is rare in the literature.
Ó 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Accountants are affected by institutionalized beliefs and practices in their environment. Therefore, their practices often
reflect these sociopolitical norms (Rahaman, 2009; Neu et al., 2010; Neu et al., 2013a). In a sociopolitical setting where cor-
ruption is pervasive, ‘‘it is a fully institutionalized part of commercial activity” (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006, p. 403). Accountants
operating in a setting with pervasive corruption are usually characterized by unethical practices (Abdul-Baki et al., 2021).
Nigeria is a typical example of such countries where accounting practices have been permeated by corruption in the wider
society (Wallace, 1992; Bakre, 2007; Abdul-Baki et al., 2021). As such, several studies on the relationship between account-
ing and corruption have unveiled a symbiotic association between accountants and corruption. For example, Mitchell et al.
(1998) found that accountants are accomplices in organized crimes of money laundering (also see Sikka, 2008). Similarly,
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: zayyad.abdul-baki@zu.ac.ae (Z. Abdul-Baki), adiab@psu.edu.sa (A. Diab), abdulraheem.kadir@kwasu.edu.ng (A.O. Kadir).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107052
0278-4254/Ó 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Z. Abdul-Baki, A. Diab and A.O. Kadir J. Account. Public Policy 42 (2023) 107052
they have developed strategies to aid their clients in tax evasion (Sikka & Hampton, 2005; Sikka, 2015; Sikka & Willmott,
2013). Furthermore, Bakre (2007) showed how accountants in Nigeria have assisted clients in falsifying their financial state-
ments, and Abdul-Baki et al. (2021) discussed how two accounting firms were part of a collusive force in oil subsidy corrup-
tion scandal in Nigeria.
Notwithstanding these findings, organizational responses to institutionalized practices are often heterogeneous (Oliver,
1991). Similarly, within the context of Nigeria, despite the pervasiveness corruption (Doh et al., 2003), it is expected that
some accountants will still endeavor to uphold the required professionalism1 and defy the isomorphic pressure of corruption.
Strategies adopted to resist institutionalized practices are also not homogeneous (Oliver, 1991) and are dependent on ‘‘the rel-
ative power of the actors who support, oppose, or otherwise strive to influence it” (DiMaggio, 1988, p. 13).
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are meant to engender accountability through public audit (Lapsley & Pong, 2000;
Bowerman et al., 2003; Free & Radcliffe, 2009; Ferry et al., 2015). However, several factors prevalent in different jurisdictions
influence their effectiveness in meeting this goal (Radcliffe, 1998; Mihret & Yismaw, 2007; Radcliffe, 2008; Heald, 2018). In
both developed and developing countries, the discussion around the influence of the sociopolitical environment on SAIs’
activities has found that political considerations shape audit processes and outcomes such that corruption is sustained rather
than curtailed, and, in some instances, public audit actually facilitates corruption (Neu et al., 2013a, Lassou et al., 2021; Lino
et al., 2021; Sumiyana et al., 2021; Abdul-Baki et al., 2021).
In Nigeria, a crucial determinant of public audit effectiveness is the level of corruption that plagues the country (Iyoha &
Oyerinde, 2010). Corruption has rendered accounting infrastructure ineffective, and, in most cases, accountants are accom-
plices to corruption rather than acting as guardians of public interest (Abdul-Baki et al., 2021). However, while prior liter-
ature findings seem to be consistent on SAIs aiding rather than fighting corruption, we contest that despite the similarity
of the institutional contexts observed, responses to institutionalized beliefs and practices are not homogeneous. This study
examines how Auditors-General for the Federation (AuGF) in Nigeria resisted corruption. Furthermore, we explore the
strategies adopted by AuGFs to sustain such resistance given that, in the Nigerian context, the risk associated with exposing
corrupt practices is high.
We adopt multiple case studies in arguing that the AuGFs resist institutionalized corruption. We used a combination of
interviews that we conducted, video interviews from secondary sources, and video documentaries together with documents
to answer the following research questions: How have AuGFs in Nigeria resisted corruption? Through which mechanisms
have the AuGFs sustained resistance to institutionalized corruption in Nigeria? Based on the lens of the logic of resistance,
we found that AuGFs resist corruption by reporting corrupt practices of government officials in their audit reports despite
facing pressure not to do so. Secondly, we found that the AuGFs sustained resistance to corruption by adopting the strategy
of ‘hiding’ (Brivot & Gendron, 2011), which is a form of avoidance strategy as put forward by Oliver (1991).
Our contributions to the literature are as follows. Prior literature regarding public sector audit and corruption has found
accountants to be silent about corruption and/or engage in corruption themselves (e.g., Neu et al., 2013a, Lassou et al., 2021;
Lino et al., 2021; Sumiyana et al., 2021; Abdul-Baki et al., 2021). On the contrary, we found AuGFs in Nigeria to be resisting
corruption by disclosing accounting irregularities in their audit reports. Secondly, resistance to practices is usually perceived
as a negative act that hinders the objective of the imposed practice from being achieved. On the contrary, we show that
resisting institutionalized practices can be positive when corruption is an institutionalized practice. Thirdly, we add to
the body of literature on accounting and corruption by showing that SAIs operating in a highly corrupt environment do
not necessarily have to be silent or support corruption; they can resist corruption through reporting corrupt practices
and hide such resistance.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature on SAIs and corruption, Section 3
discusses the theoretical framework of the study, Section 4 explains the research method, Section 5 analyzes the data,
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) and corruption
The International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) defines SAIs as ‘‘a public body of a state or supra-
national organization which, however designated, constituted or organized, exercises, by virtue of law, or other formal action
of the state or the supranational organization, the highest public auditing function of that state or supranational organization
in an independent manner, with or without jurisdictional competence” (INTOSAI, 2022).2 SAIs have vital roles in ensuring
public sector accountability and transparency by working as authoritative and independent watchdogs over public funds
(Cordery & Hay, 2019), thereby preventing corruption (Gustavson & Sundström, 2018), promoting public trust, and maintaining
effective and efficient use of public resources (INTOSAI, 2022). However, institutional and environmental factors existing in dif-
ferent contexts can impact the ability of SAIs to achieve their goals (Heald, 2018). For example, like many other SAIs in Africa,
including Ghana and South Africa (Nzewi & Musokeru, 2014), the office of the AuGF in Nigeria lacks the power to
prosecute individuals found wanting of financial irregularities. Interestingly, however, unlike their Nigerian counterpart, the
Auditor-General in Ghana has a special power to surcharge any such individual or organization (Lee-Jones, 2017).
1
Complying with ethical codes of conduct and practice as spelt out by their respective professional accounting bodies including IFAC.
2
https://www.intosai.org/about-us/overview.
2
In the U.S., Radcliffe (2008) found the appearance of government auditing as a pragmatic practice, where public auditors
sought to maintain public secrets. This situation limited their fight against public sector corruption. Focusing on the Cana-
dian Federal Government’s sponsorship program, Neu et al. (2013a) showed that ‘‘political considerations frame, enter into
and are exercised through audit judgments, thereby making it difficult to detect and report on potentially corrupt activities”
(p. 1223). In the same context, Neu et al. (2013b) observe the ‘skillful use’ of accounting practices in the Canadian context to
avoid anticorruption barriers, which ultimately enabled corruption. Comparing the work of SAIs in Scandinavia, South Eur-
ope, and Africa in fighting corruption, Reichborn-Kjennerud et al. (2019) found that SAIs’ work is shaped by coercive,
mimetic, and normative pressures interacting with institutional logics in each context. For instance, African SAIs are
observed to face conflicting institutional logics. While politicians want them to ignore corruption, people and international
institutions want them to stand against it. In South Europe, normative pressures from professional institutions prevent SAIs
from engaging in fighting corruption, which explains the ineffective or passive role of such organizations concerning corrup-
tion. Finally, in Scandinavia, the existence of an evaluator logic (investigating and analyzing an audit question) explains the
tendency of SAIs therein to fight corruption.
Generally, in some developing countries, the dominant culture of systemic corruption has serious implications for the
effective functioning of SAIs. In these contexts, public sector auditors are anticipated to be involved in or contribute to sus-
taining corruption (Lino et al., 2021). For instance, in Nigeria, Abdul-Baki et al. (2021) revealed how accounting firms were
forced to conspire with other players, due to institutionalized corruption, in order to support the mismanagement of public
funds in an oil subsidy corruption scandal. Accounting firms working in this context had to adapt or conform to the corrupt
environment to sustain their survival and future appointments. In Indonesia, Sumiyana et al. (2021) explained the effects of
political hegemony and ideology supported by the imperium (political state in power), and those of the ruling-class mental-
ity on public sector auditing. These external factors had forced public auditors to comply with the underlying political
agenda of the state and distorted their normative values of practice. This weakened public auditors’ independence, decreased
audit quality, and negatively affected the effectiveness of public audit. Lino et al. (2021) showed the mechanisms through
which corruption is sustained by Brazilian public sector audit organizations. They found that politicoeconomic elites’ private
interests infiltrated public audit organizations through the appointment of loyal auditors to control the audit process. This
resulted in those auditors lacking independence and professionalism, which ultimately maintained corruption. Here, corrup-
tion was resisted or demiclosed only according to specific conditions, i.e., in line with the interests of the powerful political
elites. Lassou et al. (2021) clarified that public audit institutions in Benin had only discharged a limited part of their mandate
by performing insignificant audits, which restricted their role in curbing corruption. This situation was attributed to several
institutional factors, including the historical belief that leaders should favor their ethnic group or tribe (i.e., politicized
appointments) and the colonial legacy that failed to cultivate a belief among the public concerning the accountability of
political leaders for public assets. In this society, public assets are perceived as gifts from government officials rather than
collective property produced from regional taxpayers.
Despite the significant value of the previous studies, there is still a need for in-depth investigation into how highly cor-
rupt environments affect public auditors, and how those auditors respond to these environments. Our study extends the
prior studies by showing how AuGFs, through public audit, resist the isomorphic pressure of corruption in Nigeria by disclos-
ing the corrupt practices of government officials despite the severe repercussions associated with such disclosures. Our study
contributes to the literature by showing that in an environment with large-scale corruption where accountants face different
pressures to support corruption, some accountants still make efforts to ensure accountability, through the disclosure of insti-
tutionalized corruption. We also show how the AuGFs have maintained such resistance without facing the usual conse-
quences associated with exposing corrupt practices in Nigeria.
3. Theoretical lens
3.1. Institutional isomorphism
Institutional isomorphism has its roots in neoinstitutional theory. It assumes that environments are collective and inter-
connected, and that organizations must be responsive to external demands and expectations in order to survive and main-
tain their legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three forms of institutional isomorphism through which
practices are being institutionalized, namely, coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism (see also Rodrigues & Craig,
2007). Coercive isomorphism is concerned about pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations that they depend
on for survival or social expectations that abound in their immediate environment; mimetic isomorphism holds that orga-
nizations adopt practices of other organizations that are considered more successful, or more legitimate, in their institutional
environment; and normative isomorphism recognizes how professionals operate in a similar way by virtue of undergoing
similar training (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007).
Isomorphism assumes that these institutions mold organizations’ practices with little resistance (Quattrone & Hopper,
2001). It also assumes that actors in a particular field would adopt the structures considered socially acceptable in that field
regardless of their usefulness to their organization (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Besharov & Smith, 2014). Thus, it emphasizes
that there are fixed templates for change; that is, ‘isomorphic’ organizations develop in response to institutional pressures
(Scapens, 2006), which leads to a state of homogenization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Therefore, from this perspective,
3
institutional theory proffers a monolithic or unitary concept of the environment and legitimizes institutional myths
(Townley, 1997). This view suggests that an organization (and its members) will neatly adhere to specific norms and insti-
tutionalized rules in its environment.
However, we cannot consider organizations as monolithic, as there are some variations within the same context due to
the role of local actors in their attempts to achieve their personal or societal interests (Albu et al., 2014). Thus, organizations
are perceived here as heterogeneous bodies that are composed of different groups pursuing various goals and promoting
variant interests (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). These groups face institutional pressures of varying strengths (Guerreiro
et al., 2012), and hence, they are responding differently to these institutional pressures (Albu et al., 2014). Besides, not all
organizations (or groups within a network) will conform to the stated institutional pressures, while some may be more sus-
ceptible to specific pressures than others. That is, organizations do not always blindly mimic or acquiesce in the face of insti-
tutional pressures. Actors always enjoy significant discretion regarding how they respond, perceive, and abide by the
institutionalized norms of governance and control (Cooper & Robson, 2006).
3.2. The logic of resistance
According to the logic of resistance, individuals do not always comply with existing institutions. This is because resistance
is always present in the background, which can manifest in different forms or tactics by organizations or employees (Oliver,
1991). The literature explained that responses of organizational members to institutional pressures vary from compliance to
outright resistance (Oliver, 1991). Organizations can accept, reject, ignore, or transform the imposed formal norms and reg-
ulations (Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). In particular, Oliver (1991) proposed five types of organizational strategic responses to
institutional pressures: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Acquiescence includes compli-
ance, blind adherence to taken-for-granted values, and imitation. Compromise strategies include balancing, pacifying, or bar-
gaining with external constituents. Here, organizations are more active in advancing their interests than in the case of
acquiescence. Avoidance strategies include concealment, disguised compliance, or escaping tactics. Defiance implies more
resistance to institutional pressures through tactics such as dismissal or challenge. Manipulation represents the most active
response, where actors can influence values and norms, or control the institutional pressures imposed on them. These
responses are shaped by a set of factors, including pressures for compliance, the actors applying pressures, the norms, the
controls used to apply pressures, and the contextual environment (Albu et al., 2014).
Resistance may manifest in a ceremonial (rather than a real) adoption of the present institutions and norms (see Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). With this superficial adoption (Moore et al., 2006), organizational members will be legally and officially
adhering to the institutionalized norms, so there will be no liability or claim on them. However, this type of implementation
does not impact how they perform their tasks (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). It is disembodied or disengaged from their behaviors,
i.e., there is no substantive change that reflects the spirit of the imposed norms (Durocher & Gendron, 2011). This situation is
known in the literature as ostensible compliance, ‘compliance in appearance’ (Maroun & van Zijl, 2016), or ‘decoupling’
(Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). An example of this occurred in South Africa, where Maroun & van Zijl (2021) found that flexible
adherents to fair value accounting do not have a clear commitment to either historical accounting or fair value accounting;
instead, they usually resort to legalistic and superficial application of accounting rules (i.e., decoupling). In contrast, prepar-
ers that advocate historical cost ‘‘are reluctant but obedient adopters of fair value accounting” (p. 2).
Brivot and Gendron (2011) showed that two main resistance strategies were mobilized against the implementation of a
computerized knowledge management system (KMS) in a Parisian tax/law firm: the development of unofficial markets of
knowledge outside of the centralized KMS (understood as ‘hiding’), and the development of new games of visibility involving
the purposeful self-disclosure of one’s work (understood as ‘showing off’). Tremblay and Gendron (2011) explored how pre-
scriptions regarding audit committees’ function in Canadian public companies lead to informal resistance. Resistance here
was enabled by undermining the need for substantial reforms through ‘individualization of failure’ and referring it to some
immoral or incompetent actors. Furthermore, Durocher and Gendron (2014) examined experienced Canadian accountants’
reactions to the compulsory application of fair value accounting standards. They found a significant level of variability in
their epistemic commitment to the applied standards; for example, they observed that accountants were inclined to refer
to profitability issues when they wanted to refer to these standards’ appropriateness. However, the accountants hesitated
to voice high-level concerns about implementation ambiguities and lack of professional cognitive authority (Durocher &
Gendron, 2014).
In most cases, the logic of resistance is reported to have the effect of diminishing corporate transparency and accountabil-
ity (see Roberts, Sanderson, Barker, & Hendry, 2006; Maroun & van Zijl, 2016) as they decrease the expected positive effects
for which the new norms were applied (Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). The situation is different in our present case. We argue
that the logic of resistance would undermine accountability practices if the applied norms, in essence, contribute to achiev-
ing the common good of society. However, institutionalized corruption and misdoings might be resisted by other members
of the society who seek a common good for their community. Here, the logic of resistance might have a sociopolitical objec-
tive that is aimed at restoring accountability and transparency in the Nigerian public sector. This is consistent with Gilbert
(2020), who showed how auditing was employed as a tool for resisting neoliberal order and explained how the government
of Ecuador used auditing to renegotiate a cutback of its public debt that is tied to neoliberal measures. In this context, it is
anticipated that public auditors in their resistance can adopt various strategies depending on the context where auditing is
practiced.
4
3.3. Resisting corruption in Nigeria
Corruption is not specific to certain countries, and we cannot generally say that one particular country has more corrup-
tion than another (Johnston, 2005). That is to say, corruption is ubiquitous, but at variant levels and in different forms,
depending on a country’s institutional systems or contextual circumstances. In other words, as Neu et al. (2013b) noted, cor-
ruption is field-specific—it is shaped by context-based forms of political participation and the type of barriers of anti-
corruption applied in that setting. From this point, developed countries are not immune to corruption, or, to put it in other
terms, corruption is not exclusive to developing countries. As per Johnston’s (2005) typology of corruption, the strong insti-
tutional structures and anti-corruption barriers in developed and democratic countries, such as the Unites States and Canada
(i.e., influence market countries, according to Johnston, 2005), are likely to discourage outright forms of corruption and cre-
ate other indirect and more complex ones, where these institutions end up regulating, rather than eliminating, the flow of
government resources and the buying and selling of political influence.
In contrast, developing countries are characterized by weak institutions and oversight bodies, lack of transparency, and
ineffective anti-corruption legislation (Neu et al., 2013b; Okonjo-Iweala, 2018). As such, corruption is committed with impu-
nity in a scenario Johnston (2005) coined as ‘‘official moguls”. Here, corruption ‘‘is a symptom of problems so fundamental
and systemic” (Johnston, 2005, p. 212) that ‘‘corrupt leaders and their personal favorites exploit society and the economy,
including aid and investment, rather than developing it” (Johnston, 2005, p. 211). In a country that is characterized by sys-
temic corruption, corruption is a norm to the extent that engaging in it is the expected behavior, and unwillingness to par-
ticipate in corrupt activities is abhorred (Persson et al., 2013, 2019; Phiri & Guven-Uslu, 2019).
The two primary dimensions of corruption are pervasiveness and arbitrariness. The pervasiveness of corruption implies
that corruption is widespread, while arbitrariness means that the outcome of engaging in corrupt practices is uncertain. In
African developing countries, and specifically in Nigeria, corruption is highly pervasive, and its arbitrariness is very low (Doh
et al., 2003) as engaging in corruption is the expected behavior (Persson et al., 2013, 2018; Abdul-Baki et al., 2021). As
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006, p. 403) argued, in environments ‘‘where corruption is highly pervasive, it is a fully institutionalized
part of commercial activity.”.
Accountants operating in societies with systemic corruption are not immune to corruption. As Okike (2004) noted, ‘‘corruption
in Nigeria has reached such alarming proportions that it has become contagious, affecting even members of the accounting pro-
fession” (p. 710). In settings like this, when accounting institutions work to report, reveal, or resist corruption, they are likely to face
disastrous consequences. Thus, accountants often play along in corrupt practices to avoid such consequences.
Kumar and Santoro (2017) stated that in contexts with weak legal protection, corruption reporters are likely to face
charges of betrayal. For example, in Mozambique, a journalist was killed in 2000 following investigation of the country’s lar-
gest case of bank fraud (The Times, 2003, p. 21). In the context of Nigeria, Okafor et al. (2020) observed that disclosing cor-
rupt practices represents a high risk to reporters, including the risk of physical elimination. For example, in 2001, the
Nigerian Attorney-General was killed after presenting a paper at the tenth international anticorruption conference in Czech
detailing information about the assets stolen by the previous government (Transparency International, 2002). Similarly,
Nuhu Ribadu, the first chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime Commissions (EFCC), created in Nigeria in 2003,
was shot at but fortunately was unharmed because he was in a bulletproof car (Ribadu, 2015). Furthermore, Ngozi
Okonjo-Iweala, the former Minister of Finance in Nigeria, was targeted, and her mother was kidnapped, for attempting to
curtail corruption (Okonjo-Iweala, 2016; 2018).
Besides these extreme consequences are other, relatively less severe repercussions, such as those associated with a loss of
employment. For example, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria noted that:
Just over a year ago, President Goodluck Jonathan suspended me from my position as governor of the Central Bank of
Nigeria after I questioned an estimated $20bn shortfall in oil revenues due to the treasury from the state oil company.
(Sanusi, 2015, p. 1)
In 2020, the former chairman of EFCC was removed from his office allegedly because of his fraudulent activities. However,
given his detailed response to the allegations (see Magu, 2020), and the inability of his accusers and the panel set up to inves-
tigate the allegations to charge him to court, it appears that he was targeted for fighting corruption.
Under the above circumstances, disclosing and reporting corruption in Nigeria comes with a high risk. However, if a dis-
closer of corruption continues to make such revelations despite these repercussions, it can be argued that they are definitely
resisting corruption. As argued by Oliver (1991), resistance can come in various forms. In this study, we show that the AuGFs
resist corruption by continuing to disclose accounting irregularities of government officials. However, we argue that the
AuGFs will not ignore the potential repercussions of their resistance. As such, we explore the mechanisms by which the
AuGFs sustain the resistance of corruption in Nigeria.
4. Research method and data analysis
4.1. Research method
This study adopts a case study research design. Specifically, we adopt multiple case studies. In multiple case studies,
‘‘cases must be selected for theoretical reasons, i.e., because they allow literal replication or theoretical replication”
5
(De Massis & Kotlar, 2014, p. 18). Literal replication facilitates the prediction of similar results, while theoretical replication
allows for contrasting results. We seek to achieve both of these replications. As such, we analyze two cases involving the
AuGFs to show consistency in the AuGFs’ disclosure of corrupt practices (literal replication). On the other hand, we analyze
a third case to show that the AuGF is acting differently (i.e., not supporting corruption) to other actors or auditors in the orga-
nizational field (theoretical replication). Such replications ensure the validity of our conclusion that the AuGF is indeed
resisting corruption.
‘‘Corruption is a difficult subject to study, and the data on motivation behind corruption are particularly inaccessible. Stig-
matized, hidden, and sometimes illegal, the abuse of entrusted power for private gain is difficult to identify, observe, or dis-
cuss with perpetrators” (Zaloznaya, 2014, p. 191). In a corrupt society like Nigeria, the disclosure of corruption, as we have
discussed, has severe repercussions. Thus, obtaining interview data is equally difficult. Accordingly, prior studies on the rela-
tionship between accounting and corruption have used few interviews to strengthen their interpretations from documentary
evidence of corruption. For example, Neu et al. (2013a) used an extensive interview with a knowledgeable individual to but-
tress their argument from analysis of documents in examining corruption in a Canadian government sponsorship program.
Abdul-Baki et al. (2021) used four interviews to explain the coercion of two accounting firms into engaging in corruption in
an oil subsidy scheme in Nigeria. Many other studies have used documents only to study corruption (e.g., Sikka & Hampton,
2005; Bakre, 2007; Sikka, 2008), while some have used secondary interview sources, such as videos, to strengthen documen-
tary evidence (e.g., Dragomir et al., 2021). However, there are exceptions to these limitations. Some recent studies have used
a large number of interviews to study corruption and SAIs practices (Lassou et al., 2021; Lino et al., 2021). However, the
scope of their interviewees is broader than ours,3 while some had a very rare opportunity to gain access to a large sample
of interviewees (Lino et al., 2021). In our case, we do not have such a rare opportunity, and the scope of our study is the office
of the AuGF. However, we were able to conduct ten face-to-face interviews with auditors (including auditors from the office of
the AuGF) and accountants from the public sector. We corroborated these interviews with video interviews of the AuGF and
video documentaries (see Table 2). Finally, we used 12 main documents, including audit reports of the AuGF from 2012 to
2019, to enrich our data.
It is generally expected that in qualitative studies, a researcher uses multiple sources of data to reduce biases and enrich
results (Bowen, 2009). In particular, as mentioned above, corruption-related studies in accounting are, in most cases, limited
by their inability to obtain primary data from interviews. Thus, other secondary sources, such as documents and videos, are
often used together with interviews to create a rich and complementary dataset. Moreover, it is difficult for the different
experiences of interviewees to be captured in documents or publicly available sources such as videos. Therefore, conducting
interviews has ensured that views from varied experiences of interviewees inject more meaning into secondary data sources.
Specifically, in this study, the interviewees revealed other insider details regarding pressures they face, which are rarely
available publicly. The data sources are outlined in Tables 1 and 2.
In this study, we adopted a ‘‘theoretical thematic analysis” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84) using a deductive approach,
which tries to fit data into a researcher’s theoretical or analytic framework. Hence, a detailed analysis of the dataset that fits
into the theory is made, rather than a complete description of the dataset (Braun & Clarke, 2006). To fit the data into the
theoretical frame (i.e., logic of resistance), we coded the data using the following codes derived from the theory: pressure
to support and responses. In particular, responses were coded using Oliver (1991) as follows: acquiescence, compromise,
avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Because the main work of an auditor is to report their findings and opinion, we coded
the pressure into two forms: pressure to actively support and pressure not to disclose.
5. Data analysis
5.1. The case of annual audit of the AuGFs (Defiance)
In accordance with the Nigerian constitution, the AuGF is responsible for the audit of all ministries and departments
of the Federal Government of Nigeria. The AuGF submits the audit reports to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC),
which comprises the members of the legislative arm of the Nigerian government. The PAC considers the report of the
AuGF and summons responsible government officials for questioning and clarifications based on the findings in the audit
reports.
At the state level, the Auditor-General for the State Government does the work of the AuGF, and adheres to a similar
responsibility structure to that of the Federal level (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria, 2019). However, the audit
of government enterprises is different. An external auditor is appointed by the government enterprise, and the audit report
of the external auditor is submitted for approval to the office of the AuGF or Auditor-General for the State Government at the
state level. Fig. 1 summarizes the structure of public audit in Nigeria.
In the past, auditors that have exposed corruption perpetrators have suffered some severe consequences. For example,
Murtala Aliyu Ibrahim, the unit head of ICT process audit and special investigation of the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria,
was sacked in May 2017 for exposing a variety of contract fraud (AFRICMIL & MacArthur Foundation, 2020). Similarly, Sambo
Abdullahi, deputy manager and head of internal audit, Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Plc, was redeployed to a learning and
3
For example, Lassou et al. (2021) had interviewees from NGOs, World Bank, the EU and two SAIs.
6
Table 1
Profile of Interviewees and Videos’ Details.
Pseudonym Industry Experience Duration

Accountant Government University 27 years 1 hr 30
mins
External Auditor Government University 29 years 1 hr 40
mins
Principal Auditor State Auditor-General’s Office 8 years 35 mins
Project Accountant Ministry 10 years 1 hr 12
mins
Internal Auditor Government University 16 years 40 mins
Auditor 1 Office of the AuGF 15 years 54 mins
Auditor 2 Office of the AuGF 12 years 1 hr 18
mins
Auditor 3 Office of the AuGF 10 years 56 mins
Senior Auditor State Auditor-General’s Office 11 years 1 hr 35
mins
Accountant 2 Government Agency 12 years 2 hr 10
mins
Videos
Coding Title Links Duration
AuGF Interview I Focus: Auditing in Nigeria-Challenges and Ways https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDXCvWIgO3A 53 mins
Forward
AuGF Interview II Accountability in the Use of Public Funds One on One with Auditor General of the Federation 57 mins
Anthony Mkpe Ayine – YouTube
AG Conference (2020) Conferences of Auditors-General in Nigeria https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_ 59 mins
(2020) permalink&v=324543125049906
AFRICMIL and MacArthur Corruption, Crime and Cover ups – The travails Corruption, Crime and Cover ups – The travails of 21 mins
Foundation (2020) of whistleblowers in Nigeria whistleblowers in Nigeria – YouTube
Table 2
Documents.
S/N Documents Source

1. Audit Report 2012 Welcome to OauGF Official Website
9. House of Representative Ad hoc Committee Report on Oil Subsidy. KGB 2015 subsidy.pdf (premiumtimesng.com)
10. Report of the Auditor-General for the Federation on Special Periodic Welcome to OauGF Official Website
Checks on the Activities and Programs of Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC) for the Period 1 January 2013 – 30 June 2018.
Cited as NDDC Report (2020).
11. Report on Special Periodic Checks on the Activities and Programs of Welcome to OauGF Official Website
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) for the Period 2008 –
2012.Cited as NDDC Report (2015).
12. Re: Submission of the Auditor-General for the Federation’s Annual re: submission of the auditor-general for the federation’s annual
Report on the Federal Government of Nigeria Consolidated Financial report on the federal government of Nigeria consolidated financial
Statements for the Year Ended 31st December 2019.Cited as Press statements for the year ended 31st December 2019 (oaugf.ng)
Release (2020).
development unit, where he has remained redundant in addition to being denied salary and other entitlements since Decem-
ber 2017 (AFRICMIL & MacArthur Foundation, 2020).
Apart from the general pressures militating against auditors performing their role of maintaining accountability in Nige-
ria, the office of the AuGF has its own additional peculiar pressures that may make them compromise their professional duty
of safeguarding public funds and rendering account of the true state of affairs of the nation. In most cases, the threat to their
independence is a major obstacle toward ensuring accountability and transparency. The audit office is not autonomous and
is subject to the rules of the civil service. For example:
The Office of the Auditor General for the Federation depends on the Federal Civil Service Commission for the recruitment,
promotion and discipline of all but junior staff on GL6 [Grade Level 6] or below. This impedes the administrative inde-
pendence of the Office. (Auditor-General for the Federation, 2016, p. 38)
7
Office of the Auditor -

General for the
Federation/Auditor-
General for the State
Public Accounts
Government
Committee
External Auditors
Government Enterprises Government Ministries

and Agencies and Departments
Fig. 1. Structure of Public Audit in Nigeria.
Promotion is a means for the audit staff to ascend to higher levels and acquire more income for meeting their needs. A
denial of promotion implies a denial of an increase in income. This has some implications for the morale of the audit staff,
and those in charge are fully aware of the implications of the audit staff not being promoted because auditors in the office of
the AuGF are grossly underpaid (Senior Auditor). This leads to self-interest threat and in many cases encourages auditors to
do the bidding of their ‘masters’ (AuGF Interview II).
Presently, the men from the office of the auditor general used to engage in yearly promotion and the people that coor-
dinate the promotion happen to be the Office of the Head of Service and Federal Public Service Commission or Civil Ser-
vice Commission. That means the Civil Service Commission in collaboration with the Office of the Head of Service. And for
that reason alone, if you are actually giving them serious trouble, you may not be promoted. (Principal Auditor)
Also, as a consequence of the low pay of auditors, auditees frequently offer bribes to auditors so that auditors issue a clean
report, which is tantamount to a poor-quality audit (Senior Auditor).
As I am working here, we also have some external auditors that do come around, we usually give them some money just
to influence them. (Project Accountant)
Exposing any form of wrongdoing with the aim of pursuing accountability may perhaps backfire as the audit environment
in Nigeria has been permeated by corruption in the wider society. Examples of this scenario were provided by interviewees
as follows:
We carried out an audit exercise and they stated in the account that they procured two [assets] and unfortunately, we
confirmed the existence of the asset by sending our men to go for that exercise, but when we got there, there was nothing
and it was to the tune of N25million each, we could not find anything. When I got this information, I sent the query
straight to the Chief Executive. Sincerely, they almost removed the Auditor-General himself. They even changed the Head
of Department that signed the query. The executives were not ready to agree with corruption-free environment. (Princi-
pal Auditor)
Now auditors will write any report and give to the client and the client will say no I do not want this one, begin to cancel it
[the report]. This is the beginning of corruption, if you do otherwise you will run into problem. (External Auditor)
know of a friend that lost his job. He was ready to go because the chief executive said he should do something, and he
insisted he was not going to do it. (University Accountant)
Here, it can be seen that in Nigeria, exposing corrupt practices can have severe repercussions. In such an environment, it is
expected that many auditors will not be able to uphold the integrity demanded by their profession. However, responses to an
environment’s institutional norms range ‘‘from passive conformity to proactive manipulation” of institutional pressures
(Oliver, 1991, p. 145). In some instances, auditors are the perpetrators of corruption (see Bakre, 2007); at other times, they
aid in the perpetration of corruption and are coerced into engaging in it (see Abdul-Baki et al., 2020; Lino et al., 2021; Lassou
et al., 2021).
In contrast to the foregoing, the AuGF has been reporting accounting irregularities in its annual report over the years. For
example, in an interview with the AuGF on the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), it was mentioned that the AuGF’s 2017
report stated that ‘‘most MDAs did not remit the sum of N1.6 trillion [approximately USD4.4 billion based on 2017 exchange
rate]” (AuGF Interview I).
In Table 3, we provide some examples of accounting irregularities disclosed by the two AuGFs over the course of their
tenure in their audit reports. We argue that the consistency in such disclosures signifies their determination to disclose
(i.e., resist) corrupt practices of their auditees despite the potential dangers associated with such disclosures, as we discussed
earlier. The AuGFs did not limit this resistance to their annual reports; rather, they extended it to all their engagements. To
8
support this claim, we discuss another report of the AuGF, and highlight the pressures against the AuGF disclosing its find-
ings and the AuGF’s response.
5.2. The case of Niger Delta Development Commission (Defiance)
The NDDC was established in the year 2000 by the NDDC Act of 2000. The NDDC replaced the Oil Mineral Producing Areas
Commission (OMPAC) as an attempt by the government to improve the well-being of the people of the Niger Delta. The Niger
Delta is a large region in Southern Nigeria with a population of about 30 million people. It comprises nine states, including
Rivers State, Bayelsa State, Delta State, Akwa-Ibom State, Cross River State, Edo State, Abia State, Imo State, and Ondo State
(Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2020). The NDDC has the mandate to formulate and implement policies and guidelines for
the socioeconomic and infrastructural development of the Niger Delta. Another key responsibility of the NDDC is to tackle
ecological problems arising from oil and gas exploration in the Niger Delta.
The OAuGF has the mandate to conduct periodic checks on the operations of government agencies and departments. As
such, a compliance audit on the activities of the NDDC was conducted over the period 2003–2018 to ascertain the achieve-
ment of the Commission’s objectives. However, in addition to the underlying general threats to reporting corrupt practices as
discussed in Section 5.1, the AuGF faced numerous specific threats in the conduct of compliance audit of the NDDC.
There were attempts by the NDDC Finance and Accounts Department to frustrate a smooth implementation of the com-
pliance audit by not providing the needed reports and documents for examination.
The team was kept idle for two weeks without any documents and records for the conduct of the AuGF’s statutory duties.
When documents were released, they were made in bits and returned upon completion before further releases. This made
it difficult to cross reference issues observed on the documents. . .. despite the fact that a check list was forwarded in
advance to the Commission. (NDDC Report, 2015, p. 3)
Nonprovision of relevant accounts and documents for audit are typical tactics of government ministries and departments
to frustrate audit efforts (AuGF Interview I; AuGF Interview II). Only when documents are available can the unveiling of
fraudulent practices be made and reported upon. However, when documents are not available, the ability of the AuGF to
make such findings is crippled, and the corrupt practices are unreported. This attempt was consolidated by providing limited
documents when some documents were eventually made available. For example, the AuGF mentioned that:
Cash books were not released to enable the team to determine the number of payment vouchers for the period under
review as only one-year (2011) cash book was produced for examination for the five years accounts expected to be exam-
ined. (NNDC Report, 2015, p. 4)
Despite the insufficiency of necessary documents, the audit team endeavored to scrutinize the ones made available, and
the fraudulent practices revealed therein were unimaginable (see Table 4 for few examples). The NDDC management, having
observed that the audit team were able to make shocking discoveries, sought to further frustrate the revelation of the cor-
ruption as observed by the AuGF:
During the exit conference, the team informed the management of the need to issue memos (audit queries) to respective
officers for which further information may be needed to enable the team to have a conclusive report. The statement did
not go down well with the management of NDDC. Thereafter, after much argument, they vehemently rejected the idea of
memos (audit queries) to individuals. (NNDC Report, 2015, p. 4)
The quote below shows that the report was not expected to be disclosed to the public as the management of the NDDC
requested the audit team to forward their findings and recommendations to them. This explains the management’s vehe-
ment opposition of an individual audit query, because corrupt officials can be individually identified and leaves a stain on
their employment records.
In conclusion, it was agreed that the audit query should be part of the recommendations. Attempt by the team to continue
presenting the report [during the exit conference] was frustrated after the first twenty observations were read out. This
therefore made the exit conference inconclusive. The team was therefore asked to write their report and forward to them
[NDDC management team].
Thus far, the two cases discussed have shown that AuGFs resist corruption through the disclosure of accounting irregu-
larities in their audit reports. This form of response to isomorphic pressure by the AuGF is considered a defiance strategy by
Oliver (1991). To further illustrate this resistance, we discuss another case to show that AuGFs have an alternative to disclos-
ing accounting irregularities amidst pressures to do the opposite. They can simply keep quiet about such discoveries or even
partake in them (i.e., acquiescence), which is the usual response of auditors in Nigeria (Accountant 2). Thus, for them to have
chosen to disclose such accounting irregularities, knowing the possible consequences of such disclosures, they are deter-
mined to resist corruption. To support this argument, we discuss the case of the oil subsidy scandal in Nigeria.
9
Table 3
Examples of Accounting Irregularities in the Financial Statements of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
2013 2014 2016

1 There was no evidence of the authority for the The sum of ₦36 billion (USD 219.6 million) Examination of Note 2 on the Federal
expenditure (disbursements) of the sum of ₦1 was released to the Office of National Security Government share of VAT revealed that the
trillion, by way of Appropriation Act from the Adviser for rehabilitation and the construction sum of ₦108.998 billion (USD 30.2 million)
National Assembly, thereby resulting in extra of dams instead of Federal Ministry of Water was recorded as due to the Federal
budgetary spending of ₦322 billion (USD 2.02 Resources. The purpose of this amount had no Government as share of VAT without the full
billion1). relevance to the mandates of that Office. One picture of the VAT earnings to the Federation
wonders what the Office of Security Adviser from which the Federal Government share
was doing with ‘‘rehabilitation and was derived. However, audit extract from the
constructions of dams”. This was a gross abuse Federation account revealed a figure of
of the funds. ₦116.783 billion as the Federal share from
January to December 2016. This posted a
difference of ₦7.785 billion being a shortfall in
actual Federal Government share of VAT
revenue, recorded in the financial statements.
2 Analysis of actual revenue collected into the In the table of FAAC distribution of Statutory The actual personnel cost of some Ministries,
under listed funds by some collecting Agencies Revenue Allocations, there were direct Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) for the
and amount reported in Note 13 revealed that deductions from FGN shares in respect of 1 % year 2016, when compared with the Personnel
there was under statement of ₦134.4 billion Police Reward Fund totaling ₦5.2 billion (USD Cost Budget as disclosed in Note 11 of the
and over statement ₦83.8 billion, thereby 31.7 million), paid into Account Nos. Financial Statements, revealed extrabudgetary
resulting to a net understatement of 1,750,021,595 and 1,017,557,923 with Skye expenditure of ₦408.7 billion (USD 1.59
₦50.6 billion (USD 317.7 million). Bank and United Bank for Africa, respectively. billion).
Also of note is that this has been a yearly and
regular deduction from the allocations of the
three tiers of Governments (Fed, States, FCTA
and Local), without evidence of accounting for
the utilization of this Fund and no evidence of
the auditing of the Fund.
3 National Information Technology Fund In the Financial Statements, no figure was It was observed on Note 11 that 12 MDAs had
(NITDF) with total collection of ₦9.8 billion given in respect of 4 % cost of collection for actual Personnel Cost for the Financial Year
was not reported in Note 13. Examination of Federal Inland Revenue Service, and there without any approved budget, which resulted
the mandates revealed that a total amount of were no figures for expenditure in respect of in seeming extrabudgetary expenditure of
₦3.8 billion was disbursed from 5 % Sugar Federal Inland Revenue Service personnel and ₦6.049 billion (USD 23.48 million).
Development Levy as against ₦2.7 billion, in overheads costs, because the Financial Report
Note 13, thereby resulting to a difference of of the Organization was not available for
₦1.1 billion (USD 6.9 million) not accounted consolidation. This was the same excuse given
for as a disbursement in Note 13. in the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 Financial
Statements, and no action was taken between
then and now to have complete transactions of
Federal Government Agencies Revenue and
Expenditure incorporated in the account. This
action resulted in the understatement and
noncompleteness of transactions in the
Financial Statements by ₦79.8 billion (USD
486.8 million).
Source: Audit Reports for Years 2013, 2014, and 2016(We examined audit reports for 2012–2019. However, we only used a 3-year sample here for brevity.
Moreover, the accounting irregularities are very similar, and our sample captures the two audit regimes: 2012–2014 for Samuel T. Ukura and 2015–2017 for
Anthony M. Ayine.).
1
Average exchange rates for 2013, 2014, and 2015 are 159.27, 163.93, and 257.66, respectively.
Table 4
Examples of Accounting Irregularities of the NDDC.
1. It was revealed that the sum of ₦836.9 million (USD 2.5 million) and ₦521.4 million (USD 1.6 million) were purportedly paid as imprest for the
offices of Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer (via Nseobot Inyang Willie), Executive Director Finance and Administration (via Nwikpuinee
Nwiluka Luccasson), and Executive Director Project (via Sonni Efe Efurhievwe) for the periods of January to December 2017 and January to June
2018, respectively. It was observed that the said imprests were purportedly used for the procurement of goods and services, payments of
accommodations, and payments of security allowances in excess of approved limit for imprest.
Note: The limit of reimbursable imprests for directors is ₦200,000 (USD 600), and all local procurement of stores and services costing above ₦200,000
should be made only through Award of Contracts.
2. Records available to the team revealed that the sum of ₦70.5 billion (USD 443.9 million) was collected as mobilization payments by 1,723
contractors without going to the site.
3. The analysis of budget performance produced to the team revealed that the Commission overspent various heads and subheads of their yearly
expenditures budget over and above the amount approved to them without recourse to National Assembly approval to the tune of ₦90.5 billion
(USD 570.7 million) for the period of 3 years.
Source: NNDC Report (2015 and 2020).
10
5.3. The case of oil subsidy (Acquiescence)
Nigeria, due to corruption, has most of its refineries not functioning or functioning below maximum capacity. As a result,
to get most of the needed petroleum products, the crude oil is exported, and then refined petroleum products are imported
back into the country at an exorbitant price beyond the capacity of the average Nigerian. The government has long subsi-
dized the prices of refined petroleum products to enable average Nigerians to afford these products. However, in 2011,
the Finance Minister of Nigeria, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, suggested that the subsidy be removed as the rich, through dubious
means, were benefiting more from the scheme than the average Nigerian, while the subsidy to be paid by the government to
oil marketers was skyrocketing (Okonjo-Iweala, 2018). To understand the rapid increase in the subsidy payment and justify
its removal, the government set up a committee to review the scheme for 3 years (2009–2011).
The investigation revealed that while the scheme was ongoing, the Federal Ministry of Finance had employed the services
of two accounting firms due to the distrust it had in its employees, to verify the quantity of crude oil imported by various oil
marketers for the purpose of paying off the subsidy due to them (House of Representative, 2012). However, the House of
Representative ad hoc committee found that:
. . ..the firms contributed little value to the veracity of the exercise. Indeed, during interaction with the Committee, it
became obvious that the firms had neither adequate knowledge of procedure of measuring products in a vessel before
and after discharge nor did they demonstrate professional care expected of their standing in auditing marketers’ claims
based on quantity, exchange rate and crude price. This care-free attitude could hardly be explained beyond an interest of
participating in a bazaar and collecting N275,000 per vessel. Surprisingly, the loophole of non-availability of reliable data
on quantity of imported products or any other relevant information could not be salvaged by these firms (House of Rep-
resentative, 2012, p. 85).
Corruption is an institutionalized practice in Nigeria, which has affected the practices of accountants (Okike, 2004). There-
fore, the nonresistance to corruption by the two accounting firms is understandably a compliance with the status quo. In par-
ticular, accounting firms are set up for profit making (Sikka, 2008), and these two firms are not different. Their survival in
business is dependent on their ability to acquire and maintain their clientele. In a country like Nigeria, especially in the public
sector, where corruption is the norm, accounting firms will find it difficult to not engage in corrupt activities for the client or, at
the very least, will turn a blind eye to such practices. This assertion is confirmed by one of the interviewees below:
Those audit firms, there is no job for them to do, so the ones they get, they want to do everything possible to attract and
retain, and if you have that mindset of attracting and retaining, there is nothing you cannot do. (Accountant)
It was noted by the House of Representatives (2012, p.85) that ‘‘there was no evidence that due process was followed in the
process of their [i.e., the two accounting firms] appointment as consultants.” It can be inferred from this that the appointment of
the two accounting firms was most likely due to some political or social connections with some key officials from the Federal
Ministry of Finance. With this, the seed of corruption is sown, as the two accounting firms cannot bite the hand that feeds them.
The irregular appointment and the desire to retain audit clients are not the only pressures faced by the audit firms to aid
corruption in the oil subsidy scheme. The coercive isomorphic pressure arising from the involvement of other individuals
and agencies in the scheme in corrupt practices is equally an important factor. Regarding this, one of the interviewees com-
mented as follows:
So, the environment we are taking about, the oil subsidy issue, is a sensitive issue that if an angel goes there, he will be
influenced. The issue is more than what we are saying; it cannot be survived by any accounting firm because of the
threats, the money, the involvement of the president, all the companies are involved and you are asked to go there,
the intimidation is there so whatever condition they give you will be accepted by you. It is a very serious environment
to audit. (External Auditor)
The above case shows a different response to institutionalized corruption by the two accounting firms. In contrast to the
AuGFs that have consistently reported corrupt practices encountered during the course of the audit of government ministries
and departments, the two accounting firms allegedly did not only partake in the corruption but also facilitated the hiding of
the corruption from the public and government authorities, as observed below:
Staff of the [accounting] firms appended their signatures on every document submitted by marketers to process their
claims. Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) testified that the reliance it placed on the signatures
was weighty, as it normally forwarded marketers’ claims for payment to Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) once certified
by the firms. Reliance on statements of the two firms was foundational, as all other agencies, including the Ministry of
Finance, Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation and the CBN, all relied on PPPRA’s certification. (House of Rep-
resentative, 2012, p. 84)
The alleged involvement of the two accounting firms in corrupt practices of the oil subsidy scheme shows a stark differ-
ence from the response of the AuGFs, despite facing similar pressures to support corruption. The consistency of the AuGFs in
reporting corrupt practices of ministries and departments, as we have shown in the first two cases discussed, shows that
such behavior is not an isolated case for the office; rather, the office is determined to fight corruption in Nigeria regardless
of the pressures to act otherwise.
11
5.4. Hiding resistance to corruption (Avoidance)
Brivot and Gendron (2011) discussed ‘hiding’ as a resistance strategy whereby actors act against institutions (i.e., rules
and practices) without making it obvious. Hiding is one of the avoidance strategies identified by Oliver (1991). As discussed
earlier, the danger embedded in reporting corrupt practices in Nigeria is enormous. For this reason, when the AuGF was
asked about the reason why many accountants may not be interested in being a public sector auditor in an interview, he
answered thus:
Especially in our environment, it is quite a risky job because you are writing about infractions of others and I may not go
too far on that. You know the risk involved in the process. (AuGF Interview II)
The quote above shows that the AuGF is aware of the risk and, due to the prevalence of corruption, expects the inter-
viewer to similarly be aware of the risk involved in disclosing corrupt practices. Mentioning that he may not go too far
on discussing the issue also shows his unwillingness to talk about the details publicly (i.e., hiding) even though his reports
are ridden with revelations of such infractions. It is not surprising that President Muhammadu Buhari, the current President
of Nigeria, is also aware of this reality. In the auditors-general conference held in 2020, the President emphasized the need
for auditors-general to do their work without fear or compromise, establishing the existence of such fear that has often led to
a compromise.
Let me emphasize once again the importance of your role as the constitutional watchdogs. You are to be vigilant, inde-
pendent, and to be above politics. Your work must be of the highest quality and you must report your findings without
fear or compromise. (AG Conference, 2020)
We observed that none of the AuGFs suffered severe consequences for disclosing corrupt practices of ministries and
departments, with the exception of an acting AuGF whose appointment was not confirmed after indicting the three arms
of government in his audit report. We argue that the AuGF is able to sustain resistance to corruption in Nigeria through ‘hid-
ing.’ They disclose the infractions in their reports but at the same time manage to escape the usual consequences of such an
action. Therefore, understanding specific channels or strategies adopted by the AuGFs to sustain resistance to corruption is
quite important. We now discuss how the AuGFs have been able to hide their resistance to corruption.
5.4.1. Qualified vs adverse opinion

Accountants form audit opinions based on their findings from an audit. When the errors in the financial statements they
audited are not pervasive (i.e., not affecting the whole financial statements), they typically issue a qualified opinion. Where
the errors are pervasive, they issue an adverse opinion. In the event that the accountant is unable to form an opinion but
believes that, if he were able to do so, the errors will certainly be pervasive, a disclaimer opinion is issued. Auditors issue
unqualified opinions when they do not find material errors in the financial statements.
To hide their resistance to corruption, AuGFs have stated that the financial statements of the Federal Government show a
true and fair view subject to their observations (i.e., ‘except for’ opinion) rather than stating outright that financial state-
ments of the government of Nigeria do not show a true and fair view, based on the pervasiveness of accounting irregularities
(see Table 5 for audit opinions of the AuGFs). Typically, an ‘except for’ opinion is used when accounting irregularities are not
pervasive, but in this case, the plethora of irregularities is inconceivable (as presented in Table 4). Thus, an ‘except for’ opin-
ion is inappropriate, and an adverse opinion should be used instead.
Prior experience has shown that a confrontational approach may cost the AuGFs their job, as the case of Mr Vincent Azie, a
former AuGF, showed:
On February 10, 2003, Mr Vincent Azie, then acting Auditor-General of the Federation was sacked by President Olusegun
Obasanjo. The controversial decision was predicated on the damning 2001 audit report Azie authored which incriminated
the three arms of government. It revealed how billions of Naira were collected for purchases not made, contracts not exe-
cuted and for the supply of what in most cases were simply listed as ‘‘various items”. (This Day, 2013)
Therefore, the AuGFs must have learned from this incident and arguably now use a less confrontational approach in their
resistance. The ‘except for’ opinion is a form of logic of resistance. As noted by Radcliffe (2008), the mundane nature of audi-
tors’ work and findings arguably makes the Executive Summary ‘‘the most influential and widely read section” (p. 111) of the
audit report. The Executive Summary section simply states some basic findings of the report, while the findings of several
accounting irregularities are embedded in the audit report and are not often read by users of the financial statements
(Radcliffe, 2008). One of the interviewees confirmed this argument of Radcliffe (2008) as follows:
How many people read the audit report? If you were not doing a research I am sure you would not have read the report.
(Auditor 2)
Similarly, the AuGF’s audit report is divided into part I and part II; however, one of the interviewed auditors (Auditor 1)
was not aware that part I of the audit report is now published. When asked why he was not aware of the publication of part I,
he mentioned that they submit their findings to the AuGF, who compiles the report, and he hardly bothers about the report
afterward. This shows the possibility that many of the audit team members may not even read the report following the
completion of their audit assignments. Thus, it further demonstrates Radcliffe’s (2008) argument.
12
Table 5
Audit Opinions 2012–2017.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Opinion In my opinion the In my opinion the In my opinion the In my opinion, the In my opinion, In my opinion,
Financial Financial Financial Financial except for the except for the
Statements give a Statements give a Statements give a Statements give a effects of the effects of the
true and fair view true and fair view true and fair view true and fair view matters described matters described
of the state of of the state of of the state of of the states of in the Basis for in the Basis for
affairs of the affairs of the affairs of the affairs of the Qualified Opinion Qualified Opinion
Government of the Government of the Government of the Government of the section of this Section of this
Federation as at Federation as at Federation as at Federation as at report, the report, the
31st December 31st December 31st December 31st December accompanying accompanying
2012 and of the 2013 and of the 2014 and of the 2015 and of the financial Financial
financial financial financial financial statements present Statements present
transactions for the transactions for the transactions for the transactions for the fairly, in all fairly in all
fiscal year ended fiscal year ended fiscal year ended fiscal year ended material respects, material respects,
on that date on that date on that date on that date, the financial the financial
subject to the subject to the subject to the subject to the position of the position of the
observations observations observations observations Federal Federal
contained in my contained in my contained in my contained herein Government of Government of
Domestic Report Domestic Report Domestic Report and Part 1 of Nigeria as at Nigeria as at
dated 30th dated 10th March dated 14th March Auditor-General’s December 31, December 31,
December 2013. 2015. 2016 Annual Report for 2016, and (of) its 2017, and (of) its
Financial year financial financial
ended 31st performance and performance and
December 2015 its cash flows for its cash flows for
earlier issued. the year then the year then
ended in ended in
accordance with accordance with
International International
Public Sector PublicSector
Accounting Accounting
Standards (IPSAS). Standards (IPSAS).
AuGF Samuel T. Ukura Samuel T. Ukura Samuel T. Ukura Anthony M. Ayine Anthony M. Ayine Anthony M. Ayine
Categorization Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified
of opinion
Source: Audit Reports for Years 2012–2017.
Despite questioning almost every aspect of the financial statements, indicating the pervasiveness of irregularities, the
AuGFs have been pragmatic in expressing their audit opinion by adopting a less challenging tone in the most widely read
aspect of the audit report (i.e., the Executive Summary). According to some of the interviewees, the use of the ‘except for’
opinion enables the AuGF to hide the resistance to corruption, as stated below:
You understand Nigeria. Everybody is trying to be economical with the truth. Because the AuGF is not giving an adverse
opinion is as good as being economical with the truth. He has already spelt out the irregularities. (Auditor 1)
Maybe when you are trying to find a balance, you will still convey what you have in mind and will not create so much
damage. Sometimes you may be forced to find a balance in your opinion. So, you stay in the middle. What is important to
you is that you have been able to convey and depict what happened. Maybe it is not 100 % in terms of blowing the whole
thing, but one important thing is that you have said what you are supposed to say. (Auditor 2)
It is not inconceivable to state that the AuGFs are aware that the details of the report are hardly read despite being hosted
on the website of the office of the AuGF, which may have led them to reveal the accounting irregularities in the less read part
of their report. It is important to state that the hosting of audit reports on the website of the office of the AuGF began in 2015
(AG Conference, 2020). Prior to this, there was limited public access to these reports. This further substantiates the hiding
strategy of the AuGFs.
5.4.2. Challenging the media

The media is a powerful actor in shaping the public’s perception of an issue (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Camaj, 2013).
‘‘Increased media attention is believed to lead to increased community concern for a given issue” (Brown & Deegan, 1998,
p. 25). Regarding corruption, Neu et al. (2013b) found that media attention triggered investigation into corruption in the
Canadian government’s sponsorship program. Similarly, Islam (2014) found that media attention increased public concern
about corruption in Australian local councils.
The AuGF recognizes the power of the media and its ability to shape public perception of events. As such, following his
declaration that likely errors and unsubstantiated balance of N 4.97 trillion (USD 11.3 billion) were discovered in the
13
consolidated financial statements of the Federal Government, which the media framed as a misappropriation of funds, the
AuGF published a press release to counter such claim:
The Auditor-General for the Federation (AuGF), Mr Aghughu Adolphus A., wishes to state unequivocally that the ‘unsub-
stantiated balances of N4.97 trillion’ mentioned in his address during submission of his annual report of the Federal
Government of Nigeria’s (FGN) consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31st December 2019 to the clerk
to the National Assembly on 18th August 2021 was not misappropriation of funds as misrepresented in certain section
of both print and electronic media. (AuGF Press Release, 2021)
If the AuGF had not made such declarations, public perception would have been that the current government is irrespon-
sible and reckless regarding public funds. To further clear the air, the AuGF moved on to state that the account of the FGN
shows a true and fair view despite such an unprecedented level of errors.
For avoidance of the doubt, the AuGF states ‘‘the materiality was determined in the context of the likely errors and unsub-
stantiated balances amounting to ₦4.97 trillion (USD 13.8 billion) noted in the course of the audit which was above the
materiality level of ₦89.34 bn set for the audit, among others.” This statement was made as one of the bases for his qual-
ified opinion. The qualified opinion notwithstanding, the FGN’s Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended 31st
December 2019 was true and fair. (AuGF Press Release, 2021)
This is another hiding strategy by the AuGF. Through the declaration that the financial statements of the Federal Govern-
ment show a true and fair view, the AuGF is attempting to hide his resistance to corruption. Such declaration has the poten-
tial to make the irregularity to be perceived as less severe than it ordinarily is.
6. Conclusion
Accountants and auditors in Nigeria operate in an environment that is enmeshed in corruption. Their approach to engag-
ing with this corruption-ridden environment in the discharge of their duties ranges from compliance with institutional pre-
scriptions to actively resisting the source of institutional pressure. While resistance to institutional pressures is uncommon,
compliance with institutional norms is widespread (Bakre, 2007, Abdul-Baki et al., 2021). Our study examines the middle
range between the two extremes. Despite the consequences of disclosing corrupt practices, the AuGFs have chosen to chal-
lenge corruption. However, the disclosures have been kept hidden through different means by the AuGFs, ranging from non-
publication of audit reports until 2015 to using a positive tone in the expression of audit opinion and countering media
narratives.
Although the AuGFs disclose accounting irregularities, the hiding strategies they have adopted have undermined the pos-
sibility of bringing corruption perpetrators in the public service to book. Nonpublication of audit reports means that public
and media pressures to hold erring officers accountable will be avoided as there is no evidence of their culpability. Similarly,
the positive tone in the audit opinion may also create an appearance of a ‘normal’ public service because the use of an ‘except
for’ opinion means everything is ‘fine’ except for a few things. In fact, such a positive tone may deter readers from venturing
deeper into the report to uncover accounting irregularities disclosed therein.
Overall, while the purpose of SAIs is to ensure accountability and transparency in the use of public funds, the hiding of
such disclosures may work against this end goal. The courage of the AuGFs to disclose such high-level corrupt practices is
commendable. Nonetheless, the hiding of such disclosures has not made these efforts apparent. In any case, the Public
Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Nigeria is charged with holding erring government officials accountable
for their corrupt practices. Therefore, the AuGFs’ hiding of their resistance should not have crippled their accountability if
the PAC were doing its job.
Prior studies have shown that auditors in the public sector are incapacitated in guarding public funds against misman-
agement and corruption as a result of many pressures. These pressures include the influence of politicohegemonic forces that
crippled public auditors’ independence and judgment (Neu et al., 2013a; Lassou et al., 2021; Sumiyana et al., 2021; Lino et al.,
2021), and the prioritization of profit-seeking over public interest by audit firms working in a public sector context (Abdul-
Baki et al., 2021). In contrast to these studies, our findings show that despite the existence of similar pressures within the
operating environment of the AuGF in Nigeria, the AuGF continues to disclose corrupt practices in resistance to institution-
alized corruption in Nigeria. In a corruption-ridden environment, accountants can still disclose corrupt practices and facil-
itate the accountability process, although they may not make their efforts very apparent. The first process in ensuring
accountability over public funds is the reporting of corrupt practices in audit reports, which are submitted to the PAC for
further actions. However, if the PAC does not act, the process is truncated. Thus, to really ensure accountability in Nigeria,
all mechanisms of the accountability system need to be determined to fight corruption. Until such overall coordination is
achieved, the AuGFs can hardly achieve more than they are now.
This study extends prior studies, and we hope it opens up further interesting inquiries in this research area. We make
some suggestions for future research. Firstly, the question ‘‘How determined are accountants in fighting corruption?” is
an important one. Unlike the use of avoidance strategy (hiding) by AuGFs in Nigeria, are there auditors who use a more chal-
lenging strategy of defiance to resist corruption? What are the implications of using these strategies and how has this strat-
egy been sustained? Secondly, we observed a progressive trend in the AuGFs’ wording of their opinions. It is important to
14
have an in-depth study on this to understand the evolution of AuGFs’ audit opinion with particular emphasis on the factors
leading to this evolution. Such study should examine how audit opinion has been localized given specific local conditions of
Nigeria. Thirdly, while this study examines resistance to corruption as an outcome, it is important to understand the pro-
cesses leading to this outcome. Particularly, it is important to understand how the AuGFs’ audit teams are arguably encour-
aged to resist pressures of corruption. What training do they receive? Are there codes of ethics they must adopt, and how
committed are they to these codes?
At present, the office of the AuGF does not have the power to prosecute. As such, their disclosure of corruption, while it is
needed, has limited impact in the fight against corruption. However, there are corruption-fighting institutions in Nigeria,
including the EFCC and the Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), with which the
office of the AuGF can form alliances in fighting corruption in Nigeria. Similarly, the government needs to ensure that the
office of the AuGF, while being legally independent, has the needed administrative and financial independence to carry
out its functions without fear or favor. In the meantime, as it is the case in Ghana, the AuGF can be granted powers to sur-
charge any individual found to have engaged in accounting irregularities. Such powers will enhance the authority of the
AuGF and make government officials more responsive to audit queries.
Data availability
The links to the secondary data are in the manuscript.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have
appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
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J. Account.

Public Policy 42 (2023) 107052

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

J. Account. Public Policy

Full length article

Resisting institutionalized corruption: The case of public audit

2. Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) and corruption

3.1. Institutional isomorphism

3.2. The logic of resistance

3.3. Resisting corruption in Nigeria

4. Research method and data analysis

4.1. Research method

5.1. The case of annual audit of the AuGFs (Defiance)

Pseudonym Industry Experience Duration

S/N Documents Source

Office of the Auditor -

Government Enterprises Government Ministries

Fig. 1. Structure of Public Audit in Nigeria.

5.2. The case of Niger Delta Development Commission (Defiance)

2013 2014 2016

Source: NNDC Report (2015 and 2020).

5.3. The case of oil subsidy (Acquiescence)

5.4. Hiding resistance to corruption (Avoidance)

5.4.1. Qualified vs adverse opinion

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: Audit Reports for Years 2012–2017.

5.4.2. Challenging the media

The links to the secondary data are in the manuscript.

Declaration of Competing Interest

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