Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
“Therefore we do not lose heart. Though
outwardly we are wasting away, yet
inwardly we are being renewed day by
day.”
2 Corinthians 4:16
PART 12
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
SECTION 5. No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
WHAT ARE THE TWO
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
UNDER SECTION 5?
1. Non-Establishment of religion; and
2. Free Exercise of religion
NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR (2006)
FACTS: n a sworn-letter complaint dated
July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro
Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253,
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for
an investigation of respondent Soledad
Escritor, court interpreter in said court,
for living with a man not her husband,
and having borne a child within this
live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that
Escritor is committing an immoral act
that tarnishes the image of the court, thus
she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that
the court condones her act.[2]
Consequently, respondent was charged
with committing “disgraceful and immoral
conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter
VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Respondent Escritor testified that
when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
she was already a widow, her husband
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
having died in 1998. She admitted that she
started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage more
than twenty years ago when her husband
was still alive but living with another
woman. She also admitted that she and
Quilapio have a son. But as a member of
the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, respondent asserted that
their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs and
has the approval of her congregation.
In fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.” For
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration
allows members of the congregation who
have been abandoned by their spouses to
enter into marital relations . The
Declaration thus makes the resulting
union mora l and binding within the
congregation all over the world except in
countries where divorce is allowed. As
laid out by the tenets of their faith, the
Jehovah’s congregation requires that at
the time the declarations are executed,
the couple cannot secure the civil
authorities’ approval of the marital
relationship because of legal
impediments. Only couples who have
been baptized and in good standing may
execute the Declaration, which requires
the approval of the elders of the
congregation. As a matter of practice, the
marital status of the declarants and their
respective spouses’ commission of
adultery are investigated before the
declarations are executed. Escritor and
Quilapio’s declarations were executed in
the usual and approved form prescribed
by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by
elders of the congregation where the
declarations were executed, and recorded
in the Watch Tower Central Office.
Moreover, the Jehovah’s
congregation believes that once all legal
impediments for the couple are lifted, the
validity of the declarations ceases, and
the couple should legalize their union. In
Escritor’s case, although she was
widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal
impediment to marry on her part, her
mate was still not capacitated to remarry.
Thus, their declarations remained valid. In
1 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
sum, therefore, insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is
nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and
Quilapio and they remain members in
good standing in the congregation.
HELD: In our decision dated August 4,
2003, after a long and arduous scrutiny
into the origins and development of the
religion clauses in the United States (U.S.)
and the Philippines, we held that in
resolving claims involving religious
freedom (1) BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
OR ACCOMMODATION, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit,
intent and framework underlying the
religion clauses in our Constitution; and
(2) in deciding respondent’s “plea of
exemption based on the Free Exercise
Clause” (from the law with which she is
administratively charged), it is the
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST,
the strictest test, which must be applied.
In sum, a review of the Old World
antecedents of religion shows the
movement of establishment of religion as
an engine to promote state interests, to
the principle of non-establishment to
allow the free exercise of religion.
Religion Clauses in the U.S.
Context U.S. history has produced TWO
identifiably different, even opposing,
strains of jurisprudence on the religion
clauses.
First is THE STANDARD OF
SEPARATION, which may take the form of
either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer
version of strict neutrality or separation ,
or what Mr. Justice Carpio refers to as the
second theory of governmental neutrality.
Although the latter form is not as
hostile to religion as the former , both are
anchored on the Jeffersonian premise
that a “wall of separation” must exist
between the state and the Church to
protect the state from the church . Both
protect the principle of church-state
separation with a rigid reading of the
principle.
On the other hand, the second
standard, the BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
OR ACCOMMODATION, is buttressed by
the view that the wall of separation is
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
meant to protect the church from the
state.
FIRST STANDARD: Strict
Separation and Strict
Neutrality/Separation The STRICT
SEPARATIONIST believes that the
Establishment Clause was meant to
protect the state from the church, and
the state’s hostility towards religion
allows no interaction between the two.
According to this Jeffersonian view, an
“absolute barrier” to formal
interdependence of religion and state
needs to be erected. Religious institutions
could not receive aid, whether direct or
indirect, from the state. Nor could the
state adjust its secular programs to
alleviate burdens the programs placed on
believers. Only the complete separation of
religion from politics would eliminate the
formal influence of religious institutions
and provide for a free choice among
political views, thus a strict “wall of
separation” is necessary.
Strict separation faces difficulties,
however, as it is deeply embedded in
American history and contemporary
practice that enormous amounts of aid,
both direct and indirect, flow to religion
from government in return for huge
amounts of mostly indirect aid from
religion. For example, less than
twenty-four hours after Congress
adopted the First Amendment’s
prohibition on laws respecting an
establishment of religion, Congress
decided to express its thanks to God
Almighty for the many blessings enjoyed
by the nation with a resolution in favor of
a presidential proclamation declaring a
national day of Thanksgiving and Prayer.
Thus, strict separationists are caught in
an awkward position of claiming a
constitutional principle that has never
existed and is never likely to.
The tamer version of the strict
separationist view, the STRICT
NEUTRALITY OR SEPARATIONIST VIEW,
(or, the governmental neutrality theory)
finds basis in Everson v. Board of
Education, where the Court declared that
Jefferson’s “wall of separation”
encapsulated the meaning of the First
Amendment.
2 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
However, unlike the strict
separationists, the strict neutrality view
believes that the “wall of separation” does
not require the state to be their
adversary.” Rather, the state must be
NEUTRAL in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers.
“State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor
them.” The strict neutrality approach is
not hostile to religion, but it is strict in
holding that religion may not be used as a
basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action , whether the action
confers rights or privileges or imposes
duties or obligations. Only secular criteria
may be the basis of government action. It
does not permit, much less require,
accommodation of secular programs to
religious belief.
The problem with the strict
neutrality approach, however, is if applied
in interpreting the Establishment Clause,
it could lead to a de facto voiding of
religious expression in the Free Exercise
Clause. As pointed out by Justice
Goldberg in his concurring opinion in
Abington School District v. Schempp]
strict neutrality could lead to “a brooding
and pervasive devotion to the secular and
a passive, or even active, hostility to the
religious” which is prohibited by the
Constitution.Professor Laurence Tribe
commented in his authoritative treatise,
viz:
To most observers strict neutrality
has seemed incompatible with the very
idea of a free exercise clause. The
Framers, whatever specific applications
they may have intended, clearly
envisioned religion as something special;
they enacted that vision into law by
guaranteeing the free exercise of religion
but not, say, of philosophy or science. The
strict neutrality approach all but erased
this distinction. Thus it is not surprising
that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
strict neutrality, permitting and
sometimes mandating religious
classifications.
Thus, the dilemma of the
separationist approach, whether in the
form of strict separation or strict
neutrality, is that while the Jeffersonian
wall of separation “captures the spirit of
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
the American ideal of church-state
separation,” in real life, church and state
are not and cannot be totally separate.
This is all the more true in contemporary
times when both the government and
religion are growing and expanding their
spheres of involvement and activity,
resulting in the intersection of
government and religion at many points.
SECOND STANDARD: Benevolent
Neutrality/Accommodation
The theory of benevolent
neutrality or accommodation is premised
on a different view of the “wall of
separation,” associated with Williams,
founder of the Rhode Island colony.
Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant
to protect the state from the church, the
wall is meant to protect the church from
the state Benevolent neutrality
recognizes that religion plays an
important role in the public life of the
United States as shown by many
traditional government practices which,
to strict neutrality, pose Establishment
Clause questions. Among these are the
inscription of “In God We Trust” on
American currency; the recognition of
America as “one nation under God” in the
official pledge of allegiance to the flag;
the Supreme Court’s time-honored
practice of opening oral argument with
the invocation “God save the United
States and this Honorable Court”; and the
practice of Congress and every state
legislature of paying a chaplain, usually of
a particular Protestant denomination, to
lead representatives in prayer. These
practices clearly show the preference for
one theological viewpoint— the existence
of and potential for intervention by a god
— over the contrary theological viewpoint
of atheism. Church and government
agencies also cooperate in the building of
low-cost housing and in other forms of
poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism
and drug addiction, in foreign aid and
other government activities with strong
moral dimension.
Examples of accommodations in
American jurisprudence also abound,
including, but not limited to the U.S.
Court declaring the following acts as
constitutional: a state hiring a
Presbyterian minister to lead the
3 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
legislature in daily prayers, or requiring
employers to pay workers compensation
when the resulting inconsistency
between work and Sabbath leads to
discharge; for government to give money
to religiously-affiliated organizations to
teach adolescents about proper sexual
behavior; or to provide religious school
pupils with books; or bus rides to
religious schools; or with cash to pay for
state-mandated standardized tests.
As with the other rights under the
Constitution, the rights embodied in the
Religion clauses are invoked in relation to
governmental action, almost invariably in
the form of legislative acts. Generally
speaking, a legislative act that purposely
aids or inhibits religion will be challenged
as unconstitutional, either because it
violates the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause or both. This is true
whether one subscribes to the
separationist approach or the benevolent
neutrality or accommodationist approach.
But the more difficult religion
cases involve legislative acts which have a
secular purpose and general applicability,
but may incidentally or inadvertently aid
or burden religious exercise. Though the
government action is not religiously
motivated, these laws have a the free exercise claim. Otherwise, the
“burdensome effect” on religious exercise.
The benevolent neutrality theory
believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of
religion may be allowed, not to promote
the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance.
The purpose of accommodations is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the
“government may take religion into
account to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.” In the ideal world, the legislature
would recognize the religions and their
practices and would consider them, when
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
practical, in enacting laws of general
application. But when the legislature fails
to do so, religions that are threatened and
burdened may turn to the courts for
protection.
Thus, what is sought under the
theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption
from its application or its “burdensome
effect,” whether by the legislature or the
courts . Most of the free exercise claims
brought to the U.S. Court are for
exemption, not invalidation of the facially
neutral law that has a “burdensome”
effect.
Sherbert, Yoder and Smith The
pinnacle of free exercise protection and
the theory of accommodation in the U.S.
blossomed in the case of Sherbert v.
Verner, which ruled that state regulation
that indirectly restrains or punishes
religious belief or conduct must be
subjected to strict scrutiny under the
Free Exercise Clause . According to
Sherbert, when a law of general
application infringes religious exercise,
albeit incidentally, the state interest
sought to be promoted must be so
paramount and compelling as to override
Court itself will carve out the exemption.
It is certain that not every
conscience can be accommodated by all
the laws of the land; but when general
laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless
some “compelling state interest”
intervenes. Thus, Sherbert and
subsequent cases held that when
government action burdens, even
inadvertently, a sincerely held religious
belief or practice, the state must justify
the burden by demonstrating that the law
embodies a compelling interest, that no
less restrictive alternative exists, and that
a religious exemption would impair the
state’s ability to effectuate its compelling
interest. As in other instances of state
action affecting fundamental rights,
negative impacts on those rights demand
the highest level of judicial scrutiny. After
Sherbert, this strict scrutiny balancing
test resulted in court-mandated religious
exemptions from facially-neutral laws of
4 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
general application whenever unjustified
burdens were found.
Then, in the 1972 case of Wisconsin
v. Yoder, the U.S. Court again ruled that
religious exemption was in order,
notwithstanding that the law of general
application had a criminal penalty. Using
heightened scrutiny, the Court
overturned the conviction of Amish
parents for violating Wisconsin
compulsory school-attendance laws.
The Court, in effect, granted
exemption from a neutral, criminal
statute that punished religiously
motivated conduct. The cases of Sherbert
and Yoder laid out the following
doctrines:
a. Free exercise clause claims were
subject to heightened scrutiny or
compelling interest test if
government substantially
burdened the exercise of religion;
b. Heightened scrutiny or compelling
interest test governed cases where
the burden was direct, i.e., the
exercise of religion triggered a
criminal or civil penalty, as well as
cases where the burden was
indirect, i.e., the exercise of
religion resulted in the forfeiture
of a government benefit; and (c)
the Court could carve out
accommodations or exemptions
from a facially neutral law of
general application, whether
general or criminal.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had
five main components. First, action was
protected—conduct beyond speech,
press, or worship was included in the
shelter of freedom of religion. Neither
Sherbert’s refusal to work on the Sabbath
nor the Amish parents’ refusal to let their
children attend ninth and tenth grades
can be classified as conduct protected by
the other clauses of the First Amendment.
Second, indirect impositions on religious
conduct, such as the denial of twenty-six
weeks of unemployment insurance
benefits to Adel Sherbert, as well as direct
restraints, such as the criminal
prohibition at issue in Yoder, were
prohibited.
Third, as the language in the two
cases indicate, the protection granted
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
was extensive. Only extremely strong
governmental interests justified
impingement on religious conduct, as the
absolute language of the test of the Free
Exercise Clause suggests.
A free exercise claim could result
to THREE KINDS OF ACCOMMODATION:
a. those which are found to be
constitutionally compelled, i.e.,
required by the Free Exercise
Clause;
b. those which are discretionary or
legislative, i.e., not required by the
Free Exercise Clause but
nonetheless permitted by the
Establishment Clause; and
c. those which the religion clauses
prohibit.
MANDATORY ACCOMMODATION
results when the Court finds that
accommodation is required by the Free
Exercise Clause, i.e, when the Court itself
carves out an exemption. This
accommodation occurs when all three
conditions of the compelling interest test
are met:
1. a statute or government action has
burdened claimant’s free exercise
of religion, and there is no doubt
as to the sincerity of the religious
belief;
2. the state has failed to demonstrate
a particularly important or
compelling governmental goal in
preventing an exemption; and
3. that the state has failed to
demonstrate that it used the least
restrictive means.
In these cases, the Court finds that
the injury to religious conscience is so
great and the advancement of public
purposes is incomparable that only
indifference or hostility could explain a
refusal to make exemptions. Thus, if the
state’s objective could be served as well or
almost as well by granting an exemption
to those whose religious beliefs are
burdened by the regulation, the Court
must grant the exemption. The Yoder
case is an example where the Court held
that the state must accommodate the
religious beliefs of the Amish who
objected to enrolling their children in
high school as required by law.
5 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
The Sherbert case is another
example where the Court held that the
state unemployment compensation plan
must accommodate the religious
convictions of Sherbert.
PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION ,
the Court finds that the State may, but is
not required to, accommodate religious
interests. The U.S. Walz case illustrates
this situation where the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of tax
exemption given by New York to church
properties, but did not rule that the state
was required to provide tax exemptions.
The Court declared that “the limits of
permissible state accommodation to
religion are by no means coextensive with
the noninterference mandated by the
Free Exercise Clause.” Other examples are
Zorach v. Clauson, allowing released time
in public schools and Marsh v. Chambers,
allowing payment of legislative chaplains
from public funds. Parenthetically, the
Court in Smith has ruled that this is the
only accommodation allowed by the
Religion Clauses.
PROHIBITED ACCOMMODATION .
as when the Court finds no basis for a
mandatory accommodation, or it
determines that the legislative
accommodation runs afoul of the
establishment or the free exercise clause,
it results to a In this case, the Court finds
that establishment concerns prevail over
potential accommodation interests. To
say that there are valid exemptions
buttressed by the Free Exercise Clause
does not mean that all claims for free
exercise exemptions are valid. An example
where accommodation was prohibited is
McCollum v. Board of Education, where
the Court ruled against optional religious
instruction in the public school premises.
Given that a free exercise claim could lead
to three different results, the question
now remains as to how the Court should
determine which action to take. In this
regard, it is the strict scrutiny-compelling
state interest test which is most in line
with the benevolent
neutrality-accommodation approach.
Under the benevolent-neutrality
theory, the principle underlying the First
Amendment is that freedom to carry out
one’s duties to a Supreme Being is an
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
inalienable right, not one dependent on
the grace of legislature. Religious freedom
is seen as a substantive right and not
merely a privilege against discriminatory
legislation. With religion looked upon
with benevolence and not hostility,
benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances.
US Constitution and jurisprudence
vis-à-vis Philippine Constitution By
juxtaposing the American Constitution
and jurisprudence against that of the
Philippines, it is immediately clear that
one cannot simply conclude that we have
adopted—lock, stock and barrel—the
religion clauses as embodied in the First
Amendment, and therefore, the U.S.
Court’s interpretation of the same. Unlike
in the U.S. where legislative exemptions
of religion had to be upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court as constituting permissive
accommodations, similar exemptions for
religion are mandatory accommodations
under our own constitutions.
Thus, our 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions contain provisions on tax
exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government
institutions, and optional religious
instruction. Our own preamble also
invokes the aid of a divine being. These
constitutional provisions are wholly ours
and have no counterpart in the U.S.
Constitution or its amendments. They all
reveal without doubt that the Filipino
people, in adopting these constitutions,
manifested their adherence to the
benevolent neutrality approach that
requires accommodations in interpreting
the religion clauses.
The argument of Mr. Justice Carpio
that the August 4, 2003 ponencia was
erroneous insofar as it asserted that the
1935 Constitution incorporates the Walz
ruling as this case was decided
subsequent to the 1935 Constitution is a
misreading of the ponencia. What the
ponencia pointed out was that even as
early as 1935, or more than three decades
before the U.S. Court could validate the
exemption in Walz as a form or
permissible accommodation, we have
already incorporated the same in our
Constitution, as a mandatory
6 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
accommodation. There is no ambiguity
with regard to the Philippine
Constitution’s departure from the U.S.
Constitution, insofar as religious
accommodations are concerned. It is
indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution.[128] As stated in our
Decision, dated August 4, 2003:
The history of the religion clauses
in the 1987 Constitution shows that these
clauses were largely adopted from the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
xxxx Philippine jurisprudence and
commentaries on the religious clauses
also continued to borrow authorities from
U.S. jurisprudence without articulating
the stark distinction between the two
streams of U.S. jurisprudence i.e.,
separation and benevolent neutrality. One
might simply conclude that the Philippine
Constitution and jurisprudence also
inherited the disarray of U.S. religion
clause jurisprudence and the two
identifiable streams; thus, when a religion
clause case comes before the Court, a
separationist approach or a benevolent
neutrality approach might be adopted and
each will have U.S. authorities to support
it.
Or, one might conclude that as the
history of the First Amendment as
narrated by the Court in Everson
supports the separationist approach,
Philippine jurisprudence should also
follow this approach in light of the
Philippine religion clauses’ history. As a
result, in a case where the party claims
religious liberty in the face of a general
law that inadvertently burdens his
religious exercise, he faces an almost
insurmountable wall in convincing the
Court that the wall of separation would
not be breached if the Court grants him
an exemption. These conclusions,
however, are not and were never
warranted by the 1987, 1973 and 1935
Constitutions as shown by other
provisions on religion in all three
constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in
constitutional construction that the
constitution must be interpreted as a
whole and apparently conflicting
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized in a manner that will give to
all of them full force and effect.
From this construction, it will be
ascertained that the intent of the framers
was to adopt a benevolent neutrality
approach in interpreting the religious
clauses in the Philippine constitutions,
and the enforcement of this intent is the
goal of construing the constitution
We therefore reject Mr. Justice
Carpio’s total adherence to the U.S.
Court’s interpretation of the religion
clauses to effectively deny
accommodations on the sole basis that
the law in question is neutral and of
general application. For even if it were
true that “an unbroken line of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions” has never held
that “an individual’s religious beliefs [do
not] excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct
that the State is free to regulate,” our own
Constitutions have made significant
changes to accommodate and exempt
religion. Philippine jurisprudence shows
that the Court has allowed exemptions
from a law of general application, in
effect, interpreting our religion clauses to
cover both mandatory and permissive
accommodations.
To illustrate, in American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, the Court
granted to plaintiff exemption from a law
of general application based on the Free
Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was
required by an ordinance to secure a
mayor’s permit and a municipal license as
ordinarily required of those engaged in
the business of general merchandise
under the city’s ordinances. Plaintiff
argued that this amounted to “religious
censorship and restrained the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession, to wit: the distribution and
sale of bibles and other religious
literature to the people of the Philippines.”
Although the Court categorically held that
the questioned ordinances were not
applicable to plaintiff as it was not
engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said “merchandise” for profit, it
also ruled that applying the ordinance to
plaintiff and requiring it to secure a
license and pay a license fee or tax would
7 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
impair its free exercise of religious
profession and worship and its right of
dissemination of religious beliefs “as the
power to tax the exercise of a privilege is
the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment.” The decision states in part
“The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the
right to disseminate religious information.
Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom
of expression on the grounds that there is
a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent.
At this point, we must emphasize
that the adoption of the benevolent
neutrality-accommodation approach does
not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise
claim comes before it. This is an
erroneous reading of the framework
which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio
seems to entertain. Although benevolent
neutrality is the lens with which the
Court ought to view religion clause cases,
the interest of the state should also be
afforded utmost protection. This is
precisely the purpose of the test — to
draw the line between mandatory,
permissible and forbidden religious
exercise.
While the Court cannot adopt a
doctrinal formulation that can eliminate
the difficult questions of judgment in
determining the degree of burden on
religious practice or importance of the
state interest or the sufficiency of the
means adopted by the state to pursue its
interest, the Court can set a doctrine on
the ideal towards which religious clause
jurisprudence should be directed.
We here lay down the doctrine
that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt
the benevolent neutrality approach not
only because of its merits as discussed
above, but more importantly, because our
constitutional history and interpretation
indubitably show that benevolent
neutrality is the launching pad from
which the Court should take off in
interpreting religion clause cases. The
ideal towards which this approach is
directed is the protection of religious
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
liberty “not only for a minority, however
small- not only for a majority, however
large but for each of us” to the greatest
extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.
We now resume from where we
ended in our August 4, 2003 Decision. As
mentioned, what remained to be resolved,
upon which remand was necessary,
pertained to the final task of subjecting
this case to the careful application of the
compelling state interest test, i.e.,
determining whether respondent is
entitled to exemption, an issue which is
essentially factual or evidentiary in
nature.
There has never been any question
that the state has an interest in
protecting the institutions of marriage
and the family, or even in the sound
administration of justice. Indeed, the
provisions by which respondent’s
relationship is said to have impinged, e.g.,
Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of
the Revised Administrative Code, Articles
334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and even the provisions on marriage and
family in the Civil Code and Family Code,
all clearly demonstrate the State’s need to
protect these secular interests. Be that as
it may, the free exercise of religion is
specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It
is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights — “the most inalienable and sacred
of human rights,” in the words of
Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to
contend that the state’s interest is
important, because our Constitution itself
holds the right to religious freedom
sacred. The State must articulate in
specific terms the state interest involved
in preventing the exemption, which must
be compelling, for only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests
can limit the fundamental right to
religious freedom. To rule otherwise
would be to emasculate the
Free Exercise Clause as a source of
right by itself. Thus, it is not the State’s
broad interest in “protecting the
institutions of marriage and the family,” or
even “in the sound administration of
justice” that must be weighed against
8 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
respondent’s claim, but the State’s narrow
interest in refusing to make an exception
for the cohabitation which respondent’s
faith finds moral. In other words, the
government must do more than assert the
objectives at risk if exemption is given; it
must precisely show how and to what
extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted.
This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s
application of the compelling interest
test, the State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition, in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise
claim, cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic. The State cannot plausibly
assert that unbending application of a
criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill
any compelling interest if it does not, in
fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition.
In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her
partner. The State has never sought to
prosecute respondent nor her partner.
The State’s asserted interest thus
amounts only to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
Incidentally, as echoes of the
words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in
their concurring opinions in our Decision,
dated August 4, 2003, to deny the
exemption would effectively break up “an
otherwise ideal union of two individuals
who have managed to stay together as
husband and wife [approximately
twenty-five years]” and have the effect of
defeating the very substance of marriage
and the family.
The Solicitor General also argued
against respondent’s religious freedom on
the basis of morality, i.e., that “the
conjugal arrangement of respondent and
her live-in partner should not be
condoned because adulterous
relationships are constantly frowned
upon by society”; and “that State laws on
marriage, which are moral in nature, take
clear precedence over the religious
beliefs and practices of any church,
religious sect or denomination on
marriage. Verily, religious beliefs and
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
practices should not be permitted to
override laws relating to public policy
such as those of marriage.”
The above arguments are mere
reiterations of the arguments raised by
Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago in her
dissenting opinion to our Decision dated
August 4, 2003, which she offers again in
toto. These arguments have already been
addressed in our decision dated August 4,
2003. In said Decision, we noted that
Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago’s dissenting
opinion dwelt more on the standards of
morality, without categorically holding
that religious freedom is not in issue.] We,
therefore, went into a discussion on
morality, in order to show that:
a. The public morality expressed in
the law is necessarily secular for in
our constitutional order, the
religion clauses prohibit the state
from establishing a religion,
including the morality it sanctions.
Thus, when the law speaks of
“immorality” in the Civil Service
Law or “immoral” in the Code of
Professional Responsibility for
lawyers, or “public morals” in the
Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in
the New Civil Code, or “moral
character” in the Constitution, the
distinction between public and
secular morality on the one hand,
and religious morality, on the
other, should be kept in mind;
b. Although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state
interests;
c. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes
in the case at bar should be
understood only in this realm
where it has authority.
d. Having distinguished between
public and secular morality and
religious morality, the more
difficult task is determining which
immoral acts under this public and
secular morality fall under the
9 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
phrase “disgraceful and immoral
conduct” for which a government
employee may be held
administratively liable. Only one
conduct is in question before this
Court, i.e., the conjugal
arrangement of a government
employee whose partner is legally
married to another which
Philippine law and jurisprudence
consider both immoral and illegal.
While there is no dispute that
under settled jurisprudence, respondent’s
conduct constitutes “disgraceful and
immoral conduct,” the case at bar involves
the defense of religious freedom,
therefore none of the cases cited by Mme.
Justice Ynares-Santiago apply. There is no
jurisprudence in Philippine jurisdiction
holding that the defense of religious
freedom of a member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses under the same circumstances
as respondent will not prevail over the
laws on adultery, concubinage or some
other law.
We cannot summarily conclude
therefore that her conduct is likewise so
“odious” and “barbaric” as to be immoral
and punishable by law.
In this case, the government’s
conduct may appear innocent and
nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is
oppressive to the minority. In the
interpretation of a document, such as the
Bill of Rights, designed to protect the
minority from the majority, the question
of which perspective is appropriate would
seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text,
history, structure and values implicated in
the interpretation of the clauses, all point
toward this perspective. Thus, substantive
equality—a reading of the religion clauses
which leaves both politically dominant
and the politically weak religious groups
equal in their inability to use the
government (law) to assist their own
religion or burden others—makes the
most sense in the interpretation of the
Bill of Rights, a document designed to
protect minorities and individuals from
mobocracy in a democracy (the majority
or a coalition of minorities).
As previously discussed, our
Constitution adheres to THE
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY APPROACH
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that
respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement
she had was “illegal per se because, by
universally recognized standards, it is
inherently or by its very nature bad,
improper, immoral and contrary to good
conscience,” the Solicitor General failed
to appreciate that benevolent neutrality
could allow for the accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state
interests.
Finally, even assuming that the
OSG has proved a compelling state
interest, it has to further demonstrate
that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is
not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state,
i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little
as possible on religious liberties. Again,
the Solicitor General utterly failed to
prove this element of the test. Other than
the two documents offered as cited above
which established the sincerity of
respondent’s religious belief and the fact
that the agreement was an internal
arrangement within respondent’s
congregation, no iota of evidence was
offered. In fact, the records are bereft of
even a feeble attempt to procure any such
evidence to show that the means the state
adopted in pursuing this compelling
interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious freedom.
Thus, we find that in this particular
case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests
must be upheld in order that freedoms -
including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise
as a preferred freedom, however, man
stands accountable to an authority higher
than the state, and so THE STATE
INTEREST sought to be upheld must be
so compelling that its violation will erode
10 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
the very fabric of the state that will also
protect the freedom.
IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING
THAT SUCH STATE INTEREST EXISTS,
MAN MUST BE ALLOWED TO SUBSCRIBE
TO THE INFINITE.
IN ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, THE SC
DISCUSSED THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE AND THE
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IN ITS 2003 DECISION
THESE 2 CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES ARE ALWAYS IN
CONFLICT. THEY CANNOT CO-EXIST.
THE SC EXPLAINED IT BY SAYING THAT
UNDER THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE, IT IS A GUARANTEE THAT THE
STATE SHALL NOT DO ANYTHING THAT
WILL INFLUENCE RELIGION BECAUSE
THE STANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS
ALWAYS NEUTRALITY. WHILE UNDER
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, THE
GOVERNMENT MUST ENSURE THAT
THE PEOPLE CAN ENJOY THEIR RIGHT
TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION WHICH
MEANS THAT THE GOVERNMENT
MUST DO ANYTHING POSSIBLE
WITHIN ITS POWER IN ORDER THAT
CITIZENS CAN ENJOY RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM. HENCE THEY CANNOT
CO-EXIST. DID THE SC MAINTAIN THE
SAID DECISION ITS 2006 RESOLUTION?
● NO. Free Exercise Clause and
Non-Establishment Clause can
co-exist because both are
intended to deny the government
the power to influence religious
belief. The Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses, it should be
noted, were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have
a single goal — to promote
freedom of individual religious
beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with
penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the Establishment
Clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious belief with
rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two
religion clauses were intended to
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
deny government the power to use
either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.
WHAT DOES RELIGION MEAN?
● A profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man
to his Creator. (Aglipay v. Ruiz)
● The definition of religion in this
case is a theistic concept because
the center of the belief to be
considered as a religion must be
belief in God however He may be
called.
● In Estrada v. Escritor [2003], the
SC discussed the etymology of the
word ‘religion’. ‘Religion’ came
from Middle-English word
‘religioun’ and from Old French
‘religion’ and the Latin ‘religio’, all
these terms mean "bond between
man and the gods." Thus,
etymologically the word ‘religion’
is a theistic concept. But this
concept was extended to
non-theistic belief. According to
the SC, a system of belief or
philosophy may be considered as a
religion if it complies with the 4
requisites citing US v. Seeger
REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT A SYSTEM
OF BELIEF OR PHILOSOPHY MAY BE
CONSIDERED AS A RELIGION
1. There must be belief in God or
some parallel belief that occupies a
central place in the believer’s life;
2. The religion must involve a moral
code transcending individual
belief, i.e., it cannot be purely
subjective;
3. A demonstrable sincerity in belief
is necessary, but the court must
not inquire into the truth or
reasonableness of the belief
4. There must be some associational
ties (Estrada v. Escritor [2003])
SUPPOSING THAT A PERSON IS BEING
CHARGED WITH BIGAMY, CAN SHE
CONVERT TO ISLAM TO ESCAPE
LIABILITY?
● No. The 3rd requisite is not
present i.e. sincerity of belief.
11 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF properties used for

RELIGION IS STRENGTHENED BY THE religious purposes
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE b. Permissive
UNDER SEC. 6 OF ART. 2. THE WALL OF ● Exemption of
SEPARATION HAS 2 CONCEPTS. THESE religious activity
ARE? because of public
1. Separationist approach policy.
a. Strict separationist ● Example: Victoriano
● There is an absolute v. Elizalde Rope
impregnable wall Workers’ Union.
that separates the
church and state WHAT KIND OF WALL OF SEPARATION
● Activities of the THAT IS MANDATED BY THE
church shall only be CONSTITUTION?
done by the church ● Benevolent neutrality
● Roads built by the
government cannot UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
be used for religious PARTICULARLY SEC. 29, ART. 6, PUBLIC
procession FUNDS OR PROPERTY CANNOT BE
b. Strict neutrality USED FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES. DOES
● Religion cannot be THAT MEAN THAT ANY USE OF PUBLIC
used as basis to FUNDS OR PROPERTY FOR AN
favor or discriminate ACTIVITY THAT HAS RELIGIOUS
religion COLOR IS PROHIBITED BY THE
● Whatever applies to CONSTITUTION?
secular activity ● NO. Public funds or property may
should also be be used as long as there is some
applied to religious secular legislative purpose
activity. If employees involved in the activity.
are required to work
on Saturday, this WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE TEST IN
shall apply even to ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER USE
those who belong to OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY FOR
religious ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE RELIGIOUS
organizations who COLOR MAY BE ALLOWED?
cannot work on a ● Lemon Test (laid down by the SC
Saturday because of in Lemon v. Kurtzman)
religious belief ● Under the Lemon Test, in order to
2. Benevolent neutrality approach validly use public funds or
(wall of accommodation - a property for activities that have
religious practice can be some religious color it is required
accommodated or exempted from that the activity must be have:
the coverage of mandatory law 1. Secular legislative purpose;
either civil, criminal, or 2. Neither promotes nor
administrative) prohibit religion; and
a. Mandatory 3. It does not foster excessive
● An accommodation entanglement with religion
or exemption of
religious activity
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ
based on the
Constitution. FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio
● Example: Par. 3, Sec. Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
28, Art. 6 - Independent Church, seeks the issuance
exempting from this court of a writ of prohibition to
prevent the respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps

A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s) 12 of 28

 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts
announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration
in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third
International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
In spite of the protest of the petitioner's
attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage for
printing
HELD: The prohibition herein expressed
is a direct corollary of the principle of
separation of church and state. Without
the necessity of adverting to the
historical background of this principle in
our country, it is sufficient to say that our
history, not to speak of the history of
mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for
occasions might arise when the state will
use the church, and the church the state,
as a weapon in the furtherance of their
respective ends and aims. The Malolos
Constitution recognized this principle of
separation of church and state in the
early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty
of Paris between the United States and
Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in
President McKinley's Instructions to the
Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and
finally embodied in the Constitution of
the Philippines as the supreme expression
of the Filipino People. It is almost trite to
say now that in this country we enjoy
both religious and civil freedom. All the
officers of the Government, from the
highest to the lowest, in taking their oath
to support and defend the Constitution,
bind themselves to recognize and respect
the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, with its inherent limitations and
recognized implications.
It should be stated that what is
guaranteed by our Constitution is
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, not mere
RELIGIOUS TOLERATION. RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, however, as a constitutional
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial
of its influence in human affairs. Religion
as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator
is recognized. And, in so far as it instills
into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their
ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselves
and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy," they thereby
manifested their intense religious nature
and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and
nations.
The elevating influence of religion
in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and
laws exempt from taxation properties
devoted exclusively to religious purposes
(sec. 14,subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of
the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec.
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code)
sectarian aid is not prohibited when a
priest, preacher, minister or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such is
assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). Optional
religious instruction in the public schools
is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec.
5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad.
Code).
Thursday and Friday of Holy Week,
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and
Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29,
Adm. Code) because of the secular idea
that their observance is conducive to
beneficial moral results. The law allows
divorce but punishes polygamy and
bigamy; and certain crimes against
13 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state
(see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal
Code).
Act No. 4052 contemplates no
religious purpose in view. What it gives
the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the
Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not
authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property
for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present
case, however, the issuance of the
postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications was
not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious
denominations. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given
to that church.
On the contrary, it appears from
the letter of the Director of Posts of June
5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps
was "to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country." The
officials concerned merely took advantage
of an event considered of international
importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people". It is significant
to note that the stamps as actually
designed and printed, instead of showing
a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines
and the location of the City of Manila, and
an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb.
3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila,
the capital of the Philippines, as the seat
of that congress. It is obvious that while
the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
Church, was not the aim and purpose of
the Government. We are of the opinion
that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply
because of incidental results, more or less
religious in character, if the purpose had
in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation.
The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated.
IN AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, WHAT WAS THE
SECULAR LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE FOR
THE RELEASE OF THE
COMMEMORATIVE STAMP?
● For tourism purposes— it is to
promote tourism and not to
promote the activity.
● It is significant to note that the
stamps as actually designed and
printed, instead of showing a
Catholic Church chalice as
originally planned, contains a map
of the Philippines and the location
of the City of Manila, and an
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic
Congress itself but Manila, the
capital of the Philippines, as the
seat of that congress.
GARCES v. ESTENZO
FACTS: The barangay council of Valencia,
Ormoc City issued four (4) resolutions
regarding the acquisition of the wooden
image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in
the celebration of his annual feast day.
One of the resolutions further provided
that the barangay council, in accordance
with the practice in Eastern Leyte,
Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the
Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta,
would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image
would remain in his residence for one
year and until the election of his
successor as chairman of the next feast
day.
Several days after the fiesta or on
April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his
sermon during a mass, Father Osmea
allegedly uttered defamatory remarks
14 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
against the barangay captain, Manuel C.
Veloso, apparently in connection with the
disputed image. That incident provoked
Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the
city court of Ormoc City a charge for
grave oral defamation. Father Osmea
retaliated by filing administrative
complaints against Veloso on the grounds
of immorality, grave abuse of authority,
acts unbecoming a public official and
ignorance of the law.
Meanwhile, the image of San
Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic
church of Valencia. Because Father
Osmea did not accede to the request of
Cabatingan to have custody of the image
and "maliciously ignored" the council's
resolutions, the council enacted another
resolution, authorizing the hiring of a
lawyer to file a replevin case against
Father Osmea for the recovery of the
image. On June 14, 1976, the barangay
council passed another resolution,
appointing Veloso as its representative in
the replevin case. The replevin case was
filed in the city court of Ormoc City
against Father Osmea and Bishop
Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council
had posted a cash bond of eight hundred
pesos, Father Osmea replevin, he assailed
the constitutionality of the said
resolutions library.
Later, he and three other persons,
Andres Garces, a member of the
Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic
laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas
Dagar, filed against the barangay council
and its members (excluding two
members) a complaint in the Court of
First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for
the annulment of the said resolutions.
The lower court dismissed the complaint.
It upheld the validity of the resolutions.
HELD: The wooden image was purchased
in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint,
San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents .
One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
mass.
Consequently, the image of the
patron saint had to be placed in the
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
church when the mass was celebrated. If
there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal
in holding a fiesta and having a patron
saint for the barrio, then any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the
patron saint (such as the acquisition and
display of his image) cannot be branded as
illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the
barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its
celebration is an ingrained tradition in
rural communities. The fiesta relieves the
monotony and drudgery of the lives of the
masses.
The barangay council designated a
layman as the custodian of the wooden
image in order to forestall any suspicion
that it is favoring the Catholic church. A
more practical reason for that
arrangement would be that the image, if
placed in a layman's custody, could easily
be made available to any family desiring
to borrow the image in connection with
prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the
petitioners are shown in their affidavits.
Petitioner Garces swore that the said
resolutions favored the Catholic church.
On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and
Edullantes swore that the resolutions
prejudiced the Catholics because they
could see the image in the church only
once a year or during the fiesta. The
Court finds that the momentous issues of
separation of church and state, freedom
of religion and the use of public money to
favor any sect or church are not involved
at all in this case even remotely or
indirectly. It is not a microcosmic test
case on those issues. This case is a petty
quarrel over the custody of a saint's
image. It would never have arisen if the
parties had been more diplomatic and
tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the
trouble of causing contributions to be
solicited from his own parishioners for
the purchase of another image of San
Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his
church.
There can be no question that the
image in question belongs to the barangay
council. Father Osmea claim that it
belongs to his church is wrong. The
barangay council, as owner of the image,
has the right to determine who should
have custody thereof. If it chooses to
15 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
change its mind and decides to give the
image to the Catholic church that action
would not violate the Constitution
because the image was acquired with
private funds and is its private property.
The council has the right to take
measures to recover possession of the
image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and
12. Not every governmental activity which
involves the expenditure of public funds
and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions
regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use
of public money or property.
In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201,
what was involved was Act No. 4052
which appropriated sixty thousand pesos
for the cost of plates and the printing of
postage stamps with new designs. Under
the law, the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Department Head and the
President of the Philippines, issued in
1936 postage stamps to commemorate the
celebration in Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress
sponsored by the Catholic Church. The
purpose of the stamps was to raise
revenue and advertise the Philippines.
The design of the stamps showed a map
of the Philippines and nothing about the
Catholic Church. No religious purpose
was intended. The instant case is easily
distinguishable from Verzosa vs.
Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307,
where a religious brotherhood, La
Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento,
organized for the purpose of raising funds
to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta
in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and
the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held
accountable for the funds which it held as
trustee. Finding that the petitioners have
no cause of action for the annulment of
the barangay resolutions, the lower
court's judgment dismissing their
amended petition is affirmed.
IN GARCES v. ESTENZO WHAT WAS THE
SECULAR LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF
THE PURCHASE OF THE WOODEN
IMAGE OF SAN VICENTE FERRER?
● The wooden image was purchased
in connection with the celebration
of the barrio fiesta honoring the
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer,
and not for the purpose of favoring
any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious
beliefs of the barrio residents. The
barrio fiesta is a socio-religious
affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural
communities.
● THE SECULAR PURPOSE IS THAT:
The fiesta relieves the monotony
and drudgery of the lives of the
masses. In short, it is intended to
entertain the people.
UNDER THE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, THERE ARE THINGS THAT
EACH INDIVIDUAL CAN PROFESS
THEIR RELIGIOUS FAITH WITHOUT
INTERFERENCE FROM THE
GOVERNMENT. DOES RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ALSO INCLUDE THE ACT OF
PROSELYTIZING?
● This is the activity involved in
American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, proselytizing is the
distribution of religious materials
as a form of religious ceremony.
The SC, in the case, included this
activity.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF
MANILA
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign,
non-stock, non-profit, religious,
missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines. In
the course of its ministry, plaintiff's
Philippine agency has been distributing
and selling bibles and/or gospel portions
thereof (except during the Japanese
occupation) throughout the Philippines
and translating the same into several
Philippine dialects.
On May 29, 1953, the acting City
Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
plaintiff that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise since
November, 1945, without providing itself
with the necessary Mayor's permit and
municipal license. Plaintiff protested
against this requirement, but the City
Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit
and pay the sum of P5, 891.45 which it
16 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
paid under protest. A suit was brought by
plaintiff against defendant.
HELD: The constitutional guaranty of the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the
right to disseminate religious information.
Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom
of expression on the grounds that there is
a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent.
The fees under Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair
its free exercise and enjoyment of its
religious profession and worship as well
as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs. There is a difference when the tax
is imposed upon the income or property
of the religious organization and one
imposed against the acts of disseminating
religious information. To tax the latter is
impair the free exercise and enjoyment of
its religious profession and worship as
well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs regardless of the amount
of such fees.
As to Ordinance No. 3000
requiring the obtention of a mayor’s
permit before any person can engage in
any of the businesses, trades or
occupations enumerated therein, we do
not find that it imposes any charge upon
the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices. Ordinance No. 3000
cannot be considered unconstitutional,
even if applied to plaintiff Society.
But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the
City of Manila, as amended, is not
applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
defendant appellee is powerless to license
or tax the business of plaintiff Society
involved herein for, as stated before, it
would impair plaintiff's right to the free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000,
as amended, is also inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff.
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
"In the case of Murdock vs.
Pennsylvania, it was held that an
ordinance requiring that a license be
obtained before a person could canvass or
solicit orders for goods, paintings,
pictures, wares or merchandise cannot be
made to apply to members of Jehovah's
Witnesses who went about from door to
door distributing literature and soliciting
people to 'purchase' certain religious
books and pamphlets, all published by the
Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The
'price' of the books was twenty-five cents
each, the 'price' of the pamphlets five
cents each. It was shown that in making
the solicitations there was a request for
additional 'contribution' of twenty-five
cents each for the books and five cents
each for the pamphlets. Lesser sum were
accepted, however, and books were even
donated in case interested persons were
without funds.
On the above facts the Supreme
Court held that it could not be said that
petitioners were engaged in commercial
rather than a religious venture. Their
activities could not be described as
embraced in the occupation of selling
books and pamphlets. Then the Court
continued: 'We do not mean to say that
religious groups and the press are free
from all financial burdens of government.
See Grosjean vs. American Press Co., 297
U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct.
444. We have here something quite
different, for example, from a tax on the
income of one who engages in religious
activities or a tax on property used or
employed in connection with those
activities. It is one thing to impose a tax
on the income or property of a preacher.
It is quite another thing to exact a tax
from him for the privilege of delivering a
sermon. The tax imposed by the City of
Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of
which is a condition of the exercise of
these constitutional privileges.
The power to tax the exercise of a
privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. Those who can
tax the exercise of this religious practice
can make its exercise so costly as to
deprive it of the resources necessary for
its maintenance. Those who can tax the
privilege of engaging in this form of
17 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
missionary evangelism can close all its
doors to all 'those who do not have a full
purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this
ancient and honorable manner would
thus be denied the needy.
It is contended however that the
fact that the license tax can suppress or
control this activity is unimportant if it
does not do so. But that is to disregard
the nature of this tax. It is a license tax -a
flat tax imposed on the exercise of a
privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. The
power to impose a license tax on the
exercise of these freedoms is indeed as
potent as the power of censorship which
this Court has repeatedly struck down. It
is not a nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the
expenses of policing the activities in
question. It is in no way apportioned. It is
a flat license tax levied and collected as a
condition to the pursuit of activities
whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press and
religion and inevitably tends to suppress
their exercise. That is almost uniformly
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of
this flat license tax.'
Nor could the dissemination of
religious information be conditioned
upon the approval of an official or
manager even if the town were owned by
a corporation as held in the case of Marsh
vs. State of Alabama or by the United
States itself as held in the case of Tucker
vs. Texas. In the former case the Supreme
Court expressed the opinion that the
right to enjoy freedom of the press and
religion occupies a preferred position as
against the constitutional right of
property owners.
IN ABS v. MANILA, THERE ARE 2
ORDINANCES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE:
ORDINANCE 2529 AND ORDINANCE
3000. ORDINANCE 2529 ONLY IMPOSES
A TAX ON ACTIVITIES OF SELLING AND
OTHER TRANSACTIONS IN THE CITY
OF MANILA. ORDINANCE 3000
REQUIRES THE OBTENTION OF A
PERMIT. ARE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
PETITIONER IN DISTRIBUTING THE
MATERIALS FOR A FEE COVERED BY
ORDINANCE 2529?
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
● NO. It would impair plaintiff's right
to the free exercise and enjoyment
of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs
● The power to tax the exercise of a
privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. Those who
can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its
exercise so costly as to deprive it
of the resources necessary for its
maintenance. Those who can tax
the privilege of engaging in this
form of missionary evangelism can
close all its doors to all those who
do not have a full purse. Spreading
religious beliefs in this ancient and
honorable manner would thus be
denied the needy.
● The power to impose a license tax
on the exercise of these freedoms
is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has
repeatedly struck down. It is not a
nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the
expenses of policing the activities
in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is a flat license tax
levied and collected as a condition
to the pursuit of activities whose
enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press
and religion and inevitably tends
to suppress their exercise. That is
almost uniformly recognized as the
inherent vice and evil of this flat
license tax
DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO ANY TAX? THE RELIGIOUS
MINISTERS LIKE PRIESTS, BISHOPS,
AND RELIGIOUS, ARE PROFESSIONALS.
LIKE LAWYERS, DOCTORS, AND
ACCOUNTANTS, THEY ALSO RECEIVE
COMPENSATION IN THE DISCHARGE
OF THEIR PROFESSION. CAN THERE BE
TAX FOR THE COMPENSATION THEY
RECEIVE IN ADMINISTERING
ACTIVITIES? (E.G. DURING A MASS, A
PRIEST BE PAID 5K PER MASS)
● Yes. A tax on the compensation of
the religious ministers is not a tax
18 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
on the religious activity. The
privilege of accepting
compensation is not part of their
religious activity, it is ONLY
incidental, but it is not part of the
ceremony.
SUPPOSING THE PRIEST RECEIVES AN
OFFERING, AND THE OFFERING IS IN
MONEY. IS IT TAXABLE? CAN WE SAY
THAT OFFERING IS PART OF THE
RELIGIOUS CEREMONY (SO AS TO
EXEMPT IT FROM TAXATION)?
● No, it is not taxable. An offering is
not subject to taxation for an
offering is part of the religious
activity, which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
ACCORDING TO ORDINANCE 3000
BEFORE THEY CAN ENGAGE IN THE
ACT OF DISTRIBUTING MATERIALS,
THEY HAVE TO OBTAIN A PERMIT
FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
MAYOR. IS IT APPLICABLE TO THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE PETITIONER IN
THE CASE OF ABS v. MANILA?
● No, similar to Ordinance 2529.
● We do not find that it imposes any
charge upon the enjoyment of a
right granted by the Constitution,
nor tax the exercise of religious
practices.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
WHAT ARE THE 2 ASPECTS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?
1. Freedom to believe; and
2. Freedom to act on one’s belief
(Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA)
WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?
● Freedom to believe is absolute,
while the other is subject to
regulation. (Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA)
● According to Justice Frankfurter:
‘The constitutional provision on
religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious liberty,
not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
religious dogma. Once a religious
activity violates a law the State can
interfere.
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE FREEDOM OF
RELIGION GUARANTEED?
● The freedom of religion is
guaranteed to the extent that a
person may:
1. Worship God according to
the dictates of his
conscience;
2. Not to worship God at all;
3. Entertain notions
respecting his relationship
with God;
4. Exhibit sentiments in such
form of worship not
injurious to the equal rights
of others;
5. Prohibit any legislation for
the support of religion
because the State cannot
establish a church, aid one,
aid all and participate in
purely religious activities.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly
organized religious organization, has a
television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday
and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The
program presents and propagates
petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices often times in comparative
studies with other religions. Petitioner
submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television
the VTR tapes of its TV program Series
Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board
classified the series as "X" or not for
public viewing on the ground that they
"offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law."
In its first course of action against
respondent Board, INC appealed to the
Office of the President where it was
favored and then again, before the
Quezon City RTC alleging that the
respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of its TV program
19 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
and in x-rating them, where it INC again
won but was directed to refrain from
attacking other religions. The Court of
Appeals reversed the same.
HELD: The right to religious profession
and worship has a TWOFOLD ASPECT, viz
., (1) freedom to believe and (2) freedom to
act on one's beliefs.
The “first is absolute” as long as
the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The “second is subject to
regulation” where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public
welfare. We thus reject petitioner's
postulate that its religious program is per
se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and
ears of children. The Court reiterates the
rule that the exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will
bring about the clear and present danger
of some substantive evil which the State is
duty bound to prevent , i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest
of public health, public morals, or public
welfare.
A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to
the liberal mind but history counsels the
Court against its blind adoption as
religion is and continues to be a volatile
area of concern in our country today.
Across the sea and in our shore, the
bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by
men were caused by irreconcilable
religious differences. Our country is still
not safe from the recurrence of this
stultifying strife considering our warring
religious beliefs and the fanaticism with
which some of us cling and claw to these
beliefs.
Even now, we have yet to settle the
near century old strife in Mindanao, the
roots of which have been nourished by
the mistrust and misunderstanding
between our Christian and Muslim
brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise
of weird religious cults espousing
violence as an article of faith also proves
the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict
let alone policy on the exercise of
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
religion. For sure, we shall continue to
subject any act pinching the space for the
free exercise of religion to a heightened
scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational
exercise to the irrationality of man. For
when religion divides and its exercise
destroys, the State should not stand still.
First, The evidence shows that the
respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
series for "attacking" either religions,
especially the Catholic church. An
examination of the evidence will show
that the so-called "attacks" are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions . The
videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the respondent court as
indecent, contrary to law and good
customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under section 3(c) of PD
1986.
This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion.
Second, even a side glance at
section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that,
the ground "attacks against another
religion" in x-rating the religious program
of petitioner, is not among the grounds to
justify an order prohibiting the broadcast
of petitioner's television program. The
ground "attack against another religion"
was merely added by the respondent
Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it
runs smack against the hoary doctrine
that administrative rules and regulations
cannot expand the letter and spirit of the
law they seek to enforce.
Third, in x-rating the TV program
of the petitioner, the respondents failed
to apply the clear and present danger
rule. In American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, this Court held: "The
constitutional guaranty of free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justified like
other restraints on freedom of expression
on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent."
20 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, we further ruled that "it is
only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger."
Lastly, the records show that the
decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate
court, is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever
of the type of harm the tapes will bring
about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent
evil which has taken the life of a reality
already on the ground.
IN THE CASE OF INC v. CA, THE MTRCB
GAVE THE SHOWS OF INC X RATING,
ACCORDING TO MTRCB IT IS
ATTACKING ANOTHER RELIGION
PARTICULARLY THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
RELIGION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE
PETITIONER CLAIMS THAT IN COMING
UP WITH ITS SHOWS, IT IS
EXERCISING ITS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
AND SO MTRCB HAS NO AUTHORITY
TO REVIEW AND CLASSIFY ITS SHOWS.
AS TO THAT ARGUMENT OF THE
PETITIONER, DID THE SC AGREE?
● No. The mere invocation of the
right does not render the
government totally powerless in
restricting or regulating the
activity. Even religious activities
may be subjected to governmental
regulations. For when religion
divides and its exercise destroys,
the State should not stand still.
● But where the individual
externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public,
his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the
State. As great as this liberty may
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
be, religious freedom, like all the
other rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, can be enjoyed only
with a proper regard for the rights
of others. It is an error to think
that the mere invocation of
religious freedom will stalemate
the State and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare.
The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious
practices inimical to society. And
this is true even if such practices
are pursued out of sincere
religious conviction and not
merely for the purpose of evading
the reasonable requirements or
prohibitions of the law.
● Justice Frankfurter: The
constitutional provision on
religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious liberty,
not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of
religious dogma.
BUT AS TO THE X RATING GIVEN BY
THE MTRCB, DID THE SC SUSTAIN IT?
AS TO INTERFERENCE OF THE STATE
ON THESE TYPES OF CONTROVERSIES,
HOW DID THE SC RULE? CAN THE SC
RULE ON HOW THE INC ATTACKED
ANOTHER RELIGION?
● NO, the SC cannot rule on such.
There is a difference between
attacking and offending. Offending
● religious feeling is a criminal act
under the RPC. But attacking does
not necessarily mean offending.
According to the case, “In a State
where there ought to be no
difference between the
appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy
against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom
of religion is freedom of thought
and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of
dueling ideas. When the luxury of
time permits, the marketplace of
ideas demands that speech should
21 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
be met by more speech for it is the
spark of opposite speech, the heat of
colliding ideas that can fan the
embers of truth.”
AS TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
DOCTRINES OF INC, IN ATTACKING
ANOTHER RELIGION, ARE ACTIONABLE,
THE SC SAID THAT THEY CANNOT
INTERFERE BECAUSE IT IS AN
INTER-RELIGION CONTROVERSY
INVOLVING THEIR DOCTRINES. AS TO
THE ISSUE OF THE SHOW CAN BE
REGULATED, THE SC SAID THAT IT IS
STILL WITHIN THE POWER OF THE
GOVERNMENT. CAN WE SAY THAT ALL
ACTS DONE BY RELIGIOUS MINISTERS
ARE RELIGIOUS?
● As held in the case of Diocese of
Bacolod v. COMELEC, “Clearly, not
all acts done by those who are
priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or
any other religious make such act
immune from any secular
regulation. The religious also have
a secular existence. They exist
within a society that is regulated
by law.”
BUT SC RECOGNIZED THE REALITY
THAT EVERY ACT CAN BE MOTIVATED
BY MORAL, ETHICAL, OR SPIRITUAL
CONSIDERATIONS. IT IS NOT ALWAYS
EASY TO DETERMINE IF THE ACT IS
ECCLESIASTICAL OR SECULAR. SC,
HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF AUSTRIA v.
NLRC, GAVE 4 PROCEEDINGS WHICH
ARE BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURTS, AND THEREFORE ARE
“ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS.” WHAT ARE
THESE?
1. Proceedings for excommunication;
2. Ordinations of religious ministers;
3. Administration of sacraments; and
4. Other activities with attached
religious significance.
ATTY GAB: There is a case involving
Ang Dating Daan and Iglesia ni Cristo.
In the television show of Ang Dating
Daan, Bro. Soriano said that members
of the INC are being killed inside the
church. Members of the INC filed libel
complaint against him. According to
Bro. Soriano the court cannot interfere
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
because this is between Ang Dating
Daan and INC. The SC said that the
issue involved violation of law and not
who has a better doctrine. In that
regard, the Court said that when
exercise of religion destroys the court
cannot standstill, it must interfere
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAST
SENTENCE OF SEC. 5 OF ART. 3
PROHIBITS RELIGIOUS TEST FOR THE
EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL
RIGHTS (E.G. BEFORE ONE CAN
EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO VOTE, HE
MUST PASS RELIGIOUS TEST). CAN THE
GOVERNMENT IMPOSE
GOVERNMENTAL TEST (SECULAR TEST)
FOR THE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS?
● NO
IN THE CASE OF ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR,
THE SC DETERMINED WHETHER THE
ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE
RESPONDENT AND HER PARTNER IS
MORALLY PERMISSIBLE. WHAT
STANDARD IS TO BE APPLIED TO
DETERMINE THE MORALITY OF THE
ARRANGEMENT? DO THE COURTS
APPLY RELIGIOUS MORALITY OR
SECULAR MORALITY?
● Secular morality because the
Courts are courts of law and the
only standard they can apply is law
and not religious standard. Which
means that applying secular
standard, the arrangement of the
respondent and her partner is
immoral, because it is not allowed
for a married person to cohabit
with another person. Therefore, it
is secularly immoral. The next
question is whether such activity
be exempted from the coverage of
a secular law. In determining
whether an arrangement can be
regulated by a mandatory law,
whether criminal, civil or
administrative, the law must apply
the compelling State interest test.
All the questions provided for in
the test must be in the
affirmative—if one of the questions
is no, then the governmental
regulation failed the test.
22 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
Therefore, the government
regulation cannot be applied to the
religious activity.
CAN IT BE EXEMPTED FROM THE
COVERAGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
OR THE ETHICAL STANDARDS OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND THE REVISED
PENAL CODE?
● The SC applied the compelling
state interest test based on
benevolent neutrality in
determining whether a religious
practice can be exempted from the
coverage of mandatory law.
WHAT ARE THE 3 QUESTIONS THAT
MUST BE ANSWERED UNDER THE
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST?
1. Have the statutes or laws created a
burden on the religious freedom?
2. Is there a sufficiently compelling
state interest involved to justify
the infringement on religious
freedom?
● Generalized statement of
principles is not enough.
There must be specific
interest that must be
established by the
government to show that
there is a need to regulate
the activity.
3. Did the state in achieving its
legitimate government interest use
the least intrusive means so as not
to interfere with the religious
freedom no more than what is
necessary to achieve its purpose?
● Least intrusive means - the
governmental action is the
only way in order to achieve
its purpose. It requires that
the compelling state
interest cannot be achieved
through any other means.
The only way that a
government can achieve its
legitimate interest is by
interfering with the
religious activity.
● If the above mentioned questions
are answered in the affirmative,
the governmental regulation can
be applied in the religious activity.
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
If one of the questions is answered
in the negative, the religious
activity is exempted.
THE RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY IS THE
EXTRAMARITAL COHABITATION; THE
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
SOUGHT TO BE APPLIED TO THAT IS
THE RPC, PROHIBITING CONCUBINAGE
AND ADULTERY, THE ADMIN. CODE,
REQUIRING ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICERS TO LIVE A MORAL LIFE; SO
CAN WE SAY THAT THE LAWS UNDULY
BURDEN THE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM OF THE RESPONDENT?
● Yes. Because the respondent
would have to choose whether to
follow the law or to follow her
religious beliefs, which means that
her religious belief was
compromised by a law. So either
she follows the church or she
follows the government, so
definitely, there is a burden.
WOULD THE PUNISHMENT OF THE
ARRANGEMENT IN ESTRADA V
ESCRITOR BE THE ONLY WAY OF
PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY IN THE
PUBLIC SERVICE OR THE SANCTITY OF
MARRIAGE?
● NO. There are other means that
can be taken. Therefore, it cannot
restrict the religious freedom.
DOES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ONLY COVER TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES?
● No, it also covers bizarre religious
practice. As held in the case of
Ebralinag v. Division
Superintendent of Cebu, the
religious belief sought to be
professed by the student is not
singing the national anthem, which
is not a traditional religious
practice. But the SC considered it
as covered by the Constitutional
guarantee since however "bizarre"
may be, so long as it is part of
religious activity, the State cannot
interfere with it.
23 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
EBRALINAG v. DIVISION
SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU
FACTS: All the petitioners in these two
cases were expelled from their classes by
the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of
DECS making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach
their children not to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge for they believe that
those are "acts of worship" or "religious
devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give to anyone or
anything except God". They feel bound by
the Bible's command to "guard ourselves
from idols — 1 John 5:21". They consider
the flag as an image or idol representing
the State.
They think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and
spirit which the Constitution protect
against official control However, the
petitioners herein have not raised in issue
the constitutionality of the above
provision of the new Administrative Code
of 1987. They have targeted only Republic
Act No. 1265 and the implementing orders
of the DECS.
HELD: The 30-year old decision of SC in
Gerona upholding the flag salute law and
approving the expulsion of students who
refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled
with. It is somewhat ironic however, that
after the Gerona ruling had received
legislative cachet by its in corporation in
the Administrative Code of 1987, the
present Court believes that the time has
come to reexamine it.
The idea that one may be
compelled to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of
being dismissed from one's job or of being
expelled from school, is alien to the
conscience of the present generation of
Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
Rights which guarantees their rights to
free speech and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship.
Religious freedom is a fundamental
right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The
right to religious profession and worship
has a TWO-FOLD ASPECT, vis., freedom
to believe and freedom to act on one's
belief.
The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public
welfare The sole justification for a prior
restraint or limitation on the exercise of
religious freedom is the existence of a
grave and present danger of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and
duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to
public safety, the expulsion of the
petitioners from the schools is not
justified.
The SC is not persuaded that by
exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge,
this religious group which admittedly
comprises a "small portion of the school
population" will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation
"untaught and uninculcated in and
unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and
admiration for national heroes". After all,
what the petitioners seek only is
exemption from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools where
they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts,
sciences, Philippine history and culture
but also receive training for a vocation of
profession and be taught the virtues of
"patriotism, respect for human rights,
appreciation for national heroes, the
rights and duties of citizenship, and moral
and spiritual values as part of the
curricula. Expelling or banning the
24 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
petitioners from Philippine schools will
bring about the very situation that this
Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a
small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of
country or respect for duly constituted
authorities.
To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a
compulsory routine is to make an
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds.
When they diversity are so
harmless to others or to the State as
those we deal with here, the price is not
too great. But freedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.
Furthermore, let it be noted that
coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, — assuming that such unity and
loyalty can be obtained through coercion
— is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. A desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means.
Moreover, the expulsion of
members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the
schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens,
under the 1987 Constitution, to receive
free education, for it is the duty of the
State to "protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education . . . and to
make such education accessible to all
(Sec. 1, Art. XIV). SC holds that a similar
exemption may be accorded to the
Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of
respect for their religious beliefs,
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem
to others. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises .
It is appropriate to recall the
Japanese occupation of our country in
1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless
of religious persuasion, in fear of the
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
invader, saluted the Japanese flag and
bowed before every Japanese soldier.
Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through
that dark period of our history, they
would not quibble now about saluting the
Philippine flag.
For when liberation came in 1944
and our own flag was proudly hoisted
aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to
behold that made our hearts pound with
pride and joy over the newly-regained
freedom and sovereignty of our nation.
Although the Court upholds in this
decision the petitioners' right under our
Constitution to refuse to salute the
Philippine flag on account of their
religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless,
that another foreign invasion of our
country will not be necessary in order for
our countrymen to appreciate and
cherish the Philippine flag.
IMBONG v. OCHOA
FACTS: 14 petitions and 2
petitions-in-intervention were filed in
Court assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012, or the
RH Law, for short.
HELD: In view of the seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents, not only to the
public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the
guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health,
the freedom of religion and expression
and other constitutional rights. Mindful of
all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among
a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions
raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is
the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the
Court need not wait for a life to be taken
away before taking action.
The principle of separation of
Church and State is based on mutual
respect. Generally, the State cannot
25 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and
dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor
one religion and discriminate against
another. On the other hand, the church
cannot impose its beliefs and convictions
on the State and the rest of the citizenry.
It cannot demand that the nation follow
its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that
they are good for the country.
In short, the constitutional
assurance of religious freedom provides
two guarantees: the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause
"principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It
mandates a strict neutrality in affairs
among religious groups." Essentially, it
prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources
for the support or prohibition of a
religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the
free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.
Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from
unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.
Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union wrote: The
constitutional provisions not only
prohibits legislation for the support of
any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of
worship, but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. It has
been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect
the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
though the burden may be characterized
as being only indirect. But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its
power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite
its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing
such burden.
In the case at bench, it is not
within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one’s participation in
the support of modern reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious
standpoint or whether the same is right
or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. For the Court has declared that
matters dealing with “faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters
which are outside the province of the civil
courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the
Court makes in the case at bench should
be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious
freedom.
In the same breath that the
establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot
do with the government. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To
do so, in simple terms, would cause the
State to adhere to a particular religion
and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are
misguided in their supposition that the
State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
26 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply
because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and
State demands that one render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and
unto God the things that are God’s.
In a situation where the free
exercise of religion is allegedly burdened
by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with
the Court’s espousal of the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the
conscientious objector’s claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption
from obligations under the RH Law,
unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily
so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
exemption from the RH Law deserves no
less than strict scrutiny.
The Court is of the view that the
obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction
of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will,
refers a patient seeking information on
modern reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he
has been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, at the basis of the free
exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.
Though it has been said that the act of
referral is an opt-out clause, it is,
however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit
in the performance of an act that they
find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be
the principal, but he is equally guilty if he
abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.
In case of conflict between the
religious beliefs and moral convictions of
individuals, on one hand, and the interest
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive
health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the
Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of “the
principle of non-coercion” enshrined in
the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.
The Court is not oblivious to the
view that penalties provided by law
endeavour to ensure compliance. Without
set consequences for either an active
violation or mere inaction, a law tends to
be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a
constitutionally protected right the Court
firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval.
The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer
a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure
on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a
constitutional guarantee which the Court
cannot allow.
The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers.
There is no perceptible distinction why
they should not be considered exempt
from the mandates of the law. The
protection accorded to other
conscientious objectors should equally
apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the
public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every
individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken
off even if one acquires employment in
the government.
The Court finds no compelling
state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious
27 of 28
 Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

objectors, however few in number. Only thru distribution of periodicals and

the prevention of an immediate and grave other religious materials,
danger to the security and welfare of the Ebralinag v. Division
community can justify the infringement of Superintendent — religious
religious freedom. If the government fails freedom thru salute), the
to show the seriousness and immediacy applicable test is clear and present
of the threat, State intrusion is danger test. But when religious
constitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of freedom is exercised exclusively,
religion means more than just the not with the cognate rights under
freedom to believe. It also means the Sec. 4 of Art. 3, compelling state
freedom to act or not to act according to interest test is applicable.
what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act
against one’s belief or is prevented from
acting according to one’s belief.

IN IMBONG v. OCHOA, THE DOCTORS

CAN REFER PATIENTS TO ANOTHER
DOCTOR. WHILE THEY CANNOT BE
COMPELLED TO GIVE MEDICAL
OPINION BECAUSE OF THEIR
RELIGIOUS BELIEF, THEY ARE
MANDATED AT THE VERY LEAST TO
REFER TO ANOTHER DOCTOR. IS THAT
A REASONABLE COMPROMISE?
● No. Because religious freedom
cannot be impaired directly or
indirectly.
● Though it has been said that the
act of referral is an opt-out clause,
it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they
find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is
equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect
participation.

IN ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, SC APPLIED

COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST.
WHILE IN OTHER CASES (E.G. ABS v.
MANILA) SC APPLIED OTHER TESTS
(CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST),
HOW DID THE SC EXPLAIN THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO?
● If the subject is religious freedom
together with other rights under
Sec. 4 of Art. 3 (INC v. CA —
religious freedom thru television;
ABS v. Manila — religious freedom

A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s) 28 of 28