The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, also known as the Fisheries Case, was a pivotal

moment in the history of international law, primarily concerning fishing rights in the North
Sea. The case, brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1951 by the United
Kingdom against Norway, revolved around conflicting claims of jurisdiction over fisheries in
the North Sea.

Territorial Jurisdiction: The case emphasized the importance of determining maritime

boundaries and territorial jurisdiction, which has been a fundamental function of
international law throughout history.

Historic Fishing Rights: The United Kingdom claimed historic fishing rights in the area, dating
back to medieval times. However, the ICJ ruled that these historic rights did not grant
exclusive fishing rights in the disputed area and must be interpreted in accordance with
contemporary international law.

Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: The principle of the natural prolongation of the continental
shelf played a central role in the case. The ICJ held that Norway had jurisdiction over
fisheries beyond its territorial sea, extending up to twelve nautical miles from the coastline,
based on this principle. This concept has since become a cornerstone of modern maritime
law and was later incorporated into the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).

Customary International Law: The case underscored the evolving nature of customary
international law. It established that customary law could be modified through state practice
and opinio juris, reflecting changing international norms and practices. Norway had claimed
a historical customary right to calculate its territorial waters from the edge of rocky outcrops
along its coast. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered Norway's assertion of this
historical practice and the fact that other nations, including Great Britain, had allowed
Norway to use this method for centuries without objections.

The ICJ acknowledged that historical data and peaceful usage, attested by ancient traditions
and practices, can legitimately be taken into account when drawing maritime boundaries.
This highlighted the idea that customary rights based on long-standing and peaceful practice
can continue to be recognized under contemporary international law.

In conclusion, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case was a landmark decision that had
significant implications for the development of international law. It clarified principles
related to maritime boundaries, historic rights, continental shelf jurisdiction, and the
evolution of customary international law. This case contributed to shaping the legal
framework for the rights and responsibilities of coastal states in managing and conserving
marine resources, setting important precedents for future international disputes related to
the law of the sea.
North Sea continental shelf case: The case involved a dispute among three parties -
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands - concerning the delimitation of a Continental Shelf
in the North Sea. The main issue was how to fairly and equitably allocate the Continental
Shelf among these countries, given the concave nature of Germany's coastline compared to
the convex coastlines of Denmark and the Netherlands.

Issues:

Whether the Geneva Convention of 1958, specifically Article 6, was binding on Germany.
Whether the equidistance principle had become a rule of Customary International Law

The ICJ held:

Germany had signed but not ratified the Geneva Convention of 1958. However, the Court
rejected the argument that Germany had unilaterally assumed obligations from the
Convention without evidence of detrimental consequences to Denmark or the Netherlands.
The Court concluded that Article 6(2) of the Convention was not a binding 'norm-creating'
provision. The Court emphasized that the Convention allowed for reservations, highlighted
the importance of agreement between States for delimitation, and included a provision for
'special circumstances.' These factors made it clear that the equidistance principle was not
binding on Germany under treaty law.
Denmark and the Netherlands argued that Germany was bound by the equidistance
principle under customary international law. However, the ICJ rejected this argument as well,
stating that the equidistance principle had not evolved into customary international law
when the Convention was drafted or even afterward.
The Court emphasized the importance of generality and uniform state practice, coupled with
opinio juris, for a principle to become customary international law. In this case, the
equidistance principle did not meet these criteria.
Ratio Decidendi:
The ICJ ruled that the equidistance method of delimitation was not binding on the parties,
neither by treaty law nor customary law. Delimitation should be achieved through
agreement, considering equitable principles and all relevant circumstances.

Analysis:
The case clarified that the duration of state practice alone is not sufficient to establish
customary international law. The essential elements for customary international law are
state practice and opinio juris (the belief that there is a legal obligation to follow a certain
practice). Opinio juris is a psychological feeling of obligation on the part of the State.

The judgment underscored that customary international law can change, and the
recognition of custom may result from self-interested state behavior. It highlighted that
changes in customary international law are malleable and fluid in nature.
Lotus case: France vs Turkey On August 2, 1926, a collision occurred on the high seas
between the French vessel “Lotus” and the Turkish collier “Boz-Kourt”, resulting in the
sinking of the Boz-Kourt and the death of eight Turkish nationals. The French mail steamer
Lotus, captained by a French citizen , continued to Constantinople with survivors from the
Boz-Kourt on board. On August 5, the captain was questioned by Turkish authorities and
subsequently arrested without informing the French Consul-General. He was later convicted
by Turkish criminal courts for manslaughter and sentenced to 80 days of imprisonment and a
fine.

Whether Turkey violated international law by exercising jurisdiction over a crime committed
by a French national outside Turkey's territory?
Whether Turkey should pay compensation to France if it violated international law?

There is no rule of international law that restricts a sovereign state from exercising criminal
jurisdiction within its own territory over a foreign national who commits offenses outside
that state's national jurisdiction. Turkey had the right to prosecute because although he was
aboard a French ship, the impacts of the alleged offense occurred on a Turkish collier. Both
states could exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the entire incident because there was no
established international law rule regarding collision cases that exclusively vested criminal
proceedings in the state whose flag was flown.

The "flag state principle" argued by France was rejected by the majority of the court because
there was no existing international law rule supporting it at the time. However, the Geneva
Convention of the High Seas in 1958 altered the implications for future cases by emphasizing
that only the flag state or the state of which the alleged offender was a national had
jurisdiction over incidents occurring on the high seas

The court's decision was based on the concept of the sovereign will of states. International
law regulates relations between independent states, and principles that bind states originate
from their own consent expressed in conventions and usages. In this case, the court took a
positivist approach and considered the consent of states to be highly significant.

Turkey did not violate international law by initiating criminal proceedings. The court held
that Turkey had jurisdiction because the offense had an effect on a Turkish collier, and the
Turkish collier was considered Turkish territory in this context. Therefore, Turkey was within
its rights to exercise jurisdiction over the ship, similar to how it exercises jurisdiction over its
land, to the exclusion of all other states. The Lotus case established the principle that a state
cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond its territory unless permitted by an international
convention or customary law, emphasizing the importance of state consent in international
law.
The Nicaragua vs. United States case, decided in 1986, centered on military and paramilitary
activities carried out with assistance from the United States against Nicaragua between 1981
and 1984. This case is significant for several reasons, including its exploration of customary
international law related to the use of force and non-intervention, the determination of the
elements necessary to establish customary international law, and the interplay between
customary and treaty law.

Key Questions and Issues:

Whether the Court could base its findings on customary international law when a
multilateral treaty reservation was in place.
The relationship between treaty law and customary international law.
The necessary elements for the formation of customary international law.
The customary international law status of the principle of non-intervention.

Relevant Findings of the Court:

Independence of Customary and Treaty Law: The Court held that multilateral treaty
reservations cannot preclude the Court from relying on customary international law.
Customary law exists independently of treaty law, even if the two sources of law deal with
the same subject matter.

Coexistence of Customary and Treaty Law: The Court established that customary
international law and treaty law can coexist in two contexts:
a. Identical Principles: When customary law principles are identical to treaty provisions, both
customary and treaty law apply. Even if the treaty ceases to apply between treaty parties,
the identical customary law provision continues to apply between them.
b. Differing Rights and Obligations: In situations where customary and treaty law rights and
obligations differ concerning the same subject matter, both sources of law coexist. The Court
emphasized that areas governed by these two sources may not always overlap, and their
rules may not always have the same content.

Relationship with the UN Charter: The Court clarified that the Charter of the United Nations
and customary international law on the use of force and self-defense are not in conflict but
are interconnected. The Charter expressed principles already present in customary
international law.

Continuing Validity of Customary Principles: The Court concluded that principles such as the
non-use of force, non-intervention, respect for independence and territorial integrity of
states, the right of collective self-defense, and freedom of navigation remain binding as part
of customary international law, regardless of their inclusion in conventional (treaty) law.
Asylum case: The case concerning the granting of diplomatic asylum in the Colombian
Embassy at Lima in 1949 involved a dispute between Peru and Colombia. The asylum was
granted to a Peruvian political leader accused of instigating a military rebellion. The issue at
hand revolved around whether Colombia, as the granting state, had the unilateral authority
to determine whether the leaders actions constituted a political offense or a common crime.
Additionally, the Court was asked to decide whether the territorial state (Peru) was obligated
to provide guarantees for the leaders safe departure from the country.

Whether Colombia, as the state granting asylum, could unilaterally determine the nature of
the offense committed by Haya de la Torre, i.e., whether it was a political offense or a
common crime.
Whether the territorial state (Peru) was obligated to ensure the safe departure of the
refugee (Haya de la Torre) from the country.
Whether the granting of asylum to Haya de la Torre violated the Pan-American Havana
Convention on Asylum (1928).

Unilateral Qualification of Offense: The Court ruled that Colombia did not have the unilateral
authority to qualify the offense committed by Haya de la Torre in a manner that would be
binding on Peru. In other words, Colombia could not unilaterally determine whether the
offense was political or common in nature.

Obligation of Territorial State: The Court held that the territorial state, Peru, was not obliged
to provide guarantees for the safe departure of the refugee, Haya de la Torre, from the
country. It was not Peru's responsibility to ensure the refugee's safe exit.

Violation of the Havana Convention: The Court found in favor of Peru's counter-claim, stating
that the granting of asylum to Haya de la Torre in the Colombian Embassy violated the Pan-
American Havana Convention on Asylum (1928). The Convention laid down conditions under
which asylum could be granted, and the Court determined that these conditions were not
met in this case.

Conclusion:
In the 1950 judgment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against Colombia's
unilateral qualification of the offense, emphasizing that such determination was not binding
on Peru. It also clarified that Peru was not obligated to ensure the safe departure of the
refugee, Haya de la Torre. Furthermore, the Court found that the granting of asylum had
violated the provisions of the Pan-American Havana Convention on Asylum, ultimately
resolving the dispute between Peru and Colombia in favor of Peru.
Luther vs Sagor: The case involves Mr. Luther, a British citizen who owned a timber industry
in Soviet Russia. In 1917, the Russian government nationalized his factory, and Luther
subsequently left Russia for the United Kingdom. In 1920, Mr. Sagor entered into an
agreement with a Russian nationalized business company to purchase timber. When the
timber arrived in the UK, Luther claimed that it belonged to him and argued that the UK had
never recognized the legitimacy of the Russian government, making the nationalization of
his factory unlawful.

The main issue before the King's Bench Division was whether the United Kingdom had
recognized the government of Russia. Additionally, the court considered the legality and
legitimacy of the nationalization of Luther's factory by the Russian government.

The court held that the recognition of a state by a government is retroactive in its effect.
Therefore, the change in government and any delay in recognizing the new government do
not have an impact before the English courts. In this case, it was established that the British
government had indeed recognized the government of Russia. The court emphasized that
the recognition of Russia had retrospective effect, meaning that the timing of the
recognition was not a relevant consideration.

The British government provided de facto recognition of the current government of Russia.
Recognition of Russia had retrospective effect, making the specific timing of recognition
irrelevant.
In matters of effective relationships and legal considerations, there is no significant
difference between de facto and de jure recognition of a government.
Ultimately, the court ruled that the nationalization of Luther's factory by the Russian
government was legal and valid, as the British government had recognized the government
of Russia, and this recognition had retroactive effect.
Germany Vs Italy: The case involves a dispute between Germany and Italy regarding
jurisdictional immunity for acts committed by a state's armed forces during an armed
conflict. In 1943, Italy surrendered to the Allies and declared war against Germany, which
had occupied parts of Italian territory during World War II. German forces committed
various crimes against Italian civilians and soldiers during this period. After the war,
Germany enacted laws to compensate victims of these crimes, but some Italian military
internees were excluded from these laws. These excluded internees brought civil claims
against Germany in Italian and Greek courts, seeking compensation for the crimes.

Is jurisdictional immunity available to a state for acts committed by its armed forces during
an armed conflict?
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled as follows:

Jurisdictional Immunity: The ICJ confirmed that jurisdictional immunity is generally available
to a state for acts committed by its armed forces during an armed conflict. States enjoy
immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts in cases related to their sovereign acts, and
this includes acts of their armed forces in the conduct of an armed conflict.

Violation by Italy: Italy violated its obligation to respect Germany's jurisdictional immunity
under international law by allowing civil claims against Germany based on violations of
international humanitarian law committed by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945.
Additionally, Italy violated this immunity by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek
courts that had ruled against Germany. Italy's actions were inconsistent with its international
obligations related to state immunity.

Measures of Constraint: Italy's measures of constraint against German property in Italy were
also deemed to be in violation of Germany's jurisdictional immunity. Such measures
infringed upon the immunity that Germany enjoys under international law.

The ICJ ordered Italy to enact legislation or take other appropriate measures to ensure that
the decisions of its courts and other judicial authorities that infringe upon Germany's
immunity cease to have effect. In doing so, the ICJ reaffirmed the principle of jurisdictional
immunity for states and emphasized its importance in maintaining international legal order.