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for reconsideration by petitioner. Hence, the court and become final prior to or
she filed the instant case before the SC apart from the decree of legal
alleging that the CA erred in setting separation. Rather, they are mere
aside the questioned order. She further incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus,
alleged that an action for legal they may not be subject to multiple
separation is among the cases where appeals.
multiple appeals may be taken.
According to her, the filing of a record on Petitioner’s alternative prayers that in
appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 case we do not dismiss the appeal, we
of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in return the records to the trial court and
this case. However, since respondent require respondent to file a record on
failed to file the record on appeal within appeal, or we return the records to the
the reglementary period as provided trial court and retain only the pleadings
under the Rules of court (Sec 1-b, Rule and orders relevant to the appeal, are
50), the same should be dismissed untenable. If we grant the first, we are
effectively saying that the instant case is
Issue: one involving multiple appeals, which it
is not. If we allow the second, we are
WON multiple appeals may be allowed effectively applying by analogy, Section
in an action for legal separation? 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court, without petitioner
Held: showing support therefor in law or
jurisprudence.
NO
III
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in
special proceedings, in actions for PACETE vs. CARRIAGA
recovery of property with accounting, in G.R. No. 53880 March 17, 1994
actions for partition of property with
accounting, in the special civil actions of FACTS:
eminent domain and foreclosure of
mortgage. The rationale behind allowing Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete
more than one appeal in the same case were married on April 30, 1938 and had
is to enable the rest of the case to a child. Enrico contracted a second
proceed in the event that a separate and marriage with Clarita dela Concepcion.
distinct issue is resolved by the court Alanis learned of it on Aug 1, 1979.
and held to be final.
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on
In said case, the two issues raised by October 1979, for the Declaration of
therein petitioner that may allegedly be Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile
the subject of multiple appeals arose husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la
from the same cause of action, and the Concepcion, as well as for legal
subject matter pertains to the same separation between her and Pacete,
lessor-lessee relationship between the accounting and separation of property.
parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in She averred in her complaint that she
that case would only be violative of the was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
rule against multiplicity of appeals. they had a child named Consuelo; that
The same holds true in an action for Pacete subsequently contracted a
legal separation. The issues involved in second marriage with Clarita de la
the case will necessarily relate to the Concepcion and that she learned of such
same marital relationship between the marriage only on August 1979.
parties. The effects of legal separation, Reconciliation between her and Pacete
such as entitlement to live separately, was impossible since he evidently
dissolution and liquidation of the preferred to continue living with Clarita.
absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor The defendants were each served with
children, follow from the decree of legal summons. They filed an extension within
separation.[19] They are not separate or which to file an answer, which the court
distinct matters that may be resolved by partly granted. Due to unwanted
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moved to dismiss the case on the entitled to exercise control over conjugal
ground that the cause of action is barred assets. As he is bound by the Decision of
by previous judgment in the divorce his own country's Court, which validly
proceedings before the Nevada Court exercised jurisdiction over him, and
wherein respondent had acknowledged whose decision he does not repudiate,
that he and petitioner had "no he is estopped by his own representation
community property" as of June 11, before said Court from asserting his right
1982. The Court below denied the over the alleged conjugal property.
Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition.
To maintain that, under our laws, Alice
In her petition, Alice contends that has to be considered still married to
Richard is estopped from claiming on the Richard and still subject to a wife's
alleged conjugal property because of the obligations under Article 109 of the Civil
representation he made in the divorce Code cannot be just. Alice should not be
proceedings before the American Court obliged to live together with, observe
that they had no community of property; respect and fidelity, and render support
hence, barred by prior judgment. to Richard. The latter should not
Richard avers that the Divorce Decree continue to be one of her heirs with
issued by the Nevada Court cannot possible rights to conjugal property. She
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the should not be discriminated against in
Philippines and its declared national her own country if the ends of justice are
policy; the acts and declaration of a to be served.
foreign Court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
VIII
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Issue:
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case, We hold that the lot in question is in her concurring opinion, the rule that
paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for should govern in that case is that the
the personal debts of the wife. wife's paraphernal properties, as well as
those of their conjugal partnership, shall
The presumption that property is be liable for the obligations incurred by
conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers the wife in the course of her business
to property acquired during the (Arts. 117, 140, 172, 203, and 236, Civil
marriage. When there is no showing as Code; Art. 10, Code of Commerce, cited
to when the property was acquired by a in Commentaries on Phil. Commercial
spouse, the fact that the title is in the Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1, 1970 Revised
spouse's name is an indication that the Edition, pp. 14-15). After all, whatever
property belongs exclusively to said profits are earned by the wife from her
spouse. business go to the conjugal partnership.
It would only be just and equitable that
As correctly pointed out by the the obligations contracted by the wife in
respondent Court, the party who invokes connection with her business may also
the presumption that all property of the be chargeable not only against her
marriage belongs to the conjugal paraphernal property but also against
partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) the conjugal property of the spouses.
must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of XIII
acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non for the operation GO vs CA
of the presumption in favor of the G.R. No. 114791
conjugal partnership. (Cobb-Perez, et al.
vs. Lantin, et al., 23 SCRA 637; Jose FACTS:
Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corp., 36 SCRA 289). In the same Private respondents spouses
manner, the recent case of PNB vs. Court Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married
of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 affirms that: on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The
video coverage of the wedding was
When the property is registered in the provided by petitioners at a contract
name of the a spouse only and there is price of P1,650.00. Three times
no showing as to when the property was thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim
acquired by said spouse, this is an the video tape of their wedding, which
indication that the property belongs they planned to show to their relatives in
exclusively to said spouse. And this the United States where they were to
presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil spend their honeymoon, and thrice they
Code cannot prevail when the title is in failed because the tape was apparently
the name of only one spouse and the not yet processed. When they return,
rights of innocent third parties are however, they found out that the tape
involved. had been erased by petitioners and
Furthermore, even assuming for the therefore, could no longer be delivered.
sake of argument that the property in
dispute is conjugal, the same may still Furious at its loss, private respondents
be held liable for the debts of the wife in filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint
this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil for specific performance and damages
Code, the wife may engage in business against petitioners before the Regional
although the husband may object (but Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch
subject to certain conditions). It is clear 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted
from the records that the wife was trial, the court a quo rendered a decision
engaged in the logging business with the declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy
husband's knowledge and apparently Go jointly and severally liable to
without any objection on his part. The plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C.
acts of the husband show that he gave Ong.
his implied consent to the wife's
engagement in business. According to Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners
Justice Ameurfina-Herrera (then elevated the case to the Court of
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Appeals which, on September 14, 1993,
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dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Zambales. The trial court found that as
trial courts decision.Hence, this petition. early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to
divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
ISSUE: returned for good in 1972, Miguel
refused to stay with Carlina but stayed
WON the husband, petitioner Alex Go is alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
jointly and severally liable with his wife Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old
Nancy Go regarding the pecuniary Miguel contracted a second marriage
liabilities imposed with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. Two
months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly
HELD: purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at San Felipe, Binalonan
No. Petitioner Alex Go is absolved from Pangasinan. A house and lot in
any liability to private respondents and Binalonan, Pangasinan was also
that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee, but
to said private respondents for the this was disclaimed by the notary public
judgment award. Under Article 117 of saying that the money used to buy the
the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the property was given by Miguel. On
Family Code), the wife may exercise any October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia
profession, occupation or engage in Palang executed a deed of donation as a
business without the consent of the form of compromise agreement. The
husband. parties agreed to donate their conjugal
property to their only child, Herminia
In the instant case, SC is convinced that Palang. Miguel and Erlinda had a son,
it was only petitioner Nancy Go who Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and
entered into the contract with private Erlinda were convicted of concubinage
respondent. Consequently, SC rules that upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years
she is solely liable to private later, Miguel died.
respondents for the damages awarded
below, pursuant to the principle that On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her
contracts produce effect only as daughter Herminia filed an action for
between the parties who execute them. recovery of ownership and possession of
the Riceland and house and lot both
located at Binalonan, Pangasinan
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The
RTC dismissed the case and ruled in
favour of Agapay. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the trial
court’s decision and declared Carlina
and Herminia Palang the owners of the
properties in question.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUNSBAND AND WIFE Issue:
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for the purchase price and directed that the Office of the Register of Deeds on
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the May 15, 1970. In due course, the original
vendee. title was cancelled and in lieu
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
The transaction was properly a donation 84897 was issued in the name of the
made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one respondents Benito and Tomasa.
which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was When the donor died, the 6 heirs left ,
made between persons guilty of adultery including Respondent Benito, executed
or concubinage at the time of the a Deed of Partition with Recognition of
donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Rights on March 18, 1973 wherein they
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family distributed among only three (3) of
Code expressly provides that the them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left
prohibition against donations between by their common progenitors, excluding
spouses now applies to donations the land in question and other lots
between persons living together as disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
husband and wife without a valid earlier.
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out Disagreements arose among them.
to be better than those in legal union. Petitioners Romana and Constancia filed
a Complain for the annulment
XV of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897
against respondents Benito and Tomasa
ARCABA VS BATOCAEL before the RTC of Pangasinan on
December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged
XVI that the issuance of the transfer
certificate of title was fraudulent; that
Romana Locquiao- Valencia and the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that
Constancia L. Valencia, petitioners, the notary public who notarized the
VS document had no authority to do so,
Benito A.Locquiao, now deceased and; that the donation did not observe
and substituted by Jimmy Locquiao, the form required by law as there was no
Tomasa Mara and the Registrar of written acceptance on the document
Deeds of Pangasinan, respondents. itself or in a separate public instrument.
G.R. No. 122134 Issue:
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described. However, Article 1330 of the repeated demands for accounting and
same Code provides that “acceptance winding up went unheeded, prompting
is not necessary to the validity of him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of
such gifts”. In other words, the a Partnership Affairs, Accounting,
celebration of the marriage between the Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
beneficiary couple, in tandem with Damages with Writ of Preliminary
compliance with the prescribed form, Attachment.
was enough to effectuate the
donation propter nuptias under the Old RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua,
Civil Code. and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan
solidarily liable for any and all claims of
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are Chua. RTC’s judgment was upheld by the
different. Article 127 thereof provides CA. Then the sheriff levied upon and
that the form of donations propter sold at public auction Sunga-Chan’s
nuptias are regulated by the Statute of property in Paco, Manila, over which a
Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which building leased to PNB stood. Sunga-
contains the Statute of Frauds requires Chan questions the levy on execution of
that the contracts mentioned thereunder the subject property on the ground that
need be in writing only to be it is an absolute community property
enforceable. However, as provided in with her husband Norberto Chan.
Article 129, express acceptance “is
not necessary for the validity of Issue:
these donations.” Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient. Whether the absolute community of
property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan
It is settled that only laws existing at the and Norberto Chan can be lawfully made
time of the execution of a contract are to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan
applicable thereto and not later statutes, under the judgment.
unless the latter are specifically intended
to have retroactive effect. Consequently, Held:
it is the Old Civil Code which applies in
this case since the donation propter Yes.
nuptias was executed in 1944 and the
New Civil Code took effect only on The records show that spouses Sunga-
August 30, 1950. As a consequence, Chan and Norberto were married after
applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil the effectivity of the Family Code.
Code in the determination of the validity Withal, their absolute community
of the questioned donation, it does not property may be held liable for the
matter whether or not the donees had obligations contracted by either spouse.
accepted the donation. The validity of Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code
the donation is unaffected in either case. pertinently provides: Art. 94. The
absolute community of property shall be
SYSTEMS OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY liable for: x x x (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the
XVII marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of
SUNGA – CHAN vs CA the community, or by both spouses, or
GR 164401 by one spouse with the consent of the
other; (3) Debts and obligations
Facts: contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that
In 1977, Lamberto Chua and Jacinto the family may have been benefited.
Sunga formed a partnership, Shellite Gas Absent any indication otherwise, the use
Appliance Center (Shellite). After and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-
Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, Chan of the assets of Shellite even after
Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, the business was discontinued on May
petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered
continued with the business without to have been used for her and her
Chua's consent. Chua's subsequent husband's benefit.
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that Eusebia failed to prove this pre- an act that is both illegal and immoral.
requisite. We disagree. What petitioners fail to grasp is that
Nicolas and Pacita’s cohabitation cannot
The question of whether the subject work to the detriment of Eusebia, the
properties were acquired during the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a and Eusebia continued to exist
factual issue. Both the trial and appellate regardless of the fact that Nicolas was
courts agreed that the subject properties already living with Pacita. Hence, all
were in fact acquired during the property acquired from 7 October 1926,
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The tax the date of Nicolas and Eusebia’s
declarations covering the subject marriage, until 23 November 1996, the
properties, along with the unrebutted date of Eusebia’s death, are still
testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses, presumed conjugal. Petitioners have
establish this fact. We give due neither claimed nor proved that any of
deference to factual findings of trial the subject properties was acquired
courts, especially when affirmed by the outside or beyond this period.
appellate court. A reversal of this finding
can only occur if petitioners show Finally, petitioners’ reliance on Article
sufficient reason for us to doubt its 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. A
correctness. Petitioners in the present reading of Article 148 readily shows that
case have not. there must be proof of "actual joint
contribution" by both the live-in partners
Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is before the property becomes co-owned
conjugal or not, the answer came from by them in proportion to their
petitioners themselves. Nicolas and contribution. The presumption of
Eusebia were married on 7 October equality of contribution arises only in the
1926. Nicolas and Pacita started absence of proof of their proportionate
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 contributions, subject to the condition
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were that actual joint contribution is proven
married on 16 December 1996. first. Simply put, proof of actual
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot contribution by both parties is required,
No. 152 was purchased on 4 October otherwise there is no co-ownership and
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. no presumption of equal sharing.
152 is clearly during the marriage of Petitioners failed to show proof of actual
Nicolas and Eusebia. contribution by Pacita in the acquisition
of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed
Since the subject properties, including to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152
Lot No. 152, were acquired during the with her own money, or that she actually
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the contributed her own money to acquire it.
presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal XIX
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
burden is on petitioners to prove that the De Leon v. De Leon
subject properties are not conjugal. The GR# 185063
presumption in Article 116, which
subsists "unless the contrary is proved," Facts:
stands as an obstacle to any claim the
petitioners may have. The burden of On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon,
proving that a property is exclusive then single, and the People’s Homesite
property of a spouse rests on the party and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered
asserting it and the evidence required into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
must be clear and convincing. purchase on installment of a 191.30
Petitioners failed to meet this standard. square-meter lot situated in Fairview,
Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24,
The cohabitation of a spouse with 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in
another person, even for a long period, a civil rite officiated by the Municipal
does not sever the tie of a subsisting Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this
previous marriage. Otherwise, the law union were born Danilo and Vilma.
would be giving a stamp of approval to Following the full payment of the cost
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price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC was acquired with funds of the
executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed partnership. Only proof of acquisition
of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, during the marriage is needed to raise
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. the presumption that the property is
173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 conjugal. In fact, even when the manner
in the name of Bonifacio, "single." in which the properties were acquired
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, does not appear, the presumption will
sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, still apply, and the properties will still be
and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa considered conjugal.
(Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The
conveying Deed of Sale dated January In the case at bar, ownership over what
12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the was once a PHHC lot and covered by the
written consent and signature of Anita. PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Sell was only transferred during the
Three months later, the Tarrosas marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well
registered the Deed of Sale. They settled that a conditional sale is akin, if
secured the issuance in their names not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In
from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. both types of contract, the efficacy or
Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a obligatory force of the vendor’s
reconveyance suit before the RTC in obligation to transfer title is
Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita subordinated to the happening of a
and her children alleged, among other future and uncertain event, usually the
things, that fraud attended the full payment of the purchase price, so
execution of the Deed of Sale and that that if the suspensive condition does not
subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show take place, the parties would stand as if
that he was still the owner of the parcel the conditional obligation had never
of land. The Tarrosas, in their Answer existed. In other words, in a contract to
with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred sell ownership is retained by the seller
that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was and is not passed to the buyer until full
his exclusive property inasmuch as he payment of the price, unlike in a
was still single when he acquired it from contract of sale where title passes upon
PHHC. As further alleged, they were not delivery of the thing sold.
aware of the supposed marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time It cannot be over-emphasized that the
of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
ruled in favor of Anita and her children. consequence of the husband alienating
CA held that the Tarrosas failed to or encumbering any real property of the
overthrow the legal presumption that the conjugal partnership without the wife’s
parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. consent. To a specific point, the sale of a
conjugal piece of land by the husband,
Issue: as administrator, must, as a rule, be with
the wife’s consent. Else, the sale is not
WON the property in question is part of valid. So it is that in several cases we
the conjugal property of Bonifacio and ruled that the sale by the husband of
Anita. property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the
Ruling: wife is void ab initio, absent any showing
that the latter is incapacitated, under
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the civil interdiction, or like causes. The
governing provision in effect at the time nullity, as we have explained, proceeds
Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, from the fact that sale is in
provides that all property of the contravention of the mandatory
marriage is presumed to belong to the requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.
conjugal partnership unless it is proved Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the
that it pertains exclusively to the consent of the wife before the husband
husband or the wife. For the may alienate or encumber any real
presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. property of the conjugal partnership, it
Court of Appeals teaches, even follows that the acts or transactions
necessary to prove that the property executed against this mandatory
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provision are void except when the law and are in actual and physical
itself authorized their validity. possession thereof up to the present,
and have made considerable
As a final consideration, the Court improvements thereon, including a
agrees with the CA that the sale of one- residential house where they presently
half of the conjugal property without reside.
liquidation of the partnership is void.
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal From 1966 (the time when the
partnership, the interest of each spouse [respondents] were able to possess the
in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a property) to 1983 (the time when the
mere expectancy, which constitutes [petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had
and does not ripen into a title until it already been cancelled by the Registry
appears that there are assets in the of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a
community as a result of the liquidation span of 17 years; and from 1983 to 1995
and settlement.26 The interest of each (the time when the Heirs filed the
spouse is limited to the net remainder or original action) is a period of another 12
"remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) years.
resulting from the liquidation of the
affairs of the partnership after its The Deed of Transfer of Rights, executed
dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the by Hernandez, Sr. in Camisura’s favor,
husband or wife to one-half of the expressly states that the former, in
conjugal assets does not vest until the consideration of the amount of
dissolution and liquidation of the P6,500.00, transfers his rights over the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution subject property to the latter. Notably,
of the marriage, when it is finally such deed was simultaneously executed
determined that, after settlement of with the SPA on February 14, 1963.
conjugal obligations, there are net assets
left which can be divided between the Petitioners contend that the lack of
spouses or their respective heirs. consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez
(the spouse) rendered the SPAs and the
HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, deed of sale fictitious, hence null and
SR., namely: SERGIA V. HERNANDEZ void in accordance with Article 1409 of
(Surviving Spouse), DOMINGO V. the Civil Code.
HERNANDEZ, JR., and MARIA
LEONORA WILMA HERNANDEZ, ISSUE:
Petitioners,
vs. Whether or not the consent of the
PLARIDEL MINGOA, SR., DOLORES spouse is necessary for the validity of
CAMISURA, MELANIE MINGOA AND alienation of conjugal property?
QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS,
Respondents. HELD:
G.R. No. 146548
No. The consent of Domingo Hernandez,
FACTS: Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus,
the sale of his ½ share in the conjugal
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a property was valid. With regard to the
piece of real property in 1958 by the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to
PHHC as part of the government’s the sale involving their conjugal
housing program at the time. Title over property, the trial court found that it was
the said property was issued in 1966 in lacking because said wife’s signature on
the name of Hernandez, Sr., after full the SPA was falsified. However, Sergia’s
payment for the property was received lack of consent to the sale did not render
by the PHHC. the transfer of her share invalid.
Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr., It bears stressing that the subject matter
took possession of the said property. On herein involves conjugal property. Said
the other hand, the [respondents] took property was awarded to Domingo
possession of the said property in 1966 Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed
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SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. the transaction necessarily barred her
Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez, from questioning the sale of the subject
Sr. covering the subject property was property to third persons.
issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the
property to Melanie Mingoa and the
issuance of a new title in her name
happened in 1978. Since all these events
occurred before the Family Code took
effect in 1988, the provisions of the New
Civil Code govern these transactions. We
quote the applicable provisions, to wit: XXI
Art. 165. The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal PHILIPS MATTHEWS vs BENJAMIN
partnership. and JOSELYN TAYLOR
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been GR 164584
declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction Facts:
or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin
any real property of the conjugal A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject,
partnership without the wife’s consent. If married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-
she refuses unreasonably to give her year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while
consent, the court may compel her to their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn
grant the same. x x x. bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294
Art. 173. The wife may, during the square-meter lot (Boracay property)
marriage, and within ten years from the situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay
transaction questioned, ask the courts Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in
for the annulment of any contract of the consideration of P129,000.00. The sale
husband entered into without her was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
consent, when such consent is required, Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the
or any act or contract of the husband latter’s funds, constructed
which tends to defraud her or impair her improvements thereon and eventually
interest in the conjugal partnership converted the property to a vacation and
property. Should the wife fail to exercise tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben
this right, she or her heirs, after the Bow Inn. All required permits and
dissolution of the marriage, may demand licenses for the operation of the resort
the value of property fraudulently were obtained in the name of Ginna
alienated by the husband. Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.
In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras,41 we held However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a
that: falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
The Family Code, which took effect on 3 Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn
August 1988, provides that any executed a Special Power of Attorney
alienation or encumbrance made by the (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing
husband of the conjugal partnership the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
property without the consent of the wife sub-lease and otherwise enter into
is void. However, when the sale is made contract with third parties with respect
before the effectivity of the Family Code, to their Boracay property.
the applicable law is the Civil Code.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
that the disposition of conjugal property entered into an Agreement of Lease
without the wife's consent is not void but (Agreement) involving the Boracay
merely voidable. property for a period of 25 years, with an
annual rental of P12,000.00. The
Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to agreement was signed by the parties
file with the courts an action for and executed before a Notary Public.
annulment of the contract during the Petitioner thereafter took possession of
marriage and within ten (10) years from
Page 21 of 47
the property and renamed the resort as We find and so hold that Benjamin has
Music Garden Resort. no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Issue(s): Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and
• The marital consent of public lands in the Philippines.
respondent benjamin taylor is not Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
required in the agreement of the designated “vendee” in the Deed of
lease dated 20 july 1992. Sale of said property, she acquired sole
Granting arguendo that his ownership thereto. This is true even if
consent is required, benjamin we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he
taylor is deemed to have given provided the funds for such acquisition.
his consent when he affixed his By entering into such contract knowing
signature in the agreement of that it was illegal, no implied trust was
lease as witness in the light of the created in his favor; no reimbursement
ruling of the supreme court in the for his expenses can be allowed; and no
case of spouses pelayo vs. Melki declaration can be made that the subject
perez, g.r. no. 141323, june 8, property was part of the
2005. conjugal/community property of the
spouses. In any event, he had and has
• The parcel of land subject of the no capacity or personality to question
agreement of lease is the the subsequent lease of the Boracay
exclusive property of jocelyn c. property by his wife on the theory that in
Taylor, a filipino citizen, in the so doing, he was merely exercising the
light of cheesman vs. Iac, g.r. no. prerogative of a husband in respect of
74833, january 21, 1991. conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect
• The courts a quo erroneously controversion of the constitutional
applied article 96 of the family prohibition. If the property were to be
code of the philippines which is a declared conjugal, this would accord the
provision referring to the absolute alien husband a substantial interest and
community of property. The right over the land, as he would then
property regime governing the have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
property relations of benjamin disposition. This is a right that the
taylor and joselyn taylor is the Constitution does not permit him to
conjugal partnership of gains have.
because they were married on 30
june 1988 which is prior to the Claiming that the Agreement was null
effectivity of the family code. and void since it was entered into by
Article 96 of the family code of Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent,
the philippines finds no Benjamin instituted an action for
application in this case. Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn and
• The honorable court of appeals the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that
ignored the presumption of his funds were used in the acquisition
regularity in the execution of and improvement of the Boracay
notarial documents. property, and coupled with the fact that
he was Joselyn’s husband, any
transaction involving said property
• The honorable court of appeals required his consent.
failed to pass upon the
counterclaim of petitioner despite In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered
the fact that it was not contested into between Joselyn and petitioner
and despite the presentation of cannot be nullified on the grounds
evidence establishing said claim. advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold
its validity.
Held:
Page 22 of 47
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it and respondent as buyers do not reflect
unnecessary to address the other issues the true agreement of the parties since
raised by the petitioner. respondent did not pay a single centavo
of the purchase price and was not in fact
a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who
paid for the properties using his
XXII exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the
real and absolute owner of the
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner, properties; and, that petitioner acquired
vs. absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, of Absolute Sale/Assignment which
Respondent. Jambrich executed in his favor.
GR 159310
In her Answer, respondent belied the
Facts: allegation that she did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price. On the
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was contrary, she claimed that she "solely
assigned by his employer to work here in and exclusively used her own personal
the Philippines where he met respondent funds to defray and pay for the purchase
Antonietta Descallar, a separated price of the subject lots in question," and
mother of two boys, with whom he had a that Jambrich, being an alien, was
live-in relationship with. During the prohibited to acquire or own real
course of their relationship, a Deed of property in the Philippines.
Absolute Sale was issued in their favor The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
by Agro-Macro Subdivision respecting a petitioner. The decision was however
house and lot where they transferred reversed by CA on appeal.
and lived together. When the deed was
presented before the Registry of Deeds ISSUE:
for registration, a Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued only in the name of WON the petitioner as the successor-in-
respondent and the registration was interest of Jambrich, who is a resident
refused on the part of Jambrich on the alien, has validly obtained the right over
ground that he was an alien and could the subject property without violating
not acquire alienable lands of the public the prohibition under the Constitution.
domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s name
was erased from the deed of sale. In the HELD:
meantime, Jambrich adopted the sons of
respondent. However, not long after, the YES.
couple broke up and lived separately
without settlement of their properties. As the rule now stands, the fundamental
While still in the Philippines, Jambrich law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
met petitioner Camilo Borromeo with acquiring or holding title to private
whom he was indebted in the amount of lands, except only by way of legal
P150,000 relative to the purchases he succession or if the acquisition was
made from the latter which he was not made by a former natural-born citizen.29
able to pay. Believing that his interest in
his property with the Agro-Macro Therefore, in the instant case, the
Subdivision still exist, he sold the same transfer of land from Agro-Macro
by way of Deed of Absolute Development Corporation to Jambrich,
Sale/Assignment to petitioner. When who is an Austrian, would have been
petitioner was about to register the declared invalid if challenged, had not
deed, he discovered, however, that the Jambrich conveyed the properties to
property was already transferred in the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In
name of respondent and had already United Church Board for World Ministries
been mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the
complaint for recovery of the real consistent ruling in a number of cases31
property. Petitioner alleged that the that if land is invalidly transferred to an
Deed of Absolute Sale over the alien who subsequently becomes a
properties which identified both Jambrich Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
Page 23 of 47
Page 24 of 47
Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of It must be stressed that there is no
Civil Procedure provides that “real allegation or proof that Marilou
property sold as provided in the last redeemed the property in behalf of the
preceding section, or any part thereof petitioner. Marilou did not act as agent
sold separately, may be redeemed in the of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised
manner hereinafter provided, by the the right of redemption in her own right
following persons: xxxx a)The judgment as successor-in-interest of the petitioner.
obligor, or his successor-in-interest in Under the circumstances, should there
the whole or any part of the property; be any right violated, the aggrieved
party is Marilou, petitioners wife. The
The successor-in-interest of the property in question was the exclusive
judgment debtor referred to in the above property of Marilou by virtue of her
provision includes a person who redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid
succeeds to his property by operation of cause of action against the respondent.
law, or a person with a joint interest in
the property, or his spouse or heirs. Divested of all interest over the
property, the petitioner has ceased to be
Under the above provision, petitioner the proper party who may challenge the
could have redeemed the property from validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a
Marilou after she had redeemed it. The rule, the agency, as a contract, is
pleadings filed and the records of this binding only between the contracting
case do not show that petitioner parties, then only the parties, as well as
exercised said right. Consequently, as the third person who transacts with the
correctly held by the CA, Marilou parties themselves, may question the
acquired ownership of the subject validity of the agency or the violation of
property. All rights and title of the the terms and conditions found therein.
judgment obligor are transferred upon This rule is a corollary of the foregoing
the expiration of the right of redemption. doctrine on the rights of real parties in
And where the redemption is made interest. xxxxx Petition is denied.
under a property regime governed by
the conjugal partnership of gains, Article CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
109 of the Family Code provides that XXIV
property acquired by right of redemption
is the exclusive property of the spouses PISUEÑA vs HEIRS OF PETRA
redeeming the property. UNATING
GR 132803
2. NO. Facts:
A cause of action is an act or omission of
the defendant in violation of the legal Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista are
right of the plaintiff. the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino
A complaint states a cause of action Villar. They claimed that the land in
when it contains three essential dispute known as Lot 1201 was
elements:(1) a right in favor of the registered in the name of Petra Unating
plaintiff by whatever means and under married to Aquilino Villar. However,
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation sometime in 1950, after the death of
of the defendant to respect such right; Petra Unating, Aquilino Villar entered
and (3) the act or omission of the into an oral partnership agreement for
ten years with Agustin Navarra involving
Page 25 of 47
the swampy portion of the lot in question paraphernal property of Petra Unating.
consisting of around four hectares which Concededly, properties acquired during
was converted into a fishpond with the the marriage are presumed to be
investment capital of Agustin Navarra conjugal. However, this prima facie
and the net income shall be divided presumption cannot prevail over the
equally between Aquilino Villar and his cadastral court’s specific finding,
children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar on reached in adversarial proceedings, that
one hand, and Agustin Navarra on the the lot was inherited by Petra Unating
other hand. from her mother.
In 1958 when Agustin Navarra died, the Consequently, by virtue of the Deed of
heirs of Petra Unating repossessed the Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina
land in question until the defendant effectively transferred to Agustin
Jessie Pisueña, son-in-law of Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title
Navarra, disturbed their possession over their two-thirds share in the
sometime in 1974. And finally, sometime disputed lot. However, they could not
in 1982, the defendant, with the have disposed of their father’s share in
company of several men, including the same property at the time, as they
policemen, forcibly took physical were not yet owners. At the most, being
possession of the said land from the the only children, they had an inchoate
heirs of Petra Unating. Thus, they filed interest in their father’s share. When
the instant action for recovery of Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without
possession and ownership of a parcel of disposing of his one-third share in the
land against Jessie Pisueña. disputed property, Felix and Catalina’s
inchoate interest in it was actualized,
On the other hand, defendant countered because succession vested in them the
that the whole land in dispute was sold title to their father’s share and,
by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to consequently, to the entire lot. Thus,
Agustin Navarra, as evidenced by that title passed to Agustin Navarra,
Escritura de Venta Absoluta. And he and pursuant to Article 1434 of the present
his wife purchased the said land from Civil Code, which was already in force at
the heirs of Agustin Navarra. the time of Aquilino’s death in 1953.
XXVI
Ferrer vs Ferrer
Issue: GR No. 166496
Page 26 of 47
marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a case the property is sold by the owner-
piece of lot, covered by Transfer spouse.
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He
applied for a loan with the SSS to build Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution
improvements thereon, including a in determining the ownership of the
residential house and a two-door improvements that are made on the
apartment building. However, it was separate property of the spouses at the
during their marriage that payment of expense of the partnership or through
the loan was made using the couple’s the acts or efforts of either or both
conjugal funds. From their conjugal spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
funds, petitioner posited, they improvement and any resulting increase
constructed a warehouse on the in value are more than the value of the
lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that property at the time of the improvement,
respondent Manuel occupied one door of the entire property of one of the spouses
the apartment building, as well as the shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
warehouse; however, in September subject to reimbursement of the value of
1991, he stopped paying rentals the property of the owner-spouse at the
thereon, alleging that he had acquired time of the improvement; otherwise,
ownership over the property by virtue of said property shall be retained in
a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael subject to reimbursement of the cost of
and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was the improvement. The subject property
cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued was precisely declared as the exclusive
and registered in the names of property of Alfredo on the basis of Article
respondents. 120 of the Family Code.
Page 27 of 47
Florencia married to Nelson Pascual Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides
a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. that all property of the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal partnership,
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the unless it be prove[n] that it pertains
declaration of nullity of marriage under exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Article 36 FC, w/c was granted by the This article does not require proof that
Quezon City RTC in 1995. In the same the property was acquired with funds of
decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the the partnership. The presumption
dissolution and liquidation of the ex- applies even when the manner in which
spouses conjugal partnership of gains, the property was acquired does not
w/c the latter failed. appear.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof
with spouses Norberto and Elvira obtains on the acquisition of the
Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan property during the existence of the
from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and marriage, then the presumption of
Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the conjugal ownership applies. Proof of
obligation, Florencia and the spouses acquisition during the marital coverture
Oliveros executed several real estate is a condition sine qua non for the
mortgages (REMs) on their properties, operation of the presumption in favor of
including one lot no. 156283. Due to the conjugal ownership. When there is no
failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros showing as to when the property was
to pay their loan obligation, MBTC acquired by the spouse, the fact that a
foreclosed the property. title is in the name of the spouse is an
Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before indication that the property belongs
the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare exclusively to said spouse.
the nullity of the mortgage of the
disputed property, alleging that the
property, which is still conjugal property,
was mortgaged without his consent.
Page 28 of 47
through monthly salary deductions of because they lacked paying capacity and
P1,687.66. The respondents then were unwilling to pay the incidental
constructed a thirty-six (36)-square charges; the sale was with the implied
meter, two-story residential house on promise to repurchase within one year,
the lot. during which period (from May 1, 1992
to April 30, 1993), the respondents
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject would lease the subject property for a
property was transferred to the monthly rental of P500.00; when the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of respondents failed to repurchase the
Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, subject property within the one-year
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as period despite notice, he caused the
attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated transfer of title in his name on July 14,
consideration of P602,000.00. On 1993.
September 24, 1993, the respondents
filed a complaint with the RTC for the In a Decision dated January 23, 1997,
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It
claiming that there was no sale but only found that the subject property was
a mortgage transaction, and the Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property
documents transferring the title to the that was inherited from her father.
petitioner’s name were falsified.
The CA decided the appeal on June 25,
The respondents alleged that in April 2002. Applying the second paragraph of
1992, the petitioner granted them a Article 158 of the Civil Code and
P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the CA
first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the held that the subject property, originally
petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property,
advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, became conjugal property when it was
and made her sign a document used as collateral for a housing loan that
purporting to be the mortgage contract; was paid through conjugal funds –
the petitioner promised to give the Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions; the
P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda subject property, therefore, cannot be
surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS validly sold or mortgaged without
mortgage cancelled, and submits an Eliseo’s consent, pursuant to Article 124
affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he of the Family Code. Thus, the CA
waives all his rights to the subject declared void the deed of absolute sale,
property; with the P200,000.00 advance, and set aside the RTC decision.
Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel
the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; in ISSUE:
May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the
petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but Whether the subject property is
returned Eliseo’s affidavit, unsigned; paraphernal or conjugal.
since Eliseo’s affidavit was unsigned, the
petitioner refused to give the HELD:
P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the
mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda As a general rule, all property acquired
return the P200,000.00 advance; since during the marriage, whether the
Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 acquisition appears to have been made,
advance because it had been used to contracted or registered in the name of
pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept one or both spouses, is presumed to be
the title; and in 1993, they discovered conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in
the petitioner’s name, cancelling TCT In the present case, clear evidence that
No.1427 in their name. Erlinda inherited the residential lot from
her father has sufficiently rebutted this
The petitioner countered that there was presumption of conjugal ownership.
a valid contract of sale. He alleged that Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the
the respondents sold the subject Family Code, properties acquired by
property to him after he refused their gratuitous title by either spouse, during
offer to mortgage the subject property the marriage, shall be excluded from the
Page 29 of 47
Page 30 of 47
Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained
the RTC a motion for execution, which a loan from Ayala Investment and
was granted on December 7, 1999. A Development Corporation (AIDC). As
writ of execution was issued against added security for the credit line
CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of
levied on a property covering a lot PBM, executed security agreements
registered in the name of petitioner. making himself jointly and severally
Petitioner argued that the subject answerable with PBM's indebtedness to
property belongs to the conjugal AIDC.
partnership; as such, it cannot be held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC
CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be filed a case for sum of money against
subject of levy on execution or public PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the
auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for court rendered judgment ordering PBM
the nullification of the levy on execution and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally
and the auction sale, as well as the pay AIDC the principal amount of
certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending
appeal and upon motion of AIDC, the
Issue: lower court issued a writ of execution
and the Deputy Sheriff caused the
WON or not the property in question is issuance and service upon spouses
conjugal. Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three
(3) of their conjugal properties. Spouses
Ruling: Ching filed a case of injunction to enjoin
the auction sale alleging that the
All property of the marriage is presumed judgment cannot be enforced against
to be conjugal. However, for this the conjugal partnership levied on the
presumption to apply, the party who ground that, among others, the subject
invokes it must first prove that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
property was acquired during the the said conjugal partnership.
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the
the operation of the presumption in conjugal partnership of gains of spouses
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, Ching is not liable for the payment of the
the time when the property was debts secured by the husband Alfredo
acquired is material. Similarly, the Ching.
certificate of title could not support
petitioner’s assertion. As aptly ruled by Issue:
the CA, the fact that the land was
registered in the name of Evangelina Whether the conjugal partnership should
Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no not be made liable for the surety
proof that the property was acquired agreement entered into by the husband
during the spouses’ coverture. in favor of his employer.
Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well Held:
settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already Yes.If the husband himself is the
existing. principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services
CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS to be used in or for his own business or
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP his own profession, that contract falls
XXX within the term ". . . obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership."
AYALA INVEST AND DEV’T CORP. vs Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It
CA is enough that the benefit to the family
GR 118305 is apparent at the time of the signing of
the contract. From the very nature of the
Facts: contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or
Page 31 of 47
Page 32 of 47
Page 33 of 47
Page 34 of 47
NO.
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation,
through its president, Wilfrido C. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8
Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all
credit accommodation with petitioner debts and obligations contracted by the
Security Bank and Trust Company husband for the benefit of the conjugal
(SBTC). Petitioner approved the partnership." But when are debts and
application and entered into a credit line obligations contracted by the husband
agreement with respondent corporation. alone considered for the benefit of and
It was secured by an indemnity therefore chargeable against the
agreement executed by individual conjugal partnership? Is a surety
respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel agreement or an accommodation
J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound contract entered into by the husband in
themselves jointly and severally with favor of his employer within the
respondent corporation for the payment contemplation of the said provision?
of the loan. The respondent corporation We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon
finally availed of its credit line and Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia 9 that, in
received P9M. Out of that amount, it was acting as a guarantor or surety for
able to pay about P4M while the another, the husband does not act for
remaining balance remained outstanding the benefit of the conjugal partnership
as the corporation suffered business as the benefit is clearly intended for a
reversals and eventually ceased third party.
operating. To enforce its claim against
the corporation on the remaining In Ayala Investment and Development
balance of the loan, petitioner filed a Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 10 we
complaint for a sum of money with a ruled that, if the husband himself is the
prayer for preliminary attachment principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the
against respondent corporation and direct recipient of the money and
individual respondents in the Regional services to be used in or for his own
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC business or profession, the transaction
rendered a decision holding respondent falls within the term "obligations for the
corporation and individual respondent benefit of the conjugal partnership." In
Martinez jointly and severally liable to other words, where the husband
petitioner for the remaining balance of contracts an obligation on behalf of the
the loan including interest and attorney’s family business, there is a legal
fee. It, however, found that the presumption that such obligation
obligation contracted by individual redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
respondent Martinez did not redound to partnership. [11]
the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on On the other hand, if the money or
the conjugal house and lot of the services are given to another person or
spouses Martinez. entity and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, the transaction
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, cannot by itself be deemed an obligation
petitioner appealed to the CA but the for the benefit of the conjugal
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s partnership. [12] It is for the benefit of
decision in toto. Petitioner sought the principal debtor and not for the
reconsideration but it was denied. surety or his family. No presumption is
Hence, this petition. raised that, when a husband enters into
a contract of surety or accommodation
ISSUE: agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Proof must be
WON the conjugal partnership may be presented to establish the benefit
held liable for an indemnity agreement redounding to the conjugal partnership.
entered into by the husband to [13] In the absence of any showing of
accommodate a third party? benefit received by it, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable on an
HELD: indemnity agreement executed by the
Page 35 of 47
Page 36 of 47
provides that payment of personal debts a motion to dismiss the same on the
contracted by the husband or the wife ground of lack of cause of action.
before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership Issue:
except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. W/N a husband, as the administrator of
Unlike in the system of absolute the conjugal partnership, may legally
community where liabilities incurred by enter into a contract of lease involving
either spouse by reason of a crime or conjugal real property without the
quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute knowledge and consent of the wife.
community of property, in the absence
or insufficiency of the exclusive property Held:
of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art.
of conjugal partnership of gains. The 165. The husband is the administrator of
conjugal partnership of gains has no the conjugal partnership," in view of the
duty to make advance payments for the fact that the husband is principally
liability of the debtor-spouse. responsible for the support of the wife
and the rest of the family. If the conjugal
Parenthetically, by no stretch of partnership does not have enough
imagination can it be concluded that the assets, it is the husband's capital that is
civil obligation arising from the crime of responsible for such support, not the
slander committed by Erlinda redounded paraphernal property. Responsibility
to the benefit of the conjugal should carry authority with it.
partnership.
The husband is not an ordinary
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be administrator, for while a mere
held liable for the personal obligation administrator has no right to dispose of,
contracted by one spouse, unless some sell, or otherwise alienate the property
advantage or benefit is shown to have being administered, the husband can do
accrued to the conjugal partnership. so in certain cases allowed by law. He is
not required by law to render an
ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL accounting. Acts done under
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY administration do not need the prior
XXXIV consent of the wife.
Page 37 of 47
the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil respondent spouses that the contracts to
Code) sell had already been duly perfected and
Norma’s refusal to sign the same would
XXXV unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma
refused to sign the contracts prompting
GUIANG vs CA petitioner to file a complaint for specific
GR 125172 performance and damages against
respondent spouses before the Regional
XXXVI Trial Court.
The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
were thereafter prepared by Art. 124. The administration and
petitioner.She and Edilberto met for the enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
formal signing of the typewritten property shall belong to both spouses
Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed jointly. In case of disagreement, the
the contracts, petitioner delivered to husband’s decision shall prevail, subject
him two checks. The contracts were to recourse to the court by the wife for a
given to Edilberto for the formal affixing proper remedy, which must be availed of
of his wife’s signature. within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
The following day, petitioner received a
call from respondent Norma In the event that one spouse is
(wife), requesting a meeting to clarify incapacitated or otherwise unable to
some provisions of the contracts. During participate in the administration of the
the meeting, handwritten notations were conjugal properties, the other spouse
made on the contracts to sell, so they may assume sole powers of
arranged to incorporate the notations administration. These powers do not
and to meet again for the formal signing include the powers of disposition or
of the contracts. encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written
When petitioner met again with consent of the other spouse. In the
respondent spouses for the formal absence of such authority or consent the
affixing of Norma’s signature, she was disposition or encumbrance shall be
surprised when respondent spouses void. However, the transaction shall be
informed her that they were backing out construed as a continuing offer on the
of the agreement because they needed part of the consenting spouse and the
“spot cash” for the full amount of the third person, and may be perfected as a
consideration. Petitioner reminded binding contract upon the acceptance by
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inability, the authority of the court. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed
Article 124 of the Family Code, the the action for annulment of sale within
governing law at the time the assailed five (5) years from the date of sale and
sale was contracted, is explicit: execution of the deed. However, her
action to annul the sale pertains only to
ART. 124. The administration and the conjugal house and lot and does not
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership include the lot covered by TCT No. T-
property shall belong to both spouses 26471, a property exclusively belonging
jointly. In case of disagreement, the to Pedro and which he can dispose of
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject freely without Mary Ann’s consent.
to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy which must be availed of On the second assignment of error,
within five years from the date of the petitioners contend that they are buyers
contract implementing such decision. in good faith. Accordingly, they need not
inquire whether the lot was purchased
In the event that one spouse is by money exclusively belonging to Pedro
incapacitated or otherwise unable to or of the common fund of the spouses
participate in the administration of the and may rely on the certificates of title.
conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of The contention is bereft of merit. As
administration. These powers do not correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a
include the powers of disposition or purchaser in good faith is one who buys
encumbrance which must have the the property of another without notice
authority of the court or the written that some other person has a right to, or
consent of the other spouse. In the interest in, such property and pays a full
absence of such authority or and fair price for the same at the time of
consent, the disposition or such purchase, or before he has notice
encumbrance shall be void. of the claim or interest of some other
However, the transaction shall be person in the property. To establish his
construed as a continuing offer on the status as a buyer for value in good faith,
part of the consenting spouse and the a person dealing with land registered in
third person, and may be perfected as a the name of and occupied by the seller
binding contract upon the acceptance by need only show that he relied on the
the other spouse or authorization by the face of the seller’s certificate of title.
court before the offer is withdrawn by But for a person dealing with land
either or both offerors. (Emphasis registered in the name of and occupied
supplied.) by the seller whose capacity to sell is
The particular provision in the New Civil restricted, such as by Articles 166 and
Code giving the wife ten (10) years to 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of
annul the alienation or encumbrance the Family Code, he must show that he
was not carried over to the Family Code. inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell
It is thus clear that alienation or in order to establish himself as a buyer
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership for value in good faith.
property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void. In the present case, the property is
registered in the name of Pedro and his
Hence, just like the rule in absolute wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny
community of property, if the husband, knowledge that during the time of the
without knowledge and consent of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary
wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity
void. If the sale was with the knowledge did not appear in the deed. Even
but without the approval of the wife, assuming that petitioners believed in
thereby resulting in a disagreement, good faith that the subject property is
such sale is annullable at the instance of the exclusive property of Pedro, they
the wife who is given five (5) years from were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of
the date the contract implementing the her objection to the sale and yet they
decision of the husband to institute the still proceeded to purchase the property
case. without Mary Ann’s written consent.
Moreover, the respondents were the
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ones in actual, visible and public The respondents then were not allowed
possession of the property at the time to enter their rightful home or family
the transaction was being made. Thus, abode despite their impassioned pleas.
at the time of sale, petitioners knew that
Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the Firmly established in our civil law is the
subject properties and yet they failed to doctrine that: “Every person must, in the
obtain her conformity to the deed of exercise of his rights and in the
sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now performance of his duties, act with
invoke the protection accorded to justice, give everyone his due, and
purchasers in good faith. observe honesty and good faith.” When
a right is exercised in a manner that
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, does not conform with such norms and
the restoration of what has been given is results in damages to another, a legal
proper. The relationship between the wrong is thereby committed for which
parties in any contract even if the wrong doer must be held
subsequently annulled must always be responsible. Similarly, any person who
characterized and punctuated by good willfully causes loss or injury to another
faith and fair dealing. Hence, in in a manner that is contrary to morals,
consonance with justice and equity and good customs or public policy shall
the salutary principle of non-enrichment compensate the latter for the damages
at another’s expense, we sustain the caused. It is patent in this case that
appellate court’s order directing Pedro to petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of
return to petitioner spouses the value of these established civil law standards.
the consideration for the lot covered by
TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.
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Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
the title issued to the petitioners by
virtue thereof. The RTC ruled in his Article 124. The administration and
favor and declared that the SPA was enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
forged. The decision of the RTC was property shall belong to both spouses
affirmed by the CA. Hence the present jointly.
case filed by petitioners imputing error
to the CA for not applying the “ordinary In case of disagreement, the husband’s
prudent man’s standard” in determining decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
their status as buyers in good faith. The to the court by the wife for proper
petitioners submit that Article 173 of the remedy, which must be availed of within
Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family five years from the date of the contract
Code, governed the property relations of implementing such decision.
the respondents because they had been
married prior to the effectivity of the In the event that one spouse is
Family Code; and that the second incapacitated or otherwise unable to
paragraph of Article 124 of the Family participate in the administration of the
Code should not apply because the other conjugal properties, the other spouse
spouse held the administration over the may assume sole powers of
conjugal property. They argue that administration. These powers do not
notwithstanding his absence from the include disposition or encumbrance
country Dionisio still held the without authority of the court or the
administration of the conjugal property written consent of the other spouse. In
by virtue of his execution of the SPA in the absence of such authority or
favor of his brother; and that even consent, the disposition or encumbrance
assuming that Article 124 of the Family shall be void. However, the transaction
Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified shall be construed as a continuing offer
the sale through Atty. Parulan’s counter- on the part of the consenting spouse and
offer during the March 25, 1991 the third person, and may be perfected
meeting. as a binding contract upon the
ISSUE: WON Article 173 of the Civil Code acceptance by the other spouse or
and Article 124 of the Family Code authorization by the court before the
should apply to the sale of the conjugal offer is withdrawn by either or both
property executed without the consent offerors.
of Dionisio.
Thirdly, according to Article 256[29] of
Held: the Family Code, the provisions of the
Family Code may apply retroactively
NO provided no vested rights are impaired.
In Tumlos v. Fernandez,[30] the Court
To start with, Article 254[27] the Family rejected the petitioner’s argument that
Code has expressly repealed several the Family Code did not apply because
titles under the Civil Code, among them the acquisition of the contested property
the entire Title VI in which the provisions had occurred prior to the effectivity of
on the property relations between the Family Code, and pointed out that
husband and wife, Article 173 included, Article 256 provided that the Family
are found. Code could apply retroactively if the
application would not prejudice vested or
Secondly, the sale was made on March acquired rights existing before the
18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein,
effectivity of the Family Code. The however, the petitioners did not show
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article any vested right in the property acquired
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted
that any alienation or encumbrance their situation from the retroactive
of conjugal property made during application of the Family Code.
the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Fourthly, the petitioners failed to
Family Code.[28] substantiate their contention that
Dionisio, while holding the
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itstestate/intestate. No shortcut by
lumping claim against Alipios with those
against the Manuels.
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