889124

research-article2019
DAS0010.1177/0957926519889124Discourse & SocietyLi and Song

Article

Discourse & Society

Taiwan as ghost island? 1­–22

© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
Ambivalent articulation of sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0957926519889124
https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926519889124
marginalized identities in journals.sagepub.com/home/das

computer-mediated discourses

Yao-Tai Li and Yunya Song

Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

Abstract
This study examines the conflicting self-presentations when using the term ‘ghost island’ in Taiwan,
a self-mocking way to belittle the homeland. While some view this term as a form of social critique,
others consider it to be suggestive of a social malaise affecting contemporary Taiwanese. Drawing
on online posts and comments from the most popular bulletin board system in Taiwan, this study
combines topic modeling with a discourse-historical approach (DHA) to critical discourse analysis
(CDA) to examine the constructions of ‘ghost island’ by Taiwanese netizens. A computer-aided
content analysis was implemented using Structural Topic Modeling (STM) to identify discourse
topics associated with netizens’ discourses on ghost island. Our findings suggest that the images
of ‘us’ (the ordinary people) are presented as victims as against powerful ‘others’ (e.g. mainland
China and local elites). Specifically, self-mockery was often invoked to project a loser image
and marginalized status living on the island, whereas self-assertive narratives were invoked to
affirm Taiwanese society’s democracy and freedom. The conflicting narratives – with a mixture
of grudge, helplessness, pessimism, hope and pride – point to Taiwanese netizens’ ambivalent
articulation of marginalized identities that operates to strengthen affective connectedness and
virtual bonding.

Keywords
Bulletin board system, discourse-historical approach (DHA), ghost island, loser aesthetics, self-
mockery, Taiwan

Corresponding author:
Yunya Song, Department of Journalism, Hong Kong Baptist University, Communication and Visual Arts
Building, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
Email: yunyasong@hkbu.edu.hk
2 Discourse & Society 00(0)

Introduction
The bulk of research on self-presentation proceeds from a self-enhancement perspective
(Goffman, 1990; Van Dijk, 2006) that posits a self-presentation motive to develop, main-
tain or amplify a positive self-image. Social media tend to be viewed as a platform where
people engage in self-enhancing presentation to put forward ‘positive’ impressions.
Recently, however, an increasing number of netizens dismiss mainstream conceptions of
success by presenting their ‘negative’ self-images in a self-mocking way – a culture
known as ‘loser aesthetics’ – a mind-set that makes sense of an underprivileged status in
response to mainstream values and social expectations (Gong, 2016; Sum, 2017;
Szablewicz, 2014; Witteborn and Huang, 2016; Yang, 2017; Yang et al., 2015).
Taiwan, a highly online-connected society, has been noted for its robust media and a
proud culture of dissent (Tobias, 2013). Taiwanese today utilize cyberspace as a new site
for negotiating and experimenting with new forms of identities in a media-saturated but
politically polarized and fragmented society (Huang, 2019). In 2011, an online article
written by a former secretary of the government information office, Guan-Ying Guo,
mentioned, ‘In fact there is no such a thing or place called Taiwan. It is not even a prov-
ince, a county, not to mention a country; it is just a ghost island’. Since then, Taiwanese
frequently call Taiwan ‘the ghost island’ in their everyday lives and particularly on the
Internet, adopting a self-mocking way to present their ambiguous ‘loser aesthetics’ –
self-belittling while self-assuring. They mock themselves as ‘underprivileged losers’
who fail and aim to ‘escape’ the hopeless island. Sometimes the term is also used to criti-
cize government incapacity, exploitative employers who set salaries too low, increasing
living costs and rent, and the dim prospects of life under the threat of mainland China; at
other times, it implies a desire to leave Taiwan and migrate to (Western) countries; in
other contexts, it self-mocks but represents people’s hopes and pride in Taiwan’s seem-
ingly chaotic expressions of democracy (e.g. protests, freedom of speech, progressivism)
and creates affective connectedness and virtual bonding among Taiwanese netizens. The
ambiguous articulations of the ghost island, associated discourses and conflicting pres-
entations of selves and emotions all make netizens’ online self-presentation and articula-
tion a suitable case to examine.
This study looks beyond a simplistic reading of the ghost island as a self-assertion of
losers. Instead, we problematize the discursive production of the ghost island as a hope-
less land and ghost islanders as losers. Ghost island ambiguously signals netizens’ frus-
tration with a meager chance of upward socio-economic mobility. At the same time,
netizens resist the ghost island stigma but claim pride in the key tenets of diversity,
freedom and democracy. They create, modify, reproduce and negotiate the meanings of
the ghost island during online interactions. The ambiguous and conflicting presentations
of ghost island make it emblematic of an emergent form of affective identification and
bonding through which alternative desires of Taiwan’s future are articulated and enacted.
The existing literature on online self-presentation and digital identities has theorized
the contexts, reasons and ways in which people present a specific self-image in online
contexts (Bullingham and Vasconcelos, 2013; Nelson and Hull, 2009; Thumim, 2012;
Yee et al., 2009). The literature mostly addresses how a specific online self-image is
presented and its similarities to the off-line self. Little research has examined how and
Li and Song 3

why multiple or even conflicting self-presentations coexist and are negotiated in online
contexts. To fill this research gap, we examine the circumstances under which and how
conflicting selves are presented by Taiwanese netizens when referring to the island where
they live on.
When presenting conflicting selves, the discourses also imply how Taiwanese see
themselves and how Taiwan’s future is related to ‘others’ – boundary work is therefore
another important concept we bring into the discussion. Taiwanese netizens consciously
distinguish and establish boundaries between an innocent ‘us’ and powerful ‘others’ (e.g.
mainland China and local political/economic elites) and attach different positive and
negative attributes to themselves and different others. Focusing on the ways of conflict-
ing self-presentations of netizens in different contexts, we examine how we versus others
and different group boundaries (we vs Mainlanders and we vs local elites or local citi-
zens) are constructed and reinforced. In Internet society and the dynamic interactions it
creates, we seek to know the following: How do Taiwanese netizens construct otherness
to position their different selves? Which discursive strategies do they employ to con-
struct their in-groups (i.e. we ordinary people) as against others (e.g. Mainlanders, local
elites)? How do these discourses and ways of presentation reflect the marginalized iden-
tities of Taiwanese netizens?

The context of the study

Taiwan was once called ‘Formosa’ by the Portuguese, meaning the ‘beautiful island’.
With its rapid economic growth during the latter half of the 20th century, Taiwan became
one of the four ‘Asian Tigers’. Taiwanese citizens have a sense of pride in their democ-
racy and freedom. They tend to highlight their differences from mainland Chinese and
(negatively) view and present mainland Chinese as the other (Ho, 2018; Tu, 1996). The
indigenization of Taiwanese, which calls for a native Taiwanese consciousness and spe-
cific ethnic identification (Hokkien, Hokka and the indigenous people), has also been
widely discussed (Brown, 2004; Wu, 2016).
Oftentimes, Taiwanese citizens refer to Taiwan as Bao-dao (the precious island) or
Formosa, highlighting its rapid economic growth, democracy, freedom, safety, hospital-
ity, modern conveniences and so on. Such positive self-images and discourses, however,
have been undergoing significant transformations in recent years, due to its ambiguous
political status with the mainland, stagnant economic growth and other socio-cultural
factors (e.g. increasing crime rates, income gaps, social problems). Externally, under the
call for territorial integrity (Hughes, 1997; Unger, 1996), the Chinese government has
been using both hard and soft power to push for the integration between Taiwan and
mainland China. Furthermore, the Chinese government has not given up the possibilities
of resorting to military action to reclaim Taiwan (Seligman, 2019). For the Taiwanese,
threats from the mainland are tangible in everyday experiences. Internally, economic
problems are substantiated in the sharp decline of economic demand, stagnant salaries
and increasing inequality between poor and rich (Clark et al., 2018). Under political
threat and a stagnant economy, one direct result is that the Taiwanese have gradually lost
confidence in Taiwan’s future.
4 Discourse & Society 00(0)

Theoretical background
Us versus them: the construction of online identities
Earlier literature has discussed self-presentation management and tactics (Leary, 1996;
Lee et al., 1999). Other scholars have also examined issues regarding self-presentations
and identity formation in online contexts (Bullingham and Vasconcelos, 2013; Nelson
and Hull, 2009; Thumim, 2012; Yang, 2017). Among such studies, some adopt Goffman’s
(1990) idea of front stage versus back stage and show that people strive to create a spe-
cific image (their online selves) in online contexts. Others focus on whether constructed
‘online selves’ are consistent with or different from their ‘real’ offline identities (Cover,
2016; Yee et al., 2009). Other issues such as why and how an online user manipulates a
specific self-image and establishes ‘boundaries’ with others are also well-covered
(Fullwood et al., 2016; Keep and Attrill-Smith, 2017; White et al., 2018).
Self-presentations and boundary-making processes directly reflect and influence how
one sees oneself and others. Barth (1969: 15), for example, emphasizes how boundary
signals distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’, even among people with similar cultural or ethnic
backgrounds. Brubaker et al. (2004) also highlight the importance of how actors see the
world and interpret social experiences.
Subjective perception of self and others is important in shaping intergroup boundaries,
particularly in online contexts where anonymity, masking and pseudonymity change the
ways people imagine us and others. Scholars (Gong, 2016; Szablewicz, 2014) have
pointed out that online users in mainland China have created terms such as diaosi to rep-
resent their underprivileged identity (short, poor, ugly), which shows they are aware of
income inequality and power disparity as opposed to ‘tall, rich, and handsome’ people.
Moreover, in constructing the boundary between us and others, people also create
affective connectedness and virtual bonding with each other (Boxer and Cortés-Conde,
1997; Witteborn and Huang, 2016). Yang et al. (2015), for example, found that the term
‘diaosi’ (loser) in mainland China represents a space of ‘infrapolitics’ – a cultural process
of alternative identity construction and meaning-making that creates social solidarity
among those who share similar situations and are against mainstream values.

Loser aesthetics through self-mockery

In East Asian countries such as China, an increasing number of netizens mock them-
selves as diaosi (roughly translated to loser) when referring to their unpleasant personal
experiences in the professional, romantic and daily interaction realms (Witteborn and
Huang, 2016; Yang, 2017). The rise of ‘loser’ subculture in China’s digital sphere is
closely related to and reflect people’s frustrations in a status-obsessed East Asian society,
along with widening rich–poor gap. Netizens who feel left behind in China’s new econ-
omy claim themselves to be diaosi as an ironically proud expression of loser-hood. They
create a unique ‘loser aesthetics’ through making fun of themselves qua venting about
social values that emphasize only the material wealth and consumption. Status is the
specter that looms large when netizens mock themselves and voice their cynicism against
a social situation in which they are on the losing end. Witteborn and Huang (2016) argue
Li and Song 5

that diaosi is part of a ‘counter-hegemony identity’ born out of resentment against the
rich and higher-ups in the Chinese society, which resists the rules and mainstream values
of the advantaged.
Self-mockery is one of their often-used communicative practices to indicate their
status of being ‘outsiders’. As an alternative to conveying idealized and self-enhancing
impressions to others, self-mockery also constitutes an important aspect of presentation
of self. Instead of serving self-destructive purposes, self-mockery also functions to
strengthen the bonding (Boxer and Cortés-Conde, 1997). Through self-mockery, diaosi
describe their struggles and experiences that resonate with millions of Chinese millen-
nials who show sympathy with what diaosi are ranting about. It thus brings about posi-
tive reinforcement of a sense of self that is seen as morally superior to mainstream
social values, as well as a feeling of connectedness among the underdogs who are dis-
satisfied with their unattainable wealth and socio-economic status (Witteborn and
Huang, 2016).
Similarly, in the digital sphere in South Korea, we have also witnessed the rise of
‘loser subculture’ which reflects the challenges of neoliberalism and the social atmos-
phere. Yang (2017) uses the term ‘Internet freaks’ to describe the struggles and chal-
lenges people face (e.g. they failed to become a ‘successful’ person in real life).
Different from the loser aesthetics in China which displays a playful irreverence
for elites and establishment through a non-violent but uncooperative discourse, neti-
zens in South Korea invoke self-mocking humor to question, contest, and negotiate
neo-liberalization. A comparative study of youth activism in East Asia shows that the
youth share similar problems of job insecurity and social inequality in the status-
obsessed East Asian context, and their expression of dissatisfaction about the existing
social value order on the cyberspace shows commonalities in their repertoires (Joo,
2018) In Taiwan, young netizens are venting out their impatience with stagnant eco-
nomic growth, rising inequality and tensions with the mainland, all of which are held
responsible for their loser status. Meanwhile, though acknowledging their loser sta-
tus, many Taiwanese youth take pride in Taiwan’s democracy, diversity and progres-
sivism. As such, an ambivalent articulation of conflicting selves is emerging in
Taiwan’s cyberspace.

Data and methods

Dataset description
The data were from the largest bulletin board system in Taiwan, PTT. It has more than
1.5 million registered users, most of whom are in their 20s to mid-40s. PTT has more
than 20,000 boards related to various topics. Twenty thousand posts with more than
500,000 comments are made daily. The online site is a place where Taiwanese can voice
their disapproval of the government and big corporations/local elites (Tseng et al., 2011).
We selected the ‘Gossiping’ board because of its popularity (the hottest board on PTT);
the post themes are also representative of the most updated political, economic and
socio-cultural dissatisfactions; news which are discussed frequently; and current debates
on multiple issues.
6 Discourse & Society 00(0)

Using the keyword ‘ghost island’ in titles and posts, we retrieved 5340 posts that were
posted by 2442 users from 18 February 2018 to 12 July 2019 since PTT only stores data
for around 1 year.

Analysis procedure
This study adopted a discourse-historical approach (DHA) to critical discourse analysis
(CDA; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak, 2011, 2015). DHA is one of the methods
frequently adopted to examine the representation of ‘self versus other’ identities and
discursive constructions of national identity. DHA emphasizes the historical dimension
by accounting for historical, political and socio-cultural contexts where discursive events
are embedded, as well as particular types and genres of discourse (Reisigl and Wodak,
2009; Wodak, 2011; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). It moves between ‘critical textual, topics
and macro-structural analyses’ with an aim to ‘establish how linguistic devices at the
textual analysis’ feed into a particular social macro-structure ‘while explicating the
effects of the control over the topics’ (KhosraviNik, 2010: 62).
In this study, we apply DHA to computer-mediated discourse which by nature is more
interactive and user-centered than traditional media (Mahfouz, 2018). The aim is to
examine how Taiwanese netizens perceive their status quo and future in Taiwan and
which social realities (including threats and hopes) are reflected through their online
discourses when referring to the term ‘ghost island’. Our analysis takes the following
steps: (1) identifying ‘specific contents’ or ‘topics of discourse’, (2) examining the ‘dis-
cursive strategies’ used and (3) analyzing ‘linguistic means’ and ‘context-dependent lin-
guistic realisations’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 93).
First, a computer-aided content analysis was implemented using Structural Topic
Modeling (STM) to identify discourse topics. To implement or manipulate a belief or an
ideology, control and management is carried through discourse topics (Van Dijk, 1991).
‘Control of discourse topics’ fits into the ‘macro-structure’, which serves to ‘control the
relevant texts’ (KhosraviNik, 2010: 62). Meanwhile, the texts also reflect the macro-
structure by subsuming linguistic devices through which they reciprocate with the
macro-structure on another level.
The STM analysis to model topics was implemented using Python. Using each post
as a separate document, this analysis computed the distribution of topics. The output
included word lists representing each of the identified topics. With the tremendous
increase in the volume and variety of unstructured text documents (e.g. social media
data), topic models have been increasingly used to explore hidden thematic structure
within a corpus of text documents. A topic model identifies a set of topics (i.e. recurring
themes that are discussed in the texts) and measures the degree to which each document
exhibits those topics. In order to find out the appropriate number of topics, we imple-
mented the STM iteratively and finally set the number to be 15 based on the interpreta-
tion of topics. The patterns of two topics are meaningless, and thus we removed them
from the final model.
Second, we conducted a systematic analysis of DHA’s referential, predicational and
argumentative strategies. This analysis is meant to expose the linguistic patterns in terms
of the presentations of self and other. We focused on the following: How are persons,
Li and Song 7

Table 1. Discursive strategies of DHA.

Discursive Purpose Questions to discursive Language indicators

strategy
Nomination Discursive
construction of
objects, phenomena,
processes and actions
Predication Discursive qualification
(positive or
negative) of objects,
phenomena, processes
and actions
Argumentation Justification or
questioning of claims.
Persuading addressees
of the validity of
specific claims of
truth and normative
rightness
features
How is ‘ghost island’ referred Noun phrases
to linguistically? How is the Retrieve the noun
in-group (we ordinary people) phrases from the
and out-group constructed? texts
What (positive or negative) Adjective
characteristics or qualities are collocates
attributed to ‘ghost island’ Retrieve the
and the imagined ‘us’ and adjectives from the
‘others’ in the discourse? texts
By means of which arguments Example, the topos
and argumentation schemes of threat, the topos
(i.e. topoi) do Taiwanese of exploitative
netizens justify and legitimize reality and so on
their viewpoints on ‘ghost
island’?

Source. Adapted from Reisigl and Wodak (2009).

DHA: discourse-historical approach.

objects, phenomena or actions referred to nominally? What qualities and traits are used
to characterize social actors, objects and phenomena? What arguments are employed in
the discourse under investigation?
The decoding of each strategy relies on the examination of linguistic devices. For
nomination, this study identifies the noun phrases to answer how ‘ghost island’ and
related social actors or phenomena are discursively constructed. For predication, we
examine adjective collocates that are used to describe the island, people who live on the
island and different others. This is expected to find out what qualities are attributed to
social actors and phenomena related to the experiences of living in Taiwan. For argumen-
tation, this study analyzes the topos (i.e. argumentation schemes) which netizens used to
justify or legitimize their claims for the purpose of normative rightness. By examining
these linguistic means and their link to the historical, social and political contexts, we
intend to delineate the multifaceted categorization of actors which can lead to in-group
and out-group polarization in terms of us versus them (see Table 1, adapted from Reisigl
and Wodak, 2009).

Results
Figure 1 shows that on average there are 10–20 posts per day containing the term ‘ghost
island’. The number of posts containing ghost island increased significantly during
November 2018 and gradually decreased in January 2019. One explanation is that there
was a local mayoral election in November, which raised intensive discussion on Taiwan’s
future.
8 Discourse & Society 00(0)

Figure 1. The number of posts containing the term ‘ghost island’ per day from February 2018
to July 2019.

Figure 2. The number of ratings containing the term ‘ghost island’ per day from February 2018
to July 2019.

Figure 2 shows the overall positive and negative ratings of posts containing ‘ghost
island’ from February 2018 to July 2019. Overall, thumbs-up (push) has more counts
than thumbs-down (boo). Most netizens echo each other’s discussion of the ghost island
(e.g. they agree with each other that ghost island has a dark future), except during the
period of the end of December when there was a local election and referendum, which
provoked opposing opinions based on different political preferences.

Predominant topics in the ‘ghost island–related’ discourses

Table 2 presents the 20 most frequently occurring words in each of the 13 topics pro-
duced by the STM analysis: emigration and work overseas, ties with mainland China,
election, living cost and salary, law and justice, history, child-raising, employment, edu-
cation, religion, government performance, strikes and public health. The topic compris-
ing the largest percentage of the corpus was emigration and work overseas, making up
15.38% of all words in the collection (excluding stop words).
The distinctiveness of several topics was apparent directly from the word list output
by the STM analysis. These topics were ties with mainland China and the United States,
elections and multi-party competition, and government performance. Netizens discuss
these topics with diverse emotions and provide predicated words such as hopeless, help-
less, chaotic and proud when referring to the topics that either happen in the ghost island
or justify their opinions why Taiwan is a ghost island. The nature of other topics was
more contextualized, such as law, justice and safety, history, religion, strikes and public
health. The topic of industrial environment and employment comprises meta-level
Li and Song 9

Table 2. The 20 most frequently occurring words in each topic.

Topic label Proportion Top 20 most frequent words

of corpus (%)
Emigration 15.38 台灣 (Taiwan), 八卦 (gossip), 有沒有 (whether or not), 真
and work 的 (really), 美國 (USA), 工作 (job), 國家 (nation), 一堆 (a
overseas lot of), 國外 (overseas), 鄉民/網民 (netizens), 這種 (such),
移民 (emigration), 好像 (seems), 最近 (recently), 東西
(stuff), 其實 (in fact), 薪水 (salary), 如題 (as title), 出國 (go
overseas), 生活 (life)
Ties with 10.76 中國 (China), 台灣 (Taiwan), 美國 (USA), 祖
mainland 國 (homeland), 國家 (nation), 中共 (CPC), 國際
China and the (international), 覺青 (awaken youth), 支持 (support), 台
United States 獨 (Taiwan independence), 這種 (such), 統一 (unification),
香港 (Hong Kong), 世界 (world), 大陸 (mainland), 中華民
國 (Republic of China), 智障 (stupid), 日本 (Japan), 英國
(England), 歷史 (history)
Elections and 9.83 台灣 (Taiwan), 真的 (really), 民進黨 (DPP), 中國 (China),
multi-party 國家 (nation), 民主 (democracy), 政治 (politics), 國民
competition 黨 (KMT), 韓國瑜 (Han, Kuo-yu), 支持 (support), 柯文哲
(Ko, Wen-Je), 藍綠 (Blue vs Green), 其實 (in fact), 總統
(president), 能源 (energy), 一堆 (a lot of), 經濟 (economy),
選舉 (election), 這種 (such), 綠能 (green energy)
Living cost 8.46 台灣 (Taiwan), 政府 (government), 一堆 (a lot of), 真的
and salary (really), 老闆 (boss), 勞工 (labor), 老師 (teacher), 年輕
人 (young people), 房價 (housing price), 這種 (such), 薪水
(salary), 社會 (society), 低薪 (low salary), 薪資 (salary), 垃
圾 (trash), 房子 (house), 員工 (employee), 女老師 (female
teacher), 遇過 (met), 工作 (job)
Law, justice 7.45 法官 (judge), 警察 (police), 法律 (law), 新聞 (news), 警方
and safety (police), 台灣 (Taiwan), 駕駛 (driving), 機車 (scooter), 殺
人 (murder), 完整 (complete), 發生 (happen), 真的 (really),
男子 (men), 死刑 (death penalty), 酒駕 (drunk driving),
司法 (judicial system), 這種 (such), 法院 (court), 判決
(judgment), 保護 (protection)
History 6.82 日本 (Japan), 台灣 (Taiwan), 國家 (nation), 韓國 (Korea),
新加坡 (Singapore), 慰安婦 (comfort woman), 便宜
(cheap), 原住民 (indigenous people), 地方 (place), 真的
(really), 台幣 (New Taiwan Dollars), 支那 (zhina), 東京
(Tokyo), 其實 (actually), 天龍 (privileged), 不過 (however),
不到 (not to the extent), 中國 (China), 美國 (USA), 房價
(housing price)
Child-raising 6.73 小孩 (children), 女生 (girl), 男生 (boy), 大學 (college),
肥宅 (couch potato), 真的 (really), 台灣 (Taiwan), 生小
孩 (having children), 書卷 (studious), 虎爛系 (bluff), 女人
(women), 其實 (actually), 結婚 (marriage), 社會 (society),
不過 (however), 父母 (parents), 男人 (men), 可愛 (cute),
老婆 (wife), 孩子 (children)
(Continued)
10 Discourse & Society 00(0)

Table 2. (Continued)

Topic label Proportion Top 20 most frequent words

of corpus (%)
Industrial 5.79 台灣 (Taiwan), 公司 (company), 工作 (job), 新聞 (news),
environment 完整 (complete), 網友 (netizens), 報導 (report), 大陸
and (mainland), 企業 (entreprise), 員工 (employee), 薪資
employment (salary, 連結 (link), 備註 (footnote), 指出 (point out), 來源
(source), 媒體 (media), 人口 (population), 網址 (link), 老闆
(boss), 產業 (industry)
Education 4.42 大學 (college), 台大 (National Taiwan University), 台灣
(Taiwan), 學生 (student), 醫院 (hospital), 學校 (school),
畢業 (graduation), 孩子 (children), 大陸 (mainland), 申
請 (application), 校長 (Principal), 中國 (China), 高中 (high
school), 教育 (education), 教育部 (Ministry of Education),
政府 (government), 醫生(doctor), 真的 (really), 醫師
(doctor), 新聞 (news)
Religion 3.93 台灣 (Taiwan), 恐怖 (terror), 攻擊 (attack), 真的 (really),
中國 (China), 國家 (nation), 宗教 (religion), 回教 (Muslim),
以色列 (Israel), 穆斯林 (Muslim), 大學 (college), 強國
(strong nation), 伊斯蘭 (Islam), 不過 (however), 虎爛系
(bluff), 書卷 (studious), 佛教 (Buddhism), 回教徒 (Muslim),
美國 (USA), 這種 (such)
Government 3.72 柯文哲 (Ko Wen-Je), 新聞 (news), 市長 (mayor), 民進
performance 黨 (DPP), 蔡英文 (Tsang, Ing-Wen), 完整 (complete), 媒
體 (media), 總統 (President), 組織 (organization), 發
展 (development), 報導 (report), 選舉 (election), 政府
(government), 工作 (job), 被告 (defendant), 台北 (Taipei),
議員 (legislator), 政治 (politics), 大陸 (mainland), 連結 (link)
Strikes 3.46 問卦 (ask for gossip), 罷工 (strike), 工會 (union), 時
間 (time), 新聞 (news), 看板 (board), 自由 (freedom),
作者 (author), 資方 (capitalist), 注意 (attention), 水桶
(prohibition), 標題 (title), 理由 (reason), 高雄 (Kaohsiung),
暫停 (suspension), 台灣 (Taiwan), 機師 (pilot), 快樂
(happiness), 真的 (really), 未滿 (less than)
Public health 3.09 台灣 (Taiwan), 豬瘟 (swine fever), 國家 (nation), 非洲
(Africa), 德國 (Germany), 人類 (human), 其實 (actually), 政
府 (government), 歐洲 (Europe), 病毒 (virus), 豬肉 (pork),
足球 (soccer), 綠黨 (Green Party), 真的 (really), 總統
(President), 大學 (college), 烏克蘭 (Ukraine), 這種 (such),
宗教 (religion), 新聞 (news)

content referring to job market. It differs from the topics of living costs and salaries and
child-raising as the latter topics are more specifically about individuals’ experiences.

Nomination
Following Wodak’s (2015) framework of discursive strategies and linguistic devices, for
the nomination strategy we show how PTT users use membership categorization (us vs
Li and Song 11

others) device to discursively construct object (the place they live), social actors (people
who live on the island and external others such as the mainland) and associated phenom-
ena (low salary, chaos, etc.). For example, the term ghost island itself is a typical noun
showing Taiwanese people’s pessimism regarding ‘their’ status quo and future. Other
common nouns implying in-group nature include losers, the island of chaos, the island
of slaves, the island of overtime work/low-salary and so on.
As mentioned, the island becoming a ‘ghost island’ has something to do with people’s
perceptions of the threats from ‘others’. Taiwanese netizens identify Mainlanders (others)
as potential threats to ‘us’ and use satirical phrases/nouns such as qiang-guo-ren (people
come from a strong nation), zhuguo (a satirical term for homeland), zhina (a derogatory
term for the mainland), 426 (stupid Mainlanders), Communists, five cents (referring to
netizens from the mainland who only earn 5 cents), locusts and cockroaches to describe
their potential encroachment of Taiwan. In addition to Mainlanders, local political/eco-
nomic elites are another source of threats and are also different from ‘us’. Satirical phrases/
nouns that refer to them include dog officials, no-conscience enterprises and spoiled
bosses. Together with threats from the mainland, these elites are categorized as ‘others’
who need to be held responsible for the miserable status ‘we’ suffer.
Other terms and phrases describing ‘we’ ordinary citizens include ghost islanders,
losers, Taiwanese girls (means ‘gold-diggers’ or those who prefer to marry White men),
Taiwanese boys (similar to diaosi), couch potatoes (nerds who rarely leave the house)
and slaves (implying people are too obedient to challenge anything).
Some try to switch the stereotype and instead use the term ‘Formosa’ (Bao-dao, meaning
a treasure land) to describe ‘our’ island, yet PTT people use it in a self-mocking way. For
example, when mentioning ‘Bao-dao’ or ‘the heaven’, some would even associate it with
hospitality, safety and a relaxed life style. Netizens frequently use satirical terms and nouns
to represent Taiwan, such as the heaven of crime (implying judges always claim that crimi-
nals can be educated and returned to the society, so criminal penalties are light), the heaven
of scam (referring to scammers who can be released quickly), the heaven of drunk-driving,
the heaven of rich people (capitalists exploit their workers and buy mansions and fancy
cars), the heaven of poisonous food (dodgy companies save costs by using poor-quality
ingredients) and the heaven of speculation in property markets (properties are often used for
speculation). Other nominations/satires include the heaven of haters, the heaven of losers,
the heaven of ruthless politicians, the heaven of (male) foreigners (they can date Taiwanese
women easily) and the heaven of landlords. Clearly, the nominations here are presented in a
self-mocking way: for ‘others’ like local political and economic elites, Taiwan is like a
heaven, but certainly not a heaven for most ordinary people (‘us’). The nomination strategy
of ‘ghost island’ shows that Taiwanese people consciously construct boundaries between us
(ordinary people as victims and losers) and powerful others (Mainlanders and local elites).

Predication
For the predication strategy, we focus on the linguistic device of evaluative attributions
of negative or positive traits, as well as explicit comparisons (Wodak, 2015). We exam-
ined the use of adjective collocates from the discourses associated with the ghost island
in specific contexts to see how netizens perceive living in Taiwan. As mentioned, when
referring to ghost island, it is always associated with stereotypes and pessimistic
12 Discourse & Society 00(0)

emotions. The most common (negative) descriptors include hopeless, helpless, terrible,
poor, chaotic and disordered. These adjectives were applied not only to the island itself
but also to those who lived on the island (i.e. ghost islanders). Common (negative) adjec-
tives referring to the ghost islanders were greedy (ordinary people), selfish (ordinary
people), exploitative (local elites), corrupt (politicians), unlawful (ordinary people),
uncivilized (ordinary people), obedient (ordinary people, in the negative sense) and stu-
pid (ordinary people). Sometimes netizens also use other adjectives in a self-mocking
way, for example, beautiful Taiwanese in fact implies that people are selfish and incon-
siderate. These adjectives were often used to describe ‘others’ as explicit comparisons to
innocent us – exploitative capitalists, corrupt politicians and selfish people.
On the other hand, conflicting emotions are substantiated in the way that netizens also
use ‘positive’ adjectives to describe the island and people who live there. For example,
democratic (system), free (including freedom of speech, assembly and press), progres-
sive (social atmosphere, for example, LGBT-friendly), safe (living environment), hospi-
table (ordinary people), affordable (living cost), chill/relaxed (lifestyle) and peace-seeking
(foreign policy and the character of ordinary people) are used to describe the desirable
conditions of living in Taiwan.

Argumentation
Argumentation is a discursive strategy which uses language to ‘justify or refute a stand-
point’ (Van Eemeren et al., 2011: 85). It often includes ‘claims’ and ‘evidence’ through
which the arguments are produced. In other words, argumentation strategies can show
different standpoints around an issue to which people have different opinions and pro-
vide for two contrasting communicator roles.
The argumentative construct of topoi distinguishes the DHA from other schools of
CDA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009). Wodak and Meyer (2009) claim that topoi or loci
can be described as parts of argumentation. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 75) define topoi
within the DHA as the ‘content-related warrants or conclusion rules that connect the
argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim’. They can be made explicit as
conditional or causal paraphrases such as ‘if x, then y’ or ‘y, because x’ (Reisigl and
Wodak, 2009: 110). As such, below we will formalize the analysis of topos as a condi-
tional or causal paraphrase in the way of ‘if x, then y’ or ‘y, because x’. Below we provide
few fragments showing how Taiwanese netizens adopt topoi to link their standpoints
(arguments) to claims/conclusions when referring to ghost island.

1. The topos of threat. The topos of threat appears in the format of ‘if there are specific
threats, one should do something about them’. For Taiwanese netizens, the main threats
come from the mainland (externally) and local political/economic elites (internally). For
example, when speaking of the future of Taiwan, the threat from the mainland is often
highlighted. the mainland’s growing power and intransigent attitudes toward Taiwan are
tangible for most Taiwanese. Many PTT users express their concerns for Taiwan’s pros-
pects under such threats, and the quoted fragments below show how netizens provide
arguments associated with threat and reach the conclusion that they should do something
(escaping from Taiwan) to diminish the threat:
Li and Song 13

Excerpt 1.
Post title: How can we escape from ghost island?
Content: Under the threat from the mainland, Taiwan has no international space, no seat in the
United Nation, and is not allowed to hang the national flag in the Olympic Games. It is a ghost
island, not a country. How can we escape from ghost island?

Excerpt 2.
Look at those protests in Hong Kong . . . Do you want to see tons of Mainlanders coming to
Taiwan and making housing very expensive like Hong Kong?

Both of the above fragments show the source of threat: the mainland. The topos of
threat links argument and conclusion together that one should take action to diminish or
avoid the threat. Both fragments can be paraphrased differently: People should take
actions to leave the ghost island (Taiwan) to avoid the perceived threat under the main-
land. The mainland is also narrated as ‘other’ that imposes threat to ‘we’ Taiwanese.
Adopting the topos of threat, Taiwanese netizens highlight that Taiwan is now an inter-
national orphan in the international system. Some clearly express their desire to ‘escape’
from ghost island and to obtain citizenships from other Western countries, although the
discourses are often narrated in a self-mocking way such as ‘we should feel proud of our
zhuguo (mainland China) and of being part of it!’ and ‘after unification we will become
qiang-guo-ren’.
The feeling of threat does not just emerge when projecting Taiwan’s future from the
threat of an ‘external’ powerful other. Taiwanese netizens also sense it from ‘internal’
threats, particularly when there is news about ‘corrupt government officials’ and ‘exploit-
ative capitalists’. For example, a fragment says,

Excerpt 3.
Post title: Witnessing the terrible situation in this ghost island but cannot escape, am I even
more terrible?
Content: People are talking about low salaries in ghost island recently. People compare salaries
and living costs in different countries. My conclusion is, the low salary in ghost island has to do
with exploitations by rich capitalists. Rich people own the real estates and keep raising property
prices. Governmental officials probably also received bribes so they won’t help us laobaixing
[ordinary people]. Feel the prospect of ghost island is terrible and I am like a loser stuck here
in this sad place.

Power imbalance dominates the above post via the representation of two opposing
social actors here: the powerful group (political and economic elites) and the vulnerable
group (the general public). The topos of threat is narrated in the way that netizens create
an in-group of the innocent people and an out-group of the exploitative and greedy elites.
Facing the internal threats (rich capitalists and politicians), leaving Taiwan becomes a
reasonable conclusion (to avoid such threats).

2. The topos of marginalized status. The topos of marginalized status can be expressed as
‘because life success and self-worth is measured by income and material things, being
successful is equivalent with being rich’. Those who cannot escape ghost island are
14 Discourse & Society 00(0)

therefore falling into the category of losers. In other words, one needs to do something to
get rid of the marginalized status such as emigrating to another country; if one cannot,
one should try to make easy money in Taiwan, otherwise one would earn very little and
would be seen as a loser:

Excerpt 4.
Post title: Any gossip about how to make quick money from real estate business in ghost island?
Content: The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing. Winners in Taiwan can make easy
money by buying and selling properties. Losers, in contrast, can only be jealous and hate rich
people. Unfortunately, most people in Taiwan are losers.

The above excerpt uses earnings and associated material resources to represent
one’s status. The topos of status was adopted by netizens to imply that in Taiwan,
most of the people are losers due to low salaries and savings. Therefore, a specific
action (making easy money) should be performed/carried out (to become winners
instead of losers). Other common comments narrated in a self-mocking way include
‘whoever earns 300K per year on ghost island, he is the winner in life: he will have
many pretty girls chasing him and live in a very comfortable lifestyle’. In contrast,
‘losers’, similar to diaosi, are often referred to those ‘who have nothing to do but surf
the PTT or play video games at home’, ‘fat, dirty, smelly’, and ‘earn very little and
therefore with whom no girls are willing to have a relationship’. Post titles such as
‘Will we losers become winners if we emigrate to other countries?’ and ‘Which
country should we losers choose to escape ghost island?’ represent most netizens in
the forum acknowledge they easily fall into the category of losers if they keep stay-
ing in Taiwan. Interestingly, PTT users tease each other in the self-mocking way
(comments like ‘winners are busy in making money rather than talking trash on
PTT’, ‘you deserved it, loser!’, ‘girls like to make friends, but not with losers’, etc.)
and oftentimes share their everyday experiences of being a loser (e.g. failure to find
a girlfriend). When adopting self-mockeries of losers, they create a mind-set of loser
aesthetics at the same time that in the ghost island being a loser is ‘normal’; as losers,
they can find people exactly like them on PTT and therefore they are not ‘alone’.

3. The topos of hopelessness. Similar to the topos of threat, the topos of hopelessness can
be expressed as follows: ‘if dark future in the ghost island brings about a hopeless situa-
tion, one should act in order to diminish it’ (escape from ghost island to other ‘better’
countries). Netizens on PTT frequently compare their situations in Taiwan vis-à-vis the
ones in other countries, particularly Western countries:

Excerpt 5.
Post title: How to escape ghost island? Which other country do you want to go?
Content: We all know that future of ghost island is dark, we don’t have other choices but to find
other countries to stay. Yet, how can we manage to leave the ghost island? Which other country
do you want to go? Japan, USA, Canada, or Netherland?

Political status and economic conditions, including the cost of living, salaries and
quality of life, together decide people’s perceptions of the status quo and future. The
Li and Song 15

topos of hopelessness was adopted to describe the future of Taiwan, which is associated
with the feelings of hopeless and the conclusion that people want to leave. Excerpts
below provide more detailed reasons and highlight the topos of hopelessness:

Excerpt 6.
Post title: [News] Ghost island? A veteran employee receives only 27K TWD per month, which
freaks the rookies out
Content: Rookies generally have motivations and dreams when they first join a company. They
are hoping to get promoted and to have pay rise. However, one netizen shared his experiences
when he found out that another veteran colleague who only receives 27K TWD per month
[around $850 USD], he felt hopeless and asked for help online.

Excerpt 7.
. . . nowadays young generations dare not to have kids on ghost island because of low salaries
and high rents, all the money goes to rich capitalists and we earn nothing, the price of everything
in the ghost island increases, except our salary.

The above fragments show that actions should be undertaken to diminish hopeless
conditions. The claims of being losers contain the emotions of hopelessness toward
Taiwan’s status quo and prospects. The topos is then used to justify the reasons why
people want to leave. Meanwhile, hopelessness is also substantiated when some use a
self-mocking way to distinguish Taiwan as a tourist destination (for them – the tourists)
and as an everyday living place (for us – Taiwanese living on the island) in their com-
ments: ‘Of course tourists enjoy visiting Taiwan, they don’t need to live here!’, ‘in terms
of travel it is a Formosa, in terms of everyday living it is a ghost island’ and ‘they [for-
eigners] will find out the [negative] reality if they stay longer or work here’.

4.The topos of injustice. Justice is a general and sometimes abstract topos that also relates
to claims of loser status and different treatment between us and others. The confidence
of Taiwan’s justice and legal system is often discussed on PTT when people share news
about unfair trials, for example, when convicts are released easily or do not receive pro-
portional punishments. Therefore, ‘if an action does or does not conform with justice,
then one should or should not perform or take it’:

Excerpt 8.
Post title: Unjust Ghost island?
Content: Growing up in the ghost island, I always feel it’s unfair that there are many dinosaur
judges and greedy politicians in office. Why cannot these people be punished? Why cannot
justice be implemented?

Excerpt 9.
Post title: Why is murder immune to death penalty in the ghost island?
Content: The criminals did murder are generally those who cannot control their emotions. If
they remain alive in the world, there would be more victims. The judges in ghost island must
feel his/her family wouldn’t be the victims, so they easily release the murderers. If the victims
are the judge’s family, I doubt they [judges] would use ‘there’s a possibility for them to be
re-educated’ as an excuse to release those convicts.
16 Discourse & Society 00(0)

The above fragments show strong claims: the dinosaur judges and greedy politicians
should be punished to reach justice. Netizens adopt topos of injustice to show their opin-
ions of justice and sense of hopelessness in Taiwan through discourses such as ‘so many
dinosaur judges on ghost island, what can we expect from them?’ and ‘drunk driving
receives such a low punishment in Taiwan; living on ghost island, we can only keep our
fingers crossed and hope we are lucky not to be hit by drunk drivers (them)’. Here we can
clearly see people express their concerns for the unjust judicial system and use the topos
of injustice to claim that some actions need to be done (implementing more strict law or
punishing judges and politicians) to improve the unjust conditions. Meanwhile, people
also use a self-mocking way to express their helplessness toward the law and judicial
system. Such comments include the following: ‘ghost island has its own rule of game’
and ‘not surprising, it’s the ghost island’.

5. The topos of pride. The above four topoi are adopted by Taiwanese netizens to justify
and show why they are pessimistic about Taiwan’s status quo and future and why they
want to leave the island. The discourses around these topoi are oftentimes expressed in a
self-mocking way. In contrast to the conclusion of threat and hopelessness, it is common
that PTT users also adopt a self-mocking way to show they still feel hopeful about the
future of Taiwan and feel proud of democracy, human rights and freedom of speech.
Therefore, ‘if there are reasons of why the island can be felt proud of, one should perform
or omit a specific action to increase its pride’. Below are some typical fragments:

Excerpt 10.
We should cherish the freedom of speech we enjoy right now, our comments won’t be censored,
and we won’t be disappeared by the government (y) if we make some offensive comments
about it (x).

Excerpt 11.
We have a lot more freedom than people in the mainland, who are restricted from accessing
Facebook and Youtube. They have to cross the wall to receive information. We should feel
proud of being Taiwanese.

The two excerpts above clearly show that ‘if’ there are reasons of why the island can
be felt proud of, ‘then’ one should perform (feel proud of it) or omit a specific action (e.g.
leave the island). Other comments highlight the topos of pride even more directly: ‘we
are proud to be the first in Asia to pass the same-sex marriage law!’, ‘welcome to ghost
island. We are LGBT-friendly’, and so on. Even sometimes these discourses are narrated
in a self-mocking way: ‘ghost island is chaotic, it has all kinds of protests everyday’ and
‘it’s nonsense that ghost islanders elect their government by voting’. These discourses
show arguments contrasting ‘Taiwan is a ghost island and people should escape’ and
reaffirm people’s sentiments, pride and self-assurance toward their homeland.
Adopting the topos of pride, Taiwanese netizens invoke glories to arise their confi-
dence, which stimulates determination to protect Taiwan from mainland influences. The
rhetorical topos is employed to create a shared pride and bonds Taiwanese people together,
as it differentiates themselves from the Mainlanders. Here the topos of pride has a dual
Li and Song 17

effect on building a civil society in Taiwan with social cohesion. On the one hand, it places
Taiwan in the international area of cooperation and competition; on the other hand, it
reinforces a sense of Taiwanese identity and highlights its difference from the mainland.
With certain conditions, the conclusion is that Taiwan is not a ghost island and people
should not leave here. Pride also expresses itself when netizens claim they hate the term
‘ghost island’ as it stigmatizes Taiwan: ‘Can we stop using the term “ghost island”?
Really feel uncomfortable to see other people belittle their homeland’. Other comments
containing the topos of pride include the following: ‘every time I travel to other countries
or live overseas for a few years, I always think of the good things about Taiwan and miss
its convenient lifestyle’, ‘one good thing about ghost island is people there are friendly
and are always ready to help!’ and ‘even though there are insufficiencies, overall it is a
decent place to live’. People even think of this term in a positive way: ‘ghost island could
be a term that urges us to realize the negative parts of Taiwan; then we can try our best
to improve it’.

Discussion
‘It’s all their faults’: self-mockery in the presentation of marginalized
selves
Based on the above findings, we can see the online discourses about ghost island are
often connected to netizens’ perceptions of themselves (as losers) and pessimism about
Taiwan’s status quo and future. Under the threat from the mainland, Taiwanese netizens
express their pessimism about Taiwan’s future. In fact, the term ‘ghost island’ contains a
mixture of self-deprecating and self-mocking sentiments. While revealing pessimism
and self-awareness of their marginalized status, many of the PTT users use a self-mock-
ing way and say Taiwan will return to the zhuguo (mainland China) one day and ‘together
(unification), we become stronger’. They adopt self-mockeries to make sense of their
underprivileged status while reversing the mainstream claim of ‘Taiwan is a ghost
island’. In other words, the implication behind their discourses is: ‘without the threat
from the mainland, Taiwan would be a beautiful island’.
Similarly, in the economic dimension, the discourse shows concerns about the nega-
tive self and being a loser: low salaries, high rents, poor working conditions and exploita-
tive capitalists – all of which directly influence how people see their futures on the
island. Stagnant economic growth, increasing inequality and an erosion of Taiwanese
confidence have led to a low fertility rate, which suggests young people fear having
children and so delay childbearing (Chen, 2012). However, Taiwanese netizens also
mutually tease each other as losers and create a shared understanding that ‘we are all
losers’ to affectively bond all PTT users together, which contains emotions blaming the
inaction and corruption of ‘the others’ (local political and economic elites) for deficient
policies, economic stagnation and worsening quality of life. Loser aesthetics on PTT is
expressed in a self-mocking way that netizens make sense of the fact of being a loser and
share their everyday experiences of being losers, on the one hand; yet they highlight an
innocent and vulnerable ‘us’ as victims vis-à-vis ruthless, exploitative and corrupt others
18 Discourse & Society 00(0)

(political/economic elites) who made the island miserable and made their loser status, on
the other hand.
Discourses on PTT not only reflect people’s emotions and frustrations in the political
and economic sphere, but the term ‘ghost island’ now more frequently appears in and is
applied to people’s everyday life, including dissatisfactions about social welfare, poor
public health, declining trust in the judicial system, social inequality and associated cul-
tural phenomena (e.g. more and more single men (losers) who cannot find suitable
Taiwanese women to marry). Having no better solutions, PTT users create a self-mock-
ery discourse to comfort themselves, which always comes with comments like ‘not sur-
prising, we are living on the ghost island’. While blaming different others who make the
island miserable, they acknowledge their loser status and link ‘escaping from Taiwan’ to
‘getting rid of loser status’.

Not a real loser: presenting conflicting selves in a self-mocking way

Even though ghost island implies pessimism and self-deprecation and a wish to ‘escape’
to other ‘better’ countries, Taiwanese are expressing self-assurance at the same time;
even sometimes they express it in a self-mocking way. In Taiwan’s case, ghost island also
contains sentiments that consolidate in-group belonging (i.e. we ghost islanders). The
phrase ‘the pride/glory of ghost island’ has positive connotations, for example, referring
to a local brand that can successfully enter the international market or someone who has
had significant achievements despite the political, economic or socio-cultural barriers.
The ‘pessimistic but still hopeful’ sentiment appears in a more detailed analysis of the
content. The topos of pride discussed above presents that even though Taiwan has many
problems, netizens highlight the positive elements of Taiwan: safety, affordable medical
care, tolerance and progressivism, freedom of speech, local citizen hospitality and mod-
ern conveniences.
In short, PTT users do not ‘rearticulate’ their underprivileged status as an ‘alternative
lifestyle’ – as popularly represented in diaosi – to challenge mainstream values (Sum,
2017; Szablewicz, 2014). Diaosi in China and losers in South Korea. For Taiwanese neti-
zens have a more realistic view and acknowledge the problems existing in Taiwan, and
yet they highlight and cherish the positive self of being a ‘ghost islander’. Nevertheless,
sometimes these positive qualities of Taiwan are narrated in a self-mocking way (e.g.
‘the glory of ghost island’, ‘chaotic and has protests everyday’). In other words, self-
deprecation and self-mockery exist in symbiotic relationship, and together they present a
unique loser aesthetics in Taiwan’s online context that netizens feel marginalized and
helpless, but they are also proud of what they have achieved and therefore they are not
‘real’ losers. Through self-mockery, Taiwanese netizens also consolidate affective con-
nectedness and virtual bonding with a mutual understanding of the commonalities of
hopeful fate and positive characteristics.

Conclusion
This article combines topic modeling with a critical discourse analysis to examine the
topics, contexts and meanings of discourses on ‘ghost island’ in the largest bulletin board
Li and Song 19

system in Taiwan. We found that the term ‘ghost island’ and its associated discourses
reflect conflicting self-images about Taiwan, which are presented in a self-mocking way.
We also found when negotiating between different self-images, Taiwanese netizens
attach positive and negative meanings to themselves and different others (Western coun-
tries, the mainland and local political/economic elites) and create corresponding bounda-
ries. Two types of emotions are invoked in the discursive production of ‘loser aesthetics’
and netizens’ conflicting selves: (1) acknowledging/accepting being a loser (negative
self) but attributing the faults to others to reconcile social reality and their own under-
privileged status, and (2) assurance of the positive self, including feeling proud of the
mocked characteristics (e.g. hospitality of people, democracy, progressiveness) that are
unique and different from others (e.g. the mainland).
Although prior studies about diaosi or losers often focus on individual failures under
neoliberalism, in this article, however, we point out the use of the term ‘ghost island’,
and the associated discourses show the ways Taiwanese people articulate their various
marginalized status on the Internet. They often attribute their individual and aggregate
marginality to others’ faults, such as threat from the mainland and exploitation from cor-
rupt government officials and greedy capitalists – all of which lead to their loser status
and provide reasons for them to escape. Yet different from diaosi in mainland China or
losers in the Korean context, ghost islanders acknowledge their progressive social envi-
ronment (e.g. democracy and freedom) of which they feel proud.
Exploring the half-serious-half-playful use of the term ‘ghost island’, this article pre-
sents the socio-political contexts in Taiwan in which a unique loser aesthetics is created.
To be more specific, Taiwanese netizens’ aggregate discourses and negative sentiments
show their sense of marginalization when facing a threat from the mainland, economic
plights (under the exploitation of capitalists and corrupt politicians), social inequality,
decreasing quality of life, and dissatisfactions about their everyday lives. The online
platforms such as PTT create a discursive opportunity structure for Taiwanese netizens
to construct their in-group identity (i.e., being victims and losers) and to blame others for
being dominating, exploitative, ruthless and uncivilized. Yet, we can see netizens sharing
their everyday ‘loser’ experiences in a self-mocking way. It creates a mutual understand-
ing among netizens and affectively bonds all ‘losers’ together. On the other hand, self-
mockeries are also used to amplify the positive sentiments (e.g. hope and pride) at the
same time, which is reflected in how people use the self-mocking phrases ‘the pride of
ghost island’ and ‘proud of living in a chaotic island’ to refer to positive characteristics
of Taiwan. Some also criticize others who use this term to disparage Taiwan. Self-
mocking discourses explain how two conflicting self-presentations (marginalized/nega-
tive self vs positive self) are symbiotic.
Yet, in addition to diaosi or Internet freaks, which generally refer to people who are
aware of their individual loser status (failure to find romance or to achieve success),
ghost island involves anger with others and self-assurance. Self-mockeries are used to
make sense of their loser status and affirm that there are positive elements of Taiwan. In
this sense, the term ‘ghost island’ represents complex emotions that include hopeless-
ness, anxiety, mockery, hope and pride. The use of the term in fact presents a unique way
that Taiwanese people are constructing and consolidating their desirable identity and
20 Discourse & Society 00(0)

self-image, based on socio-political contexts and all the power disparities (either interna-
tionally or internally) they experience.

Acknowledgements
The authors thank Prof. Van Dijk, Dr Hilary Yerbury and anonymous reviewers for their construc-
tive and thoughtful comments. They also thank Shih-Hao Liu for his help with collecting data and
managing the database.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/
or publication of this article: This research was funded by Research Committee, Hong Kong
Baptist University (FRG2/17-18/069).

References
Barth F (1969) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference.
Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Boxer D and Cortés-Conde F (1997) From bonding to biting: Conversational joking and identity
display. Journal of Pragmatics 27(3): 275–294.
Brown M (2004) Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing
Identities. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Brubaker R, Loveman M and Stamatov P (2004) Ethnicity as cognition. In: Brubaker R (ed.)
Ethnicity Without Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 64–87.
Bullingham L and Vasconcelos AC (2013) ‘The presentation of self in the online world’: Goffman
and the study of online identities. Journal of Information Science 39(1): 101–112.
Chen YH (2012) Trends in low fertility and policy responses in Taiwan. The Japanese Journal of
Population 10(1): 78–88.
Clark C, Tan AC and Ho K (2018) Ending Taiwan’s economic stagnation: The implications of
the elections of presidents Tsai and Trump. Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and
Strategic Relations: An International Journal 4(3): 871–899.
Cover R (2016) Digital Identities: Creating and Communicating the Online Self. Amsterdam:
Academic Press.
Fullwood C, James BM and Chen-Wilson CH (2016) Self-concept clarity and online self-presen-
tation in adolescents. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 19(12): 716–720.
Goffman E (1990) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin.
Gong Y (2016) Online discourse of masculinities in transnational football fandom: Chinese
Arsenal fans’ talk around ‘gaofushuai’ and ‘diaosi’. Discourse & Society 27(1): 20–37.
Ho M-S (2018) Challenging Beijing’s Mandate of Heaven: Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement and
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Huang P (2019) Chinese cyber-operatives boosted Taiwan’s insurgent candidate. Foreign Policy,
26 June. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/26/chinese-cyber-operatives-
boosted-taiwans-insurgent-candidate/
Li and Song 21

Hughes C (1997) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International
Society. London: Routledge.
Joo Y (2018) Same despair but different hope: Youth activism in East Asia and contentious poli-
tics. Development and Society 47(3): 401–422.
Keep M and Attrill-Smith A (2017) Controlling you watching me: Measuring perception control
on social media. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 20(9): 561–566.
KhosraviNik M (2010) Actor descriptions, action attributions, and argumentation: Towards a sys-
tematization of CDA analytical categories in the representation of social groups. Critical
Discourse Studies 7(1): 55–72.
Leary MR (1996) Self-Presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Lee S-J, Quigley BM, Nesler MS, et al. (1999) Development of a self-presentation tactics scale.
Personality and Individual Differences 26(4): 701–722.
Mahfouz IM (2018) The representation of Meghan Markle in Facebook posts: A discourse histori-
cal approach (DHA). International Journal of Language and Linguistics 5(3): 246–259.
Nelson ME and Hull GA (2009) Self-presentation through multimedia: A Bakhtinian perspec-
tive on digital storytelling. In: Lundby K (ed.) Digital Storytelling, Mediatized Stories: Self-
Representations in New Media. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 123–144.
Reisigl M and Wodak R (2001) Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and
Antisemitism. London: Routledge.
Reisigl M and Wodak R (2009) The discourse-historical approach (DHA). In: Wodak R and Meyer
M (eds) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: SAGE, pp. 87–121.
Seligman L (2019) U.S. increasingly concerned about a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Foreign Policy,
16 January. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/16/u-s-increasingly-concerned-
about-a-chinese-attack-on-taiwan/
Sum N-L (2017) The makings of subaltern subjects: Embodiment, contradictory consciousness,
and re-hegemonization of the diaosi in China. Globalizations 14(2): 298–312.
Szablewicz M (2014) The ‘losers’ of China’s Internet: Memes as ‘structures of feeling’ for disil-
lusioned young netizens. China Information 28(2): 259–275.
Thumim N (2012) Self-Representation and Digital Culture. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tobias S (2013) Internet and press freedom in Taiwan. The Diplomat, 28 June. Available at:
https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/internet-and-press-freedom-in-taiwan/
Tseng SF, Chen WC and Chi CL (2011) Online social media in a disaster event: Network and pub-
lic participation. In: Cherifi H, Zain JM and El-Qawasmeh E (eds) Digital Information and
Communication Technology and Its Applications. Berlin: Springer, pp. 256–264.
Tu W (1996) Cultural identity and the politics of recognition in contemporary Taiwan. The China
Quarterly 148: 1115–1140.
Unger J (1996) Chinese Nationalism. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Van Dijk TA (1991) Racism and the Press. London: Routledge.
Van Dijk TA (2006) Ideology and discourse analysis. Journal of Political Ideologies 11(2): 115–
140.
Van Eemeren FH, Jackson S and Jacobs S (2011) Argumentation. In: Van Dijk TA (ed.) Discourse
Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction. London: SAGE, pp. 85–106.
White CM, Cutello CA, Gummerum M, et al. (2018) Cross-cultural study of risky online self-
presentation. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 21(1): 25–31.
Witteborn S and Huang Q (2016) Diaosi [underdog talk] as a way of relating in contemporary
China. In: Carbaugh D (ed.) The Handbook of Communication in Cross-Cultural Perspective.
New York: Routledge, pp. 142–152.
22 Discourse & Society 00(0)

Wodak R (2011) The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Wodak R (2015) Critical discourse analysis, discourse-historical approach. In: Tracy K, Ilie C and
Sandel T (eds) The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction. Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 1–14.
Wodak R and Meyer M (2009) Critical discourse analysis: History, agenda, theory, and method-
ology. In: Wodak R and Meyer M (eds) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE, pp. 1–33.
Wu R-R (2016) The Lilliputian dreams: Preliminary observations of nationalism in Okinawa,
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Nations and Nationalism 22(4): 686–705.
Yang P, Tang L and Wang X (2015) Diaosi as infrapolitics: Scatological tropes, identity-making
and cultural intimacy on China’s Internet. Media, Culture & Society 37(2): 197–214.
Yang S (2017) Networking South Korea: Internet, nation, and new subjects. Media, Culture &
Society 39(5): 740–749.
Yee N, Bailenson JN and Ducheneaut N (2009) The proteus effect: Implications of transformed
digital self-representation on online and offline behavior. Communication Research 36(2):
285–312.

Author biographies
Yao-Tai Li is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Hong Kong Baptist University. He holds a
PhD in Sociology from the University of California, San Diego. His research interests focus on the
intersection of identity politics and social media.
Yunya Song is an Associate Professor of Journalism at Hong Kong Baptist University. She works
in the areas of global communication, computer-mediated networks and new media. She is also the
director of the AI and Media Research Lab in the School of Communication at Hong Kong Baptist
University.