An Environmental Ethical Conceptual Framework For Research On Sustainability and Environmental Education

Environmental Education Research
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An environmental ethical conceptual framework

for research on sustainability and environmental
education
David O. Kronlid & Johan Öhman
To cite this article: David O. Kronlid & Johan Öhman (2013) An environmental ethical conceptual
framework for research on sustainability and environmental education, Environmental Education
Research, 19:1, 21-44, DOI: 10.1080/13504622.2012.687043
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Environmental Education Research, 2013
Vol. 19, No. 1, 21–44, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2012.687043
An environmental ethical conceptual framework for research on

sustainability and environmental education
David O. Kronlida* and Johan Öhmanb
a
Department of Education, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; bSchool of Humanities,
Education and Social Sciences (HumES), Örebro University, Sweden
(Received 23 June 2010; final version received 26 March 2012)
Downloaded by [Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek] at 10:58 16 October 2017
This article suggests that environmental ethics can have great relevance for envi-
ronmental ethical content analyses in environmental education and education for
sustainable development research. It is based on a critique that existing educa-
tional research does not reflect the variety of environmental ethical theories.
Accordingly, we suggest an alternative and more nuanced environmental ethical
conceptual framework divided into Value-oriented Environmental Ethics and
Relation-oriented Environmental Ethics and present two pragmatic schedules for
analyses of the value and relation contents of e.g. classroom conversations, text-
books and policy documents. This framework draws on a comparative reading
of some 30 key books and 20 key articles in academic journals in the field of
environmental philosophy and reflects main traits in environmental ethics from
the early 1970s to the present day.
Keywords: value-oriented environmental ethics; relation-oriented environmental
ethics; education for sustainable development; environmental education; concep-
tual framework
Introduction
Although the growth economy allegedly brings education, energy, increased security
and health to people in both developed and developing countries, the high-consum-
erism lifestyle of privileged groups exacerbates the vulnerability for non-human spe-
cies, future generations and disadvantaged people in distant places. For example, it
is estimated that 150–200 million people will be displaced and 30% of all species
run the risk of being extinct by 2050 due to anthropogenic climate changes (www.
footprintnetwork.org; intergovernmental panel on climate change [IPCC 2007; Page
2007; NRC 2009]).
This means that new generations in both north and south will inevitably face a
vast number of complex moral dilemmas. Environmental ethical issues are therefore
– as Payne (2010a) recently has pointed out in this journal – of considerable signifi-
cance for environmental education (EE), education for sustainable development
(ESD) and, hence, for sustainability and EE research.1
The aim of this paper is to suggest an environmental ethical conceptual frame-
work that acknowledges the complexities of the environmental moral conundrums
that all students face. The framework is based on studies of some 30 key books and
*Corresponding author. Email: david.kronlid@edu.uu.se
Ó 2013 Taylor & Francis

22 D.O. Kronlid and J. Öhman
20 key articles in academic journals in the field of environmental philosophy. We

claim that such an intellectual resource and methodological tool can contribute to
sustainability and environmental research by providing a stringent language of
analysis, qualifying textual and in situ analyses of environmental ethical content in
various educational practices, identifying relevant and perhaps overlooked questions
concerning the value dimension of sustainability and EE and providing increased
opportunities for comparative reflection. Thus, our ambition is that the framework
should be easily applied to both EE- and ESD-related research and help to clarify
the myriad of theoretical and empirical inconsistencies and contradictions that are
found within these discourses.
Our purpose is methodological rather than normative. We do not argue for or
against any of the positions captured by the framework, nor do we intend to justify
any specific moral norms and values. Rather, we present various environmental ethi-
cal theories condensed in a conceptual framework for the purpose of facilitating
nuanced environmental ethical analyses within EE and ESD. Thus, the paper aligns
with the position that environmental ethical theories function as ‘intellectual frame-
works that support the analysis and solution of particular moral problems’ (Stone
1987, 133) and allows the suggested framework to coexist with other intellectual
resources reflecting e.g. aesthetic, religious and economic considerations.
As the framework reflects our interpretations of key positions within environ-
mental philosophy, we cannot claim that what is presented here captures the full
variety of creative features within the field or that it corresponds to each position in
detail.2 In addition, the article is limited in that it only refers to environmental eth-
ics as produced in a north/western discourse of environmental philosophy. Accord-
ingly, the framework is not all-inclusive and excludes e.g. environmental ethics
from African (e.g. Onuoha 2007) and Indian (e.g. James 1999) perspectives.
Another limitation is that it does not consider ethics of the built environment (see
Fox 2007). However, in order to increase the functional value of the framework for
research in so-called poverty-stricken south/east contexts, it is constructed in a way
that makes it possible to add theoretical perspectives and analytical questions
beyond the limitations of north/western environmental ethics discourse.
Background
In both Swedish and international educational research there is an increased interest
in exploring the ethical dimension of EE and ESD. In Sweden, a number of doc-
toral dissertations on educational subjects incorporate environmental ethics3 (Öst-
man 1995; Svennbeck 2004; Öhman 2006; Lundegård 2007; Sund 2008). In
international research, the ethical perspective has mainly been used as a basis for
critique of the so-called anthropocentric bias of traditional science education and
EE (Ashley 2000; Bowers 2001) and the concept of SD and ESD (Bonnett 2002;
Postma 2002). For example, Bonnett (2003) has explored the idea of nature’s intrin-
sic value in relation to the aims of EE, while others have used ecofeminist environ-
mental ethics to highlight a gender aspect of environmental crises and to explore
the possibilities of establishing new ethical norms in EE (Gough 1999; Li 2007).
New contributions to this field have also recently been launched by e.g. Hitzhusen
(2007), who highlights the Judeo-Christian ecotheological contribution to EE, and
Payne (2010b), who sheds light on how a more everyday environmental ethic and
ecopolitic can be nurtured by family members intergenerationally. Environmental
Environmental Education Research 23
ethical content analyses of policy texts and textbooks (see Kronlid and Svennbeck
2008) and classroom studies of the ethical dimension of EE/ESD practices are rarer
(see Öhman and Östman 2007, 2008; Pedersen 2008; Lundholm 2008). These
examples indicate that environmental ethics can fruitfully fertilise sustainability and
environment research with a potential for further development.
A lively debate has been held within the field of environmental ethics in recent
decades. In the 1990s, environmental ethicists engaged in a domestic debate regard-
ing the practical value of environmental ethics (Hargrove 1989; Stone 1995;
Callicott 1999). This debate focused on the question of moral pluralism vs. moral
monism, i.e. whether one person can hold and apply contradictory yet equally justi-
fied moral principles at the same time. This discussion engaged researchers con-
cerned with pragmatic environmental ethics and those involved in developing the
so-called intrinsic value discourse (Kronlid 2003). Pragmatists quintessentially

argued – and still argue – that the intrinsic value discourse has little practical value
(Weston 1985, 1992; Norton 1991, 1995; Light 1996a, 1996b). Recently, this claim
has been refuted by the argument that the intrinsic value discourse is to environ-
mental policy what the human rights discourse is to development policies (Callicott
2005). That is, that the concept of the intrinsic value of nature may contribute sig-
nificantly to the development of e.g. national and international environmental poli-
cies through the endorsement of the Earth Charter by the United Nations General
Assembly (Callicott 2002).
Accordingly, this paper relates to a long tradition in environmental ethics of debat-
ing and developing positions on the practical or policy value of philosophical enqui-
ries into the moral dimension of nature encounters and relationships. When
combining educational perspectives, objectives and questions with ethical reasoning
and clarifications, the quality of such research is dependent on the degree to which the
characteristics and differences between different environmental ethical positions are
considered. Hence, it is significant that the research reflects both the diversity and
development within the environmental ethical field. This, in our opinion, is not fully
reflected in current educational research into the ethical dimension of EE and ESD.
In current, combined educational-ethical approaches, anthropocentrism (a
human-centred position) is often taken as synonymous with a non-environmentally
friendly position as opposed to non-anthropocentrism (e.g. bio- or ecocentrism) that
is often taken as synonymous with an environmentally friendly position (see Helton
and Helton 2007). Anthropocentrism and bio/ecocentrism are thus seen as opposite
ends of a continuum, or as two logically and normatively opposite positions. This
is also a basic presumption in the widely acknowledged New Ecological Paradigm
(NEP) scale used to measure environmental attitudes and beliefs (Dunlap and Van
Liere 1978; Dunlap et al. 2000).
Lundmark (2007) has shown how this scale both misses crucial elements of the
contemporary environmental ethical debate and is poorly specified from a theoreti-
cal point of view. This critique is a reminder of the importance of avoiding a certain
normative bias in research and of the problems of discerning qualitative differences
between different environmental ethical theories on a simple linear scale. We also
believe that a distinction between normative and descriptive analysis in environmen-
tal ethics (Kvassman 1999; Stenmark 2002; Kronlid 2003) is useful in order to pre-
vent combined educational-ethical approaches from falling into the same trap as
NEP-scale research – identifying and separating environmentally friendly i.e. non-
anthropocentric, from non-friendly, i.e. anthropocentric positions.
In an attempt to nuance the unidimensional NEP-scale, Wiseman and Bogner

(2003) developed an alternative tool for measuring the effects of environmental
educational programmes consisting of a two-dimensional field with attitudes to
conversation on one axle and utilisation on the other (The Model of Ecological Val-
ues – see also Johnson and Manoli 2008).
Although we believe that such elaborations are a step in the right direction, we
are not convinced that the advanced ethical reasoning developed by environmental
ethical researchers and the complex relationship between environmental concern
and ethical positions that has been revealed in environmental ethics have been used
to their full potential in educational research. In order to contribute to this develop-
ment, we suggest a basic but stringent conceptual environmental ethical framework
that clarifies the distinctions between different environmental ethical positions and
their fundamental assumptions and core arguments regarding the moral dimension
of environment and development issues.
The suggested environmental ethical framework is constructed in two parts in order
to reflect developments in environmental ethics from the early 1970s to the present day:
Value-oriented Environmental Ethics and Relation-oriented Environmental Ethics. It is
important to note that the distinction made between Value-oriented and Relation-
oriented ethics is our own, and resembles existing distinctions such as those between
intrinsic value discourse and radical ecology. The former is presented in two categories,
namely Value-oriented Anthropocentric Environmental Ethics and Value-oriented Non-
anthropocentric Environmental Ethics. We suggest two schemes of analytical questions
based on this framework to be applied when analysing the environmental ethical con-
tent of texts and conversations. Finally, we discuss how the framework can aid the
growth of a combined educational-ethical approach to sustainability and EE research.
Value-oriented environmental ethics

Since the early 1970s, environmental ethics has been a diverse field of research
involving moral philosophy and ethics, feminist and gender research, critical culture
studies, ecocriticism, anarchist theory, pragmatism, ecotheology and postmodern
theory (Naess 1973; Sylvan 1973; Singer 1973; Zimmerman 1993; Oelschlaeger
1995). During the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘intrinsic value’ discourse (Goodpaster
1978/1993; Norton 1987; Callicott 1989, 1999; Hargrove 1989; Taylor 1989) came
to be seen as the environmental ethics in pioneering academic journals such as
Environmental Values and Environmental Ethics.4
The intrinsic value discourse concerns the question of whether non-human nat-
ure can be said to have intrinsic as well as instrumental value.5 Furthermore, the
concept of ‘instrumental value’ (or extrinsic value) refers to things/people that are
valuable because they are the means to what is or is perceived as being good in
itself (Frankena 1973). This discourse reflected in environmental policy and educa-
tion influenced academia, which came to regard environmental ethics as divided
into two main and contradictive metaethical and normative centric positions:
anthropocentrism vs. non-anthropocentrism (Stenmark 2002).
According to the intrinsic value discourse, the general idea of anthropocentrism
is that as only humans have intrinsic value hence only humans are moral objects.
This involves the idea that non-human nature, including non-human animals, is only
valuable if it has instrumental value for human well-being. In other words, that
humans and/or the community of humans are the only moral objects. The intrinsic
value discourse has made an imprint in certain EE currents, such as the conserva-
tionist/resourcist current and the naturalist current (Sauvé 2005).6
Simultaneously, the environmental movement challenged what came to be iden-
tified as human-centred worldviews. A number of scholars characterised the ‘wes-
tern’ way of life and worldviews as predominantly human centred and materialistic,
thus leading to a short-sighted exploitative approach to nature. Accordingly, anthro-
pocentric moral outlooks were accused of being an important vector for global and
local environmental crises (Carson 1962; White 1967/1998; Naess 1973).
A variety of environmental ethical theories soon mushroomed. It was argued that
it was reasonable to assume that non-human nature as a whole, or individual non-
human entities, have intrinsic value beyond their instrumental value for human
well-being. These theories came to be labelled as non-anthropocentrism (e.g.
Rolston 1985; Taylor 1989; Callicott 1989, 1999), a position most often recognised
in what Sauvé called the ‘naturalist current’ associated with nature and outdoor
education (2005).
According to our comparative study, Value-oriented environmental ethics have
three central moral considerations in common: (a) who or what is considered as a
moral object, (b) the human–nature relationship and (c) definitions of nature’s value.
Based on the positions taken in relation to these questions, Value-oriented environ-
mental ethics can be divided into various sub-categories.7 Our presentation of
anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism relates to (a)–(c) and attempts to unlock
these positions from their theoretical domiciles. The main reason for doing this is to
highlight the inclusion of a pluralistic and diversified content of varying moral out-
looks within what has often been treated as a rather restrained anthropocentrism–
non-anthropocentrism field. This increases the number of combined possibilities of
applying various results of environmental ethics to environmental and sustainable
education. In Table 1, we present how this produces a diversity of anthropocentric
sub-positions.
With regard to moral objects, Intergenerational anthropocentrism is presently a
common ethical position in e.g. the climate change discourse and energy policy dis-
cussions. The German philosopher and theologian Hans Jonas (1979) argued that
the state of the world called for a new ethical approach. Although this involved
non-anthropocentric concerns, his ethic strongly recommended Intergenerational
intrahuman responsibility (Jonas 1985). The climate change discourse has now
developed Intergenerational anthropocentrism further, which has alerted moral phi-
losophers to the issue of backward-looking moral responsibility. Accordingly, this
Transgenerational anthropocentrism introduces the issue of respecting the well-being
of both prior and future generations (e.g. Page 2007). These are examples of how
the development of the anthropocentric discourse on nature’s value implies that an
instrumental valuation of nature can also motivate a long-term and serious commit-
ment to the flourishing of non-human entities and systems (Norton 1987, 1991).
The question of whether we have moral obligations vis-à-vis people at a geo-
graphical distance is not new. However, like Intergenerational anthropocentrism, a
recent development of global ethics follows in the wake of the challenges that envi-
ronmental and development issues pose to society. Economic globalisation is often
pointed to as a chief vector in the development of Global anthropocentrism (Dower
1998; Attfield 1999). Thus, as Table 1 illustrates, a Value-oriented anthropocentric
framework comprises a number of potentially combined positions on nature’s
Table 1. Value-oriented anthropocentric environmental ethics.
Anthropocentrism
(a) Moral object, i.e. holder People alive today (Intragenerational anthropocentrism)
of intrinsic value People alive today and future generations (Intergenerational
anthropocentrism)
People alive today, past and future generations
(Transgenerational anthropocentrism)
People that are geographically, emotionally and mentally
close to me (Nearness anthropocentrism)
People that are geographically distant yet emotionally and
mentally close to me (Global anthropocentrism)
(b) Human–nature Humankind and nature separated or integrated

relationship (a) Geographically

(b) Historically
(c) Biologically
(d) Discursively
(c) Instrumental value of Natural resources are valued because they satisfy our felt
nature preferences (demand value)
Natural resources are valued because our experiences of
nature may change our preferences, moral outlooks and
world views (transformative value)
Natural resources are valued because the conception of nature
is constitutive of being human (constitutive value)
Natural resources are valued because humankind is
dependent on nature for its basic well-being and survival
(need value)
instrumental value and human–nature relationships, and should therefore not be

construed as a homogeneous environmental ethic.8
Since the field of environmental ethics includes as many clarifications of
human–nature integration as for human–nature separation, here we only underline a
few possible positions found in the literature (see below). Within Value-oriented
anthropocentrism, it is possible to view humans/humanity and nature both as sepa-
rated and integrated. The second row in Table 1 illustrates four different ways in
which this separation and integration can be explained.
According to a place-oriented view, nature resides in places that have a specific
quality of wildness constituted predominantly by hands-off policies and actions
(Kronlid 2003, 35–7; Katz 1998, 233); nature is contrasted with domesticated land-
scapes, cities, communities, etc. In addition, and according to a process-oriented
view, the essence of being ‘natural’ is defined and identified as ongoing historical
self-creative processes rather than specific geographical locations, which means that
nature and the natural exist to differing degrees in the environment as a whole
(Kronlid 2003, 37–8). Hence, although separated from human artificial (non self-
creative) processes, ‘nature’ can reside in differing degrees in e.g. remote Norwe-
gian mountains, plots and multi-storey car parks (Hargrove 1989; Kronlid 2003;
Hansson, af Geijerstam and Östman in progress). A third view of human–nature
relationships concerns the extent to which humans/humanity and nature share the
same evolutionary, biological and ecological history (e.g. Norton 1987).9 According
to a fourth discursive view, demarcating pure cultural and natural places and
processes is impossible, since the wilds or wilderness that we attempt to capture in

spoken and written words always confounds our efforts (Cheney 1989; Klaver
1995).10 Simultaneously, our stories and conceptualisations of nature are necessarily
entangled and intertwined with our experiences of being and acting with and in nat-
ure/culture, places and processes, in that views of human–nature separation and
integration are bioregional narratives.
This presentation illustrates the complexities associated with the question of
human–nature relationships, and also that from an EE and ESD perspective it is
important to highlight how the simultaneous separation from and integration with
and within nature is manifested in educational practice in great variety. Sallie McFa-
gue puts it like this:
Our relationship with nature is like our relationship with our own bodies: we can live
only in and through them, we are nothing without them, we are intrinsically and
entirely embodied and yet, we can distance ourselves from them and have many dif-
ferent views of them. We both are our bodies, and we drag them around after us like
cans tied to a dog’s tail. (McFague 1997, 17)
Furthermore, our illustration avoids the traditional dichotomisation between

dualistic and holistic views of human–nature relationships. For example, it is
common for its critics to portray anthropocentrism as a short-sighted dualistic
ethic that only values nature because it fulfils immediate human demands.
However, in that anthropocentrism cannot be automatically dismissed as an
environmentally hostile dualistic position from a methodological perspective,
our analysis suggests that a more refined critique is needed in order to clarify
the advantages and shortcomings of anthropocentric environmental ethics for
EE and ESD.
Like anthropocentrism, non-anthropocentrism can be divided into various sub-
positions in relation to the questions accounted for above: (a) who or what is con-
sidered as a moral object, (b) the human–nature relationship and (c) definitions of
nature’s value. Table 2 illustrates various potential combinations of sub-positions
within non-anthropocentric environmental ethics.
All Value-oriented positions share the view that only humans are moral agents,
i.e. only humans can be held accountable for their actions, although they differ with
regard to the identity of the moral object. In Value-oriented environmental ethics,
being a moral object means being morally relevant. That is, that one’s well-being,
interests, health, preferences, flourishing, functions, etc. ought to be taken into
account beyond whatever instrumental value one might have for the other. From
this, it follows that Table 1 reflects the various positions oriented in line with
human well-being, whereas Table 2 is oriented in line with the well-being of
humans and of certain animals, plants, species, ecosystems and landscapes.
While it is common to combine e.g. Ecocentrism with integrative views of
the human–nature relationship, Ecocentrism does not necessarily imply this.
Another example is that although Sentientism’s focus on the moral relevance of
individual organism’s ability to experience pain and suffering seems to concur
mainly with dualistic views of the human–nature relationship, it is possible to
combine Sentientism with other views of the human–nature relationship.
It is well known within environmental ethics that the intrinsic value dis-
course11 includes a variety of concepts of value (Norton 1987). For example, the
meaning of the non-anthropocentric concepts of value and worth accounted in
Table 2. Value-oriented non-anthropocentric environmental ethics.
Non-anthropocentrism
Moral object, i.e. holder of Non-human animals with the ability to experience pain and
intrinsic value suffering have intrinsic value (Sentientism)
Non-human animals with a sense of self have intrinsic value
(Animal rights)
Non-human animals with the ability to engage in relationships
have intrinsic value (Social animal ethics)
All organisms have intrinsic value by virtue of having a good
of their own related to their flourishing (Biocentrism)
Ecosystems and species have intrinsic value because it is
possible to relate to them as separate entities and because they
have a capacity to sustain life and well-being in terms of their
integrity, stability and beauty (Ecocentrism)
Human–nature relationship Humankind and nature separated or integrated

(a) Geographically
(b) Historically
(c) Biologically
(d) Discursively
Intrinsic value of nature Non-human nature has an objective value of its own (inherent
worth)
Non-human nature has a socially constructed induced value of
their own (inherent value)
Systems have transactional value of their own that emerges in
encounters between the parts of the system (systemic or
emergent value)
Table 2 relates to the normative positions of which these values are part. Thus,
‘inherent worth’ (Taylor 1989) implies that individual organisms have something
that come close to a dignity of their own, whereas ‘inherent value’ (Callicott
1989) implies that non-human species and systems have a value of their own,
induced by humans. Finally, the concepts of valuing as ‘ecological-relational’ and
of value as ‘systemic value’ (Rolston 1982, 1998) do not fit into the scheme of
either objective or humanly induced value/worth. Rather, systemic value (or per-
haps emergent value) implies that in whatever has a value of its own, this value
is a product of the interactions between the parts of the system – non-human and
human.
From this structuring of environmental ethic positions it can be concluded that
environmental ethics offers considerable variety. The importance of highlighting this
variety is also recognised by several other scholars in the field of environmental
ethics (see Plumwood 1995, 1999). In particular, Weston (2004, 29) suggests that
environmental ethics should ‘recognize a world of multiple voices and beings that
do not reduce to a single type and do not naturally fall into the orbit of one single
sort of being’s center’. Although sticking with a centrist language in his normative
argument, Weston points to a way from mono-centrism towards a Multi-centrist
methodology that strives for ‘decentering’ (2004, 29). Consequently, there is a
plurality in environmental ethics that can be accounted for when using environmen-
tal ethics in sustainability and EE research. This diverse content of environmental
ethics is illuminated even further when we introduce the concept of Relation-

oriented environmental ethics.12
Relation-oriented environmental ethics

A number of environmental ethicists have criticised Value-oriented environmental
ethics for its focus on the concept of intrinsic value (see Weston 1985; Light
1996a; Cuomo 1998; Warren 2000). In essence, their critique revolves around the
fact that Value-oriented environmental ethics rests heavily on so-called moral exten-
tionism philosophy, i.e. relies on philosophical arguments for or against extending
the circle of moral relevance. Thus, Value-oriented environmental ethics is accused
of disregarding moral aspects of the environmental crisis associated with e.g. psy-
chological, gender, institutional, religious and spiritual phenomena (Merchant 1992,

1996; Zimmerman 1993; Oelschlaeger 1995; Callicott 2002).
Another dimension of the critique is that a one-sided focus on values of nature
contributes to a reproduction of an unfortunate dualism that the world consists of
two separate spheres: the human and the non-human world. According to Relation-
oriented environmental ethicists, this idea, and its presumed impact on the organ-
ising and structuring of our societies, is often regarded as a significant reason why
nature is exploited for the benefit of human well-being.13 Although separating
notions of human–nature relationships, as shown above, only represent one out of
several possible positions; this critique raises important questions as to whether
certain environmental ethics carry specific human–nature ontologies.
Value-oriented environmental ethics tries to overcome the moral distance
between humanity and nature by introducing the concepts of nature’s instrumental
and intrinsic value. Relation-oriented environmental ethics takes the vantage point
that moral agents are situated in morally relevant relationships with humans and
non-humans, and that the justification of actions and principles will take these
particular relationships into consideration (Kronlid 2003, 156). Although Value-
oriented theories also involve notions of relationships (e.g. relationships of separa-
tion and integration with nature), it is fair to say that they are not moulded as
Relation-oriented theories. Whereas Value-oriented theories use moral extentionism
to draw certain objects into a rationalist embrace of moral agents, Relation-oriented
ethics is launched on the basis that moral significance can only be validated within
rational and emotive relational contexts.
A vast number of theories can be referred to as Relation-oriented environmen-
tal ethics, e.g. Deep ecology (Naess 1973; Sessions 1993), Ecofeminism (Merchant
1980, 1992, 1996; McFague 1993, 1997; Warren 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000; Cuomo
1998; Kronlid 2003), Social ecology (see Merchant 1992; Zimmerman 1993),
Pragmatist environmental ethics (Weston 1985; Norton 1991, 1995; Light 1996a,
1996b) and Postmodern environmental ethics (Oelschlaeger 1995).14 This category
has interesting similarities with Sauvé’s holistic current in EE. According to Sau-
vé, the holistic current underscores ‘the different dimension of the person who
enters into relation’ with ‘socio-environmental realities’. This current also high-
lights the relevance of ‘the web of relations which connects beings with one
another, and from which they draw meaning and significance’; something that sev-
eral of the Relation-oriented environmental ethical positions concur with (Sauvé
2005, 20). Further, it is interesting to note that several of the positions in the
Relation-oriented category can be associated with various currents in the Sauvéan
30
D.O. Kronlid and J. Öhman
Table 3. Relation-oriented environmental ethics.
Postmodern Pragmatist environmental

Deep ecology Social ecology Ecofeminism environmental ethics ethics
View on The crisis can be The crisis originates The crisis originates The crisis can be The crisis originates from
environment- and explained by ‘shallow’ from ecopolitical from interlinked explained by a totalising everyday-life problems of
development crisis philosophies of life that dominion inherent in theandrocentric and and colonising discourse people´s relationship with
do not acknowledge the hierarchical structuringanthropocentric of domination that the environment and the
‘deep’ connections epistemologies,
of political institutions assimilates the world limited value of theoretical
between self and nature and ideologies ontologies, values and debates in solving it
practices
Relational space Accentuates individual Accentuates social group Accentuates situated Accentuates contextual Underlines interhuman
relationships with, and relationships within human–non-human discursive spaces of relationships in moral
identification processes ecopolitical space relationships of relationship between practice in a democratic
involving, free or wild accentuating the dominion in context humans, reality and and/or policy context
nature within the space interlinkages between language
of worldviews interhuman and
intrahuman dominion
Practical implications Identifications with Environmental justice, i. Underlines how Highlights the possibility Accentuates the need for
other species and the e. a fair political system values of care, of engaging in ethical pluralism arguing
land involve a deeper that acknowledges the partnership, kinship, contextual discourses that the goal is to describe
sense of belonging, suffering of both humans love, friendship etc. that bridge the gap people’s actual reasons for
which means and non-humans take precedence in between subject and valuing nature
developing aesth/ethical human–non-human object worlds:
practice relationships bioregional narrative
Note: Sigurd Bergmann coined the term ‘aesth/ehtic’, see Bergmann (2005).
typology – pragmatist environmental ethics (problem solving current and praxis

current), social ecology (humanist/mesological current) and ecofeminism (feminist
current).15
The main features of these theoretical positions are presented in Table 3 above.
Since Relation-oriented theories focus on relations, and not on objects like predominant
Value-oriented environmental ethics, the table has a different logic. While Value-
oriented theories are concerned with philosophical analyses of different arguments for
inclusion and exclusion in the moral community, Relational theories locate their prob-
lems in situated relational space. This means (a) that a predominant vantage point of
these theories is experiences of environmental and developmental crisis practice, (b)
that the question of relational space is central and (c) that they are explicitly concerned
with practical implications. Although Value-oriented theories may subscribe to points
(a) and (b), their focus is predominantly theoretical, whereas Relation-oriented theoris-
ing is predominantly and explicitly situated in relational practice.
These theories can all be regarded as ‘radical’ ecologies in relation to Value-ori-
ented theories, although this term is often limited to Deep ecology, Social ecology
and Ecofeminism (Merchant 1992; Zimmerman 1993; Kronlid and Svennbeck
2008). The term ‘radical’ originates from the Latin radix (root) and refers to an
intention to get to the bottom of things; an orientation that favours fundamental
change ‘at the roots’. This term is primarily applicable to Relation-oriented environ-
mental ethics, because here the argument is that people and or institutions need to
shift their presumptions, actions and or organisations in order to facilitate sustain-
able and fair ways of life. Secondly, the theories themselves impose a drastic shift
of some kind, e.g. in worldview, social structures, gender structures, language and
policy.
Relation-oriented environmental ethics suggests that we need to look into how
environmental values and the actions associated with those values are created and
maintained in various contexts of humans relating to other humans, to nature and to
technology. In addition to looking for answers in philosophical theory, Relation-
oriented environmental ethics seeks answers to questions about how we ought to
live in political, spiritual and religious, gendered, technical and discursive everyday
life.
To a certain extent, these positions also share the opinion that the question of
whether humanity or individual humans have a unique factual or normative position
can never be answered outside the actual context, or in other words, outside rela-
tional space. Thus, Relation-oriented environmental ethics refers to positions in
which people’s relationships and experiences of and within the world are appropri-
ate spaces for environmental ethical reflection. This involves an attempt to dissolve
the agent/object division typical for Value-oriented environmental ethics.
Taken together, the positions accounted for in Tables 1–3 comprise a conceptual
framework that captures a wide variety of environmental ethical positions. In this
way, the suggested categorisations offer possibilities for a nuanced understanding of
what environmental ethics can mean for sustainability and EE research.
Pragmatic analytical schemes

In order to use the presented framework in practical scientific work it is necessary
to extract analytical questions corresponding to different environmental ethical posi-
tions. In Figures 1 and 2, we suggest examples of schemes of questions that can be
used in analyses of the environmental ethical content of textbooks, educational pol-

icy texts and classroom conversations. The scheme outlined in Figure 1 can be used
for analyses of the value content of both texts and conversations, and the scheme in
Figure 2 for analyses of relational aspects. Observe that the empirical material can
often be fruitfully analysed with regard to both its value content and relational
aspects.
The sub-questions in Figures 1 and 2 follow the internal logic of these two main
aspects. The vertical and horizontal arrows in the two schemes correspond to ana-
lytical paths for the analyst. The purpose of a scheme-based analysis is not to cate-
gorise the empirical material as corresponding to one or the other analytical
question, e.g. that the value of nature is constituted either as demand value or as
transformative value. Consequently, the scheme acknowledges that the empirical
data may hold several positions that are theoretically incommensurable, since moral
reasoning is seldom consequent or follows the strict lines of ethics. However, this
Inherent worth Inherent value (dependent Systemic or emergent

(independent of on moral agents) value (dependent on
moral agents) transactional processes
between nature and
humans)
Intrinsic
What kind of values of nature value
are constituted?
Instrumen
-tal value
Demand value Transformative value Constitutive value (the Need value (nature
(nature provides (nature encounters conception of nature meets human
satisfaction for felt transform preferences and constitutes the conception needs)
preferences) meaning) of humanity)
Non-human - Non-human animals with - Social non-human - All individual - Ecosystems and
animals with the a sense of Self animals Organisms species
ability to
experience pain
and suffering
Nature
Who/what is constituted as
moral objects?
Humans
Present human Present and future human Past, present and future Local human Global human
generations generations human generations generations generations
Shared Shared historical process Shared biological features Discursively

geographical space constructed
community
Integration
How are the ontological

relations of Humans and
Nature constituted?
Separation
Separate Separate historical Different biological Nature excluded

geographical processes features from discursive
spaces community
Figure 1. Value-oriented analytical scheme.

- As identifications - As an egalitarian - As practices of care, - As local narratives - Treated as an

with nature and a political system that partnership, kinship, love, of human–nature empirical
deeper sense of acknowledges the friendship etc. integration question, a task
belonging suffering of both for open ended
humans and non- pluralistic
humans inquiries
How are solutions to the

environmental crisis
constituted?
- A space of individual - A political space - A gendered space - A discursive space - A situated

worldviews (institutions for every-day
decision making) practical space
Which relational spaces are

touched upon?
- As inability to - As inegalitarian - As patriarchal power - As discursively - Treated as an

identify with nature hierarchical relations constituted empirical
institutional relations disconnected and question, a task
dominant for open ended
relationships pluralistic
towards nature inquiries
How are the causes to the

environmental crisis
constituted?
Figure 2. Relation-oriented analytical scheme.
does not mean that the arrows represent a continuum of positions. For example, the
relational spaces in the Relation-oriented analytical scheme are qualitatively sepa-
rate.
It is accordingly our ambition to present schemes that are sensitive to the com-
plexity of moral life, but that nonetheless provide a stringent tool for systematic
analyses based on environmental ethical research. Furthermore, we want to leave
room for additional positions, unknown to theory, produced by the material itself,
as well as for positions from other environmental ethical theories not included in
our study.
The second Relational-oriented analytical scheme takes Relation-oriented envi-
ronmental ethics as the vantage point. It follows the internal logic of Table 3 and
can either be used in combination with the Value-oriented scheme or separately in
order to analyse which and how relational aspects of environmental moral meaning
making are manifested in various empirical material.
Contributions to sustainability and environmental educational research

We suggest that when environmental ethics is used in sustainability and EE
research, such cross-disciplinary work should take the complexity and pluralism of
environmental ethical issues and the variety of sub-positions produced above into
consideration. To continually reproduce a simplified notion of anthropocentrism and
non-anthropocentrism reduces environmental ethics research. Furthermore, such
simplification fails to take the full potential of environmental ethics in sustainability

and EE research into account.
In this section, we discuss six different ways in which the conceptual framework
and the analytical schemes outlined above can contribute to sustainability and EE
research: (i) by providing a common and theoretically anchored language of analy-
sis, (ii) by reminding of distinctions between normative, descriptive and perspective
uses, (iii) by qualifying textual as well as in situ analyses, (iv) by identifying rele-
vant and perhaps overlooked questions, (v) by contributing to the development of
the concept of ESD and (vi) by providing increased opportunities for comparative
reflections.
First, reference to a conceptual framework in line with the discipline of environ-
mental ethics can provide researchers who are interested in the ethical dimension of
EE and ESD with a common and nuanced language that is both anchored in the
environmental ethics literature and comprises important conceptual distinctions. A
common environmental ethical language can also increase the methodological value
of educational and ethical cross-disciplinary studies, since it provides a rich arsenal
for studying environmental ethical content in educational practice. For example, if a
given study shows that a certain educational practice can be classified as anthropo-
centric, a language that reflects this can facilitate clarification of the potential
anthropocentric teaching and learning involved. This can include questions concern-
ing the extent to which this type of anthropocentrism includes consideration for
past, present and future human generations. Furthermore, such a language makes it
possible to combine distinctions between intra-, inter- or transgenerational anthropo-
centrism with conceptions of nature’s instrumental demand, transformative, existen-
tial or need values. Similar combinations of Value-oriented anthropocentric and
non-anthropocentric sub-positions are possible, as are combinations of Value-ori-
ented and Relation-oriented sub-positions.
To conclude, a theoretically anchored language can increase the possibilities of
cross-referencing and an accumulation of knowledge about the ethical aspects of
teaching and learning within the EE/ESD field. It may also help educational
researchers to keep abreast of developments in environmental ethical research and
create further opportunities for cross-disciplinary research projects and cooperation
between researchers in the educational and ethical fields.
Second, the framework highlights the importance of considering conceptual clar-
ifications relating to differences between (1) normative, (2) descriptive and (3) per-
spective uses of different environmental ethical positions. In a normative
application, the framework is used in order to put forward valid arguments for why
one main- or sub-position (or combinations of positions) should be favoured before
other positions. From a normative standpoint, the purpose of putting a certain posi-
tion forward would be to e.g. argue whether nature should or should not be
respected as a moral object. Accordingly, the framework could be used, norma-
tively, to argue that the fabrication of environmental moral meaning making in
school should both respect and take non-human nature into account, that the well-
being of future generations ought to be considered, and/or that individuals have cer-
tain global responsibilities and duties.
A descriptive application means describing certain states of affairs concerning
the moral dimension of a material. In this case, the framework and the analytical
schemes are used as a typology to help the researcher to categorise the ethical con-
tent of the empirical material being worked with, e.g. policy documents or video
recordings (e.g. Stenmark 2002; Kronlid 2005; Öhman and Östman 2008). Thus,
from a descriptive position, the analytical schemes could be used to clarify the
moral content of environmental moral reactions, norms, reflections, etc. as these are
manifested in texts and various educational practices. The analytical schemes could
also be used to construct questionnaires and interviews concerning the environmen-
tal outlook of a certain group, practice and population.
When using the framework to derive analytical perspective/s the empirical mate-
rial may be analysed from a specific environmental ethics vantage point. For exam-
ple, if an ecofeminist perspective is taken as vantage point, the empirical material
can be analysed on the basis of the assumption that gender aspects are interlinked
with the exploitation of nature (e.g. Gough 1999; Li 2007). In this way, the results
of a perspective analysis can mean that environmental problems, policy documents,
educational practices, etc. appear in a new and varying light.16

Third, the framework and the suggested analytical schemes can contribute by
means of qualifying textual as well as in situ analyses. For example, when using
comparative strategies (see Edwards 1997; Fairclough 2000) in discourse text analy-
ses, the framework offers rich possibilities for contextualisation. Comparative dis-
course analyses focus on the processes of exclusion and inclusion, i.e. the language
used in an authoritative text is compared with other ways of using language that
appear to be possible and reasonable in the context in question (Östman 1998).
Accordingly, a more precise and comprehensive understanding of alternative ethical
languages is necessary for a relevant and precise discourse analysis. Here we
believe that the distinctions presented in the framework can be helpful. An example
of such analyses can be found in Kronlid and Svennbeck’s (2008) account of their
study of the environmental ethical content of textbooks in the subject of religion in
Swedish upper secondary school. Using a similar framework in their study facili-
tated the identification of the degree of systematic ethical reflection in this subject.
Further, the framework clarified that the language of intrinsic value dominated the
subject. Thus, the advantages of using the framework in textbook analyses are that
it enables both the identification and clarification of the ethical content of potential
environmental ethical reflections in the subject in question and illuminates the diver-
sity or uniformity of this content.
We also suggest that analytical schemes like those suggested here have great
potential for analyses of classroom conversations and other in situ studies. So far
classroom studies of the ethical dimension of EE/ESD have mainly focused on
the processes of moral and ethical meaning making (e.g. Öhman and Östman
2007, 2008). In the development of this type of research, the suggested framework
could add analysis tools that not only relate to how such meanings are created
and sustained, but also to the nature and content of students´ moral and ethical
meaning making in educational situations. In particular, the relational aspects of
the Relation-oriented theories described in Table 3 facilitate analyses that consider
the complexity, ambiguity and contradictory character of moral action in everyday
life.
Fourth, the framework can be used as a basis for identifying important and per-
haps overlooked questions in policy-oriented sustainability and EE research. The
different ethical theories provide important messages as to which relations, aspects
and experiences ought to be considered when creating guidelines for educational
practices in EE/ESD. For example, references to Deep ecology can be used as an
argument for an integration of outdoor education in EE and ESD. Such an argumen-
tation can be based on Deep ecology’s emphasis on personal outdoor experiences,

and how such aesth/ethical experiences can lead to identification with nature as a
whole and function as vectors for developing environmental moral approaches
(Reed and Rothenberg 1993; Van De Veer and Pierce 1998). In this way, Deep
ecology deepens the significance of outdoor experiences by focusing on relation-
ships with nature rather than on ethical principles and the question of whether or
not nature has intrinsic value.
Another example is how ecofeminist theories can develop ethical analyses of
environmental moral meaning making in EE/ESD by focusing on ethical concepts
of care, sympathy, compassion, gratitude and friendship. Feminist ethics and Ecofe-
minism argue that ethical analysis should also be informed by insights derived from
intimate relationships. As opposed to adapting somewhat abstract moral principles
of justice, equity and freedom, such relational and contextually derived ethical con-
cepts can help EE/ESD educators and sustainability and EE researchers to focus on
how knowledge and insights derived from students’ everyday experiences may con-
tribute significant information to, and thereby further the understanding of, the
moral and ethical dimension of EE/ESD. A third example is how Ecofeminist posi-
tions that highlight that relationships in technological space, i.e. human–machine
relationships, are significant to an understanding of how certain values and ideals
are sustained in technological practices. Such analyses can contribute to a richer
understanding of the meaning of environment-as-nature, hence of environmental
ethics. Accordingly, a technogenic relational perspective will further the develop-
ment of sustainability and EE research by expanding its space of analysis to include
experiences of encounters and identifications with nature (as is the case with Deep
ecology) as well as technogenic identification processes. Furthermore, such an
expanded view could further our understanding of how eco-, anthropo- and techno-
genic identification processes (Kronlid 2008) interplay in everyday life by shedding
new light on the meaning of environmental awareness and attitudes.
Fifth, we are confident that both Value- and Relation-oriented environmental
ethics can offer important reminders about the development of the relatively new
concept of ESD. Some educational researchers have highlighted that the concept of
sustainable development neglects our relationships with nature, and that as a conse-
quence sustainability simply becomes a matter of human welfare (see Bonnett
2007; Sandell and Öhman 2010). One reason for this, it is argued, is that the ethos
of the influential definition of sustainable development stated in the Brundtland
Report concerns our anthropocentric responsibilities for future human generations.
On the basis of this, the distinctions made by Value-oriented theories in Tables 1
and 2 can function as important reminders of the diversity of potential moral experi-
ences and positions regarding human–nature relationships, such as whether other
species, ecosystems, landscapes, etc. also have a right to flourish and develop in
sustainable ways, as well as of the relevant arguments for including non-human
welfare in the meaning of sustainability.
Furthermore, the Relation-oriented environmental ethics outlined in Table 3 can
contribute to the theoretical development of ESD in that they share similar inter-sec-
tor perspectives. ESD highlights the interconnections between the social, ecological
and economic aspects of ‘sustainable development’, and aims to integrate these
three aspects of development in an educational approach to environmental crises
(United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development [UNESCO]
2005). In other words, what have traditionally been regarded as classical environ-
mental and development issues are now being brought together in the classroom. In
a similar way, radical environmental ethics take the vantage point that it is seldom
meaningful to analyse intrahuman ethical issues as something separate or different
from ethical issues that emerges in human-nature relationships. From a relational
point of view, a person’s environmental moral outlook can seldom be divided into
separate moral spheres. Rather, morality acts in mysterious and sometimes inconsis-
tent ways. Hence, using Relation-oriented environmental ethics can help EE/ESD
educators and researchers to clarify how the relationships between different dimen-
sions of our moral outlooks interplay in processes of moral meaning making.
Sixth, the framework highlights the pluralism and complexity of potential ethical
reasoning concerning humans’ relationships with nature as well as other ethical
issues relating to EE and ESD. In this way, the framework provides increasing
opportunities for comparative reflections on various Value-oriented and Relation-ori-

ented environmental ethic positions. One advantage of comparative reflections is
that they can illuminate the heterogeneity of anthropocentric and non-anthropocen-
tric environmental moral outlooks and Value-oriented and Relation-oriented environ-
mental ethics. This advantage is furthered by the fact that the suggested framework
allows educational researchers to combine specific positions within and between
Value-oriented and Relation-oriented environmental ethics. Thus, the framework
should not be used as a map of moral life, but should rather be regarded as a patch-
work of, sometimes inconsistent, positions that can be combined in order to under-
stand the at times inconsistent ways of moral agents. This includes educators and
researchers being given increased opportunities to reflect on their own and others’
environmental moral outlooks (meta-reflection) and on environmental ethical theory
in general.
Final remarks
Environmental ethics is an ever-evolving enterprise. In this, the traditional antipodes
of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism are not categorised to mirror
people’s experiences, and new ethical positions and arguments are frequently added
to the field. Accordingly, we do not envisage the suggested framework as a fixed
and ultimate/definitive way of structuring environmental ethics, but as a starting
point and something that follows the changes in environmental ethical research.
Both the environmental situation and the content of EE/ESD are in constant
change. Lately, climate change has offered new challenges to education with regard
to the ethical dimension (Adger et al. 2006; Northcott 2007; Page 2007; Garvey
2008). The challenges that climate change poses for education, policy-making and
individual responsibilities and choices are a reminder of the importance of develop-
ing nuanced analysis tools in cross-disciplinary educational-ethical research. Climate
change is a so-called post-normal problem with high degrees of epistemological,
ethical, economic and political uncertainties that cut through societal sectors and
spaces of power and domination. Contemporary concerns about climate change
often rely on versions of a distant or general ethic – a general concern for others in
remote geographical and temporal places of the world. From an educational point
of view, a distant ethic is challenging in itself, partly because climate change is to a
great extent caused by indirectly observable impacts on many small local sources,
which in turn means that the relationship between action and consequence is seldom
obvious for the individual. In this sense, there is also a need to develop models
with which to study local post-normal morals.
A climate change ethic does not only concern care for nature, but also involves
an intimately mixed concern for the well-being of humans within nature and cul-
ture. It is simultaneously a common global problem and one that is highly situated
and contextual. Taken together, this highlights an intricate ethical question about
how to balance mitigation and adaptation in responsible ways. Studies of climate
change education and these ethical issues thus impose new demands on the func-
tionality of an environmental ethical framework for education.
To conclude, we believe that environmental ethics has an important role to play
in sustainability and EE research and that there is great potential in widening this
research in terms of methodology and empirical material. Some of this potential lies
in applying the framework to sustainability and EE research focusing on classroom

conversations, textbooks and policy documents, as well as on environmental moral
dimensions of social and community learning.
We hope that the suggested framework illustrates that theoretical environmental
ethics are of considerable practical value for the field of sustainability and EE. It is
also hoped that it will help to bridge the theoretical and methodological gaps
between the disciplines of ethics and education and be instrumental in stimulating
the development of empirical research in this cross-disciplinary field.
Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Senior Lecturer Anders Melin
at Malmö University, Sweden, the SMED research group at Örebro and Uppsala universities
and the anonymous reviewers of this article.
Notes
1. In this article, EE and ESD refer to educational practices, while ‘sustainability and envi-
ronmental education (EE) research’ refers to research into these practices and theoretical
questions associated with them.
2. Given the restrictions of the paper, we have been obliged to exclude contributions that
do not represent key positions in the debate, e.g. Ecotheology (Gottlieb 1996; North-
cott 1996; Bergmann 2004; Bergmann and Gerten 2010) and Spiritual radical ecology
(Merchant 1992), either because they do not contribute anything substantially new to
the environmental ethical debate, e.g. Ecocriticism (Glotfeltley and Fromm 1996; Garr-
ard 2004) or simply being to much material to handle within the limits of this paper,
e.g. environmental justice (Paavola 2005; Adger et al. 2006), ecojustice (Bergmann
2004) and environmental ethics from the perspectives of developing countries (Guha
1989).
3. Here we use Nigel Dower’s distinction between ethic as ‘an ethical theory or approach
which put forward a set of norms and values to guide our relations with the rest of the
world’ and ethics as ‘the philosophical inquiry into the nature, extent and justification of
the ethical claims which are made on human beings …’ In this sense, an environmental
ethic is the result of philosophical inquiries into environmental ethical claims (see Dower
1998, 2–3). However, to Dower’s terminology we add the distinction between ethic as
theories and approaches developed in research contexts and reserve the term ‘moral’ for
things like people’s, groups’, institutions’ expressions of moral beliefs in certain con-
texts.
4. Callicott (1989) maintains that the question of nature’s intrinsic value is ‘… the central
theoretical problem of environmental ethics’ (160). See Norton (1987) for one of the first
value theoretical typologies in the field.
5. In this article we use ‘intrinsic value’ in a broad sense to cover the conceptions of value
accounted for below, referring to things/people that are or are perceived to be good in
themselves or by virtue of their intrinsic properties.
6. Sauvé (2005) proposed a mapping of 15 ‘currents’ in environmental education in order
to explore varieties of pedagogical propositions in the field. Several of these currents are
associated with some of the environmental ethical categories and positions presented in
our suggested framework.
7. See also Norton (1987) for a similar and successful attempt to categorise the content of
Value-oriented environmental ethics.
8. See e.g. Norton (1987) and Marietta (1995) on anthropocentric holism.
9. See also non-anthropocentrists Rolston (1982) and Callicott (1989).
10. Although Cheney and Klaver’s positions can hardly be labelled as Value-oriented, we
nevertheless introduce their versions of discursive integration for the purpose of illustrat-
ing how Value-oriented environmental ethics may include various conceptions of human-
nature separation and integration.
11. As noted earlier (n. 5), in this paper the term ‘intrinsic value’ is neutral, i.e. it does not
refer to any specific value theoretical position.
12. We first used the term ‘Relation-oriented’ environmental ethics in Kronlid and
Svennbeck (2008). Since then we have developed the concept to include more environ-
mental ethical theories.
13. An additional critique is that the concept of anthropocentrism is falsely homogeneous
and that talk of ‘humanity’ vs. ‘nature’ misconstrues the importance of acknowledging
hierarchical power-relations and various differences in humanity related to sex, gender,
ethnicity, age, wealth, etc.
14. Our distinction between Value-oriented and relation-oriented environmental ethics does
not exclude a certain overlap. For example, although deep ecologists would accept that
non-human nature has intrinsic value, they would argue that nature encounters and
human’s personal relationships with non-human nature are keys to developing a ‘deeper’
moral outlook that can, from a Value-oriented perspective, be described as a respect for
nature’s intrinsic value. Furthermore, these and other theoretical overlaps strengthen our
case that presumably neat or ‘pure’ distinctions that depart from theory (rather than from
investigative questions as in our case) and remain true to these distinctions throughout
the analysis may force the empirical result into theoretical purity, rather than observing
the sometimes paradoxical content of the empirical result. In addition, although it could
be convincingly argued that normative ethical theories should include a conception of
what is valuable and what the nature of this value is (see e.g. Fox 2007, who argues for
value as a relational quality), it is not the same thing as saying that all theories are
Value-oriented.
15. Sauvé has identified a feminist current in EE that apparently comprises the classical
Ecofeminist twin domination thesis. Ecofeminism has come a long way since its first
wave, according to which women, compared to men, are seen as primary caretakers of
nature (Warren 2000) or, as Sauvé puts it quoting Clover, Follen and Hall (2000),
‘women are often the first environmental educators’ (2005, 25). For a still valid critical
discussion of Ecofeminism’s development as critical theory in relation to other dis-
courses of domination, such as neo-colonial critique and cyborg feminism, see Cuomo
(1998).
16. Such perspective use of the framework can be descriptive or normative.
Notes on contributors
David O. Kronlid is docent of ethics at the Faculty of Theology and senior lecturer at the
Department of Education, Uppsala University, Sweden. His research focuses on
ecofeminism, mobility, climate change justice and environmental ethics in the context of
education and sustainable development.
Johan Öhman is an associate professor at Örebro University’s School of Humanities,

Education and Social Sciences, Sweden. His area of research is environmental ethics and
democratic issues within the sphere of education of education for sustainable development,
environmental education and outdoor education.
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Environmental Education Research

ISSN: 1350-4622 (Print) 1469-5871 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceer20

An environmental ethical conceptual framework

David O. Kronlid & Johan Öhman

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2012.687043

Published online: 14 Jun 2012.

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An environmental ethical conceptual framework for research on

*Corresponding author. Email: david.kronlid@edu.uu.se

Ó 2013 Taylor & Francis

20 key articles in academic journals in the ﬁeld of environmental philosophy. We

so-called intrinsic value discourse (Kronlid 2003). Pragmatists quintessentially

In an attempt to nuance the unidimensional NEP-scale, Wiseman and Bogner

Value-oriented environmental ethics

Table 1. Value-oriented anthropocentric environmental ethics.

(b) Human–nature Humankind and nature separated or integrated

relationship (a) Geographically

instrumental value and human–nature relationships, and should therefore not be

processes is impossible, since the wilds or wilderness that we attempt to capture in

Furthermore, our illustration avoids the traditional dichotomisation between

Table 2. Value-oriented non-anthropocentric environmental ethics.

integrity, stability and beauty (Ecocentrism)

Human–nature relationship Humankind and nature separated or integrated

ethics is illuminated even further when we introduce the concept of Relation-

Relation-oriented environmental ethics

chological, gender, institutional, religious and spiritual phenomena (Merchant 1992,

Postmodern Pragmatist environmental

typology – pragmatist environmental ethics (problem solving current and praxis

Pragmatic analytical schemes

used in analyses of the environmental ethical content of textbooks, educational pol-

Inherent worth Inherent value (dependent Systemic or emergent

Shared Shared historical process Shared biological features Discursively

How are the ontological

Separate Separate historical Different biological Nature excluded

Figure 1. Value-oriented analytical scheme.

- As identifications - As an egalitarian - As practices of care, - As local narratives - Treated as an

How are solutions to the

- A space of individual - A political space - A gendered space - A discursive space - A situated

Which relational spaces are

- As inability to - As inegalitarian - As patriarchal power - As discursively - Treated as an

How are the causes to the

Figure 2. Relation-oriented analytical scheme.

Contributions to sustainability and environmental educational research

simpliﬁcation fails to take the full potential of environmental ethics in sustainability

educational practices, etc. appear in a new and varying light.16

tation can be based on Deep ecology’s emphasis on personal outdoor experiences,

opportunities for comparative reﬂections on various Value-oriented and Relation-ori-

in applying the framework to sustainability and EE research focusing on classroom

Johan Öhman is an associate professor at Örebro University’s School of Humanities,

Goodpaster, K. 1978/1993. On being morally considerable. In Environmental philosophy:

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