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Synopsis Problem Solving Using Machine Learning

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 A Synopsis:

Problem Solving: The Integration of Personality,

Cognition, and Interest Subgroups around Verbal,
Numerical, and Spatial Problems using Machine Learning

Richard L. DeNovellis, DVM, Ph.D.

This synopsis of the book by the same name contains a

comprehensive theory about subgroups of people and their
problem-solving characteristics. The theory and data from 95
different studies by the author and others incorporate information
about personality, interests and cognition integrated around
various kinds of numerical, verbal, and spatial problems. Using a
developmental perspective, the research illustrates how children,
adolescents, adults and different subgroups of people apply
knowledge to everyday problems and, at times, become stymied,
slowed, or adept in the problem-solving process. Individual
differences are characterized through a classification system of 36
problem-solving subgroups via machine learning-Naïve Bayes,
support vector machine, and decision-making trees.

Keywords: Individual Differences, Problem Solving,

Multidimensional Analysis, Nearest Neighbor, Subgroups,
Classification, Support vector machines
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Electronic Book Publications

First Copyright: Catalog of Copyright Entries. Third Series: A5112550: 1974: January-June
Copyright:

Second Copyright: Catalog of Literary Works, TXu 2-061-201, July 2017

Richard L. DeNovellis, DVM; Ph.D.

October 2019

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 Preface

An Integrative Approach to Problem Solving (IPS) is not necessarily new, just a different
perspective. People in education, business, psychology, and the sciences have spent many years
studying the problem-solving processes of adults and children. Most of these studies have been
useful, providing an extensive knowledge base. This book attempts to integrate both the author's
studies and the studies of others to provide a cohesive, pragmatic, and useful theoretical
foundation for studying the problem-solving process. The intent is to form a solid basis for the
education of teachers, counselors, and others in the helping professions who are interested in the
“how” and “why” of the problem-solving process. A related purpose is to identify, classify, and
describe different kinds of subgroups- how each differs in the solution of problems involving
words, numbers, and spatial activities.

Cognitive psychology, temperament, interests, physics, biology, and the concepts of information
processing are the cornerstones of the IPS theory. The explosion of information in biology,
especially brain research, may revolutionize the way that learning is conceived. Likewise, the
latest information from physics provides a foundation for understanding environmental
/organismal interaction. Information processing, although relatively new, attempts to integrate
the processes of thinking as descriptive and interactive. In the past, problem-solving has been
conceived as more static, more as a concept related to ability and intelligence. This book
characterizes the process of learning to solve problems as dynamic, changing, ongoing, and
related to the process of aging and experience.

Temperament, abilities, and interests have always been the foundations of career and vocational
problem-solving. In the intelligence model, children and adults have more or less capability to
solve problems. In this book, the emphasis is on continued experiences that allow the practice
of ability-related skills leading to the mastery of different kinds of problems. The present
approach differs from past approaches in that ultimately, the problem-solving process is a
product of motivation, personal orientation, and experience. IPS theory is based on an integrated
and balance model which considers the experiential nature of problem-solving as developmental
experiences along a life path that contribute to the complex process of solving problems in
schools, businesses, or chosen vocations.

This book uses both empirical data and theory as a basis for its approach to problem-solving. The
result is a three-tiered cognitive and affective model that posits how 36 “ideal” subgroups of
people use individual differences to solve spatial, numerical, and verbal problems. The author
(first educated as a teacher in the field of biological studies, later as a person interested in
educational psychology as well as curriculum and instruction, and finally as a veterinarian) has
never abandoned any of those historical roots. Forty years of data collection, which never
produced anything not previously discovered, but provided an extensive database on children
and adults from 3-78 years of age, has allowed the author the luxury of making extrapolations to
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the thinking and problem-solving process of children and adults. The first instruments developed
by the author in 1975-1985 were integrated, using psychological style, embedded designs,
interests, and cognitive tests as methods of categorization. The big four factors of the PTPI (an
instrument developed in 1977) preceded the big five of Costa and McCrae by 10 years but the
database was small (1600-2000 people), fragmented, and incomplete.

During those early years, many master’s level students in my research and statistics, tests and
measurement, and child development classes at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona,
CA collected data from their classrooms as part of their graduate work. Other data came from
university medical, dental, and veterinary students while I was teaching at Mississippi State
University. The majority of data came from students working on their master’s degree Theses,
university grants, and the Psychological Research Institute for Business and Education in
Claremont, CA (Associates for Human Perspective, Inc.) during the early 80s and late 90s. The
author is grateful to the Master level students (see Bibliography), staff, and friends of PRI (Linnea
and Mark Brush, Simone Kim, and Ron). Each person contributed to some small facets of what
now is called the IPS theory. However, the author takes responsibility for all assertions made
throughout this book and its synopsis.

Some of the 95 different studies (some published, many unpublished or written as research
reports for aerospace and fortune five hundred companies in Southern California during the 80s
and 90s) originally were designed to study other questions of interest or a particular population
of people in their jobs. However, many people were assessed multiple times as the data were re-
analyzed in light of the present model.

The model for this book was developed ex post facto or "after the fact." The non-random database
contains 5,500 people from which many individuals were randomly selected from all different
ages and diverse kinds of work. In addition, in another database, 1500 managers from many
distinct kinds of fortune five hundred companies were used as representatives of more expert
real-life problem solvers. The author for 10 years had the privilege of running a psychological
and business research institute that generated considerable data from schools, colleges, and
businesses. Groups of data, where possible, were randomly stratified based on age, gender,
ethnicity, and socioeconomic characteristic. The data collection was not systematic and instead
was based on “where” and “when” available. The data for four thousand people, which make
up the normative database of the IPS, the model was gathered during the late 70s as well as 80s,
90s, and early 2000s. These data were then re-analyzed in light of many of the facets of the IPS
theory. Many items came from 7 different measuring instruments, including management tests,
career tests, perceptual speed tests, ability tests, standardized academic tests, and learning style
tests. Other kinds of data collection included observation or rating forms used by employees to
rate others in their organization as well as personality inventories. All instruments were
previously correlated with many different academic, and non-academic tests during the 40-year
developmental period. The author’s interest in how problems are solved led to the collection of
many different kinds of problem-solving exercises. All this data provided a way in which to test

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many of the assumptions in this book. The collection of the data occurred mainly from 1976-2004;
while the re-analysis of the data occurred mainly from 2004 through 2017.

The history of psychological testing which leads to the methodology of integrating these diverse
areas is itself fragmented, diverse, and noncontiguous. Like all scientific endeavors, the end
result of integration is to provide illumination of an area defined often as the "black box”, the area
of the brain. Our methodology is mainly descriptive and taxonomic with a small amount of
psychometric analysis. People who use psychometric techniques rely heavily on correlation and
significance testing. The results of all of our research are descriptive as most samples are not
random, but convenient.

The author who personally oversaw the data collection is solely responsible for any errors,
omissions, and theoretical interpretations. In my opinion, taxonomic classification can only be
accomplished by algorithms that are constantly modified based on age, developmental level,
educational background, the complexity of tasks involved as well as cultural heritage.

Finally, the level of prediction based on items, subscales, and instruments has a tremendous error
which was only decreased when extended scales and algorithms were developed for
classification. The base scales which utilize basic psychometric principles are reliable and valid.
The extended scales are composite scales that do well on test-retest over periods of months and
years. Base scales tested for reliability and validity are useful in the identification, convergence,
and explication of concepts. Extended scales do well in classification which requires a broad and
inclusive measurement. Extended scales were derived from our tried-and-true psychometric
instruments (items and subscales tested for reliability and validity) and then combined across the
domains of cognition, personality, and interests.

Finally, one principle that pervades this work is summarized as:

At this point in time, the current statistical method of analysis (multivariate, multidimensional,
etc.) cannot accurately predict classifications of people, only pertinent theory and specific
algorithms combined with statistical analysis based on reference subgroup feedback from real
people in real situations can decrease error to acceptable levels). Enjoy!

Richard L. DeNovellis (richarddenovellis@yahoo.com)

October 2019

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Table of Contents

Contents

PREFACE ..................................................................................................................................... A

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................I

CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................................. 1

Synopsis: Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1

Dynamics of problem-solving: ..................................................................................................................................1
Types of problems ....................................................................................................................................................2
IPS three-tier model ..................................................................................................................................................4

Synopsis: Data representation of brain functions and processes ........................................................................... 7

Picture 1: Personality, cognition, speed, and interests ............................................................................................7
Picture 2: Integration subgroups within subgroups..................................................................................................9

CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................10

Synopsis: IPS theory............................................................................................................................................. 10

Conscious, unconscious, and subconscious pathways............................................................................................10
Environmental press ...............................................................................................................................................11
Modifications ..........................................................................................................................................................11
Filters ......................................................................................................................................................................12
Layers and surface characteristics ..........................................................................................................................12
Brain networks ........................................................................................................................................................13

CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................................14

Synopsis: Definable characteristics of the IPS system .......................................................................................... 14

Defining environments ...........................................................................................................................................14
Defining speed of processing ..................................................................................................................................15
Defining other cognitive outcomes.........................................................................................................................15
Defining preferences...............................................................................................................................................17
Defining categories of problem solving and personality ........................................................................................17
Defining career and vocational preferences ...........................................................................................................18
An integrative model ..............................................................................................................................................19

Synopsis: Top-down and bottom-up processing .................................................................................................. 21

Model concept ........................................................................................................................................................22
Synopsis: 36 Subgroups ..........................................................................................................................................23

CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................................25

Synopsis: History of problem-solving ................................................................................................................... 25

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Synopsis: Research on verbal, numerical, and spatial problem solving ................................................................ 32

CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................................36

Synopsis: Tier One: .............................................................................................................................................. 36

Anatomical structure & function of problem-solving ........................................................................................... 36

Synopsis: Memory...................................................................................................................................................37

CHAPTER 6 ................................................................................................................................39
Synopsis: Encoding..................................................................................................................................................39
Synopsis: Energy .....................................................................................................................................................40
Synopsis: Self-regulation/control............................................................................................................................42

CHAPTER 7 ................................................................................................................................44

Synopsis: Problem-solving model ........................................................................................................................ 44

CHAPTER 8 ................................................................................................................................47

Synopsis: Problem-Solving Pathways ................................................................................................................... 47

Time ........................................................................................................................................................................47
A simple model pathway example ..........................................................................................................................49
Memory/limited memory pathway ........................................................................................................................49
Associational pathways...........................................................................................................................................51
Analytic pathways ...................................................................................................................................................53
Logical analytic or just analytical ............................................................................................................................53
Divergent pathways ................................................................................................................................................54
Convergent pathways .............................................................................................................................................56
Divergent/convergent logical pathway using comprehension ...............................................................................57
A complex and compound pathway involving comprehension ..............................................................................58
Interaction of social and different mental pathways ..............................................................................................59

CHAPTER 9 ................................................................................................................................61

Synopsis: Delays in problem-solving .................................................................................................................... 61

CHAPTER 10 ..............................................................................................................................65

Synopsis: Integrative Problem solving ................................................................................................................. 65

Axiom ......................................................................................................................................................................66

CHAPTER 11 ..............................................................................................................................70

Synopsis: Tier Two: Cognitive and affective problem-solving model .................................................................... 70

Synopsis: Tier three: problem-solving-clinical observation .................................................................................. 70

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Synopsis for Stage Neonate: birth to twenty-four months ................................................................................... 71

Diagram 2 ................................................................................................................................................................73

CHAPTER 12 ..............................................................................................................................80

Synopsis: Stage: Infancy: 24 months to 7 years .................................................................................................... 80

CHAPTER 13 ..............................................................................................................................81

Synopsis: Stage: Children: 8-9 years of age .......................................................................................................... 81

CHAPTER 14 ..............................................................................................................................82

Synopsis: Stage: Early Adolescence: The Measurement System ........................................................................... 82

CHAPTER 15 ............................................................................................................................ 106

Synopsis: Learning, problem-solving, and energy .............................................................................................. 106

Category Subscales ...............................................................................................................................................107
Gender differences ...............................................................................................................................................109

CHAPTER 16 ............................................................................................................................ 110

Synopsis: Complex problem solving ................................................................................................................... 110

Gender differences ...............................................................................................................................................111
Samples .................................................................................................................................................................111
Problem Solving Categories ..................................................................................................................................114
General and differential problem solving .............................................................................................................114
Perceptual .............................................................................................................................................................115
Conception ............................................................................................................................................................116
Motor ....................................................................................................................................................................116
Analysis .................................................................................................................................................................117
Social .....................................................................................................................................................................119
Control and structure............................................................................................................................................120
Flex ........................................................................................................................................................................121
Flex and control patterns ......................................................................................................................................122
Category and profile analysis ................................................................................................................................123
Differences in Types of Problems Solved ..............................................................................................................124
Other important variables ....................................................................................................................................127

SYNOPSIS: INTERESTS .............................................................................................................. 129

Holland’s career patterns .....................................................................................................................................130
Our Career and Interests Inventory ......................................................................................................................131
Synopsis: Gender differences in interests ............................................................................................................133

CHAPTER 18 ............................................................................................................................ 135

Synopsis: Vocational Measurement ................................................................................................................... 135

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Historical Background ...........................................................................................................................................135

Synopsis: Management problem solvers. .......................................................................................................... 136

Anonymous ratings ...............................................................................................................................................136
Results from extended scales ...............................................................................................................................137

CHAPTER 19: ........................................................................................................................... 139

Synopsis: Research, Categorization, and integrative models. ............................................................................. 139

A cognitive model .................................................................................................................................................139
A model of personality ..........................................................................................................................................141
A model for interests ............................................................................................................................................141
Integrative models ................................................................................................................................................142
Cattel’s 16 PF ........................................................................................................................................................143

Our Research Integrated Model ......................................................................................................................... 143

Categorization model ............................................................................................................................................145

CHAPTER 20 ............................................................................................................................ 147

Synopsis: Measurement issues .......................................................................................................................... 147

True and false positives ........................................................................................................................................148
Factors of misclassification ...................................................................................................................................149
Feature extraction and dimension reduction .......................................................................................................150
Feature extraction ................................................................................................................................................151
Rate of misclassification .......................................................................................................................................152
Item level scoring ..................................................................................................................................................154
Scale level .............................................................................................................................................................155
Profile selection. ...................................................................................................................................................156

Subscales and selected examples of items ......................................................................................................... 157

General/differential problem solver .....................................................................................................................157
Perceptual problem-solvers ..................................................................................................................................159
Conceptual problem solver ...................................................................................................................................160
Motor problem-solvers .........................................................................................................................................162
Analytic problem solver ........................................................................................................................................163
Social problem solver ............................................................................................................................................164
Control/structure ..................................................................................................................................................165
Flex (cognitive flexibility) ......................................................................................................................................167
Extraversion, ambivert, and introversion .............................................................................................................167
Examples: cognitive items: ...................................................................................................................................169
Example: perceptual speed items ........................................................................................................................170
Examples: career and interest items ....................................................................................................................171
Problem-solving categories defined by measurement .........................................................................................172
Measurement issues using rank scoring ...............................................................................................................173

CHAPTER 21 ............................................................................................................................ 175

Synopsis: Our theory on how to find subgroups ................................................................................................ 175

Deconstructing and reconstructing correlation matrices .....................................................................................175
The 36 subgroups..................................................................................................................................................177

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Writing the descriptions of subgroups: ................................................................................................................178

Analysis of subgroups ...........................................................................................................................................179

CHAPTER 22 ............................................................................................................................ 182

Synopsis: Machine learning and subgroups ....................................................................................................... 182

A brief history of machine learning ......................................................................................................................182
Using a machine learning methodology ...............................................................................................................183
Using machine learning to classify the subgroups ................................................................................................185
Decision trees .......................................................................................................................................................188

SUMMARY: IPS THEORY ........................................................................................................... 190

Author’s Reference List for the 27 chapters in the book: ................................................................................... 192

Appendix A: ....................................................................................................................................................... 206

A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON PROBLEM SOLVING.................................................................. 206

Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 206
Higher dimensions ................................................................................................................................................206
Law of parsimony ..................................................................................................................................................208
Energy ...................................................................................................................................................................208
Different kinds of forces .......................................................................................................................................210
Forces in higher dimensions .................................................................................................................................210
Abstract, not spatial ..............................................................................................................................................212
Quantum theory ...................................................................................................................................................212
Quarks ...................................................................................................................................................................213
Superstrings ..........................................................................................................................................................214
Evolutionary remnants .........................................................................................................................................216

REVIEW: ENERGY AND COGNITION .......................................................................................... 216

Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 216
Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................217
The energy at the origin of life ..............................................................................................................................218

COGNITION ............................................................................................................................. 220

IPS theory-cognition .......................................................................................................................................... 220

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................221

Quantitative period ........................................................................................................................................... 223

Intelligence as an ability .................................................................................................................................... 223

Speed of processing ........................................................................................................................................... 224

The current research literature on the speed of processing ............................................................................... 225

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Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................225

CATEGORIES OF PERCEPTION, CONCEPTION, AND ANALYSIS.................................................... 227

Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 227

IPS theory- perception ....................................................................................................................................... 227

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................228

ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................. 230

Analysis as logical thought ................................................................................................................................. 234

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................235

CONCEPTION ........................................................................................................................... 236

IPS theory-conceptual ........................................................................................................................................ 236

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................237
Animal research ....................................................................................................................................................237
Evolutionary development....................................................................................................................................238
Philosophical period .............................................................................................................................................239
Quantitative period...............................................................................................................................................239
Psychometric studies ............................................................................................................................................240

Review summary ............................................................................................................................................... 241

REVIEW: PERSONALITY ............................................................................................................ 241

Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 241
Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................242

Personality Trait-Extraversion/Introversion ....................................................................................................... 243

IPS theory-extraversion/introversion ................................................................................................................ 243

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................244
Allport ...................................................................................................................................................................244
Early theorists .......................................................................................................................................................244
McDougal and Kempf ...........................................................................................................................................245
Other theorists ......................................................................................................................................................245

Personality Trait: Sensory Motor ....................................................................................................................... 246

Historical view:......................................................................................................................................................247

Personality Trait: Social ..................................................................................................................................... 248

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................249

Personality Trait: Control ................................................................................................................................... 251

IPS internal and external control ..........................................................................................................................252

Personality Trait: Flex ........................................................................................................................................ 256

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Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................257

Personality Trait: Achievement Motivation ....................................................................................................... 259

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................259
Atkinson and McClelland ......................................................................................................................................259

Interests ............................................................................................................................................................ 260

Historical view .......................................................................................................................................................260

Chapter Summary .............................................................................................................................................. 262

REVIEW: IDENTIFICATION OF SUBGROUPS ............................................................................... 264

Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 264
Overview of subgroup models ..............................................................................................................................264

Unipolar or one-group model ............................................................................................................................ 265

Bipolar or two-group models ............................................................................................................................. 265

MULTIPLE GROUP MODELS ..................................................................................................... 266

Gregorc’s model ....................................................................................................................................................266
Sternberg’s Model ................................................................................................................................................268
Myers Briggs Type Indicator .................................................................................................................................268
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16 PF) ................................................................................................269

Issues related to the measurement of subgroups .............................................................................................. 269

Our 36 subgroups .............................................................................................................................................. 271

Picture 5: 36 Subgroups ........................................................................................................................................271

Subgroups within subgroups.............................................................................................................................. 272

Picture 6: Analytic (A), Social (S), and Analytic Social (AS) ....................................................................................273
Picture 7: Motor (Mot); Conceptual (Con); and CM .............................................................................................273
Picture 8: Centroid for Motor; Conceptual; CM ...................................................................................................274

Summary ........................................................................................................................................................... 274

APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................. 275

Book references ....................................................................................................................................................275

APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................. 307

General Problem Solver-1 .....................................................................................................................................311
General Problem Solver-9 .....................................................................................................................................331
General Problem Solver-19 ...................................................................................................................................355
General Problem Solver-30 ...................................................................................................................................381

Appendix C ........................................................................................................................................................ 399

Analytic Items Version 2.0 Raw Score/Means, S.D. ..............................................................................................399
Spatial items version 2.0: Age and Education .......................................................................................................400

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Cog flex .................................................................................................................................................................402

Letter identification ..............................................................................................................................................404
Embedded designs ................................................................................................................................................406
Arithmetic Distraction ...........................................................................................................................................407
Memory ................................................................................................................................................................407

APPENDIX D............................................................................................................................. 408

Sample Sizes, Means and Standard deviations from selected studies 1977 to 2002. ..........................................408

APPENDIX E ............................................................................................................................. 417

Hierarchical Decision-Making Tree .......................................................................................................................417

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 Synopsis of the Book Entitled:

Problem Solving: The Integration of Personality,

Cognition, and Interest Subgroups around Verbal,
Numerical, and Spatial Problems using Machine Learning

Chapter 1

Synopsis: Introduction

In the book entitled, “Problem Solving: The Integration of Personality, Cognition and
Interests Subgroups around Verbal, Numerical, and Spatial Problems using Machine
Learning” twenty-seven chapters provide information about neural pathways,
subgroups, subgroup classification, and the problem-solving process involved in the
solution of numbers, words, and spatial activities. Many people and reviewers have
requested the information in a concise summary or as an overview. What follows is a
long Synopsis of some of the main points of the theory, and research in the book. To
condense 27 chapters (700 pages with data) into 190 pages is impossible, so the synopsis does not
answer all the questions of how personality, cognition, and interests are integrated around
different kinds of problems, but the synopsis provides insight. In the synopsis, the Tables,
Diagrams, and Pictures are labeled with the same numbers found in the book. At the end
of the Synopsis is the documentation of over 500 APA-style references. The references
for statements in the Synopsis are found in each Chapter of the book (not in the
synopsis!). The actual descriptions of the 36 problem-solving subgroups and the criteria
used for classification are found in another document entitled, “DeNovellis’ Descriptions
of 36 Problem Solving Subgroups.” Management Profiles are also found in a separate
document. We begin our synopsis with an introduction to the dynamics of solving
problems.

Dynamics of problem-solving:

The dynamics of problem-solving begin at or before birth and continue until the last breath;
therefore, the scope of this book covers all age groups from birth to senior citizens. Many of the
problem-solving trends are easier to understand from a developmental perspective as "The child’
is the 'father of the man." (Wordsworth, 1807).

Duncker (1945), Newell and Simon (1972), and Maier (1931) use different terminology to describe
a problem but the essence is the same. A problem has an initial state, a middle state, and an end
state; each state must be defined and extrapolated to understand the dynamics of the problem-
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solving process. According to Drucker (1945), what is meant by problem-solving? A problem is a

question to be answered; problem-solving is a process by which the answer is derived. A problem
can be viewed in many ways such as:

• A question---How can speed be defined in the universe?

• An obstacle or conflict--How can one travel from point “a” to point “b” without a source
of locomotion?
• A goal---How can I achieve my career ambitions?
• An inner energizing force-My curiosity stimulates me to find the answer to a situation.

Types of problems

The solving of complex problems differs according to type, characteristics, situational

circumstances, and the people who are solving them (Dostál, 2015). Problems can be simple,
complex, abstract, compound, or part of the total problem-solving process. Simple problems that
involve decision-making are the easiest to understand as most occur as part of everyday living.
The problem is “what clothes do I wear in the morning or how do I go from the house to the car.”
Compound problems are a little more complicated as they involve a series of many distinct kinds
of simple problems. For example, assume you were asked to fix a broken handle on a toilet. The
process could be involved, i.e., find the proper tools, remove the handle, find a proper handle,
and use tools to replace the handle on the toilet. What often seems like a simple problem becomes
compounded since each of the simple steps has another set of problems associated with it. Maybe
a person could not find the right handle for the toilet, or one found the handle, but the connection
was worn and the new one would not fit.

The problem-solving process is the methodology for finding a solution to a problem or a series of
problems. Therefore, the methodology representing a series of steps or different courses of action
(decision-making) becomes simple or complex, depending on the problem either tangible or
intangible.

Problems involving tangible objects are more concrete and specific while problems involving
intangible objects are generally more abstract. For example, try visualizing an abstract concept
such as mass, perhaps the 'mass' of a rock. The process is difficult without a definition or an
illustrative concept. Even if given a definition (i.e., mass is an integrated large body of matter
without a defined shape), the concept of mass might be too abstract to interpret or visualize.
Compare visualizing the ‘mass’ of rock to that of visualizing the rock itself. Which is easier?

As another example, consider the tangible problem-solving process of assembling a kite, i.e.,
using string to tie the wood frame and using paper to cover the frame. When assembling the kite,
the problem solver must understand the purpose of the string, paper, and wood frame. Although
the sequence of events used to assemble the kite might vary, a final solution in assembling the

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kite requires the paper to be attached to the wood frame. So, what kind of strategies are used in
assembling a kite?

There are multiple strategies but the two main ones are to read the directions or to use trial and
error. Reading the directions often leads to a simple logical solution that has been previously used
by others. However, the use of trial and error requires a different kind of thought process. Solving
problems by trial and error relies more upon experience and guesswork as well as divergent
and/or convergent thinking. The key point is that finding a solution via “reading the directions”
is more efficient, feasible, and dependent upon others who previously identified the steps in the
process.

Academic literature reviews of problem-solving often make distinctions between complex and
simple problem-solving as well as problem-solving results studied in laboratory situations vs.
those that are studied in situ. The reason for this distinction is easy to understand. Very defined
simple tasks in the laboratory or regulated experimental situations requiring reasoning and
inference are often highly correlated with intellectual ability. In contrast, complex problem-
solving tasks, such as those found in ill-defined, real-life situations are more likely to be related
to a host of factors such as previous experience, knowledge, expert performance, motivation,
interest, and the self-regulated disposition of the individual. In this book, the results from
laboratory experiments as well as real-life problem solving are examined. Both are important.

In the problem-solving process, both the characteristics and dynamics of the problem solver as
well as the characteristics of the problem are important. The experiences of the person which
contribute to understanding an abstract concept are as important as the problem itself. In the
journey to understand the concept of problem-solving, characteristics of the problem and the
problem solver are studied from many different perspectives, i.e., biological, environmental, social,
and psychological.

Limiting the problem-solving process

The easiest way to develop limits that can help in understanding the complexity of problem-
solving is to use categories and classification. We have chosen the following:

1) Categories of numbers include problems using numeric calculations as in arithmetic (1 +1

=2). Examples are simple arithmetic tests (adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing),
standardized achievement tests, academic tests involving numerical operations, and
numerical proficiency exams.

2) Word categories are defined as any problem which is comprised of letters (c, a, t). This
includes word comprehension tests, reading tests, standardized tests in comprehension,
reading, and literature as well as vocabulary proficiency tests.

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3) Spatial processing involves any objects that require spatial manipulation, spatial
visualization, and temporal-spatial dis-embedding. Examples include spatial tests, object
manipulation, perceptual speed processing, and activities that pose spatial problems.
Often spatial relations and spatial visualization are inclusive of spatial processing. This
also includes the use of tools or objects which might be mechanical or not.

4) Mixtures problems are obvious combinations of words, numbers, and spatial problems
that result in an outcome or performance (expert performance in music, chess, subject
matter domains, or areas such as performing a repair on a car).

By limiting the problem-solving process to these four categories, one can weave the study of
individual differences around the complexities of personality, interests, and cognition. IPS is a
descriptive system that allows us to separate people into subgroups and identify several types of
problem solvers. Taxonomic classification is used to separate groups of people much as the
biologist uses taxonomic classification to separate various kinds of species of trees in the
environment. Although each category appears independent, as noted above, the continuum of
abstractness to concrete contributes to interdependence. This property leads to the characterization
of our theory of problem-solving as integrated.

IPS three-tier model

Integrative Problems Solving (IPS) represents a three-tier model that explains the biological
processing underlying cognitive, emotional, and vocational decision-making as well as the
process of solving problems involving numbers, words, and spatial activities. The first tier, Tier
One of the models, explains the biological and cellular processes that utilize energy to develop
neurological pathways. The second tier, Tier Two of the model, addresses cognitive, interest, and
personality functions that mirror the underlying biological processes found in Tier One. The next
tier, Tier Three, illustrates the use of supra-ordinate constructs that mimic brain processing and
function. The latter set of constructs is exemplified by 8 measurement subscales which are labeled
as motor, conceptual, perceptual, analysis, social, control, flex, and extraversion/introversion. These eight
constructs, as well as cognition and interests, are used to describe and interpret 2 groups of
problem solvers—general and differential.

General problem solvers, as defined here, have higher scores on cognitive and non-cognitive
attributes; while differential problem solvers have higher scores on one or more of these skills,
usually those in which each person is skilled or interested. The experiences of general and
differential are similar in some ways and quite different in others. In many instances, the speed
of processing and the time needed to solve problems of general and differential problem solvers
is very different. Many differential problem solvers have slower processing speeds on verbal,

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numerical, and spatial skills in timed situations, but excel in an untimed situations where interests
and use of cognition are paramount.

Why are there three tiers in the cognitive and affective problem-solving model? All three tiers are
necessary to understand individual differences and problem-solving. Any model that attempts
to explain the complexity of relationships in human information processing, subgroups, neural
pathways and problem-solving must address the realities of things that cannot be seen, but which
influence the outcome of everyday and complex problem-solving.

The three tiers represent a medical model. In clinical medicine, diseases are diagnosed and
classified via observation, diagnostic tests, and the patient’s symptoms. Clinical actions occur at
Tier 3, the level of clinical practice. However, the result is dependent upon Tier Two, i.e., clinical
pathology, and Tier One, the mechanisms of anatomy, physiology, and descriptive research
compiled over centuries. In the same manner that clinical medicine is dependent upon tiers, the
three tiers of IPS contribute to understanding individual differences and solving problems.

In the early chapters of the book, neural pathways in Tier One are described in the language of
biology and genetics as one assumes that inhibition and facilitation in these pathways give rise
to individual differences in the solving of problems. Neural pathways are labeled as “top-down”
or “bottom-up” to identify differences in outcomes. Since people encode images, text, and
auditory forms in a different manner and at different speeds, these differences contribute to
individual differences in problem-solving and are the basis of our assumption that groups of
people are going to manifest differences in time constraints which are measurable.

In the second tier of the IPS, we address model pathways that are abstracted from brain functions.
In reference to our cognitive and affective problem-solving model, a simple pathway is labeled
as inputs-process-outputs. As an example, the sensory modes of feeling, smelling, taste, etc. are
‘inputs'; memory encoding is 'process'; and products such as written papers, lectures, and/ or
physical and mental actions are ‘outputs. The cognitive model in the second tier describes several
ways that cognitive processes such as divergent thinking, convergent thinking, analysis, and
synthesis are used to solve various kinds of verbal, numerical, and spatial problems.

The third tier shows how the measurement of the different constructs which overlay brain
functioning contributes to solutions of verbal, numerical, or spatial processing. The constructs
labeled as motor, conceptual, perceptual, etc. are based on item selections of children and adults as
well as their performance on distinct kinds of cognitive problems and tests. The preference and
performance patterns of adults and children identify a specific type of problem solver which
helps in classification and description and provides definitive separation of identifiable
subgroups that differ with age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and mental maturity.

As an example, in later chapters, we make statements based on our category system that a group
of people who are General Problem Solvers with a dominant mode of Conceptual and Analytic,
(GCA) is more likely to solve verbal, numerical, and spatial problems differently than people

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classified as Differential Problem solvers with a dominant mode of Motor, Social, and Flex.
(DMS-u). The basis of those statements is individual differences in biological functioning due to
encoding, language, symbolizations, energy, mental representations, and neural pathways. From
an academic point of view, the statements made in Tier Three might appear farfetched and
without a basis in research if the information could not be related to the underlying mechanisms
in Tier One and Tier Two.

Developmental exposure and experiences lead to individual differences and dominance in the
solving of diverse kinds of problems. Thus, the dominant attribute becomes important in the
individual’s approach to solving problems. Athletes excel at motor activities (coordination and
manual dexterity) while artists excel at perceptual (use of the eyes and perception to see shapes
and figures). Other people and professions are dominant in conceptual activities (use of the mind
to generate ideas). Some people are better at analysis (diagnostic ability, breaking things into
subunits)); while others understand the dynamics of people and social systems (social). Some
people excel at all types of problem-solving (General Integrated Problem Solvers) while many
individuals specialized in solving problems associated with their area of strengths and interests
(Differential problem-solvers). Regardless of the cognitive and affective traits and processes that
identify and define the individual and the subgroup, it is the combination of categories that help
in the separation and prognostication of individual difference in problem-solving.

The capacity to solve problems is much more than simple cognitive processing. Capability and
capacity are based on control of brain functions and emotions. However even control, by itself,
is insufficient. Control helps individuals to focus, to sharpen their minds, and to focus on a goal,
however, another separate mechanism is used simultaneously. This other control mechanism
which is necessary for solving problems, we denote as Flex. Flex is sometimes inversely related
to structure, control, and analysis and is the release mechanism needed to let the mind wander,
to be creative enough to generate alternatives needed to solve a problem. At the same time, Flex
represents an impulse that finds its origin in emotions. Flex is controlled or not controlled by
focused thought or thinking, a function learned through repetition and experience with objects
in the environment. Introversion and extraversion facilitate control and analytical functions as
energy is directed toward or away from objects in the environment. One group of neural
pathways controls emotions so that one can focus; while another group of neural pathways allows
the mind to diverge, think of alternatives, or respond impulsively to external stimuli. At times,
the scores on both mechanisms move inversely and at times each acts as an independent subscale!

Biomarkers, used to understand anatomical and physiological changes, can be mapped with new
medical techniques such as optogenetics. Optogenetics allows the mapping of circuitry in a
neuron or a group of neurons. In short, this technique uses light to control neurons that are
genetically altered to show light-sensitive ion channels. Neural networks can be investigated via
the introduction of proteins into the brains of mice. Since the proteins have been genetically
modified, scientists can turn on and turn off functions and examine the results. This leads to the
mapping of neural pathways for certain cognitive and affective responses. Techniques such as

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optogenetics allow scientists to manipulate neural circuits and understand explicit actions by
changing the membrane voltage potential of excitable cells.

Our thesis is explained in the first nine chapters of the book on problem-solving (Chapters 1-9).
In the middle chapters (10-18), we address how different age groups from young children,
adolescents, college students, adults, and managers have responded to instruments designed to
measure the theory. By following the developmental process, we demonstrate how the speed of
processing, memory, and individual differences result in the solution of diverse kinds of
numerical, word, and spatial problems. The last chapters (19-21) address the vocational problem-
solving of adults as well as the measurement problems involved in separating the averages of
problem-solving groups. We provide 5 reference chapters (22-26) at the end for those who have
little background in the areas and want additional reading.

Synopsis: Data representation of brain functions and processes

Integrative Problems Solving (IPS) is a basic explanatory system that is both data and theory-
oriented. The theory has its origin in data and description which illustrates the integrative nature
of how the structure and function of the brain’s anatomy and physiology act as a whole. This is
represented in the book in the form of pictures and tables. To understand the integrative process
and IPS theory, the data representation labeled below as Picture 1 shows a 2-dimensional non-
metric picture of how 20 variables representing the 4 groups of cognitions, speed of processing,
personality, and interests are integrated. In Picture 1, notice how general cognition (small area of
blue-C1-C2) and speed of processing (large area of blue S1-S4) is closer to the left of the plot while
personality (P1-P8) and career dimensions (CR1-CR6) are around the perimeters of the picture.

Picture 1: Personality, cognition, speed, and interests

Personality (P1-P8), general cognition (C1-C2; small blue),

career and interests (CR1-CR6) as well as Speed of Processing (S1-S4; large blue)

Using non-metric distance measures, cognition and speed seemed to be embedded in and around
measures of personality and interests. The non-metric picture shows how each of the elements

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is related to each other by a distance. Distance measurement assumes that attributes (personality
and cognition) which have close proximity in distance are similar. In each of the Chapters in the
book, the integrative nature of how these 4 groups influence the approach to solving problems of
numbers, words, and spatial activities are explained in detail, but first, let’s try to summarize
pictorially how subgroups are displayed as integrative and competitive.

Using the statistical methodology of canonical correspondence analysis, the next picture shows
how, in our model, subgroups exist within subgroups. In our integrative system, pairs of
subscales and model characteristics work in opposition and conjunction with one another
(extroversion, introversion, perceptual accuracy and global processing, conceptual and motor,
analysis and social, flex and control).

The scores for the picture come from the standard scores derived from the Table of 36 subgroups.
The Table contains columns across the top such as Extroversion, Conceptual, Motor, Analytic and
Social. Each column is converted to a word designation where a high standard score on analysis
is termed Analytic, a low score is termed Social, and an intermediate standard score (48-54) is
designated as Analytic Social. These measurement profile subgroups are displayed on a two-
dimensional graph as A; S; or AS. In the picture, those higher in the use of analytical thought (A)
are in the upper left quadrant, those dominant in social (S) are in the upper right, and those
sharing in the lower left quadrant (AS). In essence, the table represents three distinct
measurement subgroups. The subgroup of people who have a dominant characteristic of
Analysis when solving problems is different and separate from the subgroup of people who
approach the solving of problems in a social manner. Likewise, there is even a third subgroup of
people who are mixtures of both approaches. If neurological pathways of the brain work both in
opposition and similarity due to differences in stored memory, then these competitive differences
should be evident in dominant approaches to solving a problem.

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Picture 2: Integration subgroups within subgroups

Integrative Nature of Subgroups: Analytic (A), Social (S), and Analytic Social (AS)

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Chapter 2

Synopsis: IPS theory

IPS is both a data-oriented and theory-oriented construction. The theory is elaborated below,
while the data is elaborated in Tier two and Tier three. IPS theory provides the foundations for
understanding how environmental match or mismatch occurs during the early years of
development and contributes to solving problems academically and in everyday life. The
problem-solving process begins at birth and continues through many different cognitive and
affective phases of life. Consistency, adaptations, and change lead to many modifications of the
conscious, subconscious, unconscious, and neural pathways. From the moment of birth,
individuals filter information from the environment, determining whether the press from objects
or people provides harmony or consternation.

Layers, which are just neurological pathways that either facilitate or hinder information along
nerve fibers, provide the basis for filtering in the conscious, subconscious, and conscious. A small
number of layers contribute to problem-solving, while a large number of layers inhibit or delay
problem-solving. Complex layers are formed when emotions and affective feelings are so
constant as to inhibit or interfere with everyday problem-solving. Layers are formed when there
is a mismatch in the environment, either in terms of the child’s or adult’s intentions. Complex
layers result in neurons or brain networks holding conflicting feelings, emotions, and
information.

Surface characteristics or how one appears to others are the direct result of the complexity of
layers. When people approach everyday and academic problems, their method, style, or habit
patterns are usually subconscious based on autonomous actions learned from previous
encounters. These habit patterns affect the surface characteristics of the individual and result in
response patterns that form the basis of how subgroups solve problems.

There are many ways to illustrate the IPS theory and its usefulness in solving problems. However,
the process can be complicated and technical so one simple method of conveying the essence of
the theory is in the following statement. How one acts, how one thinks, and the individual’s everyday
interests influence how problems involving words, numbers, symbols, and combinations thereof are solved.
The statement is quite straightforward; however, the application requires limits and
qualifications as exemplified by the conscious and unconscious mechanisms of the brain.

Conscious, unconscious, and subconscious pathways

The conscious, unconscious, and subconscious pathways in the brain are active, constant
participants in the solving of problems. Many problems are solved as part of everyday living,
while other problems are solved via abstract and academic thinking. The conscious mind has
neural pathways directly connected to the cerebral cortex and its auxiliary areas, while the

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subconscious mind is part of the autonomic nervous system. Both conscious and subconscious
neural pathways differ from what is called the “unconscious.” The unconscious, as defined by a
psychologist, exists as thoughts that are not part of the conscious thinking process but are
represented as repressed ideas and feelings. The unconscious exists, in part, as representations
from either short-term or long-term memory storage which have not been recently acted upon.

Environmental press

“Environmental press” is an expression used to denote the pressures of stress exerted in the lives
of children and adults as they mature. An environment that produces constant stress inhibits the
solving of everyday problems while environmental press that is facilitative in problem-solving
leads to feelings of safety, well-being, and security. Security for the newborn child is based on
consistencies, a response to the changing press of the environment. Consistency, especially in the
early years, is the routine of everyday life so expectations and trust for the caregivers are strongly
developed. Consistencies are learned from everyday activities where there is freedom from
constant threats and mental stress. Consistencies are the forerunner of control and structure in
personality as the child learns how to act and react to changing situations. However,
consistencies must be balanced by adaptability, and the ability to learn quickly how to change
and survive, not just by the child, but also by the caregiver. Adaptability allows the individual
to make better decisions as problem situations constantly change. Adaptability is also a
modification to escape from threats, mental stress, or environmental impositions. Modifications
emanate from the lack of consistency or pressures of stress in the environment.

Modifications

Modifications in behavior and approach are important in everyday problem solving as some
changes are adaptive or while many others are not. Modification is any change in behavior, ideas,
and thoughts which occur because of pressures exerted by significant others in the environment.
Modifications can be adaptive, harmless, or occasionally destructive. Changes in behavior and
thought which are not adaptive can result in resistance, obstruction, and sometimes negativity.

Modifications take place as the parents or caregivers provide a ‘learning and living environment’;
a place for the child to interact and change. Modification occurs when the environmental press is
greater than the intentionality exhibited by the child. That is, the child can intentionally react to
the outer world. When the child exerts his or her ideas, thoughts, and energy on the problem-
solving situation, the child exerts intentionality. Intentionality encompasses any form of emotion,
cognitive thought, or interest. If intentionality is greater than the environmental press, the child
has more control of the situation or problem-solving process while the converse is true. In many
instances, parenting is a process of handling the growth of children as they pass through various
developmental stages associated with intentionality.

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Filters

Filters are the result of attention directed toward objects during the problem-solving process. At
any given moment in life, sensory information from TV, radio, light, and people bombard the
individual. The subconscious works overtime to filter all kinds of information, especially
information temporarily stored before it is repressed or brought to conscious awareness.
Blindsight is the term documented by Lawrence Keiskrantz, a British psychologist. His work
reported how people can report details about events occurring around them, even events that are
not part of conscious awareness. Studies, such as his and others in neuroscience, have noted how
conscious awareness constitutes only a fraction of information modeled in the brain.

During problem-solving situations, attention is directed toward the salient characteristics of the
problem. Attention and filters either keep one on task or result in a diffuse focus. A diffuse focus
that comes from holding multiple images, sounds, and feelings acting simultaneously usually
confuses those who are very young.

Layers and surface characteristics

In IPS theory, layers result in a slowing of decision-making and are detrimental to the problem-
solving process. Layers in the child occur when the inclinations of the child are contrary or
opposite to the inclinations, control requirements, and values of the adult, environment, or family
in which one lives. Layers (as a result of modification or changes) are part of growing neurological
shells in either the parent or the child. Layers, physiologically, are just neurological fibers,
networks, and tracts that have emotions of pain, suffering, and abuse stored in long-term
memory.

Surface characteristics are directly affected by the size of the developed layers. Layers continue
to form as conflicting information about joy, sadness, and pain are stored in memories in various
places in the brain. Cognitive dissonance comes via the conflict in information about the pain.
Shells or layers influence the ability or inability to solve problems. An association from an
episode of pain causes emotional reactions that can completely interfere with cognition, thereby,
stirring some rational and other times irrational actions. What one sees is not what one necessarily
gets!

Surface characteristics are especially important when trying to classify individuals or their
behaviors. Surface characteristics are likely to represent true feelings, behaviors, and thoughts
when layers are thin and pliable. As the depth of the layer increases, surface characteristics are
false representations of thoughts and ideas which cause misclassification, and misrepresentation.
That is, thick layers or complex and multiple neurological pathways filtered through distinct
parts of the brain may produce responses that are not representative of the individual’s true
feelings, ideas, or thoughts.

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Brain networks

Many experiences in life are the result of the application and solution of problems encountered
either as part of the work experience or in daily living. Our thesis and theory are applied in real-
life situations by information from multiple concepts about our brain networks. These neural
networks help to clarify the problem-solving process through quantification and classification
based on our measuring instruments. Each of these constructs from brain activity is integrated
around cognitive, personality, and interest patterns which help clarify the complexity of problem-
solving as one encounters different numeric, verbal, or spatial puzzles. Similar to brain function,
the key to solving problems is that learning and adaptive changes occur constantly over a lifetime. Just as
the brain undergoes adaptive changes so does a person’s approach to problems. Each person’s experiences
hone skills in solving both general and specialized problems that lead to many individual career
paths.

The brain has many diverse kinds of networks that function simultaneously in different brain
regions. In later chapters, there are explanations of how regions and structural anatomy of the
brain work in competition with each other. This unique ability of homo sapiens give rise to
competition from functions exhibited by flex and control, from thinking and feeling, and from
sensory-motor to conceptual processing. These checks and balances provide a realistic
explanation of how differences occur in energy flow throughout the body. Energy flow is the
process by which internal thoughts move from the brain to the outside environment or continue
to be processed repeatedly in the brain. Energy flow gives rise to personality characteristics such
as introversion and extraversion.

Use of a taxonomy

Generally, individual differences which arise from similar genetic and cultural environments are
better understood by using a taxonomy. It is almost impossible to categorize any single individual
as individuals change and adapt so rapidly. However, by grouping individuals into a subgroup,
then one can better understand the single case, the person. This occurs by comparing and
contrasting how the person differs from an idealized subgroup. Let’s repeat that axiom since it
is so important. Accurate predictions of problem-solving behaviors cannot be made, especially
where actions, thoughts, ideas, and values of a person change quickly in daily activities.
However, one can define, a prior, differences in approach to problems by various groups and
then compare how each person differs from the nearest “ideal” cognitive, personality, and
interest pattern exemplified by that subgroup during the problem-solving process. This ideal
group is usually defined as a reference group. The term, reference group, is widely used in
research when a group of people defined by specific criteria tends to act in similar ways.

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Chapter 3

Synopsis: Definable characteristics of the IPS system

Our quest for understanding is inherent in the Integrative Problem-Solving System (IPS). The
working model has different components and parts similar to a model train which has an engine
with different kinds of railroad cars. Each component has a different name and contributes to the
total understanding of the IPS system. The foundation of the problem-solving process is based
on categories. Categories signify the broad thinking constructs which integrate the overall
manner in which people approach problems. Categories are interwoven with smaller building
blocks called elements. Elements are interests, thinking mechanisms, and emotions designated
by labels from instruments such as career and interest, personal style, speed of processing, and
cognition. Elements are generated from the daily experiences of people from childhood to
adulthood. Each daily experience influences a person's perceptual process; that is, how each
person sees the world around him or herself. Ultimately, the cumulative effect of these daily
experiences is the ability to solve problems which leads to a strong career and vocational path.

Defining environments

Basically, there are two environments emphasized throughout this book: traditional and non-
traditional. A traditional environment encompasses the events associated with school and
classroom-based learning, while a non-traditional environment encompasses learning which
takes place outside of schools and classrooms. Traditional environments, as currently taught in
American schools, have learning outcomes or skills which are unipolar-right and wrong.
Learning in traditional environments is measured by achievement and power tests in school-
based situations.

School-based learning occurring in a traditional environment is often domain-specific as the

problems and knowledge are organized structurally and sometimes hierarchically in books. For
example, the knowledge of mathematics is organized by books on general mathematics, algebra,
trigonometry, and calculus, while the knowledge of history is found in books entitled “American
history”, “World History, European History, etc.” School-based learning is often domain-specific
and hierarchical in the sense that knowledge found in one course is the foundation for knowledge
in another course. Likewise, traditional classroom environments emphasize verbal, numerical,
and spatial problems and solutions.

A non-traditional learning environment is an experience that is outside the formality of

traditional school-based learning. This includes problems found in the shop and homemaking
classrooms, as well as non-classroom settings such as a church, home, and daily living. This book
is based on the assumption that developmental learning and experiences take place “inside” and
“outside” the classroom.

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The three-tiered model used to explain problem-solving is all-encompassing as it gives credence

to learning and problem-solving in traditional and non-traditional environments. Non-traditional
learning environments have a powerful effect on the individual and subgroup. Non-traditional
environments provide the skills of problem-solving for both the general and differential problem
solver. Learning at home before entering the classroom for the first time has the greatest effect as
it sets the foundation for lifetime learning. Classroom learning, or a traditional environment, also
has a powerful influence as it provides the basis for organized knowledge and further education.

Defining speed of processing

Speed of processing is a psychological construct that has been studied for over a hundred years.
In physiology, the speed of processing is a form of electrochemical activity, which flows along
neural pathways and becomes the basis of mental speed. In a narrow and reductionist context,
the speed of processing is heralded as a major contributor to individual differences. In fact, the
dictum, whether true or not, is that intelligent people process alternatives faster which contributes
to the process of solving problems quicker and more efficiently. The reason for these statements
is based on many academic reviews of research literature (See Appendix A for a literature
review).

In IPS theory, brain processing speed, either fast or slow, contributes to the processing of multiple
alternatives in the solution of problems. Our construct of the general problem solver is based on
those who process well-defined numerical, verbal, and spatial problems faster and more
efficiently. Speed of processing (S1-S4) is defined by four diverse kinds of data assessments: In
the research literature, these assessments are called elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs) because
they involve a measurement speed factor as well as low task complexity (Low “g” scale of 1-2).

Figural Flexibility (S1-CF); Scanning a field of curved and straight lines from an exemplar.
Letter identification (S2- LD); Picking out a specific letter such as an ‘x’ or ‘e’ from a crowded field
of many lines of random letters (measures the discrimination of letters).
Embedded Designs (S3- EB) Having the individual circle an embedded figure in a group of
embedded designs (measures dis-embedding of the part from the whole).
Arithmetic distraction tests (S4-AD). Performing a simple arithmetic operation such as adding (1 +
5 -2) in a distracted field.

Data has also been collected using a 2-minute memory test (M1-M2) to assess the ability of young
children to hold letters and symbols in short-term memory.

Defining other cognitive outcomes

In our model, the outcome of solving problems is skill-based where a skill may be either unitary
or part of a set of skills. The skill might be a special talent or a special ability but, in most cases,
the skill comes from repeated skill-building, exposure, and practice developed over time from
birth. Skills result in mastery which increases self-efficacy and self-confidence. Skills can be

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academic, motor, physical, or combinations thereof. An example of an academic skill is solving a

mathematical equation, authoring a paper, or developing a project. A motor skill might be
throwing a football, performing a floor gymnastic exercise, or painting a picture. Emotional and
cognitive energy is transformed into focused energy as the person is rewarded or not rewarded
for a particular skill set.

The most prolific theorists in the areas of cognition are Carroll (1993), Horn (1965), Vernon (1950),
and Cattell (1971/1987). From a measurement standpoint, most theorists denote general ability
(“g”) as a major factor followed by broad groups of second and third levels.

Carroll’s explanatory model has wide acceptance. Carroll’s intelligence model incorporates two
concepts originally coined by Raymond Cattell called fluid intelligence and crystalline
intelligence. Fluid intelligence is composed of sequential reasoning and inductive reasoning,
while crystalline intelligence includes verbal and reading comprehension. Another factor of
Carroll’s is knowledge and achievement which incorporates general school achievement as well
as verbal information and knowledge. Perceptual speed memory and mental reasoning are also
separate factors. Finally, there are two closely related vectors named visual perception and
closure.

If “g” is a part of problem-solving, then data collected over many different age groups should
suggest the “how” and “why”. In IPS theory, two different kinds of assessments, logical
analysis, and spatial reasoning are used with achievement tests and teacher observations to assess
skill development.

Logical analysis (C1-Pslap): A series of 6 analogies and 6 sequence problems that

are untimed. Measures logical thinking (Examples in Chapter 20). Average “g”
with a rank order of 6-7 on a 10-point scale.
Spatial analysis (C2-Pssp): A series of 5 pictures of blocks arranged in various
spatial configurations and 3 drawings that require perceptual and spatial
reasoning. (Examples in Chapter 20; Average “g” with a rank order of 6 on a 10-
point scale)

When teacher observations are combined with cognitive assessment and achievement tests, the
results help define the limits of early problem-solving skills (ages 7-11). As noted throughout this
synopsis, early problem-solving skills are the foundation of later problem-solving skills and in
some instances, define the major differences between older general and differential problem
solvers in the solution of verbal, spatial, and number problems.

In the early developmental periods of life, skills are developed in the home, church, or areas of
exposure such as pre-school. Later, schools use standardized tests that represent one
measurement of skill development in academic subjects such as English, math, and science.
However, many other types of artistic and manual skills are developed in music, art, and
vocational classes or out-of-school experience. To define categories for taxonomic purposes, all

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types of problem-solving outcomes must be used and related to the elements (personality,
interests, and cognitive processes). IPS theory suggests ways that elements become variables that
define skill-based outcomes. Later in the book, many distinct types of problem-solving outcomes
related to the speed of processing and standardized testing are examined.

Defining preferences

So, what are preferences? Preferences are conceived as how individual emotional and cognitive
differences (hence energy) are accentuated in the environment. Preferences come from individual
choice and experience in the selection of activities in the environment. For example, a child who
prefers to spend most of his or her time outside running, jumping, and engaging in play activities
has different preferences than a child who prefers to spend most of his or her time inside reading
books. Likewise, a parent who prefers not to have their children outside in uncontrolled
situations presents a different environmental press, and therefore a different modification of their
children's behavioral patterns than a parent who prefers to let their children play in uncontrolled
situations. Each different parenting activity contributes to and interacts with a child’s preference
pattern.

Preferences incorporate both interests and values and are reflections of personality and cognition.
Often time what the child or adult prefers to do (their interests) also determines or reflects what
each person values. If one spends a lot of time playing chess, then presumably one is interested
in the cognitive activity and enjoyment of various strategies, and competition. Likewise, if one
spends a lot of time in church-related activities, this reflects values related to religion. Thus,
preferences help to define the temporary or core level of interest or values that a person holds.

However, as is expected, core levels of interests and values are difficult to uncover. The use of
items on objective tests as well as personality and interest questionnaires are methods of defining
preferences. Item preferences by the individual are unidirectional and unipolar for cognitive
power tests, while non-cognitive items reflect bipolar scales and sometimes multi-directional
orientations. Inherent in the choice of items is the assumption that if a person selects one
preference over another then this reflects one’s values, ideas, personality, or modes of thinking.

Defining categories of problem solving and personality

In the IPS model of identifying dissimilar categories of problem-solving behaviors, there are 10
personality and cognitive scales of measurement known as perceptual, conceptual, analytic,
social, motor, control, flex, extraversion /introversion, general and differential. Simple
definitions and labels for each of the scales are presented here, while other chapters explain
the constructs in detail.

Perceptual(P1-P): Use of the perceptual senses (eyes, nose, hearing, smell, touch) to perceive
changes in shapes, figures, objects, and people.
Conceptual(P2-Cn): Use of memory and cognition to associate and generate concepts.

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Motor (P3-M): Reliance on physical and motor coordination, and manual dexterity to solve
problems.
Analysis (P4-A): Diagnosis and analysis are used to understand and dissect problems.
Social (P5-S): Understanding of the problems inherent in the dynamics of people and social
systems.
Control/Structure (P6-Cont): Planning and structuring the environment, helps individuals to
attend, sharpen their minds and focus on a goal involved in solving problems.
Flex(P7): Determining an unconscious release mechanism; sensitive to impulse and idea
generation
Extraversion (P8-EN): Flow of mental and emotional energy from the individual to people and
objects.
Generally integrated problem solver (G): Solves abstract numbers, word, and spatial problems
quickly and easily.
Differential problem solver (D): Solves practical, abstract, theoretical, and ill-defined problems
associated with their area of strengths and interests.

These scales, which are augmented by cognitive and non-cognitive assessments, illuminate
developmental differences which are evident at an early age and have implications for solving
problems. Some scales are extended; others are simple, primary subscales.

In our theory, a measurement scale represents a category related to the problem-solving

process. For example, the measurement scale called a general problem solver represents a group
of people who are better at solving different kinds of general problems, while the measurement
scale of a differential problem solver represents a group of people who solve very specific kinds
of problems better. The measurement subscale of introversion and extraversion are simply
personality elements that push energy flow either inward or outward. When energy (internal
thoughts, emotional energy) moves inward, introversion results. When energy (internal thoughts
emotional energy) moves outward, extraversion results. When energy moves sometimes inward,
and sometimes outward, this results in ambiversion. During the problem-solving process, energy
flow is dependent upon many practical factors such as differences in situations, kinds of
problems, and the influence of the environmental press.

Defining career and vocational preferences

In 1986, we developed two separate career instruments (Career and Interests Inventory, and
Vocational Inventory) using Holland’s RIASEC categories. Each instrument was validated by
comparing the subscales against samples of items from COPS (Knapp et al.,1974) Strong (Strong,
1994), and Holland’s (Holland,1965). These instruments were tested at the Career Center at Cal
Poly, Pomona from 1986-1992. The career instruments had 11 subscales of which 6 were similar
to Holland’s. For convenience and ease of understanding in reading this book, the subscales are labeled
with a well-known RIASEC acronym. This is to provide a comparative basis for those who do
research. The career and interest instruments have 232 preference statements about problem-

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solving in different vocational activities. The definition of these scales is similar to Holland’s
classification but has different items than Holland’s instruments.

Realistic (R-CR1): Prefers applying knowledge and emotional interactions to objects in the
environment. Objects can be machinery, pots & pans, kitchen utensils, toys, trees, tools, or
anything living or non-living
Investigative (I-CR2): Prefers to find out how things work and what they are made of. Likes to
trace lines of thought, patterns of objects, and basic assumptions of what makes an object work.
Artistic (A-CR3): Prefers creative, divergent thinker, enjoys using the mind and hands in crafts, or
the Arts.
Social (S-CR4): Prefers to engage objects and work which has social value; helps another or has
altruistic aims.
Enterprising(E-CR5): Likes thing which involves business, trade, or influencing others in business
transactions
Conventional (C-CR6): Prefers jobs or vocations which are characterized by internal structure and
order. Work such as accounting or clerical.

Other subscales (CR7-CR11)- An additional 5 career problem-solving subscales which are

referenced in this book were also developed. These 5 subscales are used for classification. The
additional subscales are integrated with the six subscales of Holland -referenced here (again:
different items, different subscales than those of Holland but similar in orientation).

An integrative model

Our integrative model for problem-solving suggests that components of “g” are intertwined with
emotions, memory, and constant environmental actions in an interactive process. This produces
a cognitive and affective model that is fluid and changing as people interact with and solve
diverse kinds of words, numbers, and spatial problems. These interactive elements can be
modeled in many different ways. There is no doubt that some individuals who are measured
with the Wechsler scales, Raven matrices, or their equivalents have higher scores than others on
both cumulative and subset scores (general problem-solvers). Whether those individuals are
better at all diverse kinds of problem-solving is a different issue.

The outcomes of the integrative model, which is displayed next, suggest that abstract and
practical problem-solving can take many different forms. The fact that many of life’s problems
are on a continuum from very defined to ill-defined suggests that instruments such as the
Wechsler’s may not have the capability to adequately distinguish groups of people who can solve
some groups of ill-defined problems, particularly those which are social and cultural. However,
these problem-solving capabilities can be defined by many different instruments measuring a
variety of personalities, interests, and cognitive abilities. The model infers how and where
differential problem-solvers make contributions to society in many different areas. These
contributions are found under the categories of learning, knowledge, achievement, and

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crystalline intelligence. Using Carroll’s seven categories defined later, our integrated model
might be displayed as follows:

Figure 1: An integrated model

Math Reasoning
Arithmetic

Fluid Intelligence (Gf)

Logical Analysis
Visual Perception Closure
Spatial Embedded Designs

Perceptual Speed
Speed of Processing/Letter Identification/Cogflex

Problem Solving
Learning
Memory

Knowledge and Achievement

Problem solutions, Achievement Motivation,
Knowledge of Behavioral Control (Control/Analysis/Social etc.)
Knowledge exemplified from learned Interests
Ideational Fluency
Divergent thinking/Conceptual
Flex

Crystallized intelligence (Gc)

Reading Comprehension
Communication/Listening

Problem Solving Model: Integrating Speed, Personality, Cognition and Interests based on the
model by Carroll (1993)

Notice that knowledge of Behavioral Control is categorized under Knowledge of Achievement.

In our theory, this is also where constructs related to interests are located.

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Synopsis: Top-down and bottom-up processing

What happens when affect is combined with cognition during problem-solving? To answer that
question requires some insight from a recent study by a group of neuroscientists. Kosslyn et al.
(2009) have identified two general levels of brain functioning called top-down and bottom-up
processing. Kosslyn’s group based their assumptions on Miskin and Ungerliger’s 1982 study with
Rhesus monkeys. This study surgically removed parts of the brains of the monkeys who were
taught two different kinds of tasks. One task required learning shapes while the other required
learning location (spatial). When the bottom part of the brain of a monkey was removed, the
animal lost the ability to identify shapes (objects) but still could perform tasks or relearn the tasks
which required knowledge of location (spatial). Likewise, the removal of the top part of the
monkey’s brain resulted in the inability to relearn tasks requiring knowledge of the location, but
the monkeys could do tasks requiring knowledge of shape (objects).

In another experiment, the researchers were able to monitor individual neurons. Neurons in the
top part of the brain were activated in decisions about the location (spatial), and neurons in the
bottom part of the brain were activated in decisions about shape (objects). Spatial vision is part of
the top-down system while object memory is part of the bottom-up system.

Information from many later research studies (Wilson et al., 1993) now has documented, in
general, how the two systems, top-down and bottom-up, coordinate and work together. The top
brain is dorsal from the temporal and occipital pathways while the bottom brain is ventral via
lower temporal and occipital pathways. Information flows from the bottom to the top and vice
versa. For example, information coming via motor and sensory is organized, compared to the
object in short-term or long-term memory, and then classified and interpreted. Information coming
via the temporal and occipital pathways may go to the frontal lobe. With this latest information,
many studies suggest that the top brain and bottom brain provide feedback loops from the
environment about the correctness of a problem solution. New information constantly shapes
and modifies current thoughts and ideas.

Top-down processing, when juxtaposed and interacting with the affective system, results in
global cognitive processing, such as metacognition, component self-regulation, and active meta-
components. Meta-components are supra structure, such as planning, and forethought. Top-
down processing, when combined with environment feedback systems, affects one’s feelings
(affective system). Thus, the two systems (top-down and affective) acting simultaneously result
in global processing, which is more ideational, and intuitive. When emotions or feelings are
blocked, or held at a low level, then cognitive systems may rely more on logical thought.
Repressed feelings and emotions may lead to cold hard logic or then again repressed feelings
may also lead to a complete lack of logical thought.

Being in a happier mood may make a person less attuned to negative threats in the environment.
Therefore, in less stressful problem situations, individuals usually rely on subconscious
automated response mechanisms to obtain their goals. The top-down system can bypass the data-

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driven detailed oriented bottom system and use a simple heuristic (rule of thumb) to meet current
goals. This happens frequently to the individual who is an image or pattern processor as is
described in a later section and our 36 subgroups. Being positive, and less attuned to the
problems of the outer world, the pattern processor skips over details of their immediate
environment as is evident in their global speech and writing. This pattern is also particularly
evident in aging senior citizens whose speech and verbal processing become more nondescript
or in individuals whose culture does not allow detailed knowledge of nouns, verbs, or adjectives.
“Get that thing over there for me, will you?”

Anxiety, an affective response, can keep the data-driven bottom-up system from finding an
inferential principle to help in any given situation. Even though the two systems work in a
coordinated manner, the top-down system can dominate or interfere with the bottom-up system
under certain situations (euphoria, distress, anxiety-driven, morose, sadness (Schwartz, 2002). Of
course, the reciprocal is true.

Dorsal and ventral processing in the brain leads to cognitive differences which may be either
temporal or more permanent. Dorsal processing (top-down) moves via the occipital lobes, across
parietal to dorsal lateral rostral prefrontal while ventral processing moves via occipital-temporal
to rostral prefrontal. Ventral processing (bottom-up) is more sensory (area 17, occipital) motor
which results in the categorization of objects (verbal, numerical) while dorsal processing is more
visual-spatial (parietal) and determines the location of objects. Both systems interact
continuously, but a preference for either the use of bottom-up or top-down is developed in some
people based on experience and habitual use. For people who do not develop a clear preference
of use, there is not a distinct measurement difference, but the assumption is that both top-down
and bottom-up processing is used.

The concepts of top-down and bottom-up processing are useful for identifying trends in patterns
of vocational decision-making, thinking, and social concern. Social concern is a mixture of
feelings, moods, and affective states. Because thinking and feeling are affected by the complexity
of problems found in the environment, mood and temperament differences generated by the
stimuli in the environment affect problem-solving situations. When under pressure (threat or
negative mood producing) from the environment, problem solvers use more of a data-driven,
bottom-up information processing strategy generating more attention to detail. Other groups of
problem solvers, especially under non-threat conditions, depend more on a top-down strategy
which can be more heuristic, less attentive to detail, and considered global. Both top-down and
bottom-up systems are interactive, multi-directional, and useful for solving diverse kinds of
number, word, and spatial problems.

Model concept

The underlying concept of this work is based on the notion that the present stage of research has
established at least 5 foundational areas based on the work of Costa and McCrae (1995) as well as
others. Integrating cognition and career with personality to obtain more precise measurements of

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subgroups in the world of problem-solving can provide a fresh look and a different perspective
to existing areas of research.

Synopsis: 36 Subgroups

The use of 8 conceptual terms related to personality and cognition along with questionnaires
about interests helps define two groups of problem solvers (general and differential) whose
problem-solving capacities differ especially under timed conditions when solving verbal,
numerical, and spatial problems. These same concepts along with performance measures on
different cognitive tests and vocational interest questionnaires define the 36 subgroups. The 36
subgroups are listed in Appendix B of the book by the same name as the synopsis. The 36
subgroups represent “ideal composites,” a taxonomic classification based on the Category
Framework for describing people. An “ideal composite” does not represent or describe any single
individual. An ideal composite is the result of a classification system used like other classification
systems developed by biologists. Mathematically, an ideal composite score comes from a
reference vector that allows a comparison of a person’s profile score to a group profile score.

As an analogy, an “Ideal Composite” should be thought of as a class of objects such as trees. There
are many distinct types of trees: oak trees, maple trees, redwood trees, etc. The general concept
of a tree is neither unique nor specific. By adding a label, the general category becomes more
specific. Therefore, the category designated as oak trees is more specific than the general
classification tree. An oak tree found in one’s yard has even greater specificity as it can be
touched, located, and examined as a real entity. Ideal composites, as subgroups, have greater
specificity than comparisons made by broad group measurements, such as those typically
compared by statistics using mean, median, and mode.

How does one define and build a descriptive subgroup? First, determine a person’s score on
cognitive and non-cognitive assessments. Different kinds of items, preferences, and academic
tests assess verbal, numerical, and spatial cognitive as well as non-cognitive skills. The
combination of scores from personality, interests, and cognitive items is used to categorize
children and adults into major groups and then subgroups. Individuals who score higher in all
areas (personality, interests, cognition) are categorized as general problem-solvers while those
who score higher in just some of the areas are classified as differential problem-solvers. Using
various subscales, identify a subgroup pattern. The subgroup pattern comes from the
deconstruction of the intercorrelations of the 20 variables identified by the different measuring
instruments and the individual’s responses to those instruments. After the subgroup pattern is
identified, write descriptive statements that characterize how the subgroup responds to different
preference statements. That is if 67 percent of the subgroup indicated that they prefer theory over
facts or vice versa then place the percentage in parenthesis. Likewise, if there is a sufficient
correlation of the subgroup subscale with another test indicating low anxiety then write the
description as part of the profile. An example of a subgroup is written in the Appendix of the
Synopsis while the book “DeNovellis 36 Subgroups” contains all 36 subgroups defined for

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general and differential problem solvers. Other descriptions of specific groups such as managers,
teachers, or children’s learning styles are associated with their specific instruments.

Picture 3 below shows how the 36 different subgroups (1 through 36) are distributed by
multidimensional (MDS) distance measures based on their standard scores. The objective is to
Picture 3: Subgroups

2-Dimensional Picture of the Distribution of

Subgroups by Non-Metric Distance

get as much separation as possible between each subgroup and group each unit by common
characteristics. As an example, subgroups 1 and 4 are close; the profile scores differ in only a few
areas. The various Chapters help clarify the meaning of the numbers in the picture as well as the
subgroups.

How do we use a person’s response pattern in classification? The scores of any new person are
compared to the nearest subgroup pattern with the assumption of likeness in groups. However,
as expected, it is difficult to classify subgroups or individuals when surface characteristics are not
congruent with true underlying feelings, thoughts, and ideas. Or when an individual purposely
falsifies a response. In such cases, the individual vigorously objects stating that the descriptive
subgroup has no relation to his or her person. True enough!!

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Chapter 4

Synopsis: History of problem-solving

The study of problem-solving has a long and varied history. At the heart of the journey is the
quest for survival. This synopsis provides a sociological, psychological, and historical review of
the myriad obstacles to understanding the research associated with the problem-solving process.

To the best of our present knowledge, the generic problem-solving process extends back to the
beginning of civilizations. In contrast, the domain-specific reviews of problem-solving are
identified under the separate nomenclature related to each category of problems, i.e., verbal,
spatial, and numerical. Domain-specific refers to a particular area of expertise, i.e. knowledge
about the brain; while generic refers to general knowledge such as knowledge about history,
literature, or the world. Furthermore, information about verbal, numerical, and spatial
problems is found under diverse topics such as text comprehension, spatial visualization,
mathematical understanding, and ability. Has the bridge between knowledge of the brain and
the solving of verbal, numerical, and spatial problems narrowed the gap, so issues related to
solving diverse kinds of problems are more easily understood? A historical review provides some
insight.

Historical view

Problem-solving has been a part of our history as long as people faced the everyday problems of
living and survival. According to geological evidence, fossils, and other artifacts, early Homo
neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens faced extinction many times. Neanderthals (Homo
neanderthalensis) lived 100,000-200,000 years ago. This seems like a long time ago, until one
contrast that date to the day of the dinosaurs who lived 65 to 100 million years in the past.

Today, modern people differ in DNA in only 1 to 4 percent of segments from the DNA found in
Neanderthals (Prüfer et al., 2014). Uncontrollable weather, harsh living conditions, and disease
influenced many historic problematic situations. The average lifetime of the Neanderthals was
about 30 years. Survival was based on adaptation as well as finding solutions to the problems of
everyday living, i.e., gathering food, finding shelter, and avoiding danger.

The early cave dwellers of 40,000 years ago, and social workers today find commonality in
solutions to well-defined and ill-defined problems (Brabeck, et al., 1990). Well-defined problems,
such as getting dressed in the morning, have a boundary--a way of determining if the goal is met.
Ill-defined problems, such as those involving changes in the weather, have either no boundaries
or boundaries which are constantly changing. Adaptive methods for solving ill-defined and well-
defined problems are necessary for survival.

Evidence from fossils and geology suggests that in recent years from 6000 to 3000 B.C.E, many
aborigines were present in all parts of the world. Early migration of species related to homo sapiens

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occurred between seventy to one hundred thousand years in the past. These migratory groups
traveled on land from Asian, African, and European continents to North and South Americas as
well as islands of the Pacific Ocean and Australia.

Early examples of verbal, spatial, and numerical problems

Each migratory group developed its own system of solving spatial, numerical, and verbal
problems in everyday life. Three thousand years ago, in an Egyptian tomb, written history in the
form of hieroglyphics (spatial problems) was recorded on the walls of caves. Other recordings were
found on papyrus, and clay tablets. Counting and measurement in these early times were
necessary for daily life. Numerical formulas, such as areas (length times width) of land were
calculated for paying taxes on the quantities of food raised. Drawings and symbols provided
substantive examples of practical solutions concerning building, construction, and daily life.
Symbolic problems and solutions embodied in the mathematical and astronomical writing of the
Egyptians were also found in other historical relics and documents such as the Rhind papyrus
(Gillings, R. 1972).

Early history provides a plethora of other examples of verbal, numerical, and spatial problems
denoting scientific and pseudo-scientific solutions to practical problems during its millennia.
Examples of academic problem solving come from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. in the
Greco-Roman period. The mathematics of the Greeks, geometry, and arithmetic (number problems)
were applied to scientific formulations such as astronomy, optics, and harmonics. Aristotle, in
Posterior Analytics, discussed issues that reflected the contemporary mathematics practiced in
Plato’s Academy. Symbolic abstractions in technical work showed the use of letters to identify
pictorial representations of buildings and construction (Heath, 1949; Allen, 1969).

Of course, many literary (verbal) forms of problems were commonplace in earlier times, as seen
in established forms of writings and symbolic activities in various languages. Examples included
literary symbols found on the walls of caves. Egyptian treaties were written on literary papyrus,
and early forms of Chinese writing, middle to late Shang dynasty, were etched on turtle shells and
animal bones. In Medieval times, especially from the 10th to 12th centuries, Christian writers as
well as those representing Jewish and Arabic traditions composed all forms of dialogues
representing solutions to existing daily problems (Maxfield, 2008).

Problem-solving in the late 1800s

In the tradition of domain-specific knowledge, the work of Benjamin Rush during the early 1800s
provided historical evidence of psychological issues related to the mind in solving everyday
problems. In 1812, Rush’s textbook on Medical Inquiries and Observations on Diseases of the Mind
suggested that many problems in the mind were due to a lack of circulation of blood to the brain
or sensory overload.

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In the late 1800s, the Behaviorist or empiricists, as some called them, wanted to avoid the
mind/body black box phenomena. Issues were not grouped by problems to be solved but by
schools of thought, i.e., Behaviorism, Gestalt, and Psychodynamic. Groups of scientists studied
reflexes, the physiology of neural circuits, and various forms of conditioned behavior. Their focus
was on the behavioral aspects of observed phenomena. The work of Thorndike (1911) typified
the early thinking of the Behaviorist who relied on a stimulus-response (S-R) model. In the
problem-solving model, the “problem” is the stimulus and the response is the goal. The S-R
model basically suggests for every stimulus there exists a response that may or may not be
reinforced. According to Thorndike’s law of effect, if the response is satisfying, the response is
reproduced or replicated in a comparable situation and is likely to occur again.

Later, Thorndike’s law was used by B.F. Skinner in his development of operant conditioning, “a
learning process by which the effect, or consequence, of a response, influences the future rate of
production of that response (Grey, 2008).” Other Behaviorists, such as Clark Hull and Pavlov,
adopted principles from Skinner’s work. While Thorndike (1921) was pursuing the experimental
and empirical aspects of psychology, the psychologists at Würzburg such as Oswald Külpe, Karl
Bühler, and Otto Selz focused on defining problems by analysis of the whole form or “gestalt.”
Earlier in 1893, Von Ehrenfels introduced the concept that the conscious state of the mind could
not be decomposed. The mind was too powerful, and the task of psychology was to describe
cognition rather than explain the physiological aspects of human informational processing.
Mental laws and perceptions determine how objects were perceived.

The Gestalt psychologist influences many researchers, especially those who studied insight
problems. The most common insight problems according to Dow and Mayer (2004) are verbal,
mathematical, and spatial.

Problem-solving in the middle of the 1900s

Problem-solving is highly dependent upon experience, knowledge, and memory. In 1932,

Frederick C. Bartlett published his first book called Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social
Psychology. In 1958, he published a second book called: Thinking: An Experimental and Social Study.
According to Henry Roediger, Bartlett’s work was the forerunner of many ideas in cognitive
psychology which came to the forefront in the early 1960s and 1970s (Wheeler and Roediger,
1992).

Most of the current psychology textbooks cite three important problem-solving exercises which
initially contributed to the literature on problem-solving during the 1900s. These three exercises
were: Maier’s (1931) pendulum problem, Duncker’s (1945) tumor radiation problem, and Newell
and Simon’s Tower of Hanoi. These different problem-solving exercises have a wealth of
literature contributing to analogical transfer in problem-solving and are still used today by
researchers in the field (Simon, 1975).

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In 1945, Duncker, a pioneer in the study of problems, describe problem-solving as a goal that does
not yet have a solution. Most of Duncker’s observations came from the laboratory where he found
results from practical and mathematical problems. In his experimentations, he had his students
“think aloud” as a method of reaching their goals. This process, in his words, was different than
introspecting as the student could not divorce him or herself from the problem at hand. “Thinking
aloud” allowed the student to reach the restructuring necessary for a solution to the problem.

In the 1960s, Herbert Simon and his two colleagues, Shaw and Newell studied the solving of
complex problems. Complex problems were different from insight problems in that there was not
a crucial element leading to the solution. Simon (1971) was interested in the process, that is, the
cognitive strategies, mental operations, and how problems were solved. Since the computer was
used to simulate human problem-solving, the protocols involved the concept of searching
problem space. This led to algorithms that could be programmed to solve these well-defined
human problems (Simon, 1961; Newell et al., 1960).

In 1972, Newell and Simon proposed a comprehensive theory of problem-solving that still
contributes to problem-solving models today. These researchers used the complex problem
known as the Tower of Hanoi, a well-defined problem with a solution or endpoint. The problem
was to move disks located on three pegs to a known configuration. The solution involved 27 steps.
Three of the theoretical components were described as an initial state (all the disks on peg 1), a
goal state (how the disks should look for the final solution), and operators used to move from one
state to another (mental representations by the participant to figure out the solution). The
problem space encompassed the total process; that is, the beginning, the end, and all the
operations which occur in between.

Theories of problem-solving

Recently, many authors and researchers have written profusely on thinking, problem-solving,
and cognition (Mayer, 1983, Sternberg, 1994, Davidson, J. E. & Sternberg, R. (2003) ). Theories
Abound! A textbook could be written on each facet. Each theory of problem-solving may have
components, meta-components, or even supra structures that define the problem-solving process.
The supra structures are planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the problem solution and are
components of metacognition. Metacognition occurs when the individual becomes conscious of
the problem-solving process and thinks about ways to strategize and monitor one’s own
behavior. For example, Nietfeld and Bosma (2003) found that explaining how the problem was
solved (not just the solution to the problem) improved task performance as individuals could
monitor their own performance.

Of particular importance was one theory of the mind which utilized the idea of association and
came from the early philosophy of Aristotle. This theory denoted as associationism suggested
that thinking could be explained in terms of ideas (elements) and associations (links). Cognitive
thought was the result of habits families developed by trial and error over time. A stimulus (S)
gives rise to various responses (R1, R2, R3, R4); the links or associations are in the problem solver’s

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head. For any given problem-solving situation, there is a family of responses, one that is either
strengthen or weakened. The differences in the strength of response lead to a hierarchy. This
hierarchy of responses becomes habits that are conditioned by reward and therefore are likely to
occur with a greater frequency of response. In the language of the IPS, a habit is a response that
occurs over defined neural pathways. (Mayer, 1983).)

The practical application of the theory was found in studies of anagrams, analogies, puzzle boxes,
measurement of the electrical activity of muscles, and studies of brain-damaged patients
(Mayzner & Tresselt, 1958; Devnich, 1937 Gick & Holyoak, 1983). The essence of those studies
was data on the median solution times in seconds. Therefore, the researchers noted how many
seconds were required to transform an anagram from “beahc” to beach. Likewise, the probability
of letter transitions, the number of moves, and the order of transition from one form of anagram
to another were calculated. This research provided benchmark data for those interested in the
speed of processing.

Later theorists concentrated on the components of problem-solving. Components of problem-

solving include problem definition, problem representation, and all the intermediate steps to
arrive at solutions. Knowing which components are involved in the problem-solving process
helps define the pathways that are involved. Meta-components include workable mental
strategies (stratagems) to arrive at a solution. The choice of cognitive processes depends upon
which theory has immediate practical value.

Problem definition

Researchers agree that problem definition, problem finding, and problem formulation are
difficult and dependent upon many theoretical and practical factors, particularly whether the
problem was ill-defined or well-defined. Newell and Simon (1972) used a clearly defined problem
(Tower of Hanoi) that had a beginning and an end with an area that could be searched (problem
space). Well-defined problems can be solved more easily via computer programming. Ill-defined
problems involving differences in time, space, and environmental constraints are more difficult
for problem definitions, problem finding, and problem formulation.

Getzel (1982) gave three examples of ill-defined problems. The first was: problems discovered.
Did the problem already exist in the environment or was it discovered during a problem search?
Second, was the problem created as a result of other known problems? A scientist does well at
discovering unfamiliar problems in a field as well as solving those which already exist. Artists
spend considerable time finding and creating problems. Both of these classes of problems are
different from Getzel’s third class—the problem presented. How is the problem presented to the
subject? Problem definition, in all classes of problems, is based on a concise definition that
illustrates all conditions necessary for a solution. For the problem to be accurately defined, it must
be recognized and described with a knowledge of all constraining factors.

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Problem representation

When a problem is found, formulated, and defined, it can be represented mentally in some form.
Representation is constrained by the cues in the environment that present the problem. In
general, the representation is either verbal, numerical, visual-spatial, or any combination thereof.
An example is indicated by early studies which asked people to illustrate how the following
phrase was encoded in their minds. “Plus, over a star.” Think about how you would encode the
phrase. The most common responses were either verbal or visual. The people who responded
visually saw a picture with a plus sign over the star. The people who responded that they verbally
encoded the sentence saw words. That is, they responded that the representation was a verbal
sentence indicating a plus over a star. The sentence did not lend itself to a numerical
representation; however, the phrase {what is the sum of a ‘plus over a star’ added to a ‘plus over
a star’} could be represented numerically.

Problems given by researchers to subjects are usually represented in four different forms-verbal,
spatial, mathematical, or a mixture of each. The mixture can be represented as a complex measure
such as an outcome or performance (playing a musical piece, repairing a car, etc.). Examples of
each of the different forms are listed below:

A simple mathematical problem (usually presented in a distracted field with all kinds of
squiggles and marks).

(1+ 5-6+2=?)

A verbal problem is represented in the following form:

Misha and Marjorie were born on the same day of the same month of the same year. Their other
sister was born on a different day in the same month of the same year: How is this possible?

A spatial (visual-spatial) problem:

Place a line through all 9 dots without lifting your pencil once you have selected a beginning
point.

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A mixture requiring both verbal and mathematical representation:

There are 10 bags, each containing 10 gold coins, all of which look identical. In 9 of the bags, each
coin weighs 16 ounces, but in one of the bags, the coins weigh 17 ounces each. How is it possible,
in a single weighing, on an accurate weighing scale, to determine which bag contains the 17-
ounce coins?

The second type of mixture problem might be:

A mechanic reads the computer codes for a problem with a Ferrari engine. Consulting his
manual, he finds a process flowchart illustrating 20 possible problems for the single code that was
selected. Eliminating the first two potential problems, what is the minimum number of codes that
are left to check?

Since our thesis revolves around neural pathways and the solving of verbal, spatial, and
numerical problem solving, the next three sections provide an up-to-date review of these 3 areas.
Current studies do not refute prior research but add to the growing body of important ideas on
the state of the art.

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Synopsis: Research on verbal, numerical, and spatial problem solving

Verbal Problem Solving

Words, text, or any similar structure of letters that convey meaning can be defined as verbal.
Comprehension is defined as understanding the meaning of words, letters, and anything
literary in form. Lucangeli, Tressoldi, and Cendron (1998) demonstrated in a research study
that text comprehension is a necessary component of problem-solving. Generally, the accepted
notion is that text comprehension preceded the components of problem representation,
problem solution, and tentative problem solutions as well as the meta-components of problem
evaluation. In other words, one must understand the meaning inherent in the words before the
rest of the problem can be solved.

Many studies have documented that a broad knowledge base influences text comprehension
(Cote, Goldman & Saul, 1998; Kintsch, 1998, Voss, J. F. & Silfies, 1996). Differences are based on
the type of problem (domain-specific vs. generic) and type of knowledge base (domain-specific
vs. generic). In other words, there is a difference in understanding words in a specific subject
matter area versus words in a general sense.

Researchers (Kintsch, 1998; Graesser, Millis, & Zwann, 1997) have developed many different
classifications of words and their organization in written form. Each category has specific
implications for comprehending the meaning assumed by the text in question. According to
Brooks & Warren (1972), various kinds of texts such as scientific articles, comic books, novels,
and science fiction can be interpreted differently. For example, in the category known as
discourse genre, students report a difference in long-term memory representations depending on
whether they thought they were reading literature or a scientific article. This particular kind of
filtering (differences in memory representations) gives rise to our assumption that filters are the
precursors to layers as layers are developed when specific instances of mental pain are filtered
and remain in long-term memory.

According to Brooks and Warren, each different classification of text is affected by the manner
of the structural representation of letters. If there is insufficient information due to missing
letters, improper syntax, or poorly written text, then the processes in the brain responsible for
activating the memory storage necessary for matching the level of representation are lost and
the meaning is not conveyed. In other words, one’s brain can understand this “all c_ts purr
when content” but not this “all __s bite when angry. The assumption, of course, is that the
reader possesses the necessary skills and relevant previous knowledge.

When words or text in problem-solving are categorized as textbase (Perfetti and Britt, 1995),
then the form is known as propositional. Propositional suggests that the manner and form of the
written text provide information about the meaning. For example, a verb provides knowledge
of a goal, action, or state while a noun provides information about objects of action. Likewise,
the place of the verb or noun in the sentence provides clues to the meaning of the word. These

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4 different theoretical considerations highlight how words, texts, or the structural denotation
of letters increases the difficulty of understanding how problems are solved.

Data from neuroscience seems to confirm much of the information found by earlier scientists
who used psychometric techniques. When problem-solving activities are arranged into
categories of complexity (high “g”, middle “g” and low “g”) then high “g or vocabulary tests
and information similarities appear to activate Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas in the brain,
especially for women. There is less activation or processing in the same area of the brain for
men on similar tasks.

Numerical problem solving

Simple numeric skills in calculating ordinary arithmetic are necessary for vocational, and
everyday problem-solving. The ability to add, subtract, multiply, and calculate fractions is
required in managing money, using a calculator, or measuring things. The use of arithmetic in
selecting economical items at the grocery store or in calculating interest on the loan is a prime
example. The inability to perform simple arithmetic calculations is evident in preschool and
school-age children. It occurs also in patients with cerebral lesions.

Henchen (1919) performed one of the first systematic studies of impairments in calculations.
By investigating patient records, patients, and brain lesions in over 300 cases, Henschen noticed
a co-relationship between reading and language disorders. He argued that difficulty in
numbers could be identified and named the condition acalculia. Berger (1926) extended the idea
that a specific disorder in calculations could occur. In his small study of 18 patients, he
identified 3 patients in which there was an impairment in the ability to carry out simple
calculations. He termed the disorder anarithmetria. In the academic literature, today, there are
many examples of children who do well in reading and verbal studies but have impairment in
mathematical calculations and vice versa.

Converging evidence demonstrates that children’s mathematical performance is supported by

cognitive abilities such as working memory, executive functions, semantic long-term memory,
and processing speed (e.g., Andersson, 2007; Berg, 2008; Bull et al., 2008; Geary, 2004;
Passolunghi, Mammarella, & Altoè, 2008; Passolunghi & Pazzaglia, 2004; Swanson, 1994). The
role of short-term memory, however, is still in dispute. Some authors argue that short-term
memory is more important as an indicator of fluid intelligence. Others define short-term
memory as dormant or “the subconscious” acting within a theoretical framework of support
and not actively involved in the manipulation of any representation.

Often, the question is whether verbal and numerical propensities are separate skills functioning
in brain pathways. Many studies have shown that mathematical skill is supported by general
cognitive abilities when researchers use standardized tests to measure mathematical
performance. A few studies have used relatively specific measures of arithmetical calculation

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and problem-solving (e.g., Andersson, 2008; Maybery & Do, 2003; McLean & Hitch, 1999;
Swanson & Beebe-Frankenberger, 2004; Wilson & Swanson, 2001). When using specific
arithmetical calculations (Swanson & Beebe-Frankenberger, 2004; Wilson & Swanson, 2001)
found that tasks requiring verbal working memory could predict skills in calculation---reading
and fluid IQ were held constant. However, these results differ from other researchers (Durand,
Hulme, Larkin, and Snowling, 2005) and Swanson (2004) who did not find any relationship
between the calculation skills of children and verbal memory. Conclusion: the jury is still out.

Spatial problem-solving

Spatial cognition is the cognitive interpretation of spatial information in the environment by

distance, direction, and typology. Spatial cognition begins at birth. The use of spatial cognition
in the solving of simple and complex problems is defined as spatial problem-solving. As a simple
example, an infant in a crib attempts to find an object such as a finger. The problem is solved
when the finger is located and grasped. Almost all actions from birth involve sensory information
as the first step in spatial problem-solving. The eyes, ears, and hands are often used to perform
tasks in space.

The application of spatial problem-solving in simple everyday life is common and becomes more
complex as the use of abstractions increases. Spatial representations involve the use of long-term
memory to store information about objects in the environment. At birth and during early infancy,
representations about the environment are continuously stored, rewritten, and utilized.

In our theory, any interruption or delay in a processing system leads to an interruption in

problem-solving. In the case of spatial problem solving, there is a lengthy list of interruptions or
impairments that can be defined. This includes difficulty in shape or object discrimination,
impairment of hue or colors, as well as deficits in the associative meaning of objects. Individual
variation in spatial problem solving occurs based on memory, representation, the speed of
processing, and pathways utilized for encoding information.

Does individual variation extend from spatial problem-solving to the analysis of spatial
perception? Spatial perception is perceiving the relationship between objects in the environment
while solving spatial problems. Impairments in spatial perception include both simple
relationships (single points) and complex relationships (spatial analysis). An impairment related
to a single point has been described by Holmes (1918/1919). He noted a patient who could not
move from one area of the room to another without bumping into furniture. The patient could
not judge the distance and depth of perception between himself and the objects. Paterson &
Zangwill (1944) cited examples of patients who made errors in simple spatial tasks such as
copying objects. They also could not count blocks in a 3x3x3 cube. Noteworthy is that some
children in the age group of 3-5 exhibit similar problems in copying, counting, and analyzing
spatial patterns.

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Are these impairments only found in a single individual? Or are there differences in subgroups
of children and adults who display similar characteristics when given spatial problems? The
answer to the latter question is a resounding, “yes.”; subgroups of people have been defined by
results from spatial problems. Some differences extend from early childhood. Others are found
in adults who suffer impairments in neural functioning due to trauma. Some of these differences
are perceptual, while others are conceptual and sensory-motor. Conceptual and sensory-motor
become more evident as the complexity of the problems increases. The concepts of field
independence and field dependence (which were introduced in the review of the literature in
Chapter 24 of the book) are just one example. In simple examples, differences in either perceptual,
conceptual, or sensory-motor are not as evident. However, with an increase in problem
complexity as well as adding a time limit, the speed of processing separate groups of individuals.
That is the reason that so many researchers find significant differences in spatial studies of field
independence and field dependence—increase problem complexity and time limits.

Many distinct types of tests have been developed to measure spatial processing. Poppelreuter
(1923) developed a search test designed to locate a single target among a background of
distractors. The main objective was to quantify the amount of spatial bias. Others (Albert, 1973;
De Renzi E., 1983) have similar objectives. Using various kinds of search tasks, they were able to
differentiate patients who searched one-half of a target rather than both sides. This led to
considerable differences in time differentials related to spatial bias.

In cognitive neuroscience, reference frames are used to distinguish different parts of space in
constructing spatial configurations. Different spatial frames constitute different spatial
representations. One current theory from animal studies suggests there is not a single Cartesian
coordinate system in the brain. Instead, multiple areas of the brain appear to process visual data.
Each of the individual areas seems to have its maps and methods of orienting the stimulus based
on the source. Other groups of cells, in another cortical area, make a wide receptive field that
locates features within an object. In other words, specialization occurs with groups of brain cells
and regions of the brain. This contributes to a spatial representation.

Data from neuroscience studies suggest that high “g” or complex visual-spatial processing takes
place in the parietal lobe for men. There is less activity or activation in imaging studies for
women.

How do affective and cognitive factors interact during the process of solving problems? Is
motivation just as important as cognition? Some clues and answers are found in Tier One.

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Chapter 5

Synopsis: Tier One:

Anatomical structure & function of problem-solving

Tier One of our problem-solving models represents the structure and function of the brain and
other integrative systems in the body. The regions of the brain are varied and show different
degrees of specialization and utilization. The area in the front of the brain is denoted as the frontal
lobes. From an evolutionary perspective, the frontal lobes developed last and are thought to be
the centers of higher-level processes such as discrimination and concept processing. The region
in the back of the brain is the occipital lobe, involved in visual processing. The sides of the brain
are designated as temporal and parietal. The temporal lobes are just below the cortex area and
are associated with memory storage and processing. The diencephalon contains the thalamus
which functions as a switchboard, promoting homeostasis, and the hypothalamus which controls
hormones. The cerebellum contains a motor system responsible for movements.

The cerebrum is responsible for sensory, motor, and other cognitive functions. The cerebrum
contains a thick sheet of neuron cell bodies referred to as the cerebral cortex. The cerebral cortex
has a newer evolutionary structure (neocortex) and an old section (paleocortex). In the temporal
lobe of the paleocortex is the hippocampus, a structure important in learning and memory. The
subcortex contains white matter, which is really the neural fiber tract. Another structure in this
cortex is the basal ganglia. The basal ganglia are important in motor and non-motor functions.

The limbic system is of paramount importance as its structures are involved in many functions of
everyday life. The fornix, hippocampus, cingulate gyrus, amygdala, parahippocampal gyrus, and
parts of the thalamus make up the limbic system. Throughout the book, there are examples of
how these structures work in concert with neural circuitry critical for emotional reactivity,
associative learning, fear, aggression, and memory. In the limbic system, the amygdala and its
interconnections (pathways) moderate memory, regulate fear and adjust attention.

Through research over the last few decades, it is known that the mammalian cortex is not
organized as separate functional units. Instead, systems that support a particular function are
organized as distributed networks with many communications to sub-regions. The brain itself
has both a horizontal and well as vertical organization. This leads to many subsections acting in
a separate but integrated way. The reticular activation system has over 110 separate nuclei. Each
of these separate sub-regions supports a multidirectional flow of information and interacts with
other regions. For example, when one sees something (visual), the brain interacts with multiple
networks including where the visual images are stored in memory. These broad superhighways
share information between the left and the right cerebral hemispheres. The left hemisphere may
process more details in information; while the right hemisphere may connect with more
conceptual networks; however, this statement is in dispute by many researchers.

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Synopsis: Memory

Memories exist in separate places and different forms. Memories, at the cellular level, exist inside
neurons in the form of electrochemical energy transmissions. Previously memories in
neuroscience were thought to exist at the synapse. Now, neuroscientists find that even when
synapses are erased, electrochemical changes persist. Thus, memory traces within the neuron
itself are preserved. Theoretically, the trace is encoded via a modification to the cell’s DNA as
particular genes are expressed. The preservation of the memory trace allows it to be altered under
conditions of fear and stress. Memories also are stored in other structures such as the amygdala.

A person’s tendencies in the solving of problems, especially when combined with pre-existing
knowledge structures, either built from “reading knowledge” or developed from experiential
knowledge, are highly dependent upon episodic and semantic memory structures. Encoding of
environmental and inner mental electrical impulses results in meaning important for the
individual as it relates to a series of events (episodes) or meaning shared by others (semantic).
Episodic and semantic memory structures result in memory traces. Memory traces are not static
holding places but highly functional electrochemical energy units. The functional electrochemical
energy found in neurons resulting from memory traces assists in image reconstruction, feelings,
and emotions. Memory structures are categorized as either long-term or short-term and
contribute to reasoning or logical thought by providing comparisons of previous events,
knowledge, and images to existing perceptions. Whether a memory structure contributes to
logical differences is dependent upon the pathways used in the brain. There is no anatomical
structure for logical thinking as logic depends upon rules stored in memory, built by practice and
reading over lengthy periods of time. If the memory storage of rule-based operations is bypassed,
then intuitive or associational thought based on feelings results. This type of thinking can lead to
the “aha!” experience expressed by intuitive people or to incorrect perceptions based on feelings
without any basis of fact.

Short and long-term semantic and episodic memory contributes to everyday cognitive tasks such
as reading a newspaper, deciding what to wear, and doing daily chores. Long-term memory
contributes to problem-solving in categories, especially those requiring expertise and
specialization. Expert performance (specialization) in solving problems is obtained over an
extended period and is gained through the mastery of complex and difficult challenges, usually
within domain-specific areas. In many cases, expert performance (specialization) encompasses
multiple skill acquisitions as well as complex learning.

The cognitive processes which underlie expert performance encompass an extensive structured
knowledge base and semantic memory which are applied to problems through reason, creative
thinking, text, numerical and spatial comprehension, as well as decision making. Expert
performance changes with the type of tasks and subtasks involved in the domain of expertise.

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Current research suggests that there are different models of how memory works. One model
suggests that memory constitutes an active system of speech and non-speech-based information
(verbal-phonological, semantic, and number) and a storage system for holding visual and spatial
(visual-spatial) information. Each of these “slave systems” is driven by a central executive system
(frontal lobes) that acts upon the temporary and active storage system of information through
reasoning, decision-making, and coordination. These cognitive and affective tendencies,
combined with a tendency to have energy flow outwardly toward people (extraversion) or
inwardly toward an internal state (introversion) form measurable individual differences. When
individual differences are similar among people, then identifiable subgroups are formed.

Using the model of the visual-spatial sketchpad and the phonological loop, two assumptions are
possible. The first concerns the phonological loop which is really the loop of echoic memory
moving between Broca’s area and Wernicke’s areas. Remember, from the review of the literature,
Broca discovered an area of the brain which was non-functional in patients who could understand
speech but could not speak while Wernicke found an area that was the basis of understanding
speech. FMRI shows oxygen consumption in these areas.

The visual-spatial sketch pad was related to icon memory. When a person is trying to recall
words, the areas associated with visual (i.e. optic nerve conduction through lateral geniculate to
the occipital lobe) processing via oxygen consumption is active. This suggests the image
processor is using the memory associated with words.

Emotions are important in cognitive thought. Many events are stored in memory along with
emotions during interactions with the environment. Emotions are more random, and
individualistic. Given their importance in mood and cognition, their pathways are also important
but much less predictable. Emotions are more temporal than personality traits.

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Chapter 6

Synopsis: Encoding

Encoding, resulting from environmental stimuli, is the transfer of energy from a source (either
outside or inside) to a form that the neurons can utilize. Encoding does not occur in a vacuum.
Encoding occurs simultaneously with all the feelings and emotions of the situation and/or the
environmental stimulus. Thus, storage in memory contains not only the encoded image, action,
and perception, but also the feeling attached when the event occurs. When a stored event is not
immediately at a level of perception/attention, it remains at the subconscious level until recalled
with a similar stimulus. When recalled or moved from storage, the emotions and feelings come
to a conscious level with an event stored in memory. This is, one of the reasons, that IPS theory
specifies cognitive and affective neural pathways in response to environmental stimuli.

Encoding information is primary in problem-solving. The information which is encoded

incorrectly results in an improper retrieval mechanism and causes individual differences in the
speed of solving problems. Most of the information about encoding is actually inferred from
observed actions and responses of an individual during controlled situations using fMRI
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) or positron emission tomography (PET). Both of these
methods are used to map areas of the brain. Some specific areas of the brain responded to specific
tasks, while others do not. According to studies in fMRI, encoding takes place in the neurons of
the brain in different places. The places depend upon the kind (text, aural, numeric, image, and
smell) and the action required by the task. Encoding has a genetic and evolutionary foundation
that has been developed over thousands of years. Encoding information from the environment is
central to the Integrative Problem-Solving Model. In our theory, encoding differs according to
subgroups, and the model pathways used.

In theory, encoding actually stops once an energy stimulus originating from the environment or
the brain is processed in either a single neuron or group of neurons representing a network;
however, the process is ongoing as energy stimuli are never-ending. Encoding at the level of
neurons and neural networks is measured by non-linear spikes representing electrical impulses.
The output of neuron firings consists of a lot of noise (error) depending upon where the neurons
are located and what type of task is involved. Extrapolation of information comes from different
patterns and firing of information.

Whatever the form (text, aural, numeric, image, and smell), the encoding process is short and
difficult to isolate. Therefore, from a practical point of view, the process of encoding is usually
extended from symbolization and mental representation to a form of output (behavior, image, or
product). Symbolization precedes mental representation as symbols in the various forms (text,
numbers, signs, etc.) must be stored or processed before any of them can be represented.

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In the vocabulary of the IPS system, symbolization suggests that the visual or aural form of the
object has been encoded from any of the five senses to the memory. Symbolization is the
translation of neural impulses from the environment through the senses to either processing or
temporary storage in the memory. Representation then becomes a further step when an
association has taken place between information from either a) more than one sensory system or
b) various kinds of information via the senses.

Associations related to encoding occur via integration. The brain contains many complex paths
such as the arcuate fasciculus pathway and the association pathways. The bundles of nerves
connect various regions of the brain so that information flow can occur at multiple places which
is why oxygen consumption and blood flow in those areas are identified by fMRI. When an
individual is working on a problem related to an idea, the association in episodic memory
produces images or patterns which have been previously bound up by the hippocampus.
Remember the hippocampus is part of the old cortex and in animals and other species works to
bind memories that are related to survival. The old or paleocortex stores memories related to
emotions and visual representations felt in the episode, especially in situations involving fear.
Decisions about what to do are taking place in the frontal lobes (rostral prefrontal lobes) at the
same time the hippocampus is binding the memories together. The binding process occurs over
a period of time, maybe even while one is sleeping. If the emotions associated with the episodic
memory are strong enough then the binding continues for a prolonged period. According to
theory, one presumes that encoding related to working memory takes place in multiple regions
of the brain, i.e. visual (occipital lobe area 17); aural (temporal lobe), etc. The encoding of specific
types of sensory information (eye, ear, touch) is processed in neurons and neural networks in
those areas first and moves via alternate pathways to other parts of the brain.

If the information from optogenetics is accurate then the neurons which are closer in juxtaposition
become active and link with other neurons to form associations where the binding process occurs
in the hippocampus. Repeated encoding processes that stimulate representations (visual icons
transferred into various chemical substances via protein transcriptions and enzyme interactions)
are then stored.

Synopsis: Energy

Energy, as used in our model (IPS), is a dominant force or press that exists in our environment.
The effects of physical energy cannot be denied. Whenever a physical force (press) acts on a
physical object, changes occur. One has only to look at the mountains which have erupted from
the earth's floor during periods of earthquake activity to appreciate the effect (press) of physical
force on physical objects. However, there are different and subtler kinds of forces in our
environment. For example, think of electrical or magnetic activity. Do you feel the effects of the
daily bombardment of atoms on parts of your body? Do you know the effect of blue light emitted
from your laptop and phone and its effect on your eyes? Recent data suggest that blue light
affects your rapid eye movements (REM) and your sleep. That is, spending time on your

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computer late at night before you go to bed can cause you to lose deep sleep. Many times, the
energy forces that we do not see have the greatest effect on our daily lives.

The forces important in problem-solving are more ethereal and less visible, but still, have an
immense impact as energy helps people focus on problems. These forces are the result of the
interaction of people and objects in the environment. They constitute energy forces from family,
the institutional press, and significant people whenever they are part of the problem-solving
process.

The solving of simple and complex problems occurs via energy transmissions as the individual
interacts with the environment. Impairments or interferences with cognitive functioning are basic
interruptions in energy transformations. Nerve transmissions in the brain are conceived as
biochemical reactions at the cellular level that release and transmit packets of energy. In our
theory, energy units (particles, waves), which result from electrochemical transmission in
neurons, follow the laws of quantum mechanics. That is, energy units in their form of
transmission have characteristics of self-consistency, string vibrations, and resonance. Energy
units in the neurons follow consistent pathways which by definition constitute a form of memory.
Energy units in the body and brain flow outward and inward as various kinds of encoding via
the senses take place.

At the macro level, one defines forces as emotional and cognitive energy, as opposed to the
physical energy that most people in the area of science conceived. The cognitive and emotional
energy emitted from individual to individual is extremely important in the problem-solving
process. These forces either help one become a better problem solver or can impede the ability to
solve problems. In the early chapters of this book, the term "environmental press" is an all-
encompassing term used to signify the effect of the energy or pressure from parents, significant
others, or those in institutions such as a school or college (teachers, administrators) which interact
with a person while solving a problem.

Emotional energy and its effects can be seen when a person “erupts” or “flies off the handle” with
a temper tantrum that impedes the thinking process. In the sequence of development, children
are influenced to become social and focus on the feelings of others. When a child focuses too
much on their own individual needs, aspirations, and feelings in early life, then in later life, they
are likely to personalize the thoughts, actions, and words of others as being directed toward their
own being. That personalization leads to emotional outbursts and is likely to result in physical
actions and perhaps skewed mental actions (hurting others, physical violence, etc.).

In the model of integrative problem solving (IPS), energy forces are conceived as filters that
modify or change our long-term developmental process. Parental pressure (environmental press)
may force a young couple not to get married or even impede a social relationship. The use of
emotional energy as analogous to physical energy is purposeful and designed to emphasize how
powerful emotional forces really are in the individual.

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Emotional energy forces can be destructive or enhancing. Anxiety is the primary emotional
energy force that acts to impede or enhance cognitive performance. Anxiety is emotional
electrical energy that manifests itself from stored representations of previous experience
(semantic or episodic memory). State anxiety, temporary anxiety or worry, prevents failure in
goal attainment by acting as a motivational stimulus. Trait anxiety is destructive when emotional
electrical energy impedes cognition and prevents problem-solving. State anxiety and trait anxiety
are interactive as perceived threat conditions increase. Emotional energy, filtered through
memories representing stored image episodic behavior, removes or alters the condition of threat
or stress.

Emotional forces occurring during the child's or adult’s developmental periods work much like
a physical beam of light that is modified or changed as the light cascades from some point in time.
When a green filter is used with a light, the light filters the spectrum of colors so that only green
is visible. When a child is faced with emotional energy either from a significant person or an
inner anxiety-producing condition, modification or changes usually take place.

Emotional energy leads to compensatory patterns when there is a mismatch between the
environment conducive to problem-solving and an environment that is not conducive.
Compensatory patterns such as passive resistance, withdrawn states, and isolation, interfere with
normal neural processing as energy must be used to deal with the internal environment as
opposed to the external environment in which problems are usually encountered

Synopsis: Self-regulation/control

Affective self-regulation occurs through a structuring (order, planning) of the environment and
internalization of conscious and unconscious control of affective impulses. The basis of emotional
maturity comes from many different interactive problem-solving situations. Thinking and
emotions when responding to a problem situation are not separate but integrated based on stored
memories which are brought to consciousness by encountering problems in the environment. Too
much emphasis on cognitive structuring brings about cognitive rigidity, while too little results in
emotional overreactions to existing events. Cognitive flexibility represents the brain’s plasticity
and allows the individual to drop structured plans and address problems in a new light or
differently. “Analysis by paralysis” or too much analyzing increases rigidity and decreases flex.

Motivation to solve problems occurs in phases as energy flow is not constant or consistent but
tends to ebb and flow. The inconsistency of energy flow requires self-regulation. Self-regulation
is a process of harnessing one feelings, thoughts, and actions to obtain personal goals. Self-
regulation is a cyclical process that relies on prior performance, goal orientation, and affective
feelings such as satisfaction and anxiety. Adjustments are constantly made to maximize effort.
One can have the capacity and capability to solve any problem but lack motivation thereby
making a solution impossible.

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Affective systems based on social recognition interact constantly with top-down and bottom-up
cognitive processing. A top-down system that is based on abstract conceptualization through the
brain is more likely to lead to the processing of supra-ordinate concepts such as those related to
intuition since more concepts are stored in memory from reading and experience. Remember that
intuition is emotional energy that bypasses the logic system and results in feeling about external
events. The kind and type of material which is read and retained in memory is also of paramount
importance. That is, there are identifiable cognitive differences in measured abstraction
depending on whether one reads literary, historical, scientific, mechanical, daily life magazines,
and books. Affective differences from bottom-up processing or motor processing are often the
result of hormones such as dopamine and other neurotransmitters and affect daily life.

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Chapter 7

Synopsis: Problem-solving model

Elements of the cognitive and affective processes have been the subject of many articles for several
years. In a simple model, there are three steps--inputs, processes, and outputs. Inputs represent
incoming sensory information relative to the problem encountered, processes represent different
pathways through the brain, and outputs represent the behavioral responses, images, or products
of thought. The input and output are rather easy to follow. How information is processed
provides the greatest mystery. The elements used in our problem-solving model follow Bloom
(1956) & Guilford (1967) in part as well as Gardener (1993).

The cognitive model is a list below in Diagram 1. In the diagram, there are different elements of
input, process, and output. Each component is explained in the chapter. The one aspect which is
not present in the model is the affective component of emotions. In reality, the affective
components are just as important as the cognitive parts of the model but are so much more
difficult to model as the control of emotions differs greatly from person to person. Also, the
cognitive problem-solving model does not contain categories relative to the 36 subgroups. These
super-ordinate constructs, explained in later chapters, are found in Tier Three in later chapters.

Diagram 1

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Why? Why spend a whole chapter explaining the terms associated with the problem-solving
model? Simply, the processes that occur in the brain are complicated and an ongoing mystery.
The so-called ‘black box’ contains many distinct functions which are based on the biological
structure and neural functioning. As noted in the last chapter, simultaneous cognitive processing
combined with emotional reactions contributes to individual differences. Individual differences
in problem-solving rely heavily on the uniqueness of the individual developed over a vast period,
a uniqueness that comes from experience, practice, the firing of neurons in the brain as well as
the brain’s structure and function. In this chapter, the explanations move up a symbolic level from
just biological functioning to functional processing to make the process easily comprehensible for
those who have less background in biology and science.

Model characteristics

Our cognitive model can be hierarchical, linear, or recursive. Various strategies used by people, such as
trial and error, make it that way. Oftentimes, the strategies used by individuals complicate the
process of understanding the model. Notice that any stimulus can be internal (stored memory) or
external related to the environment. Information can go directly from memory (emotions, feelings)
to muscles or motor actions thereby bypassing analysis, comprehension, and other forms of mental
activity (a person experiences a feeling of anger and swings his arm). Or the form of the image
encountered in the environment (perceptual) can stimulate an idea (memory to conceptual) which

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results in the person drawing a picture. Likewise, an unknown “sound” in the environment can
cause a person to start analyzing different contingencies (bypass long-term memory as no
representations of the sound are available). Just how these processes occur is based on the model
terms defined and explained in the book.

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Chapter 8

Synopsis: Problem-Solving Pathways

In a review of the cognitive model in Chapter 7, a simple pathway is input-process-

output. As an example, perception can be 'input', memory encoding can be 'process', and
verbalization can be 'output'. Few people argue over the simple pathway but as the
complexity of the problem increases so do the arguments, but again, that is the purpose
of theory. Since our cognitive model is recursive, any number of the brain or neural
pathways, as well as elements, can be involved. This chapter uses the terms of Tier Two
cognitive model to explain the meaning and importance of neural and brain pathways
and possible interruptions to the problem-solving process.

Our thesis is that particular pathways are used more than others, and some pathways are
more habitual and efficient than others. The use of pathways is important and helps
defined groups of problem solvers. Problem-solving can be slowed for any number of
reasons: cognitive dissonance, aging, the complexity of the problem, interferences from
environmental stimuli, learning difficulties, neurological deficits, etc. Identifying
pathways, using measurements of time and function, can facilitate understanding of how
problem solutions are efficient and habitual as well as interfered with, arrested, or
slowed.

Time

Is time really an important variable in traditional and non-traditional problem-solving?

Of course, it depends!! Time is not a factor in many cases related to school, work, or home
where constraints are not imposed by other people, events, or situations. However, when
a constraint, limit, or pressure is imposed by significant others or environmental
situations; time becomes an issue.

Time measurements are based on the difference between when a process starts and ends.
Thus, in most of our examples below, the simple pathway (see-encode-represent) can be
measured. Children push a computer button to start a clock indicating that they have
perceived an object and then push a computer button indicating that they have encoded
or represented either the object or perceptual situation by name, i.e., dog, cat, or mass.
Sometimes this occurs in milliseconds. In cases where a start and a finish cannot be

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precisely timed, the time measurement is implied. For example, an event becomes timed
when a teacher imposes a time limit on an activity by stating that a classroom test must
be finished by the end of a school period which is 45 minutes long or a standardized test
must be finished at an identified time

Many unstructured events in life involve time management. Usually, during work, a
person does not have a stopwatch or there is not a person keeping time; however,
companies and people have deadlines that must be met. Events associated with work or
employment have implied time constraints. People are given directives to accomplish a
task and the manager must assess whether the task was accomplished efficiently. In some
cases, a person is given a task and must work overtime as not enough time exists during
the workday to solve the problem. Examples in everyday situations are numerous. Have
you ever delivered your car to a shop and the car was not fixed within a reasonable time
limit?

Recent studies about experts and others in different skill areas suggest that individuals,
categorized by distinct levels of cognitive skills, achieve problem-solving solutions based
on time differentials. Many outcomes based on time are logarithmic (experts vs. novice)
rather than linear. Many assessments are group-based (sanitation workers, plumbers,
electricians, accountants, etc.), suggesting that certain occupational groups solve
problems in their profession faster than other occupational groups. A person who spends
more time thinking about problems in one’s area of expertise is more likely to reach a
better problem resolution quicker than a person with less experience. However, efficiency
does not necessarily imply quality! In fact, many quick solutions may be inferior to
solutions taking more time.

A fact! Individuals differ in the speed with which they conduct various cognitive
activities. A slow time for completion of a task could simply represent more time spent
processing various logical alternatives or time off-task, i.e., daydreaming. In our
experience, the time required to converge to a single best response for a divergent thinker
can be relatively long compared to a person who spends less time examining alternatives
converging to a single response. However, the time spent to achieve problem resolution may
not necessarily be directly associated with output. Think about a student who has not studied
the classroom assignments and spends a lot of time trying to answer questions on a test.
Since information-related concepts are not in his or her memory, time spent processing
the test questions may not be related to responses given on the test.

Because of the great variation in time differentials situations, many studies suggest that
either time is not variable in problem-solving or that faster times are equated with
better problem solvers. Of course, this is very controversial as explained in many
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sections of this book. In the next section, many examples illustrate how many diverse
kinds of situations and approaches to problems cause time differentials in individual
responses. This time differential can be associated with arrestment or slowing in the
problem-solving process!!

Time measurement along with deep levels of processing help to differentiate the
problem-solving process. By examining the following model pathways, the amount of
time required to solve complex problems becomes apparent.

A simple model pathway example

In the process model of Chapter 7, the simple terms of input and output are used. Many
important cognitive and affective processes occur in milliseconds or maybe nanoseconds.
If the amount of time in either perceiving or hearing is increased, then processing time
can increase substantially until either confusion subsists, or comprehension takes place.
The outcome depends on the task complexity as well as the number and kind of neural
pathways that are used.

To understand how a child may exhibit different degrees of efficiency in response to a

problem-solving situation, consider the number of various kinds of mental model
pathways that a child may use in the following scenario. A child sees the cover of a book
with a picture of Mary walking ahead of her little lambs. Each of the little lambs is
covered by a large heavy cloth and has their tongues hanging out, depicting exhaustion
and thirst. The book cover reads, "Mary had a Little Lamb." The following possible
response patterns are based on the cognitive diagram in Chapter 7 and indicate where in
the model various individual thought processes could be arrested so that a problem
resolution can or cannot be efficiently reached. These response patterns occur with many
recursive iterations between neural pathways, so a linear sequence is illustrative but
difficult to quantify.

Memory/limited memory pathway

Perception- attention--memory at a subconscious level. The simplest problem-solving

pathway involves perception, encoding, and then output, either from a memory source
or by passing a memory source. The typical scenario is--seeing an object, encoding the
object, naming the object, and/or continuing to perceive other objects. The child sees a
book, subconsciously encodes 'book' in the brain, but looks at other objects without
focusing or directing attention specifically toward the book.

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Perception-memory or memory first then perception. An extremely critical point is that in all
pathways, the stimulus can be initiated either internally or externally. This can occur in
any order. For example, a conversation stimulates a memory, which is initiated internally,
followed by perception. Or vice versa, memory follows perception which is initiated
externally. Remember our cognitive model is recursive with many feedback loops. As an
example, think of a situation where an idea “pops” into your mind but has nothing to do
with what is happening around you. Perhaps you are sitting on the couch watching
television and from your subconscious comes a new thought associated with your job.
That is “memory first” and then perception. If the thought is keyed by what you are
watching on television, then it is ‘perception first’ than a memory.

The internal stimulus for action is usually an emotion and a memory stored in traces
while an external stimulus for action is sensory (hearing, feeling, touching, and seeing).
An external stimulus is first temporarily stored in memory where it may or may not be
represented (working memory vs. long-term memory). For example--a child sees a book
cover and stores the picture of the book cover in memory but does not recall the memory
trace except when memory is desired because a question is asked, or a problem is posed.
This memory-perception pathway is important as complex problems are not usually
solved by a simple memory pathway. Identification of memory impairment is also
important as memory precedes the outcome of most problem-solving activities.

In a second example, the student sees the book, consciously encodes the picture on the
book cover, and says "book" when asked for a response of what he or she sees (output).
Little comprehension may exist at this level. The book represents a memory stimulus. A
problem is not generated until the student is asked: “what do you see.” Little or no time is
needed for solving this simple problem which is based on a memory or perceptual
response and the problem-solving process is unlikely to be arrested. However, as seen in later
examples, the more complicated the problem, the more likely a process may be arrested, delayed,
or terminated or that a person adapts to the complexity and the person becomes more adept and
efficient in solving the problem.

In your experience as a youngster, was there a child or friend whom others might have
characterized as “slow?” Can you remember his or her name? Were other children aware
of this “slowness?”

What about senior citizens? Many times, arrestment (stoppage for a brief time while
struggling to recall) occurs as people age. For some senior citizens, memory recall is
affected. In the course of a conversation, it is not unusual for an arrest to occur. If a place,
name of a store, event, or location cannot be recalled, then the pause (arrestment) is

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obvious. A sentence or word fillers and sounds allow time to remember. “Oh, what is
that person’s name?? Do you know? Ah, ah, ah, or silence.”

Take a minute, ask anyone a question, and watch for arrestment (pauses for a fleeting
time before a response) to occur. Listen carefully for differences in the kind of questions
that are posed. Notice how much arrestment or slowness occurs as the difficulty and
complexity level of the question increases. Try it and note simple differences between
members of your family or friends.

Associational pathways

A second pathway involves a mode of limited comprehension called associations. Earlier

a mode was described as a temporary process. The child perceives a book, encodes the
stimulus, then gives a verbal response associated with the stimulus. For example, the
child sees a book, encodes the picture of Mary and the little lambs on the front cover, and
gives a response-- a nursery rhyme such as "Ba Black Sheep- have you any wool?" related
to the title or picture. In other words, the response was associational. Some time was
needed to generate a response, but only slightly more than the previous example. The
difference in the amount of time needed to generate the response helps define the
pathway. For example, the difference in a pathway from memory to association can be
defined in nanoseconds and the difference is real and sometimes measurable, depending
on the amount of slowing or searching for the association. In many people, the amount
of separation time (ask the question- receive a response) is remarkably close, almost
identical. Everything depends on age, experience, the complexity of the question, and
language familiarity.

One can measure the time of the pathway but not its route through the brain, unless, of
course, one is using fMRI. The exact pathway itself cannot be determined as it may be
sequential, recursive, or non-sequential. However, in our model, the pathway is
associated with the kind (type) of response received---for example, analytic vs.
association vs. memory. Repeat: The pathway is associated with a categorization of the
output (analytic response, divergent thinking, singular convergent response, emotional
feeling response, etc.).

A singular pathway could also be designated as Perception-memory-association with another

stored memory: An individual sees an object, stores it in memory, and associates it with
an existing stored memory to form a representation but does not comprehend the
meaning of the situation. Example: - an 18-month-old child sees a box, moves to the box,
and lifts the lid to see what is inside. Comprehension may or may not occur, depending

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on whether an association is present. Note: The child must have some association with
an object (box) to lift the lid. He or she would not know how to lift the lid to look inside
without some association. This process is elementary and is the first stage of problem-
solving.

Animals use this pathway as a form of imitation or general association; In psychology,

the pattern is usually designated as S-R or stimulus-response pathway with different
forms of conditioning based on rewards and goal objectives, i.e., a Pavlovian response
such as parrots responding with speech to a command, a dog getting a paper, etc.

Assume there are a series of numbers such as 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25. An 8-year-old child
perceives the 5 number symbols (previously stored) and makes an association that 5
separate numbers exist but does not see a simple pattern or relationship which exists
(seriation-increases by 5 between each number). There is only partial comprehension if
the child recognizes that the numbers vary from 5 to 25 by association only. If there was
complete comprehension, the child would see the existing pattern of 5 separating each
number using the process of analysis (an adult assumption, I admit). The pathway is
denoted as associational with partial comprehension, rather than analytical with
complete comprehension if seriation is not recognized.

Or as another example, the child does not see his or her mother, thinks of or says, "where
is my mother?" In other words, the child associates the mother with representation in
memory and makes a query. One assumes an association as sensory input was such that
the mother was not present.

My daughter's friend (10 years old), who was staying the night, went into a dark
bathroom standing next to me to wash her hands. After washing her hands, she
exclaimed! "Who turned out the light?? Actually, the light was never on. She had used
the light from the room next to her to see how to wash her hands. She only realized that
the light was not on as she was about to leave the room and reached for the light switch
(memory association).

Recently my 9-year-old son heard a Dodger baseball radio announcer indicate that all the
outfielders were "straight away." He heard the information, checked his memory store,
and did not understand the idiom "straight away." He was perplexed,i.e. partial
comprehension. Many examples of idioms in language exemplify an associational
pathway. Associational pathways in many instances do not encompass understanding
or comprehension. Again, two of my older friends from the Philippines did not laugh at
one of my jokes since it involved the phrase “wondering about a person stealing a
hubcap”, a phrase which did not match their experience (many vehicles did not have
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hubcaps in their younger years). A lack of common associations results in a lack of

communication, and oftentimes, comprehension.

Analytic pathways

In this pathway, the child perceives the book cover, encodes the stimulus, and gives a
verbal response to the following question “What is happening?” Instead of giving an
associational response when seeing the book cover, the child says, "Mary is being
followed by the lambs who seemed to be hot." Wow! This response required an
interpretation of the events on the cover based on the lambs having their tongues hanging
out. Since the event was interpreted, there was some comprehension (text comprehension
related to the question) which led to the analysis (which seemed to be hot). An analytic
response requires about the same amount of time as an associational response. Therefore,
the content of the response has to be interpreted. In this example, the first part of the
response is descriptive, while the second part (seemed to be hot) is an inference (analysis
required) based on the observation.

Remember that in our cognitive model in Chapter 7, discrimination (simple analysis) is a

process whereby a child discerns the differences between objects. The process of
deciphering the differences by relating them to other associations is a more complex
analysis than simple discrimination. When analysis involves comparison and contrast, it
is more complex. To make comparisons requires the person to use words (simile) such
as "fire is like melting iron as both tend to destroy the surface with which each comes in
contact." Or “the point of a needle hurts like the tip of a knife blade." Or “this rock has
more color and striations than that rock.” Analysis can be simple discrimination, or an
inference, a statement indicating the decomposition of complex thought into simpler
components.
The pathways of perception-memory-analysis can be illustrated with distinct kinds of
examples but are easier to understand by using words. Words have many meanings and
although a person may understand your reasoning, they may not agree with it. In the
previous example related above, attempts by the child to fathom the meaning of 'straight
away' by attempting to give meaning to the words constitutes a form of analysis. The
problem was not solved since the meanings were obtuse, and not part of his vocabulary.

Logical analytic or just analytical

Many examples below illustrate the difference between similar kinds of thinking, i.e.,
analytic and logical analytic.

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Analytic: If the response is purely associational and an interpretation or inference is

made, then the classification of the response is analytical. There is a difference between
analytic and logical analytics. Analytic pathways are used often by children from ages 5
to 11 or by adults (ages 11-90); however, these same pathways do not always involve
logical analytic thought. Simple discriminations, as well as the dissecting of an argument,
are valid analytical responses that may or may not be logical. An analytic response to the
lamb story above might be: “It feels like the lambs want to go home.” Is that response an
inference or an intuitive notion? Lots of people analyze situations and their analysis
contains little logic, yet their solution or conclusion is correct. Maybe the lamb wants to
go home but, according to the individual’s report, the outcome was determined by a
feeling.

Can one find a solution to a problem through intuitive thinking based on many
observations of a pattern of events?

Logical analytic: Our definition of logical analytical involves examples using analogies
and seriation. For example, determine the relationship (similarity) between this set of
words—the dog is similar to the house as the elephant is similar to? (circus) How would
judge the following response by a child to this analogy: 1) dog is to house as the elephant
is to ________?

The response by an 8-year-old: a dog plays in the house and the elephant plays at the
circus. Likewise, what about this response: A dog lives in the doghouse while the
elephant lives in his house at the circus. If the response requires the respondent to give a
relationship and it has a common reference that can be verified by others, then we classify
the response as logical and analytical.

What about the example above: "Mary is being followed by the lambs who seemed to be
hot?” The first part of the response was descriptive, while the second part (which seemed
to be hot) is an inference (analysis required) based on the observation that the tongues
were hanging out-- common reference verified by others but is it logical analytic or just
analytic?

Divergent pathways

Problem-solving situations in high school often exist as part of a narrow context, within
a confined subject matter area, discipline, or set of circumstances. For instance, a problem
given in an English class might require the student to write a literary character portrayal.
An activity such as writing uses many divergent and convergent pathways. Think about

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your favorite TV character (Sherlock Holmes, for example). How would you write a
characterization? First recall the character’s multiple activities, expressions, and ways of
behaving. Now transfer these images, icons, or mental representations into written words
on a piece of paper, a very divergent and convergent activity.

Often in the later years of one’s life, a person, after seeing many problems in their area of
specialty, moves into management. Having many different and varied experiences
provides the new manager with many alternative solutions when a problem arises.
Divergent thinking in this sense allows the mind to think of more than a single
alternative. In earlier chapters, the process was described as making decisions between
competing pathways that provided different mental representations.

In the university system, I have met many students who were extremely perplexed
because they did not score well on an exam. They had studied long and diligently. Many
of these students when questioned orally could give analytic explanations about the
material. However, these same students could not interpret what was required by a
written question on the exams. That is, their thought pattern was: What is being asked by
this question? If the teacher would verbally clarify, explain, or narrow down the options,
then the question could be answered correctly by the student. In other words, the teacher
acted as the intermediary in converging the vast number of divergent possibilities

Likewise, many students were unable to choose a correct answer between alternatives on
a multiple-choice exam, especially if the alternatives were written in a similar style and
manner with words changed for logical inference. Their divergent thinking and method of
networking information contributed to their confusion on tests. In many instances, they failed
to converge quickly. When they analyzed each alternative on the multiple-choice test,
the number of associations they created as possible answers was so great that they were
overwhelmed. Their thought process was: “Well, it could be this or then again maybe
this.” “Well if this is true, the answer might be?” The answer required on the multiple-
choice test was logical, convergent, and time-dependent. Of course, my colleagues would
suggest that they did not study long enough to comprehend the complexity of the
question as related to the study material.

Our system of education places emphasis on problem-solving but usually in specific

settings and within defined parameters of subject matter such as math, science, English,
reading, social studies, or social relations. Often, this emphasis requires convergent
analysis and memory, not divergent thinking

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Perception (Ideation)-memory-divergent –association)

In this next pathway, the child perceives the book, encodes the stimulus, diverges to
ideational content in the brain, and then converges to a single associative response.
Actually, this is a recursive response where converging to a single response requires time
to go back and forth between many different divergent thoughts. This cognitive process
is time-consuming, especially if the student can generate many different divergent
thoughts which may pose plausible solutions to the stimulus situation. Some of the most
recursive, divergent thinkers that we have measured have jobs in advertising and
writing. They develop and write jingles, and scenarios for radio, television, and
newspapers. When given alternative stimuli, the number of ideas generated is mind-
boggling.

As an example of this pathway, an older child may pose his or her problem based on
seeing the picture of Mary and the little lambs on the cover, "I wonder if the author of the
story Mary had a Little Lamb was a man or a woman?" or "Was Mary a real person and
where did she live?" Or "Was wool a necessary commodity at the time in which the poem
was written?" These responses are rather sophisticated for a child, but they illustrate the
point. The more creative or divergent the student, the more likely the response is unique.
Sometimes my colleagues when hearing such divergent responses characterize the same
person as “spacey.” On a recent trip abroad, one of the women in our tour group (in
response to our tour guide's monologue about what we were observing) would come up
with the most seemingly bizarre questions or statements. The “quiet or wait time” as
others in the group attempted to understand her associations were astounding!

Remember, that children (and adults) spend a lot of time daydreaming, reading books,
or just thinking about things that may seem ridiculous to others. Their fantasy-land
thoughts may or may not have real components that aid in the solution of a problem. The
more divergent the thinking process of the individual, the greater the number of
alternative responses that are generated, and the more time required to think about which
alternative is useful in the solution of a problem.

Convergent pathways

Perception-memory, analytic, convergent. An individual sees a math problem on a sheet of

paper, stores that perception in memory, and thinks about the single best response and
answers. Example: The child sees a math problem, remembers the previous day’s lesson,
decides which answer is best, and gives the single right answer.

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A teacher writes on the board, "How many 5's are contained in 25? The child thinks:
What does she mean? Multiplication, division, addition, subtraction? This question
requires a divergent response to answer unless one assumes that only an operation, such
as division exists and responds with an answer of five to that operation. People make
assumptions (i.e. convergent answers based on division by 5). However, a divergent
thinker might think of multiple operations before answering multiplication (5x5);
subtraction (25-5-5-5-5-5); addition (5+5+5+5+5); or division (25/5) before deciding on the
single convergent response of 5.

A teacher writes on the board, "How many 5's are contained in 25? Use division for
obtaining your answer?" The child remembers the form of the problem presented in the
previous day’s lesson and applies the same method of dividing 5 into 25 and converges
to the single right answer of 5. What would be the response to the question: “How many
times is 5 contained in 25? Use addition to answer this question Notice that the constraints
(use division, use addition) limits the divergence and allows for quick convergence. Were
these logical responses posed by IPS theory?

Divergent/convergent logical pathway using comprehension

The perception-memory-logical analysis is also a type of analysis that is considered by many

to be a premium pathway of thinking since the elements of logical analysis can be verified
by others as a correct response. The key is ‘verified by others.’ This pathway is not often
used until the developmental age stage of 10 or 11 or cognitive developmental stages
between 13 and 22. A child is given a math problem, stores or draws from memory, and
then analyzes what is needed to solve the problem. The child sees a problem in the
following form. "How many fours are found in the following problem (24 + 12)." The child
remembers a sequence of addition from memory but must analyze and comprehend the
meaning of the word problem- how many fours? One answer might be (6 + 3) or another
is 9. The answer can be verified by others since there are mathematical rules used to solve
the problem.

As noted earlier, our model allows for partial and complete comprehension.
Comprehension suggests that the meaning of words is either individualistic or common.
When people diverge with multiple associations, comprehension is individualistic until
another person commonly interprets the meaning. How many times during your lifetime
has a member of a family said something to you and you had to ask several questions to
understand what the family member is saying? There was partial comprehension until
the statement was clarified and finally there was comprehension.

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Perception-memory-(association-divergent)-analysis-divergent/convergent) A person sees

something, stores it in memory, thinks of different ideas which are related, imagines some
possibilities, and thinks about which one is best.

Example: (Obviously, this is a complicated example for an older child). The child
encounters a math problem with the instructions: Using any set of numbers and
arithmetic operations, generate a problem with a numerical solution of 4.

The child stores or draws from memory (which operation-addition, subtraction

multiplication, divisions?). He makes an association with different memory ideas (6-2=4,
4 x 1=4, 16/4 = 4), generates different ideas (6+2-4=4, 12x4/9=4), examines different ideas,
and finally chooses one.

The student must comprehend the operations to use them properly and all of the
outcomes are verifiable according to mathematical rules.

A complex and compound pathway involving comprehension

People contribute substantially to society by solving immensely complex problems that

are not constrained by time. Often these same people use their time at home or away
from school or work to solve complex or compound problems. Some of the previous
problems in this section are classified as complex and compound. Remember that any
problem requiring multiple mental operations is complex, while a compound problem
requires a series of steps involving divergent, convergent thinking, and an evaluation of
the results. Does evaluation imply the answer makes sense in the context of the question
posed? Compound problems are often found in fortune five hundred companies where
expansion and maintenance issues require solutions to problems that have many steps.

In Chapter 17, managers in organizations are representative of complex and compound

problem solvers. As many senior managers are aware, complex problems in business are
usually solved by teams of people. For younger problem solvers, complex problem-
solving pathways are often part of math and science or project-oriented curriculums.

Perception-memory association. Linkage, analysis, complex association (understanding) -

divergent -convergent -evaluation- Recursion.

An individual sees an object, stores the object in memory, thinks about the characteristics
(with or without analysis) and links thoughts with other characteristics that are stored in
memory.

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Example: The child is given a math problem, remembers the previous lesson, relates to
other images stored in memory, and links up many distinct parts from the lesson read
the previous day. Then the child analyzes the best response and then diverges to several
different viable solutions by trial and error. Finally, after many recursive iterations, he or
she converges to a single solution and evaluates the response--starting the process over.
This process is often called simultaneous thinking (Bruner, 1961).

Perception-memory-(association-divergent)-analysis-convergent-evaluation. A person notes

something, stores that image in memory, and thinks of different ideas that are related. He
or she imagines other possibilities, decides which is best, writes the response down, and
evaluates its appropriateness. He or she starts over, thinks of another particular response,
tries to decide which is the best alternative, and finally decides. Wow! Does this really
happen? Ask any student who had tried to solve a complex, math-related word problem
or any history student who had tried to put everyday observed situations into a historical
context!

If the problem is extraordinarily complex, there are many situations where a problem-
solving individual becomes arrested in a stage or pathway related to a problem. The more
complex the problem, the more likely that some form of arrest may occur in the process.
In fact, in some cases, a solution cannot be synthesized, even if one is given all the elements and
unlimited time. The solution to a problem might be a paper, an equation, a new project, a
work of art, or fixing a car.

Interaction of social and different mental pathways

Association-affective: Any of the pathways may be affected by emotions, threats, or

external factors such as hunger, fatigue, or environmental interference. Almost everyone
is aware of how an emotionally laden response skews or biases the meaning of the verbal
content offered with the information. All kinds of emotional responses can occur based
on how the following words are uttered— “get out of here.” A blocking or suppressing
of the emotional content or affect is just as diagnostic as the actual emotional content
itself. It is possible to suppress affect and feelings when dealing with problems. The
suppressing of feelings is more likely as egocentricity increases. That is, the more
egocentric the person, the less likely that a pathway includes an initial emotional
response. The reason: egocentric individuals tend to interpret almost all responses in
terms of their perspective; how it affects them. One cannot discuss all the relationships
between social and mental pathways, but some are more important than others. Suffice
at the present that perception memory-affective-association-analytic is important when the
‘social context’ of a problem needs to be understood.

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Association-biological factors: Hunger and fatigue are obvious biological factors that slow
the problem-solving process. Children are especially vulnerable to feelings of fatigue and
hunger. Children who cannot pay attention because they are sleeping in class are not
good at solving problems. Have you ever stayed too long in the sauna? The blood flows
to the extremities and when getting out, one feels faint and the sensory-motor system
fails. There is great difficulty in doing much of anything, much less solving any type of
problem. How about when a child is scared, try asking them to solve a simple problem.
Most of the time, one gets a blank stare, garble response, confusion, or panic.

When a person becomes more egocentric, he or she is more likely to have difficulty
identifying with social cues. Egocentricity can occur as a result of many things including
being in an education setting for long periods, especially for those graduate students in
disciplines that require a structured knowledge base. Developing a structured knowledge
base requires that the individual spend many hours reading, thinking, and organizing.
Hours away from social interaction with other people can lead a person to more focus on
self-needs, self-gratification, and social awkwardness.

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Chapter 9

Synopsis: Delays in problem-solving

Delays in the everyday solution of problems are quite common. Many known problems in
cognitive pathways exist in daily life, education, and medicine. Obstructions, slowing, and lesions
due to trauma, developmental delay, accidents, and individual differences are typical problems
associated with neural pathways. Many documented studies in clinical neuroscience suggest
impairments in neural pathways lead to processing difficulties and slowness of response.
Impairments in seeing objects clearly, difficulty in matching overlapping figures, as well as
disorders related to the meaning of objects have been found in many single cases by clinicians
and researchers. The IPS theory extends the solitary case evidence to the idea that different groups
of people, who are not impaired with cerebral lesions have delays in the processing of
information. In IPS theory, rather than being abnormal, these delays are related to the process of
growth and differentiation as well as the repeated use of sometimes incorrect pathways to solve
problems.

Impairments in neural functioning are well-known and have been studied clinically for years.
Impairments are defined as anything which causes a delay, or malfunction of normal problem-
solving. Impairment occurs as a result of interferences with neuron transmissions, lesions,
deficits, emotions, and incorrect use of cognitive patterns due to emotions and feelings.
Impairments interfere with cognitive functioning. Anxiety, impulsiveness, and impatience are
well-known impairments that can result in cognitive interference. Alzheimer’s disease through
the spread of amyloids in the brain impairs the functioning of the hippocampus in the limbic
system causing problems in learning and memory and the recognition of novelty and spatial
relationships. In education, developmental differences accentuate individual differences in the
solving of school-related problems, particularly those measured by verbal, numerical, and spatial
tests through standardized testing. Developmental differences may result in life-long vocational
differences that affect career pathways.

Developmental delays in neuro pathways may contribute to difficulties in problem-solving and

affect general life functions. Because of neurodevelopmental problems that are caused by
differential functioning, children may develop identifiable characteristics. Autism is one example
of a neurodevelopmental delay that can cause social ineptness, difficulty in processing
environmental stimuli, and a host of related symptoms. Less serious problems are also evident as
a result of problems in neuro pathways. Children who have simple cognitive and affective
processing difficulties may have problems in processing language, speech, words, numbers, and
images. These simple cognitive and affective delays lead to identifiable differences in
standardized testing which are manifested early in age development.

The field of education is full of children who are developmentally delayed in one form or another.
The most obvious example is children classified as special education. The least obvious examples

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are illustrated in the following story. Recently I talked with a third-grade teacher who taught
advanced students in a higher average income area. I questioned him about the student’s
capability of solving math problems in the third-grade curriculum. He stated that 14 of the 26
students were fine but 12 were behind. Twelve advanced students behind, I gasped! When I
asked him the reason, he stated that, in his opinion, they were developmentally delayed! Think
about an 8-year-old student in an advanced class being developmentally delayed in math.

To me, this statement was the equivalent of stating that neurological cognitive interference,
deficits, inhibition, and developmental cognitive growth patterns contributed to neural pathways
that were less efficient in problem-solving in comparison to other children of the same age, mental
maturity, and experience. One does not think of children who score in the 90th percentile and
above on most standardized tests as being developmentally delayed. Most often, the standard of
‘developmentally delayed’ is applied to those who score in the lowest 30th percentile of
standardized tests. Can the “case” be made that there are simply different degrees of
developmental delays in children that contribute to differences in problem-solving?

In the IPS model, Tier One and Tier Two are just as important as Tier Three. That is,
understanding the theoretical foundations of neural functioning is important in understanding
how cognitive interference, growth differentials, deficits, and pathway inhibition influence the
solving of problems. In the research literature, one of the often-stated axioms is that once a
neurological pathway is used or developed, then it is easier to reuse. The complicated process is
developing the energy, resources, and time to cut a new neural pathway! Learn something new!
After a pathway is developed, repeated practice increases memory usage, and structured recall
from an ordered knowledge base increases efficiency and performance quality. What happens
when a person is stymied or lost in a pathway, either by cerebral lesions, brain trauma, aging, or
normal interference from one’s own emotions? The answer to that question requires a textbook
on clinical cognitive neuropsychology. In this chapter, the focus on the issues is brief and
superficial as two well-known examples are selected.

Process theory/performance theory

Two of the dominant theories in the literature address both the processes and outcomes of
problem-solving. The Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007),
was developed from the earlier Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Both
theories were developed based on empirical data. Processing Efficiency Theory explains how
well the resources (encoding, memory, neural tracts) are used to effectively process information
while Attentional Control Theory is a performance theory that relates to the quality of the
outcome of a problem-solving situation.

Research on these two theories is usually laboratory-based. High anxiety and low anxious
subjects are given performance tasks under threat and non-threat conditions. In general, time-
related processing shows high anxious subjects are usually slower in processing information,
especially under threat conditions. High anxious subjects are more likely to process task-

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irrelevant information during an exercise. This is a simple example of cognitive interference.

Time to reach a problem solution is increased by emotional interference which results in a time
differential.

Test anxiety

Test anxiety, a known impairment in neuropathways, is an emotional condition that often results in
a lower grade on tests. High levels of anxiety occur simultaneously with or before a cognitive
problem-solving operation thereby impeding or interfering with cognition. Anxiety is emotional
electrical energy that cascades through the brain, internal organs, and integumentary system. The
source of anxiety depends upon whether it is a state or trait. State anxiety is a temporary condition
that increases motivation and often prevents failure in goal attainment. That is, “I better study
tonight to keep from failing the test tomorrow.” Trait anxiety is less situational, more enduring,
and occurs with greater frequency in the everyday behavior of an individual. Trait anxiety comes
from reoccurring situations which increase stress, expectations, pressure, and the need to
succeed. Trait anxiety becomes destructive when emotional electrical energy impedes cognition
and prevents problem-solving. State anxiety and trait anxiety are interactive as perceived threat
conditions increase. Emotional energy, filtered through memories representing stored images in
episodic behavior, removes or alters the condition of threat or stress.

How does cognitive interference occur? Both the Process Effectiveness Theory and the
Attentional Control Theory assume that there is a fundamental distinction between “performance
effectiveness” (quality of performance) and “processing efficiency” (the relationship between
performance effectiveness and use of processing resources), and that anxiety impairs “processing
efficiency” more than “performance effectiveness.” According to theory, the constant thoughts
resulting from anxiety are off-task (irrelevant) during a problem-solving situation thereby
shifting attention from the task at hand. This self-preoccupation is a strong and impulsive force.
When taking a test, if one is constantly worried about the baby at home, this worry shifts attention
from the ongoing task or questions posed on the test. This can result in a lower test grade.

Clinical neuroscience

Let’s start with the most obvious cases of cognitive delay, i.e., accidents. In brain trauma resulting
from the brain moving forward and backward during car accidents, delays in cognitive functions
are common. Delays are the result of either brain or vascular injury. When one car rear-ends
another car and causes neck and brain injury, the brain, and next joints move forward or
backward for several millimeters. Injury to the blood vessels causes ischemia or reduced blood
flow which results in microinfarctions. Reduced blow flow causes a problem with cellular
metabolism and neurons do not carry brain signals as easily. A loss of brain neurons, fibers, and
tracts retards signals from auditory, visual, or cognitive areas. Obvious clinical signs are slurring
of words, inability to speak, lack of motor coordination, and inaccurate word associations. Pet
scans and fMRIs indicate areas of malfunctions and delays.

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From clinical neuroscience, there are other known problems in neuropathways that apply to the
IPS theory. The first is Apperceptive Agnosia or the impairment of seeing objects. Milner (1958)
noted that lesions in the right hemisphere, specifically the temporal lobes, caused difficulty in
matching overlapping figures. The inability to make visual shape discriminations (Wesikrantz,
1980) is associated with bilateral posterior cerebral lesions. Disorders related to the meaning of
objects are known as Associative Agnosia (Lissauer, 1988). This was studied post-mortem but
confirmed by other single cases (Ferro & Santos, 1984). There are many studies on impairments
in visual perceptual abilities (Taylor & Warrington, 1971).

This solitary case of evidence is extended to the concept that different subgroups of people are
not impaired but show delays or increases in the processing of information. Four examples are
often given. First, the nature of the problem or problem situation causes delays or increases in
processing time, thereby causing individuals to shift to other mental resources such as focusing
on existing social processes rather than the problem being presented. That is, when emotional
content is provided with the problem, the affective nature (threat, hostility, or anger) impedes the
cognitive processes causing people to focus on social outcomes rather than cognitive problem
outcomes. The second alternative suggests that when so many cognitive resources are available
and a problem is presented, favorite pathways (habits) are used by different people. That is, the
divergent thinker, focusing on other alternatives related to the problem, fails to respond with an
immediate solution as their favorite pathway “thinking of multiple alternatives” is used. The
third and most often cited example is that changes occurring in the environment (from verbal,
and non-verbal situations) affect processing time. One of the most often cited examples is
environmental conditions in the classroom that affect and interfere with individuals who are
taking a test—lights, noise, other students talking or shifting their bodies, etc. Fourth, delays are
related to the process of growth (not having reached a neurological endpoint). This is often cited
as a “readiness” factor. Rather than being abnormal, biological delays are normal occurrences
but are often overlooked especially by parents. Ultimately, delays or increases in neural
pathways and processing lead to compensations, habits, or repeated use of neural pathways that
provide information about characteristics of personality, interest, and cognitive subgroups of
people!

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Chapter 10

Synopsis: Integrative Problem solving

A short synopsis of our theory suggests that problem-solving is an ongoing process that occurs
daily as the person is involved in different situations. People of different ages, cultural
backgrounds, gender, and previous knowledge encounter distinct types of problems in different
kinds of environments. When people encounter several types of problems, problem
identification, problem solution, task characteristics, and individual differences are a part of the
problem-solving process. Many different internal and affective states of the individual occur in a
process of interaction with the problem-solving situation. Constant, consistent, perceptual
feedback from the environment modifies the initial, middle, and end-stage of problem resolution.
Such frequent and ongoing interactions when combined with individual differences in
personality, cognition, and interest contribute to diverse levels of processing information and
thus influence notions about insight, intuition, and inferences.

The complexity of problems involving words, numbers, and spatial processing defies a synopsis
as the literature is incomplete and varied. However, generalizations and assumptions can be
developed as interactions of subgroups and problems are researched. Current research studies
suggest that words, numbers, and visual-spatial concepts are processed in different places but
simultaneously in the brain. Words and numbers are processed more in the parietal ventral part
of the brain while spatial processing occurs on the left side of the brain. Again, this statement is
controversial.

Integrative Problem Solving is at the macro level and transcends many biological systems in the
individual. Personal characteristics, interest patterns, and cognitive/affective processes of
thinking have been studied for many years as isolated elements. Studies found in books, research
articles, and literature provide many conceptual ways of viewing problem-solving. At the macro
level of integration for the individual, the problem-solving process, utilizing all biological
systems, interacts and functions holistically.

As noted, many times earlier, encoding, representation, and neural feedback provide thousands
of neural firings simultaneously in nanoseconds causing cognitive processes to appear integrated.
When integration occurs, individual differences are amplified.

When a problem is being solved, especially under a threat or anxiety-created situation, the interaction
between all biological systems as well as the environmental task makes it almost impossible to separate or
isolate individual elements, except when previous processes unique to the individual’s problem-solving
process have been identified.

In an integrative model, many questions about the speed and duration of solving problems are
relevant as decisions are made quickly. For example, assume one is flying a Boeing 777 and two

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out of three engines are on fire or failing. Is it possible to isolate the problem-solving
characteristics of a pilot in the cockpit of a plane carrying 200 passengers in such a situation?
How do decisions regarding speed, duration, and maneuverability of the airplane change for the
pilot who is under threat? What happens as new information becomes available? Under such
conditions, the slowness or quickness of a decision is related to the complexity and nature of the
problem, the experience of the individual, and the nature of the environmental consequences.
What is presently known is that for almost any individual, the integrative factor makes it almost
impossible to divide the whole into the sum of its parts in such dire circumstances. Sometimes
the only visible factor of what happens is the outcome—the plane crashes or not. However, the
influence of the individual’s background (training, motivation, prerequisite knowledge, natural
ability, comprehension of the problem, amount of time practicing similar examples, and cognitive
factors) are paramount in defining and contributing to a problem-solving outcome

Example: To make the argument more explicit, let us use an example from math. Math is the
easiest to track and understand as the outcome is more likely to follow logical rules. Consider
these directions found on a recent achievement test--"factor this algebraic expression into 2
different components: (x2-y2). The answer is (x + y) times (x-y) where the middle term disappears
or is canceled.

For a child to answer the question, the child’s background and personal characteristics, as well as
the question given on the achievement tests, should be considered. First, based on personal
characteristics, children differ in their motivation to solve such a problem. If one does not like
math, then solving quadratic equations is not fun. Second, the children who desire or have the
motivation to solve the problem may not have the foundation of quadratic equations (prerequisite
knowledge) necessary to determine a solution. Third, if the knowledge (skill or information base)
was not present, then a natural ability to detect or recognize patterns could be involved. In such
a case, the person might give the correct answer but not understand the methodology by which
it was obtained.

And finally, there are children who through teaching and study have prerequisite information.
They practice the skill; give the correct answer but do not have any understanding of its use. They
perform (recall with automatization of the skill) but do not understand how the material is
applied. When is the last time that you used a quadratic equation? The skill is automatized by
practice from familiarity with similar problems found in math books. In essence, as shown in the
next paragraphs, many invisible integrated factors contribute to the correct solution to any
problem.

Axiom

At any given moment when an individual is solving a problem, the interdependence of

emotional, physical, and biological systems in the normal individual is considered, for all
practical purposes, single, interdependent, and integrative. Remember the mousetrap in Chapter 2. In
other words, all the individual systems function as a whole at higher levels of thought. This

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axiom holds true except when any of the biological systems are malfunctioning due to a lack of
attention, normal attrition, or energy deprivation. Or then again, perhaps the exception is an
external cause (rain, sleet, snow, earthquake) or when other people intercede causing interference
with problem-solving activity.

Consider as a concrete example: when I am sitting in my easy chair writing this book, I am not
worried about or cognizant of actions occurring at a micro atomic level in any of the objects in
my immediate environment. Quantum physics and the influence of energy and light in my
environment concern me only to the degree that they impact my writing on my computer.
However, if my wife should throw a pillow at my head, I am going to quit writing and duck.

Likewise, if I do not eat for several hours and I become hungry and tired, the loss of energy from
one of my biological systems becomes important to the degree that there is interference in the
writing of the book. I cannot write since I am hungry. I have to go to eat. The interface between
biological functions and cognitive functions is so great that should a malfunction occurs in one
area; there is a direct influence in another. A pain in my stomach when I have the flu keeps me
from doing my best work.

So why all the fuss? This information seems like common sense. The emphasis here is on solving
problems. In our research, the integrative nature of biological systems functioning holistically can
be better understood by using a variety of measurement subscales that address problem-solving
activity in a complex and multifaceted way. Knowing both the problem solver and the problem-
solving activity as well as the environmental circumstances helps to understand the complexity
of the problem-solving process.

The characteristics of different biological systems and the physical environments can be better
understood by understanding the interactions which occur; however, problems are particular to
the individual or groups of individuals. When one goes to the doctor for a problem, the fact that
smoking leads to a greater probability of cancer influences the doctor in his physical exam if the
patient is a smoker. However, the influence of smoking on any patient is unique to their
particular immune systems and to the group of people who smoke! Cancer can be but is not
necessarily an outcome. The same is true for solving problems. Some people are better problem
solvers than others since they have an experiential history of solving similar kinds of problems
(Captain Chelsey Sullenberger landed an Airbus A320 with failing engines on the Hudson River
in 2009.).

This leads to a second axiom regarding the integrative nature of solving problems. Integrative
systems have multiple functioning dependent and independent units which act in concert but
simultaneously function antagonistically to the whole. A cell might function independently and
dependently on the organ in which it is contained; a hormone may increase or decrease the
function of the whole. Thus, the brain contains physiological and structural systems that are
competitive and antagonistic but function holistically as an integrative unit.

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No doubt, the experiential history of children and adolescents relates to the development of the
biological and neurological systems. For the child, any teacher of any sport or subject recognizes
that "readiness" or the time when children are ready to learn or engage in certain motor or mental
activities is important. In teaching youngsters, there is a readiness stage for solving diverse kinds
of problems that involve verbal, numerical, and spatial problems. The readiness stage is different
for different people or groups of people.

Readiness assumes that mental operations increase with biological development and that age-
wise cognitive acumen varies with previous experience, exposure, and mental development. This
may seem difficult to accept, especially for test developers who develop tests by age groups that
schools use to pigeonhole children. Both schools and test developers should consider writing
academic tests by developmental groups, rather than by age or grade level, especially if an
achievement test is used as a basis for assigning students to educational activities. The interaction
of energy reactions in motor and neural pathways, as the result of practice and exposure, helps to
develop readiness characteristics.

For the adult, complex and compound problem solving is the result of years of experience and
tenacity in solving particular kinds of problems. Very few people can ascertain the number of
hours and the work ethic needed to solve unique problems. Many of the complex problems of
society have been solved by people who have dedicated their lives to solving problems related to
their interests or work.

Learning is at the heart of problem-solving. Learning involves a modification of neural pathways

associated with neuron memory storage. The change or modification occurs in emotions
associated with neuron memory storage, previously stored knowledge, and icon representation
associated with the problem at hand. The degree of learning may be dependent upon its
complexity. Simple learning occurs in nanoseconds with neural feedback systems based on
encoding, speed of processing, and context comprehension. Complex learning can take hours,
days, weeks, or months. People, who solve a particular problem correctly, often learn all facets of
that kind of problem. The process of learning occurs with repetition, experiences, and multiple
instances of problem identification and problem resolution.

Speed of processing information for all three types of problems (word, number, spatial) is a
crucial factor in timed situations that occur when people are involved in standardized and
regulated testing. Speed of processing and reaction time for numbers, words, and symbols are
less important in complex and compound problem solving where compound problem solving
involves many steps and decisions at each step and there is not an imposed or implied time limit.
Complex problem-solving is different from compound problem-solving. Complex problem
solving is evident when a simple problem increases in difficulty level. Complex problem solving,
which occurs more in daily life, is usually ill-defined (difficult to grasp). Its difficulty level can be
related to a lack of definition or the ability to understand the problem.

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General problem solvers who enjoy solving many different kinds of problems are more likely to
solve problems involving all classes of words, numbers, and symbols. General problem solvers
are more likely to feel less threatened when encountering ill-defined problems. General problem
solvers are more likely to exhibit characteristics such as cognitive flexibility (flex) since they have
been exposed to many different kinds of problems. Differential problem solvers are different from
general problem solvers by exposure and experience. Differential problem solvers have less
exposure, less experienced, and less familiarity with a wide range of difficult discipline
(academic) type problems. Differential problem solvers, in the early years of their life, often
develop a structured approach to typical problems in their area of interest. However, the same
children often develop a trial-and-error strategy outside of their area of interest. Differential
problem solvers are more likely to solve problems in their area of interest and develop cognitive
strengths when they begin to mature and focus on outcomes. Many differential problem solvers
are very successful in the same environment as a general problem solvers as they mature over
time and develop successful methods of practice in their area of interest. Many other differential
problem solvers are not as successful as the general problem solver because more energy is
devoted to internal issues related to emotional feelings. When emotional or biological energy
consumes more energy internally than externally, problem-solving is inhibited or slowed.

Simple problem solving is often well-defined, has an identifiable goal, and is usually age and
situation-dependent. Therefore, word, numerical, and spatial problems related to schooling are
solved differentially by individuals using their age-related cognitive resources, personality, and
interests.

As people age and mature and become involved in vocational problem-solving, ill-defined
problems become more prominent in daily activities. This is extremely evident in the complexity
of dealing with everyday changing economic and situational environments, work environments,
or management situations involving businesses. Individual differences in complex problem
solving are very evident in management situations in extremely large and variegated companies.
Therefore, differences related to understanding and resolving complex problems in large
companies are very evident between groups of seniors, middle, and first-line managers. Senior
managers are generally able to diagnose and resolve complex organizational problems.

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Chapter 11

Synopsis: Tier Two: Cognitive and affective problem-solving model

Tier Two describes a model of the cognitive and affective processes which mirror the biological
functions just described in Tier One. The cognitive model illustrates the thought process involved
in problem-solving. Simultaneous cognitive processing combined with emotional reactions
contributes to individual differences. Individual differences in problem-solving rely heavily on
the uniqueness of the individual developed over a vast period, a uniqueness that comes from
experience, practice, the firing of neurons in the brain as well as the brain’s structure and function.

Tier Two is an overlay of biological functioning and image processing. The cognitive and affect
models show how information is processed in many pathways through the brain. From sensory
input through the pathways of short-term and long-term memories, emotional and affective
feelings, associations, representations, and analytic and logical thoughts are used to establish
types of output such as verbal, motor, and emotional. Thus, the cognitive model illustrates multi-
dimensional thinking patterns. Deep processing of information is contrasted with “lung to
tongue” responses, depending on age and stage of development level. Rather than showing a
simple hierarchical model of cognition with high order constructs and self-monitoring at the
upper level, the model demonstrates the reality of brain processing where simultaneous
processing occurs in multidirectional ways depending on the amount and time devoted to a
depth of processing, memory storage, and energy transformations.

Tier Two contains data and numeric-oriented chapters in the book and not in the Synopsis. These
sections are usually of interest to researchers who want to understand the research concepts
underlying the 36 subgroups. For those who do not prefer a lot of numbers just proceed to Tier
Three below.

Synopsis: Tier three: problem-solving-clinical observation

Tier Three represents clinical practice, diagnosis, and classification in the process of solving a
word, number, or spatial problem. For medical and non-medical personnel, the process of
determining the classification of a problem occurs via observation, diagnostic tests, and clinical
symptoms. Clinical assessment is ongoing, contributing to the building of a realistic case for
diagnosis. Medical models use all three tiers of anatomy, physiology, and functional cognitive
and neuro analysis to make an accurate diagnosis and reasonable assessment. The same process
is used by school personnel as they instruct children, although this occurs in a less structured
way. School personnel are constantly diagnosing children with all kinds of learning disabilities
and problems with learning

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Brain pathways established early in life contribute to time and outcome differentials (correct
answers on problem-solving tests) which result in measurable differences apparent at different
ages and in various stages of individual development. Cognitive differences and pathways are
illustrated through the use of a cognitive model that mimics brain functioning. Some children
and adults, due to individual differences in development, as well as experience, and maturity,
become stymied, delayed, or have a deficit (lesions, trauma) in these pathways. This may result
in difficulties associated with the solving of everyday and academic problems, especially in word,
number, and spatial activities.

To illustrate those real differences exist in problem-solving, the IPS theory requires realistic
measurement and interpretation. Real data is collected from real people. That data was collected
and analyzed over forty years. The IPS theory incorporates the following areas of cognition (fluid
ability as represented by spatial items, analogies, block counting, and image visualization) and
semi-cognition (images represented by field independence, field dependence, visual search,
arithmetic processing, and cognitive image search) as well as non-cognitive items where people
make choices that result in scores on the problem-solving instrument. Measurement of children
differs from the measurement of adults so different instruments, methodologies, and procedures
are used at different ages.

The complexity of the IPS theory suggests that differences are exhibited as part of the life-long
developmental process. Differences are apparent in various stages of development (birth, ages
2-7; 8-9; 10-13; 14-17; adulthood, and senior adulthood). A complex model is only realistic if the
data collected shows a significant difference in the problem-solving scales as well as significant
differences in the solution of words, numbers, and spatial activities at different ages and maturity.
Each of the following stages, after neonate and infancy, is illustrated by real data in the book.

Synopsis for Stage Neonate: birth to twenty-four months

There are important critical periods in the central nervous system development, especially in the
third trimester of pregnancy. At any stage, a virus or other organism may intercept the fetus
causing an increased risk or problem in central nervous system development. For example, the
Zika virus may cause microcephaly and other birth defects.

Each cell's development is dependent upon energy, either electrical, enzymatic, or weak forces.
Glia cells, which are increasing at a fast pace, have axons and dendrites continuing their growth
while other neurological structures are in various stages of development. The cells of the fetus
increase at a rate of 250 thousand a minute.

The mother's psychological well-being drastically influences her progress in development. For
example, at the University of Washington, researchers found that some mothers' prolonged
depression can significantly reduce the activity in parts of the infant's brain. Conditioning takes

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place before birth! After birth, stimulation, a form of environmental energy, is still critical for
growth in cortical structures. With stimulation, the neurons blossom in the brain like a flower
responding to the water and the sun. By birth, the infant will have most of the entire cadre of
brain cells, shaped by more than 50, 000 cells from the human genome. The importance of
stimulation during the time in which the neonate is developing has been shown in many different
studies involving sensory deprivation. This is true, especially for the development of the cortex.
Critical periods of stimulation must occur if the visual cortex is to develop and function
adequately.

Initially, at birth, neurons are firing in all different systems in the brain, but the majority are
bottom-up, that is, neurons involved in sensory-motor processing. Top-down processing is built
through interaction with objects in the environment and representations have a long
development period. The beginning of cognitive and affective processing representing different
subgroups of people has its origin in the first years of life but represents modes of things rather
than styles of thinking.

Sensory information changes with physical development as the child interacts with objects in the
environment by crawling and finally by walking. Walking occurs from nine to twelve months.
Each stage of physical development contributes to conceptual development as more sensory
information is available. The changes are so great from birth to 18 months, that it is difficult to
account for all of them.

In the latter stages of development, perhaps 8 to 16 months, the results of cognition manifest
themselves in various forms of imitation, play, and imagination. Imitation such as pretending to
shave like daddy or mommy is important. Imitation is defined as a performance via a pathway
of perception, memory, symbolic, and abstract representation since, as is the case with daddy, he
is not present and is not shaving.

Many children from birth to 2 are exposed to numerous experiential situations but many times
only receive corrective feedback based on their behavioral response. Many children learn to
control behavior but have not received corrective feedback on cognitive information. We use the
term "print-rich environment" to denote a child who is brought up from birth to 18 months with
both behavioral and corrective cognitive feedback when reading books. Corrective feedback is
especially useful during reading sessions with print matters such as books or pictures. Corrective
feedback is leading, but not coercive, as the task is to entice the child to take initiative in the
process of reading and identifying.

Cognitive Model

The cognitive model of the neonate has many missing labels and functions compared to the adult
model. Logical rules, advanced analytic thought, evaluation, and synthesis, all processes
designed for higher-order thinking, are missing. Are the frontal lobes intact and functioning?
Even though the child probably enters the world with some minute representations and short-

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term memory, the long-term process of cognition is just beginning. The senses are intact with
perception, hearing, touch, kinesthetic, and smell providing sensory information. Language
processing occurs anywhere from 8 months to 16 months depending on the child. Mental
representation and imitations (long-term memory) appear also from 21 to 28 months depending
on the exposure and experience (Liston and Kagan, 2002). Spatial processing is evident in the
first 3 months after birth. Discrimination, a simple form of analytic thought, is present, but the
exact age has not been determined. Notice that divergent and convergent thinking are both
evident as studies suggest occurrence during the first few months. Spatial, numeric, and verbal
representations are present at various times depending upon stimulation and exposure. A lack of
stimulation, exposure, and experience results in the uneven development of problem-solving
capabilities.

Diagram 2: The Cognitive Model (Neonate)

Cognitive Model: Neonate (Birth to Age 2)

Perception

Perception is the active process of interpreting and organizing incoming stimuli or sensations.
The newborn is actively engaged in gathering information about light, sound, aroma, taste, and
touch. Attention is estimated by the amount of time processing all these stimuli as indicated by
behavioral scanning.

Neonates do not have good vision when they are born. Faces are fuzzy shapes. Vision increases

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with time and the resulting attention and perception help define the image, identity, and self-
knowledge during the first years of life (Gibson, 1969, 1995; Lewis, 1994: Neisser, 2003; Rochat,
1995; Rochat & Morgan, 1995a; Schmuckler, 1995, Vander Meer & Van der Weel, 1995).

Conceptual thinking

Each association that a child makes from birth can result in some form of conceptualization. Most
researchers prefer pre-concept learning for the time prior to long-term memory formation.
Comprehension is related to concept development although it is not the same. Comprehension
for most researchers is based on memory, encoding, associations, and concept development.
Concept development is the ability to group and sort by features, properties, or common themes.
Concept development occurs early; perhaps 21 to 28 months as studies have shown this is the
time that long-term memory also develops (Liston & Kagan, 2002). Concepts increase the speed
of processing. Taxonomies allow for understanding and comparison with known objects and
ideas. Studies have noted the neonate’s resourcefulness in classifying and categorizing similar
things that have perceptual similarities. As noted earlier, perception precedes concept
development.

At this point in time, given what is known, almost all internal motor-related concepts originate
initially from "bottom-up processing." Concept formation probably occurs simultaneously for all
practical purposes with bottom-up and top-down processing. Bottom-up processing, as cited in
Chapter 6, occurs in the ventral pathways of the brain and is basically sensory-motor. Bottom-up
processing with encoding and memory storage allows categorization, a process evident by 17
months as the child sorts and categorizes similarly shaped blocks. Children begin to fill in the
gaps developed from bottom-up processing by storing long-term memory information. The child
encodes information from the environment via sensory-motor innervation and combines that
information with memory as he or she reacts to sensory-motor encoding. Remember, there are
different kinds of memory, even memory specifically designed for the proprioceptive muscles.
That is, the arms and legs in the child’s body remember what sequences occurred in muscle
movement.

Motor

Obviously, sensory-motor actions and physical development are rapidly changing during the
period of birth to 18 months. Neonates move from limited body actions and self-exploration to
movements associated with crawling, walking, and running. Early movements are restrictive,
such as raising up on the forearms while being on the tummy. Each child in a crib can hold his
head up at 6 months. The neonate moves from the actions of rolling over to standing alone and
finally cruising. At about 18 months, some children can push and pull cars or hold objects while
walking. Other children can assist with dressing and undressing, hold a crayon and scribble, and
walk downstairs if holding someone’s hand. All these events are motor events that directly
influence self-confidence and self-motivation.

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Motor actions in the environment directly affect cognition. The encoding process of the newborn
gradually develops from birth and changes daily as new information becomes available. Often
the only way for a newborn to verify the information is via sensory input (seeing, touching,
hearing, feeling). Motor actions increase the tendency to use sensory input as the best method of
verification. This later leads to children being quite practical and concrete about objects which
exist as reality or exist only in fantasy. Children who continue to focus, sharpen, accentuate, and
improve motor functions and their associated conceptual referents develop a preference for
motor-oriented and concrete activities. This preference is the basis of our classification of a child
being in the Motor subgroup (DM or GM).

Analytical processes

For the neonate, simple discrimination and association are at the heart of the thinking process.
Analysis constitutes the first step in decision-making. The neonate is born into a world of sounds,
sights, and touch, all of which require simple discrimination. After one month, there is
recognition of sounds and voices. The neonate recognizes and responds to his or her name by the
fifth month. At six months, objects are being studied and at 7 months there is evidence of
anticipation of feeding or events which have been established by routine. The hallmark of new
events is finding hidden objects at 10 months. Of course, all of these descriptions are arbitrary
and vary with the individual child. At what age does problem-solving begin?

For us, the child’s action at three months is a sign of problem-solving based on intentionality. The
intent to grasp a favorite toy and shift it to another hand suggests a goal has been reached. Studies
show that a child can recognize the simple differences in categories of food items, furniture, and
stuffed animals by 12 months of age (Younger, 1985) while at 18 months, the child can sort objects
in different groups. This suggests that some form of simple and perhaps compound analysis can
occur by one and a half years of age.

Social

The social behaviors of the child have received the most attention from the scientific community.
One is less likely to see a child smile during the first month. Around 2 or 3 months of age, smiles
increase and continue throughout the first year (Robert, 1989). In the first months, physical
manifestations are everywhere, cognition is less evident. Crying, anger, and frustrations are easy
to identify. According to some researchers, anger follows a U-shaped curve with a decrease in
anger in the second through the sixth month and increasing anger when a child cannot grasp
what is wanted. Many studies show that newborns are more responsive to their mothers than
strangers.

Evidence of maternal touch is negatively associated with indicators of distress (Stevenson,

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Thompson, & Sonuga-Barke, 1996). Shyness, which is based on observed behaviors, is only
evident in some children. When seen, the observed behavior is assessed by speed (slowness-
caution), especially when a child is approaching situations that are novel or uncertain.

Control (Structure)

Control and structure are related to co-regulation, especially in the neonate. Co-regulation is a
process of helping children internalize rules, regulations, and social behaviors (Maccoby, 1984).
For the neonate, co-regulation involves a parent or caregiver and occurs early--- usually at the
beginning of the physical movement (Kopp,1987). When children endanger themselves or engage
in the behaviors of hitting, throwing, or kicking caregivers, the behavior is restricted. Parents or
caregivers espouse many “no--s” or “don’ts.” The internalization of verbal rules begins to take
place. The neonate’s normal behavior is impulsive and inquisitive. Control is the structuring of
events and actions by parents or the structuring required for goal attainment in the neonate. In
many cases, the neonate does not understand the reason for the control and structuring from the
outside. The association of names, labels, and actions does not lead to comprehension in the first
18 months. The development of language begins with the process of self-regulation and self-
initiation, but its completion is many months away.

Two types of control: one kind of control is from the parents or caregiver and the other is from
the child seeking a solution to a goal (hungry-get food). External structuring (and in some
instances the lack of structuring) is instituted from the outside in the form of routine or habits.
Control from the inside is the series of steps necessary to maintain basic survival (eat, drink, and
breathe). When the basic survival needs are fulfilled, control from the inside is still based on goal
attainment, fulfilling the need for mental and physical stimulation.

Flex

Flex is short for cognitive flexibility. Flex is impulse stimulation combined with emotions, reflex
actions, and feelings. Flex, at the developmental age of the neonate, occurs as a response to
sensory-motor stimuli and reflex actions which are initiated from internal basic needs, such as
the need for food, water, and breathing. Likewise, flex is a response to impulses generated by
stimuli from the external environment. Flexibility occurs when trying to overcome obstacles to
achieve goal attainment imposed by external or internal sources.

Flex is the cognitive action of escaping external and internal control or obstacles and thus
contributes to goal attainment or problem-solving. Flex occurs with intentionality when escaping
internal control. If the internal impulse is to get food because of hunger, then flex is the cognitive
action of eliminating obstacles in the environment to achieve the goal. Flex does not involve
planning as cognitive and emotional impulses may only be a spur of the moment, and sometimes
completely irrational. When responding to a goal, flex is the process of using cognitive and
emotionally generated ideas creatively or differently as a way to achieve the goal.

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A neonate lying in a prone position in a crib is hungry. A bottle is placed in the hands in such a
way that the hands must be lifted to the mouth to find the nipple on the bottle. The reflex action
is to bring the nipple to the mouth to suck the nipple. Repetitive actions increase memory traces.
At a later time, the bottle is dropped. The goal is the same and the actions to solve the problem
require a series of steps to retrieve the bottle and bring the nipple to the mouth. Flex is the
adaptive cognitive thinking process (trying out different methods on how to retrieve the bottle).
The goal may never be achieved because reacting to the impulse (hungry-find bottle) with
imagination may be sufficient. Flex contributes to creative behavior as flex along with control and
conceptualization allows the problem to be solved. That is, through the flexible and adaptive
thinking process involving the inner world of words, numbers, and spatial entities, problems can
be solved.

Flex does not occur in isolation. As conceptualization and ideation increase, so may flex. If
conceptualization or imaginative ways of achieving goals are unregulated (without control), then
the dreamer or divergent thinker may not be grounded in the reality of objects and emotions. Flex
mediated by emotion without the intervention of analysis as one method of control can lead to
many different interesting conclusions, depending on circumstances.

There are not many studies on cognitive flexibility at this age as most people are interested in the
child establishing and maintaining control while he or she increases self-regulation. The studies
on creative thinking occur later when the child engages in goal-directed behavior, imaginative
activities, manual tasks, and reading.

Differences in Types of Problems Solved

Word problems solving

For the neonate, word problem-solving begins with nonverbal behavior. Gestures are a common
means of communicating by 7 months. Gestures require intentionality. In the early months,
language develops. Language consists of babbling or saying familiar words like “dada” or
“mama.” This may result in a long series of syllables which, in turn, might produce sounds that
appear to be a conversation (birth to 8 months). Sometime around 10-12 months, a few
recognizable words are spoken. By 13-15 months the average vocabulary is 4-10 words. By 18
months, the number has increased to 20. Even words, such as “please” and “thank you” are part
of the vocabulary. Two-word phrases are evident at 24 months.

In our model, we assume that everything that the child feels, hears, and sees is encoded
simultaneously, but in different parts of the brain. Every action that a child makes before birth
(fetus) and later in the early years constitutes the experience of the child. We used the term "picture
memory" to refer to the encoding of what the child sees visually. Thus, the image of a tree is
encoded as a picture memory. Whether it is actually stored as a picture memory is a matter of
contention. Later, when the child sees a visual representation of a tree in a book, better

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discrimination occurs when there is corrective feedback simultaneously with the event. In
common terms, a parent says the word "tree" as the child sees the picture in the book. This
process, when coupled with a non-judgmental tone, reinforces and modifies the association in
memory.

Exposure without corrective feedback has limited value. A child can see and encode many things
in their picture memory based on experience but only the references verified over time by
corrective feedback, either by person or actions in the environment, determine the individual
orientation and perspective of the child. Many children from birth to 2 are exposed to numerous
experiential situations, but in some cases, the child only receives corrective feedback based on
their behavioral response-bad behavior, good behavior, etc. Many children learn to control
behavior but do not receive corrective feedback on cognitive information associated with the
“why” of the situation. We use the term "print-rich environment" to denote a child who is
brought up from birth to 18 months with both behavioral and corrective cognitive feedback about
words, numbers, and spatial activities. Corrective feedback is especially useful during reading
sessions with print matters such as books or pictures. As noted later, children from a print-rich
environment, respond differently to problem-solving in the latter years of adolescence.

Many parents increase the cognitive experience of the child by providing books with pictures
such as Richard Scarry's Best Word Book Ever. This book, written in 1963, is still available on
Amazon. Again, a child who is exposed to numerous picture books with corrective feedback
differs substantially in academic achievement from a child who is exposed to pictures without
corrective feedback.

Numerical problem solving

All type of theories exists about neonate and their ability to use numbers. Some are nativist, that
is, researchers suggest that children are born with an inherent understanding of quantity such as
bigger and smaller. Others suggest that number and quantity problems are associated with
everyday learning and experience such as having portions of food on a plate. Studies in
neuroscience have demonstrated that neonates can comprehend relative size by estimation. The
area of the intraparietal sulcus is involved when neonates show surprise about changes that occur
in the length of rows of M & Ms at 3 months old. These studies conducted by Dehaene in the
1990s led to the hypothesis that children are born with an innate ability to estimate. Her later
work suggested that the impaired functioning of this numerical estimation system resulted in
lower grades on standardized math tests. She called the impairment “dyscalculia” (the
computational equivalent of dyslexia). In an article in Science Magazine, she noted, “They earn
less, spend less, are more likely to be sick, are more likely to be in trouble with the law, and need
more help in school.” (Dehaene, 2010).

Controversial studies by Wynn (1992) and Wynn, Bloom, and Chiang (2002) suggest that children
as early as five months can discriminate differences in quantities and use that knowledge to add
and subtract simple numbers up to 3. They reached their conclusions based on experiments that

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manipulated the number of objects placed behind a screen. By adding and subtracting objects and
measuring the time intervals that children watched the objects (violation of expectation method),
they deduced that children could discriminate differences in quantities.

Very young children at (14-16) months repeat numbers in their daily languages, such as one, two,
three, and jump, however, this may only indicate partial comprehension or memory.

Spatial problem solving

Newborns organize the objects in their perceptual field according to the relationships in space.
According to Piaget (1954), the newborn’s knowledge of space is based on the activities within that
space. A search of space is based on the egocentric frame of reference if environmental cues are
missing. Researchers have generally agreed with this position. In the absence of cues from the
environment, the position of their bodies is used to find an object and make location decisions.
Bremner and Bryant (1977) hid objects to the right or left of 9-month-old subjects. After exposing
them to training sessions where they learn how to find the objects, the children were rotated 180
degrees. The children were unable to find the objects since they appeared, they were still using the
bodies as a frame of reference. As the child matures and develops the use of cues or landmarks to
specify a physical location is more evident.

The ability to reproduce the visual-spatial world accurately and to recreate relevant objects in the
absence of relevant stimuli is one of the hallmarks of spatial processing (Gardener, 2000). At this
point, this ability does not appear to be in the neonate’s repertoire from birth to 18 months.

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Chapter 12

Synopsis: Stage: Infancy: 24 months to 7 years

The 68-month period from neonate to childhood is extremely important for the development of
problem-solving skills. During this time, the child develops more memory and thinking skills.
Before 18 months, sensory-motor development is centered on crawling, walking, and finally
running. Gross motor control is more evident. As time goes on, the ability to utilize associations
and abstractions changes everything. Children start to solve everyday concrete problems—how
to get what they want! Notice the emphasis on concrete problems or problems involving touch,
feeling, or realistic objects because what the child perceives is the child’s reality. Concrete
problems manifest themselves around real things in the environment-chairs, beds, trees, clothes,
and real feelings such as anger, joy, and embarrassment. Through observation, real preferences
are evident in the first years of life. However, other preferences must be elicited by questioning,
actual performance and individual observation as self-report is not as reliable. Our research
utilized the former strategies for these age periods.

Summary: The data presented in the book (not the Synopsis) indicates how different subgroups
of children display differences in speed of processing, personality, and interests on standardized
tests. Similar to the information presented for the neonate, the chapter on Infancy provides the
foundation for children's problem-solving behaviors utilizing the different constructs of the
cognitive model. The data illustrate both individual differences as well as subgroup differences.

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Chapter 13

Synopsis: Stage: Children: 8-9 years of age

The use of abstractions for solving school-related problems changes from primary associational
to more analytic and spatial. True, some children in the third grade are already functioning at a
higher level of thinking; however, the percentage is quite varied. Early analytic and conceptual
thinkers are stimulated by home environments and significant others whose constant attention
to their intellectual development is their sole interest. Such children between the ages of four to
eight are more adept at processing abstract problems.

For other children, the process differs. At age eight, the vast majority of children have their
thinking tied to concrete things-chairs, beds, trees, clothes, feelings, touch, and embarrassment.
They are capable of abstract thinking, but that thinking is tied to familiar objects. Abstract
thinking which has a concrete, object, or feeling (referenced to their experience) is more likely to
bring comprehension.

Summary: Again, the data presented in this chapter of the book (not the Synopsis) indicates how
different subgroups of children display differences in speed of processing, personality, and
interests on standardized tests. Descriptive profiles illustrate how young people in classrooms
approach words, numbers, and spatial problems differently. The data illustrate both individual
differences as well as subgroup differences.

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Chapter 14

Synopsis: Stage: Early Adolescence: The Measurement System

In this section and for this synopsis rather than summarizing the data, we provide various
examples that support the thesis that some children are slowed in the process of solving academic
problems of word, numbers, and spatial activities while others are becoming more adept. Much
of the data displayed come from terminal master’s degree studies. Other data was contributed by
teachers who collected data as part of the graduate degree.

Generally, children who are classified as regular education but suffer from a low academic self-
concept, have a problem with timed tests and display a host of other problems. This may include
difficulty in making logical and spatial decisions that contribute to the greater difficulty in
academic problem-solving. This group of students is, by definition, a differential problem solver.
Cumulative factors lead to a lower grade point average (GPA) and low academic achievement on
both teacher-made and standardized tests.

Anne Holbrook (1989) examined some of the family background and parental behavioral
practices which led to the conclusion that children who come from a “print-rich” family are more
likely to have faster processing speeds and better academic problem-solving. Anne, as part of
her master’s Thesis, collected data on 100 randomly selected students with high GPAs (greater
than 3.3) and 100 randomly selected students with a lower GPA (less than 2; less than a C
average). The students with a high GPA consisted of both differential and general problem
solvers. With their parent’s permission, she tested 147 eighth-grade students from multiple
schools. She sent home questionnaires. The parents of thirty-one of the low achieving students
(Group A) and fifty-one of the high achieving students (Group B) returned the questionnaires;
with a 54 percent return rate. Using data from instruments developed by the author as well as
others, Ann determined which home and parental factors separated the high and low
achievement groups. She concluded that parents of high achievers stress the importance of a high
school and college diploma, kept in close contact with the school and teachers, and stress
academic work as a priority in the home. The data from that study was statistically re-analyzed
in terms of the present thesis. Table 11a presents the total average scores of 147 children on
problem-solving. Table 11b presents the average scores for 147 children on the speed of
processing instruments.

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Table 11a:

Psa Ps30 Pslap Pssp Df Per Cn Mt

9.18 11.99 13.26 13.11 11.96 28.59 35.49 34.39
2.46 1.48 2.93 2.12 1.11 7.73 7.96 7.38

An So Ct Fx EI
35.05 34.41 46.63 40.56 17.99
10.1 9.24 15.52 3.31 9.34

Raw Scores of 147 13-year-olds on the Problem-Solving Instrument

Table 11b

AGE PF Letid Emb Arith N

Mean 13 11.52 27.22 29.98 15.48 82
SD .05 1.89 6.69 2.96 5.73

PF=Perceptual Flexibility LD=Letter identification, Emb=Embed Figures, Arith=Arithmetic Distraction

Average scores for the total of 147 13-year-olds on Speed of Processing

The scores for the problem-solving groups in the above table are unremarkable while the scores
on the speed of processing are higher than average for the age group. This increase is most
probably due to the number of high-achieving students in the sample.

When the scores in the two groups are divided into Group A (Grade Point Average less than 2)
and Group B (GPA greater than 3.3) then the average differences are quite remarkable. Table
11c and Table 11d present the scores on problem-solving and Table 11e presents the scores on
the speed of processing instruments.

Table 11c

Group A Psa Ps30 Pslap Pssp Df** Per Cn

Mean 7.27 10.93 10.89 12.16 12.69 28.90 31.03
SD 2.28 1.35 2.73 2.05 1.17 7.50 7.12
Group B Psa* Ps30* Pslap* Pssp* Df Per Cn*
Mean 10.33 12.64 14.70 13.69 11.51 28.39 38.20
SD 1.46 1.13 1.45 1.89 0.65 7.80 6.79
Group A N=31; Group B N=51 P=.01*

Scores for 13-Year-olds (Groups A & B) on the PS Instrument

Scores in Tables 11c and 11d illustrate the large differences between the low-achieving group and
the high-achieving group. Scores on both types of instruments Psa and Ps30; Pslap; & Pssp are

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illustrated. From Table 11c, the high achieving group (Group B) has significantly higher mean
scores on Conceptual and all general problem-solving scales (Ps30, Pslap, Pssp). The low
achieving group, which has an average GPA of less than 2, is significantly higher on the
Differential subscale as well as two other subscales that appear in 11d.

Table 11d

Group A Mt* An* So Ct Fx* EI

Mean 36.40 37.67 30.20 37.87 41.32 16.13
SD 6.75 11.91 10.50 17.25 2.96 9.35
Group B Mt An So** Ct** Fx EI**
Mean 33.49 33.69 36.90 52.00 40.10 19.20
SD 7.32 8.71 7.48 11.70 3.41 9.36

Group A N=31; Group B N=51 + Levine statistic (heterogeneity of variance)

Scores for 13-Year-olds (Groups A & B) on the PS Instrument

From Table 11d, Group A, the lower-achieving group, has higher means on Motor, Analysis, and
Flexibility while Group B, the group with a higher GPA has significantly higher means on a total
of 8 subscales including- Socialization, Structure /Control, and Extroversion. Now addressing
the speed of processing scores in Table 11e below, the group with a higher GPA has significantly
higher means on almost all speed of processing tests.

Table 11e

Group Name CF** Letid** Emb** Arith*

Group A
Mean 10.83 25.27 28.63 14.20
Group A St.
Dev. 2.60 7.94 4.75 6.77
Group B
Mean 12.22** 29.16** 31.33** 16.76*
Group B Stan.
Dev. 1.17 5.44 1.18 4.69

Group A N=31; Group B N=51 **=.01 *=.06

Scores for 13-Year-olds (Groups A & B) on Speed of Processing

In conclusion, these Tables support the notion that high achieving students as indicated by a
higher-Grade Point Average (GPA) have faster processing speeds and a propensity to solve
academic problems with less difficulty.

Tables 11c and 11d also indicate the non-cognitive Psa and the cognitive scores (Ps30; Pslap; & Pssp,
as a measurement of academic problem solving, move in a similar direction with a large average difference.

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For example, Psa, Ps30; Pslap, & Pssp, as representative of cognitive and non-cognitive variables, have
large average differences between Group A and Group B.

This next section shows data that verify how perceptual speed increases developmentally for the
age group of 10 through 13.

Perceptual speed (10-13)

Perceptual speed, which includes a component called attention span, is still increasing in 11- and
12-year-olds but stabilizes about 13 years of age. As noted in an earlier chapter, the Perceptual
Flexibility Test (PF) has 13 stimulus items. The perceptual field contains about 26 rotated and
non-rotated similar items. The students have two minutes to match as many items as possible in
the stimulus field to the perceptual field.

Table 12

Age Male (M) S.D. Female (M) SD. Range Max N. Sp. Ed SD. N
7 4.2 2.3 4.6 2.24 0 11 185 3.40 1.4 42
8 5.5 2.3 6.0 2.54 0 12 324 4.65 1.36 15
9 5.6 2.8 6.1 2.60 0 12 135 5.33 2.0 47
10 5.7 2.7 6.6 2.78 0 13 142 5.6 2.3 41
11 7.1 3.0 6.7 3.31 0 13 188 6.15 2.5 25
12 7.5 3.2 8.5 3.25 1 13 94 6.6 2.4 92
13 8.3 3.1 9.3 5.3 0 13 125 7.0 2.56 32

Male and Female (Means and S.D.) for Perceptual Flexibility Tests for Ages 7-13

Notice in Table 12 above, the Perceptual flexibility test, that the seven-year-old male has an
average score of 4.2 and a standard deviation of 2.3. A female of the same age (seven) has a mean
of 4.6 (SD-2.24). Compare this with an eight-year-old male scoring 5.5, a nine-year-old male
scoring, 5.6 (2.8), a ten-year-old male 5.7 (2.7), and an eleven-year-old male scoring 7.1 (3.0). A
female eight, nine, ten, eleven and 12-year-olds had average scores / (standard deviation) of 6.0/
(2.54), 6.1/ (2.6), 6.6/ (2.78), 6.7/ (3.3), and 8.5 / (3.25) respectively. In other words, the averages for
perceptual speed tests have been increasing steadily, along with brain and body development
since about 5. The increments taking into account socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and gender,
are fairly stable and predictable.

This pattern follows the work of Epstein (1978) and Toepfer (1980) on brain growth. Accordingly,
Epstein and Toepfer suggested that brain growth occurs in spurts, with defined periods of no
growth. The 3 periods in which the brain does not show cognitive growth are 4 to 6 years of age,
8 to 10, and 12 to 14. Based on Epstein and Toepfer, one expects the averages of the Speed of
Processing Tests at different ages in perceptual development to follow similar patterns with
spurts at 7-8, and 11-12. Although the pattern is not exact, the average increase is 5.7 to 7.1 (males)
and 6.7 from 8.5 (females) around 11 to 12 years of age. Differences in most means are large for
males and females but are not statistically significant.

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Is the same pattern evident in the other tests involving perceptual speed? Table 13 below
indicates that the combined average correct scores for a group of males and females on letter
identification, embedded designs, arithmetic, and memory show identical patterns.

Table 13

AGE PF Let Emb Arith N

9 Mean 5.34 21.36 13.56 6.55 162
SD 2.87 9.72 9.91 4.94
10 Mean 6.25 22.81 15.60 7.60 178
SD 2.85 8.00 8.28 4.94
11 Mean 6.71 25.50 16.05 9.66 219
SD 3.09 8.67 8.53 5.40
12 Mean 7.69 28.61 17.31 11.12 275
SD 3.00 8.69 8.67 5.47
13 Mean 7.80 29.43 16.83 10.38 178
SD 3.31 8.90 9.46 5.27
+includes special education Note: large sample sizes vs small samples in the previous table

Scores on the Perceptual Speed Test for Ages 11-13

Note: Table 13 demonstrates that all means for the perceptual tests increase almost linearly with
age, i.e., memory and perception are dependent upon sequential growth in the brain and central
nervous system.

Table 14 below shows the average scores and standard deviations on two timed perceptual
memory tests for regular and special education students (5-13). The students were given a sheet
with a field of 26 letters in a normal or rotated status. The task was to remember as many of the
letters as they could. They studied the field for 2 minutes. The sheet was turned over. The students
were shown another field of letters and told to identify any figure present in the first field by
circling. The same procedure was used for symbols. A correct score was the correct number
memorized as indicated by placing a circle around the figures that were present in the field they
studied

Table 14

Age Regular S.D. Min Max N Sp. Ed Mean SD Range N

5 0.00 0.0 0 00 00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 00.00 0.00 0 00 00 2.79 1.93 0-05 14
7 06.23 3.92 0 14 24 03.64 3.00 0-10 14
8 07.68 3.48 0 16 47 04.64 4.94 0-14 14
9 08.39 5.08 0 16 60 04.20 3.66 0-12 15
10 09.65 5.09 0 23 54 05.27 3.73 0-12 15
11 10.60 5.23 0 26 187 08.13 6.46 0-22 22
12 10.45 5.25 0 26 45
13 10.58 5.60 0 26 25

Average Scores on Memory for Regular and Special Education Students

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The sample did not include any children in the range of ages 5-6. However, we did measure a
small group of 14 special education students at age 6. At age 13 the regular students remembered
an average of 10.58 letters or symbols. The pattern is: the older the child the greater the number
correct until about age 11-13 then the average, for young students, remains consistent at about
10.55. Special education and regular students did better with letters memorized and circled than
with symbols. Regular students were able to correctly retrieve from memory more correct
symbols and letters. Notice the number correct also increased with age.

From our perspective, the increase in memory and perceptual accuracy with age is important.
Memory and perception are the basic building blocks of problem-solving. Again, in the IPS
model, the input process is perceptual, and the process factor is memory. Before problem-solving
can take place, an individual must take in the information (attention/perceptual) and store the
basic building blocks in memory. Children's thinking patterns, up to this point, have been mainly
associated, with some analytical thought. Only some children display logical approximation,
inference, and logical analytic thought. Usually, students who are 11 or 12 years of age are in
the sixth or seventh grade. Teachers who have a classroom filled with sixth-grade students can
testify about the limited number of children who use logical thought or logical approximation.

There is also some evidence that a few children understand the complexity of life's decision-
making and can approximate better decision-making. Average or below-average 7th graders
who can make better life decision-making (deciding what clothes to wear to school) may still have
problems with abstractions in specialized areas such as math. For this group of 12-year-olds,
there is generally a less statistical correlation between standardized test data and skills requiring
more complex operations (spatial analysis and sequence identification). From seventh grade,
onward, children solve more complex academic problems using logical and spatial thinking.

The basic elements of the problem-solving model apply differently to each age group (11-13, 14-
17, etc.). Developmental perspectives and maturation play an important part in understanding
how the individual approaches each problem.

The problems solving categories were somewhat conceptually distinct, but not necessarily always
mathematically distinct at 8-9 years of age--are they mathematically distinct at 10-13? Five
different master’s Theses (from Kristen Shand, Erwin Odbam, Jim Cox, Anne Holbrook, and Mike
Ellis) give us an insight into both the problem-solving categories of youngsters at this age and
into differences due in development. These 362 children represented by the five studies provide
a good look at a cross-section of youngsters in the California school system. Scores on their
standardized tests generally followed a normal distribution. Most of these children were 12 years
old, a few were 10 and 11.

For the first time, one can derive a measurement of an age group in which confidence can be
placed. The test-retest reliability for these scales varies from .84 to .92. Below are the numerical
averages and standard deviations of the scales. The sample variation in the average scores of 3

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of the 5 groups is evident on the subscales. Table 15a shows the means and standard deviation
across the 10 subscales for the elementary non-cognitive assessment.

Table 15a

Name Age Psa Df Per Cn Mt An So Ct* Fx EI

1. Erwin 12 12.11 11.48 39.44 43.86 35.30 46.32 46.95 53.12 27.49 22.79
N=114 2.43 0.93 9.61 10.77 10.39 9.47 11.38 13.90 3.34 4.82
2. Ann 12 9.18 11.96 28.59 35.49 34.39 35.05 34.41 46.63 40.56 17.99
N=82 2.46 1.11 7.73 7.96 7.38 10.10 9.24 15.52 3.31 9.34
3. Mike 12 12.03 10.93 37.47 36.33 33.07 34.33 42.27 63.87 26.44 22.63
N=62 2.69 1.33 10.97 8.49 7.54 7.90 8.58 18.98 4.29 5.14
Average Mean 11.75 11.77 36.31 37.00 36.82 38.37 41.83 49.91 30.40 20.87
Std. 1.37 1.11 10.13 9.94 9.35 10.71 10.56 15.79 6.18 6.51
Psa Dif Per Cn Mt An So Ct* Fx EI

Means and Standard Deviation on Non-Cognitive PS Subscales Scores

For 262 Twelve-Year-Old Students

A factor analysis of the ten subscales suggests that at least two groups exist: the first group is
conceptual, analytical, and social while the second is general/differential, perceptual, and
motor. The first factor is dubbed internal representations and the latter scale is called
performance. The first set of scales is related more to creative endeavors such as music, drawings,
and artistic development while the latter is associated with academic indicators, doing well on
academic tests, and performance with hands. These relationships are somewhat expected.
However, one might question why perceptual motor also occurs with differential and general
problem-solving. For now, suffice it to say that academic performance, the second factor, is
significantly correlated with memory while conceptual, analytical, and social are not.

What other tests are significantly associated with the second factor? From the same study,
standardized pretests, posttests, and regress gain scores on arithmetic as well as memory are all
significantly related (r=.36 to .52, mean correlation .45; p=.05). This establishes the second factor
as an academic factor-related more to math problem-solving.

From the results of another study, the first factor dubbed Internal Representation is significantly
correlated with Structure, Achievement, Learning Perception, and Self-Concept (r=.40 to .56;
average mean=.46 p=.001) All of these subscales are indirectly related to achievement tests.

Gender differences

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Gender differences are shown in Table 15b below. The means for the Psa scale are almost 1 point
higher than the means for the 8-9 years old students who were presented in the previous chapter.

Table 15b

Males Psa Df Per** Cn Mt An* So Ct Fx EI

Mean 11.49 11.67 34.13 34.08 34.61 38.44 34.95 52.03 28.61 19
SD 1.54 1.25 7.52 8.43 7.38 8.79 9.06 17.49 3.68 7.48
Females Psa Df Per Cn* Mt An So* Ct* Fx EI**
Mean 11.54 11.3 32.14 60 32.99 32.04 40.71 57.39 28.13 21.17
SD 1.45 1.14 10.53+ 7.9 7.43 7.99 7.68+ 16.34 3.79 6.88
N=485 **P=.05 *P=.01 +logarithmic correction for heterogeneity-Levine’s statistic
Elementary Non-cognitive (Psa), PS instrument

Gender Differences for 12-Year-old Male and Females Combined Means

From Five Different Studies of 12-year-old on Adolescent and Elementary Instruments

Females score higher on the Conceptual, Social, Control scales and Extroversion while males
score higher on Analysis and Motor. Notice that the Flex scores are comparable, but Control is
much higher than Flex. Males scored significantly higher on the Perceptual Scale.

In this next section, we examine each of the PS’S subscale scores more closely to determine how
each subscale compares to normative data of 10-13-year-olds. The presentation starts with those
subscales which identify the general and differential problem solver and then examines the
means and standard deviations of the rest of the problem-solving scales for the early adolescent.
The measurement system includes cognitive and affective data from many different studies
conducted from 1994 and sometimes earlier.

Problems Solving Scales

General problem solving

The demographical characteristics of the children in the five studies, generated by the graduate
students working on their master’s Thesis, are as follows: In the first study, Michael (Ellis, 1994),
there were 62 twelve-year-old, 29 males and 33 females. Students came from a moderate SES
background. The group consisted of 23 Caucasians, 3 Asians, 5 Afro-Americans, and 29 of
Hispanic origin. The average Stanine score (goes from 1-9) on the California Standardized
Achievement Test (CSAT) was 4.53 with the math percentile being 41.2 percent. Overall, this
group was below average academically in math. The scores on perceptual speed tests were
generally average for their age group.

Three other studies, Shand (1999), Obdam (1994), and Cox (1995) were similar in that the students
were predominantly Caucasian and Hispanic with a small number of Asians and Afro-

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Americans. Obama's group of 114 people and Cox’s group of 174 people consisted of mostly
twelve-year-old and a very small group of 11 years old. Erwin’s and Jim’s groups had a greater
number of lower and middle social-economic classes. The latter three groups of Jim, Kirsten, and
Erwin had higher average scores on the academic achievement tests. Kirsten’s group, which had
more advanced students, had an average proficiency score in the 64th percentile in reading and
math.

The goal of IPS theory is to predict and classify children and adults based on their performance
and preferences. If one could find a set of predictors that separated children’s performance based
on their preferences, this could be quite helpful in understanding individual differences. The
non-cognitive general problem-solving scale (Psa) is based on the premise that those children
who are developing emotional stability, social insight, independent thinking, and achievement
orientation are more likely to perform and learn better than those who do not. These non-
cognitive characteristics come from instruments measuring children 12 and younger. That
premise related to non-cognitive factors is likely to be most evident in younger children rather
than adults. What do we find in this age group? Four (Erwin, Ann, Jim, and Mike) of the five studies
are compared on all subscales next. We first examine the scores on general problem-solving in Table
16.
Table 16

Non-
General Problem Solving Elementary cognitive Psa

Name Sample Size Age Statistics

Erwin 114 12 12.11

S.D. 2.43

Mike 62 12 12.03

S.D. 2.69

Jim 104 12 11.45

S.D. 2.41

Ann 82 12 9.18

S.D. 2

Ave of 4 studies 11.19

Ave. SD 2.38

Average all 12yrs N=629 250 12 11.61

S. D. 1.71

Mean 8-9 Psa* Total 148 8&9 11.03

S.D. 3.48

Comparison of Averages for Different Groups on

The Elementary (non-cognitive) PS Instruments

Erwin’s group scored the highest while Mike’s group, which was selected for remedial work in
math, had the second highest Psa or General Non-Cognitive Problem-Solving score (12.03). The
other scores, including the average of all 12-year-olds, were generally comparable.

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Without going into a lot of detail, 3 of 4 studies with 12-year-olds showed good mean separation
using both non-cognitive and cognitive for the ten measurement subscales. The following examples
show one study of the cognitive subscales (Table 16a and Table 16b) with normal differences in
the mean separation and one study (Table 17) that is reversed from expectations.

Table 16a below presents the data from Kirsten’s Group. Kristen’s group used the cognitive
adolescent PS instrument (Ps30; Pssp; Pslap). A very large percentage of students were higher in
academic achievement and therefore the separation between the means on the Problem-Solving
subscales was very good. Although the samples are disparate in numbers (N=29 vs. N=99), the
differences are illustrative.

Table 16a: Kirsten’s 12-year-old Group

Ps30* Pslap* Pssp* Dif Per Cn

Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
N 29 99 29 99 29 99 29 99 29 99 29 99
Mean 10.97 11.80 11.36 12.48 10.95 12.65 13.79 12.85 41.6 40.66 36.64 33.28
SD 1.46 1.74 2.08 2.6 2.18 2.52 1.82 2.32 10.33 11.53 8.62 12.05

Mt An Soc Ct Fx EI
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
N 29 99 29 99 29 99 29 99 29 99 29 99
Mean 45.28 44.27 37.12 39.38 48.32 43.81 41.92 36.58 35.52 39.22 19.28 20.25
SD 9.5 11.09 10.43 15.32 11.71 11.37 11.32 14.49 13.23 12.42 6.11 6.49
P=.01*
Averages of students on the PS subscales using the Math
Standardized Tests as a Division at the 50th percentile

Table 16b below gives a normative comparison for older age groups (16-50) on the same
instrument. The normative comparison age groups, listed in 16b, were based on 300 children
(ages 16-17) and 447 adults who are greater than 23 years of age. Note the increase in means for
the problems solving subscales for different age groups 16-17 and 23+ (Averages of 12.31 & 13.25)
as well as the other differences in the subscales

Table 16b

Ps30 Pslap Pssp Dif Per Cn Mt An So Ct Fx EI

16-17 12.31 13.91 13.42 11.33 33.31 30.46 33.26 40.69 37.66 38.86 33.89 18.69
SD 1.42 1.81 2.43 1.72 9.08 11.68 10.61 13.20 11.26 12.43 9.77 6.04
23+ 13.25 14.72 14.89 10.19 42.61 15.26 19.88 20.04 38.97 32.14 24.49 12.35
SD 1.64 2.42 2.63 2.09 11.79 5.53 5.70 6.38 14.49 13.23 7.25 11.51
For 23+ age group: More college-educated individuals in this group N=448; For 16-17 N=70 Mostly high school seniors

Comparison Raw Scores for 2 Age Groups (ages 16-17; 23-60)

Next, Table 17 shows a group with the non-cognitive Psa that did not have a good separation of the
mean scores based on high and low scores on reading. Best results are obtained when groups are similar

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in age, i.e., 10-11; 11-12, or 12-13, with a maximum variation in the group reading, math, or spatial
scores. Michael’s group in Table 17 did not show as much differentiation on the reading
standardized tests as they were below average and much more difficult to separate. For Michael’s
group, there was also a cognitive score on Pslap. The cognitive and non-cognitive problem-
solving scores could be compared for this select group. The average score for Michael’s Pslap
was 11.07 with a standard deviation of 1.54.

Using Tables 16a and 16b, compare this average of 11.07 with the averages for Kirsten’s age group
(16-17), and the adults 23+ who were academically superior. In comparison, Michael’s group was
significantly lower In Michael’s group, a greater number of students scored between 0 and 33
percentiles on the standardized tests. There is a lot of homogeneity in the scores of individual
students who comprise the lowest one-third of a standardized test group. Our theory is that the
group was so homogeneous, that the means on the general problem-solving scale were in almost
the same proportion for both groups of high and low. The Psa for Michael’s group was 12.03/2.69.
Although the very low students did not score well on math tests, they possessed greater self-
esteem and learning identity which is one reason that they were selected for special math training.
These results are reflected in the non-cognitive Psa score in Table 17.

Table 17:

Psa Df Cn Per Mt
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
N 38 22 38 22 38 22 38 22 38 22
Mean 11.17 10.89 10.76 11.24 36.63 38.91 36.68 35.73 33.21 32.82
SD 1.6 1.44 1.21 1.49 12.07 8.83 8.15 9.2 6.79 8.85

Table An So Ct** Fx EI
Low High Low High Low High Low High
N 38 22 38 22 38 22 38 22 38 22
Mean 34.26 34.45 42.63 41.64 66.32 59.64 25.9 27.36 22.53 22.82

SD 8.53 6.87 8.1 9.53 17.14 21.56 3.86 4.9 5.5 4.56
P=.05**
Averages of Students on the PS subscales using the Math
Standardized Tests as a Division at the 50th percentile

Michael’s group had means which were comparable across subscales with only the Structure and
Control preference scale showing significance. In the next section, compare the mean separation
on all different problem-solving scales across the different studies.

Differential problem solver

The majority of students are differential problem solvers based on this calculated scale.
Remember that this scale is calculated as an inverse scale of the General Problem Solver to help
teachers quickly discern Differential Problem Solvers. The foundational characteristics, ideas, and
work habits of the differential problem solver are formed in early life. This is evident in the
studies below. In the four studies listed in Table 18 below, the Differential problem-solving score
of Ann’s sample was the highest academically and therefore scored the lowest on the Dif scale as

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this scale is the inverse of the Ps scale. Interestingly enough, Mike’s group (who were selected
for remedial work in Math) scored comparatively higher on this subscale i.e. they did not perceive
themselves as general problem solvers. As noted earlier, these students did not score well on
academic achievement. Originally, Michael’s students were selected based on the need to
improve their performance on math fractions.

Table 18

Differential Sample Size Age Elementary

Mike 62 12 12.06
S.D. 1.74
Erwin 114 12 11.27
S.D. 1.75

Jim 104 12 11.13

S.D. 2.31
Ann 82 12 10.74
S.D. 1.89
Mean of 4 studies 11.30
SD of 4 studies 1.92

Ave. for all 12 yrs. (N=629) 10.24

S. D. 1.95
Mean yrs. Dif* 148 8&9 11.03
S.D. 3.48

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Differential Problem-Solving Subscale

Perceptual problem solver

Perception relates to what a child sees and hears when addressing a problem situation. The
amount of time that a child focuses on a problem is inherently related to problem-solving
effectiveness. A child who cannot focus his or her attention for any length of time has difficulty
solving complex problems. The attention span for average youngsters at age 12 is about 15
minutes—about 5 minutes at the short end and 25 minutes for those with the longest attention
spans. Most of all, children who have longer attention spans tend to spend more time with printed
materials or reading. Attending is the first step in the conceptualization of the external
environment.

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Children who have a very short attention span also have trouble attending to the spoken word.
They turn their attention to their interests--feelings, mind wanderings, objects, or thoughts of the
day. For children with short attention spans, individual directions and explanations are
necessary since many children with short attention spans do not attend except when given
individual attention.

In Table 19 below, notice the various mean scores and standard deviations for the 12-year-olds
on the Perceptual subscale. The average score range is 28.59 for Ann’s group to 39.77 for Jim’s.

Table 19

Perceptual Sample Size Age Elementary

Jim 104 12 39.77
S.D. 12.23
Erwin 114 12 39.44
S.D. 9.61
Mike 62 12 37.47
S.D. 10.97
Ann 82 12 28.59
S.D. 7.73
Mean of 4 studies 36.32
Ave. SD 10.14

Ave. all 12 yrs. 40.84

S. D. 11.28
Mean 8-9 148 8&9 28.03
S.D. 10.24

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Perceptual Problem-Solving Subscale

Conceptual

The operational definition used in research for conception is using and/or displaying a preference
for ideas. Children in this age group who are high on ideation are generally voracious readers
(or come from homes where the parents display behaviors such as liking verbal word games or
creating verbal images. Some authors substitute words like creative or imaginative to describe
conceptual thinking. In our studies, various operational definitions of conceptual have produced
comparable results.

Studying the problem-solving behaviors of 450 children in the age range of 11-13 gives some
indication of the number of children who identified themselves as having a greater preference for
ideas. These two constructs of ideation and conceptual, by themselves, are more important in

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developing problem-solving behaviors which become important in later career pathways. At an

early age, relationships are significant in one study but not in another.

In Table 20 below, the average scores on the conceptual subscale differ considerably for the 4
groups of 12-year-olds. Erwin’s group was the highest (43.86) while the other three averaged
around 34-35.

Table 20

Conceptual Sample Size Age Elementary

Erwin a b 114 12 43.86
S.D. 10.77
Mike 62 12 36.33
S.D. 8.49
Ann 82 12 35.49
S.D. 7.96
Jim 104 12 32.31
S.D. 12.56
Mean of 4 studies 37.00
Ave. SD 9.95

Ave. all 12 yrs. 34.15

S. D. 8.03
Mean 8-9 148 8&9 29.62
S.D. Adult 9.55

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Conceptual Subscale

What are academic problem-solving behaviors? Children are presented with various school
academic problems and must take some active steps to solve the problem. Children who seemed
to solve different kinds of academic problems well are generally inquisitive, asking questions to
gain more information, structured in a sense of planning the problem out, analytical in the sense
of evaluating different kinds of outcomes, and motivated, willing to try and find some kind of
outcome.

The outcomes of problems differ widely in that some problems are well defined, and others are
less defined. The undefined problems require the individual to put boundaries or constraints on
the problems. The solutions may have multiple outcomes, rather than a single right answer.

For example, a group of 6 students with whom I was working recently wanted to make a vehicle,
similar to a go-kart. The students were sent out to look at various kinds of go-karts and design a
vehicle. When their drawings were analyzed, 5 out of the 6 drew pictures based on what they

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had seen. The sixth person draws a vehicle that had no relation to the existing pictures of go-
karts. The last person also scored higher on the conceptualization subscale. Based on his pattern
of scores, he was designated as an “image pattern processor” as he was also higher on flex and
average on control and structure. The image pattern processor seems to rely more on top-down
processing (explained in an earlier chapter).

As indicated earlier, all people receive information perceptually through their senses, but many
take that information and form ideas which are considerably different from the information taken
in. These students use ideation more and generally choose adjectives associated with constructs
that they have conjured.

Younger age students (10-11) in this group choose self-descriptive adjectives which are very
aligned with the existing concept of ideation, especially girls. They prefer words such as creative,
rather than realistic. This is not unusual for many youngsters are transitioning from a fanciful
world of dragons, elves, and other mythical figures. The 11-year-old still possesses a sense of
fantasy about the world in which he or she lives.

Motor problem solver

In this age group, another dimension is added to the characteristics of the motor problem-solver.
Previously the uniqueness of this problem solver as a person who is good at motor, hand-eye
coordination, and manual skills was emphasized. This uniqueness also contributed to their
ability to apply simple direct solutions to problems, usually in a form or method which can be
incorporated by others. The scores in Table 21 reflect their preference patterns for motor
activities.

Table 21

Motor Sample Size Age Elementary

Jim 104 12 44.5
S.D. 12.1
Erwin 114 12 35.3
S.D. 10.39
Ann 82 12 34.39
S.D. 7.38
Mike 62 12 33.07
S.D. 7.54
Mean of 4 studies 36.82
Ave. SD 9.35

Ave. all 12 yrs. 44.47

S. D. 10.77

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Mean 8-9 148 8&9 27.08

S.D. 9.53

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Motor Subscale

In the example in the previous section, children design a go-kart. Five of the six children showed
designs of a go-kart that each had seen. Four of these five children chose “practical” as a self-
descriptive adjective on our instruments. They preferred to solve problems based on their images
similar to those derived from their senses. They see an object and modify it. The process was
called “applied creativity” and we designated them “object processors”, similar to those who rely
on bottom-up processing.

All individuals receive information from the environment in some form for problem-solving.
Some of this information comes through the five senses and some are generated from thinking
and emotions. Individuals who perceive information through the senses or generate the
information internally from previous experiences and thoughts and apply the information in
several different ways are generally motor problem solvers. As a trivial example, suppose the
problem is to put a cap on a bottle of milk. The solution is to pick the cap with the hand, place it
on the top of the bottle, and press it. Simple, yes? This is what the motor problem solver does. A
motor problem solver is usually one who has abundant common experience with the problems
found in his or her environment. He or she seeks solutions to those problems in a simple direct
manner.

If the characteristic of a motor problem solver is defined in this manner, is not everyone a motor
problem solver? The answer is probably yes to some degree. But again, can you think of people
who do not seek a simple solution to common problems? Instead of a simple solution, the solution
is unique, too complex, or even inane? Often this characteristic separates the conceptual problem
solver from the motor problem solver as maturation occurs. Can not a person be both, perhaps
shifting back and forth between the two systems? Sure, in that case, if both orientations are
differentiated by age, then the classification of CM occurs. However, most older people have
more of a preference for one or the other when one uses a cut point at the 50 th percentile. Motor
choices occur with greater frequency than conceptual choices in the 12-14-year-old age group.

Analysis

There is a distinct difference in the preference for a certain activity and the capability to solve
problems in that area. Having a preference for analyzing things does not mean that one actively
spends time analyzing things either well or logically but that is our assumption as the data
collected over many years suggests a stronger significant relationship with this subscale.

Table 22

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Analysis Sample Size Age Elementary

Erwin 114 12 46.32
S.D. 9.47
Jim 104 12 37.79
S.D. 10.35
Ann 82 12 35.05
S.D. 10.1
Mike 62 12 34.33
S.D. 7.9
Mean of 4 studies 38.37
Ave. SD 10.71

Ave. all 12 yrs. 38.94

S. D. 14.48
Mean 8-9 148 8&9 40.72
S.D. Adult 11.93

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Analysis Subscale

In Table 22 above, Erwin’s group had the highest average score while the 12-year-olds, in general,
had the greatest variety of scores (SD=14.48). Why? Erwin’s group of students used computer
technology as an aid in solving problems. Does this present some sample bias? Probably?

Is there a difference in the preference responses of males and females on the subscale measuring
analysis in 12 different studies involving children of different ages? The results of these studies
show expected gender differences, with males scoring significantly higher on preference for
problems involving both analytical as well as logical thought processes but these differences are
slight in comparison to the total group. Remember these data are based on preferences for items
reflecting problem-solving in the age group 11-13, not ability.

Logical analysis elements

Once again, there is a difference in our definition of analytical thought versus logical analytical
thought. Logical analysis elements are based on correct responses versus preferences. Previously
children who were less than age 10 had difficulty with logical thinking, especially problems
involving seriation, transitive interference, and reversibility, Children in early adolescence can
answer the following question with a degree of assurance: Jane is shorter than Mary. Mary is
shorter than Susan. Who is taller-- Mary or Susan?

Our tests incorporate some fluid ability items which are in the form of analogies, series, and
sequential items. All three types of items have years of precedents in the measure of intelligent
behavior. Spearman (1923) used the terminology of “nongenetic thinking” to describe the

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process of solving analogies. The experience was emphasized in his first principle: the
the apprehension of experience while his second and third principles emphasized the power of
inferences and education of correlates.

A logical series is defined as being able to induce or infer what number or figure in a series comes
next. A typical series might be 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16, __ where an individual is required to circle the
number 32 from possible alternatives such as 25, 9, 32, or 18. Likewise a figural series might look
like: + + + + -- ++ -; whereas the answer of +would be circled from possible answers such as +, -, 0,
or /. (sequence is 4+, 2+ 1+; 2-,1-,0-). These different kinds of items can be examined in the various
kinds of tests in the appendix.

Analogies, in contrast, can be in the form of words and/or numbers. A simple number analogy
is “4” is to “12” as “?” is to “36.” The possible answers are 12, 15, 16, and 4. The respondent must
choose which is correct. The word or verbal analogies are like "hot" is to “cold” as “?” is to
“night.” The possible alternatives are day, evening, morning, and afternoon. The last analogy is
very simple and 98 percent of the people in the 11-89 age group can answer it correctly. Table 23
and Table 24 below shows mean standard deviations, as well as the number, correct out of 12 on
analogies and sequential problems for the current age group (10-13) as well as a comparison of
special education students in grades 4-8. Table 23 illustrates the scores of children in special
education.

Table 23

Mean S.D. N. Grade Age

0.96 0.36 45 4 9
1.07 0.76 35 5 10
1.43 0.98 59 6 11
2.32 1.43 41 7 12
2.45 1.11 34 8 13

Means and Standard Deviations on Analogies and

Sequential Items for Special Education Students in Grades 4-8

Special education students had difficulty answering any of the logical problems but notice that
their means still increase linearly with age. A 12-year special education student who was
developmentally delayed in grade 7 could only answer about 2.32 out of the twelve items.
Compare the mean scores of males and females at the same age and grade level in Table 24. For
example, as noted in Table 24 below, a 12-year regular student could answer about 5 items (mean-
5.12) or 44 percent correct.

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Table 24

Age Grade N Males S.D. Females S. D. Min Max Percentage

9 4 143 2.34 2.9 1.85 2.9 0 4 40
10 5 156 3.61 2.11 3.51 2.03 0 5 44
11 6 178 4.63 2.63 4.22 2.08 0 6 55
12 7 195 5.12 2.42 4.42 2.32. 0 6 44
13 8 221 6.48 2.53 5.92 2.35 0 9 47
*** Adjusted by versions of the test

Means and Standard Deviations of Analogies,

Sequential Items for Ages 9-13 regular students***

Notice the mean scores increase with age as expected. The same kind of sequential and series
problems are used at all different age levels. The number of possible points changed with
different versions as noted in the chart. Version 1.5 had 10 possible points; while, Versions 1.0
and 2.0 had 12 possible points. When comparisons between or among various groups are made
in this document, standard scores can be used. The conversion is simple; just use the average
means and standard deviations. Standard scores lessen the effect of sample variation.

What is the difference in average scores among a 12-year-old, a 13-year-old, a 17-year-old, and a
25-year-old? An average 12.6-year-old scores 4.4 out of a possible 10 while the 14, 17, and 25-
year-old have a mean score on the logical block and folded spatial problems of 5.5, 7.5, and 7.56
respectively. For measurement specialists, the standard deviations are comparable with large
samples. The scores of older children and adults on these subscales are higher and start to level
out after age 23 or so.

Social

Social problem solving, in general, is important for all ages. Social problem solving, as defined
here, not only refers to the ability to get along with other people in social or group situations but
also more specifically the capacity to interact in a manner that facilitates solving social problems.
The idea of socialness is different for a child of 10 compared to an adult who is eighteen. Our
data suggest that children are less engaged in “socialness” than adults. Socialness for this age
child is based on selecting any of the following types of items: a) playing together, b) being able
to interact in a group, c) engaging other children, and d) working on problems as a teammate and
e) liking to solve the problem with other children. Table 25 illustrates the average scores for this
age group.

Table 25

Social Sample Size Age Elementary

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Erwin 114 12 46.95

S.D. 11.38
Jim 104 12 43.69
S.D. 13.05
Mike 62 12 42.27
S.D. 8.58
Ann 82 12 34.41
S.D. 9.24
Mean of 4 studies 41.83
Ave. SD 10.56

Ave. all 12 yrs. 44.69

S. D. 11.54
Mean 8-9 148 8&9 39.43
S.D.
Adult 12.14

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Social Subscale

Clearly, those who are shy, isolated from their peers or family, or who have a personal orientation
that focuses more on the internal world of ideas, are more likely to be perceived as less social.
However, since social behaviors occur during social or group problem-solving, the introvert can
be just as good at social problem-solving as the extrovert. At the age of 10-13, some children are
still learning how to become “social.” Other children have the benefit of being brought up in
homes where social etiquette and socialness are valued at an early age. Latchkey children who
have less external control as both parents work often attach a different meaning to the term
“social.” Socialness to many of these “ghetto” children infers survival on a day-to-day basis as
socialness is finding a group or other people who will protect them.

Teachers who work with children in the previous age groups (5-10) usually placed more emphasis
on socialization and social behaviors as it is a necessary prerequisite to learning. Teachers in
grades 1 to 5 are much more likely to control behavior and place emphasis on social interaction
as a key to “getting along” inside and out of the classroom.

Control and structure

Control and structure at this age are very much an extension of the co-regulation that was
discussed earlier. Children are not independent; therefore, learning to be self-regulated and
developing emotional and cognitive control is a constant learning process. In many cases, control
for young children is related to either delayed self-gratification or goal attainment. The first is
internal and the latter is both internal and external. Delayed self-gratification according to Freud
(1922) comes from cognition and perception (ego) which is attempting to regulate individual

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needs and desires. Skinner, on the other hand, suggested control was a learning process that
originated from regulating internal impulses and inappropriate behavior. In goal attainment,
control is sequencing the appropriate steps (structuring) to achieve the desired end as many
environmental obstacles are circumvented.

With these definitions in mind, the scores on the Control subscale for a group of 12-year-olds are
quite interesting. Since control and internal structure are usually associated with greater
academic achievement, the expectation is that the higher the score, the better. However, since
control (as an internal mechanism), when considered with flex, is so important, this is not the case
for some groups or individuals. In Table 26 below, the highest score in the control was Mike’s
group.

Table 26

Control/Structure N Sample Elementary

Mike 62 12 63.87
S.D. 18.98
Erwin 114 12 53.12
S.D. 13.90
Ann 82 12 46.63
S.D. 15.52
Jim 104 12 36.00
S.D. 14.77
Mean of 4 studies 49.91
Ave. SD 15.79

Ave. all 12 yrs. 55.46

S. D. 16.54
Mean 8-9 148 8&9 38.95
S.D. Adult 12.79

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Control Subscale

yet, as explained earlier in the chapter, Mike’s group is the lowest academically. A large
percentage of students scored below the 33 percentiles on standardized testing. Mike’s group was
targeted for extra instruction on solving math problems involving fractions.

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Flex problem solver

Flex is part of an internal control mechanism that filters impulses from the external and internal
environment. Cognitive flexibility is built over a long time and results from being put in a myriad
of different circumstances and having to quickly adapt to changes. Being related to the control
system, the individual learns quickly that their reactions, actions, emotions, and behaviors cause
changes in the emotions and physical behavior of others.

Control is often manifested at both a subconscious and a conscious level. One simple control
mechanism is the suppression of an emotional impulse at a conscious level but not necessarily at
the subconscious level. Children have learned by this age that certain emotional impulses are
either not socially acceptable nor should these impulses be expressed overtly. There is only one
thing to do, let the emotional impulses, through suppression, wander creatively in the brain and
find expression in another acceptable form. Suppression of impulses leads to imagination and
fantasy which can take many different acceptable forms when an outlet is found for their
expression. Later in life, art, sculpture, painting, stand-up comedy, and verbal quips are just a
few modes of conscious expression.

Children are quick to notice perceptual differences such as a change in the expression, emotion,
or mood. Their reactions are controlled or not controlled. Uncontrolled impulses result in all
kinds of emotional responses from anger to joy. Controlled reactions are manifested in different
ways depending on the individual.

In Table 27, Mike’s and Erwin’s group had low flex scores while Jim’s group had the highest.
Jim’s group was selected for more independent thinking.

Table 27

Sample
Flex Size Age Elementary
Ann 82 12 40.56
S.D. 3.31
Jim 104 12 37.48
S.D. 13.82
Erwin 114 12 27.49
S.D. 3.34
Mike 62 12 26.44
S.D. 4.29
Mean of 4 studies 30.4
Ave. SD 6.18
Ave. all 12 yrs. 38.5
S. D. 12.62
Mean 8-9 148 8&9 35.98

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S.D. Adult 4

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Flex Subscale

Extraversion/introversion

Energy utilization and focus are different for males and females. Energy is more likely to flow
outward to the environment for females, primarily because of the differences in socialization
processes at earlier ages.

Is that difference still present from ages 11-13? For the answer, inspect Table 28 below.

Table 28

Extroversion/Introversion Sample Size Age Elementary

Erwin 114 12 22.79
S.D. 4.82
Mike 62 12 22.63
S.D. 5.14
Jim 104 12 20.08
S.D. 6.76
Ann 82 12 17.99
S.D. 9.34
Mean of 4 studies 20.87
Ave. SD 6.52

Ave. all 12 yrs. 19.54

S. D. 7.80
Mean 8-9 148 8&9 16.54
S.D. Adult 5.32

Scores of 12-year-old Students on the Introversion/Extraversion Subscale

Addressing the scores from 4 of our samples of 12-year-olds, Mike’s group along with Erwin’s
scored the highest for extroversion; while Ann’s group scored the lowest on Extroversion.

Based on twelve other samples at this age, females score higher on extroversion or the flow of
energy into the environment. This is manifested in many different problem-solving patterns.
But most importantly it is significantly correlated with self-concept. During problem-solving
activities, children whose energy flows into the environment in the different forms of mental and
physical play perceive themselves as having a better self-concept. The correlation coefficient (.26)
at p=.001 at n=245 undergirds one of the basic principles in this book as the relationship persists

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from early childhood until cognitive development matures into the latter stages of formal
operations. However, as seen in later data, there is not one but a group of tendencies that
influence behavior. Inspecting the means from the 6 different studies for males and females,
females tend to score higher on extroversion.

Differences in Types of Problems

Late Adolescence:

Since our secondary goal is to classify a person whose cognitive, personality, and interest systems
are interdependent, our first method of measurement is idiographic or intra-individual. That is,
the different modes (cognitive, personality, interests, and semi-cognitive) are basic scales that
form a single standardized profile analyzed, similar to a single chromosome composed of genes.
The methodology used to find peaks and valleys in the profile form the base of classification. By
standardizing each score of the subscales and plotting these as a profile, the assumption is that
people who have like profiles are going to be characterized similarly. This measurement
methodology emphasizes that order and sequence are important, not only at the subscale level
but also at the item level. Group differences in the problem-solving scales become apparent when
data are compared to theory.

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Chapter 15

Synopsis: Early Adolescence

This chapter provides a broad understanding of the mathematical and conceptual

properties of the different problem-solving subscales used in the Category system. As
such, the examples are somewhat trivial but designed to illustrate measurement and theoretical
properties. In the previous chapters, the characteristics of the age group--10-13-were
sometimes mathematically distinct, depending on cognitive maturation. Now with
children's increased intellectual capacity per memory and brain processing, more
measurement distinctions are possible.

The age group 14-17 differs widely on the ten problem-solving and interest subscales.
The differences are as vast as the number of people encountered. Individual differences
noted here, are based on typical demographic factors--age, gender, socioeconomic status,
school and church environments, and ethnicity. In the 14-17 age group, there is an
increased in the number and kinds of complex assessments as the reading and
understanding level of children has increased. The total number of students assessed
ranged from 1400 -1800, depending on the instruments used.

Synopsis: Learning, problem-solving, and energy

Energy is just as important at this age level (14-17) as any other. Students often complain
of having too little energy to complete certain activities. Coaches who are familiar with
athletes know that it is almost impossible to sustain a high level of activity and energy
for any length of time. Those who watch athletic events often watch the energy effects of
“Mo” or momentum. Momentum or energy during a game goes back and forth as one
team attempts to push back against the other. Slumps by players in various sports are
often the result of a lack of sustained attention or energy. Some students study late at
night or early in the afternoon since they have more energy at different times of the day.
Biorhythms are good examples of changes in energy cycles.

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Diagram 6: Cognitive model (Adulthood)

Cognitive Model: Late Adolescence (14-17)

The cognitive model in Diagram 6 is very similar to the model for earlier age groups. The
reason, as noted earlier, is the same. Young adults in the age group of 14-17, the high
school years, are using the same cognitive and affective pathways but with greater
frequency. Accordingly, more youngsters are using logical analysis to solve analytical
problems. Either early exposure or learned experience has promoted it and certain
curricular subjects require it.

Category Subscales

Throughout this age group (14-17), an experiential method of solving problems is

beginning to solidify. Because of age, each of the methods of solving problems is
represented as mode states, not necessarily traits or types. A state is a behavioral
condition that is defined by a transitory time that changes under different kinds of
external or internal impetus, such as motivation or threat. For example, think of a ‘state
of mind’ as a transitory period. One can be angry one moment and happy the next. Trait
or type exemplifies group and individual characteristics viewed as more enduring, and
less transitory. The trait is a quality that persists in the behavioral repertoire of the person

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over a long period. Type represents a composite of all traits and states of a person. Traits,
states, and types are usually related to personality dimensions and increase with
maturation and result in a style. As used here, style refers to predispositions and
resulting actions based on repeated use of all three conditions.

Our experience has shown that each of the problem-solving characteristics is used
intermittently depending on the situation. The categories, motor, perceptual and
conceptual may be dominant in a child who prefers playing a soccer game as
entertainment while perceptual, conceptual, and motor might be the order of dominance
in a child who likes doing the arithmetic problem for fun.

Each of the styles is biologically interdependent. Is it possible to identify different

problem-solving styles since a person may utilize different pathways with different kinds
of problems? The answer is yes. Biologically, through the process of description,
scientists have succeeded in identifying and describing the actions of many different
biological systems and the impacts of environmental stimuli. The field of medicine is the
study of how agents (bacteria, parasites, fungi, or environmental toxins) affect biological
systems. Through the process of systemization, and taxonomic classification, the effects
of problem-solving styles can become more explicit and group characteristics of trait and
type are more measurable.

During the latter years of this developmental period, analytic, spatial, and perceptual
tendencies begin to coalesce and act in concert with motivation to form the basic skills
necessary for life and career development. An eleventh-grade student who works on the
school yearbook, generally, has an integrated skill set that facilitates the work of editing,
copying, sequencing, and imaging.

In the same manner, a lack of a coalition of skills indicates whether the individual is
arrested in a particular stage of cognitive development or not. Those who have taught
high school are painfully aware of the individuals who have minimum or delayed skill
sets in a particular area, especially reading math, and writing. If a lack of skill
development occurs in a school subject such as science or history, it directly affects
performance and achievement. Any lack of skills could extend to later vocational areas
where hand and eye coordination are needed. A lack of analytical skills is obvious to
teachers and students alike.

At the beginning of high school, many students identify themselves as being

academically oriented or not! It is an erroneous type of self-selection where, sadly
enough, many students dropped out of school to pursue other avenues (see our drop rate
in high schools). In contrast to other countries such as Germany, most of our schools are
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not equipped to handle those children who excel at vocational educational skills and
trades. Between fourteen and seventeen is also the time that students attend special
schools designed for their special skills—schools for creative arts, or schools for
alternative students. Children are more likely to perceive their worth or value in areas of
strength such as sports, academics, or project skills. Also, the perceptions of others are
important. For many children, it is others who identify and define the talents of their
worth.

Gender differences

Differences between boys and girls are very evident at this age and those gender
differences are apparent on some of the ten subscales. Below, there are two Tables
reflecting differences between males and females. Each table differs as the first represents
a culturally diverse group (Hispanic, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries) of one
hundred and fifty 14-15-year-old; while the second Table represents an Honor group of
students who are 16-17 years of age. Examining the scores in Table 43 for 14 and 15-year-
olds indicated that males scored higher on the analysis subscale and females scored
higher on Motor and Social. The usual pattern of males scoring higher on the Motor,
Analysis, and Flex was not apparent. In contrast to our expectations from adult data,
females scored significantly higher on the Motor subscale. This is significant as it
represents a sample characteristic that requires further analysis for demographic and
background characteristics.
Table 43

Males- Ps Df Per Cn Mt An* So Ct Fx EI

Mean 11.818 12.53 32 30.37 31.32 38.712 36.41 35.593 31.59 17.66
SD 1.4472 0.848 9.1275 10.89 10.05 8.9038 11.81 9.4743 10.15 6.161
Females Ps Df Per Cn Mt** An So** Ct Fx EI
Mean 11.624 12.58 33.538 28.79 34.68 35.253 42.46 36.264 32 20
SD 1.2951 0.903 10.082 10.76 9.876 8.4565 10.38 9.6036 10.18 6.216
*=.05 **=.01 N=150

Gender Differences between Male and Females 14-15-Year-Old

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Chapter 16

Synopsis: Complex problem solving

Complex problem-solving in the work environment requires foresight, planning, intuition, and
experience. There is not a single right answer but many right answers in the form of information
that must be understood, analyzed, and assessed. As an example, the ability to keep large
corporations on track with monetary gains, and product development as well as make
breakthrough discoveries is a formidable undertaking that occurs with only average success as
unforeseen advantages and disadvantages are constantly occurring. Managers in fortune five
hundred companies often undertake complex problems daily.

Complex problem solving was assessed in various groups of people ranging from school
activities to the world of work. Thirty-five hundred school children and working adults, as well
as fifteen hundred managers, were used to test the validity of the IPS theory in real-world
settings. Elementary school, high school, and college-age students were assessed by standardized
testing and ratings to determine effectiveness in solving complex numerical, verbal, and spatial
problems, usually those associated with a discipline such as math, science, or history. All
different levels of non-managers, as well as managers (from supervisors to fortune five hundred
CEOs), were assessed to determine effectiveness in solving complex problems in the work
environment. Ratings from many independent sources were integrated into the process of
identifying and assessing people who could solve complex problems. These independent sources
were other employees, organizational consultants, and trainers. Results about the validity of the
theory for these different groups are found in the many chapters of Tier Three.

Below one finds an example of the data used to compare the problem-solving performance found
in different samples--adolescents, college students, managers, and graduate students. The data
from the various Fortune Five Hundred managers is briefly summarized under the topic -
Synopsis: Vocational Measurement. Actual data is available in the book.

By using various diverse groups such as juvenile delinquents and normal academic students as
well as those selected for academics or the lack thereof, the dimensions of the problem-solving
process and subscales are further clarified. In the discussion below, the purpose is to present
normative data to understand how group differences are operating in late adolescence and early
adulthood. As always, the question is “Are there subgroup differences in the problem-solving
approach toward verbal, numerical, and spatial problems?” This question is addressed in the last
part of the chapter in the book.

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Gender differences

In Table 61 below are gender differences for 466 people (average age = 31.26). These gender
differences mirror the differences found in early age groups. That is, males (n=262) tend to prefer
analytic items while females (n=204) prefer social items. Females, on average, are more
extroverted than males and select items containing value content related to control and structure,
a tendency prevalent in the earliest years of schooling.

Table 61

Males Ps30 Df Per Cn Mt An** So Ct Fx EI

Mean 12.14 11.76 38.42 30.16 39.03 43.2 41.8 60.97 51.81 14.62
SD 1.39 1.86 11.95 10.21 9.45 13.08 12.65 20.52 14.02 11.44
Females Ps30 Df Per Cn Mt An So** Ct** Fx EI**
Mean 12.08 11.78 38.78 30.95 39.36 32.73 47.11 63.16 49.94 17.22
SD 1.51 2.06 15.29 9.45 9.88 11.65 12.85 25.23 15.14 10.79
N=466 P=.01** P=.05* +logarithmic correction for heterogeneity-Levine’s statistic

Gender Differences for Adults on the PS subscales

Samples

Below in Table 62, there are nine different comparison groups representing 1312 people. The
table is constructed with the eleven-different subscales across the top with the last row
representing introversion and extroversion scores. The total statistics for all scores are listed either
in the Appendix or in the manual for each instrument. Means or averages in this chapter may not be
directly comparable to other samples in other sections as the instruments and items differ. The means and
standard deviations are close, however.

Table 62

No Name N Ps30 Pslap Pssp Df Per Cn Mt An So Ct Fx EI

Graduate
1 Students 89.00 14.10 16.89 15.82 9.87 33.41 37.25 48.82 40.41 36.27 43.86 46.68 15.29
2 Gifted 32.00 13.94 16.53 15.37 9.05 32.55 37.48 33.35 44.16 33.42 41.68 50.06 15.39
3 Managers 64.00 13.20 14.48 14.92 10.30 35.01 29.33 32.33 34.21 39.25 39.02 39.15 18.07
4 College 279.00 13.16 15.05 14.55 10.20 42.67 29.60 40.20 38.01 40.48 73.52 47.02 9.32
5 Adults 305.00 12.74 14.69 13.89 10.71 32.75 36.37 39.86 38.19 37.56 51.60 51.12 15.23
6 Hs (16-17) 70.00 12.34 13.91 13.42 11.33 35.64 33.45 32.87 38.12 37.48 36.78 33.97 18.61
7 Hs (14-15) 150.00 11.70 12.54 12.75 14.87 35.92 32.39 33.36 36.61 39.12 36.00 31.84 19.08
8 Juv. Del. 68.00 10.98 8.98 11.74 14.64 39.86 32.19 37.02 34.86 35.69 49.72 38.15 15.14
9 Alternative 113.00 10.82 14.06 29.43 32.64 34.57 32.29 36.04 36.35 48.14 15.45
Averages 145.78 12.55 14.14 14.06 12.23 35.25 33.41 36.93 37.43 37.26 45.39 42.90 15.73
SD 1.19 2.50 1.38 1.91 4.00 3.05 5.36 3.53 2.17 11.99 7.21 2.90
Hs=High School; Juv. Del =Juvenile Delinquents; Alternative-=Alternative High School.

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Comparison of Scores for 9 Different Groups

On the 10 Problem Solving Scales

Rather than using the raw scores, the scores could be presented as normalized T scores with a
mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Anyone who prefers the T scores can simply convert
using the data shown in Table in Appendix D. The instruments for measuring these 10 groups
produce two sets of scores--- base and extended. The base scores found in Table 62 are ordered
by the average problem-solving scores (Ps30-beginning at 14.10 and ending at 10.82). The base
scores represent the separate and distinct personality and cognitive measurement scales. These
problem-solving cognitive scores come from analogies and spatial drawing and reflect fluid
intelligence. The base scores on the problem-solving scales have been explained throughout the
various chapters. The extended scores, not shown, here, are based on the composites (integration)
of career, semi-cognitive, cognitive, and personality and are used for predicting subgroups.

The first of the nine comparison groups are graduate students from two different universities.
These self-selected students volunteered for a testing session over four days during the 1990s
(DeNovellis and Shand, 2004). The second sample (Gifted) consisted of high achieving high school
students (n=32) who were selected for a summer institute at Mississippi State University
(Carskaden, 1986). The criteria for selection was a national percentile ranking on a standardized
test for math and reading as well as problem-solving ability.

The third sample (Hitt, 1987) was a group of Extension Agricultural Managers (ages 30-64) who
were judged for their managerial effectiveness in a dissertation study in 1985; while the fourth
group was College students who were part of a career testing program at California Polytechnic
University (1983-1987). The fifth group were high school students (16-17) who participated in a
master’s Thesis study (Clingwald, 1986) and were 16-17 years of age. The Adult data came from
the studies conducted by the Personality and Research Institute for Business and Education
(DeNovellis, 1984-1995). The seventh sample (Hunt, 1987) was composed of 150 students ranging
in age from 14-15 (91 females and 59 males, Hs 14-15). This sample, generated as part of the
master’s Thesis, was selected for its ethnic diversity and included 49 Caucasians, 23 Asians, 26
Hispanics, and 43 African Americans.

Samples eight and nine were also part of different master’s thesis studies. Sample eight was from
a pilot study for a master’s Thesis using sixteen to eighteen-year-old juvenile delinquents. The
male juveniles were incarcerated by the California Youth Authority for criminal offenses
(Juveniles); many offenses were drug-related. The average reading and math level was 6th grade
(Bernal, 1989).

The ninth comparison group (Alternative High School) consisted of 89 alternative high school
students. Of the 89 alternative high school students (Wooley, 1988), 41 males and 48 females
attended the alternative school because of their low achievement, the potential to drop out, or
simply as an alternate route through high school.

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Based on the previous literature reviews, certain differences related to the subscale scores are
expected. Without going into all possibilities, the most obvious are listed next. Since the problem-
solving scale (Ps30; Pslap; Pssp) is a more academic scale that separates groups of problem
solvers, the expectations are that both the alternative high school and juvenile delinquents would
score lower on the Ps scale, therefore, higher on the differential scale (Df), a calculated scale. The
students selected for a summer (gifted) program are expected to score higher on the academic Ps
scale than other college or high school students. Based on the IPS theory, one expects those people
with higher levels of education to have higher conceptual scores. Which group would you expect
to score higher on the subscale for motor skills—alternative high school or delinquents?

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Chapter 20

Problem Solving Categories

General and differential problem solving

For the 9 groups in Table 63 below, the problem-solving scale (Ps30) along with the
differentiation scale (Df) can be compared concurrently. Both problems solving scales measure
some degree of seriation, pattern recognition, and logical thought. The subscale has items that
include spatial orientation and analogies which require mental transformation and mental
rotation of objects. The overall mean for the Ps30 is 12.42, while the mean for DF is 12.19.

Table 63

Std. Std.
Id No. Name Sample
Ps30 Dev. Df Dev.
1 Graduate 89 14.10 1.73 9.87 3.17
2 Gifted 32 13.94 1.09 11.79 6.54
3 Managers 64 13.20 1.48 12.58 3.19
4 College 279 12.68 1.48 11.58 5.13
5 Hs (16-17) 70 12.34 1.42 13.84 2.57
6 Adults 447 12.05 1.48 12.20 5.13
7 Hs (14-15) 150 11.70 1.36 14.87 2.87
8 Juveniles 68 10.98 1.31 12.36 3.17
9 Alternative 113 10.82 1.49 14.06 2.77

Grand Average 12.42 12.19

Grand Std. Dev. 1.43 3.84

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Ps and Dif

The patterns for these two subscales are self-evident. The gifted and graduate students scored
highest on the Ps30 scale while the Juveniles and students attending alternative schools scored
the lowest. The lowest average score on the Df scale was the Graduate Students while the highest
score belongs to the high school students. The Df scale is an inverted calculated scale that is for
the benefit of teachers interpreting the information on problem-solving and as such is not used
in any of the research calculations. Do these groups show a difference in word, number, or spatial
problems? The answer comes later!

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Perceptual

The base scale for perceptual scale measures a person’s orientation toward the environment as
well as ability to attend to the details of elements in the environment. Selective attention increases
from birth. We assume that people attend to various environmental objects when those objects
become the focus of attention. Those who score higher on the perceptual scale are more likely to
attend to the details of objects than those who score lower. The extended scales, not shown here,
are a composite scale that is composed of a combination of scores from different perceptual tests
as well as responses to subscale items. The extended scales are highly influenced by scores from
the speed of processing tests. Table 64 below shows the nine groups’ averages and standard
deviations for the Perceptual Scale.

Table 64

Id No. Name Sample Perceptual Std. Dev.

8 Juveniles 68 39.86 5.07

7 Hs (14-15) 150 35.92 3.2
5 Hs (16-17) 70 35.64 3.01
3 Managers 64 35.01 3.74
1 Graduate Students 89 33.41 4.21
4 College 279 33.25 5.41
6 Adults 447 32.75 5.41
2 Gifted 32 32.55 7.02
9 Alternative 113 29.43 12.47

Grand Average 33.40

Grand Std. Dev. 5.51
Perceptual subscales and others in previous sections were based on different items and instruments*.
Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Perceptual

The average score of all nine groups is 33.40. The average standard deviation is 5.51. Juvenile
delinquents had the highest average score of 39.86 on the Perceptual Scale. Interpret this score in
proximity to a group of people who spend a lot of time on the streets where awareness of the
environment is important. The next highest average scores come from high school students and
agriculture managers. The mean of the HS (14-15) was 35.92 while the mean for HS (16-17) was
35.64. In general, managers (mean=35.01) are a very select group, noted for solving a variety of
problems. Their overall means of problem-solving scales are usually higher. The lowest average
mean (29.43) on the perceptual test is made by the students attending the alternative high school.
Interesting! The standard deviation of the grand mean (33.40) for perceptual is 1.98 so about two-
thirds of the mean scores fall between 31.40 and 35.40.

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Conception

No longer are young people dependent upon just memory for conceptualization. Idea generation
results in many creative and unique ideas or perhaps, ideas that are practical and useful. IPS
assumes that conceptualization is increased by an achievement orientation. Top-down
processing occurs continuously as one strives to obtain a goal. All of the hours of fantasy and
thinking about new things, which began in elementary school, reach fruition in object and mind
creations. Table 65 below shows the average scores for the nine groups.

Table 65

Id No. Name Sample Conceptual Std. Dev.

2 Gifted 32 37.48 14.76

1 Graduate Students 89 37.25 9.25
6 Adults 447 36.37 8.26
4 College 279 35.85 8.26
5 Hs (16-17) 70 33.45 8
9 Alternative 113 32.64 8.71
7 Hs (14-15) 150 32.39 8.37
8 Juveniles 68 32.19 7.13
3 Managers 64 29.33 9.72
Grand Average 35.56
Grand Std. Dev. 9.16

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Conceptual

So, which group scores the highest on the conceptual scale? Not surprisingly, the gifted and
graduate students have the highest average mean score. Which group scores the lowest? -
managers, especially middle managers in our data. Graduate students and gifted students score
a little over one standard deviation higher than the students who are in high school. In our data
banks, the only other subgroup that scores higher than gifted and graduate is a group of 100
youngsters chosen as part of a talent program emphasizing music, dancing, and other creative
endeavors. Their average scores were 37.87 on the adult problem-solving instrument.

Motor

The physical and mental discipline required to master motor skills causes a concomitant increase
in the development of the central nervous system as students mature from birth to high school.
The more activity to which the CNS is exposed; the earlier that the development occurs. The
neuron rate increases dramatically in the first years of life and is stimulated by hands-on
experience. One outcome is a group of people, who are practical and realistic, rely heavily on
motor skills, and use bottom-up processing. Remember that bottom-up pathways in the brain
increase attention to object processing.

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The samples below in Table 66 did not include career groups such as construction workers,
athletes, or firefighters -–people who generally score higher on motor development. So, who did
you choose to be high on the motor subscale? It probably was not the graduate students.
However, since 45 of the graduate students were from the College of Business and Accounting,
this finding is not unusual. Business students are usually quite practical and grounded in the
reality of what goes on in the world around them and thus score higher on the motor subscale. In
Table 66, the average score for most of the adults in the sample was 36.86 with college students
having a mean of 39.60. The lowest scores on the motor scale were managers at 32.33 and the
gifted group had the next lowest score with an average of 33.35. Middle Managers in Fortune
Five Hundred companies usually score high on the Motor Scale. These managers, in contrast,
were University Agricultural Extension Managers.

Table 66

Id No. Name Sample Motor Std. Dev.

1 Graduate Students 89 48.82 11.78

6 Adults 447 39.86 9.52
4 College 279 39.6 9.52
8 Juveniles 68 37.02 7.65
9 Alternative 113 34.57 10.02
7 Hs (14-15) 150 33.36 10.09
2 Gifted 32 33.35 15.7
5 Hs (16-17) 70 32.87 10.61
3 Managers 64 32.33 11.53

Grand Average 36.86

Grand Std. Dev. 10.71

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Motor Subscale

The expectation is for those individuals who score high on the motor problem-solving scale to
contrast significantly with those who score high on the conceptual subscale. Go back and look at
all the scores for the different groups and compare motor and conceptual.

Analysis

Analytic tendencies or the capability of mentally decomposing concepts into parts or rotating objects
spatially is a performance action that often results in a product or verbal outcome. Analytic problem
solvers can be more convergent in thinking, more divergent in thinking, or use both equally. The
majority of people use both processes simultaneously every nanosecond and over time have a
preference for a combination of processes that operate in conjunction with motor/conceptual,
flex/structure, or social-emotional/analytical. The key to the process is the type of problem presented
as well as the energy flow inward and outward. Analytic tendencies when combined with motor and

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structure/control lead to greater object processing while social/emotional tendencies when combined
with conceptual and flex lead to greater pattern tendencies.

Convergent analytic thinkers break the whole into the sum of its parts and then elaborate on each of
the parts. Divergent analytic problem solvers generate many alternatives to a problem solution prior
to convergence or they diverge a long time then converge then diverge again.

All people, as expected, are combinations of different processes—convergent, divergent, or even

analytic. Certainly, it is difficult to follow the mental processes of convergent or divergent thinking.
A few examples might help.

Convergent analytic

Those who are convergent analytic combine the convergent process with an emphasis on logic
(depending on age) or associations. A convergent problem solver converges to a single solution, after
analysis. For instance, consider a simple example in solving a math problem, the problem solver
might answer the following problem from memory-100-50 = 50. A more complex math problem
involving a series of steps is as follows: (300-50) + 2(10 -5) = 260.

The analytical process requires an analysis of all the constraints and limits of each part of the problem,
first (300-50) or 250, then (10-5) or 5, then 2 times 5 or 10 then finally 250 + 10 or 260. The solution is
a compilation of the operations, perhaps memory-analysis and then memory-analysis again.
However, each process involves convergence.

Another example of convergent problem-solving using words is illustrative by the following

example. Find the letter from the following list (a; e; r; o; u) which defines the word "b_t" which means
"to wager." Note that the characteristics of the problem given can cause the problem solver to be
convergent.

Divergent

Divergent analytic problem solvers do not converge easily or often to a single solution. The divergent
analytic problem solver often is intrigued by an array of symbols and images (scenes in the
environment, pictures in a magazine). Their analytic tendencies tend to extract similarities and
differences in the symbols, or words. Principles are often extracted by generalizing from symbol
systems. Often the pronouncements from divergent alternatives are only logical approximations.
The intermediate problem solutions do not necessarily fulfill the requirements elicited by the
problem. Instead, logical approximation puts the solution in the ballpark. The divergent person’s
interest in generalizations often causes problems or controversy, especially among those looking for
a single solution and a single-case scenario.

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Analytic problem solvers who use both divergent and convergent thinking processes equally can
consider multiple alternatives and select the best representation of that alternative as a convergent
response. These individuals excel at social, technical, scientific, and mathematical problems.

Many people find the process of analyzing things enjoyable. For this reason, they select items that
are analytic in content. Having a preference does not mean that one is analytic, but for many
people, that is what occurs. Simple discrimination, numerical and verbal comparison, and mental
rotations are second nature to many in this group. So, which group in Table 67 below prefers
items that are deemed analytic? As suspected, the gifted group, aged sixteen and seventeen, win
first prize. So, which group is the lowest on the scale? Why do you think that the alternative high
school student scored the lowest?

Table 67

No. Name Sample Analysis Std. Dev.

2 Gifted 32 44.16 12.2

1 Graduate Students 89 40.41 10.15
4 College 279 38.44 10.19
6 Adults 447 38.19 10.19
5 Hs (16-17) 70 38.12 9.01
7 Hs (14-15) 150 36.61 8.74
8 Juveniles 68 34.86 8.24
3 Managers 64 34.21 11.87
9 Alternative 113 32.29 9.69

Grand Average 37.82

Grand Std. Dev. 10.03

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Analysis

Social

From birth through adolescence, children score high on the Social subscale, usually much higher
than the Analytic scale. Socialization is primary in our society and continues as part of our school
curriculum, especially in the elementary grades as teachers emphasize social conduct. At each
age level from 5 until early adolescence, items from the social subscale are the items of choice.
With that in mind, the high scores on the Social scale for youngsters in the 14-15 age are not
unusual. But what about the managers, why are their Social scores so high? In data from almost
2500 people selected for management positions ranging from technical management to senior
management, the average scores on the Social problem-solving subscale are generally higher
(37.24). As managers progress up the management ladder, one of the attributes that are part of
the selection process is the capability of solving the problem with different kinds of people. Their
problem-solving scores differ, however, according to levels of management and the duties
required (See Chapter 18). The general trend for scores on the Social scale is to increase with

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education; i.e. the more education, the greater the awareness of social situations. In our nine
comparison groups below, the incarcerated group and those going to alternative schools have
lower social scores. Also, students in the gifted group were less likely to select social items, which
is not surprising based on literature reviews.

So, what exactly is social problem-solving? Examples of items that measure social problem
solving include: Liking other people, being comfortable in a group when solving problems,
expressing one's feelings or ideas orally, and knowing when and how to contribute to the solution
of an ongoing problem. All behaviors are examples that contribute to solving the problem
individually or in a team or group. The adult who likes to work in groups with other people to
solve problems generally is interested in a myriad of different kinds of social problems, from the
delinquency of minors to the place of religion in the workplace.

Again, the scores for the nine groups in Table 68 are basic (not integrated with other subscales).
When extended scores are used, a different picture is painted. For example, when integrating
interest scores, the mean scores on the Social scale are increased by vocational preference
(whether a person prefers to be a Human Resource manager or a scientist). That is why both base
and extended scores are used for analysis and are the reason for the integration of subscales
(extended scales).

Table 68

Id No. Name Sample Social Std. Dev.

3 Managers 64 39.25 12.2

7 Hs (14-15) 150 39.12 9.78
6 Adults 447 37.56 14.86
4 College 279 37.55 14.86
5 Hs (16-17) 70 37.48 9.1
1 Graduate Students 89 36.27 11.4
9 Alternative 113 33.47 13.42
2 Gifted 32 33.42 18.81
8 Juveniles 68 32.98 12.35

Grand Average 36.34

Grand Std. Dev. 12.93

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Social

Control and structure

The definition of control and structure, as well as its use in problem-solving, has been thoroughly
discussed throughout this book. As described earlier, the need for structure is a process learned
from birth. Control becomes a system used to structure internal and external events, usually by
planning. Control reduces chaos and increases the chances of success in reaching a goal. Layers

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of memory imbibed with parental and society’s “do this” and “do not do this” are embedded
from early childhood and result in various forms of self-regulation and methods of dealing with
other people. Many academics argue profusely over the exact relationship between control and
structure which is why we developed another subscale for analysis of the phenomenon.

In Chapter 12, the definition of control was expanded for adults and older children as many more
neuronal layers have been added, and internal complexity results as people become older. An
additional bipolar subscale of receptivity and receptivity was developed to assess how adults
interacted with stored and layered knowledge, preconceived ideas, and the structuring of
information. In the IPS theory, scores on external structuring are added to scores on internal
structuring to derive a final score in the extended subscales.

Control of information and emotions is paramount as problems are encountered in the

environment. Which of the nine groups in Table 69 will score higher on control and structure
and the subsequent subscale of Flex; i.e. control’s counterpart?

Table 69

Id No. Name Sample Control Std. Dev.

4 College 279 52.12 14.81

6 Adults 447 51.6 14.81
8 Juveniles 68 49.72 7.13
1 Graduate Students 89 43.86 11.84
2 Gifted 32 41.68 19.86
3 Managers 64 39.02 10.98
5 Hs (16-17) 70 36.78 9.63
9 Alternative 113 36.35 14.34
7 Hs (14-15) 150 36 9.51

Grand Average 41.66

Grand Std. Dev. 12.55

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Control

Most of the college-educated adults and adults in a general score higher on control while the
students attending alternative schools have lower scores. The score of the juvenile group is 49.72.
Why? See the answer in the section on Flex and Control below. The group of managers in the
agricultural extension system at the university has slightly lower than average scores while the
graduate and gifted students have moderate control systems.

Flex

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The second control system, the counterpart of control, is Flex. As explained earlier, in an
integrated system, different subscales interact or act in concert, sometimes. The sometimes is based
on tendencies from introversion, extroversion, and analytic suppression but not explained here.
Addressing the Flex subscale found in Table 70 in isolation, several things are evident. The
lowest-scoring group is the 150 (age 14-15) youngsters in high school. The highest-scoring groups
are gifted, college and adults. Managers score less than a standard deviation below the mean. In
other words, managers as a group (see Chapter 19 for actual differences between managers) tend
to have less flexibility. This is especially true of middle managers who use past experience, rules,
regulations, and organizational structure to manage.

Table 70

Id No. Name Sample Flex Std. Dev.

6 Adults 447 51.12 14.52

4 College 279 50.98 14.52
2 Gifted 32 50.06 13.66
9 Alternative 113 48.14 5.85
1 Graduate Students 89 46.68 14.59
3 Managers 64 39.15 10.25
8 Juveniles 68 38.15 10.37
5 Hs (16-17) 70 33.97 9.77
7 Hs (14-15) 150 31.84 10.15

Grand Average 43.34

Grand Std. Dev. 11.52

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Flex

Flex and control patterns

Patterns become more explicit when both control scales are addressed simultaneously.
Addressing Table 71 below, examine both the control and flex means for the groups scoring the
lowest on the general problem-solving scale; that is, students attending the alternative school.
The students attending alternative schools have low control and high flexibility. In other words,
they are less likely to control and structure events in their environment. They are flexible in
response to impulses of thinking and emotions and score the lowest on the PS subscale. The
juvenile group scored high in control and low in flex. This suggests more control of external
events in the environment and less flexibility in thinking and emotions. Compare this to the
Gifted group of students who have average scores in control and higher scores on Flex. In contrast,
managers, college students, high school students, and adults are relatively balanced in their
control and flex systems.

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Table 71

Id No. Name Sample Control Flex

1 Graduate Students 89 43.86 46.68
2 Gifted 32 41.68 50.06
3 Managers 64 39.02 39.15
4 College 279 52.12 50.98
5 Hs (16-17) 70 36.78 33.97
6 Adults 447 51.6 51.12
7 Hs (14-15) 150 36 31.84
8 Juveniles 68 49.72 38.15
9 Alternative 113 36.35 48.14

Grand Average 41.66 43.34

Grand Std. Dev. 12.55 9.05

Average Scores of the Nine Groups on Flex and Control

Category and profile analysis

Using the data above, the category system is used to paint a clinical picture; but first, the following
caveats are warranted. In the following scenario, the grand average is used; however, realistically
when we are profiling individuals and groups, it is better to use averages that are based on many
small groups of similar ages, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, occupational status, and
instrument subscales. As one expects, these groups are very small based on divisions and
subdivisions. By using the grand averages for the groups above, the spectrum for comparison is
highly exaggerated (gifted/graduate students vs. juveniles / alternative high school students). But
again, this example shows the methodology and process of our categorization system.

For the general problem-solvers (Ps), the groups above the grand mean are the graduate, gifted,
and college students and managers. The other groups are designated as differential problem
solvers. The highest scores on Perceptual are juveniles, high school students, and managers.
Whether the P is assigned as the second letter of description is based on the total profile. So, for
the managers the two highest relative scores are GPS-s. Managers, who are general problem
solvers, are high on the subscales labeled perceptual, social, and control. (GPS-s).

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Gifted students: They have higher scores on general problem solving (G), conceptualization (C),
control (s), and flex (u). The order was GC-su. This statement describes the gifted student----a
general problem solver who prefers to conceptualize with flexible thinking and control.

For the group of students attending an alternative school, consider that their highest scale above
the grand mean was Flex. Putting this information together with their low problem-solving
scores and high Diff (D), the pattern becomes u with low control and high flex. Our descriptive
summary of the scores with such a pattern (D-u) is as follows: The students attending alternative
high schools are differential problem solvers with lower scores on control and high scores on
flexible thinking.

Juvenile delinquents also are differential problem solvers (D). They show a pattern of high
control and less flexibility in how the ideas are implemented (D-s). Their orientation is less social
with a greater emphasis on analyzing events.

Now, let us try to determine which group prefers which kind of problems-word, spatial, or
numerical. There are many mixed patterns.

Differences in Types of Problems Solved

Word problem solving

Again, standardized test scores are used as one measure of solving verbal or word problems. The
sample group contains 40 high school students; ages 15-18, some of the students in this sample
were honor students. The sample was selected as it is representative. The criterion was splitting
the single group into two groups at the 50th percentile, with the designation of “low” for those
below the 50th percentile on the verbal section and “high” for those scores above the 50th
percentile. This same strategy was used with many examples as it provides insight into the mean
differences between high and low groups on various subscales.

The question of interest is “Do those students who have higher scores on the verbal section of the
standardized tests (labeled as high in Table 72) have significantly higher scores on the Problem-
Solving scales? The answer is given in the Sign (significance) column. Two scales, Problem
Solving and Motor, have a significant difference at the .05 level. On the general Problem-Solving
scale, the high group has a mean of 14.18, and the low group at a mean of 13.42 with a significance
level of .055. The other scale which shows a significant difference is the Motor subscale. The
high group has a mean of 31.91 while the low group has a mean of 25.33. Also, look at the scores
on the conceptual scale. Our data suggest that the greatest number of young children have higher
scores on motor (66 percent) with only about (33 percent) having higher scores on conceptual. As
the propensity for reading and the level of education increases, there is a greater increase in those
both males and females who mark items related to the conceptual scale).

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Table 72

Std.
N Mean Dev Std.Err. Min Max Sign
Ps Low 18 13.42 1.17 0.27 11.25 15.5 0.055*
High 22 14.18 1.26 0.27 12 16.25
Df Low 18 10.2 1.67 0.39 7.53 13.8 0.998
High 22 10.19 1.9 0.41 7.17 14.07
Per Low 18 33.47 5.99 1.41 20 44.35 0.183
High 22 30.67 6.86 1.46 20.87 43.48
Cn Low 18 45.11 9.36 2.21 30 58 0.075+
High 22 39.55 9.72 2.07 22 62
Mt Low 18 25.33 9.46 2.23 12 42 0.036*
High 22 31.91 9.57 2.04 10 48
An Low 18 35.33 13.56 3.2 14 66 0.173
High 22 40.91 11.82 2.52 16 60
So Low 18 45.56 15.52 3.66 12 66 0.191
High 22 39.55 13.03 2.78 18 68
Ct Low 18 70.22 25.64 6.04 16 112 0.865
High 22 68.73 28.89 6.16 8 116
Fx Low 18 49.11 12.93 3.05 28 68 0.389
High 22 52.91 14.34 3.06 28 72
EI Low 18 19.44 10.47 2.47 -2 34 0.062+
High 22 12.27 12.67 2.7 -4 36
P*= .05 +approaches significance

High and Low Groups Split at the 50 Percentile on a Reading Standardized Test

Numerical and logical analytical

During the high school years, there is a direct increase in analytic and spatial tendencies which
vary with age and education. Each year older brings about a greater variety of cognitive
experiences which affects one’s capability to do different kinds of analytical and spatial types of
problems. Table 73 represents Analogies and Serial Scores based on differences associated
with age.
Table 73

Age Possible Percent Mean SD

13.9 yrs. 12 ** 47 6.5 2.80

14.9 yrs. 12 ** 49 7.01 2.80

15.9 yrs. 12 53 7.50 2.43

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16.9 yrs. 12 58 8.2 2.2

**Adjusted by versions of test N=250
*** Excludes gifted and special students
Analogies and Serial Scores based on Age Ranges

Spatial problem solving

Table 74 shows the averages for spatial scores for children between the ages of 14-17. As noted
in both Tables, the mean and percentage correct for analytic and spatial problems increase with
each age group; the sample size is 250.

Table 74

Age Possible pts Male Mean Male Std. Dev Female Mean Female SD
13.9 25 12.4 4.93 9.34 4.02

14.9 25** 13.3 4.83 11.1 4.95

15.9 25 14.50 4.89 12.21 4.86

16.9 25 14.9 4.64 12.3 4.93

**Adjusted by versions of test N=250
*** Excludes gifted and special students

Spatial Norms based on Age Ranges 14-17

For spatial problem solving, two groups of students at different universities (Breeding,1990)
consented to engage in a problem-solving activity on a Saturday during the 1990s. The students
were given a computer activity in which 13 different targets with R’s rotated in various spatial
positions (0 degrees, 60 degrees, 90 degrees, 270 degrees, etc.). In some instances, the R was
reflected as well as rotated. The activity was timed. Students were to identify both the degree of
rotation as well as the reflection. In general, the time of choosing the correct answer was a
function of the degree of rotation and reflection; i.e. the greater the amount of rotation and
reflection, then the more time was required to make a correct decision. In essence, as complexity
increased, time increased.

The demographic factors of the 2 groups were quite a diverse-sample size: 85 students; age: 31.25,
gender: slightly more females; ethnicity was predominantly Caucasian with a few Hispanics and
a few African Americans. When there was missing data, the subject was dropped from the
analysis. The most complex situations generally require both speed and accuracy of spatial
processing. The spatial score was the difference between the initial time required for assessing
the targets (R) under normal conditions subtracted from the amount of time required to assess
the target in both reflected and rotated positions. Those who had faster times and more accurate
assessments were assigned to the high group while those who had long times and less accurate
assessments were assigned to the low group. The criterion was separation at the 50th percentile.

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Examining Table 75 below, the only subscale which is significant is the general problem-solving
scale. The other scales did not show any significant mean difference when students were divided
into high and low spatial groups.

Table 75

Std. Std.
Name Status N Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum Sig.
Ps Low 32 13.88 1.44 0.25 10.5 16.5 0.01*
High 41 14.63 1.19 0.19 12 17
Dif Low 32 11.28 1.06 0.19 9.93 13.73 0.17
High 41 10.96 0.96 0.15 9.47 13.3
PC Low 32 35.13 10.1 1.78 16 60 0.21
High 41 38.34 11.66 1.82 12 60
Cn Low 32 33.5 12.68 2.24 4 60 0.45
High 41 31.02 14.96 2.34 4 72
Mt Low 32 47 11.54 2.04 16 72 0.14
High 41 51.02 11.79 1.84 24 72
An Low 32 37.88 12.11 2.14 16 64 0.82
High 41 38.54 13.29 2.08 20 68
So Low 32 42 14.15 2.5 12 76 0.30
High 41 45.37 13.52 2.11 24 68
Ct Low 32 53 16.13 2.85 16 72 0.35
High 41 56.39 14.77 2.31 20 76
Fx Low 32 47 15.24 2.69 12 72 0.99
High 41 47.02 14.22 2.22 12 76
EI Low 32 16.12 7.45 1.32 4 28 0.32
High 41 14.44 7.13 1.11 4 30
**P=.05 P=.01*

High and Low Ps Groups Split at the 50 Percentile for Spatial

Other important variables

Without going into a lot of numerical tables, over the years, many different variables related to
adults were studied with the problem-solving scales. Some of the more important ones included:
divergent thinking, intelligence, word skills, creativity, and math skills. A summary of the results
follows:

Divergent thinking and creativity. Thinking out of the box, unique and different ideas, and
verbal quips have been considered to be associated with divergent thinking and creativity. The
subscales most mediated by those concepts on the problem-solving instrument were Conceptual,
Flex, and Control. For both divergent thinking and creativity, the conceptual subscale was

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elevated and concomitantly so was control and structure for those individuals who have a higher
educational level. When the educational level was less, the control/structure subscale tends to
decrease, and flex elevates. When the scores on the Motor subscale are elevated, divergent
thinking and creativity seem to be applied to practical problems.

Intelligence: When IQ tests are used with the problem-solving subscales, the higher the IQ the
less the differences in the PS subscale (ceiling effect). Although the Ps30 scale is elevated (Mean=
12.80-13.90), subscales for Control and Flex are most affected.

Vocabulary and Math: Higher vocabulary and math scores are mostly associated with higher
conceptual thinking as well as structure and control in older adults.

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Chapter 17
Synopsis: Interests

In IPS theory, the foundation of generalized problem solving is learned within the first
five years with skills, attitudes, and behaviors honed, sharpened, and developed over a
lifetime. Generalized problem solving is based on early exposure to a wide variety of
problems that required logical thought, spatial reasoning, and social awareness. In early
life, as children gain motor skills, each child comes in contact with a multitude of
everyday problems such as how to eat with a spoon, ride a bike, get dressed in the
morning, tie one’s shoelaces and how get along with other children in play situations.
Social awareness is increased by being exposed to different kinds of social situations
while logical thought and spatial reasoning come from the use of motor activities that
extend hand-eye coordination and fine motor skills such as activities involving riding a
bike, throwing and catching a baseball, sewing and cooking, dancing, and applying
keyboard-related skills. All different kinds of activities increase individual decision-
making and motor skills. Decision-making and choices during problem exposure lead to
goal-related activities which result in increased individual self-efficacy and belief in one’s
ability to solve situational social and task-related problems. Self-confidence built from
generalized problem-solving carries over to task and domain-specific problem-solving in
math, English, science, and history when children enter schools.

When a young person is sure of their identity and their desire to succeed, each is more
likely to choose experiences that mirror their occupational interests. Interests are
amplified by being able to solve problems in any area, particularly where success is
found. Initially, problems, especially during the younger years, are generalized to
activities occurring within the immediate environment. Does the child read, engage
actively, and find solutions to everyday problems? Puzzles, games, motor activities,
media, taking things apart, and youthful exuberances help to establish patterns of
interest. Interests are formed at an early age but are amplified by home, school, people,
church, and exploration of the outdoors as well as individual activities and engagements
selected by parents. Interests are not formalized until much later in life when self-efficacy,
self-confidence, and true identity become a part of everyday life. Identity is a
monumental key to the establishment of interests.

Social awareness and social conformity increase when a child enters school. Children are
expected to follow the rules, display order, and make decisions under adult supervision.
Interests become a motivating factor, especially when children become young adults and
are allowed to be curious, ask questions, and explore. According to Holland (1956), when
students and adults are comfortable with objects and things in their environment, they

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are more likely to investigate. Interests in the solution of problems can take many forms,
some young adults like the challenge of trade skills while others want to be
entrepreneurs, scientists, homebodies, or athletes. Regardless of the individual’s current
occupational interest, the interactions of personality, cognition, and speed of processing
form patterns found in Holland’s six categories which are used as one cornerstone for
classifying subgroups of people.

Holland’s career patterns

Holland (1997) used the 6 areas which, in his writings, were characterized as personality
rather than interests but have been used extensively as the basis for career exploration.
These six areas are often designated as the RIASEC (i.e., Realistic, Investigative, Artistic,
Social, Enterprise, and Conventional) model. In many ways, the six types of personality
reflect gender differences and preferences which are promulgated in real-life situations
as expressions of interest. For example, according to Holland, a “Realistic” person likes
to work with objects perhaps machines, cooking utensils, cutting tools, or cars, and enter
career opportunities as a carpenter, an engineer, or a construction worker; while an
“Investigative” person likes to take things apart, search out solutions in laboratory work
or solve problems in medical areas. In contrast, a “Social” person” enjoys working on
problems having social significance such as working in social services (family, church, or
home). An “Enterprising” young man or woman prefers career patterns that influence
others such as politics, business, or selling. An “Artistic” person, as the name implies,
might display creative endeavors in fashion design, while a more “Conventional” person
likes structure and order in their daily life and could choose jobs involving clerical work,
math, or accounting.

In research, the RIASEC circumplex model proposed that the six types of
personality/interests are arranged in a circular (hexagonal) structure based on the relative
similarities/differences among them (Holland, 1997). According to Holland (1997), the
model of RIASEC was operationalized as a rank order structure following a circumplex
(hexagonal) model pattern. He surmised the structure from patterns of correlations
found by correlating the different subscales. Thus, in his structural model, adjacent
subscales (e.g. Realistic and Investigative) are more strongly related than alternate
subscales (Realistic and Artistic). Likewise, the differences on opposite sides of the
circumplex model show greater individual differences than those which are adjacent. In
Holland’s studies (1959), natural pattern results from the development of strong interest
patterns over weaker patterns.

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Our Career and Interests Inventory

As described in an earlier chapter, a career and interest assessment was developed and
tested with Cal Poly students at the Career Center during the years 1986-1992. From our
data, the primary career subscales which provide the greatest average separation in
means scores for females were called literary, social, outdoors, and conventional. In
contrast, the primary subscales for males were mechanical/realistic and outdoors. These
subscales can be more diagnostic for either males or females when the scores are reversed
based on gender. For example, when a male has a higher score on literary and a lower
on mechanical/realistic, this provides diagnostic information about the subject as the
response pattern reflects a reversal from the normative pattern.

Occupations can be divided into many groups based on subscale information. Holland’s
category system, which divided occupations based on an individual’s three highest
scores (i.e., RIE for realistic, investigative, and enterprising) was the most accurate for
occupational classification. According to Holland, when groups of people in a similar
occupation were tested, their scores were closest to the theoretical prediction made by the
scores using the 3-letter acronym. For us, Holland’s categories were expanded to include
auxiliary and other supplementary scales. For example, our subscale of Realistic
included mechanical; while our subscale of Investigative included literary. Aligning
Holland’s scales with the Problem-Solving subscales (Realistic-Motor); (Artistic-
Conceptual); (Investigative-thinking); (Social-social), and (Conventional-control), only
Enterprising does not have a counterpart. Holland’s Enterprising subscale mirrors one’s
ability to influence others; so, similar information is found using the career and interest
items in the inventory.

The data from our instrument were modeled to determine the best fit. The results were
different from those found using Holland’s instrument. Our results were a Circumflex
(hexagonal) model as shown in Picture 4 below. The acronym for the subscales becomes
RISCAE as noted in the principal components analysis below. Notice the pattern of the
major categories corresponding to Holland’s subscales. Realistic is in the lower right
quadrant, upper right is Investigative and Enterprising. In the upper left quadrant is
Artistic. Going from right to left the pattern is RIEASC. In this analysis, Realistic is the
opposite of Artistic and closer to Investigative moving from right to left. Enterprising is
more opposite of Social and Conventional. As the subgroups (1-36) become more familiar,
there is a relationship between the subgroups and Holland’s convention (RIASEC).

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Picture 4: Career model and 36 subgroups

Circumflex RIASCE Career Model around the 36 Subgroup

Career and Interests (CR1-CR6) R=CR1; I=CR2; A=CR3; S=CR4; E=CR5; C=CR6

In the following Picture 5, the speed of processing factors has been added to the career
subscales. Notice that subgroups and subscales tend to remain in the same position but
are rotated depending upon the addition of variables. When the speed of processing
becomes part of Picture 5, notice the following. Arithmetic (Arith) and Cogflex (CF) are
closer to Investigation and Artistic while letter identification (LD) and embedded figures
(EB) are close to Social and Conventional. In general, the speed of figural processing (CF)
is associated more often with Artistic, while the speed of processing cognitive (arithmetic
numbers) is more often associated with Investigative. These scores for Picture 5 have a
greater number of females in the sample.

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Picture 5: Circumflex model and speed of processing

Circumflex Career Model & Speed of Processing

Around the 36 Subgroups

Career and Interests (CR1-CR6) R=CR1; I=CR2; A=CR3; S=CR4; E=CR5; C=CR6
Speed of Processing (S1=CF; S2=LD; S3=EB; S4=Arith)

Synopsis: Gender differences in interests

Gender differences drastically affect responses to career instruments. Men and women
do not always like the same things. According to vocational theory (Osipow, 1983;
Rohlfing, Nota, Ferrari, Soresi, & Tracey, 2012 ), early adolescents become more aware of
social cues, and social expectations in the movement from early adolescence to late
adolescence (Betz, 1994; Gottfredson, 1981; Harmon, 1989). Social awareness, parental
attitudes, and cultural expectations create a basic preference pattern that mimics gender
stereotyping along a continuum of men preferring tasks and opportunities involving
things and women preferring tasks involving people (Tracey et al., 2005; Tracey &
Robbins, 2005). These interest patterns are evident in meta-analytic studies which
indicate that men had higher scores in Realistic and Investigative job-related interests
while women had higher interest scores in Social and Artistic subscales (Su, Rounds, and
Armstrong, 2009). Meta-analytic studies tend to show gender-related differences in the
career standard scores of men and women; therefore, diagnostic differences appear by
examining each gender separately. (Tracey & Robbins, 2005)

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Chapter 18

Synopsis: Vocational Measurement

The theory is not very useful unless one can see the results in everyday situations. Therefore, the
validity of the IPS theory was tested with technical and non-technical managers. Managers are
excellent complex problem solvers. The sample consisted of 1500 general and differential problem
solvers in different levels of management in many different kinds of fortune five hundred
companies. The group was composed of prospective managers, non-managers, seasoned senior
and middle-level managers, displaced managers as well as those who managed “mom and pop”
organizations.

The first part of the chapter provides information about interest theory as interests are the
foundation of vocational problem solving, especially when managers are involved. Interest
theory helps to identify general and differential problem solvers and the subgroup to which each
belongs, thereby providing accurate feedback to increase problem-solving skills. Managers, as a
subgroup of individuals who are usually generalized problem solvers, manifest their skills in
various kinds of verbal, numerical, and spatial problems. The middle part of the chapter describes
our instruments, methodology, and definitions for managers. The latter part of the chapter
addresses substantive information about the validity of our theory and our measuring
instruments and how the theory can be applied to managers. Again, this is a data-oriented
validation chapter that provides many tables illustrating how complex problem-solving occurs
when managers make decisions.

Historical Background

Holland’s et al. (1969) hexagonal structure is the major explanatory model in studies about
vocations and interests. The other models are Roe’s circular and Gati’s (1979) hierarchical. Roe’s
circular model is more theoretical, while Gati’s hierarchical model is more empirical. There are
ample studies that favor Holland’s model; however, empirically Gati’s hierarchical model
appears to have better predictive value. The issue, of course, is the same for the work presented
here – ease of use vs. practicality. Establishing instruments providing a substantive theory that can
be easily interpreted and explained to others is more practical, and useful. Instruments that have
predictive value may not be used as much by the general populace.

Ackerman’s integrated model is hierarchical and uses a 4-tier model with cognition as the central
tenet. At the pinnacle is “Intellectence (sp)” which encompasses the 3rd tier as general intelligence;
the 2nd tier as fluid intelligence, visual perception, perceptual speed, learning and memory,
knowledge and achievement, ideation fluency, and crystallized intelligence, and 1st tier as math
reasoning and closure. Holland’s interests are interwoven between the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order tiers.

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IPS measurement matches the characteristics of the subgroup and the level of priority required
for work or vocational opportunities. Since the IPS theory is an integrated theory that utilizes
personality, interests, and cognition in the solving of different kinds of verbal, numerical, or
spatial activity, each vocation, in a manner much like Holland, is listed and matched. Outcome
variables allow for extended scales to use this matching process in the categorization and
classification of subgroups. Subscales for measuring career and interests similar to Holland’s
constructs of Realistic, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, Investigative, and Conventional, were
developed. These constructs were tested with students in the California State Polytechnic Career
Center in 1985-1988 and then used as part of Management tests at the Personality and Business
Research Institute in Claremont CA during the 1990s.

Synopsis: Management problem solvers.

Management consultants provided a separate measurement of the IPS categories. Many of the
people who used the instruments were management consultants, management trainers, and
organizational development specialists. These people provided feedback on the validity of the
categories when the managers were tested. In some instances, managers were displaced during
the downsizing of the organization for economic reasons. In other instances, managers were
being hired for a particular position. In all cases, the results of our instruments were used only
for improvement and feedback, not as a tool for hiring and firing. In a few instances, the
management instruments were given to those managers who were on “retreat” as a source of
feedback.

Many of the management subscales evolved. Originally all the results were based on the
manager’s self-report, i.e. how each manager perceived their management effectiveness or the
interpretation of how each manager perceived their management effectiveness based on
normative scores. For many managers, their self-report of their effectiveness differed
considerably from the perceptions of other employees or other managers. For that reason, ratings
from trainers, consultants, employees, and others were soon integrated into the scoring system.
Then these results were compared to the manager’s scores. The integration of ratings led to
overall lower effectiveness and efficiency scores on various management scales. In other words,
the consultant groups were more likely to rate the manager lower than the rating that the manager
gave them. The results from some of the ratings are summarized below.

Anonymous ratings

• Anonymous ratings can be effectively used for assessing the efficiency and
effectiveness of Management Problem Solving
• Senior Managers (because of the intense hiring practices and scrutiny received from
others in the organizations before being hired) had the highest effectiveness and
efficiency rating from other managers and independent raters.

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• Managing Specialists and first-line managers received the lowest rating and show the
greatest need to improve
• The most common attributes of those who received the lowest score in management
effectiveness and efficiency suggested they were too demanding, too impatient, and
created stressful environments
• Higher levels of management had more stress than lower levels. The greatest level of
management stress was often self-imposed.
• Managers who possess better skills in working with people received better
management ratings.
• There is a significant positive relationship between solving complex organizational
problems solving and the following variables (Management identity, Management
Effectiveness, Management Efficiency, and Leadership)

Results from extended scales

As mentioned earlier, four of the most useful extended scales include Management Identify,
Team players, Management Effectiveness and Management Efficiency. We assumed that high
scores on these scales indicate the ability to solve organizational problems in a manner that
incorporates the concerns of employees as well as the concerns of the organization.

To measure this assumption, the scores of the manager's self-report were compared to the ratings
of other managers and independent observers such as a trainer or consultant who studied the
organization. If the manager’s self-report and the rating both indicated the need for
improvement, this resulted in a lower score on the management effectiveness scales. However,
as is often the case, one of the measurement scales (ratings or the instrument), were at odds.

The technique of discrepancy analysis was used to determine a final numerical outcome.
Discrepancy analysis is a score or numerical value reflecting the difference between a manager’s
self-perception and other people’s perceptions. As a real-life example of discrepancy analysis,
one of the male middle managers in a Fortune Five hundred company gave himself a rating of 1
or “little need to improve.” When the same manager came to the item on how others might
perceive “his or her need for improvement” he or she also marked a 1 (little need to improve
management skills). The manager perceived little need to improve and, in his mind, felt that his
fellow employees or coworkers did not think that he needed to improve any of his management
skills.

Guess what! The ratings from other managers or independent raters suggested that the manager
needed to improve both management skills and technique (all 5s indicate poor management)
since he was rated low in leadership, high in contributing to a stressful environment, less
flexibility in management decisions, and less effectiveness and efficiency in the solving of daily
management problems. As a result of this large discrepancy between the manager’s self-ratings
and the ratings of others, he received a low score on Management Effectiveness and Management
Efficiency. Other factors contributing to a low score on the same two scales were combinations

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of scale scores such as a high need for control and little flexibility. His interest profile also
indicated less interest in management or activities associated with his job.

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Chapter 19:
Synopsis: Research, Categorization, and integrative models.

This chapter addresses research, categorization, and integrative models. A model is a

way that scientists show relationships between different kinds of concepts. Models are
displayed as diagrams; some involve numbers while others involve words with arrows
going in all different directions. Notice, in this book, there are different kinds of models:
process models, research models, and categorization models. Each model is different and
has different objectives.

The three-tiered cognitive process model which explains the complex process of solving
problems is different from our research and categorization models. The categorization
model is more clinical and explains how subgroups interact during the process of solving
problems while the research model projects different mathematical solutions. Our goal
in this chapter is to present our research model, the model of the research process used
in analyzing problem-solving in the different areas of words, numbers, and spatial
activities. First let us examine how other authors, in the areas of cognition, personality,
and interest, model their work.

In each of the areas of cognition, interests, and personality, researchers and armchair
theorists have developed models to explain the complex relationships of their concepts.
There are complex models both within and among the areas. For the models within each of
the areas, a major concept such as general intelligence (“g”) or extroversion is subdivided
into many different areas. For the models among the areas of cognition, personality, and
interests, the researchers take a general concept such as “g” and then integrate the
subcomponents into a base, usually designated as interests and personality. The latter
explanatory models are called integrative. In this section, three separate well-known
models are presented: 1) A cognitive model, 2) A personality model, and 3) An “interest”
model. Finally, in the latter part of the chapter, our integrated research model is
illustrated.

A cognitive model

The work of the 4 major theorists provided us with different ways of explaining human
cognitive behavior. There is a consensus among researchers in the field about how
abilities are related to each other. The most prolific theorists in the areas of cognition are
Carroll (1993), Horn (1965), Vernon (1950), and Cattell (1971/1987). From a measurement
standpoint, most of the theorists have the general ability (“g”) as a major factor followed
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by broad groups of second and third levels. Carroll’s explanatory model has wide
acceptance.

Carroll’s intelligence model incorporates two concepts originally coined by Raymond

Cattell called fluid intelligence and crystalline intelligence. Fluid intelligence is composed
of sequential reasoning and inductive reasoning while crystalline intelligence includes
verbal and reading comprehension. Another factor of Carroll’s is knowledge and
achievement which incorporates general school achievement as well as verbal
information and knowledge. Perceptual speed memory and mental reasoning are also
separate factors. Finally, there are two closely related vectors named visual perception
and closure.

According to Carroll’s model, general intelligence is composed of seven major factors

(crystallized intelligence, ideational fluency, knowledge and achievement, learning and
memory, perceptual speed, visual perception, and fluid intelligence which are divided
into many separate components.
Math Reasoning
Math Reasoning, Quantitative Reasoning

Fluid Intelligence (Gf)

Sequential, Quantitative, Piagetian, & Inductive Reasoning
Visual Perception Closure
Spatial Scanning, Visualization Closure Speed, Flex

Perceptual Speed
Stroop, Clerical Speed, Digit/Symbol, RT
General Intelligence
Learning
Memory-Visual, Associative, Free Recall, Span

Knowledge and Achievement

General School Achievement, Verbal, Information, Knowledge

Ideational Fluency
Word Fluency, Expression Fluency, Naming Fluency
Creativity, Figural,

Crystallized intelligence (Gc)

Verbal Comprehension, Reading Comprehension, Spelling, Lexical Knowledge
Reading Speed, “Cloze”, Communication, Oral Style, Writing,
Figure 2: (Derived from Carrol, 1993): Modified Factorial Constructs

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It is possible to group the 7 major areas as follows: Crystallized and fluid intelligence are
two areas, visual and perceptual speed are another two areas, knowledge and memory
coexists and finally, ideational fluency stands alone. The grouping of these areas brings
the total group to 4 rather than 7. Our research has drawn heavily on Carroll’s cognitive
factors (1993). Our modified model (after Carroll) is found in figure 2, Chapter 3.

A newer model, recently developed by Johnson et al. (2005) is called VPR which stands
for Verbal, Perceptual, and Image Rotation. In their model, the hierarchical “g” factor
(general factor) of Thurstone (1938) consists of 3 broad highly correlated factors identified
as verbal, perceptual, and image rotation. These are then subdivided into 8 specialized
factors. Verbal consists of verbal (6 tests), scholastic (11 tests), and fluency (8 tests);
perceptual becomes number (10 tests), memory (4 tests), spatial (10 tests), and perceptual
(14). Imagine rotation is defined by 4 separate tests.

A model of personality

Ackerman and Heggestad (1997) used the works of Eysenck (1947/1970), Costa and
McCrae (1994), and Tellegen (1982) to develop an integrative framework for personality.
Their framework is a three-tiered model with Neuroticism, Psychoticism, and
extroversion at the apex with the work of (Eysench) as the first level, the five factors
(Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Extroversion, Conscientiousness, Openness) by Costa and
McCrae as the second level, and the 11 constructs (Stress Reaction, Well-being,
Alienation, Aggression, Social Closeness, Control, Achievement, Traditionalism,
Absorption, Harm Avoidance) of Tellegen as the third level.

Their integrative framework for personality is a hierarchy with three different tiers. Most
personality theorists agree that broad factors encompass specific factors.

A model for interests

Holland’s et al. (1969) hexagonal structure is the major explanatory model in studies
about vocations and interests. The other models are Roe’s (1956) circular and Gati’s (1979)
hierarchical. Roe’s circular model is more theoretical, while Gati’s hierarchical model is
more empirical. There are ample studies that favor Holland’s model; however,
empirically Gati’s hierarchical model appears to have better predictive value. The issue,
of course, is the same for the work presented here – ease of use vs. practicality. Establishing
instruments providing a substantive theory that can be easily interpreted and explained

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to others is more practical, and useful. Instruments with predictive value may not be used
as much by the general populace.

Many empirical models have scientific use but lack a simple theoretical explanation for
those who use them. This is simply a part of the age-old controversy of scientific theory
vs. practical use. Both kinds of instruments have their place, however, in the social science
area where there is greater variability, the theory may never accurately explain the data
and vice versa.

Integrative models

For an integrative model, the best example comes from Armstrong and Ackerman.
Armstrong et al. (2004) used Holland’s interest measures as a primary starting point
stating that it was a logical choice given its prominent position within vocational
literature. They proceeded to use published sources as a basis for their analysis. Using
property vectors as the statistical technique, they located a set of coordinates based on
Rounds and Tracey, (1993) which help define a two-dimensional circumflex structure of
Holland's six types at the following coordinates -R (.00, .58), I (.50, .29), A (.50, –.29), S
(.00, –.58), E (–.50, –.29), C (–.50, .29).

Without going into the technical aspects which are available in their papers, they found
their results were consistent with previous research between Holland’s type and other
personality measures. Using 31 environmental measures, they fitted the variables into the
circumflex model of interest. Again, their conclusion about personality, interests, and
ability was: “important connections between personality, interests, and ability when
variables are integrated into a circumflex structure.”

A separate study presented in the paper by Armstrong et al. (2008) used a three-
dimensional model of personality, ability, and interests. Again, a general conclusion was
that interests were a good starting point for integrating individual difference variables
and that personality can be aligned with environment and ability. In their opinion, people
integrate ability and personality to adjust to environmental context.

Ackerman’s integrated model is hierarchical and uses a 4-tier model with cognition as
the central tenet. At the pinnacle is “Intellectence (sp)” which encompasses the 3rd tier as
general intelligence; the 2nd tier as fluid intelligence, visual perception, perceptual speed,
learning and memory, knowledge and achievement, ideation fluency, and crystallized
intelligence, and 1st tier as math reasoning and closure. Holland’s interests are interwoven
between the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order tiers.

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Cattel’s 16 PF

The best representation of an integrative model that exists at a single level of cognition
and multiple levels of personality is Cattell’s 16 Personality Factors. This instrument uses
a subscale of analogies denoted as ‘B’ or Intelligence, 81 different profiles, and 6 career
themes. The 81-profile pattern published by Samuel e. Krug (1981) at the Institute for
Personality and Ability Testing, Inc. illustrates the basic methodology of interpreting
clinical patterns. Many of the 81 profile patterns are extremely rare. For example, a profile
pattern denoted as 1111 occurs with an incidence percent of .1 with a rarity rank of 10
(ranks low given 81 profiles).

The rarity of many profile patterns is a real occurrence regardless of the instruments used
for measurement. This is one of the primary reasons to use only 36 profiles for the IPS
theory.

Before addressing our research integrated model, a short review of some of the pertinent
theoretical issues is necessary. The dominance of an integrated cognitive, interest, and
personality attribute comes from the use and practice of a particular function over
favored, often travel neural pathways. Auxiliary or secondary cognitive, interest, and
affective functions are less used. Pathways are identified in multiple areas of the brain by
fMRI as a result of developmental differences, specialization, experience, and genetic
heritage.

Our Research Integrated Model

To keep the model simple and understandable, the holistic elements are noted first and
the components later. At the peak of the model is cognition (“g”) and then cognition is
interwoven with personality and at the base is interests. The reason for placing cognition
at its peak is based on the hierarchical organization of the brain. The hierarchical structure
of the neocortex suggests that the structure above are higher-order processes that are
dependent upon the structures below (integrated sensory-motor function). The brain
processes information cognitively and affectively simultaneously. Emotional energy
generated from a sensory-motor function that gives rise to personality is tightly
interspersed in neural networks which are a part of cognitive processing. The broad base
representing the actions of personality and cognition is interesting. So, the triangle below
represents the first way of visualizing our integrative model.

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“g”

Cognitive Processes, Personality Cognitive Processes, Personality

Interests (Environmental Problem Solving)

(Verbal, Numerical, and Spatial problems)

A hierarchical model is best based on the literature review. For predictive purposes, the
model has now been rotated either left or right depending on the research objective. It
may look like the following:

Cognitive Processes, Personality

g Interests

Cognitive Processes, Personality

Why should one rotate the model? Our three-tiered cognitive model presented in this
book utilizes neural pathways that reflect how “g” or cognition is displayed in the real
world of problem-solving. The process begins with our equations with different
components of “g” filtered by personality and other cognitive processes to predict
outcomes that are associated with vocational interests or environmental problem solving
(verbal, numerical, and spatial problems). A typical regression equation or discriminant
function could be used for predictive purposes. The model could be flipped in the other
direction to predict how interests, filtered by personality interact with “g.” However, the
data support the first view.

Since models are just ways of conceptualizing strategies for doing things, another
methodology emphasizes a different view. Rather than using a simple triangle as a
model, let us employ a cube to emphasize how subgroups use personality and cognition
to solve problems. The best way to conceptualize the measurement of subgroup solving
problems is to think of personality and cognitive interactions. In Chapter 2, subgroups
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are displayed as a non-metric, 2-dimensional model as it is easy to comprehend.

However, what if the subgroups are displayed as three or four dimensions. That is,
personality attributes are along the top of the cube and cognition is along the side with
subgroups layered at every level of cognition. Interests are displayed in the cube as
situational relationships within each subgroup. See Appendix B for all the subgroups
with measures of cognition and personality integrated around interests.

Wow, it sounds complicated! Not really, many studies have studied aptitude treatment
and aptitude personality interactions. As more complicated statistics and forms of
analysis have become available so have ways to conceptualize and analyze information.
The research community has graduated from simple univariate statistics to multivariate
statistics with a host of complicated experimental designs. Roughly to understand how
subgroups are formed, visualize a cube with all the different subgroups at 6 different
levels that interact with personality and cognition. Interests are found within each
subgroup.

Categorization model

Categorization models are clinical in orientation. Clinical models are different from
measurement models. Clinical models often are inferred from large differences in
assessment instruments. By noting a clinical profile (the ups and downs of average scores
on a measurement scale such as the number and kinds of white blood cells), clinicians
make decisions about treatment and/or judgments about people. The clinician is the
direct assessor of what is seen, observed, and noted in a patient or client. The clinical
model is usually holistic, interpretive, and suggestive of treatment, prescriptions, or
suggestions.

Although the measurement models provide research answers which may eventually
become part of the clinical assessment, the categorization model is short-term and
immediate. Categories help people understand decisive numerical differences. The
categorization model is more clinical and uses algorithms to simulate what is seen and
observed in real life. The cornerstone of the categorization model is cognition,
personality, and semi-cognition rather than interests as the research literature provides
more substantive foundational knowledge about the categories. The term “semi-
cognitive” refers to tests that measure speed and reaction time as well as dis-embedding
(such as field independence and field dependence). Cognition in our model refers to the
assessments based on analogies and sequences and spatial decision-making (block
counting, spatial representation). Personality refers to subscales that measure personality
or temperaments. Interests refer to subscales that measure interests. Standard scores are

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scores from each of the cognitive, semi-cognitive, personality, and interest subscales
which have been developed for different age groups and are located in the Appendix.
The mathematical and theoretical basis of our model is found in Chapters 20 and 21 while
the clinical features are described in the chapters by age groups.

As is argued in the later chapter, using the current research literature and the current
categorization models, human behavior is far too complex for simple categories.
Categorization models are transitory, depending on many different demographic and
cultural factors. At best, it is possible to take the current literature, construct a model and
identify categories and significant trends that exist at any age level. Models become a
snapshot in time so that at a later date we may compare the information. This snapshot
can be compared to a criterion group of other people who have a similar snapshot and
hopefully describe the relationship between the two. The first type of measurement is
intraindividual (constructs within the person) and the second time is referred to as inter-
individual (constructs measured between people). Both methods are used in later
chapters.

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Chapter 20

Synopsis: Measurement issues

A theory is not very useful unless others can verify the assumptions through a series of
measurements. In essence, many of the tables given in the book allow others to determine the
usefulness of the theory based on the data collected. Since this system is unusual—descriptive,
recursive, interdependent, and intertwined based on the individual characteristics of the problem
solver and the individual characteristics of the type of problems solved--a measurement system that
at least defines the ends and middle of the continuum are needed. To understand the measurement
system, let us provide some background.

Events in life could be random or “chaotic” but our experience suggests that having reliable and
valid prior information changes events from being random to being more predictable. The degree
to which the prior information is less valid, and less reliable suggests more chaos or randomness
and vice versa. Theory or that which has been previously validated as ‘known information can
help in prediction and classification.

The theory is a compilation of known facts which include supposition. Suppositions are based on
the assumption of the principles inherent in the facts. Facts are known information that has been
verified continuously over time but even facts are subject to error when random events affect
them. So, we suppose that even known facts have some errors.

In IPS theory, the degree to which known information or theory can reduce error and increase
prediction is proportionate to the degree to which “known information” can reduce the error in
the classification equation, similar to using Bayesian statistics. Classification is defined as the
accurate assignment of an object to a group or class. When the classification is accurate, the class
is a superordinate construct encompassing the subordinate constructs of attributes defining the
class. In the language of classification, subordinate constructs are defined as features that include
members and subgroups. In our theory, additional or known information provided by
demographic factors of gender, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and problem-solving attributes
helps to define subgroups and features.

If a class becomes a superordinate concept, then a subclass is a subordinate construct of the class,
and the member is the smallest individual point, variable, number, or object containing the
features of the class. In the psychological or academic measurement, a profile set containing all
the profiles represents a class, a subset of profiles representing a subgroup represents a subclass,
and a person’s profile is a member. This is important as a set of similar profiles constitutes the
subgroup in IPS theory.

If attributes (traits, cognition, interests) are variables or objects which define a subclass, the
attributes are likely to be correlated in some ways and uncorrelated in other ways. For example,

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two attributes of a bird (the size of the bird’s wings and the color of the bird) might be used to
assign a bird (class) to a subclass called redbirds (small wingspan and red color or large wingspan
and red color). On the surface, the color of the wings (phenotype) might be independent of the
size of the bird’s wings (genotype). However, when the attributes of the feature occur in a single
known biological entity at the member level, a correlation or relationship between the two
attributes might occur since the body systems (integumentary, muscular, and skeletal) are
interrelated. Thus, attributes that might appear independent at a subclass level (redbirds with
small wingspan and red color) could be correlated at the member level (biological). The
designation of the subclass as a construct for prediction is artificially constructed and the analysis
of the class can be statistically independent as one refers to the random selection of members of
the class or subclass (Zena and Duncan, 2015).

How is this information applied to our model? If our interest in prediction and classification is
at the level of the population (all people who solve problems) and the population is independent,
then there is less error. Moving from the measurement of the population and applying the same
logic to our subgroups (groups of the subclass defined by motor, conceptual, or problem-solving
model, etc.), as long as the subclass is independent, there is less prediction error. However, our
subclasses are not independent as some of the variables which make up the subclass are
correlated with each other. If our interest is really at the level of predicting a single member (a
particular person) of the class, the classification error is going to increase as the correlation of the
features at the member and subclass level increases. Correlated subgroups pose a true
measurement problem in the classification of problem solvers.

True and false positives

Two concepts that are useful in determining the amount of error in classification and prediction
are true and false positives. If one is interested in predicting people who do well at problem-
solving, then a true positive is the degree of probability that the prediction is true. If one predicts
that a group of people are good at solving problems and all the members of that group do well at
solving problems then that is defined as a “true positive: and there is no misclassification. When
the prediction of the class is accurate then the probability is 100 percent. The probability of
misclassification increases as the error based on attributes (subscales on problem-solving)
increases. In any group of people, one can predict that 70 percent of the group solves problems
well and 30 percent do not. If the group is tested and 60 percent of the group solves problems
well and 40 percent did not, then individuals are misclassified as 10 percent of the total group.
Thus, sometimes a prediction is made in error and the original misclassification is a false positive.
Statistically, the error rate of false positives is (1-p) where p is the probability of true positives or
correct classification. Principles garnered at the group population or subgroup level may break
down when applied at the member level.

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Factors of misclassification

There are many factors in both theory and analysis which lead to true and false positives at the
class level, subclass level, and member level. Statisticians usually analyze data at the class or
subclass level whereas a doctor, clinician, or teacher usually analyzes patients or students at the
member level.

Theory or known information can lead to many true positives if the facts of the theory are valid,
reliable, testable, and repeatable (with less error). For example, if a doctor is educated by the
theory of the conditions which lead to type I and type II diabetes, then when encountering those
conditions in practice, the opportunity for a diagnosis leading to accurate diagnosis is increased.
Therefore, if a doctor is presented with a set of profiles including technical information about
blood glucose levels as well as descriptive information about clinical symptoms, “known
information” can lead to better diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis.

For a statistician who ascribes to Bayesian Theory, ‘known information can lead to better
diagnosis or increase the number of true positives. Known information under controlled
conditions (experiments) can lead to tentative outcomes. However, even in controlled
experiments, statistician often faces problems related to correlated features. At the class and
subclass level, the error in misclassification (false positives) could be due to many things
including the co-linearity of features (correlation between). Thus, prediction (from a statistical
point of view) is usually best when features are uncorrelated as one can then determine the
contribution from individual features which lead to the prediction.

One of the reasons that a theory is tenable is because the variables that represent the facts are
interrelated predictably. The task of research is the extraction of sets of independent variables
which provide a prediction for the theory. In other words, when scientists test theories, they try
to extract the features of the independent variables so they can describe the contributions of the
parts to the whole. This leads to an accompanying problem of co-linearity, that is, the correlated
variables (known information) may be useful in the diagnosis and prediction but are dropped
out of the analysis. This is often true in the use of regression-like statistics.

The crux of our current problem addressed in this chapter is how to extract the known
information existing in a correlated matrix at the distinct levels and use it for diagnosis and
classification at the subclass and member levels? A second purpose is to understand the
construction of written profiles and their contribution to solving diverse kinds of problems.

Again, let us explain the nomenclature used in the discussion of profiles as an example. When
administering a test to a person, the scores on the test represent one profile or one member. To
give meaning to that profile, the scores in the profile are compared to the nearest profile group
(subclass) which has been defined by a set from all similar profiles in that subgroup. This is a
form of discrepancy analysis. All profile scores are defined either by their correlation matrix and
represent the class or by the averages of the profile members and represent the subclass. But first

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before going further in our illustration let us digress to examine the role of feature extraction in
providing help for our problem.

Feature extraction and dimension reduction

There are many diverse types of mathematical models and methods for classification and
prediction. Many methods utilize techniques first leading to dimension reduction then prediction
and classification.

The methods most commonly used for dimension reduction include Factor Analysis, Principal
component analysis (PCA), Kernel PCA, and Multilinear PCA. A dimension reduction technique
is a methodology that reduces an original group of X variables representing X dimensions to a
smaller subset of variables representing one or fewer dimensions. Reducing a set of explanatory
variables from 3 to 2 allows a smaller model to represent a larger model. A special case of PCA
utilizing kernels is particularly appropriate as the function computes the coordinates of the data
in space by using inner products between all pairs of data. In pattern analysis, the task is for the
algorithm to find clusters, pairs, correlations, or relationships.

The data mining techniques map the data in a high-dimensional feature space where the data can
be transformed into a set of points in Euclidean space. This procedure gives rise to a host of ways
of identifying methods (such as “nearest neighbor”) of determining the algorithms model of
denoting a cluster. Likewise, the algorithms operating with kernels are useful in classification and
prediction (linear discriminant analysis, and support vector machine). Throughout this book
metric and non-metric, correspondence analysis, detrended correspondence analysis, and
principal components analysis are used in Pictures (1-8).

Classification is based on many interrelated factors, especially if one is using algorithms. The use
of algorithms in classification has problems also. For example, an algorithm may produce an
outcome that is skewed at the expense of other factors being measured. Algorithms are
interpolations designed to calculate missing information based on averages. Thus, improvement
in terms of accuracy in one area by its very nature causes errors in others.

Regression methods have increased since the early 1960 when the predominant methodology was
linear regression, multiple regression, and non-linear regression. Now the most useful techniques
for prediction are machine learning kernels that build classification trees through recursive
partitioning based on categorical, ordinal, interval, or ratio data.

Some of the most current methods are log-linear logistic ridge regression (Hastie et al., 2007),
Lasso penalty (Tibshirani, 1996), and random forest (Breiman, 2001). Current problems with
almost all classification methodologies include correlated groups, overfitting, ill-conditioning of
the matrix, and high dimensionality associated with having too small a sample and too many
variables for predictions.

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Other models that directly impact prediction, classification, and control are in the form of fuzzy
models. Fuzzy models (fuzzy rule-based systems) were first developed by Zadeh (1965) of the
University of California at Berkeley. He reasons that one can use a fuzzy set with linguistic
insertion instead of just discrete logic of ones and zeros. A linguistic insertion utilized the
knowledge and experience of an expert in the form of an if-then statement. As an example, if a
score on “math achievement” is greater than “80 percent” and the person has a “graduate
education” then the “reading score” of that person is likely to be above “65 percent.”

System dynamics theory (Forreste, 1961) originally developed to determine the success or failure
of a corporation can be equally applied to issues involving human dynamics. The concept of
system dynamics is used as a guiding methodology. Mathematical modeling techniques help in
understanding complex issues of predicting a class, subclass, and member in the areas of
personality, cognition, and interests.

The mathematical system underlying the profile analysis and classification of human dynamics
is both deterministic and stochastic. The system is deterministic when the problem-solving goal
is clear, defined, and achievable. The system is stochastic when the goal is unclear, ill-defined,
and achieve by trial and error.

Earlier, the analogy of bird wingspan and color was used to represent issues of prediction and
classification. However, any model involving human actions is so complicated that any
representation cannot be accurate and concrete. The areas of human thinking and emotions are
very abstract so our model must be equally complex and can use feature extraction as a
methodology for understanding, framing, and elucidating complex issues of human interaction.

As a guiding methodology, another complex abstraction called dimensionality is used in the

measurement. Dimensionality represents variables in different kinds of space and allows us to
use space-time relationships to define profile analysis and classification. Space/time relationships
are a method of explaining how certain variables of personality, interest, and cognition may
interact at a certain period and location. At the basic level, correlation and random matrices are
building blocks of system analysis.

Feature extraction

Feature extraction is a general term that assumes that the elements making up the model occur in
many different random combinations and that different models and different methods can
accurately predict the outcome but not with the same degree of accuracy. Feature extraction is a
simple concept suggesting that the dimensions of a complex entity can be explained by a simpler
and less complex model.

As an example, suppose one sees and captures the structure of an object on a computer screen?
By its shape and position, the object appears to be a bird. Using a model of morphological features

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such as color, wingspan, bones in the body, and measurements of a bird’s dimensions, the task is
to predict if it is a bird. The next task is to identify the kind of bird (bald eagle).

Of the four variables, let us assume that wingspan and color are the best in predicting whether
an object is a bird. Feature extraction decreases the model from 4 features to 2 morphological
features which predict that the object is a bird. However, feature extraction does not necessarily
predict the kind of bird (Bald eagle).

The outcomes of feature extraction are improved with training defined by many random
capturing of images on the computer screen and used to define different models. Our purpose is
to use the mathematical elements of feature extraction and apply them to profile analysis and
classification in the areas of human endeavor specifically personality, interests, and cognition
where differences occur relative to kinds of problems (spatial, numerical, verbal).

In summary, feature extraction allows us to define subgroups of personality, ability, and interest
profiles in people which represent the structure of the whole in the same manner as the
morphological features of the bird are used to define the image on the computer screen. Of course,
the assumption is that if it behaves like a bird, is shaped like a bird, and looks like a bird then it
is a bird.

Rate of misclassification

What is the expected rate of misclassification? The answer depends on so many different things;
it is difficult to give a single answer. Let us revisit some basic concepts of reliability, validity,
measurement issues, surface characteristics, layers, demographic factors, and intended use.

The ability to quantify a subgroup using numbers revolves around reliability, validity, and
measurement techniques. We have chosen distance measurements, fuzzy models, and applied
statistical methods as a method of quantification and noted that classification (ability to assign a
person to a subgroup) is a difficult process that only has validity based on theory, a prior and
posterior probabilities, as well as item and subscale response patterns. In our model, all people are
different from our subgroup (individual differences). Why? The subgroup is an “ideal composite”
established on a theoretical and empirical basis. The assumption is that having characteristics in
common with an identified subgroup provides information to and about the individual.
Likewise, knowing how one is different from the subgroup as identified by distance measures
gives information about the error, misclassification, and individual characteristics. Are there
acceptable levels of error in classification for being nearest to a subgroup.? All measurement
theory is based on error. For some researchers, the measurement error is too great, for others not
so much. For those who think the error rate is too great, please develop your own set of profiles
using subgroups!

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Intended use is another especially important variable in determining the error. In general, we
have found that if there is any personal threat associated with the assessment situation, the error
rate in misclassification is increased substantially. Why? Individuals are afraid that the
information will be used negatively and their response patterns reflect less variability (become
more conservative) and they choose more socially desired responses. There are ways to
compensate for the variation in averages due to the assessment situations but the best solution is
not to use the instruments for classification in any situation where a personal threat exists.

Age and demographic factors are also important. The ideal situation is for average scores of
comparisons to be adjusted via differences in demographic factors (age, ethnicity, education, etc.).
In the late seventies, a user complained that a group of fellow professors at his college thought
their scores were in error. The computer program that was being used to classify subgroups was
set to measure a group of 18-19-year entry-level college students based on our normative data.
The instrument should never be used for a different normative group. Normative profile scores change
substantially for a group of highly educated 45-70-year-old professors. Enough said! The
professors were correct.

Surface characteristics are especially important when trying to classify individuals or their
behaviors. In IPS theory, surface characteristics are likely to represent true feelings, behaviors,
and thoughts when layers are thin and pliable. As the depth of the layer increases, surface
characteristics are false representations of thoughts and ideas which cause misclassification, and
misrepresentation. That is, thick layers or complex and multiple neurological pathways filtered
through distinct parts of an emotionally charged brain may produce responses that are not
representative of the individual’s true feelings, ideas, or thoughts. Because surface characteristics
vary substantially from one person to another, one cannot classify an individual into a subgroup
in two very distinct situations. 1. A person does not want to be classified into a subgroup so
purposely falsifies responses on questionnaires. 2. An individual has multiple layers that
interfere with surface characteristics and therefore the person is unaware of their true response
pattern. In either case, since the subscales are in error, the person responds vociferously that
there is not a match between them and their profile classification. Guess what? True enough!

Synopsis: Items and Theory

A simple statement: In reality, all individual differences are interdependent and recursive.
Think about it! Is your digestive system separate from your integumentary system? How can
one measure something which is interdependent? That has been the question for research
and medical personnel and others since the beginning of “objective” measurement. The
response, of course, is that our taxonomic or classification systems help to describe and
understand individual differences and provide us with places to look for the crucial
difference. Taxonomies and classifications allow one to make statements about the subgroup
to which the child, student, or adult belongs. According to J. T. Lamiell (1998), Wilhelm
Windelband, a Kantian philosopher, described an objective (nomothetic) and a subjective

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(idiographic) approach to understanding taxonomies and classification. The nomothetic is

more statistically quantitative while the idiographic is more qualitative. The qualitative
process (taxonomies and classifications) identifies where remediation or development is
needed while the quantitative approach provides answers about groups to which people
below.

Item level scoring

Ranking, as a methodology, was selected as the best alternative for the measurement of some
items. For other items, simple additive scoring was used. Why ranking? First, items that are
ranked are less likely to be selected based on social desirability. Second, ranking provides
the separation in the mathematical averages that were needed to classify the existence of
subgroups.

What is rank? In simple terms, rank is “order” based on preference. By analogy, if there are
five runners, the order of finish is important. The runner finishing first has a better time than
the runner finishing second. One can rank the runners from 1-5 based on their times to the
finish line or based on the order in which each person finishes.

Our system of item measurement for the problems solving subscales requires that each
person rank two choices out of four alternatives. Within the 4 alternatives, there are usually
a pair of items that measure the same construct. Therefore, most items have 4 alternatives
consisting of 2 pairs. When a person is given a choice of the alternatives and chooses one
item over another then this constitutes a weighted preference. A person is given an item stem
and told to rank only two out of the possible 4 responses. Given these instructions, the rank
order is important. When 2 responses or a pair represent the same construct, ranking two
items of the same pair has more weight than ranking one or none. If the respondent chooses
two items, one member of the first pair and one member of the second pair, then the first
ranked response is given more weight than the second.

As a concrete example, a person is given four items, two items representing nuts and two
items representing fruits. The subscale is scored positively based on whether the person
makes similar or mixed choices for the positive end of the subscale. The positive end of these
four items is designated “preferring fruit.” A person who chooses two items for fruits versus
two items for nuts is assumed to have a stronger preference for fruits than nuts. The
assumption is that two similar choices represent a stronger preference than two mixed
choices or two choices which do not represent the positive end of the item subscale. That is,
a choice of two fruits displays a greater preference for fruit than a mixed choice of one fruit,
and one nut or a response of two items for nuts. For any mixed response, the first rank is

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more important than the second rank. Therefore, greater weight is assigned to the first
choice. The items below represent the item stem, directions, and responses below.

In the example below, a person’s order of 1st choice is weighted by 2 as it is perceived to hold
a higher value as the first choice over the 2nd choice. If the first response is weighted by 2, the
possible set of scores becomes (6, 4, 2, and 0) which, of course, reduces to 3, 2, 1, 0. Across a
set of 7 groups of item choices, the maximum score is 42 (7x 6) and the minimum score is
zero.

This method of ranking is often criticized by many people as it requires a forced choice. That
is, the respondent must select 2 of the four choices. In reality, he or she may not like and
would not select any of the choices. This is why it is called a forced-choice item selection.
Forced choice items have some drawbacks so there are other items with more choices
including ranking alternatives up to 10 possibilities. The analogies, sequence, and spatial
items are presented as multiple-choice selections.

Scale level

Example: (yes, the computer does the scoring!)

Which of the four things do you like best? Chose two responses:

a) Apples b) Oranges c) Almonds d) Cashews

(Item can be scored for a preference of fruits with the assumption that a rank of “a” or “b” is
a higher preference than the items scored for nuts – “c” or “d”. Theoretically, the item can
be scored for nuts and/or fruits but we select the preferred alternative. In the example above,
we scored the 2 items for fruit, not nuts.

A person may have the following sets of item scores when 2 are assigned as a preference for
fruit but not nuts. A score of zero is a lack of preference for fruits: Likewise, if the fruit is in
the first position then it receives twice as much weight as the fruit in the second position
Some different combinations are listed below.

a) 4, 2; The person chooses Apples and Oranges (“a” and” b”) and received a total of 6 points
for a total score. Apples are in the first rank (2x2) and Oranges are a fruit in the second
position (2x1). The total is 4 +2 for the item.

b) 4, 0; The person chooses Apples and Almonds as the first and second rank and receives 4
points for Apples being a fruit and choosing it in the first position and 0 points for Almonds
as it is a nut. The total score is 4 points.

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c) 4,0; The person chooses Apples and Cashews and receives 4 points for apples and 0 points
for Cashews.

d) 0, 2; The person chose Cashews and Oranges for a total score of 2 points

e) 4, 0 The person chooses Oranges and Cashews for a score of 4 points

f)) 0,0. The person chooses Cashews and Almonds for a score of 0 points there indicating
that he or she did not prefer fruits.

The resulting points are treated on each subscale as interval data. With the weights, the
scoring of each choice results in an item score of 6,4, 2, or 0). This reduces to 3 2, 1, 0 with
weighting. The interval between 3 and 2 is not assumed to be exactly one, just as the
intervals on a 1-5 rating scale (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are not assumed to be 1

Profile selection.

In the measurement, a scale score is the sum of correct items regardless of how the response
is weighted. An ordinal scale score is based on “order.” Thus, when a person chooses a
response, the assumptions of order and sequence are important. For people who often score
in the middle ranges on different subscales, our classification algorithm chooses the highest
standardized score. In the example below, five subscales make up an overall profile for each
of the following areas--- personality (p), interests(I), cognition (c), learning (l), and semi-
cognitive scores (sc).

These scores are listed as a single profile below with the 10 normalized scale scores (mean of
50 and standard deviation of 10). The primary scales for personality are conceptual and
social, for interests-science and business), for cognition-analogies and spatial; for learning-
vocabulary and computation standard scores, and semi cognitive-arithmetic and letter
identification. The single profile of standardized scores is listed in Table 82.

The highest scores (above 50) in each category are Social (56), Business (54), Vocabulary (56),
and Arithmetic (58). The ranking of the categories is Arithmetic (58), Vocabulary (56), Social
(56), and Business (52) with weights of 1 assumed for each category since none of the scores
exceeded a single standard deviation of 10.

Table 82

Personality Interests Cognition Learning Semi Cognitive

Mot Social Sci. Bus Anal Spat Voc. Comp Arith Letter
48 56 38 54 38 42 56 47 58 52

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Selection of Profile score to form a subgroup

There is an order to these scores. The algorithm chooses “semi-cognitive” or perceptual

speed first to classify a problem solver. The next set of scores selected is “cognitive” followed
by “personality” and finally “interests”.

Based on these scores, the idiographic methodology is used to describe the person’s method
of solving problems: good with words and numbers and can apply these talents socially in
an area such as business. Our classification above begins with semi-cognitive and then
cognition. Next comes social problem solving (S), the highest score, and then adds letters
based on extended or basic subscale scores, a process explained elsewhere.

Subscales and selected examples of items

This next section gives examples of items used to measure whether a person is a general
or differential problem solver and to determine the classification of a problem solver.
Please remember that we used 7 different instruments modified for age and development
and the item examples presented here may not occur in every instrument as they were
not age-appropriate.

General/differential problem solver

As one expects, differential and general problem-solving exist on a continuum. Differential

problem solvers can become general problem solvers and vice versa. A general problem
solver is a person who likes to spend one's time-solving problems in any area and engaging
in social or non-social activities. Time is on their side as they enjoy solving a new problem,
developing a new skill, or encountering a new and different situation. General problem
solvers have strengths and weaknesses also. The greatest strength is finding the time to
engage and solve complex problems that others do not want to solve. The greatest weakness
is that the time to spend solving problems takes time away from other important activities,
especially those involving family or loved ones. A general problem solver can solve almost
any type of verbal, numerical, or spatial problem, depending on individual differences. The
capacity to overcome difficulties in solving different kinds of problems helps one become a
general problem solver.

There are a large number of differential problem-solvers for they do the majority of work in
society. This group constitutes your artisans, craft people, skilled salespersons,
entrepreneurs, and a host of other well-known career people. The one common element of
this group is their skill level is centered on their strengths and interests developed over time.
For the purposes, here, a differential problem solver is a person who applies skills in a

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differential manner in the completion of daily problem-solving. This selected application of

skills to solve some problems (either with words, numbers, or spatial activities) continues
over a lifetime. Mastery of multiple skills comes with encounters with many different
problem situations.

There are many instances where being a differential problem solver is better than being a
general problem solver! For example, many world chess champions, sports heroes, and great
artists are differential problem solvers. They solve problems mainly in an area of interest.

Here, we emphasize items that separate individuals into the two groups-either general or
differential problem solvers. Items that are used to differentiate the general problem solver
from the differential problem solver are based on scores from analogies, sequence, block
counting, arithmetic, figural speed tests, and preference responses. The cognitive categories
associated with this particular kind of problem-solver are designated by letters such as Pslap,
Pssp, Ps30, PF LD, etc. with the order and the letters depending on the results from types of
cognitive assessments. In all cases, normative demographic information (gender, ethnicity,
socioeconomic status, and age) and the normative tables for cognitive variables
(standardized tests and others) are standardized. See normative tables in Appendix I. Some
of the items are listed below.

Directions: Indicate the order of preference: 1st, 2nd, or 3rd.

I prefer:
a) Solving math problems
b) Solving chemistry problems
c) Solving problems with people
d) Solving problems in business
e) Not solving academic problems but doing things I like

Which type of courses did you prefer in high school?

a) Physics
b) Calculus
c) Social Studies
d) Literature
e) Sports, non-academic classes
f) Did not prefer school courses

Would you rather?

a) Write a book
b) Build a house
c) Play with a Rubric’s cube

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d) Sell cars for a living

e) Be free, work in a job that you like
f) Be an individual who does what he or she likes

What kinds of problems do you prefer?

a) Academic problems (math, English, history)
b) Project problems (projects that I like to do)
c) All kinds of problems do not make a difference
d) Only problems in which I am interested.
e) Do not prefer working on problems

Which do you prefer?

a) Reading a book for fun
b) Painting a picture
c) Use a drawing to build a bridge
d) Surveying for the county
e) Using my hands to do work
f) Using my mind to do work
g) None of the above

I prefer:
a) Learning lots of different skills
b) Being a jack of all trades
c) Performing well on a math test
d) Building a go-kart
e) Doing well with work that I like
f) Working on my stuff

Perceptual problem-solvers

Perceptual problem solvers are especially attuned to the characteristics of either real objects
or images presented as real objects. Perceptual problem-solvers show faster speed in the
identification of images, letters, pictures, or other objects contained within complex
backgrounds. They look at objects in a room or drawings and notice incorrect things, that
are out of place or are incorrectly positioned. They strive for symmetry. They would be the
first to notice the different patterns in curtains which match the form and function of other
floral designs in the room. When entering a room, they are bothered by a picture that is tilted
or a tablecloth that needs to be straightened.

Most perceptual problem solvers are not even aware of their gifts in solving perceptual
problems. They may work in a specialized field such as banking, where their attention to
perceptual details is highly valued. When their special gifts are combined with a propensity

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for math, many perceptual problem solvers become accountants, bank tellers, or managers.
Most of the time, only after many years, do they realize that some very special kinds of jobs
or vocations (architectural design) match their problem-solving abilities. Some perceptual
problem solvers become great artists, editors, and proofreaders, or have the capability of
solving problems related to graphic design and forming an image. In many cases, their
talents are accentuated by computers or design equipment which enhances their abilities.
How is this assessed? By analyzing the response patterns of perceptual problem solvers and
comparing these to the other groups of problem solvers. The objective is to first identify
different kinds of items that this group is most likely to select.

What kind of problems do you prefer?

a) Modifying spatial designs b) Word problems
c) Number problems d) Noticing design properties

I am:

a) Quick to notice differences in design b) Attentive to changes in the environment

c) Better at thinking than noticing differences d) Less attentive to changes around me.

When I am walking in a crowd of people, I

a) Am quick to notice any changes c) Am aware of everyone
b) Am usually thinking about the day’s events d) Am usually lost in thought

Conceptual problem solver

The preference for dealing with ideas, either in the form of reading or verbal ideas either
developed by the individual or given by other people are the foundation of this problem-
solving category. Conceptual problem solvers are those children or adults who solve
problems predominantly using linguistics or words. They often learn slightly better by
reading rather than hearing and are often considered word-smart. Conceptually dominant
children who enter first grade are generally those who have families who value educational
processes and have introduced their children to vocabulary words and the world of ideas by
reading books, promoting creative play, talking extensively, or teaching the child to read.
Notice that conceptually dominant problem solvers can be stimulated in a verbal and non-
verbal manner (either by ideas read individually or by ideas learned from others who read
books or speak to them). Some children in first grade cannot read well but have a great
speaking vocabulary and an understanding of many different words. The amount of
interaction and time given by a caregiver is paramount; that is, someone must take time to
speak, interact, or read to them.

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One of the characteristics most evident in the conceptually dominant adults and children is
their propensity for being stimulated by the ideational content found in words. They enjoy
making connections with symbols or abstractions seen in the environment. For example, a
conceptually dominant person gets enjoyment from manifesting a singular image of their
own making (humor related to a pictorial image created in the mind by the word "joker") or
the words coming from another person in a contextual manner that stimulates images that
evoke humor. Often the association between words, symbols, or images is important in the
stimulation process. Also, extremely important are the individual or group meanings given
to words, symbols, or abstractions. Individual meanings are constructed in the person's
mind based on individual experiences; while group meanings often are based on the societal
or standard definition. An adult conceptually dominant person may look at the symbol "+";
i.e. (plus) and define it as "connectivity in the universe, spiritually of all mankind, or holistic
representation of all numbers." In other words, the person has created symbolic or abstract
connotations for “+”.

Because they prefer words, ideas, and reading, conceptual dominant problem-solvers choose
words on career and interest tests that demonstrate how their cumulative everyday
experiences have influenced their interest patterns. For example, they may choose items
suggesting they like to solve problems related to "acting in plays" or “doing creative writing
on the job." The occupational and personality portion of our problem-solving tests has many
different items that help to define the conceptually dominant problem solver.

Some examples of these items are:

I prefer:

a) Theoretical problems b) Reading problems

c) Solving complex problems d) Languages
e) Learning vocabulary words f) Writing for others, not myself
g) None of these items

Because people have many different kinds of personality characteristics, a subgroup of the
conceptually dominant group wants to apply their ideas to problem situations or understand
the working of different kinds of things. For example, the members of this group choose
items such as:

a) Having knowledge of special subjects b) Creating models

c) Making pottery d) Creating designs for business
e) Developing good photographs e) Creating motion pictures
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f) Applying ideas to technology

My mind and brain work best:

a) If I see, touch, and feel what I want to learn c) If someone draws me a picture
b) If I think about it in my mind. d) If someone tells me about it first.

Motor problem-solvers

Sports, athletic events, or activities that require hand and eye coordination dominate the lives
of individuals who select items representing this category. Many experiences are learned
outdoors, through parent-directed activities, or during play with others. Most motor skills
are learned by imitation and emulation as well as trial and error. Parents who have similar
motor skills spend time teaching their children to emulate their activities (hockey players,
acrobats, carpenters, etc.) Instructions are mostly verbal with a "follow me or watch what I
do" type of interaction.

In reality, most motor children learn from concrete to abstract, from physical activities to
conceptual activities while a small minority learn vice versa. Motor activities (crawling,
standing, moving the arms and hands) are the first activities that allow the child to explore
the environment and find links between words (verbal conceptualization) and objects. This
exploration of the environment continues until later in life when motor problem solvers try
to solve problems by finding concrete links to abstractions. A motor problem-solver uses
their senses to handle, smell, manipulate, and measure any representation of the objects
involved in a problem situation. A mechanic, when given a problem about a leak from a car,
will put his finger in the residue, smell it, taste it, or feel the area from which the leak came.
Some children in this group are less likely to read a book except to solve an immediate
problem.

Example of items for the Motor subscale:

As a child, I:
a) Preferred outdoors activities
b) Loved anything which involved physical activity
c) Spent most of my time inside watching TV
d) Preferred watching others rather than doing things myself

As a child, I preferred:
a) To play sports
b) Using my hands

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c) Using my mind
d) Doing anything which did not involve reading

On the career portion of the problem-solving instruments, adults mark items such as liking
to solve problems associated with different activities such as:

a) Loading trucks b) Making deliveries

c) Driving big machines d) Using mechanical tools
e) Moving furniture f) Cleaning rooms in houses
g) Using muscles for sports or actions h) Lifting heavy objects

The cognitive categories associated with this particular kind of problem-solver are
designated by letters such as MSC with the order and the letters depending on the results
from types of cognitive assessments.

Analytic problem solver

All people use analytic thought, however, for many people, especially women, the dominant
use of analytic preferences is not easily recognized as it remains hidden by social etiquette.
Other analytic thinkers and problem solvers, in contrast, are quite obvious in the display of
their analytic tendencies. They analyze everything; sometimes too much (paralysis by
analysis!!). Analytic problem solvers often use the meta-components of evaluation and
generalizations as they examine each step in the analytic process. Education and time spent
in the thinking process help with the recognition of different kinds of problems and problem
solvers. For example, the course of study that people take in the field of engineering requires
a lot of analytic exercises. Education leaves its distinctive marks on those who graduate.
Recently one of my friends was describing a person whom he had just met. He quipped,
“Oh, he sounded like a mechanical engineer.” Enough said!

Analytic problem-solvers place greater emphasis on either the logic of responses and
outcomes or the degree to which something can be broken into its parts. Analytic problem
solvers often have learned the rules of logic through the formal process of learning or by
actual work experiences later in life. They search for definition and clarity. “What do you
mean by that?” “I don’t understand your sentence.” If given a writing assignment during
high school, these types of problem solvers want to know how many pages and what should
be the focus (establishing the constraints on the problem). Later in life perhaps during a
work situation at a military-industrial complex, a group of analytic problem solvers could
spend 10 hours defining the problem, 20 hours clarifying the problem, and 30 hours writing
out the problem so others can focus on it. Contrast that with a work situation in a small

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business, where this same type of problem solver must not only define, clarify, and write the
problem autonomously, but also must have the expertise for solving it.
The world, in the mind of the analytic, has no boundaries for either work or sometimes their
ambitions. On the vocational part of the problem-solving instruments, adults who are
already working in business, industry, or technology mark items such as:

I:

a) Prefer logical outcomes b) Make tradeoffs in business

c) Measure objects carefully d) Am not very analytic
e) Like being an engineer e) Prefer solving people's problems

I prefer to
a) Take things apart to see how they work
b) See the parts and details and then fit them together
c) See the big picture and not worry about details
d) Take a global approach and let us fill in the details.

I am:
a) An analyzer
b) Good at detecting issues
c) Great at seeing differences in designs
d) The best at helping people

The cognitive categories associated with this particular kind of problem-solver are
designated by letters such as AS with the order and the letters depending on the results from
types of cognitive assessments.

Social problem solver

The use of the term "Social Problem Solver", once again, suggests that social interactions are
basically at the forefront of the individual’s approach to problems. Therefore, a social
problem-solver could be motor proficient, and/or have great perceptual skills. The results
are entirely dependent upon experiences.

A social problem-solver usually comes from a family with caregivers who recognize the need
for social interaction or social conventions. A lot of energy and time is spent developing the
kinds of experiences which emphasize and value people-related activities. A social problem-
solver is generally cooperative and allows others equal opportunity for engagement in the
problem at hand.

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A social orientation does not change the need to be competitive and have standards of
excellence. One of the prominent characteristics of social problem solvers is their preference
for being involved with and solving socially related problems. Over a lifetime, these
experiences provide social acumen and an understanding of people and their problems.

Social problems can require manipulations of abstract concepts or direct experiences related
to problems that people generally encounter. Social problems exist at all levels of society
and can require group interactions for all perspectives of the problems to be addressed.
Social problem solvers (clergy, teachers, health care professionals, social workers, politicians)
often interact with large groups and their importance to society becomes evident over time

On the career portion of the problem-solving instruments, adults in the age groups from 18-
72-mark items such as:

I like solving problems that involve:

a) People rather than objects or things b) Helping others

c) Teaching adults d) Personal disputes are involved
e) Handling employment issues e) Big ideas

I prefer solving problems with:

a) social activities more than non-social activities

b) People rather than things
c) Objects that I can see
d) Objects that I rotate in my mind.

The cognitive categories associated with this particular kind of problem-solver are
designated by letters such ASP with the order and the letters depending on the results from
types of cognitive assessments.

Control/structure

Control, concerning problem-solving, differs with age and development. In many instances,
control for very young people is related to personal responsibility and conscientiousness.
Control in IPS theory is related to flex and behavior. A child learns to regulate their
behavioral impulses so they can function in real-life situations. Even as early as kindergarten
and first-grade classrooms, one observes a child who is well-manner, well-behaved, follows
rules and regulations, listens to the teacher, and tries to follow directions given in problem-

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solving situations. Children with these behavioral tendencies are more likely to develop
throughout life into structured problem solvers. They listen to directions and follow them
explicitly, even if the directions are incorrect or misleading.

In the preschool years, children do not necessarily solve school problems better but are more
likely to be rewarded for effort and following the rules. Think, for example, of the young
child in preschool who is given a crayon to color objects, or scissors to cut objects. The child
who finishes the tasks is more likely to have control. One can reach the goal, overcome the
intervening obstacles, or complete the task because of their controlled focus and behavioral
responses.

Later in life, control is related less to behavioral responses and more to planning, thinking
about the problem situations and developing a strategy or method by which the problem is
solved. Behavioral control of emotions is important, but just as important is control of the
thinking process needed to solve a problem.

Because of developmental changes from childhood to adulthood, there are different scales
of measurement for different age groups. Our definitions are implicitly related to those
subscales. For the most part, ages 8-10, 11-13, and 14 -15 encompass the definitions of control
related to young people. The physical and mental changes from late high school to
adulthood require the shift from behavioral control to cognitive control.

In solving everyday problems, I:

a) Want to be in control
b) Prefer to direct others
c) Control things so I do not make a mistake
d) Live life freely without controls or restraints

Other people think of me as:

a) Living in the fast lane
b) Living a quiet life
c) Structuring my life to be efficient
d) As a planner who decreases stress.

I am a problem solver who

a) Am in control most of the time
b) Keep things structured and controlled to increase efficiency
c) Does not worry about control
d) Seldom needs to control situations, just let things be.
e) Only solves problems over which I have control

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Flex (cognitive flexibility)

Flex is related to unchecking or measuring impulses in the thinking process. Some people
must work on a single problem until it is finished. Others working on a problem of interest
have difficulty breaking their preconceived conceptions about how the problem should be
solved. This "set" or preconceived way of solving a problem is difficult for some people to
break. In general, people are more likely to solve a similar problem just like they solved it
before, especially if successful. Flexible thinking processes are often related to fluency or
the ability to generate multiple options or alternatives to a particular problem situation.
People who exhibit flex often can work on several projects at one time. They prefer to work
on many different projects because they are bored easily. Sometimes these people are less
structured in their orientation; thus, they can be flexible about how a problem is solved.
People who score high in flexibility are often more creative in their orientation toward
problems.

In the work world, individuals with diverse kinds of job responsibilities respond differently
to flex items. The items which exemplify ‘flex’ are:

In solving problems, I:

a) Prefer the freedom to seek alternatives b) Like the freedom to think

c) Allow my mind to wander d) Do not like to be boxed in
e) Feel creative, when I am allowed to think.

I can solve the problem most easily:

a) When it is solved in different phases c) When it has an identifiable sequence
b) When I am allowed to solve problems as I want d) When I can be flexible in my thinking

Which type of problems do you prefer?

a) None
b) Problems that I can see, touch, and feel
c) Problems that are simple and easy
d) Open-ended, without constraints
e) Problems that I can choose the best alternative

Extraversion, ambivert, and introversion

When the energy is directed inward, the concept is introversion, outward, the concept is
extroversion and when the preferences are equal for both, the concept is ambiversion.
The extrovert is more likely to talk and seek out others. Talking and conversing is a

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mechanism for expressing inner thoughts about daily experiences and feelings---
becoming energized. Likewise, the extrovert prefers to be engaged, and involved in social
activities where emotions, feelings, and spirit can be exhibited.

Ambiverts, the group between the extrovert and introvert, is just as important in IPS as
either extroversion or introversion. In our view, the ambiverts are a real identifiable
group. This assumption holds for others who score as “the in-between groups” on our
measurement subscales. Ambiverts exhibit patterns of both introversion and
extroversion. The traits which are exhibited depend on the situation and circumstance.
The preferences of ambiverts are just less defined in either direction.

Introversion is a preference, not a condition. An introvert can be warm, affable, and

concerned for others. In contrast to stereotypes, introverts are not necessarily shy.
Introverts are often problem-oriented as the problem is often a matter of puzzlement.

The items:
127. Most ____ a) extroverted b) reserved
128. 2nd ____ c) introverted d) outgoing

Select how a close friend is likely to describe you.

149. Most ____a) talkative b) silent c) in between

150. Most ____a) enthusiastic b) sober c) in between

When I am at work, I:

1.Most ______ a) Read an interesting article

2.2nd ______ b) Meet and talk with my friends.
c) Work by myself on interesting things
d) Talk to people in the breakroom.

I am more interested in:

a) Being a salesperson
b) Working on technical things
c) Talking about my favorite subject

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Examples: cognitive items:

An array of cognitive items is used on the seven different measuring instruments. Below are just a
few.
A. Numerical analogies

Choose the correct analogy: 48:4

179. ______ a) 1:12 b) 12:1

c) 12:4 d) 4:48

B. Verbal analogies

Choose the best response to the analogy.

Happy is too "sad" as tired is to:

180. ______ a) sad b) successful

c) happy d) energetic

C. Spatial block counting

What is the total number of seen and unseen blocks?

D. Spatial manipulation

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Example: perceptual speed items

Answer the addition and subtraction items: Time limit 2 minutes

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Examples: career and interest items

Please respond with “yes” or “No” to indicate your preferences for the following
vocational items.
010 Being a technician
018 Being less structured in solving problems
019 Changing an approach to a problem situation which
does not work
026 Creating models for leisure
051 Having knowledge of special subjects
053 Having a technical problem-solving style
054 Having the freedom to solve problems in any
manner
056 Having specialized knowledge to solve problems
064 Liking many possible solutions to daily problems
067 Liking the technical part of computers
078 Not being bound by the constraints of a problem
079 Noticing differences in architectural designs
104 Reading technical journals for information
106 Reading to solve a problem
109 Seeking knowledge to solve problems
110 Showing others how to solve problems
116 Solving problems in nutrition
119 Taking toys or objects apart to understand
123 Thinking about many different problem situations
124 Thinking about how to solve technical problems
126 Trial and error problem solving with technical
equipment
127 Understanding the complexity of computers
138 Using tools to solve problems
161 Working on many different possible solutions to
problems
192 Liking calculus problems

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Problem-solving categories defined by measurement

For the instruments used in the elementary grades and with managers, the score on the
differential problem-solving subscale is an extended scale; all the rest of the scales such as
conceptual are basic scales. The differential problem-solving subscales is a calculated score
based on the inverse of the general problem-solving scale. Therefore, it is not recommended
for use in research when the Ps30 or Psa scale is used. In essence, rather than using the Ps30
scale as a bipolar scale with low representing the differential problem solvers, a separate
scale is created making it easier for people to interpret. A secondary reason is that for
younger children the Psa scale is a composite of non-cognitive variables such as learning
perception, self-concept, achievement, and independence. As children become more socially
perceptive in the selection of item responses, the non-cognitive items tend to move toward
the middle of the distribution and do not differentiate and therefore are not used for high
school children and above.

For high school age and older, the problem-solving categories are based on a combination of
characteristics that involve interests, cognition and personal problems solving style, and
perceptual speed. We described some of the following: personal characteristics (motor,
conceptual, extroversion, flex, and control), cognitive (analytic and spatial), perceptual
(Perceptual Flexibility Tests, letter identification), memory (memory tests), and vocational
interests (mechanical, technical, social, etc.). Our work of forty years has amassed a
tremendous amount of data which suggests that statistically significant differences do not
exist between many groups of people with different problem-solving categories since there
is less group variation in young people and much older people. The statistically significant
differences between groups of people who exhibit similar problem-solving characteristics
are small--the more dis-similar the group, the greater the likelihood of statistically significant
difference, depending on where each group is on the continuum.

To understand the concept, suppose one had a jar of chocolate chip cookies made from the
same batch with the same ingredients. There would be no statistical difference between the
cookies since there exists no variation. Now add a ginger snap cookie to the group. The jar
still holds cookies, but one is different. How different? Not very different since ginger snap
cookies are made out of flour like chocolate chip. The more diverse kinds of cookies that are
added, the more variegated the population of cookies. When our batch has 200 cookies, some
chocolate chips, some ginger snaps, some Oreo as well as many other kinds, then the
variation is greater and soon it is possible to distinguish a group of chocolate chips from a
group of ginger snaps. The composition of cookies is all interrelated but chemical analysis
allows us to get finer discrimination between groups---that is, the greater the variability in
cookies, the better our discrimination. That is precisely the case with our groups of problem

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solvers. The greater the variability in the combination of characteristics the more likely we
are to detect differences where they exist.

In fact, on a logical continuum, the statistical differences are evident depending on which
elements and/or which taxonomic classification system (cognitive, semi-cognitive, personal
characteristics, or vocational interest) is used. Even if a difference is not found, this should
not deter us from using the information since it is extremely valuable in understanding
individual differences. Most of the early biological classification systems were descriptive;
soon the descriptive information leads to better understanding. The individual differences,
involving the extremes of any distribution of people are significantly different. Using
subgroups allows finer discrimination when comparing a single profile to its nearest
neighbor. The IPS model attempts to fill in the gaps not identified by statistics by using
subgroups or ideal composites.

Before exploring the different taxonomy of problem solvers, several points need to be
emphasized. First, taxonomies or categorizations are only a guide or a way of helping us
understand behavior. Behaviour is so complex that it is difficult to understand actions fully
without asking numerous questions. Even after asking questions, one cannot be certain
about the meaning of the responses without trying out different problem-solving strategies
with the adult or child. Realistically, problem-solving behaviors exist at all different levels
of the subconscious with many thoughts vying simultaneously for admission to
consciousness. When an outcome is assigned via a taxonomy, it certainly does not exclude
others but indicates that one which may be dominant or overriding in a specific problem-
solving situation.

The terms intra-individual and inter-individual are used throughout. Our experience in
measuring categories or subgroups of people is that the closest the subjects are matched on
gender, educational background, age, socioeconomic status, and within family subgroups,
the better the prediction. We determine the scores of a single individual (intra-individual)
and then compare them to subgroups of people with similar characteristics (interindividual)
or their subgroup. When making a comparison, the larger and more diverse the subgroup,
the greater the error of prediction.

Measurement issues using rank scoring

Two basic issues occur when using the current scoring method. The first issue results
from the method of scoring, the selection of item responses, and the people’s preference
patterns. In essence, when items from two opposing subscales that are conceptually

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related are ranked by the respondent, the total subscale score correlation may be inversely
related to each of the constructs. For example, on the control and flex subscales, a person’s
relative rank may be high, middle, or low. If enough people have a high relative rank on
control and low relative rank on flex, there can be a strong inverse relationship, perhaps
-.65. Of course, this is sample related. Even with a large sample of 500, a strong
relationship might exist. The high correlation is slightly inflated due to the juxtaposition
of comparative items from related constructs and allowing the person to rank the items.
This same measurement inflation provides the separation necessary to achieve accurate
classification. For us, classification accuracy is more important as verified by independent
observers as well as the participants.

The second measurement issue comes from treating the outcomes of rank scores as
interval data. Remember from the examples above the sums of 6, 4, 2, 0 are reduced to 3,
2, 1, 0. Numbers are then treated as interval data. For the purist, rank data should be
analyzed by rank methods. In our long journey, many different methods of scoring and
their validity for our purpose of classification have been tested. The method provides the
greatest validity and the most accurate and reliable classification.

In this next section, there is a theoretical overview of the ten problem-solving categories or
behaviors and some obvious examples of items that are used as a basis of measurement. The
items differ according to a) the development and grade level and b) the measuring
instrument. There is a great deal of difference between management tests and tests for 3rd
graders.

The items on the following subscales are similar to those found on other measurement
instruments for personality, interests, and cognition. What makes our model more precise
is the algorithms used for the integration of the cognitive scales with the vocational and
personality characteristics around the model representations of brain functions. Some
people argue that it is easier to administer a battery of instruments and interpret the
information. Our response to that suggestion is that it depends on one’s objective. A category
system can be more precise as long as demographic information is utilized within the system.

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Chapter 21

Synopsis: Our theory on how to find subgroups

Using a reasonable guess, how does one find a subgroup or a member profile? Suppose one
collects data on 2 known variables of math and reading achievement. Math achievement is
defined as a high score on math standardized tests and reading achievement is defined as a high
score on reading standardized tests. Assuming a reliable and valid measuring instrument of both
variables, 3500 student scores are collected on math and reading achievement and the data
indicate that the correlation between reading and math achievement over repeated sampling is
between .79 and .92. Regardless of the number of sampling, the correlation is in the same range
with an average of .85 and standard error around the mean of .06. A substantial number of
sampling and the stability of the correlation leads us to believe that there is a high correlation
between math achievement and reading achievement. This becomes “known information” which
can be replicated by anyone else since there are large sample sizes and fewer errors.

Next, the process is to use other known information and reduce the subgroups by demographic
variables of age, ethnicity, educational level, and gender. The groups are no longer random as
the demographic variables combined with our theory of math achievement have limited the
universe of possible scores and resulted in a generalization that math achievement and reading
achievement for a particular age group, educational level, gender, and ethnicity can reasonably
be determined. Thus, by using known information to decrease the error, there is an increase in
our statistic of prediction. Our correlation matrix of math and reading achievement which has an
average correlation of .85 can be deconstructed and then reconstructed.

Deconstructing and reconstructing correlation matrices

Our correlation matrix had only two variables which consist of only two sets of scores---one score
for math and one score for reading. Before we correlated the scores, we could have changed the
scores to categorical data representing 3 groups low, medium, and high. How is this
accomplished? In practice, having multiple large samples of real standardized data that have
been used to derive the correlation between math and reading achievement allows us to inspect
the scores, and establish a cut point in the distribution for high, middle, and low. As an example,
if the standard scores are in the range of 1 to the 99th percentile, we use the 33rd percentile as low,
and the 66th percentile as high. We then analyze the number of patterns that make up the
distribution. We find some students who score high in reading, and high in math. Another person
may score low in math and low in reading. Likewise, the patterns show all different combinations
such as high reading, low math, average reading, and low math.

Our task is to find a finite number of profile groups that represent the data. Collecting all the
similar patterns into subgroups, we define 9 profiles as a similar group who score in a similar
pattern. We assigned each of the 3500 members to one of the nine profile groups.

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We then re-correlate the profiles of the subgroups and find that the subgroups indeed show
comparable correlations to the original large matrix. In the deconstructed matrix (Table 85) math
and reading are profiled from low to high.

Table 85

Math Reading
Profile 1 low low

Profile 2 low average

Profile 3 low high

Profile 4 average low
Profile 5 average average
Profile 6 average high
Profile 7 High low
Profile 8 High average
Profile 9 High high

Possible profiles subgroups using standardized math and reading scores

The number of possible profiles that could be considered exhaustive is 18 but for illustration here,
we use 9. The 9 profiles represent a fuzzy set and are nominal data that allow the use of
correspondence analysis principal components analysis, redundancy analysis, and other distance
measures. The methodology of correspondence analysis and multiple correspondence analysis is
used to analyze contingency tables or nominal data.

The original large correlation matrix was mapped into a fuzzy set using the same methodology
as one might use for a steam controller (Zadeh, 1965). That is, the correlation matrix which
represents a whole was deconstructed into a set of profiles. The deconstructed set can be classified
or predicted via rules, fuzzy logic, or fuzzy sets and the probability can be assessed based on the
frequency of the number of people fitting that profile group. The variables in the deconstructed
correlation matrix can be re-correlated to determine if a new value falls within the sampling range
and standard error.

This is a practical example of the information in Table 85 where profile one is low on math and
low on reading. Of the 3500 profiles, perhaps 1300 people have a score that is less than the 33rd
percentile for math and reading. The group of 1300 is subdivided by gender, ethnicity,
educational level, and age through feature extraction. We can then use 1) our known information
on demographic factors, 2) our fuzzy sets and 3) our theory to choose a method of feature
extraction. For example, one method of feature extraction is the use of machine learning with
recursive sets to build a classification tree. We have probability data from the demographics of
the group. Using the rules of fuzzy logic (if/then statements), one can suggest that there is a
greater probability that a person with various problem-solving characteristics who is solving a
number and word problem (math and reading) is more likely to fall into the profile 1.

Most people with a measurement background will complain that using this type of methodology
requires a large sample size. That is, as the number of variables in the profile increase so does the

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complexity of the analysis and sample size necessary to complete the task. We agree. For one
purely mathematical approach, please read the article: B Class: A Bayesian Approach Based on
Mixture Models for Clustering and Classification of Heterogeneous Biological Data by Julio
Collado-vides, J. Andres Christen, and Arturo Medrano-Soto (2004) published in the Journal of
Statistical Software. They use mixture models and Bayesian methods to calculate and model
continuous/categorical data of heterogeneous sets. By calculating posterior probabilities, the
heterogeneous set is transformed into a set of homogeneous characteristics for entry into the
classification. They use standard Metropolis-Hastings and Gibbs sampling algorithms to
construct a sampler to approximate posterior moments and grouping probabilities. In essence, by
using a known database, they can approximate a classification system consistent with current
knowledge.

Our experience suggests that purely mathematical models do not result in the proper
classification of human subgroups. Only a combined approach using theory, logic, and
mathematical models can achieve a proper classification. In our model, empirical data and its
resulting theory represent known information; logic represents fuzzy logic; and mathematical
models are the process of finding the best set of variables that can identify the closest
relationship to the “nearest neighbor” or profile subgroups. For people who prefer only
mathematical models- “Each to their own” as they say.

The 36 subgroups

The example above describes the basic process which was used to deconstruct a correlation
matrix but the question for many is what matrix was deconstructed for the 36 subgroups and
why? First, many correlation matrices can be deconstructed as the correlations vary first and
foremost with samples as well as demographic factors. The random sample has to be large and
based on at least 2 of the most important demographics, gender, and age. Certainly, a male who
is seven years old is going to score differently than a female of 14 or a male of 25. When dealing
with managers in our data, the matrix of correlations was based more on older males.

This generic matrix (see Table 86 below) was deconstructed into a standard score format to obtain
36 subgroups and 10 variables. As expected, the accuracy of fit and prediction increased when
standard scores were separated into two tables, one for males and one for females. There are
many subgroups within the 36 subgroups. For example, the first 9 profiles of the 18 profiles are
extroverts and the second nine of the 18 profiles are introverts. The 18 remaining profiles are
ambiverts. The profiles for introversion and extroversion show a lot of variation, as reflected by
eigenvalues, means, and standard deviations the best generic correlation matrix which is used for
deconstructing the personality problem-solving variables is shown below:

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Table 86

PSLAP PSSP PER CN MT AN SO CT FX EI

PSLAP 1.00
PSSP 0.52 1.00
PER 0.24 0.02 1.00
CN 0.34 0.27 -0.09 1.00
MT -0.22 -0.23 -0.02 -0.53 1.00
AN 0.38 0.28 0.44 -0.04 -0.10 1.00
SC -0.38 -0.23 -0.47 0.23 0.06 -0.52 1.00
CT 0.22 -0.14 0.53 -0.14 0.02 0.14 -0.24 1.00
FX -0.32 -0.09 -0.35 0.41 -0.23 -0.14 0.39 -0.54 1.00
EI -0.17 0.16 -0.05 0.16 0.08 -0.09 0.37 -0.07 0.34 1.00

Correlation matrix of the 36 subgroups

Notice that extroversion (EI) and social (SC) are positively correlated .37 while motor (MT) and
conceptual (CN) are negatively related (-.53). Analysis (AN) and social (SC) are inversely
correlated (-.47) as are control and flex. As expected, there is a strong positive relationship (.52)
between (PSLAP) and spatial (PSSP). Perception, a focus variable, is correlated (.44 and .53) with
(AN) and (CT) respectively. Surprisingly, for some but not us, conceptual is positively correlated
with flex (.41).

There are separate matrices for intercorrelations of personality, and career and interest variables
(see Chapter 17) as well as the 4 speed of processing variables with their cognitive counterpart.
The differences as a result of deconstruction are visible in each of the pictures (see Table of
Contents for the location in Picture 1 through Picture 10) in the different chapters. The Pictures
show the separation by the distance of the 4 groups (speed of processing, personality, career, and
cognition) as well as their distribution around the 36 subgroups.

Writing the descriptions of subgroups:

Appendix B contains a description of the parameters used for defining 36 subgroups. Thirty-six
profiles might seem like a lot but Krug (1981) using the 16 PF characterized 81 different profiles
for clinical and normal populations. If a person wants to better understand their management,
learning, or descriptive profile, then we must accurately define their subgroup and indicate how
their individual scores differ from the subgroup. Our fuzzy logic programs define their level of
subgroup classification first by level of cognition, next by perceptual speed, and finally by
personality and interest. The order can be changed depending upon a number of other
demographics, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic and educational status. The 5 levels of
perceptual speed categories assist in determining their facility with letters, numbers, and spatial.
This orientation is further clarified by determining which of the 5th level of scores on cognition
best fits their problem-solving orientation. Next, after noting whether they are a General or
Deferential problem solver, we classified the person according to his or her personality and
interest scores. The written descriptive profile defines the subgroup while the person’s
individual scores define how he or she is different. The written profile can be illustrated by the
following process using the information above.

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Now, expand each profile group by adding demographic variables and set up more tables for
gender, (male and female), cultural background, educational level, occupation, and personality.
That is, analyzing the subgroups by demographic variables, we might suggest that a subgroup of
older students, more educated, (college education), and of a particular cultural background
(Asian) are more likely to fall into profile 9 with a high score on reading and a high score on math.
In other words, we can use a combination of our theory (known information), and the trees found
in random forests (or discriminant function) combined with the rules of fuzzy logic to predict and
classify. Based on demographic variables for personality, cognition, and interest, we define them
as more likely to fall into a particular subgroup.

Our description of a particular subgroup is based on actual data points that have been compared
to known profiles. The results are interpreted much like a clinician interprets a clinical pathology
report. Using feature extraction, we suggest that an Asian male who is 28 years old with a
graduate background and an interest in engineering is more likely to fall into profile Y or
subgroup X. Profile Y is defined by the scores on all areas of personality, interest, and cognition.
Therefore, we can also suggest that by the person’s combination of scores he or she is more likely
to be cognitively flexible or have a preference for use of logical thinking or be more structured in
his approach to problem-solving.

Is there some error? Of course, each prognostication has an error in the same manner as
diagnosing a person with a disease has an error. The estimate is probability-based. A
weatherman can be wrong; doctors are wrong, and of course, we could be wrong. This leads to
the following principle:

At this point in time, the current statistical method of analysis (multivariate, multidimensional,
etc.) cannot accurately predict the classifications of people. Only theory combined with
algorithms that are used with statistical analysis based on feedback from real people in real
situations can decrease errors to acceptable levels in profile analysis.

Analysis of subgroups

Each of the created subgroups is correlated in a direction that mirrors actual population variation.
Therefore, when the subgroups are analyzed, one can understand how a person in a particular
subgroup differs from other people in the subgroup. To clarify, on an elementary level, no two
people are exactly alike. Likewise, no two types of subgroups called trees are identical, but
knowing that the objects are trees helps to classify and predict. Similarly knowing that two
people have similar profiles on one variable helps us to understand them better and perhaps to
better predict preferences. If one wants to design a workstation that is better suited to a person’s
job and preferences, then knowing their classification is useful. The workstation for a person is
suitable as long as the people in the subgroup mirror the behavior of the best performance.

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Likewise, if one wants to improve the education of certain groups of people in education,
educational materials can be designed for the subgroup. Subgroups are divided hierarchically.
Extroversion, a broad construct is divided into very extroverted, mild extroversion, and less
extroversion and when combined with other cognitive constructs, then the combinations are
extroverted and field-independent or introverted, global, and field-dependent. Determining the
frequencies of people who respond to various preferences helps to explicate the relationships and
produce better predictions.

Predicting the part of the whole is better than trying to predict the whole. Predicting smaller
subgroups provides more information than predicting a large group that encompasses the
subgroup. In ecology, for example, it is easier to describe how a species of plants in an identified
river bed in Colorado behaves as opposed to describing how the same species behave in the whole
Western part of the US.

Likewise understanding the relationship between the subgroups provides basic information
about the interaction of cognition, personality, and interests. Let's examine a factor analysis of
the 36-subgroup cognitive matrix. There are three kinds of variables in the matrix. The first group
of reading and math follows Raymond Cattell’s classification of crystallized intelligence. This
group represents actual academic achievement. The fluid categories of analogies, sequences,
blocks, and drawings represent the ability to achieve. The third groups of four elementary
cognitive tests represent accuracy and speed. One expects a factor analysis with Varimax rotation
to sort the groups into three separate groups. A typical matrix of factor loading (N= 106) is
provided below in Table 87 as small samples do not separate data well in factor analysis.

Table 87

Achievement Potential Speed

Cogflex 0.54
Letid 0.3
Parts 0.5
EmD 0.49
Blocks 0.41
Spatial 0.98
Lap 0.31
Reading 0.65
Math 0.95

SS loadings 1.47 1.23 1.08

Proportion-of
Variation 0.16 0.14 0.12
Cumulative
Variation 0.16 0.3 0.42

Factor Analysis of Achievement and Aptitude variables (N=106)

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Similarly, a more diverse group (n=166) ages 12-30 whose average ability is higher has more
definitive factor loadings. See Table 88

Table 88

Variables Achievement Potential Speed

Cogflex 0.35
Letid 0.912
EmD 0.158
Arith 0.287 0.398
Sp 0.652
Lap 0.92
Math 0.867
Reading 0.818
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
SS loadings 1.643 1.411 1.18
Proportion
Var 0.205 0.176 0.147
Cumulative
Var 0.205 0.382 0.529

Factor Analysis of Achievement and Aptitude variables (N=166)

The measurement of these problem-solving categories has been identified by variables on diverse
kinds of instruments, particularly the Problem-solving Technical and Personal-style Indicator
(PTPI) and the Learning Problem Style Indicator. The next chapter illustrates the issues involved
in classifying individuals using machine learning.

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Chapter 22

Synopsis: Machine learning and subgroups

The purpose of this chapter is to explain a computer-based machine learning

methodology for classification, using the 20 different variables of the IPS system. Some
of the theoretical constructs related to machine learning were discussed in the previous
chapter as “General Measurement Concerns.” The objective here is not to give an
exhaustive examination of machine learning, but to concentrate on the aspects of the field
most closely related to the mathematical procedures used in classifying individuals into
one of the 36 subgroups.

A brief history of machine learning

Machine learning (a term generally credited to Arthur Samuel while working at IBM in
1959) was applied to artificial intelligence problems which prophesized that computers,
as machines, could learn without being programmed (McCarthy, J. & Feigenbaum, E.
1990; IBM, 1959). That is, according to a paraphrase by Samuels, a machine could be
programmed to display, at some future moment, a move, action, or insight not present in
the original computer code. On TV, on February 24, 1956, Arthur Samuel demonstrated
this potential capability using a self-learning checker program (IBM, 2011).

This computer-related learning capability, which was in its infancy in the 1960s,
eventually resulted in the development of several remarkable AI feats. For example, in
1997, Deep Blue, a computer program beat Garry Kasparov, the world chess champion
(IBM, 2011). Later, in March 2011, Watson, a computer program developed by IBM, beat
former Jeopardy Winners Brad Rutter and Ken Jennings and won a one-million-dollar
first-place prize (IBM, 2011). Similarly, in March 2016, Google’s DeepMind AlphaGo AI
program defeated the Go world champion Lee Sedol four games to one. The match, which
was watched by about 60 million people, amazed viewers with the uniqueness of
positions not programmed into the computer. This capacity to play “Go” was learned by
the computer as it played multiple games against itself over months before the contest
(Jaderberg, 2017).

In Table 89 below, the computing tasks of each of the machine learning supervised
algorithms were summarized by Lantz (2013). Three of the classifiers (model trees,
decision trees, and support vector machines) play a prominent role in classifying
individuals into the 36 subgroups in this book.

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The theory of machine learning suggests some data collected by experimenters can be
separated either linearly or non-linearly. This separation allows subsets of data points to
either be in one group or another. As noted in the following table, there are many distinct
kinds of supervised classifiers (algorithms) that can perform the separation into
subgroups.

Table 89

Supervised Learning Algorithms Task

Nearest Neighbor Classification
naive Bayes Classification
Decision Trees Classification
Rule Learners Classification
Linear Regression Numeric predictions
Model trees Numeric predictions
Neural Networks Classification
/numeric predictions
Support Vector Machines Classification
/numeric predictions

Different Kinds of Machine Learning Classifiers and their Functions (Lanz, 2013)

Using a machine learning methodology

The use of machine learning methodology is quite straightforward. There is an

assumption that data has been collected and that a model describing that data is to be
developed using the process of machine learning. The 5 steps are: collect the data, prepare
the data for analysis, use theory to propose a model and then begin the process of training
using samples from the data collection process. Next, evaluate the model either using
random cross-validation, in-sample, or out-of-sample testing. Finally, after looking at the
results, determine if the model can be improved.

Improvement, using machine learning, is usually determined by model characteristics

and type of methodology. However, before we show an actual example, let us briefly
review important ideas found in previous chapters as those concepts are integrated into
the data analysis which is to be analyzed via machine learning. In this book, 20 variables
determine how problems are solved by people in 36 ideal subgroups. Each of the 20
variables comes from one of the 3 major categories: personality, cognition, or careers.

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Cognition is subdivided into analogies (C1/Pslap) and spatial (C2/Pssp) problems.

Another subdivision of cognition is dubbed semi-cognition and is a series of 4
perceptual/achievement speed tests called cognitive flexibility (S1/CF), letter
identification(S1/LD), embedded designs(S3/EB), and arithmetic distraction(S4/AD). The
personality variables are fairly standard and found are many other personality preference
instruments. They are perceptual (P1/Per). conceptual (P2/Cn), motor (P3/Mt),
analytic(P4/An), social(P5/Soc), control (P6/Ct), flex (Pt/Fx), and
extroversion/introversion (P8/EI). The career variables, for this book and research
purposes, are similar to Holland’s categories of realistic (CR1/R), investigative (CR2/I),
artistic (CR3/A), social l(CR4/S), conventional (CR5/C), and enterprising (CR6/E) along
with 5 other subscales.

We contend that these 20 variables represent real-life attributes that work in an integrated
manner when problems are being solved. Throughout life, some attributes become more
dominant, others become secondary. The dominant attributes are useful in the
classification of people into subgroups. Knowing information about the individual and
the ideal subgroups can help in differentiating individual attributes as well as how each
person solves problems.

Using the known information (correlation matrices of personality, career, and cognition
as well as a theory about the interrelationships of the variables), 36 profiles have been
developed. The 36 profiles came from actual data collected in the tests and a series of
deconstructed correlation matrices found in the research literature in each of the areas of
personality, cognition, and career assessment. An example given in the previous chapters
suggests a profile standard score can be obtained by deconstructing the correlation
between any two variables. (See Chapter 21).

Using information from actual collected data as well as from existing correlation matrices
in the areas of personality, cognition, and career, the following table of standard scores
was constructed. Across the top are 20 variables scores and along the side of the last
column are the designated subgroups. There are 3 possible tables. One is for the General
Problem Solve (not shown), one is for a differential Problem Solver with average scores
and a third is for a differential problem-solver (not shown) with standard scores in the
below-average range. Table 90 represents the standard scores for the differential problem
solver in an average range.

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Table 90

Standardized Tests Scores for the 36 Profile Groups

of the Differential Problem Solver who scores in the Average Range

Using machine learning to classify the subgroups

If one comes from a biological background, the process of classification can be thought of
as similar to the process of identifying subgroups in a chromosome. That is, given the
DNA molecule which consists of 100 million base pairs, the task is to match a sequence
of nucleotides that have phenotypic expressions. The phenotypic expressions are usually
proteins such as the base pairs which give rise to condones of amino acids. A computer
is going to sort through the sequences of a predetermined model of chromosomes
(Genome Project) to identify segments that are similar to those put together by scientists
from across the world. In our model, the scores from tests of cognition, personality,
speed of processing, and interest variables are used to select subgroups that have a
particular predetermined outcome by theory. To develop signposts the computer
program is going to use either a hierarchical approach (decision trees) or search processes
that are programmed for identifying sequences.

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As noted earlier in the chapter, there are many machine learning algorithms and
programs that can be used from the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN). For
ease of use, the package called E1071 is selected as there are many vignettes, tutorials,
and examples available on the Internet. The package, of this time, was updated as of
February 2017. The procedure is quite straightforward and is found in the
documentation of the PDF accompanying E1071.

These are 4 steps:

1. Download the E1071 program from CRAN. The library is called E1071
2. Copy the matrices found in the Tables below.
3. Use either the continuous scores or a binary matrix as the classification matrix.
4. Execute the E1071 program to determine the accuracy of the prediction

Table 91 is the rotated matrix. The 36 profile groups are now along the top (columns)
and 20 variables are rows. Using this matrix, continuous scores can be analyzed in the
present form or converted to a binary form.

Table 91

Rotated Differential Problem Solver Matrix

Assume that we decide to convert the matrix into a binary classification with a
predetermined point of linear separation. For example, the above matrix which
represents the Differential problem solver can be converted into a binary matrix with
separation at a standard score of 52. This matrix is shown below in Table 92.

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Table 92

Binary Matrix of Standardized Scores

Most machine learning programs have the data in the first columns (1-36) and the
classification category at the end of the data matrix (column 37). After any person finishes
taking the instruments, their scores can be converted to binary
(1=high/correct/0=middle/incorrect) and added at the end of the matrix above. In Table
93 below, a hypothetical set of scores from an individual is labeled as class 19. This
binary set of scores is identical to subgroup 19. A machine learning program selects
subgroup 19 with 100 percent accuracy in every run as long as the binary scores match a
subgroup. If the set of scores from the individual is not identical to one of the subgroups,
then the nearest subgroup representing the individual’s pattern of scores is selected.
Accuracy deteriorates based on the degree of differences from an identical match. That
is, in a situation where a person does not have a single high score on any subscale, the
classification accuracy would be zero for this classification matrix. Instead, another
matrix encompassing the below-average standard scores of the differential problem-
solvers must be used. Four matrices, high, average, below average, and some
combination based on the spread of scores, usually suffice for any analysis.

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Table 93

Binary Matrix of Continuous Score with Class Designation

Decision trees

There are many ways to display the relationships of how cognition, personality,
speed/achievement, and career variables each relate to subgroups in the IPS. For ease in
understanding a complex system as well as following the theory generated by various research
studies, a hierarchical system is displayed first. According to various research studies, cognition
is the overall major contributor to solving problems. Under the umbrella of cognition comes
various levels related to perceptual speed followed by personality which is immersed and
interspersed around cognitive attributes. Each subgroup from one through 36 displays this
hierarchy. Within a subgroup, each member based on age, experience, and maturity displays
strengths in career preferences.

The hierarchical system which results in a classification of subgroups is best shown using a tree
structure. The entire tree structure is found in Appendix E. An abbreviated example of the
hierarchical tree structure is shown in Figure 5.

There are two levels of problem solvers under the IPS banner (General, Differential). Only a
partial list for the general problem solver is illustrated below. Appendix E contains the full
tree. The decision tree below shows 4 levels for the general problem solvers who have high
arithmetic scores, high scores on analogies and spatial (g), high scores on speed, and high scores
on flex, conceptual, and analytical. This pattern results in the classification of a person into
subgroups 7 and 25. People who score high on Flex and conceptual as well as analytical and
social are classified in subgroups 13 and 31. The decision tree allows for a person to be classified
into a subgroup regardless if they are a General problem solver or a Differential Problem solver.
Although not shown here, the same decision tree is displayed for the Differential problem solver.
Thus, based on the matrix used, either differential or general problem solver, every person is
classified into one of the 36 subgroups.

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Figure 5

1 IPS
2 ¦--General Problem Solver
3 ¦ ¦--high arithmetic
4 ¦ ¦ °--high g
5 ¦ ¦ °--high speed
6 ¦ ¦ ¦--Flex
7 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--conceptual
8 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
9 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--7
10 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--25
11 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--analytical
12 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
13 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--13
14 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--31
15 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--Social
16 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--1
17 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--19
18 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--motor

Partial Listing of a Hierarchical Tree

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Summary: IPS theory

IPS is a comprehensive theory and data illustration of problem-solving that has components,
meta-components, or even supra structures that define the problem-solving process. The supra
structures are planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the problem solutions which are analyzed
via metacognition. IPS posits that differences in problem-solving have their origin in experiences
of the earliest years where children mature at different rates and have different kinds of exposure.
These early experiences accentuate the development of different neural pathways. This process
of differentiation leads to neural layers that may impede, inhibit, or accelerate the flow of
cognitive energy and emotions. Differences in the amount of energy flow and the use of different
neural pathways result in identifiable subgroups. An identifiable subgroup exhibits differences
in time differentials which result in solving problems in different ways. Algorithms can predict
problem-solving outcomes by grouping individuals along a continuum.

The application of the IPS theory is based on solving different kinds of words, numbers, or spatial
problems. Researchers agree that aspects of problem-solving such as problem definition, problem
finding, and problem formulation are difficult and dependent upon several many theoretical and
practical factors. When a problem is discovered, formulated, and defined, it can be represented
mentally in some form, either verbally, numerically or visually, or any combination thereof.
Representation is constrained by the cues in the environment that present the problem i.e.;
physics problem vs. crossword puzzles or memory episodes vs. external stimuli. Cognitive
processes in complex problem-solving have been discussed by many authors and researchers.
Indications are varied but generally are described via concepts such as algorithms, cues based on
attention and perception, long and short-term memory, analogical transfers, incubation,
convergent thinking, and divergent thinking. Cognitive processes have differential effects and
contributions to different age groups (children, adults, and senior citizens).

There are many measurement issues involved in selecting the nearest subgroup for a person or
in assigning a code to an individual who is a problem solver. These issues are recurrent and
evolutionary. Finding a satisfactory algorithm is only temporary. Our taxonomic or classification
systems help separate these differences so that we can make statements about the nearest
subgroup to which the child, student, or adult belongs. This process can identify issues,
differences, and modifications where remediation or development may be different needed. In
reality, it is the individual, not the subgroup in which one is interested. The individual learns;
the individual is taught. However, even given the uniqueness of each individual some
commonalities allow the construction of “Ideal composites.”. For the sake of completeness, over
the forty years, many profile groups of managers, teachers, children, and adults have been
developed. Each group of profiles was developed after gathering data from a particular
population.

In summary, the unique differences of any individual can be described by relating differences to
the nearest subgroup. This process is similar to describing the structure and function of a

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biological organ system. In the future, another person will offer another descriptive system or
another classification measure as a means of understanding individual differences. As is often
said, “So, it goes.” Enjoy and read the book!

RLD

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Vander Meer, A. L, H. et al., 1995 .......................................................................................... 148
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 Appendix A:

A Different Perspective on Problem Solving

Introduction

The next five chapters (23-27) are reference chapters for those who lack a background in
biology, physics, and psychological theory. Chapters 23 and 24 explain the psychological,
biological, and chemical basis of solving problems. The reference chapters expand on the
theory.
Are there processes at work in the human body that cannot be seen at an observable level
of everyday interaction? Are there chemical and physical actions occurring at the cellular
and organ level which work following scientific principles? The answer to both questions
is obviously “yes.” Since that is true, perhaps, there are yet-to-be-explained phenomena
that influence the solving of complex and compound problems. If so, their discovery
could contribute to another perspective on problem-solving.
This chapter explores the question: Are the process that is known as reasoning
(analytical thought) and memory just an unbounded energy process, with energy
existing in a form of energy packets and waves which are evolutionary remnants of
either gravitational waves or another energy form of light energy known as quarks.

Higher dimensions

The IPS model attempts to explain individual differences from a different perspective.
Our approach explicates the process of learning and solving problems as an analytic
process occurring in higher dimensions. Many readers and colleagues instantly will stop
reading at this point as the question arises--are there higher dimensions and if so, what
is meant by the statement? To understand this point of view, consider the revolution
taking place in physics where scientists are willing to consider that “We” may have short-
changed our thinking by conceiving problems too narrowly, only in the three
dimensions. Many physicists are willing to consider that many problems that exist today
may be better understood by considering at least 10 dimensions!! (See String Theory later
in the chapter)

To understand this phenomenon from an intuitive sense, consider how the war and the
battlefields today differ from that of World War I or World War II, or even the middle
ages. The recent war in Kuwait (1990) was fought with the aid of satellite technology
which gave generals pinpoint information about troop movements, strategic targets, and

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battlefield engagements. Today’s battlefields are scanned by drones and satellites.
Contrast this new technological perspective with previous wars where commanders only
knew their immediate areas and not the picture of the overall war or battlefield.
Remember how commanders in the Middle Ages and earlier moved to the high ground
on a hill overlooking the battlefield to get an overall view and a new perspective. From
a two-dimensional point of view on the battlefield, the battle might seem to depend only
on winning at a single location but from a vantage point higher up, the war might be won
more strategically by placing troops at a variety of locations to counter the opponent's
overall troop strength. Losing a battle in one location might not be as bad as losing the
war. In other words, by adding another dimension, specifically a higher dimension,
perspectives changed.

Mathematical techniques, using higher and different dimensions, help solve problems
that cannot be solved in lower dimensions. Again, using a limited example as an
illustration (See picture A). Assume one is trying to separate different kinds of people
who solve problems. Let each person and their subgroup be represented as a point in a
single one-dimensional plane. The task is difficult as one cannot find a dividing line to
separate the people. By changing from a single dimension to a higher dimension, the
separation process is easier from a mathematical point of view. This is a concept used in
support vector machines (SVM) which is used for feature extraction, a methodology for
extracting pertinent features in complex equations.

Picture A

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The revolution in mathematics and physics has a lot to do with the manner and way that
this book is written. With the aid of computer databases and information, knowledge in
one area is transferred rapidly to problems being explored in other areas. The problems
of physics and biology are the problems of psychology, business, and education, and vice
versa. Physics, since the 1960s, has been seeking a unified theory that helps to explain
disparate actions in nature. Psychologists, as well as educators, have long sought after
such a theory, one which has explanatory power as well as the power to predict
individual differences.

Law of parsimony

Science has always considered the laws of parsimony as a way of developing formulas to
explain the natural phenomena of the world. Think about Einstein's simple formula
energy equals mass divided by the speed of light. Did not this simple formula lead to
many different revolutionary developments in physics--one being the atomic bomb? One
of the major tenets of IPS theory is that such simple formulas can apply to biology and
psychology, not just physics. To develop ideas about energy, concepts from a number of
areas such as genetics, biology, physics, child and adolescent development, and
educational psychology are needed. The journey into those areas may become a bit
tedious and technical for some, especially practitioners who may choose just to go to
specific chapters that relate to their area of interest. Let’s begin the long and winding
sojourn into energy, quantum theory, higher dimensions, and superstring theory.

Energy

Chapter Twenty-Two begins with a review that indicated the importance of energy in
our lives. Is it possible to live without energy? What would happen if the sun, one of our
most important sources of energy were to disappear tomorrow? Could life as it is known
today still survive?

Without a doubt, energy is the basis of life as it is known today. Consider the behavioral
difference between a child who goes to school with a hearty breakfast and one who has
not eaten for three days, or the difference between a rock lying stationary on the ground
and rock flying through the air and hitting your front window. Consider a light bulb
without an electrical current as opposed to one with electricity flowing through it.
Energy is present everywhere but in different forms. The difference in forms makes the
concept of energy elusive but necessary.

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Was the energy present in our universe during its original expansion? If so, how did
energy create the big bang as well as the laws which govern our universe? That was the
question that Einstein considered for most of his life as he searched for the single equation
which would explain everything. Consider the meaning of Einstein's equation E=mc2.
Energy is equal to mass when considering the velocity of light. To understand the simple
concept, think about the sun. It is probably not a surprise that our sun is a yellow star
composed of the elemental particles of hydrogen which are continually forming helium.
Since the protons in hydrogen weigh more than the protons in helium, the excess mass is
converted to energy via Einstein's equation and radiant energy from the sun warms our
planet, provides oxygen to our atmosphere through photosynthesis, and is the basis of
our life today.

Based on Einstein's general theory of relativity as well as the big bang theory, the universe
should be filled with a uniform sea of low-temperature electromagnetic radiation. This
prediction received credence in 1965 when radio astronomers Arno A. Penzias and
Robert W. Wilson of the US discovered a cosmic radiation background that seemed to
bombard the earth equally from all directions. Later in 1992, an orbital satellite called the
Cosmic Background Explorer detected temperature differences coming from microwave
radiation in the form of clouds of gas. These clouds of gas were surrounded by slightly
less dense bands of matter arrange with a sort of rippling effect--a ripple effect consistent
with the theory of the Big Bang. Predictions based on simple theory have utility! (Kaku,
1999)

Einstein's theories along with the Big Bang suggest that our universe is constantly
expanding and contracting. This fact was announced in 1929 by Edwin Hubbell.
According to Hubbell's Law, the farther that a star or galaxy is away from us, the faster
that it is receding in the universe. Our sun, a star, is composed of hydrogen and helium
and like other stars in our universe is receding from us at a great velocity. Other stars in
our universe, as measured by the Doppler Effect in many experiments over the last fifty
years, have been receding to distant parts of our galaxy. In other words, the theory of the
Big Bang has resulted in some predictions about the universe which have been verified
by science.

Could energy be important in the development of life and contribute to every day solving problems?
Without a doubt. But to understand how, another detour into the world of physics is
necessary. While Einstein was developing his theory of relativity, many other physicists
were concerned with finding the energy forces that govern the world of the atom—the
world of quantum physics and different kinds of forces.

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Different kinds of forces

The four natural forces in the universe are described as electromagnetic force, strong
nuclear force, weak nuclear force, and gravitational force. Electromagnetic force has
many different forms, including magnetism, electricity, and even light itself. The power
of these forces is unmistakable in everyday life—quantum mechanics is prevalent in
computers, lasers are used in surgery, electricity provides power for our cities, and
microwaves are for heating our food.

Strong nuclear force is the energy found in atoms. Gravity is the binding force that keeps
the earth and planets in orbit; while weak nuclear force is, the force governing different
kinds of radioactive decay. Weak nuclear force can be destructive as in the case of Three
Mile Island, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki where radioactive by-products cause massive
destruction. One of the major tasks of the physicist is to determine how these forces affect
our daily lives and the universe.

Forces in higher dimensions

Our lives are not confined to what can be seen and touched. Many phenomena are
occurring on a daily level in which our experience is limited, but let us resort to
explanations that have intuitive appeal. Many people before us have considered that
other dimensions exist. For instance, in 1884, a clergyman named Edwin Abbot wrote a
novel called Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions by a Square. He used literary license,
a method of social satire and criticism, to castigate those who would not believe in the
possibilities of other dimensions or worlds. With his two characters, Lord Sphere and
Mr. Square, Abbot challenged others to think about the unseen world of a third
dimension. Mr. Square (two dimensions), who represented the establishment of that
time, is visited by Lord Sphere who patiently tries to explain that he comes from a world
where everything is three-dimensional. To a two-dimensional thinker like Mr. Square,
three dimensions are impossible. When Mr. Square is hurled into Spaceland, the world of
three-dimensional objects, his life is changed. The experience of visiting Spaceland causes
him to challenge existing authority and the sacred belief that only two dimensions exist.
Our senses tell us that a third dimension exists, but what about a fourth dimension or
even a fifth or six. Individuals have come to understand three dimensions because of
simple Euclidean Geometry, an invention of Euclid in 300 BC. This system of Euclidean
assumptions helped us measure planes, and solid figures, especially those concerned
with dimensionally. Non-Euclidean Geometry (developed by Fracas Bolyai and Ni
Lobachevsky in the early 19th century) was an advancement that helped scientists

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conceive of new applications. These mathematical principles were later applied to
Einstein's Theory of Relativity.

If life, as it is known today, were to exist in more than four dimensions, as visualized
through Euclidean Geometry, perhaps the rules of logic and common sense would no
longer apply. We could see this by studying the life of a mathematician named Charles
Hinton who was intrigued by trying to visualize a four-dimensional object. Hinton
realized that he could not see a four-dimensional object in its entirety but reasoned that
he could see it in a cross-section. To bolster his arguments, he developed a set of cubes
that others used to visualize hypercubes or cubes in four dimensions. To understand his
thinking, let us first try to conceive how a person who sees only in two dimensions (call
him a flatlander) can understand three dimensions. If a three-dimensional cube is
unraveled, it forms a cross. When the three-dimensional cube is reassembled, a person
in two dimensions sees only the square in the two dimensions. All the squares in three
dimensions disappear. Being a flatlander, he can only see things that are flat.

We are similar to the flatlander since we can only see things in three dimensions not four
or more. What happens to our three-dimensional senses if the fourth dimension
disappears? If we unravel a four-dimensional cube, it is the form of a tesseract (See
diagram 7). If the cube is reassembled in the fourth dimension, all the sides are lost to
our experience, except for what we could visualize in cross-sections. That is difficult to
visualize; however, by analogy think back to the two-dimensional person who tries to see
a sphere in three dimensions by cross sections. First, he sees a small circle; next, he sees
the parts of the circle which appear to get larger and later reach the maximum
circumference of the circle. The final circles start to contract or get smaller and then
disappear (diagram 8.)

To understand the concept of four or more dimensions, simply look out the window of
your home. As I look outside my window, I see many different things, my backyard
fence, some flowers, trees, green grass, the house next door, and many other things. This
observation suggests to me that each of these objects has more dimensions than length,
width, and depth? No doubt to measure each object, we could impose a system that
defines each object mathematically within the framework of Euclidean Geometry.
However, what happens if we did not impose a pre-existing set of assumptions about the
area of view? Would not the mathematical assumptions which govern the understanding
of the objects come from each object itself--- including those aspects of the object which
are not immediately in our sphere of consciousness?

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Abstract, not spatial

What if higher dimensions can be represented as abstract dimensions (mathematically,

but not necessarily spatially)? Our brains prefer spatial representations because of our
ability to visualize. Our brain, however, can understand phenomena that are not spatial
or visual. Sight and touch are part of our senses and are important in manifesting
experiences as real or visual. An abstract representation of the unknown, such as
mathematical formula, might be just as important as a visual or spatial representation. If
one could only represent higher dimensions in the form of formulas, mathematical
representations, or even a set of numbers then visual representation might follow.

That is what is currently taking place in physics. Higher dimensions are being explored
in terms of a system of numbers. The representations are not visual or spatial and
therefore cause many to doubt their authenticity; however, the reality of higher
dimensions is now being assessed. Does the exploration of the system of higher
dimensions have any impact on people solving problems? The answer is certainly not
straightforward but has to be inferred from other things happening simultaneously in the
world of science-the explorations of the quantum theory.
Quantum theory

Early in 1925, a new theory of physics burst into the limelight. The theory, called
quantum mechanics, attempted to explain the secrets of the subatomic world. Atoms, as
defined in quantum theory, are made up of many small particles, with names like
mesons, leptrinos, and neutrinos. Ever since Newton, scientists have considered a force
to be the interaction between two bodies that have mass, regardless of distance in the
universe. Quantum theory attempted to account for interactions within the subatomic
world as a method of understanding the basic elements of matter. What kinds of
subatomic particles determine the composition of gases, metals, and stars?
By 1925 and 1926, Erwin Schrodinger and Werner Heisenberg had developed a complete
mathematical description of hydrogen and were predicting that the chemical properties
of the universe would soon be derived mathematically. Quantum theorists such as Paul
M. Dirac were beginning to herald the beginning of the new era where the universe is
understood in its microcosm. The identification of hundreds of subatomic particles
would lead to success in the understanding of how three of the different four forces of
nature (weak, nuclear, and strong) operated (not gravity). What did the quantum theorist
mean? (Kaku, 2000)

In the microcosm of quantum theory, light is divided into different packets called
photons. Forces are created from the exchange of discrete packets of energy called

212
quanta. Thus, electrons bump into each other, repel each other, and exchange a packet
of energy, the photon. Electrons, in quantum theory, act like particles and waves,
depending on the situation. Recent studies have found many substances when
photographed at the subatomic level, act according to quantum rules. That is, as
aluminum electrons smash again a solid surface act, and the electrons act as a wave with
a circular pattern called trains. The trains or pathways of electron continues to follow a
similar path repeatedly, showing properties of a memory! Yes, memory! Electrons follow
a similar path over and over, showing the properties of memory.

Electrons, in quantum theory, have the capability to tunnel or make a "quantum leap"
through an almost impenetrable barrier. Electrons are point-like particles that cause
waves when striking each other. These waves can be calculated by Schrodinger wave
equations. These waves are important to our theoretical basis and thus will be discussed
later about memory and thinking as the question is posed--Is the process known as
thinking and memory just an energy process, with energy existing in a form of energy
packets and waves which are evolutionary remnants of either gravitational waves or
another energy form known as quarks?

Gravitational waves were predicted by Einstein as part of his theory of relativity. His
basic prediction was that gravitational waves exist because of the collision of black holes in
space. The announcement of the discovery of gravitational waves was made on February
11th, 2016 at a news conference. Gravitational waves, which come from the collision of
two black holes with a gigantic mass many times greater than that of the sun, can tunnel
through matter and are invisible.

This research was organized under an NSF grant involving thousands of scientists, using
the Laser Interferometer of Gravitational-Waves Observatory (Ligo). The Ligo was
discovered by three men, Rainer Weiss of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Kip
Thorne, and Ronald Drever of the California Institute of Technology. (Calla, 2016)

Quarks

Gravitation waves are one form of energy; quarks are another. One of the reasons that
heavy particles of the atom, such as electrons, neutrons, and protons, are not fundamental
is because the tiny particles of which they consist are called quarks.

According to quantum theory, different forces are caused by the exchange of different
quantum. Thus, weak forces come from the exchange of different types of quantum

213
called the W (weak) particle while the strong forces holding protons and neutrons
together are caused by the exchange of subatomic particles called tau mesons.

Quarks are held together by small particles of energy called gluons and tend to maintain
symmetry. For example, in the diagram at the right, the proton can be compared to three
steel balls held together by a y shape string (gluons). The same is true for the tau meson
which is held by a single string. The strings undergo vibrations that help identify them
as a different subatomic particle. Each of the different kinds of particles seems to
maintain symmetry, another important point for our discussion as we digress slightly.

What is symmetry? Symmetry is defined as the exact correspondence of form on opposite

sides of a dividing line or plane or about a center or an axis. Symmetries occur often in
the physical and biological world. A starfish looks the same even if it is rotated by 60
degrees. Think of the symmetry of snowflakes, flowers, and other physical and biological
entities. Symmetries become important in the process of solving problems because they
are important in our natural environment. We see symmetries; therefore, logically, we
try to recreate symmetries as abstractions when problems are solved.
Now back to the story. In one theory, quarks are different kinds of strings that undergo
vibrations. These vibrations are important in the identification of subatomic particles.
The vibrations are also the basis of string theory.

Superstrings

String theory was developed and evolved over time by many contributing physicists,
with credit being given to many who expanded the theory. Depending on the source that
is read a few of the earliest and most influential people were Werner Heisenberg, Pierre
Ramond, Andre Neveu, Michael Green, John Schwarz, Ed Whitten, and Joel Scherk.

Superstring theory was developed as a method of uniting quantum theory with Einstein's
theory of gravity. Remember that quantum theory help provides explanations of three
of the different forces of nature but failed to include the theory of gravity. In Whitten's
String theory, particles are strings that move in space. The strings can break, collide with
other strings, or form longer strings. According to Whitten, each of these actions are
measurable and finite. The actions are not considered random but must obey a set of
conditions or restrictions called self-consistency conditions. (Briane Greene, 1998).

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The self-consistency conditions are very tough and may not be accomplished in our
current concept of four dimensions, i.e., three dimensions plus time as a fourth
dimension. The self-consistency conditions require that rotations or spins occur only in
the 10th or perhaps 26th dimensions. It is the restrictions or conditions of vibrations that
identify the type of subatomic particle. Likewise, according to many physicists (but not
yet accepted by any reputable journal) if strings make certain turns or resonance vibrations,
then it is also possible to derive Einstein's equations relative to space and time. In other
words, the movement of particles at the quantum levels satisfies not only the conditions
of space and time but also matter and energy. At the time of this writing, a scientist at Cern,
Geneva, Switzerland, has discovered 12 different kinds of particles (quarks) and has predicted a
13th. These particles called quarks make up all living and non-living matter.

Based on assumptions and inference from above, the superstring theory has implications
for solving problems as energy in the forms of strings probably make up the purine and
pyrimidine bases (adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thiamine) chemical structure of a
substance known as Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (DNA), an important biological substance
whose story is examined in the next chapter. Two of our basic building blocks of biology
(RNA and DNA) may be composed of superstrings that vibrate at the subatomic level
and satisfy the conditions of space, time, matter, and energy.

Our body utilizes charged particles which are part of the energy system related to
electromagnetism and the photon. We know that the photon (light) is important in the
development of the food chain. The energy of the photon is incorporated into plants,
animals, and almost all living things.

In the body, there are many chemical reactions taking place. ATP is converted to ADP
and vice versa. Enzymes are a catalyst for energy reactions. In every chemical reaction,
there is an exchange of electrons; some electrons are bounded (combined with another
chemical while others are unbounded, released in the form of energy. Unbounded energy
exists everywhere that electrons travel in myelin sheaths. In IPS theory, the energy which
is not bounded (in chemical compounds) is called unbounded energy. Unbounded
energy is the energy in the brain which becomes available and is used in the energy
process of reasoning. Reasoning is the basic thought process that solves problems in
everyday life!!

If the assumption is true, then where and how becomes the question? Quantum theory
was developed to explain how subatomic particles interact in the microscopic world.
How can actions related to light as defined by superstring theory relate to biological
cellular actions? The only way is for the characteristics of electrons in neuron
transmission to act similarly to the characteristics of light in photon transmission. This,
215
of course, can only occur if there is an evolutionary remnant passed genetically from
generation to generation. That is, the particles, strings, and wave-like functions (which
cause resonance vibrations, and self-consistency found in light) must be similar and result
in energy transformations in a biological organism. This same logic applies to the
characteristics of electrons found in the basic building blocks of DNA.

Evolutionary remnants

If the assumption of unbounded energy has validity, then where are the evolutionary
remnants. Certainly, unbounded energy must be available in various kinds of single-
celled organisms in the evolutionary tree. What is the evolutionary relationship between
cellular functions and DNA?

In the evolutionary tree, there are single-celled prototypes called prokaryotes and
Eukaryotes. Single cells such as prokaryotes have DNA but not a membrane. Eukaryotes
(our human species) have DNA and a cellular membrane. Energy fuels single-celled
viruses and/or bacteria both of which contain basic DNA. From where did the energy
forces which fuel the single-cell prototypes come? Originally was it the sun’s rays and
light that provided the energy in the form of quarks?

Our concept of neuphons packets resulting in twists and turns relative to the process of
analytic thought is based on tenets of the superstring and evolutionary theory. Our
statements about energy and its form of transmission in the brain are an evolutionary
remnant from the earliest building blocks of physical and non-physical entities. The
transformation from non-physical (rocks) to physical forms (life) required energy. To
understand “how” read the next chapter.

Review: Energy and Cognition

Introduction

The literature review in this chapter represents the foundation for two major themes in
this book: a) personality, cognition, and interest come from energy packets in the brain
that are intertwined, interwoven, and integrated and have different kinds of
contributions to problems involving words, numbers, and spatial activities and b)
measurement and subgroup categorization models can help explain the process of
problem-solving.
216
Any attempt to draw a single unifying theme from the vast array of diverse research
literature would be incomplete. So, we focus on a brief history of the elements in our
theory, selected those theorists whose tenets fit our IPS model, and streamlined our
approach to deriving a measurement and categorization model. To emphasize again, the
10 major problems solving measurement constructs of Conceptual, Analytic, Motor,
Perceptual, Social, Extraversion/Introversion, Control, Flex, General, and Differential
Problem Solver are primarily derived from regular personality, interest, and cognitive
primary subscales. Extraversion, Introversion, Preceptivity, Receptivity, and
Achievement Motivation are auxiliary subscales used in classification. There are 36
personality subgroups, 6 interest groups, and many cognitive factors that give credence
to the importance of these 10 supra-ordinate concepts.

The literature review for all 10 constructs is found in these two chapters (25 and 26). This
chapter focuses on the first five constructs: energy, speed of processing, perception,
analysis, and conception. Chapter 25 addresses four more constructs as well as interests.
For each construct, we provide a statement of IPS theory and a historical review. Let's
begin with a historical review of energy which is crucial to all processes within the human
body.

Historical view

Energy is crucial to the basis of our theory; so, let us start this review of the literature at
the origin of the universe and trace energy from its inception. The first question is how,
where, and why did energy evolve? There are many theories about how our universe and
energy evolved 13.8 billion years ago. Most theories suggest a “big bang” occurred at the
beginning. According to those theories, years ago, dust and gas, compressed by starlight
and aided by gravitation force formed “protoplanets” (Urey, 1952). Later, the
accumulation of matter, “planetesimals” amassed at very high temperatures. The high
temperatures were similar to the temperature of molten lava in our present-day
volcanoes. The cooling temperatures resulted in black earth with crystal-like rocks found
in meteorites that come from outer space.

Gaseous clouds in space contain similar elements to our current atmosphere. Our
atmosphere is a mixture of different gases comprised of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen,
nitrogen, and phosphorous. According to Poole (1951), the atmospheric mixture may
have come from the gaseous release of hydrogen in methane (CH4) and ammonia (NH3).
The ubiquitous nature of hydrogen and oxygen in the atmosphere with the help of energy
from the sun could have easily formed water needed for forms of life.

217
The more recent technical explanation for energy release in our universe suggests that
before the big bang, two of the fundamental forces (electromagnetism and a weak force
resulting from the radioactive decay of atomic nuclei) were a single unified force. A
millionth of a second after the big bang, as the earth cooled, these two forces separated
and a transition phase occurred. Then, according to the electroweak theory (generated by
a young postdoctoral physicist named Alan Guth), these forces underwent a transition
changing the nature of space to a background field known as the Higgs field. The Higgs
field is quite well known today as scientists have been studying different particles and
their effect on gravitation. Recently, in 2012, there was a discovery of a new particle
predicted by Higgs. This particle called the Higgs boson sheds new light on how the weak
force and electromagnetic force interact differently in the Higgs field.

In Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, gravity is a weak force compared to other energy forces.
Gravitation waves can only be measured indirectly. If scientists are correct, when the
universe was very young (i.e., smaller than an atom) quantum field theory suggests
matter was wildly fluctuating and the amount of energy packed into a tiny space was
tremendous. This caused a process known as inflation. Inflation (contributing to the big
bang) during a phase transition released enormous amounts of energy which aided the
formation of the planets, stars, and sun in our universe (Guth, 1997).
Some argue that this theory is incorrect. These authors suggest that inflation did not
contribute to the big bag because the process of inflation would still be occurring. Other
authors such as Andrei Linde, a physicist at Stanford, suggest our universe completed its
phase transition while the rest of the space was continuing with small seeds in different
locations (Linde, 1990).

According to Alex A. Starobinsky (1982), inflation should produce gravitational waves.

In March 2014, a team of scientists at the South Pole, using a microwave telescope,
claimed to have seen the original gravitational waves emanating from the big bang. Those
waves would have traveled millions of miles, perhaps billions, to enter our solar system.
The detection of gravitation waves has been recently announced by a team of scientists
in February of 2016 (Connaughton et al, 2015).

The energy at the origin of life

The IPS theory posits that energy in its many evolutionary forms is responsible for
cognition and the thinking process. The forms that energy can manifest are many,
including but not limited to radiant, electrical, chemical, electrochemical, strong forces,
weak forces, gravitational, and waves. Only a few (electrochemical, waves) are manifest

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in the cognition of Homo sapiens but a long and tempestuous evolutionary past has
provided the foundation for many other manifest forms.

The sun, a star that is the source of our energy, is at the center of our universe and to the
best of our knowledge, resulted from a supernova. Supernovae are extremely rare; the
last one was noted in 1604 by astronomer Johanne Kepler who described the supernovae
“as outshining everything in the night sky but Venus.” All supernovae recorded in more
recent times took place in other galaxies that are millions, if not billions, of light-years
away (Westman,2001).

Of course, no one knows how and when the earth was formed or how life began. There
is a lot of speculation with some actual evidence. What we do know from geologic, fossils,
and radiologic evidence is that the earth is approximately 4.5-5 billion years old and that
life of some sort has been on earth for 3.5 -4.3 billion years. Fossils of stromatolites are
dated at 3.5 billion years. Fossils of Homo sapiens, the roots of our genera, Homo
neanderthalensis, or hominids were present some 100,000-200,000 years ago.

Billions of years of immense physical pressures from environmental forces resulted in a

distinct earth formation. During the same period differentiation, mutation, and
combinatory chemical activities contributed to different forms of life on the earth---forms
of life which existed before our species. The accepted theories suggest the vast majority
of living species cannot exist without the energy of the sun. The sun’s energy is involved
in photosynthesis, the process by which plants convert C02 and water into food and
oxygen. The oxygen in the atmosphere contributed to life in general. With the help of
energy, the original chemicals (Hydrogen, Carbon, Oxygen, Phosphorous, and Nitrogen)
in the atmosphere and on earth have developed into the building blocks of life; i.e., amino
acids, RNA, and DNA.

Amino acids could have developed in many ways. For example, based on a 1977
discovery, some scientists suggest that the energy from deep-sea hydrothermal vents,
which exist at a temperature of 600 degrees Fahrenheit, resulted in forms of amino acids
with life-like properties. Currently, living organisms, such as worms, ghostly fish, and
shrimp with eyes on the back of their head live on energy, not from photosynthesis, but
from the hydrothermal vents. The energy for chemosynthesis originates from molten lava
spewing from the ocean floor.

In 1952, Stanley Miller and Harold Urey of the University of Chicago suggested the
possibility that some basic building blocks of life such as amino acids, could have formed
spontaneously given the right conditions. Based on the Urey/Miller experiments, other

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scientists advised that with the aid of energy some rudimentary self-replicating
molecules could have evolved through natural selection (Castelvecchi, 2012).

Recent experiments propose that it would have been possible for genetic molecules
similar to DNA or its close relative RNA to form spontaneously. These molecules can curl
up in different shapes and act as rudimentary catalysts. As such, they can copy
themselves--to reproduce--without the need for proteins. The earliest forms of life could
have been simple membranes made of fatty acids--structures known to form
spontaneously These chemical forms would then envelop water and become self-
replicating genetic molecules, like RNA and DNA.

The resulting genetic material would then encode the traits that each generation handed
down to the next, just as DNA does in all things that are alive today (Hazen, 2001).
Fortuitous mutations, appearing at random in the copying process, would have then
propelled evolution, enabling these early cells to adapt to their environment, compete
with one another, and eventually turn into the life forms of today.

What is the evidence for energy relationships in neurological activity and cognition?
Electrical-chemical energy is pervasive in neurological activities. Studies of animals
suggest there is a direct relationship between activity in the environment and
neurological activity in the brain. In 1989, Georgopoulos and his colleagues examine the
electrical activity in the brain of a rhesus monkey when engaged in a mental rotation task.
Using computer graphics, the team illustrated that individual neurons in the motor cortex
show a spike in electrical voltage based on the direction of the mental rotation. The
neuronal cells which fired most frequently occurred during a counterclockwise
movement (Georgopoulos et al, 1989). The firing from neuronal cells is what is known
as “cognition” today.

Cognition

To fully understand the concept of problem-solving and the integrated IPS model, a
historical overview provides how early researchers addressed the process of cognition.
The concept of solving problems is broad and inclusive, rather than narrow and targeted.
The history associated with solving problems began with philosophers, scientists, and
armchair theorists. Each group collected information about and speculated on the forms
of energy and cognition.

IPS theory-cognition

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Cognition in our view is a form of electrochemical energy generated by the
neurotransmission of electrons in the brain and therefore is an evolutionary remnant.
Energy, in the individual, manifests itself in different forms of attention directing,
emotion, thinking, logic, and perceiving. Without energy, problems are not solved. Many
research studies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries addressed cognitive
processes as related to energy transformations.

Historical view

According to Fancher (1979), most of the early research on cognition in psychology has
its roots in the philosophical works of authors like Rene Descartes, David Hume, and
Immanuel Kant who read the great works of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates. Each of these
men offered a different view of the nature of man, knowledge, and thinking as their
assumptions about life were different. Descartes was a rationalist, Hume an empiricist,
and Kant a combination of both.

For philosophers, cognition involved the mind and thinking. Descartes (1596-1650) lived
during the Renaissance and with a background in physics, geometry, physiology, and
language suggested that “Man” gained more insight from the mind than the senses. He
introduced the concept of mental objects or structures-what is now called mental
representations. David Hume (1714-1776) was much more empirical than Descartes.
Being interested in the source of ideas and the relationship among them, he postulated
that reasoning was an operation that combined simple ideas into complex ideas or
relations. Hume introduced the notion that operations of the mind included comparisons
and associations. Immanuel Kant (1724-1809) distinguished between mental structures
such as dimensions, categories, and schemas. His idea of dimensions suggested that
objects are extended in space and time. His 12 categories of reasoning defined how the
human mind creates an experience and included quality, quantity, and causality.
According to Kant, schemas were rules used to describe a concept in a general way. That
is, the concept of “animal” is a schema that brings to mind a class of objects based on
images with similar characteristics (mouth, legs, teeth, and body). The works of
philosophers provided a theory for the experimentalist of the late 1800s and the early
1900s (Fancher, 1979).

How was cognition studied in the early periods of experimental psychology? Cognition
was studied as an energy transformation in physiological processes, i.e., reflex arcs, and
memory. A few researchers studied cognition in a perceptual manner involving
embedded figures, camouflaged targets, and reaction time.

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The age of experimental psychology brought in new ideas from men who received their
training in the scientific areas of physiology and physics: William James, Wilhelm Wundt,
Johannes Mueller, Herman Van Helmholtz, and Gustav Fechner. The work of Wundt
heralded the age of intra-individual measurement (Popple and Levi, 2000). These
scientists applied a cognitive model built on measuring intra-individual attributes which
were extended to broader domains of study.

For example, Wundt studied the qualitative nature of consciousness, applying these
concepts of experience to sensations, images, and simple feelings. By using models
applied within the individual, the differences between individuals were lost. Wundt
(1832-1920) was famous as he founded the first psychological laboratory. Another of his
colleagues, William James became interested in the scientific study of consciousness, and
his work extended to the study of everyday problems. This period of structuralism and
association introduced the work of Herman Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) on the study of
memory and the building blocks of memory (associations). Ebbinghaus also introduced
the paired associates method, a method of studying nonsense syllables and memory.
Early scientists were interested in the physiology and speed of human decision-making.
Descartes introduced the concept of the reflex arc and Helmholtz used the reflex to
determine the speed of neurotransmission along motor pathways. The mental
chronometry studies emphasized reaction time (RT) and latency involved in neural
transmission. Donders, a Dutch physiologist, used the information to measure the
duration of mental operations. Using a key to be pressed and a light, Donders determined
the time it took for decisions to be made when the subject was faced with alternatives.
Merkel (1885) determined that reaction time (for a rat) increases proportionately as the
number of alternatives increases.

The Behaviorist period began in the late 1800 and early 1900s with cognitive experiments
in animal psychology. Edward Lee Thorndike’s studied puzzle boxes and cats in 1898.
The scientist named Small observed rats that navigated mazes; while John Watson's
(1878-1959) dissertation on the relationship between rat learning and neurological
development contributed to the view of behaviorist psychology as purely objective and
science of the mind (Gardener, 1985).

In 1909, Yerkes & Morgulis describe Ivan Pavlov’s studies of conditioning in dogs.
Pavlov’s background was in medicine, specifically physiology and the digestive systems.
He noticed, quite by accident, that dogs began to salivate as they were led from their
cages to the laboratory where they were to be fed. Using a tuning fork and meat as a
stimulus, Pavlov noticed that the meat caused the dog to salivate (unconditioned
stimulus). Later the meat was paired with the tuning fork and finally, the tuning fork by

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itself caused the dog to salivate (conditioned stimulus). Pavlov was one of the first to
study conditional learning (Pavlov, 1927).
Quantitative period

In the IPS theory, cognition incorporates more than the traditional areas of IQ theory and
human intelligence. This is concurrent with the general definition of cognition in the
research literature. Today, cognition subsumes the areas of emotional intelligence,
cognitive processes, and ability testing. This was not true with many studies in the early
1900s.

In the early 1900s, the study of cognition was equated with the assessment of human
intelligence. This was a time of studying individual differences by comparison of inter-
individual attributes. As such, very early scholarly articles and books addressed the
process of cognition as related to intelligence testing. A collection of 66 articles from
many early scholars (1869-1959) was found in the book individual differences by Jenkin
and Patterson (1961). For instance, Peterson’s book (1925) on “Early conceptions and tests
of intelligence” summarizes the work of psychologists such as J. M. Cattell (1890), Galton
(1883/1928), and Binet and Simon (1905/1908). The approach of Binet and Simon was to
use measurements that tested memory, attention, and cognitive functions in children.
Galton, on the other hand, was more involved in large-scale testing of adults. He focused,
not on intelligence, but on the lower-level cognitive processes such as hearing and
sensitivity. J. McKeen Cattell followed Galton’s work by testing college students (J.
McKeen. Cattell and Farrand, L, 1896).

Intelligence as an ability

In the IPS theory, problem-solving is a broad construct that subsumes social and
emotional as well as cognitive activities. The solution to the problem is not based solely
on ability but is derived from constant experience and exposure to existing and new
problems in a domain of interest. Ability has genetic roots that are expressed through
concepts related to fluid intelligence. There is not doubt that solving academic discipline-
based problems requires some ability. The problems in an academic discipline such as
math, science, or history require prerequisite knowledge that must be spatially and
rationally transformed and manipulated. Similarly, problem-solving in non-academic
and subsidiary areas uses specialized experience and abilities gained over time. Ability
is this view can be considered more of talent and talents are usually learned over time.
Again, that is not the dominant view of many authors in the field.

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There is a general consensus among researchers in the field about how cognitive abilities
are related to each other and as a measure of intelligence. The most prolific theorists are
Carroll (1993), Horn (1966), Vernon (1950), and Cattel (1971/1987). From a measurement
standpoint, most of the early theorists have modeled general intelligence (g) as a major
factor followed by broad groups of second and third-level factors. Carroll's factor
structures have wide acceptance. His structured model of intelligence uses two concepts
originally coined by Raymond Cattell called fluid intelligence and crystalline intelligence.
Fluid intelligence relates to sequential and inductive reasoning while crystalline
intelligence includes verbal and reading comprehension. Another factor of Carroll's is
knowledge and achievement which incorporates general school achievement as well as
verbal information and knowledge. Perceptual speed memory and mental reasoning are
also separate factors. Closely related vectors include visual perception and closure.

The issue for many theorists is how to measure fluid intelligence. If fluid intelligence is a
measure of sequential and inductive thinking, what types of items provide the best
measurement? Are analogies a good measure of fluid intelligence and if so, what is their
relationship to spatial processing? What type of items best measure the spatial qualities
of fluid intelligence?

Recent theory and empirical studies by Johnson et al. (2005) suggest that fluid and
crystalline intelligence could be replaced by another model denoted as Verbal,
Perceptual, and Image Rotation (VPR). The hierarchical “g” factor (general factor) of
Thurstone (1938) consists of 3 broad highly correlated factors identified as verbal,
perceptual, and image rotation. In the model of Johnson et al., the three factors are then
subdivided into 8 specialized factors. Verbal consists of verbal (6 tests), scholastic (11
tests), and fluency (8 tests); perceptual becomes number (10 tests), memory (4 tests),
spatial (10 tests), and perceptual (14). Imagine rotation is defined by 4 separate tests.

Speed of processing

In IPS theory, the speed of processing is not paramount in the solving of problems, except
in threat or controlled time testing situations. Problem-solving that is related to interest
and work patterns is often solved by extending the amount of time devoted to the
solution of the problem. That is the reason that differential problem solvers contribute so
much to society. The differential problem solver, a group that makes up a large part of
society, often gains expertise in areas of interest or work. Since time is not a pertinent or
contributing factor, many hours of deep processing occur based on an individual’s

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resources and motivation. That is, the differential problem solver can use hours and
moments outside of the normal expected working parameters.

The research literature usually focuses on general problem solvers, people who solve
academic problems (verbal, numerical, and spatial) quickly and efficiently. These general
problem solvers receive reward and recognition for domain-specific problems in highly
specialized fields as noted next in the studies of current literature.

The current research literature on the speed of processing

Energy, in the form of electrochemical activity, uses neural pathways as the basis of
mental speed; i.e., time parameters that measure the beginning and end of cognitive tasks.
These chronometric cognitive tasks are often measured by two research paradigms called
inspection time (it) and reaction times (rt). In general, the literature is replete with studies
that suggest that mental speed, i.e., faster processing of information, is strongly related
to a narrow construct of either “g” or fluid intelligence (Gf). In 1995, Eysenck in an article
in Intelligence cited a host of research studies about cognitive speed which encompassed
diverse racial and ethnic groups (Jensen, & Whang, 1993; Lynn, Chan & Eysenck, 1991;
Saccuzzo, Johnson & Guertin, 1994; socio-economic groups (Jensen, 1987); clinical status
(Gold, et al., 1995; Kirby & Thomas, 1989; Wade, Newell & Wallace, 1978; Zahn, Kruesi,
Leonard & Rapoport, 1994) and a variety of age groups (Anderson, 1988; Cerella, 1985;
Jenkinson, 1983; Myerson, Wagstaff & Hale, 1994; Nettelbeck & Rabbitt, 1992; Salthouse,
1994; Smith, Poon, Hale & Myerson, 1988; Smith & Stanley, 1983; Tomer & Cunningham,
1993).

A review of 172 studies by Sheppard and Vernon (2008) reported an average correlation of -.24
between intelligence and speed of processing measures. Using Hunt’s (1980) threshold of .30 as
a boundary for correlations, average correlations account for 5 percent of the variance.
According to Schubert et al. (2015), this suggests that “more intelligent individuals have
a higher speed of information processing;” the dominant view in the research literature
today. However, read “why” in the section on the speed of processing.

Historical view

Since the classical Greek or British philosophers had little to say about reaction time or
speed in processing, Myer et al. (1988) trace the history of mental speed back to the early
works of Muller (1838). Muller conjectured that the rate of neural conductivity was
similar to the magnitude of the speed of light (translation cited in Boring, 1950, p. 41).
Myer et al. developed a family tree to show pertinent research studies over time. In their

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family tree of events leading up to today’s studies of reaction time, the diagram of
elementary cognitive tasks (etc.), and inspection time included two main branches which
began with Helmholtz (1850). Each branch was a major contributing author and the
method of measuring reaction time. For example, there were: Donders (1868): subtraction
method; Wundt (1880): analysis of processing stages, Neisser (1967): serial vs. parallel
distinction, and McClelland (1979): cascade model. The other branch which traced
reaction time followed Hick (1952): the rate of transmission, and Wicklegren (1977): a
critique of reaction time models. Their tree did not mention the early contribution of
Galton (1890) who used reaction time to explain individual differences. Using a selection
of over ten thousand men women and children Galton suggested that differences in
intelligence were a reflection of variations in response patterns to sensory stimuli.

Research in studies of mental speed today uses tests such as those devised by W. F. Hicks
(1952) and Saul Sternberg (1966). Hicks nine tests have equal possible choices. By
measuring reaction time during a trial, the experimenter determines the relationship
between several choices and the time required to make a decision. According to Hick’s
law, the individual’s reaction time increases as a function of the number of choices
(complexity of the problem). Sternberg’s short-term memory test measures reaction time
relative to the number of recalled digits. The subject must do a serial search of working
memory to determine if a probe contained a previous set of digits. As the number of
digits increases, the subject’s reaction time also increases. Both of these tests are crucial
in measuring the increase and decrease in the individual thinking process.

Studies in the last 15 years have used a combination of cognitive tests, along with
neurological testing. Extensive studies of the last decade use a plethora of intelligence
measures. Regardless of the methodology, (e.g., protocols, scanners, and/or human
samples), there is a consensus that IQ and cortical volume are robustly and positively
correlated (Deary & Caryl, 1997; Wickett, Vernon, & Lee, 2000). For example, Wickett et
al. (2000) found a significant relationship between cortical volume, fluid, intelligence, and
memory but did not measure the speed of processing. Typically, correlations in these
studies are about .40. The relationship has been hypothesized to be of genetic origin
(Posthuma et al., 2002).
Walhovda (2015) extended the study of cortical volume to include the speed of
processing. Cortical volume was calculated as the size of the cortex, not the skull size;
while, intelligence was measured by the abbreviated form of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence test. Speed of processing was measured in their study using
electrophysiological potential (ERPs). This methodology allows calculations in
milliseconds, however, there are differences in opinion about what ERPs represent. In
this case, electrophysiological potential represented speed. The researcher’s results

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suggested that cortical volume and speed of processing both are complementary in
predicting performance intelligence (multiple R2 =.51).

Categories of Perception, Conception, and Analysis

Introduction

Three of our measurement constructs have a cognitive bias as determined by

neuroanatomy and neuronal processing. Perception is often associated with perceiving,
attention direction, and visual search processes in the environment. Conception, with its
adjective form of conceptual, has as its root meaning in “concepts” and is often associated
with the generation of ideas, sometimes new, sometimes not. We often refer to the process
as ideation as it is involved with idea generation. The third measurement construct is analysis
–breaking a whole unit into smaller components and parts. The three categories, in our
opinion, are more closely associated with brain functions and cognition than with
personality, although science has been very slow to provide separate explanations of how
and why.
IPS theory- perception

In the IPS system, we have preference tests to measure the selection of items that suggest
greater use of perceptual actions. Likewise, we have cognitive tests that provide scores
on the speed of processing, visual search, dis-embedding designs, spatial rotation, and
arithmetic operations. The preference test items give information on preferences about
attention direction and perception, while the cognitive tests provide an actual measure
of cognitive speed and performance. Our cognitive tests involve visual search, mental
image processing, and image rotation.

The word “perceptual” is the adjective form of the noun termed perception. Perception
refers to the detection of environmental stimuli. Physical energy is transformed into
neural energy as we read a book, listen to a concert, smell cologne, or taste caviar. Often
the process begins with an image developed from the external stimuli, but perception can
begin with a simultaneous internal representation. Perception relates to concepts of
attention in the research literature as attention is a broader construct that includes
detection, filtering, and search. Detection is the presence or absence of a stimulus, filtering
is the selection of one or more attributes, and search is the identification of a target
amongst a large group of distractors.

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Our theoretical concept of perception begins with an individual’s choice of items that
affect learning and understanding. That is, the person selects items related to visual,
aural, and tactile stimuli that bring about learning or change. Our performance tests
measure detection, filtering, and search. How does this approach relate to the historical
studies of perception?

Historical view

The earliest questions about the concept of perception probably go back to the Greek
philosophers, but we start with seventeenth-century philosophers. Descartes, in the
seventeenth century, worked on the eye of an ox. His work revealed the basic properties
of vision. Others, the British empiricists-- John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, and
David Hartley, conceived of mental imaging as a basic element of thought. In the
assessment of the qualitative period, Galton (1880/1883/1907) used questionnaires to
study images. From the questionnaires, he developed instruments to measure individual
differences. Stimulated by Galton’s work, Itchier (1909) and Betts (1909) had subjects rate
their ability to visualize objects such as 1) apples, 2) the sun sinking below the horizon,
and 3) the contours of the face. Visualization and perceiving objects were intertwined
with mental imaging. During the period of the Behaviorist, studies on mental imaging
waned (Watson, 1913), but were revived mainly in the 1960s and 1970s as Sheehan (1967);
Bugles (1970); and Pavia (1969) provided a substantive theory of how images and words
are stored and represented. Neurocognitive scientists, Farah (1988); and Pinker (1985)
provided additional theoretical considerations on the relationships between imagery and
perception. Particularly important was the work of Shepard and Metzger (1971) on
spatial rotation and reaction times. One of the major findings to come from the studies in
the 1970s and 80s was that there are large individual differences in imagery ability.

There are semantic differences in the cognitive activity of spatial relations, spatial
manipulation, and visual search. Spatial relations are the ability to mentally rotate an
object about its center (Shepard and Cooper, 1982). Rotations of the object occur around
one or more axes (Shepard and Metzler, 1971). There are a variety of different objects
from blocks to spatial representations. Spatial manipulation (termed spatial orientation by
Ekstrom et al., 1976) is the ability to mentally manipulate an image into another
arrangement. Visual-spatial activities occur at different cognitive levels of abstraction and
affect different parts of the brain depending on task goals.

Visual search is putting a line through a letter in a crowded field of letters. Simple visual
searches (people, houses, letters, faces) activate the visual cortex while visual rotation
activates the prefrontal cortex. Selective attention and memory are both actively involved.

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The fundamental problem for visual search is to determine precise target locations,
without any advanced information.

Eimer (1996/2008)) has divided the visual search process into 4 stages (preparation,
guidance, selection, and identification) with neural feedback occurring in each phase.
Visual search is a product of spatial global working memory. According to him,
representations exist in the visual cortex. The issue is whether pathways associated with
visual activity (such as goal selection) are position invariant. Or based on a shift in
attention, and goal selection in the prefrontal cortex, does the pathway change?
According to some authors, the activated patterns which are sensitive to current task
goals may be part of top-down processing. As thinking proceeds, the prefrontal cortex
controls target selection which is buffered by attention preparation and attention shifting.
Similar to other researchers, Koffka 1935, Duncker (1945), and Wertheimer (1945) studied
the cognitive operations of perception and thinking. They wanted to study the
perceptions related to the stimulus configuration as a whole (Gestalt). Since they relied
on an experience-based approach where subjects described their experience, their
approach was named “phenomenological” from which they developed Gestalt
principles. One of their major contributions involved changing one’s cognitive set. That
is, according to Gestalt psychologists, changing the way that a person thinks about a
problem can lead to better solutions and insight.

Gottschaldt (1926) was one of the first to examine the cognitive process of finding a
camouflaged target. The target was a geometrical form, embedded in a larger more
complex pattern. The problem of finding the target involved speed and thus was a
measure of reaction time (RT). By manipulating a figure, that is, turning the targets, it
was possible to measure different reaction times. The question was: “If presented with a
target, how much time does the subject need to circle the embedded target?”

Studies involving embedded figures often examined the effects of practice (Gottschaldt,
1926; Hanawalt, 1943). Practice or learning involved a different strategy of moving from
the whole to looking for a specific target (Hanawalt, 1942). Research on this cognitive
process was done by Thurstone (1938) using a factor analytic approach. Thurstone
decided that the factor, defined by these types of perceptual tests, illustrated “Freedom
from Gestalt Bindung” or a type of cognitive flexibility. Later authors called the process
different names such as Guilford’s (1967), “convergent production of figural
transformation”, “closure flexibility” (Ekstrom, French, Harmon, and Derman, 1976), or
Carroll’s (1993) perceptual speed.

One kind of visual-spatial processing is called dis-embedding. Dis-embedding comes

from the early of Gottschaldt’s (1926) camouflaged targets. In visual environments where
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multiple objects compete for attention, the challenge is to find relevant information and
ignore objects and events that are unrelated to current task goals. This is particularly true
of part-whole relationships that involve a completely different part of the brain and
encompass different kinds of cognitive processes than spatial rotation. This type of
visual-spatial processing is a left-brain activity and is processed separately and
simultaneously in the center for words and numbers. Often the terms field independence
and field dependence is applied to this activity. People who are field independent tend
to be highly analytic in their perceptions and parse information into organized units thus
reducing size and complexity. Whereas people who are field-dependent tend to process
figural information spatially in its original (whole) form, making it more difficult to
disembody its parts (Witkin, H. A., et al., 1977).

Interestingly enough, studies examining the cognitive concept of embedded designs

suggest that the underlying process of perceiving, remembering, and processing was a
regularity developed around personality traits (Witkin and Goodenough, 1981). Witkin,
who worked with both Koehler and Wertheimer, was struck by the consistencies of
results involving the Gestalt-like tasks using the Rod and Frame Test (RFT) as well as the
Body and Adjustment Test (BAT). The Rod and Frame Tests had a subject in a darkened
room to view a luminous rod surrounded by a tilted frame that was set to true vertical
while the BAT required a subject to sit vertically in a tilted room. Subjects who were
highly dependent upon visual cues (field dependent) scored lower than subjects who
were less reliant on visual cues and more reliant on vestibular and gravitational cues
(field-independent).
Analysis

Some people suggest “analysis” is of Greek origin; literally meaning up-release or

separation. In Greek philosophy, the term meant the dissolving of a problem and was
used by Aristotle and Socrates. (Byrne, 1997). In medieval times, Thomas Aquinas may
have used a Latin derivative of the term to suggest a decomposing, an action before the
concept of problem-solving known as synthesis (Sweeney, 1994). These interpretations
contrast with the ideas of Sigmund Freud whose psychological therapy (i.e.; psycho-
analysis) consisted of free association, dream interpretation, and the exploration of
repressed and unconscious impulses.
How does this process work? When the memory store is in the form of an image, it is
recalled as a mental representation. This image can be static, that is, appearing exactly as
it is recalled. In such cases, the image is like a picture from a camera but exists only in the
mind’s eye. The image can also be mentally rotated with energy. Try it. In your mind,
think of the picture of your mother. Now rotate the image of your mother sideways. Can
you do it? This analytic energy process is called mental imaging. For example, sound
out the word "mother" to yourself (aural form). Now--form an image of your mother.

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Visualized the spelling of the word "mother." All of those actions occurred in your mind,
but for you, each process is individual. The actions involved more than memory since
the forms differ from sound or image. At one level, the process of visualization requires
the representation of mental images. At the molecular level, the biochemical process is
indeed an energy transformation in the brain. This transformational process involves
electron transfer from chemical units.

Before we look at the complicated mechanisms which are involved at the cellular level.
Let’s just do some visualization. If you spent a lot of time thinking, were you tired? Do
you remember studying in school, sitting for a while working on a school lesson? If you
had to work for an exceptionally long period were you not tired, perhaps exhausted. To
say that thinking involves energy utilization is a reality, not an imposed supposition.

Analysis is a transformation of energy generated during a particular form of thinking. In

an analysis, a person is trying to find out how parts are linked so that the whole can be
decomposed or broken down. For a simple problem, minute amounts of energy are used.
For a complex problem, tremendous amounts of energy are used over an extensive
amount of time. Certainly, thinking about routine things (figuring out what time you are
going to work, or picking up the kids) does not involve as much energy as spending hours
writing a paper or solving a complex mathematical equation. The writing of the paper
and the solving of complex mathematical equations require more time and thus more
total cumulative energy. Time, the condition of observance, and energy are related to
Einstein’s theory.

Now to the cellular level for the mechanism of how it works. Remember earlier we
suggested that E=Mc2 (energy equal to mass times the speed of light squared) may have
an application to biological not just a physical phenomenon of the universe. What did
we mean—a literal application? No! Simply, the characteristics and functions of energy
transformations at the subatomic level, as held in quantum theory, are similar to those at
the subatomic level in biological processes. Since electron transmission occurs in both,
the characteristics of electron transmission are similar (again, see the reference Chapters
23 and 24 in the book). What are some of the similarities?

First, Einstein’s equation refers to light or photons. In the equation, light is constant
(186,000 miles per hour) and time is the differential. In Einstein's theory of special
relativity, time is different relative to positional variants. With the constant of light, it is
time that differs. For example, assume one is inside a fast-moving space capsule and
wishes to measure the movement of sand in an hourglass, using a light clock that is one
meter long. The metric for time is 1 sec per movement of 1 meter. The spaceship is
traveling at a very high rate of speed. When an hourglass is turned over, the sand travels
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to the other end in 5 seconds. Since we defined the metric for a time as 1 sec per 1 meter,
the spaceship should travel 5 meters in 5 seconds. However, when viewed from the
outside, light travels in waves (not at a different speed) but at a time that is different from
that which has been calculated inside. Instead of moving 5 meters based on the time that
the water traveled inside the spaceship, the fast-moving spaceship travels 7 meters. In
other words, the time has expanded; the amount of time is 7 seconds when calculated
from the outside versus the time differential of 5 seconds calculated inside.

For the sake of clarity, let’s use the same analogy but apply the phenomena to biological
function. Rather than referring to photons, let us refer to our concept of “neuphons”. For
neuphons (see Chapter 23) we change the formula slightly to Energy=mass multiplied by
the (velocity) of the energy emitted by a moving particle during chemical reactions. We
are suggesting that time differentials including time expansion, occur at the level of the
neuphons. In essence time at the quantum level has passed differently for the particles
(neuphons). This difference leads to differences in perceptual and neuron transmission
or speed of processing. In other words, energy transformations at the quantum level
occur differently for individual people. This leads to differences in analytic thought.

We addressed the issues of biological energy in Chapters 23 and 24 including the action
of the Krebs cycle, enzymatic activity, and formation of ATP and ADP. Most of the actions
of energy in the biological system involve chemical reactions with different masses
(organs, organelles, chemical elements, and chemical compounds). Remember the
energy released by hydrogen in the Krebs cycle (velocity of energy from moving
particles) moving between different chemical compounds (mass), and the low-
temperature enzymatic reactions (energy from the velocity of moving particles) which
increase or decrease the energy reactions (mass associated with chemical compounds).
Perhaps a better formula for biological functioning becomes E=M (mass) x (speed of the
energy (electron orbital shift) or E=Ms2 in chemical reactions.

Ion exchange, a constant process involved in neurological transmission, involves mass

(ion, an electrically charged particle) and the velocity of the moving particle (exchange of
ions between compounds). If the formula E=mass multiplied by the (velocity) of energy
from a moving particle) has a basis, why have we not been able to measure it successfully?
For the answer, read superstring theory in Chapter 23 and think about the fact that
gravitational waves have only recently been discovered. Chapter 24 explains how
vibrations (energy waves) maintain self-consistency, and how the rotations of quarks (the
smallest known particles of atoms) may be conceived in terms of superstrings. If the
superstring theory has any validity then the energy reactions of the biological systems
may take place, not in our conventional two or three dimensions but mathematically, like
those in superstring theory, in 10 dimensions. The IPS theory posits that the release of
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energy in mathematically higher dimensions, the 10th dimension, constitutes a form
of thinking known as analysis. In other words, in the previous examples related to our
cognitive tests, the operation in the brain which results in the symbolic rotation of the
mental figures in the brain is an energy process that we define as thinking.

When Einstein was trying to resolve his equations about a form of energy called light,
current theory in physics suggested two different approaches. The first theory was that
light traveled at variable speed while the second theory suggested that light traveled at a
fixed speed. To resolve these inconsistencies, Einstein focused on time and the meaning
of the term “simultaneous.” Time, according to Einstein, was simply a variable that was
measured according to a derived standard. In his analysis, he suggested time was a
variable that was measured differently according to whether an observer was moving or
standing still. That is, when measuring 2 bolts of lightning, the meaning of ‘simultaneous’
is relative to the condition of observance.

As an example, consider the same event from two different perspectives. First, imagine a
man standing on a train platform who observes 2 bolts of lightning striking an equal
distance from him. Second, think of a woman who observes the same 2 bolts of the
lightning strike; however, she is traveling on a train passing the platform on which the
man stands. Again, for the man the observation occurs while he is standing still. For the
woman, the observation occurs while traveling close to the speed of light. Both people
observe the same 2 events. For the woman, she sees the first bolt of lightning strike the
platform at one time and the second bolt of lightning strikes at a different time. The man
sees two bolts of lightning striking at the same time or simultaneously. Thus, the meaning
of simultaneous is relative to conditions of observance. This observation that time and space
were relatives was central to Einstein’s theory of special relativity.

Now let’s take another example but at the level of quantum mechanics. But first let us
review some basic properties, according to quantum mechanics, wave-like subatomic
particles may be here or there or here and there. These entities may also exhibit properties
of entanglements, self-consistency, memory, and maintenance. Assume that one is trying
to observe these subatomic particles—mesons, positrons, etc. The debate in quantum
mechanics is similar if one argues Neil Bohr’s (Bohr, 1963) position. Subatomic particles
seem to follow the laws of randomness. That is a wave-like particle may be here or there
but impossible to predict. One cannot indicate with certainty that a subatomic particle is
going to be in a certain place but one can say that at the time of measurement
(observance), there is a greater probability that one might find more subatomic particles
where their wave-like occurrences indicate. That is, the meaning of the measurement of
the subatomic particle is relative to the conditions of observance similar to Einstein's
special theory of relativity.
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 Analysis as logical thought

We just examined the process of analysis as simple discrimination and the process of
dissecting concepts into components. Now we examine the process of analysis as
reasoning or logical thought. Is analysis the same as reasoning or logical thought? Not
as it is used in our theory. Reasoning uses a form of rules and relationships where the
outcome can be verified by others. An analysis is simply dissecting or taking things apart.
One can analyze a situation by breaking it into smaller segments or scenes, none of which
require that the outcome is logical or verified by others. On the other hand, one can
attempt to make an analysis logical. If others can verify the outcome, deductions, and
inferences, and how the individual pieces fit together, the analysis is logical and follows
the rules of reasoning.

In the IPS theory, analogies and sequential thinking represent the individual’s
performance in logical thought processes. Our performance construct of logical thought
is based on understanding the relationship between verbal constructs as well as being
able to infer sequences. We have tested children and adults of all different ages (6-82)
with analogies and sequence problems. The analogies are based on the construct of fluid
intelligence. Data suggest that fluid intelligence is very important at a very young age
but less important outside of discipline-based, structured knowledge or as the complexity
of the problem increases. In complex problem solving, divergent thinking and evaluation
are as important as convergent thinking involving logical thought.

As is shown in later chapters, there is a cascading development effect on the scores of

analogies and sequence items from the very young to older adults. That is, young
children have low scores on analogies and sequence items while older children and adults
have much higher scores. there is a large variation in scores on these items for different
age, ethnic, educational, and gender groups.

Theoretically, there should be a difference in those who select preference items indicating
“a person likes to take things apart” and a performance score on problems requiring
analysis of smaller units. However, in reality, the correlation coefficient of groups of
people who respond to both preference and performance items in our data, taking into
account that the sample size is significant.

Studies in the area of neurocognition (Gazzaniga & Sperry, 1967; Corballis, 1989; and
Milner, 1968) and clinical observation by Luria (1976/1979) and Farah (1988/1995),
address the functions of lesions in the brain and impairments. The finding from these
studies supports the theory that in the logical thought process, there is a different method
of coding and at least two methods of storing information. One system is for the coding
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or processing of visual information; another is for the coding or processing of verbal
information. Thus, different pathways exist in the brain for processing verbal (words)
and visual (spatial) information. How did early theorists conceive of these processes?

Historical view

The study of cognition as logical thought combines ideas found in both the syllogistic
and informational processing of analogies. In one sense, the analogy is propositional.
Following the form of A: B: C: D, or (9:36:1:4), individual processing requires memory,
discrimination, and isolation of distinct patterns. Finding an answer to an analogy
requires an understanding of concepts in language and the ability to infer relationships.
This entails picking out patterns, identifying a recurrent theme, and manipulating
symbolic abstractions. The historical records of many cultures emphasize the unique
place of analogies in religion, literature, and philosophy (see Holyoake and Taggard,
1995). Early Greek and Roman Civilizations used analogies as tools for advancing science,
especially in the building of aqueducts and structures to bring water from distant sources.
One of the earliest recorded use was in a scientific theory about how sound is propagated.
Many philosophers, theologians, and psychologists have studied the area of cognition as
logical thought. One of the earliest to deal with the concept of logical thought was the
student of Plato known as Aristotle. Being an astute observer, intensely concrete, and
practical, Aristotle relied on his sensory observations to develop a coherent system of
philosophical thought. To know or understand, one used the instrument of logic (“organ
on”) or the formal rules for correct reasoning. Aristotle’s basic principles of categorical
thought were accepted by western philosophers until the nineteenth century.

Of recent note is the work of Jean Piaget (1954). Piaget’s theory of logical thought was
embedded in his developmental theory about children’s thinking. According to his
theory, children develop mental structures and accommodation by reacting to external
stimuli. Early information is sensory-motor. Through the process of assimilation and
accommodation, schemas are developed. The process continues throughout adolescence
when formal logic develops. In the final stage of formal reasoning, children can construct
a combination of elements, isolate and manipulate concepts, and form mental
representations of abstract ideas and events (Favell, 1963)

Johnson-Laird and Wason (1972) suggested that one line of research on cognition as
logical thought could be traced to the Wurzburg school and Gestalt psychology while a
second line was related to the behaviorist school. Current researchers who study logic
are divided into three camps a) those following Piaget b) those who used a psycho-

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linguistic approach (propositional and syllogistic) and c) those who follow informational
processing theory.

Most current researchers have concluded that working memory (memory activated to
accomplish an immediate task) is of paramount importance in the development of logical
thought. Other factors related to logical thought include the ability to inhibit irrelevant
stimuli or incorrect alternatives, the increase in domain-specific knowledge, and the
ability to integrate various abstract representations with existing memory.

Conception

IPS theory-conceptual

As noted earlier, the root meaning of conception comes from the word “concept”, a term
that signifies the unique ability of individuals to derive a common set of ideas about a
class of objects. The adjective form is conceptual. Cognitively, conception is measured as
ideational content, word, and/or verbal fluency. Having conceptual ability allows
individuals to categorize and sort by common characteristics and to put objects and
things that are similar in a common group. It also allows for common associations of
classes. With this unique capability, individuals can quickly relate to and associate
common ideas which increases communication.

A friend of mine is a classic conceptualizer. In almost every discussion, he plays words

against words as a form of humor. Another friend constantly finds unique associations
with sports concepts. Reading the classic quotes and quips of Mark Twain (My complaint
simply concerns the decay of the art of lying---Twain, 1880) and Will Rogers (I never met
a man that I didn’t like- Smallwood & Gragert, 2010) helps one idealizes the meaning of
conceptual.

In IPS theory, ideas are one of the basic units of our base scale known as Conceptual.
Most people are familiar with the concept of an idea. An idea is a mental formation, often
in graphical form, which comes from generated concepts. Ideas come from real-life
experiences, past or present, and represent knowledge, thoughts, opinions, convictions,
or just abstractions. To some people, an idea is conceived as a funny graphical image of
a light bulb emanating from a head, signifying the generation of new or novel solutions
or ideas. For us, ideation is the process of generating and implementing ideas, either at
the applied level or at a level of abstraction which may or may not have immediate
application. In the latter case, the abstraction may be new, novel, different, or divergent

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processes that are defined as creative ideation. In contrast, according to IPS theory, people
who apply ideas to everyday phenomena, objects, or common-sense situations are
defined as applied or practical ideation.

To summarize, ideas are just thoughts and concepts applied in different ways to different
things. The majority of people apply ideas to different situations every day. One usually
responds, “Great idea” when these ideas are suggested as a solution to the problem. They
are useful ideas, very practical, and applied immediately to the situation at hand.
Creative ideation may be less useful but more novel, different, or abstract and not easily
applied. In some cases, the value of an idea may not be evident until years later.

In our model, each person has the same cognitive structures with which to produce ideas.
Individual variation is the result of long-term memory, existing knowledge, exposure,
and various personality traits such as persistence. Individuals use the same cognitive
structure to either refine existing knowledge or transform existing knowledge into a new
form of original knowledge.

Historical view

Historically, most researchers are interested either in creative people as a group or the
personality characteristics which characterize the creative person. Thus, the body of
research on ideation and conceptual thinking is found in the literature about creativity.
The review generally comes from 3 different viewpoints: a) animal research b)
evolutionary development of humans and c) studies that characterize creative persons.

Animal research

Generating and exploring the implication of an idea is the essence of creativity. Animal
studies in comparative psychology suggest that animals use creative ideas in the form of
“insight” learning. In “insight” studies, animals are given problems that involve their
ability to go beyond the existing fact present in real-life situations. For example, for a rat
in a maze to retrieve food, the animal must learn new routes or use unfamiliar tools for
retrieval. This exploratory behavior may require rehearsal, elaboration, and evaluation
before choices are made. Generally, the tasks involve the prefrontal cortex as well as
controlled working memory.

Taylor et al. (2010) noted a case of insight learning involving the Caledonian Crow. After
observing an experimental situation for over a minute, the crow was able to retrieve food

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from within a cage on the first trial. Other studies involving monkeys and rats have
suggested a similar problem-solving solution. Simonton (2003) suggests that conditioned
animals deviate from a suggested pathway to exhibit psychological creative behavior. Of
course, there is only inferred evidence of how “insight behavior” occurs in animal
research studies.

Evolutionary development

Ideation is common to creativity when viewed in an evolutionary context. Across the

ages, people have developed new ideas and ways to adapt to the environment. The
majority of evidence about creativity comes from the collection of ancient artifacts
discovered in major digging sites.

According to many evolutionary historians, early hominins were skilled in making stone
tools. The making of stone tools requires the shaping of objects by cutting and striking.
Although the reconstruction of the shaping technique is inferred, trial and error
techniques were probably part of the technique. Early men had to plan to sequence the
proper strikes on stones (Schlanger, 1999). Again, the making of tools may not exhibit
creativity or novel ideas until new and different shapes and figures were made. The
earliest known artifacts come from the era of Homo heidelbergensis (Coolidge and Wynn,
2009).

Some authors argue that for ideation or conceptual behavior to develop, there must be a
cultural framework that rewards it. Creative products in societies (art, jewelry, painting)
began about 50,000 years ago while Homo sapiens emerge over 100,000 years ago
(McBreaty and Brooks 2000; Henrich, 2004). The creation of new and different ideas is
displayed in many different forms such as poetry, dance, music, body art, and written
narratives and myths (Pinker 2003).

What evolutionary changes led to people who could generate new and different ideas?
According to some authors, the differences in cerebral cortex size are implicated.
Coolidge and Wynn argue that the distinctive enlargement in the posterior parietal cortex
is the culprit. This region is implicated in human working memory (Bruner 2008/, 2010).
According to some researchers (Jonides et. al., 2008), the difference in cerebral cortex size
led to creative differences in the two species of early man (Homo sapiens and Homo
neanderthalensis).

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Philosophical period

There is authoritative disagreement as to whether early philosophers--Plato, Aristotle,

and Socrates mentioned the creation of new ideas or creativity in their writing. Most early
authors tend to discuss creativity from the standpoint of cultural history. Thus, the
creation of new ideas is interpreted in terms of language development, painting, arts,
sculpture, and the production of great works. In this context, creative works have existed
since the earliest civilization when writing on walls in Egyptian societies was a way of
telling stories or recording historic events.

In the early days, stories and ideas were passed orally--generation by generation. As such,
many types of myths were part of the cultural heritage. This is illustrated by divine being
or gods having superlative creative power. Many doctrines of the Muses were creative
and recorded heroic and epic situations. Muses presided over many of the arts such as
heroic and epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, music, and dance.

Many authors chronicle the research on new and applied ideas within the context of the
famous schools of psychology--Gestalt, Behaviorism, and Psychoanalytic. The Gestalt
school, particularly studies conducted by Wolfgang Köhler (1925), was the source of
insight studies cited earlier. In the problem-solving exercises of the Gestalt school,
creative outcomes involved the restructuring of the problem so the problem was
perceived in a new light. Skinner, the name most associated with the Behavioristic
movement, only wrote tangentially about generating new or applied ideas. He was more
interested in the arts in general. The psychoanalytic tradition emphasized creativity as
part of psychopathology as well as normal functioning in humans. Freud related the
creation of new and applied ideas to daydreaming. This line of thought was not unusual
in those days as other authors conceived of creativity and idea generation as being related
to the mad genius phenomena.

Quantitative period

The assessment period began with Galton who examined individual differences in
human abilities. Galton, a mathematician, was exposed to Darwin’s Origin of the Species
which led him to investigate the degree to which human beings were subject to natural
selection through biological inheritance. His monograph of 1869 “Heredity Genius: An
Inquiry into Laws and Consequences” addressed issues relative to creativity. Galton’s
monograph provides a basis for other researchers such as Terman (1916) to give a range
of scores on an IQ test that defines ‘genius.” Later researchers examined the notion of

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whether a person defined as a genius (a high IQ) could be defined as creative. (Gardner,
1983; Simonton, 1999; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995).

Psychometric studies

IQ tests measure abilities, including an IQ of over 130 as a genius, but does it also measure
ideation? Most researchers developed separate instruments to measure ideation or
creativity, depending on how it is defined. Is ideation or the conceptual ability the
capacity to generate remote associations or to give a large number of associations to
various stimuli? Is the creative person more likely to generate different, original, and
unique categorical responses to a stimulus? That was the question for Mednick (1962) and
Guilford (1967) as their studies on divergent thinking and convergent thinking heralded
a new era in the research of creativity.

Other researchers decided to cast the questions in a different light by asking- What are
the personality characteristics of a creative person? Perhaps for many researchers, the
assessment instrument defined the answer to the question. Some authors used the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI); or Eysenck’s Personality
questionnaire (e.g., Eysench et al., 1992; Barron, 1969; Cattell & Butcher, 1968; Francis et
al. ) while others used Gough (1970) the Creative Personality Scale constructed from the
Adjective Checklist. Torrance (1962, 1974), building on the work of Guilford, continues
the study of divergent thinking and added scales to measure the resistance to flexibility
closure.

Are the mental processes that define a creative person different from those defined as less
creative? According to Ward (1999), mental processes are the same but are used
differently by different people. One person may draw on existing knowledge to create a
different outcome from another person. According to Simon (1995), providing
background knowledge to problem situations changes the formulation of the problem
and the outcome of the solution which may be defined as creative. For example, Weisberg
(1999) argued that sudden insight (creative thought) is the result of a series of small
incremental steps. In other words, creative insights occur over time, rather than a brilliant
flash of insight. The new idea may be an old idea or existing knowledge modified and
elaborated.

Brain Studies

Several studies of the brain have alluded to or studied creativity about differences in
males and females as well as differences related to creativity in general. One study

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addressed differences in males and females concerning 4 divergent thinking tasks. There
were no overall differences in a creativity index derived by the researchers but when
specific tasks were analyzed then male and female differences appeared. In females,
specific areas of the brain were identified (modularity) with less connectivity, suggesting
that females’ creativity was related more to the task involved (painting, music, sculpture).
In contrast, in highly creative men, the areas of the brain that were identified were closer
in location and there was greater connectivity to different parts of the brain.

Review summary

IPS theory has 10 basic constructs with 3 of those driven by energy relationships, i.e.,
perception, conception, and analysis. These three constructs along with energy are traced
through various historical periods and IPS theory. Neuronal energy, as the engine of
cognition, is important as it undergoes various transformations to produce ideas,
concepts, and a means of perceiving. The transformations of energy include its chemical
components as well as its electron movements along the nerve fibers. Sensory input via
the senses of feeling, hearing, and seeing represent occurrences in the environment. The
order of the relationship is first to perception, second to conception, and third to analysis.
Philosophers and armchair theorists have speculated on the meaning of these integrative
actions of perceiving, conceiving, and analyzing for years. During these periods, many
people suggested that the trio manifests actions in neural pathways which result in
characteristics of ability. Other people have separated the actions into qualitative and
quantitative outcomes related to creativity and intellectual capacity (ability). A final
group of researchers suggests that each outcome is a separate function understood by its
actions on objects in the environment.

Review: Personality

Introduction

In the IPS theory, personality is the energy associated with emotion and affect which is
manifested by different forms of self-regulation; i.e., control and/or less control. Traits
and states are short and long-term reflections of energy directed toward objects and
people. Emotional energy directed at people is social while emotional energy directed at
objects is less social in nature. The concepts of social and less social, control and less
control, reflect substantive differences that directly affect the types of problems that one
chooses to solve.

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How do these personality traits influence the problem-solving process? If traits are
influential, which trait is the most dominant in simple and complex problem-solving?
Which personality trait is most likely to influence the solving of words, numbers, or
spatial problems? We provide a foundation for answering these difficult questions by
examining the history and origin of various personality traits. Extraversion/Introversion,
Conceptual, Motor, Social, Control, Flex, and Achievement Motivation- and applying this
information to the problem-solving processes in the early chapters of this book.

Historical view

There is not a single definition of personality, although most personality theorists would
agree that personality represents how the behaviors, emotions, thinking, feelings, and
actions of the individual influence the environment (APA, 2000). Others, such as Jung
(1953), perceived personality as a persona or mask, surface characteristics, generally more
social, but hiding the true nature of the self.

A review of the literature confirms that there are hundreds of theories on personality as
well as many isolated measurements of personality that are not based on any theory.
These range from humanist, trait theories, type theories, and psychoanalytic theories to
more behavioristic and bio-psychological theories. A few theories contribute
substantially to the IPS framework as IPS constitutes both a temperament and trait
approach.

Many psychologists argue that personality consists of a broad range of individual traits
that emerge later in life while temperament encompasses more narrowly defined
consistencies appearing earlier in life. Since ours is a developmental model for both
children and adults, we use both temperaments and traits in our review. See other
authors who address the same issue (Caspi & Shiner, 2006, Clark & Watson, 2008, McCrae
et al., 1994, Zentner, & Bates, 2008).

The concept of temperament has a long history, beginning with the ancient Greek idea
that a person's typical mood and behavior result from the balance of four humors in the
body: blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm. In this perspective, temperament
emanated from biological and emotional processes, a view consistent with the current
conceptualizations of temperament (Clark & Watson, 2008; Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995).
In more recent times, the empirical study of temperament in childhood stems from the
work of Alexander Thomas and Stella Chess, who started a longitudinal study of
children’s early-emerging behavioral styles in 1956 (Thomas, et al, 1963). To those
authors, the child’s socialization experience was the primary source of one’s personality.

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The research of Thomas and Chess also emphasized biological differences that are
important in a child’s total development. Rothbart and colleagues argue that
temperament was more inclusive. For them, temperament includes individual
differences in affect, activity, attention, and self-regulation (Rothbart & Bates, 2006).

In contrast to temperament, there are many traits theories and general theorists. The
American Psychiatric Association (2000) suggests that personality traits are “enduring
patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that
are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal contexts.” Certainly, the early works
of C.G. Jung (1916), Raymond Cattell (1963), Gordon Allport (1921), H. J. Eysench (1947),
and Lewis Goldberg (1992) were influential in establishing a basis for trait theories. Later
authors, Costa, McCrae, R., and Tellegen (1992) provided support for a more succinct
group of measurement factors (Big Five) related to traits.

Personality Trait-Extraversion/Introversion
IPS theory-extraversion/introversion

Extraversion and introversion have been studied for many years by many different
researchers. Introversion, extraversion, and ambiversion are measures of energy flow,
either inward or outward or both. We summarize our thoughts about the constructs and
then give a historical view.

From our theoretical perspective, the extrovert manifests his or her “energy” in finding
others to engage, converse with, and interact with. The extrovert is more likely to talk
and seek out others. Talking and conversing is a mechanism for expressing inner
thoughts about daily experiences and feelings--- becoming energized. Likewise, the
extrovert prefers to be engaged, and involved in social activities where emotions,
feelings, and spirit can be exhibited.

Ambiverts, the group between the extrovert and introvert, is just as important in IPS as
either extraversion or introversion. In our view, the ambiverts are a real identifiable
group. This assumption holds for others who score as the in-between groups on our
measurement subscales. Ambiverts exhibit patterns of both introversion and
extraversion. The traits which are exhibited depend on the situation and circumstance.
The preferences of ambiverts are just less defined in either direction.

Introversion is a preference, not a condition. An introvert can be warm, affable and have
concern for others. In contrast to stereotypes, introverts are not necessarily shy. Introverts
are often problem-oriented as the problem is a matter of puzzlement. Enjoyment, for the

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introvert, is interacting with thoughts, ideas, and things. The introvert, in contrast to the
extrovert, may or may not want to talk about feelings. Instead, the introvert may prefer
to engage others in discussions about an object in question, be it a book, a concept, or
perhaps an art piece. The study of the object of interest requires interaction with the
object, just as reading a book about art provides the information to be discussed. An object
in the environment is the source of interest. This often results in the introvert spending
an inordinate amount of time with things. The type of work chosen for a lifetime often
contributes to patterns of introversion as well as extraversion.

Historical view
Allport

In 1936 using 18000 terms in Webster’s International Dictionary, Allport and Odbert
published “Trait-Names: A Psycho-Lexical Study”, a paper designed to uncover the
“underlying structural units of personality” (Allport & Odbert, 1936, p. 353). One of the
most dominant traits addressed by Allport was the concept of introversion and
extraversion. For Allport, introversion and extraversion were adjustments to
environmental stimuli and situations, traits that can be independent statistical variables.
Many studies in the research literature indicate the tri or bipolar nature of the concept
called extraversion.

Early theorists

To many, extraversion/introversion is a bipolar construct (example: hot water-cold water)

with extreme attributes more readily studied and classified. In contrast, the middle layer
of scores (for example -warm water) may or may not have different characteristics than
the extremes. The tendency is to assume that the middle distribution of introversion and
extraversion is really a combination of the traits denoted by the extremes (Cohen and
Schmidt, 1979). However, the middle may either represent a different and unique group
or perhaps a tendency to mark a scaled from 1-5 items in the mid-range of 3.

Conklin (1923) introduced the term “ambiversion” to describe this middle group. In his
analysis, ambiverts were people who consciously fluctuated from introversion to
extraversion or vice versa. Guilford and Braley (1931) noted that introversion and
extraversion are states of mind which as “can be turned on and off at will.” Thus, the
introvert can be an extrovert; just as the extrovert can be an introvert. The extremes of
the continuum can be more easily identified; but those in the middle, the ambiverts are
not as easily categorized or identified.

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The early work of Jung (1925) focused on the psychodynamics of the construct while the
latter work of Eysenck (1947) addressed the behavioural aspects. Jung (1920) identified
the energy of the mind as libido, and characterized extraversion as the flow of “libido.”
For the introvert, the flow of the libido is from the object to the individual. Jung’s theory
assumes that one is characterizing a person whose behaviour is modified by the situation
and has other characteristics that intertwine and mingle with the major tendency of
extraversion. The general descriptions provided by Jung are often so broad that they can
encompass so many different types of people. They represent tendencies or implied
patterns. As Jung indicated these patterns represent mental mechanisms that can change
at will with situations. Thus, the introverts “extroverts” or vice versa when put in a
position required by work (giving a presentation), acting as a host of a gathering of
friends, or required by a general activity to show some inner part of their personality.

McDougal and Kempf

McDougal (1926) suggested that on the basis of his data that introversion and
extraversion are indeed opposite tendencies of temperament. Kempf (1921) noted that
these different tendencies result from a general property of the autonomic and central
nervous systems. The chemical nature of these systems is such that energy can be shifted,
either by increasing or decreasing resistance through the neurons and at the synapses.
The basis of McDougal’s theory was witnessing of the marked effect of drugs with
various individuals. If introversion and extraversion are measured on a single scale with
a central point, maximum and minimum, then the individual’s response on the scale is
shifted toward one end or the other by various drugs. For example, one may become
more extroverted with alcohol, chloroform. or either; while others may become more
introverted by alkaloids, strychnine, or morphine. McDougal further suggests that
cyclomanics and hysterics (extreme extroverts) can be shifted through hypnosis. In other
words, temperament (introversion and extraversion) can be affected either by outside
influence or internal neurotransmission which may, in fact, be genetically determined
and environmentally influenced.

Other theorists

Most theorists and researchers assume that extraversion is a higher order construct that
subsumes lower order dimensions. H.J. Eysenck’s (1947) theory had two factors
Extraversion and Neuroticism and a later factor of Psychoticism (1963) while Raymond
Cattell’s found a higher order factor called “Extrivia” which is a combination of lower
order traits on the 16 PF. Cattel’s Scale B (intelligence) was a simple ability scale of 10
analogies that was integrated into his instrument but did not show a relationship to

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Extrivia, the extraversion -like scale. Two reviews (Digman, 1990 and Goldberg, 1992)
suggested that personality can be explained by 5 broad factors. The five-factor model,
also known as the big five, is widely researched. Costa and McCrae (1992) conceptualized
the five factors which are called extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
emotional stability, and openness to experience.
These five factors of Costa and McCrea can easily be interpreted by using marker
adjectives developed by Marco Perugini et al. (1996). In developing the adjective list,
Perugini and co-authors used different approaches. The first was the 100 adjectives list
from Goldberg (1992). The second used the big five intrapersonal adjectives by Trapnell
and Wiggins (1990) and was based on psychological tradition adapted from Hendricks,
Hoftee, and De Raad (1999). The adjectives are illustrative and are listed in the Appendix.
Overall, they provide definitive insight into the meaning of Costa and McCrae’s five
factors.

Personality Trait: Sensory Motor

In the IPS theory, we use the general classification of the motor as an abbreviated form of
the well-known term--sensory-motor or kinesthetic. The category which represents a
group of people as Motor represents a broad construct and originates from those who in
the early years of life relies heavily on the sensory-motor and bottom-up processing.
Their life is dominated by physical activities, concrete objects, and practical solutions as
they mature. The skill in finding, naming and manipulating concrete objects suggests the
ubiquitous nature of this kind of people in many vocational areas.

A large proportion of the population falls in this category as it includes people with fine
and gross motor skills as well as those people to whom physical activity skills are a part
of vocational life. For example, a bodybuilder, mountain climber, and an athlete are
included at one end of the vocational spectrum. A seamstress, a sculpturer, an engineer,
and a person in a shipping department might be on the other end.

In the early years of research on motor development, the constant question was: “What
or who is in control. Is control related to the brain, central nervous system, or local muscle
mass? According to Schmidt & Lee (2011), the obvious choice is the brain, but in an
integrated system, all parts of muscle masses function together simultaneously to bring
about coordinated action. From conception, according to embryological development,
there is gradual unfolding as cells interact with their environment. After birth, continuous
development of all organs, bones, and muscles brings about integrated functioning.
Some muscles, bones, and organs do not reach maturity until years after birth. During
infancy and childhood, muscles receive additional training by those athletes who rely

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heavily on sensorimotor systems. Those same people continue to train or use their bodies
in primary activities for years to come. The dominant strength of this group come from
bottom-up or sensory-motor processing. Bottom-up processing suggests that reflex arcs
and motor neurons are processed quickly which could result in a speed of processing as
well as intellectual functioning.

Many academic journals such as Perceptual Motor Skills are devoted to the myriad of topics
concerning motor skills. Distinctions of motor skills range from observable behaviours
such as the change in joints position or movement of the body or both. Related topics
include motor learning, motor control and cognitive strategies used for coordination of
muscle groups. Because mental and physical health issues impede motor activity, many
writers make comparisons between unimpaired individuals and recovery in impaired
individuals.

Interactions of bodily-kinesthetic activities with cognitive strategies for reaching goal

attainments cue sharp categorical distinction about objects and people in the
environment. As such, people in this category develop very concrete ways of handling
existing problems. Adjectives that characterized motor children and adults and their
orientation in the IPS system include practical, efficient, and realistic as well as body
driven, competitive, and athletic.

Historical view:

Most of the early theorists and researchers of motor development had deep roots in
biology and wrote about brain and motor development as unfolding. That is, there were
critical periods in which morphological changes occurred leading to body and organ
maturation at different ages. Biological processes shape human development. Perhaps
Darwin (1877), who studied his own children, was one of the first to informally write
about motor development. Certainly, the contribution of Arnold Gesell 1933) and Nancy
Bayley (1936) was important for normative comparisons of infants and adults. Both Mary
McGraw (1945) and Mary Shirley (1931) contributed to their studies of infants. The early
emphasis in these research studies was on observable changes in motor development and
descriptive change. Interest waned in studies of motor development in the period from
1946 through the early 60s. Those years are often called ‘the dormant period.’

The work of Berstein (1967) emphasized body development in the context of

environmental constraints as well as environment pressure. Today’s researchers have
more of a developmental systems approach to motor develop (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000)
with an emphasis on perceiving and then acting (Gibson, 1969).

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Work by Bril and Sabatier, 1986 suggests that motor skills in Eastern cultures are highly
influenced by child care practices and belief (Mali) and differ substantially from skill
development in Western Cultures.

Campos et al (2000) investigated cultural differences in crawling and its effect on spatial
cognition. Those who rely on their primary sense of what can be seen and interpreted in
their environment were categorized as sensorimotor by Piaget (1954). Piaget was one of
the first to characterize the early stages of cognitive development as sensorimotor. He
noted how infants with acute perceptual systems and rapid reflex arcs gained rapid
knowledge of the world by relying on their senses. The infant moves through this early
stage of cognition very rapidly. Concept and symbolic development occur early.

For some children, the satisfaction and enjoyment of developing physical skills
accentuate neural pathways as a primary mode of gaining information through
adulthood. People who have excellent sensory motor skills are resourceful in cognitive
processing. They excel at location processing, finding, naming, and manipulating objects,
thus one finds a pilot, a military career officer, or as a fireman as representative of those
with this trait.

Rita and Kenneth Dunn (1978), after an extensive review of the literature, observed
children in the classroom whose primary method of learning appears to motor driven or
hands-on. They described these children as being kinesthetic. They observed that these
children were delayed in developing audio and visual skills but relied heavily on motor
skills early in life.

Personality Trait: Social

Social concern (Social) is a product of emotions and feelings which result from memory,
perceptions, and attention directed toward real objects in the environment. Social concern
assumes that the intended object (person, etc.) is valued, loved, or has societal
importance. Social concern, similar to most concepts in IPS theory, is independent but
intertwined with cognition as cognition gives meaning to the intended object. The
interdependence of social concern is directly related to stored emotions and feelings that
are part of memory. Socialness is an outcome.

Social(ness) is neurologically related to chemical concentrations of neurotransmitters.

Emotions and feelings are elevated or depressed by energy transformation according to
environmental situations. Cognition is a way of channelling and controlling emotional

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energy and/or social concern. The cognitive system and affective system are separate,
interactive systems operating with the checks and balances of environmental stimuli.
However, at any moment, one or the other may be more dominant. Thus, feelings of
emotions can be held in check or temporarily suppressed by logical thought (a cognitive
energy process which attempts to give meaning and understanding to events around us).
Or then again, the strength of emotion and feeling may be so powerful as to cancel out
and override the effect of the cognitive system. Social concern or gradations of less social
concern may be expressed as a result of the energy manifest in any given situation.

In IPS theory, social concern is a form of conscious and unconscious emotional energy
which emanates from feelings derived by the sensory signals in the environment or from
memories manifest from creative and practical ideation. Social concern is generally
altruistic in nature but may become self-destructive when unconscious emotions result
in a concern for oneself only or when feelings erupt into a rage, anger, or self-despair.
Emotions are often described as anger, love, despair, hope, embarrassment, and anxiety.
Again, social concern while dependent upon the energy of emotions and feelings are not
antithetical to any other biological or cognitive functions. For example, when the
emotional energy from an event in the environment occurs, the cognitive functions are
intact and operating to identify possible threats or comforts.

Historical view

According to Homiak (2015), the topic of social concern was addressed during the
philosophical and experimental phases of psychology. From early times, the concept of
“socialness “was defined as a struggle between reason and emotions-- thinking and
feeling. The early philosopher Plato in the Republic idealized the mind as 3 compartments
of reasoning, emoting, and desiring. For Aristotle, the social concern of people was
characterized by wrapping emotions in the complex of morality, thus incorporating
reason in control of feelings by making the right choices in moral situations. David Hume
wrote that reason was a slave of passion and feelings while Spinoza wrote about emotions
as “affections of the soul.”

American psychologists William James and Carl Lange were influential theorists in the
1800s. Each developed a theory that eventually became known as the James-Lange. James
conceived of social emanations as related to the biological sensations of the autonomic
and motor systems. For Lange, emotions and socialness were responses to experience but
also rooted in biological systems. Both Lange and James wrote that emotions are
physiological responses, contributing to reflex actions of the autonomic system such as
dryness in the mouth and a rise in the heart rate.

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In the 1900s, the most influential theorists were Magda Arnold, Richard Lazarus, and
Herman Simon. Arnold was known for the appraisal theory, Lazarus for emotions and
stress, and Simon for the influences of cognitive systems such as decision making and
artificial intelligence theory (Francher, 1979).

In the late and middle 1900s, sociologist Emilé Durkheim wrote about the customs and
practices in the Australian aborigines. Totemic rituals often whipped the individuals into
a frenzy. Durkheim characterized this as a “heighten state of emotional energy.” This
emotional peak came from worshipping sacred objects. Emotional energy in this context
is a feeling of confidence, boldness, and the power to overcome. These feelings intensified
as people gather together and interfaced. Sociologists study the socialness associated with
cultural norms and rules.

The late 1900s and early 2000s have seen a plethora of authors and researchers who study
socialness from the perspective of neuroscience and cognitive theory. Again, major issues
revolve around how cognitive systems interact or fail to interact with affective systems.
The cognitive systems are often characterized using terms such as judgment, evaluation,
reason, and logical thinking. The affective systems are the social interactions from
emotions, feelings and the objects of intentions. Socialness, feelings, and emotions are
evaluated, judged, or understood in relation to particular cognitive thought.

The most frequent social situations according to current psychological theorists is a

conscious process with understanding related to the object of intention. One connotes
socialness through emotions and feelings such as happiness by helping others. The term
“helping” suggests that meaning is given to the object of the intention. The person he or
she loves (through actions, pathways, and ontological developments) is explicated so
each may see how the actions occur. In contrast, an unconscious process (anger) may
never be evaluated or judged in relation to the object of the intention (person, abstraction,
etc.). The reason, of course, is that there is not a cognitive association; therefore, there is
no evaluation or judgment.

A psychologist, Klaus Scherer at the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences in Geneva, is
representative of cognitive theorists. His appraisal theory is multidimensional,
describing emotions, feelings, and socialness around specific situations that allow for
positive and negative emotional valence. He sanctions the idea that emotions can be
divided into 5 different components: 1. Cognitive appraisal or evaluation 2. Physiology
3. Motor expression 4. Motivational (behavioral intention or behavioral readiness) and 5.
A subjective feeling state. Accordingly, in his theory, there is an average (modal) state
which accounts for frequently occurring patterns of emotions and feelings. There are
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different stimulus evaluation checks on the central nervous system which predict the
interrelated component processing and allow for the prediction of response patterns
(Scherer, 2000)

According to a neuroscientist, different structures in the brain are more likely to be

involved in emotions such as socialness and fear. Emotions are triggered by sensory input
which is processed in the amygdala. The functions of the amygdala and hippocampus
include the processing of memory as well as emotional information. The juxtaposition of
the hypothalamus to the amygdala is not accidental as the hypothalamus sends signals
to the Autonomic Nervous System. (ANS). The ANS regulates involuntary responses
such as breathing and heart rate. Therefore, an emotion such as fear is interpreted based
on the need to survive with an increase in adrenaline and blood flow stimulating a flight
or fight syndrome. An emotion such as fear is processed quickly with stimuli moving in
concert with other brain structures. The left prefrontal cortex along with limbic and non-
limbic structures are often cited. Recently, Lövheim (2011) posited that different
chemicals such as dopamine, adrenaline, and serotonin are related to eight basic human
emotions. In his model, each of these chemicals interacts in a coordinate system with basic
emotions. Silvan Tompkins (1991) suggested emotion is related to different types of
specific chemical concentrations. As an example, anger might produce a low amount of
serotonin.

Personality Trait: Control

Control is a cognitive and feeling manifestation in behavior relating to the need for
structure and order in one’s life so that decisions regarding life events can be made more
efficiently and easily. We often used control and structure interchangeably as controlling
an external situation is an attempt to bring structure and order through planning or
forethought. Structure and order literally address the arrangement and relationships
between the elements of a complex entity. Elements are positioned in a particular
sequence or pattern relative to each other. Structure and order, in personality theory,
suggests that a person views objects, things, and people in the environment and
cognitively and emotionally imposes structure and order where there may be some, little,
or none. How a person imposes control may be by planning, verbal or non-verbal
direction, or general behavior. Control is a learned behavior but probably has genetic
roots. There are different kinds of cognitive control; those which are internally based and
those which are externally based. Each shows a different manifestation of behavior.

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A person who has a ‘need for structure’ controls situations, and plans often to relieve the
stress of not meeting one’s goals. The need for structure is often related to emotional
feelings such as anxiety, fear of failure, or a desire to understand a non-structured
situation. A structured person follows the rules, obeys others, and is self-disciplined.
They imbibe social, cultural, and parental rules and strive for goal attainment. In The Ego
and the Id, (1923), Freud defines the concept of the superego or conscience. According to
Freud, a person with a strong superego is responsible and controlled. Structure is based
on the active behavior of self-control such as planning, organizing, and carrying out tasks
to completion. People who are high on the structure are goal-oriented, punctilious, and
determined to achieve. People with less need for structure are more relaxed in pursuing
their goals. Perhaps, at times, they are less punctual, and occasionally less reliable
(Jastrow, 1932).

Some environments have less exposure to variability. Other environments are continually
changing. Environments that change continually require more flexibility and adaptability
to solve problems that are fluid and changing. Neuroplasticity of the brain literally
increases with increased environmental change, i.e.; there are a constant ebb and flow of
neuro-transformations and changing of neuropathways. Control and Flex are two
constructs that are influenced by the variability in the environment.

Our concept of structure and order has many facets. Correlations in the literature
empirically suggest a relationship with another well-known concept called
conscientiousness. Costa and McCrae (1995) defined conscientiousness with the
adjectives of dutiful, self-discipline, and competence. Are structure and order and
conscientiousness related? The correlation between the variables is usually high and
significant.

Our measurement instruments have subscales related to control and structure. The items
which are listed next come from our control subscale. A person who is structured –1.
makes lists to control, 2. plans ahead 3. is conscientious and follows the rules, 4. organizes
(to control their environment), and 5. tries to order their activities meticulously and
methodically.

IPS internal and external control

There are two types of control, internal structuring of one’s own behaviours and external
structuring of other behaviours. The external structuring is the most obvious as the child
directs others to solve a problem by way of verbal commands such as ‘do this or ‘do that.’

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Usually, the behaviours related to the neural pathway are internalized by the child from
parental instructions but occasionally the neural pathway is learned through discovery.
Internal structuring of one’s own behaviour more likely reflects the behavioural control
learned from parents, church, teachers, and other significant figures.

How are these control systems displayed as the child ages? Usually, they are just
extensions of behaviors and ideas learned earlier. When they are not, the new control
systems are extensions of independent thinking designed to obtain immediate goals. The
control systems are learned through repetition in regularized and controlled
environments. That is, the children do almost the same thing and have the same routine
day after day.

The reward of internal and external control comes from the solving of academic problems
or the satisfaction gained from learning to solve problems in the “real world.” Both
mental operations result in an internal locus of control. Our research suggests that an
internal locus of control is related to higher academic standardized test scores and
favorable treatment from others.

Many children do not show the extremes of identifiable attributes but instead display
behaviors that are characterized as the normal process of maturing. That is, children
sometimes make mistakes but try hard to overcome any adverse conditions related to
them. When the control systems are not internalized or operational, then children’s
behaviors are well documented. A statement characterizing such behaviors is stated as
“out of control.” Occasionally self or other directed destructive behaviors occur.

How important is it for the child to learn how to control emotions and thinking?? This
construct is usually highly related to learning and scores on achievement tests. Those
who choose ideas related to internal control also score quite well on independent
academic performance tests.

Preceptivity and receptivity

Because of its importance, we expanded the definitions of control for older children and
adults by developing another subscale that measured the constructs of receptivity and
preceptivity. Even in late adolescence, the process of specialization, such as choosing a
profession (medicine, law, or engineering), can lead to different internal structuring of
information. By internal structure, we mean neurons and pathways that are built,
dissolved, and rebuilt through constant reading and experience. By constant rebuilding,
the memory pathways are multilayered with many different sources to draw upon. It is

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the everyday encounters involving social situation which makes a person rely more on
two ancillary methods of responding to problems ---preceptivity or receptivity.

Receptivity and preceptivity contribute to internal boundaries. Receptivity and

preceptivity are a method of orientation and response. They are ways of controlling the
flow of information and emotions. Receptivity is a process used often by counselors.
With clients, a counselor must find out information about the person and their situation.
This can only occur by asking questions. They ask questions as a method of combining
information with information already cataloged in their minds. Counselors, who follow
Carl Rogers are generally receptive!

Preceptivity is responding to the generic structure of the problem or statement to propose

a solution or to give an explanation from memory or thought. In other words, people
have preconceived ideas of what is the outcome is based on their previous encounters
and problem-solving. Internal structure results from rigorous practice habits such as
continually studying a particular area. Any time a person spends long hours engage in
repetitious study or obsessed thought, the result is mental layers used to think about
solutions to problems. These mental layers result in more rigid boundaries. Thus, the
reference is internally structured.

One can hear how concepts are mentally structured in the conversation of the person as
they discuss issues. I recently watched the 2016 presidential debate on television. Some
candidates had spent considerable time thinking and studying issues of foreign policy.
Their responses to questions indicated the internal structuring of the knowledge they had
gained with practice, mental rehearsal, and thoughtful hours of preparation. Therefore,
they responded to simple questions with very well thought out knowledgeable
preconceived answers. They would have scored high on preceptivity or having a defined
knowledge base with a developed internal structure. Other candidates had either not
studied foreign policy as well or tried to gain further knowledge by listening to the
responses of others than repeating their thoughts. They would score high on receptivity.
In reality, everyone uses both receptivity and preceptivity, however, there is a propensity
to use one thinking process more than the other. Here are two more examples to clarify
the meaning of receptivity and preceptivity.

Suppose the teacher says to two math students in the class that "some numbers are neither
rational nor irrational." To understand that statement, one has to understand the
mathematical definitions of rational and irrational. There are only two classifications.
Irrational is any real number that cannot be expressed as an integer or as a ratio between
two integers. Rational is any number capable of being expressed as an integer or a
quotient of integers, excluding zero as a denominator.
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A student high on receptivity might ask for further clarification or want more
information. The student might ask for more examples, definitions or even want to know
why the person made the statement. Being internally structure, the student would know
by definition what was being said but want to explore further information which would
augment his existing information.

In contrast, the preceptive person might dismiss the statement as being illogical, since
there exist only two classifications. Numbers must fit into one of the two classifications.
Ergo, the statement must be false, to begin with. Likewise, the preceptive student might
just argue the point based on the definitions of the words. In other words, for the latter
student, the statement, as given, did not fit into their preconceived pattern or thought.
The two patterns of receptivity and preceptivity have an immense impact on how people
solve problems. Since a person uses both processes, let's examine each procedure. When
just memorizing and retrieving information, a person is likely to be preceptive in
response. When memorizing a single fact, the information is memorized as individual
units and retrieve as a unit, thus it sounds memorized and rehearsed. What is the capital
of California? Sacramento.

When information is stored in an organized form for solving different kinds of problems,
retrieved in relation to an environmental stimulus and the form is different from a unit
retrieval, it is still preceptive. Question: What is the capital of California? Response: A
place where the governor’s house resides--Sacramento.

Receptivity can also take different forms. If the units in the memory are modified or
changed on the basis of incoming information or questions, the information retrieval is
considered as receptive. For example, let us say that the memory unit stored was a
concept of the animal with the subset concept of dog. The subset concept of dog might
be a memory further modified through experience to include the concept of St. Bernard.
In other words, modification of the original concept 'animal' resulted in a memory store
of a specific kind of dog--St. Bernard. The modification of the original information is still
considered as part of receptivity.

Historical view

The early philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates) did not speak directly to the
concept of structure and order in people but address the issue in terms of ethics. Those
people who plan, organize and try to control their behaviour are usually ethical. The term
of control was not popular in schools of Experimentalism, Behaviorism, or Gestalt.

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However, each of these psychological approaches studied the concept but under different
names or from different theoretical perspectives. Behaviourist, for example, we're
interested in reward and reinforcement for goal-oriented behavior. They suggested that
a person planned or behaviorally changed to obtain a goal and was rewarded.

Many studies have indicated that conscientiousness or structure is associated with a vast
array of concepts and this contributes to the ability to use it as a predictor. Two areas
receiving a lot of attention are academic and career success (Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, &
Barrick, 1999; Lounsbury, Sundstrom, Loveland, & Gibson, 2003; Noftle & Robins, 2007;
Ozer& Benet-Martinez, 2006; Preckel, Holling, & Vock, 2006). Because personality
encompasses so many emotions and enduring traits, a simple trait such as control may
correlate with a wide spectrum of variables. According to Costa and McCrea (1992), based
on how the original variable is defined, it may measure different slices of reality. For
example, Lee and Ashton (2004) found that conscientiousness has different facet
structures depending on whether it is correlated with a narrow or broad spectrum. A
variable narrowly defined and operationalized may correlate more highly than a variable
more broadly defined. A recent meta-analysis suggests that being structure, dutiful, and
organized correlates from .24 to .27 with college grades, and .21 with academic
achievement at high school, with these relationships holding after accounting for
cognitive ability (Noftle & Robbins, 2007; O’Connor & Paunonen, 2007; Trapmann, Hell,
Hirn, & Schuler, 2007).

Thompson et al. developed a 12-item scale which was called Personal Need for Structure.
Individuals who score high on their subscale are more likely to display black-and-white
thinking, shunning information that is ambiguous or a threat to their existing belief
system. Their cognitive systems are less likely to be integrated, complex, or
multidimensional.

Personality Trait: Flex

In IPS, the neuroplasticity of the brain contributes to Flex. Our measurement is based on
the interaction of three scales, flex, conceptualization, and control. Most of the literature
focuses on the concept of control/flexibility and interprets the extremes as rigidity and
cognitive flexibility. Other articles in the literature focus on flex as related to creativity,
artistic temperament, and originality. Some measurement theorists suggest that flex is
relatively congruent with the self-report measures of Goff and Ackerman’s (1992) concept
of Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE) and Costa and McCrea’s (1992) Openness
subscale. For us, flex along with the ability to conceptualize underlie both areas of

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research. The so-called “kicker” is that Flex is mediated almost simultaneously with
control and structure as its origin may be in emotional impulse regulation. The impulse
to act follows from feelings generated by associations with memory representations.

We interpret the scales in the cognitive sense of representing energy actions in cognitive
brain processing. Flex, when regulated based on previous experience, is the ability to
break from a conscious mental set when solving problems. A set is defined as a method
or way of viewing the problem. People developed mental sets by seeing the same
situation day after day and attempting to solve the problems the same way each time the
problem presents itself. Flex in daily life is analyzing the problem situation, then being
open to various solutions based on the information presented. Flex in the extreme is using
the impulsive urge for a trial and error approach for every problem, even if the same
problem is presented multiple times.

Cognitive flexibility is based on having a goal such as solving a specific kind of problem
then expending cognitive energy to think of numerous alternatives to solve the problem.
Each person has the same brain power to solve the problem but some people are more
willing to think of different alternatives. Thus, flex is learned through exposure to many
different kinds of problems (energy utilization) from childhood to adulthood. People
who score high on flex seem to be looking for an easier way to solve a problem even if it
takes longer to do it. The enjoyment of exploration seems to outweigh the amount of time
needed to solve the problems.

The ability to solve problems is a function of many different attributes, but the
flexibility/control dimension is extremely important. Directly affecting the
flexibility/structure dimension are the concepts of conceptual and practical ideation,
cognitive independence /dependence, and receptivity /preceptivity. In our research, we
start with concepts of cognitive flexibility and rigidity and then apply this research to our
subgroups.

Historical view

Is flex the opposite of Gestalt’s functional fixedness and the same as Guilford’s divergent
thinking? Does flex (cognitive flexibility) incorporate the definition of innovative or novel
thinking? Is cognitive flexibility the same or does it result in behavioral adaptability?

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Operational definitions are ways of defining very broad constructs so each can be
measured. But, then again, there are so many different operational definitions. The
inability to arrive at common definitions has created controversy in the study of
behavioural and cognitive flexibility. Areas of agreement by researchers suggest that
cognitive flexibility is a fundamental process in human cognition and often results in
intelligent decision making (Boroditsky, Neville, Karns, Markman, & Spivey, 2010; Deak,
2003; Jordan & Morton, 2008; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).

Areas of disagreement come from the fact that many human actions and concepts which
inter-correlated cause multiple kinds of operational definitions. For example, some
suggest that cognitive flexibility or flex is the shifting back and forth between multiple
tasks (Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006; p. 2019) while others use a definition
associated more with creativity. The latter definition indicates that one is either a flexible
problem solver (i.e., “one who knows multiple solution procedures or one who can invent
or innovate to create new procedures” (Star & Seifert, 2006, p. 282).

Are flexibility and rigidity on a unidimensional continuum? Early 1900 theorists and
experimentalists had a difficult time deciding exactly how to interpret and define the
dimensionality of flexibility/rigidity. A unidimensional definition suggests one end was
cognitive flexibility while the other end was a kind of rigidity.

Spearman (1927) defined rigidity as “mental inertia”; Werner (1946) suggested that
rigidity was just a lack of variability; and finally, Rokeach (1950) indicated that it was the
inability to change the set when necessity requires it. Lately, most authors are content to
use “mental set” in their definitions. The cognitive approach is for a person to have
expectations about events or problems and to continue to hold on to the attitude or belief
even if the set is not effective, or efficient in finding a solution to the current situation.

Historically, the usual research procedure was to define a single continuum with
flexibility on one end and rigidity on the other. By studying either cognitive flexibility or
rigidity, the meaning of both becomes clear. This was especially true in Gestalt school.
Kounin (1948) and Werner (1946) explained the concept of cognitive rigidity as either
structural or functional. In the structural interpretation, there are mental regions. When
these mental regions are well defined and distinct, the regions are more independent and
a person is more likely to be rigid. Individuals who need structure to order their
environment perform established patterns that may become ritualistic. Thus, a person is
more likely to do things the same way and have a routine. According to their theory,
repetitive experiences establish distinct boundaries in mental structure. In the functional
interpretation, rigidity is the tendency to preserve or hold on to a previous or establish
experiential set. Functional interpretation is often associated with the solving of
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problems. A person learns to solve a problem using an established method or a developed
set of steps. Preservation tendency is defined as holding on to the established method,
set, or procedure to not fail in solving the problem.

Personality Trait: Achievement Motivation

Motivation is a drive, a force emanating from biological functions in the form of

emotional, social, and cognitive energy as well as goal attainment. Motivation comes
from sensory stimuli in the environment as well as internal energy in the body. When the
energy is directed toward a goal of needing to improve and perform well according to a
standard of excellence, then it is called achievement motivation. This type of motivation
is an indicator of competition, accomplishments, and commitment to achieve.

Historical view

Historically the concept of motivation has been studied in relation to learning,

evolutionary behaviour, psychoanalytic theory, and physiological behaviour. In classic
cases of behaviour (McClelland, 1985; McClelland, 1985b), motivation comes from
arousal or drive and is characterized as guided, directed and goal-oriented.

This is contrasted with the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and McDougall which found
motivation was instinctual and satisfied basic needs (hunger, thirst). Murray (1938) and
Maslow (1954) suggested a hierarchy of needs. Lower needs at the bottom of the
hierarchy were more basic and instinctual while higher needs to achieve growth potential
and excel (achievement motivation) were at the top,

Kurt Lewin (1943) addressed the problem of motivation in terms of field theory. Field
theory came originally from physics where it was a conceptualization of electromagnetic
phenomena in terms of fields of electromagnetic forces. The psychological perspective
was to analyze causal relationships through positive and negative valences.

Atkinson and McClelland

McClelland, & Atkinson, (1948) studied the concept of achievement motivation as fantasy
or imaginative behavior. Using content analysis, they studied imagery as a fantasy that
takes the form of thoughts about performing a task well. When blocking imagination, a
subject exhibits various levels of achievement while experiencing joy or sadness.

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More recent studies about individual differences have emphasized goal orientation
rather than needs and drives. The personal striving of the individual (Emmons, 1996) is
characterized in terms of a) obtaining goals b) expectancies, and avoidance of failure.
Ultimately, personal striving is related to measures of psychological well-being,
emotional satisfaction, and physical happiness. The outcome of personal striving or
achievement motivation is goal attainment and goal implementation. The self-
perceptions related to personal striving indicate that strong ideal integration is important
in setting realistic goals. A weak perception of self leads to negative outcomes (Higgins,
2007).
Interests

IPS theory suggests that people use their energy in various activities in the environment
and this process helps establish interest patterns. Interests as an environmental activity
represent social and non-social goal activity.

The research on interests is diverse. Silva (2006) in a review of the literature describes that
diversity by noting many contributions come from personality, organization behavior,
meta-cognition, and vocational psychology. Although interest definitions are just as
diverse; two definitions are more prominent: a) interest as a personality trait (Holland,
1997) and b) interest as a transient state related to one goal. When goals are a primary
endpoint, they are usually related to achievement motivation or other affective states
either separate or integrated with cognition (Mary Ainley, 2006, Bryan J. Dik and Jo-Ida
C. Hansen, 2011).

Historical view

Vocational guidance and career counseling played an important part in the emphasis on
careers and interests. According to J. M. Brewer in his 1942 article on “History of
Vocational Guidance,” the emphasis was due to societal upheaval, transition, and change.
The latter part of the nineteenth century brought industrialization and migration of
people to major urban cities. There was a need for direction in how to employ people and
these stimulated tools helped counselors. According to Brewer, in 1914, Jesse Davis
published the Student Vocational Self Analysis and in 1917, a psychologist, James Miner
developed an interest questionnaire. In 1920, a standardized interest inventory was
published by the Carnegie Institute of Technology Bureau of Personnel Research. In 1927,
E. K. Strong develop two inventories published by Stanford University Press. Strong has
previously worked at the Carnegie Institute of Technology. The Strong Vocational
Interest Blank (SVIB) and The Vocational Interest Blank for Women relied heavily on
empirical justification with items from school subjects, hobbies, amusements as well as

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forced choice preferences for occupations and activities. In 1947, another empirically
based interest instrument was developed by L.L. Thurstone at the Psychometric
Laboratory at the University of Chicago. (Wightwick, 1945)

Most of the early interest inventories were empirically developed and did not have a
coherent theory. Only lately have theorists attempted to develop an integrated
framework for interests. The Vocational Preference Inventory developed by John L.
Holland was to assess personality. Holland (1965) in his first work described six
personality types and environments. He used the terms Realistic (R), Investigative (I),
Artistic (A), Social (S), Enterprising (E), and Conventional (C) as referents. Accordingly,
there is a link between the personality of the individual and the activities of the work
environment. People are more likely to thrive and work productively when there is a
match between the two.

The RIASEC model is hexagonal with Realistic (R) and Investigative (I) on the north end
and Enterprising (E) and Social (S) on the south end. Conventional (C) is located on the
west side while Artistic (A) is located on the east end. The RIASEC types of personality
have a “preference for” or an “aversions against” activities and demands in the work
environment. Holland (1965) in his original work, as well as his other papers (1997, 1998),
popularized the notion that interests were expressions of personality. Waller, Lykken,
and Tellegen (1995), and, Hansen (1984) have expressed doubts about the linkage as the
correlations between the two are quite low. Many have tried to link the two areas using
instruments such as NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R) Costa & McCrae,
1992) or Tellegen’s (1982) Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ).

Roe’s (1956) circular model was developed independently and concurrently with
Holland’s (1985) original work. Her circular mode has eight categories (Science, Outdoor,
Technology, Arts and Entertainments, Service, General Culture, Organization, and
Business). Roe’s fields have a continuum based on responsibility, capacity, and skill. The
categories show a continuum: Professional and managerial 2; Semiprofessional and
small business; 3. Skilled; 4. Semiskilled and finally 5. Unskilled The continuum ranges
from more responsibility to less responsibility.

In 1979, Gati proposed a hierarchical model with two major grouping—soft sciences and
hard sciences. The major demarcation followed Roe’s “toward others” and “not toward
others.” The classification was based on a several steps algorithms with specialization of
occupations occurring with finer discrimination similar to hierarchical clustering.

In 1994, the Strong developed personal interest scales which were described as the
broadest level of interest description (Donnay & Borgen, 1996). These interest-based
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descriptions were similar to personality factors (Harmon, Hansen, Borgen, & Hammer,
1994). Lindley and Borgen (2000) suggested that the four personal styles are related to the
big five factors. Studies by Holland, Johnston, & Asama, 1994; Tokar & Swanson, 1995;
Tokar et. al., 1995 noted the relationships between the two interest themes (social and
enterprising) and the personality variable of extraversion.

Other authors have tried to relate two of the three areas: 1) interest and abilities (Mary
Ainley, 2006), or 2) interests and personality (Lori D. Lindley and Fred H. Borgen, 2000).
The closeness in assumptions of person and environment interactions allowed Holland’s
work to be tested via social cognitive theory. Recently, Hung-Bin Sheu et al. (2010) used
meta-cognitive path analysis to show a definitive relationship between social cognitive
career theory and Holland’s broad occupational themes (RIASEC). They used a 6-
variable version of interest/choice with the categories of Realistic, Investigative, and
Enterprising and a 4-variable version in the model with Artistic, Social, and
Conventional. The best and strongest model suggested that choice/goals were mediated
by self-efficacy and outcome expectations.

As early as 2000, Lubinski proposed integrating individual differences around the areas
of personality, abilities, and interests. As mentioned earlier, Ackerman et al. (1994)
developed a model for integrating personality, interests, and abilities. Armstong et. al.
(2008) formed an integrative model using personality, traits, and interests.

Chapter Summary

This chapter helps to define 6 of the 10 personality traits which are part of the IPS model.
In contrast, how the terms are used in IPS theory with the general historical research
view, the use of each term is clarified. The 6 terms are common in the psychological
literature but each has been defined and redefined over many studies.

The first term, sensory-motor, is a variant of kinesthetic relating to the motor skills of the
individual. Individuals focus on physical activities, concrete objects, and practical
solutions in everyday life. The second personality trait is social which is a product, an
outcome of the individual’s feelings and emotions toward an intended person or object,
usually with the assumption that the intended person is loved, valued, or of societal
importance. The third trait is more cognitive as control is the need to impose structure
through general behavior, planning, and verbal or non-verbal directions. Control
imposes structure while the fourth personality trait of flex attempts to find release from
control and mental sets so that flexible alternatives to problem solutions can be examined.
How this occurs is highly dependent upon the flow of mental energy in the person. When

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the energy is directed inward, the concept is introversion, outward, the concept is
extraversion, and both ways, the concept is ambiversion. The quantitative flow of energy
is usually defined in terms of a drive or motivation. If that motivation is based on
achieving the goal at a high standard, then it is achievement motivation.

The last part of the chapter defined interests as measurement variables associated with
various instruments. Hollands, Strong, Roe, Gati, and others have consistently tried to
associate interests with personality. The associations and broad interrelationships have
resulted in some integration into a unified framework. Lubinski, Armstrong, and
Akerman have proposed firm foundations for theoretical enhancements using
personality, interests, and cognition.

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 Review: Identification of Subgroups

Introduction

This chapter addresses some of the issues involving the identification of subgroups of
people. As noted in Chapter 3, when daily experiences and individual personality,
cognitive thinking patterns, and interests influence problem-solving behavior in such a
manner that groups of people utilize the same mental and behavioral pathways to solve
a problem, then a potentially identifiable subgroup develops. A subgroup, as the name
implies, is a category subsumed by a larger group. Any group can be subdivided into
smaller groups by a defining characteristic such as gender, i.e. male and female.
Therefore, a subgroup can be almost infinitely divided within any group. The assumption
is that the subgroups contain some common characteristics of the major group but also
differ in some ways. In our case, many different attributes are identified as a basis for
grouping and defining subgroups. Some of those attributes are defined as general and
differential problem solvers, introversion/extraversion, and the demographic factors of
ethnicity and culture.

One of the easiest ways to understand subgroups is to examine various known research
models that exist in the literature. These models are identified as unipolar, bipolar, and
multipolar. Most of these models are well-researched and have a plethora of studies that
illustrate correlations and associations with academic problem-solving. We briefly
introduce each model and then discuss models more thoroughly in the next section.

Overview of subgroup models

A single scale that has one end of its continuum defined as better, right, or having more
worth is defined as unipolar and defines a single subgroup. The unipolar end of a
continuum characterizes either ability or preference and assumes a preferred end. This
includes, for example, a high score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) as a reflection
of ability or Kagan’s reflective vs. impulsive (1966) as a reflection of preference. Kagan’s
subscale has two ends- reflective and impulsive. Reflective is assumed to be a preferred
attribute and arguably the scale is assumed to be unipolar,

A continuum that has both ends defined by worth, value, or correctness is defined as
bipolar. One well-known bi-polar model is by Witkin et al. (1977) and is called field
independence and field dependence. Many people consider both ends of the continuum
valuable.

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The last kind of model is labeled as multigroup. The work of Gregorc (1979) has 4
subgroups.; other authors use many more subgroups. For example, the research model
of Sternberg (1997) has 13 subgroups. The Myers-Briggs (1988) has 16 subgroups while
Raymond Cattell’s 16 Personality Factors (1981) has 81 different potential patterns.

Unipolar or one-group model

Certainly, from a historical viewpoint, the unipolar or ability model has the greatest
number of research studies. Many researchers in different camps consider the ability
model to be an “intelligence” model. A unipolar model has a positive end and in the case
of the intelligence, those who score the highest are considered the brightest or gifted.
Using a criterion 130 or greater as a cut point on an IQ test, there is no doubt that there is
a single group characterized as “genius.” Members of that subgroup solve certain types
of problems well. Under timed conditions, power tests are used to select those who solve
problems well in the areas of numbers, words, and spatial activity. Generally, in the
unipolar model, as task difficulty and complexity increase, accuracy and speed of
processing decrease. The assumption is that as the memory load and efficiency
requirements are taxed, there is an accompanying decrease in neural activity in the
prefrontal cortex even for those who have previous experience with the problem. The
subgroup who spend more time processing problems has greater neural activity based
on fMRI studies as they activate multiple areas of the brain. However, oddly enough, the
select group of the brightest and fastest problem solvers may not be the best general
problem solvers, especially when the problems exist outside of their immediate area of
expertise and experience. In World War II, the best code breakers were not the brightest
(general problem solvers) but, instead were the best pattern problem solvers (differential
problem solvers). Another unipolar model that does not incorporate abilities can be seen
in the work of Kagan (1966). Early research by Kagan and Kagan (1970) contrasted the
continuum of reflective vs. impulsive where reflection implied the examination of
alternative solutions in problem solving and impulsive was a bee-line for a single
convergent response. Empirical data collected on the two constructs definitely suggested
positive significant relationships for reflective thinking in the areas of mathematics,
reading, statistics, and visual perceptive tasks. The single group or subgroup was a good
predictor of ability.

Bipolar or two-group models

Research by Witkin and Goodenough (1981) reflected a bipolar construct termed field
independence and field dependence. Earlier work by Witkin et al. suggested that field-

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independent people who were suspended in space could maintain their directionality in
space independent of body position. Field-dependent people were more inclined to judge
spatial relationships via their body position. In later studies, Witkin’s theorized that the
ends of a continuum suggested that people designated as field independent were able to
better extract visual figures from a background pattern. An alternate test called the
Embedded Figures Tests (EFT) was developed to identify two groups of people called
field independent and field dependent. The EFT is timed; requires spatial rotation, and
uses the process of dis-embedding, an analytic technique to separate figures from ground.
The fact that field-independent people process information faster than field-dependent
people is well-known as a measurement speed factor that has been found many times.
Many research studies in the literature do not factor out the speed factor and sometimes
reach erroneous conclusions. Many studies suggest that field independence is associated
with higher academic achievement as well as domain-specific scores in areas such as
mathematics and engineering. In general, according to literature studies, field-
dependent people are more likely to favor social relationships.

When considering the bipolar continuum, both ends are supposedly valued; however,
field independence is given more weight in academic performance since a higher score
signifies faster processing, better perceptual analytic ability, and the ability to dis-embed.
For our research, we adopted a variant of the EFT which was more age appropriate and
useful across all age groups from age 5 through 77. Our assessment instrument is called
the Embedded Designs test and was originally adapted from one of Witkin’s colleagues
(‘Kit of Selected Distractions’ by S. A. Karp, 1962). Our embedded designs test requires
dis-embedding but does not have the difficulty level of spatial rotation and dis-
embedding required by the EFT. The results from these instruments were published in
the American Educational Research Association conference proceeding of 2002
(DeNovellis and Dehler).
Multiple group models

Gregorc’s model

Multiple group models as the name implies are designed to identify more than 2
subgroups of people. An example of the multi-subgroup model was developed by the
research of Gregorc (1979). Using time and space, Gregorc defined 4 cognitive style
subgroups that he called abstract random, concrete sequential, abstract sequential, and
concrete random. How these terms are defined varies; however, for Gregorc, the term
‘abstract’ connotes those who do not need to experience the information but can find
common elements by decoding written, verbal, and imagery content. Concrete refers to
those children who learn through hands-on experience. A trial and error approach to

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problem-solving is denoted as random while approaching a problem by having a goal in
mind is called sequential. If these subgroups have any validity, then there should be
some relationship with academic achievement. With younger age children, O’Brien
(1991), using Gregor’s terminology, found a greater association between higher grade
point averages and those who process information in a concrete sequential manner. As a
generalization, younger children with concrete sequential orientation had better overall
academic achievement, regardless of the type of problem or environment. Of the 4
subgroups identified, concrete sequential performed better in academic situations at the
high and middle school level (a place where the problems presented by teachers often
require answers which are analyzed in a concrete and sequential manner----our
assumption).

In another study at the college level, abstract students performed better in academics
(O’Brien, 1994). Contrasting abstract random with abstract sequential, abstract sequential
had better overall performance (Ross and Shultz, 1999). These results were contested in
other studies. Miller (2005) suggested that concrete random students did better than
concrete sequential although the type of problem was not given. In IPS theory, both
concrete and abstract sequential students can be either general or differential problem
solvers. The speed of processing on timed tests is a major contributor to both groups.
Gregorc’s model is a good example of using somewhat independent subgroups. When
subgroups are independent, there is a greater research tendency to link a specified group
with the academic assessment.

Many researchers attempt to establish the “independence” of subgroups to compare

attributes and use statistical analysis. The statistical independence model is appropriate
for both short-term and long-term research of independent groups. When randomness
is introduced, the error is equally distributed.

In contrast to the independent method of subgroup research, there are just as many
research models for working with non-random, integrative, and interdependent
subgroups as our 36 subgroups. Profile analysis of interdependent subgroups is
appropriate for classification models where the independence of subgroups has not been
established. Profile analysis uses descriptive distance methods to separate
interdependent groups, a methodology similar to the biological classification of
chromosomes, DNA, and other blood-related analyses.

Results that come from assessing different levels of education (high school, middle
school, and college) and which have different kinds of problems are likely to produce
mixed results. True differences, along with sampling errors, which exist at different

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developmental levels, are likely to extract individual differences that represent different
modes of information processing for different types of problems.

Sternberg’s Model

In Robert Sternberg’s research, there are 13 different subgroups, many of which are
interdependent. The first five subgroups representing Type I are labeled as legislative,
judicial, global, liberal, and hierarchical; the next 4 representing Type II are conservative,
monarchic, local, and executive; and the last 4 subgroups representing Type III are
different combinations of Type I and Type II These four subgroups are labeled as internal,
external, anarchic and oligarchic.

According to Zhang (2008), Robert Sternberg’s Model has constantly evolved since he
developed his Triarchic Theory in the 1980s. As the number of subgroups increases, there
is usually more interdependence which causes other researchers to regroup and re-
classify the subgroups so each can be researched as an independent group. In Fang’s
regrouping, the 13 subgroups emphasize two themes (structure and cognitive
complexity) which are dominant attributes found in the research literature. Structure,
according to Fang, is a primary variable that has shown a positive relationship to
academic achievement, particularly in traditional environments. Type I manifest
characteristics of the lower structure and lower cognitive complexity while Type II
displays high structure and cognitive simplicity. The characteristics of Type III will vary
depending on the problem characteristics. Cognitive complexity increases as individuals
expand their knowledge base related to career and daily decisions. Sternberg’s models
which were originally designated as thinking or intellectual styles have also the capacity
to incorporate emotions.

Myers Briggs Type Indicator

The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) has 16 subgroups. Using a combination of four
bi-polar continuums (thinking feeling; introversion, extraversion, sensing, intuition; and
judging and perception), the instrument is used to assign people to subgroups based on
the strengths of multiple responses on contrasting subscales. The extremes (7.5 percent
in each tail of the normal distribution) of each bipolar scale are more likely to represent
an independent subgroup. Based on the scoring method of the MBTI, a person who scores
higher on (Extraversion, Sensing Feeling, and Judging) is assigned to be assigned to the
subgroup of ESFJ. The attributes of the subgroup are established from the attributes of
each of the subscales (E, I, S, N, T, F, J, P) used to assign a person to that group.

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Based on Jung’s theory of psychological type as interpreted by Isabell Briggs-Myers, the
instrument has a long and varied history as seen from the numerous research articles
published. The research of the instruments has established its value and contributions to
the literature. One of the most notable early articles castigated the construction of the
instrument (reliability, validity), as well as its basic premises (Pittenger, 1993). According
to Pittenger, despite having face validity, the MBTI was originally dropped by many
prestigious groups including the US Army and the Educational testing service.
However, as of this time, the tremendous amount of research reported on the instrument
has given it widespread and momentous use.
.
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16 PF)

The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattel et al., 1970), which was developed
over several decades, is a self-report instrument that measures 16 primary traits. This
group of primary factors originally came from the factor analysis of multiple clusters of
traits underlying normal personality. Currently, the 16 primary traits are organized into
3 secondary global traits which are identified by individual factors. The secondary
groups are identified on a bipolar continuum: Extraversion vs. Introversion, Receptivity
vs Tough-Mindedness, and Self-controlled vs. Unrestrained. The primary factors which
make up the global factors are E/I (warmth, Liveliness, Social Boldness, Forthrightness,
and Affiliation); Receptivity vs. Tough-Mindedness (Abstractness, Openness, Sensitivity,
and Warmth), and Self-Control (Seriousness, Groundedness, Perfectionism, and Rule
Conscientiousness.

The 16 PF Questionnaire has 81 different profile patterns as interpreted by Samuel Krug

(1981) of the Institute of Personality and Ability Testing. Each profile pattern, in IPS
theory, represents a subgroup. Because the 16PF was developed over a long period by a
distinguished group of researchers and used by a group of select professionals, the
number of subgroups identified by profile analysis was not questioned. Each of the
profiles identified by Krug is accompanied by a short description related to profile
interpretation.

Issues related to the measurement of subgroups

First, let us answer a very difficult question. Are there measurable subgroups of people
who solve problems in different ways? That depends upon what assumptions are used
to answer the question and how one attempts to objectify the answer. For the greatest
skeptics, the answer is No! Such persons could argue (ad nauseum) tenets underlying
differences in cut points on a single continuum -extraversion, ambiversion, and

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introversion and then use the perennial arguments that measurement subgroups could
only be identified by modes within a universal distribution (Boltz, 1972). At the very
beginning of this book, our thesis indicated that the identification of subgroups is based
on a descriptive system that includes numbers, theory, and fuzzy logic as a method of
quantification. Also, as noted in Chapter Two, because surface characteristics vary
substantially from one person to another, one cannot classify an individual into a
subgroup in two very distinct situations. 1. A person does not want to be classified into
a subgroup so purposely falsifies responses on questionnaires. 2. An individual s has
multiple layers which interfere with surface characteristics and that person is unaware of
their true response pattern.

The ability to quantify a subgroup using numbers revolves around reliability, validity,
and measurement techniques. We have chosen distance measurements, fuzzy models,
and applied statistical methods as a method of quantification and noted that classification
(ability to assign a person to a subgroup) is a very difficult process that only has validity
based on theory, a prior and posterior probabilities, as well as item and subscale response
patterns. In our model, all people are different from our subgroup (individual differences).
Why? The subgroup is an “ideal composite” established on a theoretical and empirical
basis. The assumption is that having characteristics in common with an identified
subgroup provides information to and about the individual. Likewise, knowing how one
is different from the subgroup as identified by distance measures gives information about
the error, misclassification, and individual characteristics. Are there acceptable levels of
error in classification for being nearest to a subgroup.? All measurement theory is based
on error. For some researchers, the measurement error is too great, for others not so
much.

Since one of our principal tenets is built around speed of processing, the issues related to
timed and untimed situations are paramount in classification. In IPS theory, time tests
and threat situations, regardless of content separate people into groups. In other words,
there exists a general measurement speed factor that is found in every timed situation
involving a cross-section of society. General problem solvers who have exceptional
memories and who are quicker processors of familiar information should score higher on
timed tests. Differential or general problem solvers who tend to process many different
alternatives and those who are slower in reaching a convergent solution often score lower
on timed tests unless they have learned how to compensate by strategies, practice, and
time on task. In many research models, time is a significant factor in activities involving
academic achievement, especially when standardized achievement tests are used. Many
studies use subgroups and academic achievement scores as a standard of comparison or
correlations from those groups in determining value or worth.

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 Our 36 subgroups

The IPS system of measurement has 36 subgroups. The separation between each of the
subgroups is pictured by a non-metric system in Picture 8 below. Since the number of
groups may seem overwhelming, a taxonomic conceptual framework was provided in
Chapter 3. The Category Framework provides an overview and a methodology for
organizing the process. The Category Framework is built on the assumption that all of
us have strengths in multiple areas of problem-solving. At different periods of our life,
the combination of strengths helps in solving problems in one area as opposed to another.
Likewise, these problem-solving strengths lead to a career choice and life's work in
certain vocations.

In the figure below labeled Picture 5, there are 36 subgroups. Notice how certain
subgroups are closely related to dominant characteristics of individual variables within
the 4 processing groups (speed, career; etc.). Some subgroups appear to be separated by
a greater distance.

Picture 5: 36 Subgroups

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 Overlay of cognition (C1-C2), speed of process (S1-S4),
personality (P1-P6), and interests (CR1-C16), and the 36 subgroups

Subgroups within subgroups

Using the statistical methodology of canonical correspondence analysis, the next picture
shows how, in our model, subgroups exist within subgroups. In our integrative system,
pairs of subscales and model characteristics work in opposition and conjunction with
one another (extraversion, introversion, perceptual accuracy and global processing,
conceptual and motor, analysis and social, flex and control). The scores for the picture
come from the standard scores derived from the Table of 36 subgroups. The Table
contains columns across the top such as Extraversion, Conceptual, Motor, Analytic and
Social. Each column is converted to a word designation where a high standard score on
analysis is termed Analytic, a low score is termed Social and an intermediate standard
score (48-54) is designated as Analytic Social. These measurement profile subgroups are
displayed on a two-dimensional graph as A; S; or AS. In Picture 6, those higher in
analysis (A) are in the upper left quadrant, those dominant in social (S) are in the upper
right, and those sharing in the lower left quadrant (AS). In essence, the table represents
three distinct measurement subgroups. The subgroup of people who have a dominant
characteristic of Analysis when solving problems is different and separate from the
subgroup of people who approach the solving of problems in a social manner. Likewise,
there is even a third subgroup of people who are mixtures of both approaches. If
neurological pathways of the brain work both in opposition and similarity due to
differences in stored memory, then these competitive differences should be evident in
dominant approaches to solving a problem.

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Picture 6: Analytic (A), Social (S), and Analytic Social (AS)

In Picture 7 below, those higher on the conceptual subscale (Cn or Con) are in lower left
quadrant; those dominant in motor skills (Mt or Mot) are in the lower right; and those
sharing the same orientation of are straddling the upper quadrant (CM).

\
Picture 7: Motor (Mot); Conceptual (Con); and CM

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Picture 8: Centroid for Motor; Conceptual; CM

Picture 8 plots each profile and shows the location of the centroid for each of the three
groups conceptual Con, motor-Mot, and an average score on both conceptual and motor
(CM). There are outliers; individual points on the extremes of the centroid.

Summary

The information in this review provides a basis to conceptualize issues associated with
the classification of subgroups. The 36 problem-solving subgroups developed and
identified in this book are interdependent by definition. However, a classification system
by distance methods is possible, when prior information, statistical analysis, and theory
are available. The descriptive profiles represent ideal composites, not real people. The
subgroup composites are similar in many ways to those identified by the 16PF, and other
similar profile mapping methods.

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Appendix A

Book references

1 Abott, E. A. (1884). Flatland. A Romance of Many Dimensions. London: Seely and

Co.
2 Ackerman, P. L. (1994). Intelligence, attention, and learning: Maximal and typical
performance. In D. K. Detterman (Ed.), Current topics in human intelligence. Vol. 4:
Theories of intelligence (pp. 1-27). Norwood, NJ: Ablex
3 Ainley, M. (2006). Connecting with Learning: Motivation: Affect and Cognition in
Interest Processes. Educational Psychology Review 18(4):391-405. DOI: 10.1007/s10648-
006-9033-0
4 Albert, M. L. (1973). A simple test of visual neglect. Neurology, 23,658-664.
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 Appendix B

Descriptions of 36 Cognitive, Interest, and Personality Subgroups

Subgroup descriptions represent groups of people and do not describe any single
individual! In research, these subgroups are often called reference groups as each is
compiled from data and contains reference vectors as a means of locating the centroid of
the multivariate distribution. Reference groups are “ideal composites,” a taxonomic
classification based on the Category Framework for describing subgroups of people. An
“Ideal composite” is a classification system used in a manner similar to other
classification systems developed by biologists. That is, an “ideal composite” should be
conceived as a class objects such as trees. There are many different types of trees- oak
trees, maple trees, redwood trees, etc. The general concept of a tree is neither unique nor
specific. Only by adding a label, the general category becomes more specific. The
category of oak trees is more specific than a tree. For example, an oak tree in your yard
has even greater specificity as you can go out and touch it. Ideal composites have greater
specificity then comparisons to amorphous groups but less specificity than an actual
description of a real entity.

The information about the concepts contained in each subgroup can be found in the book
entitled “Problem Solving: The Integration of Personality, Cognition and Interests
Subgroups around Verbal, Numerical, and Spatial Problems Using Machine Learning.”
One should read either this book or the synopsis of the book so as to understand the
research implications of the 36 subgroups. The descriptions are written specifically for
Integrative Problem-Solving System (IPS).

The first 18 subgroups emphasized extroversion, and the next 18 subgroups emphasize
introversion. In the research book, there are explanations of how different groups of
people with different patterns of personality, interest and spatial scores solve everyday
problems. The two major patterns represent the General Problem Solver and the
Differential Problem Solver. Both groups of problem solvers contribute greatly to society
by solving similar and different kinds of problems. There are no restrictions on problem-
solving as people’s motivation, skill, and experience can change over a lifetime. By
definition, a General Problem Solver can become a Differential Problem Solver and a
Differential Problem Solver can become a General Problem Solver. Both groups solve
numeric, verbal, and spatial problems at home, school, and work. The terms are just used
as a placeholder to help in the classification process.

307
Both groups of problem solvers, General and Differential, have many things in common
and many differences. Often times for both groups, the greatest difference between the
problem-solving approach to numeric, spatial, and verbal problems is found in the
educational background of the first five years of life. After five years of age, experience,
exposure, interest, and many different social factors often contribute to a separation
between subgroups. For us, the commonalities and differences are understood in terms
of speed of processing, cognitive characteristics, interests, as well eight different
subscales of measurements labelled as extraversion/introversion, conception, sensory-
motor, social, analytical, cognitive flex, and control.

The many different kinds of tables that precede each subgroup labelled from 1 to 36 are
computer-based categories that help differentiate the complexities involved in
categorization. The tables represent interests, personality, cognition, perceptual speed,
as well as the ten concepts used to describe the subgroup. The tables found before each
subgroup description are patterns that are analyzed to correctly classify an individual to
an appropriate subgroup. The major tenet that guides the construction of a subgroup is
that the variation with an area such cognition, perceptual speed, personality or interests
is so great, that categorization is dependent upon a designated level and pattern.

As a simple example, consider there are various ways that a single person might score on
a test of cognition about verbal, numerical, and spatial problems. Let a plus denote better
than average, an N or A designate average, and a minus be “less than average.” A person
who scores greater than average (a single standard deviation above the mean) on all three
types of problems has different experiences in school than a person who scores less than
average (a single standard deviation below the mean). Each of these differences is
denoted by levels (A-G).

Therefore, a person’s taxonomic classification in an appropriate subgroup (1 through 36)

is influenced by the pattern of interests, personality (our category of 10 concepts, and
perceptual speed (A-G). One important assumption is that every person is different from
the nearest subgroup in meaningful ways.

Reference subgroups (1-36) are used mainly for research purposes. The validity of
reference subgroups can be ascertained by taking the scores of all people who are
categorized as belonging to a subgroup and then determining the commonality which
exists within that group. Because of large sampling variations, the differences within a
group could be greater than the differences between a group; thereby causing
consternation about the validity of the subgroup. In such cases, the researcher must be
careful to follow the criteria used to set the parameters of classifying members of the
subgroup. Further subdivisions occur via demographic characteristics such as age, etc.
308
The set of scores from a single individual can be compared to scores from many different
subgroups using machine learning. The differences are interpreted by a researcher,
counselor, vocationally trained person, or psychologist. What becomes important is not
the subgroup reference description but how any individual scores differently than the
reference subgroup.

Providing an individual with information from his or her subgroup involves several
assumptions. The first assumption which may or may not hold true is that scoring in a
similar pattern to an ideal composite provides information about both individual and the
ideal composite. The second is that differences in scores reflect reliable and valid
differences in individual responses. Both assumptions must be continually tested.

309
310
General Problem Solver-1
This pattern (Level A) is for individuals
with a higher general problem-solving
score and more positive scores on verbal,
number, and spatial problems. These
scores are bolstered by a high score on
the conception and cognitive flexibility.
Making up about five percent of the
general population, these individuals
can be called "the motivator
Identifiers
How are people in this subgroup
characterized? Generally, they are
considered responsive, affectionate, and
sentimental. They emphasize social
interests in the home, with the family,
and at work (88). Their friends regard
them as generally friendly, outgoing,
adventurous, and occasionally
intrusive."
This group of people likes to meet and
talk with their friends (88). They are very
social being, outgoing, and easy to get to
know (95).
These individuals are generally visually-
oriented. They have good powers of
observation and watch others closely.
For example, these folks are good at
remembering names and faces. They are
also sensitive to verbal and non-verbal
cues from other people. They are quick
to notice a change in facial expression or
a change in the pitch of the voice. Quite
often they gather too much information
about people and have some difficulty
determining what is important.
Problem Solving
311
How does a person in this subgroup
solve everyday problems which are
verbal, numerical, or spatial? When
approaching a problem, they use an
intuitive, random approach (65).
Sometimes this approach Is combined
with a
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the
percentage of people in this group who
agree with the statement. Interpret your
scores relative to the pattern of the
subgroup.
trial and error approach. After becoming
familiar with a problem, they either fit
the problem into their previous
experience (59) or try to invent a new
way of doing things.
In problem-solving situations, these
individual works in bursts of speed
powered by enthusiasm, especially in an
area of interest. They may spend an
inordinate amount of time on problems
that they like. When interacting with
others in a problem-solving situation,
they often jump to conclusions or even
make errors of fact because they do not
like to take time for too much precision.
Others in a group may follow their
intuitive notions initially but later as the
problem becomes more focused, others
follow a more methodical approach
Individuals in this group enjoy learning
a new skill, solving a new problem, and
using it. Often, one finds this individual
doing new things well.
Career
The career scores paint a picture of one
who is less interested in mechanical and
realistic occupations. These individuals
have a good chance of ending up in
applied vocations like teaching, scientific
research, management, medical areas, or
basic administration. Other areas of
occupational interest might include
judicial service and legal work,
behavioral science, life science, mining
and petroleum engineering, health care
services, and building services
In terms of a vocation, this person find
his forte in guidance, counseling,
nursing, advertising and marketing,
speech therapy, psychology, clinical
psychology, medical doctors, social
workers, graduate school teachers,
school principals, high school teachers,
education, college professors, judges,
playground directors, public health
officers, rehabilitation workers, director
of welfare agencies, foreign missionaries,
world peace organizers, human resource
managers, writers, insurance sales,
personnel managers, and ministers.
Usually, these individuals get other
people interested in their current
activities. They try to understand both
the world in which they live and the
people in it. This understanding allows
them to win support for the kind of
projects in which they are engaged.
This pattern is more prevalent in women
although quite a few men show their
strengths in literary and musical
endeavors. The contact personality in
older adults is less likely to show areas of
compensation suggesting more positive
experiences through childhood and early
312
adulthood. Perception is average and
the tendency to spend time analyzing is
average.
Differential Problem Solver
For the differential problem solver (Level
C), the pattern of problem-solving scores
is in the average range. The differential
problem solver is motivated by interest
patterns which are quite varied. His or
her life is dominated by the desire to help
others. Achieving personal goals is a
means to an end; the end is to apply
social and interpersonal skills in social
situations. At times, the tendency to be
impulsive dominates. Emotions and
feelings may be quite evident. Hence the
phrase, he or she wears their emotions on
a sleeve. The need for order and
organization is achieved later in life as
goal orientations are more associated
with making a living.
The tendency to leave tasks unfinished is
much more evident in the differential
problem solver. Their feelings and
impulsivity often overwhelm them.
Often they are more likely to react to
their feelings which causes them to move
to another task leaving the present task
undone
The career theme is strong for the
differential problem solver. He or she is
less likely to be a truck driver, operate
machinery, or applied one talent to
plumbing. Instead, creating literary
works, writing music, or helping others
is the key to success.
Differential Problem Solvers with less
computational interests and greater
verbal skills may score in the average
range or lower for spatial acumen. The
greater emphasis on verbal or words
may be applied in many different areas
including sales, group endeavors, and
jingoism. During the younger years, the
search or application of primary skills
can be quite confusing as a career field is
not always evident. In group problem
solving, this individual is process-
oriented, focusing on how others in the
group solve problems. There is evidence
of a tendency to dominate verbally
especially when ideas, values, and
interests are close to one’s heart
Differential problem solvers (Levels F, G)
with very difficult early life experiences
might show all kinds of acting-out
behaviors that pose problems for parents
and those in authority. When there is not
a match between environmental
pressures from home, family, church, or
sibling, confusion and a lack of goal
orientation results. In such cases, there is
a tendency to meet adversity with
solemnness and passivity. Stress and
environmental pressures can lead to all
different kinds of compensation
including the use of skillful ways of
circumventing conventional rules and
traditions
. older years, temper is held in check but
Potential Obstacles to Solving
Problems
Obstacles to solving problems for these
folks come in many different forms. For
these individuals, the fit between work
and preferences is of paramount
importance. Many problems result if
these people are placed in a job that is too
restrictive.
313
Being socially concerned, individuals in
this subgroup are eager to engage in
problems that assist other people.
However, value issues can be a gigantic
obstacle to the solution of everyday
problems.
These individuals have to be especially
cautious to not undertake more
responsibilities than they can handle.
Often, their "eyes may be bigger than
their stomach," especially where projects
are concerned. If they are not attentive,
active inspiration and initiative will
deteriorate in a lot of half-done jobs.
Thus, in such cases, they may appear
unstable, undependable, and even fickle.
One of the greatest problems for these
individuals comes from conflicts
resulting from controlling people. These
folks are Inclined to resist direct
authority and control and the people
who use it. They react better to requests
for help and assistance.
As a youngster, these folks became angry
and showed their anger in several
volatile ways. As they matured in a
professional capacity, they became
slower to take offense or anger. In their
results in passive resistance.
One of the major problems for this
subgroup is the need to achieve. They
have the potential for leadership. It is
achieving that potential which causes
problems. Sometimes a lack of self-
confidence makes them an
underachiever. They may not undertake
some problem which is encountered.
Some view this subgroup as lacking the
desire or being too lackadaisical, while
others note their lack of initiative. This is
especially true when they have 4.
underachieved. Usually, these people are
very aggressive and dominant in
leadership qualities. They decide on their 5.
true identity.
A subgroup of this general typology
tends to mobilize individuals for less 6.
than humanitarian reasons. They tend to
use their unique ability to analyze 7.
situations for more personal ends. Such
a person is very successful in many
8.
activities that need management ability
with less than noble ends. These
individuals are competitive, and this
competitiveness shows itself in several 9.
different ways, especially in the
manipulation of other people for the sake
of winning. 1.
2.
Parameters: Pattern 1 Managers
1. Management Identity: Trends show
that Non-Management and
Entrepreneurial identity is average or 3.
high. Senior Management Identity is
low except when an entrepreneur or
executive of the individual business.
Greater numbers are middle or first-
level managers.
2. Task Orientation Versus People
Orientation: Greater numbers in
management activities involve 4.
people or people-related activities.
Can manage where expertise is
involved.
3. Leadership: Shows greater
management leadership for diverse 5.
and diffuse situations. Better
leadership where creativity is
involved. Task leadership is good
where expertise is involved.
Problem-Solving Orientation:
Trends for these managers show
adaptability, less structure, and more
receptivity.
Independence in Decision-Making:
Varies with the individual but with
experience will consult others. Can
be stubborn about value issues.
Efficiency Index: Scores higher on
people relative to tasks.
Assessment of Social, Practical, and
Complex Situations: Better with
social, complex, and creative.
Information Processing: Logical,
Analytical scores generally average
5.5 with spatial higher for
mechanically oriented people.
Sales Management: Usually is less
direct and more indirect.
Pattern 1: General Parameters
Age: 26-49.
General Preferences: Prefers
management in educational, social,
health-related, therapeutic, or
religious vocations.
Preferred Roles or Activities: Prefers
management activities involving
social, aesthetic, and religious
expressions including individual or
group projects related to individual
interests. Usually performs in a
service role for an organization or
group.
Avoids: Avoids routine or humdrum
activities; avoids work involving
carpentry or building unless it is
creative; avoids manual labor if
possible.
Achievement-Creativity: Creative
and imaginative. Strives to achieve.

314
6. Self-Perceptions: Independent, 12. Motivating Factors: Recognition,
creative, original, self-accepting, social affiliation, approval, and being
impulsive, moody, cheerful, sociable, socially motivated.
helpful, concerned, self-interested, 13. Conceptual Versus Perceptual Motor
democratic, spontaneous, and Dominance: Conceptual.
emotional. 14. Sensory Modality Preference:
7. Other's Perceptions: Impractical, Auditory, and visual.
sentimental, unruly, versatile, 15. Automatization: Strong.
intriguing, and adaptable. 16. Constricted Versus Flexible Control:
8. Perceptions: 68% are Field Flexible control.
Dependent. 17. Risk-Taking Versus Cautious: Risk-
9. Aptitude: Special abilities and taking.
intelligence. Scores higher on verbal, 18. Reflective Versus Impulsive: Prone to
clerical, and form perceptions; latent act impulsively.
mathematical aptitude. IQ range is 19. Leveling Versus Sharpening:
90-130. Leveling.
10. Preferred Style of Learning: Learns 20. Cognitive Complexity versus
by doing and discussing, social Simplicity: Cognitive complex I ty.
discourse, group interaction, oral 21. Compartmentalizing: Open system.
communication, and modeling. 22. The breadth of Categorization:
11. Personality: Reduces stress by Broadly categorizes.
increasing social relationships and 23. Ego-Orientation: Other-oriented,
conforming. Defends self by "open then individualistic.
rebuttal", self-analysis, and
submissive behavior; avoids
confrontation. Can be influenced by
higher-level managers.

315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
General Problem Solver-9
This pattern represents a subgroup of
individuals with a higher general
problem-solving score and more positive
scores on verbal, number, and spatial
problems. These scores are bolstered by
a high score on cognitive flexibility. All
scores in this subgroup suggest an
applied person who is more extroverted,
and very reliant on motor skills and goal
orientation.
Identifiers
People in this subgroup are resourceful,
energetic, businesslike, and analytical.
With a sincere desire to make the
impossible possible, they try to succeed
where others have failed. Found in
about seven percent of the population,
these individuals can handle difficult
assignments and people of all kinds.
One obvious attribute of these
individuals is their combination of
preferences. In their public life, they are
conservative yet spontaneous, preferring
to plan only important things. However,
contrary to this pattern, he or she wants
everything in their job to be well thought
out. They want to spend time directing
their energies appropriately for the
fulfillment of their life. They do not want
people to think that they are not
competent. So, they want to appear
methodical in the way each approaches
work. However, they are not methodical
in their approach to problems. Instead,
they are more likely to be unorthodox,
examining many different kinds of
alternatives and missing details.
331
Problem Solving
Being extroverted (78), they work on a
variety of tasks, spending a lot of time
moving from one task to another.
However, they do
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the
percentage of people in this group who
agree with the statement. Interpret your
scores relative to the pattern of the
subgroup.
not like to spend long amounts of time
working individually on a single task.
This may pose a problem for them,
especially if that attribute is needed in
work or a project. These individual likes
to stick to the known facts when solving
problems (62). They approach a problem
by relating most things to their past
perceptions and experiences. They
prefer to use their previous experience as
a springboard for their current decisions.
These folks approach problems from a
task perspective. They enjoy everyday
problems, finding quick solutions, and
then moving on to a new problem. Since
they get bored easily, a new and different
task is always welcomed.
In a group problem-solving situation,
they focus more on the problem and how
to get it solved. They can be resistant to
solving some problems, particularly if
they do not agree with the solution.
Career
The career scores paint a picture of one
who is more interested in mechanical
and realistic occupations. There is a
preference for analyzing process
mechanisms related to goal orientation
and success. Their fortune is found in
many different areas, especially in
business, education, administration,
banking, real estate, and entrepreneurial
enterprises.
This person places more emphasis on
letting events be as they may be. They
may be an artesian as he or she strives to
make an object in the environment a
perfection of reality. Perception is strong
as is the appreciation of things in the
environment. There is less emphasis on
control.
Often, these people like the outdoors.
They might or might not like sports;
however, they probably tried some
athletic endeavors in their early years.
A young person often likes crafts and
other kinds of work that need hands-on
experience. As this person matures, he or
she does well in real estate, personnel
work, and jobs requiring social skills.
Other areas of possible occupational
interest include bookkeeping,
pharmacist, mathematical analysis,
production record work, automobile
service work, farming, navigation,
mechanics, cosmetology, purchasing,
traffic management, police work,
business executive, mid-level
administration, and retail store
management.
332
Differential Problem Solving
For the differential problem solver, the
pattern of problem-solving scores is in
the average range. The differential
problem solver is motivated more by
interest patterns which are quite diverse.
His or her life is dominated by the desire
to achieve specific goals related to
current interests. Achieving personal
goals is a means to an end; the end is to
dominate and conquer whatever. At
times, the tendency to be impulsive is
pervasive. Emotions and feelings are
hidden under the veneer of stability
The career theme is strong for the
differential problem solver. He or she
can be in diverse areas of construction,
the food industry, or small
entrepreneurial businesses. This person
may be a truck driver, operate
machinery, or apply one talent to
plumbing. However, if any one of those
careers becomes the current obsession,
the desire to achieve is overwhelming.
Differential Problem Solvers with more
computational interests and greater
verbal skills may score in the average
range or high for spatial acumen. This
person is more of a risk-taker. The
greater emphasis on verbal or words
may be applied in many different areas
including sales, group endeavors, and
advertising. While a greater interest in
computation can lead to a career in
computers or software design. During
the younger years, the search or
application of primary skills can be quite
confusing as a career field is not always
evident. In group problem solving, this
individual is process-oriented, focusing
on how others in the group solve
problems. There is evidence of a
tendency to dominate verbally especially
when ideas, values, and interests are
close to one’s heart.
occasional explosive temper, may cause
them some unnecessary problems. These
people need a partner who is very
sensitive to the individual needs of other
people to give them insight into
situations where they may be trampling
on personal feelings.

Differential problem solvers with very Parameters: Management Pattern 9

difficult early life experiences might 1. Management Identity: Trends
show all kinds of different behaviors show that Non-Management,
which pose problems for parents and Entrepreneurial, or Middle
those in authority. When there is not a Management Identity Is average
match between environmental pressures or high. Senior Management
from home, family, church, or sibling, Identity Is low except when the
confusion and a lack of goal orientation head of his own business is an
results. In such cases, there is a tendency Entrepreneur. Greater numbers
to meet adversity with solemnness, are middle or first-level
isolation, and passivity. Stress and managers.
environmental pressures can lead to all 2. Task Orientation Versus People
different kinds of compensation Orientation: Greater numbers in
including the use of skillful ways of management activities Involving
circumventing conventional rules and tasks. Can manage where the
traditions. motor or mechanical expertise is
Potential Obstacles to Problem Solving involved.
One characteristic of these individuals is 3. Leadership: Shows greater
their slightly domineering manner. They management leadership for tasks,
may, on occasion, dominate other and occasional creativity. Task
individuals, particularly those who are leadership is good where
less socially inclined. Often, they have expertise is involved.
great faith in their ability to effect a 4. Problem-Solving Orientation:
solution in the real world. So, they feel at Trends for these managers show
ease in structuring situations for other adaptability, less structure, and
persons. more receptivity.
Problems arise when they view other 5. Independence in Decision-
individuals as less capable than Making: Varies with the
themselves. In those instances, they are individual but will consult others
too harsh with those who look at the with experience. Can be stubborn
world with more sympathy and as a middle manager when direct
understanding. This, coupled with their
333
 experience or expertise is 5. Achievement-Creativity:
involved. Achieves primarily in technical
6. Efficiency Index: Scores higher and administrative areas;
on tasks. identifies with material
7. Assessment of Social, Practical, possessions. Can apply ideas
and Complex Situations: Better better than create them.
with practical and areas of 6. Self-Perceptions: Masculine,
complexity if direct experience is dominant, under-achieving
involved. (academically), conservative,
8. Information Processing: Logical, stable, and self-accepting.
Analytical scores generally Perceives self as practical-
average 7.5 with spatial scores minded, cheerful, and making a
higher for mechanically inclined. good impression.
9. Sales Management: Usually is 7. Other's Perceptions: Rate him or
more direct. her as unsure, cheerful,
Pattern 9: General Parameters: independent, and preferring
1. Age: 26-49. simple to complex outlook.
2. General Preferences: Prefers 8. Perceptions: Is more of a
management in economic and divergent thinker. Sees the world
conventional values. Less from an Individual standpoint
preference for aesthetic and and is inflexible in readjusting
religious but can do clerical and adaptive level (stereotypical and
computational tasks. unoriginal); subject to position-
3. Preferred Roles or Activities influence (constricted). Unable to
Prefers activities involving reorganize well.
administration, business, and 9. Aptitude: Special abilities and
conventional trades. Some intelligence. Higher scores on
evidence suggests a preference for clerical and form perceptions;
subordinate-supervisor roles. latent mathematical aptitude. IQ
Prefers independent situations range is 90-130.
which are not social so he or she 10. Preferred Style of learning:
can work. Learns by doing and discussion,
4. Avoids Social situations requiring prefers a lecture, and assignments
independent expression such as with the open-ended learning
personalized and artistic roles. approach.
Avoids confining situations and 11. Personality: Reduces stress by
problems. Also avoids limiting social relationships, and
intellectualism, artistic social defends self by "open rebuttal" or
sensitivity, and skill. reason. Maintains self-control by
being understanding and self-
334
 accepting. Dislikes are put in a 16. Constricted Versus Flexible
situation where the contingencies Control: Constricted.
involved cannot be involved. 17. Risk-Taking Versus Cautious:
Expresses life succinctly, is not Cautious Risk-taking.
rule-oriented, and lacks 18. Reflective Versus Impulsive:
conformity to cultural norms and Prone to act impulsively at times.
values. 19. Leveling Versus Sharpening:
12. Motivating Factors: Management Sharpening.
recognition for special abilities, 20. Cognitive Complexity versus
approval, and special identity. Simplicity: Cognitively direct.
13. Conceptual Versus Perceptual 21. Compartmentalizing: Some
Motor Dominance: Conceptual. compartmentalizing.
14. Sensory Modality Preference: 22. The breadth of Categorization:
Auditory, and visual. Narrowly categorizes.
15. Automatization: Intermediate. 23. Ego-Orientation: Individualistic,
some group.

335
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General Problem Solver-19
This pattern represents a subgroup of
individuals with a higher general
problem-solving score and more positive
scores on verbal, number, and spatial
problems. These scores are bolstered by
a high score on conception and cognitive
flexibility. All scores suggest a quiet,
creative person who is more introverted,
quiet, and affiliative.
Identifiers
The basic adjectives describing these
folks are selective, aloof, personable,
intimate, and sometimes very
unadaptable. Found in about five
percent of the population, they find their
forte in endeavors needing individual
effort and knowledge.
The combination of traits that pervade
their personality is introversion,
imagination, and feeling. These three
preferences interact to produce
uniqueness in the individual that is often
difficult to describe.
This person interacts very carefully with
people and objects. They are an observer,
constantly receiving immense amounts
of information on the actions, behaviors,
and attitudes of people around him. In
their daily world, they watch and listen
constantly. Why? Most of the time, it is
because of their sincere interest in the
actions, thoughts, and ideas of others.
The individual's attributes of
introversion and feeling make them a
serious and quiet person who works in
their own manner. They do not prefer
large groups of people. Instead, they like
to discuss significant topics of interest
355
with people who understand them.
Being an excellent observer of people,
they choose others who can share their
insights and complex innuendos.
Note: Numbers in parenthesis show the
percentage of people in this group who
agree with the statement. Interpret your
individual scores relative to the pattern
of the subgroup.
Individuals in this group can be an
enigma at times. Their world is a very
personal one filled with meaning as they
have encoded it. Thus, they encounter
others in their environment in a very
personal way.
Individuals in this subgroup often use
their academic ability to analyze issues.
This information is shared with other
persons within their group. With free
time, they are more likely to read a book
and to work on things that interest them
(70).
Problem Solving
Problem solving behaviors help this
person rely on process mechanisms for
obtaining goals. Process mechanisms are
ways of dividing complex tasks into
simple ones or recognizing the many
steps involved in solving complex
problems.
The approach to problems is usually
intuitive, random, and based on
thoughtful trial and error (80).
Individuals like to solve problems by
noting relationships and then dealing
with the known facts (82). The mind
jumps from one part of the problem to
the other (60). People in this subgroup
are better with problems that have fewer
constraints (60).
Being unique in perspective, there is a
tendency to operate independently of
others, sometimes in a world of one’s
own. However, being socially aware,
creative impulses are usually channeled
into socially acceptable alternatives.
This pattern of problem solving is more
prevalent in women although quite a few
men show their strengths in literary and
musical endeavors. The contact
personality in older adults may show
areas of compensation suggesting both
positive and negative experiences
though child and early adulthood.
Perception is average and the tendency
to analyze is often covered by social
etiquette and social sensitivity.
Career
Having better than average verbal,
computational, and spatial skills, there is
often confusion about how to apply these
diverse sets of skills to the world in
general. The future holds many different
possible career patterns depending how
emotions and creative impulses are
handled when encountering problems.
The career profile paints a picture of one
who is less interested in mechanical and
realistic occupations. Instead, there is a
preference for social value-oriented
activities that present a nurturing and
altruistic theme. There is less emphasis
on control and more emphasis on letting
events be as they may.
Differential Problem Solver (C)
The basic adjectives describing the
subgroup of differential problem solvers
356
are selective, aloof, personable, intimate,
and sometimes very unadaptable. Found
in about five percent of the population,
each finds his or her forte in endeavors
needing individual effort and
knowledge.
For the differential problem solver, the
pattern of problem solving scores is in
the average range or level C. The
differential problem solver is motivated
by interest patterns which are quite
varied. His or her life is dominated by
the desire to implement individual
interests and find socially acceptable
channels for emotions. Achieving
personal goals is a means to an end; the
end is to apply social and interpersonal
skills in social situations. At times, the
tendency to be impulsive dominates.
Emotions and feelings are lurking near
the surface, awaiting an entrance. The
need for order and organization is
achieved later in life as goal orientations
are more associated with making a
living.
The career theme is strong for the
differential problem solver. He or she is
less likely to be a truck driver, operate
machinery, or applied one talent to
plumbing. Instead, creating literary
works, writing music, or helping others
is the key to success.
Differential Problem Solvers with less
computational interests and greater
verbal skills may score in the average
range or lower for spatial acumen. The
greater emphasis on verbal or words
may be applied in the many different
areas including sales, group endeavors,
and advertising. During younger years,
the search or application of primary on feelings, behavior is emotional and
skills can be quite confusing as a career somewhat unpredictable.
field is not always evident. If one puts them in charge of a task or job
Potential Obstacles to Problem Solving they really like, they do more than an
In group problem solving, these adequate job. They do not do as well in
individuals are process oriented, jobs which do not match their ideals or
focusing on how others in the group strength.
solve problems. There is evidence of a Parameters: Management Pattern 19
tendency to dominate verbally especially 1. Management Identity: Trends
when ideas, values, and interests are show Non-Management and
close to one’s heart Entrepreneurial Identity is
This person scores higher than other average or high. Senior
persons on temperament tests measuring Management Identity is low
nuclear traits, such as gratefulness, except when the head of his or her
kindness, idealism, friendliness, own business as Entrepreneur.
softheartedness, generousness, and Greater numbers are middle or
introspectiveness. These traits are related upper managers in specialized
to their perception of themselves and businesses such as publishing,
others. Tasks or jobs which allow one to literary or creative professions.
see value beyond the routine of the job 2. Task Orientation Versus People
are motivating. Orientation: Greater numbers in
Differential problem solvers with very management activities involve
difficult early life experiences might people. Can manage where
show all kinds of acting out behaviors motor or mechanical expertise is
that posed problems for parents and involved but does not prefer It.
those in authority. When there is not a 3. Leadership: Shows greater
match between environmental pressures management leadership for
from home, family, church, or sibling, diverse and diffuse situations,
confusion and a lack of goal orientation especially creative situations.
results. In such cases, there is a tendency Task leadership is good only
to meet adversity with a solemnness and when expertise is involved.
passivity. Stress and environmental 4. Problem-Solving Orientation:
pressures can lead to all different kinds Trends for these managers show
of compensations including the use adaptability, less structure, and
skillful ways of circumventing more receptivity.
conventional rules and traditions. If he or 5. Independence in Decision-
she is too sheltered or fails to interact Making: Varies with the
with enough people, each becomes individual but with experience
selfish and relies too much on one’s will consult others. Can be
feelings. When compensating or relying
357
 stubborn when value Issues are intellectual and social areas.
involved. Achievement is underestimated.
6. Efficiency Index: Scores higher Achievement depends on the
on tasks related to people. alignment of values and interests.
7. Assessment of Social, Practical 6. Self-Perceptions: Nurturing,
and Complex Situations: Better achieving, impulsive,
with social and practical imaginative, self-accepting,
situations. tolerant, and dependent.
8. Information Processing: Logical, 7. Other's Perceptions: Original,
Analytical scores generally quiet, and sees the world from an
average 7.5 with spatial higher for individual standpoint.
mechanically inclined. 8. Perceptions: More field
9. Sales Management: Usually is less dependent more than Field
direct, more selling. Independent.
9. Aptitude: Special abilities and
PATTERN 19: General Parameters: Intelligence. Scores higher on
1. Age: 26-49. verbal and form perceptions;
2. General Preferences: Prefers latent mathematical aptitude. IQ
aesthetic, literary, artistic and range is 90-130. Can possess
social values; committed idealist. special abilities in art, music, and
Lower preference for architecture.
computational and clerical tasks, 10. Preferred Style of Learning:
except to accomplish current Learns by reading and discussing;
interest. prefers Individual assignment,
3. Preferred Roles or Activities: and open-ended responses.
Prefers management activities Learns best with an empathetic
involving the giving of expertise and caring teacher.
and advice. Likes indirect roles 11. Personality: Reduces stress by
where they are not in the limiting social relationships.
spotlight. Prefers roles such as Asserts and enhances himself by
supervisor-subordinate, doctor- helping dependent persons (gains
patient, and teacher-pupl1. love, recognition, and status);
4. Avoids: Situations involving too needs for admiration, power, and
much structure and control. prestige are unconscious.
Usually avoids conflict, numerous Diminishes stress and anxiety by
direct relationships, conventional avoidance and denial where social
values, and use of tools or roles are well-defined; can be
machines. passive-aggressive. Can be hostile
5. Achievement-Creativity: and very resentful, if emotionally
Achieves primarily in artistic, upset.
358
12. Motivating Factors: Social 18. Reflective Versus Impulsive:
welfare; creating a medium for Prone to act impulsively but
approval (art, knowledge, etc.); changes with maturity.
social motives. 19. Cognitive Complexity Versus
13. Conceptual Versus Perceptual Simplicity: Cognitively complex.
Motor Dominance: Conceptual. 20. Leveling Versus Sharpening:
14. Sensory Modality Preference: Leveling.
Auditory, and visual. 21. Compartmentalizing: Open
15. Automatization: Moderate. system.
16. Constricted Versus Flexible 22. Breadth of Categorization:
Control: Flexible control. Broadly categorizes.
17. Risk-Taking Versus Cautious: 23. Ego-Orientation: more other-
Risk-taking. oriented.

359
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9.

367
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371
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.

375
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General Problem Solver-30
This pattern represents a subgroup of
individuals with a higher general
problem-solving score and more positive
scores on verbal, number, and spatial
problems. These scores are bolstered by
a high score on control and structuring.
All scores suggest a practical person who
is less talkative, more, organized, very
reliant on motor skills and goal oriented.
Identifiers
These folks are easy to identify. They are
down-to-earth and practical. Others
characterized them as serious, quiet,
usually hurried, and logical. The single
adjective which characterizes this
subgroup is "solid." They use ideas, but
mainly those which have practical
significance. They prefer to be
conservative, thorough, and
painstakingly accurate.
These individual does not prefer large
crowds. Instead, they prefer to work
either alone on things which interest
them, read a good book, or be with a
small group of people (82). They are
unlikely to engage in idle chit-chat but
prefers to talk with close friends (67).
They like to talk about important things.
"Important things" are usually ideas that
interest him at a point in time.
These people work for long periods of
time on tasks that must be finished (63).
Their hard-working, industrious nature
makes them particularly difficult to stop
once they have started a project.
Problem Solving
381
They are more likely to score in the
middle or high ranges on preceptivity
(77). They prefer to plan and think things
out. When approaching a new problem-
solving situation, if the problem is a
familiar area, they use them
Note: Numbers in parenthesis show the
percentage of people in this group who
agree with the statement. Interpret your
individual scores relative to the pattern
of the subgroup
experience and solve the problem by
association or by focusing on detail (57).
They learn best by doing and by reading
(92).
In a group problem-solving situation,
they are confident about what works and
does not work in solving any kind of
problem with which they have previous
experience. Oddly enough, although less
talkative, they are quick to give their
"two cents" about what works.
In a problem-solving situation,
individuals in this subgroup go directly
for the solution, not process. The
quickest way to a solution is in a straight
line. They are action-oriented and quick
to determine what has worked in the past
and applied it to the future. Find a way
to calculate a solution or use standard
practice as a methodology for the current
problems.
With experience, standard practice is a
measure of almost all problems to be
solved. Tradition is to be upheld.
Career
The career scores paint a picture of a one
who is interested in many different kinds
of occupations such as accounting, math,
and computer science or conventional
occupations such as planner, architect,
and professional. There is a preference
for keeping things in order and getting
things accomplished. This leads to goal
orientation and success. In many cases,
the person has what is known as tough
poise, i.e., the ability to make difficult
decisions, not getting too close to the
interpersonal parts of the problem. This
person follows protocol. That is there are
rules and regulations which must be
followed. Perception is strong as is an
appreciation of objects, and structures in
the environment.
Areas of occupational interest for this
individual include accounting, middle-
level administration, army officer,
banking, high school teacher, service
station manager, experimental
psychologist, technical writing,
computing, production record work,
health care physician, public service,
clerical work, mechanical engineering,
and technical photography.
This pattern is equally prevalent in men
and women. The creative impulse finds
its strength in replicating and extending
patterns found in the environment. The
contact personality in older adults is less
likely to show areas of compensation
suggesting more positive experiences
though the child and early adulthood.
There is some evidence that the constant
analytic orientation is related to the early
detection of threats as a means of
survival in childhood. Perception is
above average as is the need to
constantly analyze everything.
382
Differential Problem Solve
For the differential problem solver,
problem-solving scores are in the
average range. The differential problem
solver is motivated more by interest
patterns which can be quite diverse. His
or her life is dominated by the desire to
achieve specific goals related to current
interests. Achieving personal goals is a
means to an end; the end is to dominate
and conquer whatever. At times, the
tendency to organize is pervasive. This
can lead to a compulsive need for
structuring things in the environment.
The career theme is strong for the
differential problem solver. They are
found in construction, the food industry,
or small entrepreneurial businesses. This
person could be a truck driver, operate
machinery, or apply one talent to
construction. However, if any one of
those careers becomes the current
obsession, the desire to achieve is
overwhelming. Differential Problem
Solvers with more computational
interests and greater verbal skills may
score in the average range or high for
spatial acumen. This person is less of a
risk taker, and more cautious in
orientation; that is, never get burned
twice in the same way. The greater
emphasis on verbal or words may be
applied in many different areas
including editorial, printing, or literary
fields. While a greater interest in
computation can lead to a career in
accounting, computers, or software
design. During the younger years, the
search or application of primary skills
can be quite confusing as a career field is
not always evident. In group problem
solving, this individual is less process
oriented, focusing less on how others in
the group solve problems. There is
evidence of a tendency to dominate
verbally especially when ideas, values,
and interests are close to one’s heart
Differential problem solvers with very
difficult early life experiences might
show all kinds of different behaviours
which pose problems for parents and
those in authority. When there is not a
match between environmental pressures
from home, family, church, or sibling,
confusion and a lack of goal orientation
results. In such cases, there is a tendency
to meet adversity with defiance and
retaliation. Stress and environmental
pressures can lead to all different kinds
of compensations including the use of
skillful ways of circumventing
conventional rules and traditions.
Potential Obstacles to Problem Solving
The greatest problems for this person
arise from too much ambiguity from
others in stating what they want. This
individual thrives on the clarity of
expression and explicitness. They do not
prefer too much complexity. Complexity
interferes with getting closure. They
resist talking for great lengths of time
because it interferes with his own
productivity. They have many things
they can be doing and just talking about
them is not sufficient or nearly as
efficient as doing them. Because they
work with much care and patience, they
often receive rewards and recognition for
a job well done. They are proud of his
accomplishments. Many people would
383
not spend an equal amount of time to do
the same task.
Because these individuals immerse
themselves in a particular job or task that
they enjoy, they may have difficulty
understanding the needs of others.
Primarily, this is because they feel that
everyone should do a job as well as they
do. Therefore, they have difficulty
understanding why others do not finish
tasks to their level of specificity. These
individuals have a bent for completing a
task with perseverance and
industriousness. This makes them feel
quite secure. They gain confidence from
being able to do daily tasks. This is a
suitable reinforcement for them. In
instances where they are not allowed to
complete a task to their level of
specification, it becomes upsetting and
distracting.
This person has problems with
unpleasantness in groups or situations
where his or her skills are not
appreciated.
Parameters: Management Pattern 30
1. Management Identity: Trends
show Middle Management and
First Level is average or high.
Senior Management Identity is
low except when in a technical
area or head of business as an
Entrepreneur. Greater numbers
are middle or first and middle-
level managers.
2. Task Orientation Versus People
Orientation: Greater numbers in
management activities Involved
 with tasks. Can manage where a involving technically skilled
motor or mechanical expertise is trade, and engineering vocations.
involved. Likes athletics, mechanical
3. Leadership: Shows greater drawing, marksmanship, racing,
management leadership for tasks. gardening, and surgery.
Task leadership is good where 4. Avoids Social situations requiring
expertise is involved. independent expression such as
4. Problem-Solving Orientation: personalized and artistic roles.
Trends for these managers show Avoids ambiguous situations and
adaptability, more structure, and problems. Also avoids
more preceptivity. intellectualism, artistic
5. Independence in Decision- expression, social sensitivity, and
Making: Varies with the skill.
individual but with management 5. Achievement-Creativity:
experience, learns to consult. Can Achieves primarily in technical
be stubborn. and athletic areas. Identifies with
6. Efficiency Index: Scores higher on material possessions.
tasks. 6. Self-Perceptions: Persistent,
7. Assessment of Social, Practical mature, practical, organized,
and Complex Situations: Better conservative, stable, and
with practical situations and conventional.
sometimes, complex situations, if 7. Other's Perceptions: Convergent
technical. thinker, sees the world from an
8. Information Processing: Logical, individual standpoint.
Analytical scores generally 8. Perceptions: Field independence
average 5.5 with spatial higher for scores range from 41 high, 20
mechanically inclined. middle and to 39 low.
9. Sales Management: Usually is 9. Aptitude: Special abilities, and
direct, more likely to sell. intelligence. Higher on clerical,
and form perceptions with good
PATTERN 30 General Parameters mathematical aptitude. IQ range
1. Age: 26-49. is 90-130.
2. General Preferences: Prefers 10. Preferred Style of Learning:
management in economic, Learns by doing and discussing.
and conventional areas. Less Prefers lecture, and assignments
preference for aesthetic and with right and wrong responses
religious. Can manage clerical rather than open-ended. Learns
and computational tasks. best with a systematic, sequential
3. Preferred Roles or Activities: and organized approach.
Prefers management activities
384
11. Personality: Reduces stress by 15. Automization: Moderate.
limiting social relationships. 16. Constricted Versus Flexible
Defends self by "open rebuttal" Control: Constricted control.
passive-aggressive, or hostility. 17. Risk-Taking Versus Cautious:
Maintains self-control by being Cautious.
organized and knowing what to 18. Reflective Versus Impulsive:
expect. Dislikes being put in a Prone to act and reflect.
situation where they or she cannot 19. Leveling Versus Sharpening:
control the contingencies Sharpening.
involved. Expresses life 20. Cognitive Complexity Versus
succinctly. Rule-oriented and Simplicity: Cognitively complex.
conforming to cultural norms and 21. Compartmentalization: Moderate
values. system.
12. Conceptual Versus Perceptual 22. Breadth of Categorizing: Broadly
Motor Dominance: Conceptual. categorizes.
13. Motivating Factors: Rationalism, 23. Ego-Orientation: Self, individual,
independence, and the common common good, and other-
good. oriented.
14. Sensory Modality Preference:
Auditory, and visual.

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 Appendix C

Analytic Items Version 2.0 Raw Score/Means, S.D.

By Age and Education

Age Male S.D. Female S. D. Range ED N Sp.E. S. D N.

09 2.34 2.90 1.85 2.90 0 4 4 143 .96 .36 45
10 3.61 2.11 3.51 2.03 0 5 5 156 1.07 .76 35
11 4.63 2.63 4.22 2.08 0 6 6 178 1.43 .98 59
12 5.12 2.42 4.42 2.32. 0 6 7 195 2.32 1.43 41
13 6.48 2.53 5.92 2.35 1 9 8 221 2.45 1.11 34
14 7.21 1.93 6.34 2.02 1 10 9 264 2.85 1.07 32
15 7.34 1.83 7.11 1.95 3 12 10 283 2.92 1.10 23
16 7.7 1.89 7.21 1.86 4 12 11 292 2.75 1.43 25
17 8.0. 1.64 7.34 1.93 4 12 12 234
18 8.7 1.54 8.3 1.75 4 12 13 211
19-20 8.6 1.93 8.4 1.76 4 12 14 345
21-22 9.4 1.53 9.2 1.84 4 12 15 167
23-2 49.7 1.2 9,3 1.43 5 12 16 194
25-26 10 1.1 9.7 1.54 5 12 17 175
27-28 10.2 1.1 9.8 1.76 6 12 18 187

Low Group
11-12 5.83 1.96 4.3 1.96 0 9 6 60 Michael (7th Grade)
14-17 5.85 1.76 6.54 2.09 1 12 10 91 Woolley (Alternative School)
14-17 6.10 1.92 6.24 1.92 0 10 10 172 Bernal-incarcerated delinquents

Average Group
14-15 7.75 2.66 8.54 1.94 2 12 12 53 Goldstein
16-17 8.48 1.72 8.15 1.68 2 12 11 150 Jour
15-16 8.82 1.93 8.36 2.31 3 12 10 45 Miko

High School (High Group-Gifted)

16-17 9.5 1.34 9.5 1.25 5 12 10 40 Cote-Private School
16-17 10.2 1.23 9.6 2.3 5 12 12 30 Spats-Gifted HS

College
21-24 8.81 3.02 8.5 2.82 2 11 13 165 Buck

399
19-21 9.83 1.83 8.0 2.83 2 11 13 12 Continuation Group

Graduate School
26-28 8.22 1.13 8.76 1.45 5 12 17 29 Public (Education)
34-35 9.66 1.83 9.00 1.38 6 12 17 14 Public (Education)
27-34 10.55 1.83 9.92 1.55 5 12 17 56 Public (Agri)
28-39 10.6 1.84 8.76 1.48 4 12 17 38 Public (Education)
24-28 10.92 1.50 10.5 1.70 8 12 17 38 Private (Elite)

Industry, Government, Military

24-42 8.28 1.56 2 12 12 57 TRW m 57
24-42 8.40 3.29 8.68 1.85 2 12 14 220 Catalog 3 m&f
29-36 8.80 1.32 2 12 12 36 TRW M 36
24-42 8.91 2.02 2 12 12 12 TRW 7/90
29-36 9.29 2.04 9.43 2.56 2 12 12 50 TRW-50-590
24-42 9.62 1.39 8.70 1.82 2 12 14 39 TRW sodata
24-39 10.2 2.04

Spatial items version 2.0: Age and Education

Age Male S.D. Female S. D. Range ED N Sp.E. S. D N.

09 6.68 4.90 6.85 4.95 0 8 4 143 2.0 .36 45
10 6.97 4.11 6.51 4.03 0 8 5 156 4.07 .76 35
11 7.54 4.63 6.22 4.08 0 10 6 178 4.43 .98 59
12 8.75 4.42 7.42 4.32. 0 10 7 195 6.32 1.43 41
13 9.26 4.53 8.92 4.35 1 12 8 221 7.45 1.11 34
14 12.45 4.93 9.34 4.02 1 14 9 264 8.85 1.07 32
15 13.21 4.83 11.11 4.95 3 18 10 283 8.92 1.10 23
16 14.50 4.89 12.21 4.86 4 20 11 292 9.75 1.43 25
17 14.85 4.64 12.34 4.93 4 22 12 234
18 14.10 4.54 13.3 4.75 4 24 13 211
19-20 14.50 4.93 13.4 4.76 4 24 14 345
21-22 15.12 4.53 14.2 4.84 4 24 15 167
23-24 15.60 4.2 14,3 4.43 5 24 194
25-26 15.80 4.1 14.7 4.54 5 24 17 175
27-28 16.10 4.1 14.8 4.76 6 24 18 187

400
Low Group
11-12 10.22 4.40 8.8 4.97 2 22 6 60 Michael-7th Grade)
14-17 10.98 5.26 11.7 5.46 2 22 10 91 Woolley-Alternative School)
14-17 10.75 5.92 2 22 10 172 Bernal-incarcerated
delinquents

Average Group
14-15 12.87 5.45 8.54 4.94 2 24 12 63 Goldstein
15-16 14.98 4.75 11.9 4.63 3 24 10 150 Hunt
16-17 15.09 3.47 13.8 4.95 2 24 11 45 DeNovellis

High School (High Group-Gifted)

16-17 16.92 4.42 13.85 4.13 3 24 10 40 Cote-Private School
16-17 16.57 3.97 14.7 3.69 3 24 12 30 Spats-Gifted HS

College
21-24 14.45 3.02 14.10 2.82 2 24 13 165 Buck
19-21 16.00 5.32 14.33 3.01 2 24 13 12 Continuation Group

Graduate School
28-39 10.67 .74 8.76 1.48 4 12 17 38 Public (Education)
26-28 15.90 4.02 13.9 4.42 5 12 17 294 03 87 (Education)
34-35 15.67 3.26 12.95 6.98 6 12 17 14 544 (Education)
24-28 16.83 3,86 14.33 3.93 8 12 17 38 Private (Elite)
27-34 17.89 4.08 17.24 4.14 5 12 17 56 Public (Agri)

Industry, Government, Military

24-42 13.00 5.04 1.96 2 24 12 14 TRW 7/90
24-42 14.36 4.31 1.96 2 24 12 57 TRW m 57
29-36 14.11 4.23 2 24 12 36 TRW M 36
29-36 16.61 2.04 16.68 2.56 2 24 12 50 TRW-50-590
24-39 16.30 3.08 14.61 4.33 2 24 12 40 TRW sodata 40

401
Cog flex

Cog Flex 5

Age Male S.D. Female SD. Range N. Sp. Ed Std.

D N

05 2.8 1.2 2.5 1.2 0 5 16 0.00 0.0 00

06 3.5 1.6 3.5 2.30 0 9 66 2.36 1.8 22
07 4.2 2.3 4.6 2.24 0 11 185 3.40 1.4 42
08 5.5 2.3 6.0 2.54 0 12 324 4.65 1.36 15
09 5.6 2.8 6.1 2.60 0 12 135 5.33 2.0 47
10 5.7 2.7 6.6 2.78 0 13 142 5.6 2.3 41
11 7.1 3.0 6.7 3.31 0 13 188 6.15 2.5 25
12 7.5 3.2 8.5 3.25 1 13 94 6.6 2.4 92
13 8.3 3.1 9.3 5.3 0 13 125 7.0 2.56 32
14 9.9 3.1 8.2 6.6 0 13 63 6.8 2.5 32
17 7.5 2.8 8.7 3.0 5 13 79
18 8.5 2.8 8.5 3.3 5 13 89
19 8.4 2.6 8.3 3.4 5 13 97
20 7.5 3.8 8.0 3.5 6 13 89
21 8.3 4.4 8.1 3.5 8 13 77
22 7.7 3.6 7.9 3.2 6 13 74
23-24 6.8 3.0 7.5 3.4 7 13 74
25-26 6.8 4.2 7.4 3.6 6 13 75
27-28 7.0 2.8 7.4 3.6 6 13 72
29-30 8.0 2.0 8.5 3.4 6 13 70
31-32 9.5 3.5 8.4 3.0 6 13 67
33-34 9.0 3.1 9.2 2.9 6 13 67
35-36 8.0 3.5 9.3 2.8 6 13 58
37-38 7.5 3.0 8.3 3.2 6 13 58
39-40 7.3 1.7 8.3 3.1 6 13 61
41-42 8.7 2.6 8.2 3.2 6 13 66
43-44 7.5 1.8 7.7 3.4 6 13 48
45-46 7.5 2.2 7.6 3.5 6 13 52
47-48 6.8 3.0 7.5 3.6 6 13 58
49-50 5.3 2.7 7.3 3.2 6 13 53
51-52 7.2 2.8 7.7 3.5 6 13 58
53-54 6.2 2.6 7.6 3.2 6 13 59
55-64 7.2 2.6 7.5 3.6 6 13 59
402
403
Letter identification

Age M. Mean S.D. F Mean SD Range N. Sp Ed M.

S.D. N.

05 7.8 4.9 6.1 3.4 0 29 16 6.08 3.2 25

06 10.06 6.0 11.6 4.6 9 28 44 9.54 5.1 22
07 13.9 6.5 14.2 5.7 9 30 131 10.92 5.5 42
08 18.1 6.6 20.4 8.4 0 39 277 13.59 6.5 32
09 21.01 10.5 22.7 9.2 0 47 111 16.51 8.3 45
10 23.2 8.2 23.7 8.7 0 49 142 18.62 7.2 35
11 25.8 8.6 27.3 8.3 0 49 188 20.05 7.7 19
12 27.4 8.1 29.4 8.7 5 48 94 23.92 6.9 41
13 30.6 8.1 34.3 8.0 2 48 125 25.5 7.5 34
14 35.31 9.3 37.7 8.2 26 44 54 24.81 8.2 32
15 34.8 6.3 36.8 8.3 22 47 44 30.17 8.2 23
16 35.4 7.8 36.9 8.6 22 48 67 33.6 6.3 15
17 37.6 6.8 39.6 8.5 23 49 30
18 36.6 8.1 38.9 8.2 21 49 27
19 37.1 6.2 39.2 9.1 21 49 77
20 37.7 7.2 38.6 9.1 20 48 79
21 37.5 6.2 38.5 9.0 21 48 79
22 34.3 5.9 37.5 9.6 21 48 89
23-24 37.3 4.3 37.6 9.6 22 48 74
25-26 38.0 7.4 38.5 9.5 22 48 76
27-28 32.5. 6.8 39.6 9.3 22 49 72
29-30 37.5 7.7 38.5 9.5 22 49 70
31-32 38.8 4.5 39.6 9.4 22 49 67
33-34 32.5 9.2 38.6 9.3 22 49 67
35-36 35.4 8.2 37.6 9.2 22 49 67
37-38 32.2 8.2 35.2 9.1 22 43 58
39-40 32.8 7.2 38.9 8.7 22 43 61
41-42 35.0 7.3 38.5 8.8 22 42 66
43-44 31.7 6.4 38.4 8.4 22 44 48
45-46 29.5 6.4 34.6 8.3 22 43 42
47-48 25.5 8.4 35.6 8.7 22 42 48
49-50 26.4 8.5 33.7 8.6 22 41 58

404
51-52 23.8 4.9 35.6 8.5 22 40 58
53-54 26.4 5.9 36.3 8.3 19 35 59
55-64 29.5 6.02 38.2 8.8 15 41 59

405
Embedded designs

Age M. Mean S.D. F. Mean S.D. Range N Sp Ed S.D. N

05 1.5 4.2 2.8 1.9 0 5 16 0.00 0.0 00

06 7.8 5.6 6.2 3.9 1 21 44 2.37 4.8 22
07 7.94 6.0 6.8 5.9 3 11 131 5.26 4.9 42
08 9.0 6.0 11.5 8.7 0 28 277 9.03 6.4 32
09 13.7 9.4 12.1 8.6 0 32 111 13.84 9.5 45
10 16.4 7.8 14.5 8.3 1 32 142 12.88 7.1 35
11 14.3 7.5 14.2 8.2 1 32 188 14.00 7.5 19
12 15.8 8.2 17.1 8.3 6 24 93 15.00 7.9 40
13 17.6 8.9 18,4 8.1 0 32 125 16.14 8.1 34
14 19.3 8.1 21.5 7.9 0 32 66 15.65 7.1 32
15 22.5 5.8 23.9 7.9 10 32 54 25.30 8.3 23
16 23.7 7.0 25.5 7.3 7 32 66 25.2 7.2 15
17 23.8 7.4 25.5 7.3 8 29 67
18 17.1 10.5 26.7 7.6 9 30 48
19-20 15.2 13.6 27.7 7.5 7 30 45
21-22 15.0 10.7 26.5 7.5 8 30 66
23-24 16.0 10.5 25.4 7.4 7 30 60
25-26 21.7 7.4 26.4 7.2 8 30 75
27-28 17.6 8.6 25.4 7.6 9 31 62
29-30 28.6 11.4 26.4 7.1 8 29 60
31-32 27.5 5.8 27.6 7.9 18 30 77
33-34 19.6 6.3 26.1 6.7 19 31 67
35-36 26.5 5.0 25.4 6.9 18 31 70
37-38 21.6 7.2 24.3 7.2 17 31 68
39-40 23.3 8.0 24.1 8.1 16 31 61
41-42 21.7 6.9 23.5 6.9 17 31 60
43-44 22.6 7.0 22.6 7.3 18 31 58
45-46 21.4 5.9 22.7 7.5 19 31 42
47-48 20.0 7.8 21.8 7.2 18 31 48
49-50 14.9 6.1 20.8 7.3 19 31 53
51-52 20.7 8.4 20.7 6.8 15 31 58
53-54 20.3 5.6 21.6 6.9 16 31 59
55-64 18.2 6.4 20.4 6.9 15 31 59

406
Arithmetic Distraction

Memory

Total Memory-right

Age Mean S.D. Range N. Sp. E Wrong Sp Ed M. S.D.

Age N.

5 0.00 0.0 0 00 00 0.00 0.0 0-00 00

6 00.00 0.00 0 00 00 2.79 1.93 0-05 14
7 06.23 3.92 0 14 24 03.64 3.00 0-10 14
8 07.68 3.48 0 16 47 04.64 4.94 0-14 14
9 08.39 5.08 0 16 60 04.20 3.66 0-12 15
10 09.65 5.09 0 23 54 05.27 3.73 0-12 15
11 10.60 5.23 0 26 187 08.13 6.46 0-22 22
12 00.00 0.00 0 00 00 05.48 4.86 0-17 33
13 00.00 0.00 0 00 00 07.21 5.02 0-22 23
14 10.60 4.50 4 18 10 5.12 06.38 4.78 2-15 13
15 10.90 4.58 1 16 10
16 10.16 2.74 6 14 06

407
 Appendix D

Sample Sizes, Means and Standard deviations from selected studies 1977 to 2002.

Frequent Question: Total does not add up to 5000. Why? The list does not include many small
samples that are non-public as they represent proprietary data from Fortune 500 companies.
Gender 3 is composite male and female. Gender 1 is male, Gender 2 is female. Original means
and standard deviation have since been revised based on re-scoring or psychometric item
analysis.

ID 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Catalog LSI LSI LSI (0a) LSI (0a) LSI (1) LSI (1) LSI (2) LSI (2) LSI LSI (3)
Rating Rating (3)
Date 8801 8801 8801 8801 8901 8901 9201 9201 9201 9201
Age 5&6 5&6 8&9 8&9 8&9 8&9 9&10 9&10 9&10 9&10
Education 1 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Level
Version no. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Test 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Criterion 1st 1st 3rd 3rd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th grade 4th 4th
grade grade grade grade grade grade grade grade grade
Gender 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
Sample size 71 48 15 13 28 41 41 28 22 24
Ps30 (Psa) 12.37 14.01 13.29 13.27
Pslap
Pssp
Dif
Perceptual 29.54 33.72 27.72 30.14 22.84 28.18 29.07 26.86 27.26 26
Conceptual 31.18 34.5 35.2 35.06 32.7 29.88 28.68 32.71 27.44 28.66
Motor 33.06 35.9 18.66 22.46 23.42 29.56 29.56 23.43 30.72 28.16
Analytical 30.52 33.96 29.86 30.76 38.7 45.36 45.37 38.71 47.44 40.38
Social 33.86 36.3 44.52 43.38 47.84 38.72 38.73 47.86 30.9 37
Control/Str. 33.62 36.34 48.8 47.68 45.84 38.52 38.54 45.86 31.08 36.6
Flex 67.57 59.1 83.34 82 84.65 84.1 66.29 65.57 85.64 87.66
Exint 15.15 17.37 16.8 17.23 17.64 16.82 16.83 17.64 16.55 17.25

ID 109 110 89 90 31 32 33 34 35 36
Catalog LSI (4) LSI (4) LSI J LSIJCx LSI (4) LSI (4) LSI (5) LSI (5) LSI LSI (5a)
name Err Err Lau Lau An (An (5a) Bth
(B.h.)
Date 9901 9901 9506 9506 9001 9001 8901 8901 9201 9201
Age 10&11 10&11 10&11 10&11 12 12 13 13 14 14
Education 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9
Level
Version no. 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2
Test 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

408
 Criterion 5t h 5th 6th 6th grade 7th 7th 8th 8th grade 9th 9th
grade grade grade grade grade grade grade grade
Gender 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Sample size 60 54 91 83 38 44 33 49 25 32
Ps30 (Psa) 10.76 11.05 11.88 11.9 10.29 10.73
Pslap 12.25 12.36 10.77 11.05 13.87 12.4 8.78 9.43
Pssp 11.88 12.32 12.58 13.35 11.94 12.5
Dif 12.75 12.68 13.68 13.32 11.78 12.13 14.64 14.04
Perceptual 39 39.93 31.28 29.78 36.42 38.28 36.54 30.28 35.68 36.24
Conceptual 41.53 46.44 35.76 38 35.3 37.9 33.94 36.52 31.6 31.5
Motor 36.93 33.48 32.3 29.1 34.52 32.76 34.18 34.5 37.76 39.92
Analytical 47.07 45.48 32.7 28.66 38.14 32.18 40.68 31.22 37.68 28.12
Social 44.63 49.52 41.02 45 42.58 59.94 28.78 38.2 42 48.74
Control/Str. 48.4 58.37 57.84 61.14 64 61.04 39.74 51.26 59.36 51.74
Flex 54.6 46.89 80.29 80.51 74.14 75.22 78.55 82.86 74.56 75.69
Exint 23.03 22.52 17.41 17.03 15.42 21.81 15.08 19.96 15.04 16.81

ID 38 41 42 43 44 94 95 2 3 4
Catalogue LSI (6) LSI LSI (8) LSI LSI Linny (LSI)N cat 401- cat cat
name (7)W (9)Nny Nny ny 700 701- 1000-
1000-f 1491
Age 14-17 14-18 14-18 14-18 14-18 14-17 14-17 17+ 17+ 17+
Date 8701 8801 8801 8801 8801 8801 8801 8601 9101 8901
Education 10 11 11 9 & 12 9 & 12 11 11 13 13 13
Level
Version no. 1 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 2 2
Test 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion tenth elevent elevent ninth ninth Juv. Juv. Students Work Work
thru h h grade thru thru Delinq Delinq
senior grade twelfth twelft
h
Gender 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
Sample size 31 42 49 161 172 149 50 94 56 96
Ps30 (Psa) 11.62 10.64 11.08 10.67 11.13 11.64 1.09 11.3 12.63 13.23
Pslap 13.04 10.07 11.04 10.44 10.3 11.27 1.44 11.86 13.54 15.34
Pssp 12.48 11.99 12.39 11.88 12.86 12.42 0.46 12.42 14.23 14.55
Dif 12.24 13.97 13.29 13.84 13.42 13.17 0.83 12.86 11.12 10.06
Perceptual 36.9 34.76 38.66 34.84 26.68 32.33 4.76 40.08 40.5 40.36
Conceptual 34.18 32.16 34.38 34.12 38.1 34.09 4.21 33.32 34.92 33.92
Motor 32.24 33.96 34.42 35.26 31.18 31.68 5.09 34.9 31.82 35.7
Analytical 34.32 34.28 28.38 33.3 32.9 36.24 6.08 35.42 38.88 43.08
Social 42.16 33.1 40.76 35.78 35.44 40.81 6.81 34 31.96 35.24
Control/Str. 36.24 34.6 35.32 44.38 46.66 45.8 9.89 43.28 44.92 61.36
Flex 77.81 76.37 75.38 86.18 79.14 75.54 10.1 39.94 46.74 44.56
Exint 25.41 13.71 18.72 17.36 13.83 16.96 13.87 12.96

ID 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

409
 Catalog cat 1 cat cat 3 m cat 4 m cat4f ca5m ca1 1- cat 401- cat cat
name 1491- 11491- 400 700 701- 1000-
2000-f 2000 1000-f 1491-f
Age 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+
Date 8801 8401 8801 8801 9001 8901 8401 8601 9101 8901
Education 13 13 15 13 13 15 14 13 13 14
Level
Version no. 2 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 2
Test 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion Work Work Work Work Work Work freshm freshman Work Work
an- /sophom
seniors ores
Gender 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Sample size 140 416 464 427 195 80 148 57 39 119
Ps30 (Psa) 13.79 12.71 13.25 13.06 12.4 12.08 12.84 12.6
Pslap 15.99 13.78 14.2 13.4 12.92 12.66 13.93 14.23
Pssp 15.34 14.27 15.15 15.18 14.09 13.57 14.46 13.83
Dif 9.34 10.98 10.33 10.71 11.5 11.89 10.81 10.97
Perceptual 42.5 34.32 41.38 40.4 38.7 39.64 38.56 41.76
Conceptual 34.04 32.32 33.72 29 32.98 29.36 30.8 33.04 41.42 31.02
Motor 36.28 29.94 35.48 40 35.66 38.64 35.64 33.46 26.1 37.4
Analytical 39.66 39.22 40.18 46.76 44.62 36.88 29.52 27.88 33.88 35.14
Social 39.76 34.26 39.18 42.6 47.84 39.18 39.8 38.28 34.34 43.38
Control/Str. 67.2 43.74 57.2 58.4 60.94 65.14 45.72 46.94 46.46 59.54
Flex 50.48 40.9 50.52 53.22 54 47.46 42 43.48 52.4 45.4
Exint 11.6 14.48 13.49 14.17 14.38 12.42 19.11 19.44 17.85 14.84

ID 15 16 17 18 19 20 39 40 47 48
Catalog cat 1 1 cat 2 f cat 3 f cat 4 f cat 4 f cat 5 f Gifted Gifted Miko Miko's
name
Date 9001 8401 8801 8801 9001 8901 9001 9001 8501 8501
Age 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 17+ 14-18 14-18 17+ 17+
Education 14 14 14 14 14 15 9 9 11 11
Level
Version no. 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 1 1
Test 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 1
Criterion Work Work Work Work Work Work ninth ninth eleve eleventh
thru thru nth/t grade
twelth twelth weth
Gender 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2
Sample size 250 291 530 152 71 140 50 49 60 31
Ps30 (Psa) 13.26 12.42 12.91 13.32 11.87 11.7 11.86 11.58
Pslap 15.54 13.47 13.72 14.6 11.96 11.95 13.02 12.86
Pssp 14.5 13.86 14.72 15.09 13.5 13.18 12.95 12.48
Dif 9.98 11.34 10.78 10.16 12.27 12.44 12.02 12.33
Perceptual 45.5 33.72 42.06 41.7 0 0 32.12 33.5
Conceptual 30.36 32.84 32.74 28.6 33.08 32.62 37.64 38.12 30.6 28.78
Motor 40.72 29.54 36.7 40.6 35.68 36.2 31.88 32.6 31.12 34.68
Analytical 35.1 33.02 34.44 39.64 39.8 31.96 38.12 32.6 42.72 33.7

410
 Social 44.92 38.18 45.78 48.6 51.82 45.94 33.16 39.9 36.32 42.46
Control/Str. 77.92 41.48 57.14 51.76 57.8 67.5 46.72 51.1 38.52 38.06
Flex 49.88 36.94 49.92 48.76 54.92 50.18 0 0 31.6 32
Exint 12.98 17 17.27 16.38 15.96 16 13.12 21.38 17.83 20

ID 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
Catalog Cote's Cote's Spats - Spats -f 544 544 jour-45 jour-45 f Cont- Cont
name Study- Study-f m m m
m
Date 9201 9201 9001 9001 8901 8901 8701 8701 9001 9001
Age 16-17 16-17 14-17 14-17 22+ 22+ 16-17 16-17 19-14 19-14
Education 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 14 13
Level
Version no. 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 3
Test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion elevent elevent elevent eleventh eleven eleventh Journal journalis fresh freshma
h/twel h h grade grade th /twelth ism m man/s n/sopho
vth grade grade grade elevent eleventh opho mores
h grade mores
Gender 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Sample size 26 14 19 11 108 42 11 34 6 6
Ps30 (Psa) 14.11 13.34 14.2 13.59 11.03 11.36 12.57 12 13.96 13.08
Pslap 16 16 16.71 16.13 10.88 11.93 12.68 12.65 16.33 14.5
Pssp 15.96 14.43 15.79 14.86 12.37 12.5 14.55 13.43 15.5 14.67
Dif 9.02 9.79 8.75 9.51 13.38 12.79 11.39 11.96 9.09 10.42
Perceptual 42 45.14 39.78 41.8 40 35.34 39.62 41.54 38.66 43.34
Conceptual 29.22 28.42 38.52 35.08 33.34 26.58 37.62 39.1 30.66 35
Motor 42.06 42 32.2 36.36 34.82 35.92 31.08 32.16 40.66 35.66
Analytical 40.14 35.14 46.32 39.62 35.34 24.5 39.8 29.22 32 30
Social 40.3 46 33.36 38.18 34.32 37.28 30.54 39.4 48.32 51.34
Control/Str. 63.84 79.7 45.68 50.54 42.46 38.06 44 44.7 34.66 68.66
Flex 49.22 54.84 48.84 53.08 38.92 37.28 45.8 48.94 54.66 54
Exint 16 14.57 12.42 21 17.07 18.83 23.09 28.26 18.33 18.5

ID 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
Catalog RON Ron2 Contin 455 455 HF HF Cal Cal TRW52
name Techn Tech
Age 16-19 16-19 19-22 23+ 23+ 22+ 22+ 22+ 22+ 31=
Date 9001 9001 9101 9201 9201 9201 9201 9001 9001 8601
Education 14 14 13 15 15 16 16 15 15 13
Level
Version no. 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
Test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion Interna Interna freshma teachers teache Busines Busines junior/se senior Electron
tional tional n rs s, s, nior s ic
Relatio Relatio college teachers teacher
ns ns s

411
 Gender 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
Sample size 12 12 18 3 15 37 57 26 38 28
Ps30 (Psa) 13.56 12.88 13.75 13.84 13.73 14.68 13.99
Pslap 15.92 15.67 16.28 16.17 16.3 17.14 16.74
Pssp 14.92 13.67 15.11 15.34 15.07 16.53 15.37
Dif 9.58 10.33 9.31 9.25 9.32 8.17 8.95
Perceptual 39.34 37.32 44.44 44 44.52 42.8 46.58 40.92 45.26 28.5
Conceptual 29 29.34 26.88 15.32 29.2 30.42 28.06 41.38 33.84 29.42
Motor 31.5 33 45.32 56 43.2 39.08 43.36 28.6 35.36 34.56
Analytical 53.34 43 26.76 30.66 26 43.08 33.36 38 37.52 40.84
Social 28.34 41 54.34 50.66 55.06 35.94 46.98 39.92 41.36 29.7
Control/Str. 44 44.34 78.44 49.32 84.26 78.36 79.08 54.6 78 37.14
Flex 34.82 30.66 51.54 54.66 50.92 50.38 52.36 50.92 44 37.14
Exint 20.42 19 16 2.67 18.67 7.48 10.98 11.88 14.47 11.85

ID 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
Catalog TRW TRW-1 TRW-2 TRW57 TRW3 TRW590 TRW59 TRW790- TRW7 TRWim
name 52-2 6 0-2 1 90-1 g
Date 8601 8803 8803 8812 8911 9005 9005 9007 9007 9100
Age 31+ 31+ 31+ 31+ 31+ 31+ 31+ 31+ 31+ 31+
Education 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Level
Version no. 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3
Test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion junior/ analyst analyst analyst analys analyst analyst analyst analy analyst
senior t st
Gender 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Sample size 7 26 13 57 36 34 16 41 12 14
Ps30 (Psa) 13.61 12.98 12.79 12.85 13.98 14.03 13.71 12.98 12.93
Pslap 14.62 13.8 13.28 13.8 15.79 15.93 15.28 15.41 12.78
Pssp 15.65 14.81 14.68 14.56 15.81 15.84 15.54 14 15.21
Dif 9.87 10.7 11.02 10.82 9.2 9.12 9.59 10.3 11.01
Perceptual 30.28 43.52 47.38 42.44 44 44.34 43.5 40.96 48.34 36.52
Conceptual 25.7 34.3 35.06 31.12 31.72 38.34 29.74 30.58 23.16 26.56
Motor 31.42 36.52 33.52 39.36 38.88 30.94 40.12 38.48 47.82 43.56
Analytical 36 46.22 38.46 42.7 38.6 43.34 39 44.18 39.16 38.7
Social 34.84 31.92 39.06 37.42 41.5 37.82 40.5 33.8 38 39.42
Control/Str. 37.14 60.3 55.68 54.58 55.32 68.7 76.5 59.9 77.34 52
Flex 44.56 49.68 52.32 51.28 48 60.82 61 48.18 45.66 51.42
Exint 13.71 12.62 20.16 14.67 13.83 9.82 11.75 8 5.67 14.28

ID 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
Catalog agr Agrf Psy403 psy403 Ad544 Ad544f Ve3 m Vers3f Ver3 Ver3MB
name m MB f
Age 35+ 35+ 23+ 23+ 23+ 23+ 31+ 31+ 22+ 22+
Date 8501 8501 8707 8707 8703 8703 9101 9101 9502 9502

412
 Education 16 16 15 15 15 15 14 14 15 15
Level
Version no. 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion Agr Ag Teacher Teachers Work Work Work Work Bus Bus
s
Gender 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Sample size 33 25 8 21 6 8 68 72 79 87
Ps30 (Psa) 13.54 13.29 12.94 12.67 12.75 11.81 14.01 13.65 13.32 13.15
Pslap 14.75 14.42 14.87 13.26 13.83 13.5 15.97 16.11 15.31 15
Pssp 15.45 15.12 14.19 14.45 14.34 12.63 15.78 14.99 14.73 14.55
Dif 9.9 10.23 10.47 11.15 10.92 11.94 9.13 9.45 9.98 10.23
Perceptual 35.42 36 43.5 43.62 41.32 45 41.4 46.22 44.3 41.78
Conceptual 27.16 27.04 36.74 35.22 30 33.24 30.82 30 29.58 30.02
Motor 33.6 31.84 34.24 37.04 37.66 36.5 39.1 41.5 40.32 40.66
Analytical 35.6 37.76 30.74 27.62 40.66 35 45.18 33.8 41.96 34.88
Social 44.22 41.44 36.5 42.38 31.32 36.5 33.02 46.5 36.4 44.68
Control/Str. 45.14 48.32 50 53.14 53.34 54 60.3 70.26 73.56 74.42
Flex 38.62 41.44 54.5 55.62 44 53.5 48.88 52.76 47.12 47.74
Exint 18.22 18.56 24.5 21.23 13.67 21.5 8.23 13.04 6.87 11.59

ID 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101
Catalog 403m 403f Nnypl Nnypl Kir Kir Syl Sylm Greg Bill70m
name m
Date 8707 8707 8503 8505 9811.09 9811.09 8501
Age 23+ 23+ 14-17 14-17 15-17 15-17 12 12 16 14-17
Education 15 15 11 11 11 7 7 7 11 11
Level
Version no. 2 2 1.5 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
Test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion Grad Grad Incarc Incarc Studen Student Student Stud Stud Stu
ts s s
Gender 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
Sample size 8 22 15 83 57 44 18 18 28 30
Ps30 (Psa) 12.94 12.67 11.07 11.04 12.18 12.01 11.06 11.96 11.6 12.53
Pslap 14.87 13.26 9.96 10.46 13.46 13.18 12.06 11.83 12.23 14.13
Pssp 14.19 14.45 12.91 12.59 13.38 13.18 11.83 13.75 12.84 13.73
Dif 10.47 11.15 13.56 13.47 11.58 11.83 13.06 12.21 12.46 11.07
Perceptual 43.6 43.4 40.8 40.14 39.72 41.64 41.33 42.67 41.76 31.07
Conceptual 35.2 36.6 32.04 32.14 34.67 30.73 37.56 36.89 34.32 31.47
Motor 37 34.2 37.12 36.65 43.86 47.36 42.22 44 34.96 34.67
Analytical 27.6 30.6 35.4 35.33 42.25 33.73 38.44 39.56 35.84 47.33
Social 42.2 36.4 35.48 35.3 40.63 49.64 47.33 45.78 34.24 33.87
Control/Str. 53 50 49.44 49.01 36.91 36.45 44.44 39.78 44.48 34.13
Flex 54.2 54.4 38 39.18 39.16 37 42.89 40.67 40.32 32.4
Exint 21.2 24.5 15.2 14.27 19.37 21.91 20.89 17.22 15.84 18.67

413
 ID 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 111 112
Catalog Bill70f Ptpi30 Ptpi305f Wool Wolle Agrima Agri Unk Unk
name 5 yf n
Date 8501
Age 14-17 22+ 22+ 15-17 15-17 35+ 35+
Education 11 12 12 11 11 14 14
Level
Version no. 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
Test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Criterion Studs Work Work Stud Stud Mgr.
Gender 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
Sample size 40 96 111 71 43 43 42 146 187
Ps30 (Psa) 12.16 12.7 12.73 10.67 11.08 13.53 13.29 12.97 0.84
Pslap 13.75 14.69 14.63 10.06 11.05 14.76 14.42 14.36 1.6
Pssp 13.19 13.81 13.89 12.06 12.39 15.44 15.12 14.5 0.99
Dif 11.53 10.75 10.74 13.94 13.28 9.9 10.23 10.57 1.22
Perceptual 35 41.33 42.38 28.62 30.57 35.43 36 39.6 8.34
Conceptual 29.7 31.63 30.22 31.69 34.24 27.18 27.04 31.84 4.32
Motor 32.2 37.78 40.55 34.65 34.43 33.6 31.84 36.59 4.88
Analytical 35.7 38.29 32.43 34.62 28.38 35.6 37.76 36.97 5.76
Social 40.5 39.65 47.55 33.24 40.76 44.23 41.44 39.86 6.02
Control/Str. 42.4 60.79 66.09 36.96 35.33 45.14 48.32 56.08 12.93

Flex 35 50.3 51.25 37.07 40.76 38.63 41.44 46.24 10.63

Exint 18.7 12.93 16.26 13.49 18.76 18.23 18.56 15.57 4.71

Sample Characteristics: The next Table 88 indicates the general ages, gender, and dates of the samples collected with
the data re-analyzed under the present theory.

Demographic Characteristics of Studies

Name of sample Date Sample Age Age SD Range Min Max Gender
size
cat 1000-1491-m 8901 96 23.33 9.9 38 14 52 1
cat 1 1491-2000-m 8801 140 26.13 8.87 38 16 54 1
cat 2 males-m 8401 416 33.09 13.02 57 10 57 1
cat 3 males-m 8801 464 34.11 12.06 17 19 74 1
cat 4 males-m 8801 427 40.07 10.74 45 19 64 1
cat 4 males-m 9001 195 41.4 8.5 55 19 74 1
cat 5 males-m 8901 80 34 10.81 54 13 67 1
ca1 1-400-f 8401 148 22.85 8.76 44 15 59 2
cat 401-700-f 8601 57 20.77 8.74 49 7 58 2
cat 701-1000-f 9101 39 25.71 11.21 48 12 56 2
cat 1000-1491-f 8901 119 23.33 9.9 38 14 52 2

414
cat 1 1491-2000-f 9001 250 26.13 8.87 38 16 54 2
cat 2 females-f 8401 291 33.09 13.02 57 10 57 2
cat 3 females-f 8801 530 34.11 12.06 17 19 74 2
cat 4 females-f 8801 152 36.46 9.5 33 22 55 2
cat 4 females-f 9001 71 38.77 7.63 44 22 66 2
cat 5 females-f 8901 140 34 10.81 54 13 67 2
LSI rating 5-6 -f 8801 71 5.5 0.32 2 5 6 2
LSI ratings 5-6-m 8801 48 5.5 0.32 2 5 6 1
LSI (0a) -m 8-9 8801 15 8.26 0.46 1 8 9 1
LSI (0a) -f 8-9 8801 13 8.26 0.46 1 8 9 2
LSI (1)-f 8-9 8901 28 8.5 0.76 1 8 9 2
LSI (1)-m 8-9 8901 41 8.5 0.46 1 8 9 1
LSI (2) -m 9-10 (Hvidson) 9201 32 9.5 0.28 1 9 10 1
LSI (2) -f 9-10 (Hvidson) 9201 46 9.5 0.28 1 9 10 2
LSI (3) -m 9-10 (Denise) 9201 22 9.5 0.48 1 9 10 1
LSI (3) -f 9-10 (Denise) 9201 24 9.5 0.48 1 9 10 2
LSI (4) -m 12 (Laurie) 9001 38 12 0 0 12 12 1
LSI (4) -f 12 (Laurie) 9001 44 12 0 0 12 12 2
LSI (5) -m 13 (Ann) 8901 33 13 0 0 13 13 1
LSI (5) -f 13 (Ann) 8901 49 13 0 0 13 13 2
LSI (5a) -m (Beth) 9201 25 14 0.26 1 13 14 1
LSI (5a) -f (Beth) 9201 32 13.94 0.41 1 13 14 2
LSI (6) -m 14-17 (Ila) 8701 22 14.61 0.62 3 14 17 1
LSI (6) -f 14-17 (Ila) 8701 31 14.72 0.62 3 14 17 2
Gifted (7) -m 14-18 (Deno) 9001 50 16 1.96 4 14 18 1
Gifted (7) - f 14-18 (Deno) 9001 49 16 1.96 4 14 18 2
LSI (8) -m 14-18 (Wolley) 8801 42 16 1.48 4 14 18 1
LSI (8) -f 14-18 (Wolley) 8801 49 16 1.48 4 14 18 2
LSI (9) -m 14-18 (Nony) 8801 161 16 1.95 4 14 18 1
LSI (10) -m 14 -18 (Nony) 8801 172 16 1.53 4 14 18 1
Bill's Study-m 8501 30 15.5 0.5 2 15 16 1
Bill's Study-f 8501 40 15.5 0.5 2 15 16 2
Miko's Study-m 8501 60 16.5 0.93 5 13 18 1
Miko's study -f 8501 31 16.5 0.93 5 13 18 2
Cote's study-m 9201 26 17 0.86 2 16 18 1
Cote's Study-f 9201 14 16.34 0.86 2 16 18 2
Spat's -m 9001 19 16.51 0.58 2 15 17 1
Spats -f 9001 11 16.51 0.58 2 15 17 2
544 Data Collection 8901 108 16.33 1.69 7 15 22 1
544 Data Collection 8901 42 16.42 3.44 7 15 22 2
Jour-45 m 8701 11 16.36 0.8 2 15 17 1
Jour-45 f 8701 34 16.35 0.77 2 15 17 2
Continuation group -m 9001 6 21.02 2.56 4 19 23 1
Continuation group -f 9001 6 21.02 2.56 4 19 23 2

415
Ron's Group-m 9001 12 24.6 3.67 6 18 27 1
Ron's Group -f 9001 12 24.5 3.47 6 18 27 2
Continuation group2-m? 9101 18 33.11 8.28 29 21 50 1
455-m group with 9201 3 30.27 7.45 26 23 50 1
demographic
455-f group 9201 15 30.27 7.45 26 23 50 2
Human Factors-m 9201 37 29 6.99 1
Human Factors-f 9201 57 33 8.89 2
Cal Tech-m short version 9001 26 21.34 2.99 1
Cal Tech-F short version 9001 38 22.65 4.74 2
TR 52 w/ Survey m 8601 28 24.39 5.21 1
TR 52 w/ Survey f 8601 7 21.85 1.21 2
TR sodata40 m 8803 26 33 6.61 26 23 49 1
TR sodata 40 f 8803 13 28.38 7.05 26 23 49 2
TR -m 57 8812 57 33 7.05 1
TR -m 36 8911 36 33 7.05 1
TR 50-590 M 9005 34 44 7.05 1
TR 50-590 f 9005 16 44 7.05 2
TR 7/90/ 10+ m 9007 41 33 7.05 1
TR 7/90/ 10+ m 9007 12 33 7.05 2
TR Image 14 -m 9100 14 33 7.05 1
Agri-m 8501 33 33 2.03 1
Agri-f 8501 25 25 2.4 2.03 2
Psy 403 m 8707 8 27 5.23 1
Psy 403 f 8707 21 27 5.23 2
Adoles 544 m 8703 6 35.08 9.56 37 22 59 1
Adoles 544 f 8703 8 35.08 9.56 37 22 59 2
Version 3 m 9101 68 29 11.5 35 15 50 1
Version 3 f 9101 72 29 11.5 35 15 50 2
Version 3 Mary Buck-m 9502 79 27 6.5 29 18 47 1
Version 3 Mary Buck -f 9502 87 24 6.4 27 18 38 2
LSI Version Jim Cox-m 9506 91 11 2 2 11 13 1
LSI Version Jim Cox-f 9506 83 11 2 2 11 13 2
PTPI Nurses 7704 70 11 2 2 11 13 2
PTPI Vet Students 7706 140 11 2 2 11 13 2
PTPI Miss. State Students. 7808 140 11 2 2 11 13 2

416
 Appendix E

Hierarchical Decision-Making Tree

Assumes a hierarchical model of solving problems with cognition at the top, followed by
abstract reasoning, the speed of processing, personality, and then career decision-making
found within each subgroup

1 IPS System
2 ¦--General Problem Solver
3 ¦ ¦--high arithmetic
4 ¦ ¦ °--high
5 ¦ ¦ °--highspeed
6 ¦ ¦ ¦--Flex
7 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--conceptual
8 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
9 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--7
10 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--25
11 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--analytical
12 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
13 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--13
14 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--31
15 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--Social
16 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--1
17 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--19
18 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--motor
19 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
20 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--9
21 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--27
22 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--analytical
23 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
24 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--15
25 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--33
26 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--social
27 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--3
28 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--21
29 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--conceptual
30 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
31 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--8
32 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--26

417
33 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--analytical
34 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
35 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--14
36 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--32
37 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--Social
38 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--2
39 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--20
40 ¦ ¦ °--Structure
41 ¦ ¦ ¦--conceptual
42 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Social
43 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--4
44 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--22
45 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
46 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--10
47 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--28
48 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--analytical
49 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
50 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--16
51 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--34
52 ¦ ¦ °--motor
53 ¦ ¦ ¦--conceptual
54 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--social
55 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--5
56 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--23
57 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
58 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--11
59 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--29
60 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--analytical
61 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
62 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--17
63 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--35
64 ¦ ¦ ¦--social
65 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--6
66 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--24
67 ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
68 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--12
69 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--30
70 ¦ ¦ °--analytical
71 ¦ ¦ °--social
72 ¦ ¦ ¦--18
418
73 ¦ ¦ °--36
74 ¦ °--Differential Problem Solver
75 ¦ °--average arithmetic
76 ¦ °--high
77 ¦ °--average high speed
78 ¦ ¦--Flex
79 ¦ ¦ ¦--conceptual
80 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
81 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--7
82 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--25
83 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--analytical
84 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
85 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--13
86 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ °--31
87 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--Social
88 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--1
89 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--19
90 ¦ ¦ °--motor
91 ¦ ¦ ¦--Analytical
92 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--9
93 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--27
94 ¦ ¦ ¦--analytical
95 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--social
96 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--15
97 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--33
98 ¦ ¦ ¦--social
99 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦--3
100 ¦ ¦ ¦ °--... 1 node w/ 0 sub
101 ¦ ¦ °--... 1 node w/ 11 sub
102 ¦ °--... 1 node w/ 45 sub
103 °--... 1 node w/ 190 sub
>

419
 420

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