1. People v. Juada y Navarro, G.R. No.

252276, November 11, 2021

[ G.R. No. 252276. November 11, 2021 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRICO

JUADA Y NAVARRO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

In robbery with homicide, the presence of treachery in killing the victim is considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance in fixing the proper penalty and civil liability of the
accused.1 We apply the doctrine in this appeal assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision
dated June 20, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10012.

ANTECEDENTS

Jerrico Juada y Navarro (Jerrico) was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide
committed against Florante Garcia (Florante) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3948-M-2011,2 thus:

The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accused Jerrico Juada y Navarro of Robbery with
Homicide penalized under the provisions of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of December 2011, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of
Bulacan, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with him cash
amounting to [₱]110.000.00 and a Colt MK IV caliber 45 pistol, belonging to one Florante
Garcia y Celestino, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, that on the occasion of the said
robbery and by reason thereof, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, treacherously assault, attack and shoot with a firearm he was then
provided with Florante Garcia y Celestino, who suffered mortal wounds that caused his
instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Jerrico pleaded not guilty.3 At the trial, the prosecution presented Amalia Valentin (Amalia),
PO2 Carlito Bucco, Jr. (PO2 Bucco, Jr.), Angel Bonbon (Angel), PO3 Richard Higoy (PO3
Higoy), Marlon Geronimo (Marlon), and Jonathan Garcia (Jonathan).

Amalia, a traffic enforcer, testified that on December 18, 2011 at around 11:45a.m., she saw a
man wearing a white cap, red and blue jacket, and whose face was covered with a blue
handkerchief. The man shot Florante on his temple. At that time, Florante was on board and
driving his owner-type jeep. Thereafter, the man took Florante's two (2) bags. Amalia and her
companion another enforcer, steered away to safety but the perpetrator chased after them on his
motorcycle. Amalia and her companion went to the police station and reported that the assailant
was tailing them.4

PO2 Bucco, Jr. corroborated Amalia's testimony. PO2 Bucco, Jr. narrated that he received
information from two (2) traffic enforcers who witnessed a killing incident and that the
perpetrator was after them. PO2 Bucco, Jr. stepped out of the police station and the enforcers
pointed to a man on board a motorcycle wearing a cap and a jacket. The man fled after seeing
that PO2 Bucco, Jr. drew his gun. The police officers went after the man but they were unable to
catch him.5

Angel recalled that on December 18, 2011 at around 12:00noon, she was eating in
the carinderia where she worked as a wait staff. A man wearing a white cap, red and blue jacket,
and blue handkerchief arrived and requested to use the comfort room. Afterwards, the man
grazed one of the dining tables. Angel saw that the table got stained with blood. Angel just
assumed that the man had a wound. The man went out of the carinderia. Angel then proceeded
to the comfort room and noticed that the man left his cap, jacket and handkerchief. Angel
smelled blood on the garments but did not give it much thought and returned to the table to finish
her lunch.6

PO3 Higoy testified that he verified the report of the traffic enforcers regarding a killing incident.
While in transit to the crime scene, PO3 Higoy received word that the assailant was headed
towards the direction of Barangay Wakas. Thereat, PO3 Higoy found a motorcycle abandoned in
a trucking site and two (2) bags containing money, gun and receipts. The people in the area told
PO3 Higoy that the man driving the motorcycle ran towards a carinderia. PO3 Higoy proceeded
to the carinderia where he secured the suspect's cap, jacket and handkerchief.7

Marlon narrated that Jerrico borrowed his motorcycle on the date of the incident. Jericco told
Marlon that he needed to borrow the motorcycle to buy spare parts for his tricycle. Around lunch
time, Marlon received a call from his aunt advising him to go to the police station to get his
motorcycle. On December 19, 2011, Jerrico called Marlon and apologized. Marlon told
Jerrico, "Pre, bakit naman ako at pati ang motorsiklo ko ay nadamay sa ginawa mo?" The
following day, Jerrico called again and asked Marlon about the status of Florante's case. Marlon
told Jerrico that the police wanted them. Marlon explained to the authorities that he just lent to
Jerrico the motorcycle. The police officers investigated and learned that Jerrico also had a
pending case for theft. The police officers requested the booking sheet of Jerrico and showed it
to Angel, Amalia and her companion. Angel positively identified Jerrico as the person who used
the comfort room in the carinderia.8

Jonathan testified that his neighbors informed him about the incident. Immediately, Jonathan
went to the crime scene and saw his father's body scrolled sideways inside the jeep. The police
officers returned to Jonathan the belongings of his lather and said that they will update him for
any development on the case. After two days, the authorities told Jonathan that they arrested the
suspect.
On the other hand, the defense presented Jerrico, Jayson Duhilag (Jayson) and Imelda Santos
(Imelda).

Jerrico testified that he worked as a kargador in the fish port. On December 18, 2011 at around
9:00a.m., Jerrico borrowed Marlon's motorcycle to buy spare parts for his tricycle. Thereafter,
Jerrico parked the motorcycle in the lower portion of the fish port and worked on his tricycle. At
around 11:00a.m., Jerrico discovered that the motorcycle was no longer there and presumed that
Marlon already took it back. Jerrico waited for Marlon to return so that he could thank him
personally. Marlon did not arrive so Jerrico left to drink with his kumpare named Bukol. After an
hour, Jerrico fetched his wife in Meycauayan, Bulacan. They went home and did chores. At
around 2:00p.m., Jerrico heard from a neighbor that he was accused of robbery with homicide.
Jerrico denied any involvement in the incident.

Jayson narrated that he saw Jerrico on the day of the incident aboard a motorcycle wearing a blue
jacket. Jerrico parked the motorcycle and alighted. Later, Jayson learned that Jerrico was looking
for the motorcycle. Similarly, Imelda testified that she saw Jerrico at around 9:00a.m. on the day
of the incident. Jerrico alighted from a motorcycle a few meters away from her. After an hour, a
certain Marlon arrived and took the motorcycle.9

On September 25, 2017, the RTC convicted Jerrico and held that circumstantial evidence exist
that he committed the crime,10 viz.:

From the foregoing narration and portrayal of the events that took place on the date of the
incident, a chain leading to the accused has been fashioned. More importantly, it is an unbroken
chain which directly entangled the accused into its sphere. x x x. A judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be upheld when the circumstances established would lead to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as being the
author of the crime.

xxxx

Article 294 provides that "the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, x x x" However, with
the enactment of RA 9346, only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed upon the accused,
without eligibility for parole.

As to the civil liability, the accused is adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim the following: 1)
[P]100,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim; 2) [₱]100,000.00 as moral damages:
and 3) [₱]100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused, Jerrico Juada [y] Navarro is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of "Robbery with Homicide." Thus, said
accused is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The Court likewise adjudge accused to pay the heirs of the victim the following: 1)
[₱]100,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim; 2) [₱]100,000.00 as moral damages;
and 3) [₱]100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Jerrico elevated the case to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10012. Jerrico
claimed that the prosecution failed to prove his identity as the perpetrator of the crime, and that
the RTC failed to consider his defense of denial and alibi. On June 20, 2019, the CA affirmed the
RTC's findings,11 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 25, 2017 of the
Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 84, in Criminal Case No. 3948-M-2011,
finding accused-appellant Jerrico Juada [y] Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery
with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal. The parties opted not to file supplemental briefs considering that all issues
have already been exhaustively discussed in their pleadings before the CA.12

RULING

In the prosecution of criminal offenders, conviction is not always based on direct evidence. The
Rules of Court allows resort to circumstantial evidence provided the following conditions are
satisfied, to wit: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.13 The Court explained that a judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, compatible with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and in conflict with the
notion that he is innocent.14 Here, none of the prosecution witnesses testified having seen Jerrico
killed and robbed Florante. Yet, the corpus of circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken
chain of events pointing to Jerrico's guilt.

First, on December 18, 2011 at around 11:45a.m., Amalia saw a man wearing a white cap, red
and blue jacket, and with his face covered with a blue handkerchief. The man shot Florante and
took his bags containing money and gun. The man boarded a motorcycle and fled.15

Second, on even date at around 12:00noon, Angel witnessed the man wearing the same set of
clothes arrived in the carinderia where she was working. The man requested to use the comfort
room and grazed one of the dining tables which got stained with blood.16
Third, Angel watched the man as he was leaving the carinderia. Afterwards, Angel went to the
comfort room and discovered that the man left the white cap, the red and blue jacket, and the
blue handkerchief. Angel smelled blood on the garments.17

Fourth, Angel identified the man as Jerrico through his previous booking sheet at the police
station and in open court.18

Fifth, the police officers recognized that the suspect used Marlon's motorcycle in committing the
crime and recovered it together with Florante's bags at a trucking site.19 The authorities also
proceeded to the carinderia where they secured the suspect's cap, jacket and handkerchief.20

Sixth, Marlon testified that Jerrico borrowed his motorcycle on the day of the incident. At lunch
time, Marlon received a call from his aunt advising him to go to the police station to get his
motorcycle.21

Seventh, Jerrico apologized to Marlon and asked about the status of Florante's case.22

To the unprejudiced mind, these proven facts, when weaved together, lead to no other conclusion
but of Jerrico's culpability for the crime. Amalia was sure that Florante's assailant wore a white
cap, red and blue jacket, and face covered with a blue handkerchief. Angel positively identified
Jerrico as the man in the carinderia wearing the same set of clothes. The police officers
recognized that the suspect used Marlon's motorcycle. Marlon was certain that it was Jerrico who
borrowed his motorcycle when the incident happened. It is also perplexing why Jerrico
apologized to Marlon and inquired about Florante's case if he was totally unaware of the incident
in the first place. More telling is the short interval of time between the witnesses' accounts that
Jerrico borrowed the motorcycle and the commission of the crime. This forecloses a host of
possibilities that a person, other than Jerrico, robbed and killed Florante.

Corollarily, Jerrico's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive declaration of
the prosecution witnesses. These negative defenses are self-serving and undeserving of weight in
law absent clear and convincing proof.23 On this point, we stress that the CA and the RTC's
assessment on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies are given the
highest degree of respect,24 especially if there is no fact or circumstance of weight or substance
that was overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, which could affect the result of the
case.25 To be sure, the prosecution witnesses harbored no ill motive to falsely testify against
Jerrico.26 At any rate, Jerrico did not adduce evidence that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.27 Admittedly, Jerrico was in the
same municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan at the time the crime was committed.28

Anent Jerrico's criminal liability, robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own
definition and special penalty. Apropos is Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz.:

ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed; x x x

In this kind of crime, the offender's original intent is to commit robbery and the homicide must
only be incidental. The killing may occur before, during, or even after the robbery.29 It is only
the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration.30 It
is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the crime. It is also of no moment that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense and includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.31 As such, the crime is robbery with homicide when the killing was committed to
facilitate the taking of the property or escape of the culprit, to preserve the possession of the loot,
to prevent the discovery of robbery, or to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.32

The special complex crime of robbery with homicide has the following elements, to wit: (1) the
taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with animo lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed.33 All the elements are present in this
case. Jerrico, on board a motorcycle and armed with a gun, shot and divested Florante of his
personal properties. Evidently, the taking was with intent to gain and was accomplished with
violence against person. Thereafter, Jerrico steered away and fled. Verily, the primary objective
of Jerrico was to rob and the killing of the victim was only incidental to facilitate the taking of
the property and to prevent apprehension.

Notably, the information for robbery with homicide against Jerrico alleged treachery but the
RTC did not rule on the presence or absence of this aggravating circumstance. Further, the RTC
pointed out that the crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. The RTC then discussed that Republic Act (RA) No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of
death penalty, and reminded that only reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without eligibility
for parole may be meted to the accused. Confusingly, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua but did not specify in the decretal portion of its decision that the accused is not entitled
to parole. Also, the RTC awarded civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages at
₱100,000.00 each to the heirs of the victim, which are granted only if the penalty is death but it
cannot be imposed due to RA No. 9346. Curiously, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings as to the
penalty and civil liability of the accused despite these baffling dispositions. We now clarify these
matters.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any
resistance, which may be put up by the offended party.34 Here, the prosecution established that
Jerrico shot Florante on his temple without warning. Florante was driving his owner-type jeep
and was unsuspecting of the threat to his life. The unexpected onslaught from a masked assailant
caught Florante off guard. The swiftness and stealth of the attack showed that Florante, who was
unarmed, had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The body of Florante even remained
scrolled sideways inside the vehicle. The location of the gunshot wound likewise evinced that
Florante was completely unaware of the danger that resulted in his untimely demise, thus,
ensuring the execution of the crime.

In People v. Escote, Jr.,35 the Court En Banc settled that treachery may be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide although it is classified as a crime
against property, to wit:

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime
specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with
homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of
robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the
crime.

xxxx

In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with

homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against
persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property.
Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of
"robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or
as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as
a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating
circumstance. (Emphases Supplied)

In People v. Baron,36 the Court echoed that treachery is not considered as a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide but as a generic aggravating circumstance,
the presence of which merits the imposition of the higher penalty, thus:

As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr., treachery is not a qualifying circumstance

but "a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime". Corollarily,
"Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the
penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However,
aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law
or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not
be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty". In the case at bar, "treachery
is not an element of robbery with homicide". Neither is it "inherent in the crime of robbery
with homicide". As such, treachery may be properly considered in increasing the penalty
for crime.
In this case, the presence of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance would have merited
the imposition of the death penalty. However, in view of the subsequent passage of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines," we are mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. (Emphases Supplied)

Similarly, in People v. Layug,37 the Court imposed a higher penalty for the crime of robbery
with homicide because the victim was treacherously killed, viz.:

Again, robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is
a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed
treacherously. Thus, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is appreciated in the crime
of robbery with homicide only as to the killing but not as to the robbery. x x x. The CA,
therefore, is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery in imposing the
higher penalty as it was shown chat the killing of the victim was done treacherously, xxx.
(Emphases Supplied)

To reiterate, the crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. Under Article 63 of Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance.1a⍵⍴h!1 In this case,
the presence of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance would have merited the
imposition of the death penalty. In view of RA No. 9346, however, the Court is mandated to
impose on Jerrico the penalty of reclusion perpetua with qualification that he is not eligible for
parole.38 As to Jerrico's civil liability, the CA and the RTC properly awarded ₱100,000.00 civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages.39 We also find it
appropriate to grant temperate damages of P50,000.00 considering that no documentary evidence
of burial or funeral expenses was submitted in court.40 Lastly, all the monetary awards shall earn
six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.41

FOR THESE REASONS, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated
June 20, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10012 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Jerrico
Juada y Navarro (Jerrico) is found GUILTY of robbery with homicide and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Jerrico is also DIRECTED to
pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and 850,000.00 as temperate damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until full
payment.1a⍵⍴h!1

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 People v. Escote, Jr., 448 Phil. 749, 788 (2003).

2 Rollo, p. 118.

3 Id. at 59.

4 Id. at 60 and 79.

5 Id. at 63.

6 Id. at 60 and 84.

7 Id. at 61-62 and 87.

8 Id. at 61, 93-94, and 124-125.

9 Id. at 64-65.

10 Id. at 65-69.

11 CA rollo, pp. 117-128; penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.

12 Id. at 30.

13 Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

14 People v. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 24 (1997). See also People v. Dela Cruz, 397 Phil. 401,
420 (2000).

15 TSN, September 7, 2012, pp. 5-8.

16 TSN, October 2012, pp. 6-7.

17 TSN, October 5, 2012, p. 8.

18 TSN, March 10, 2014, p. 13.

19 TSN, May 17, 2013, pp. 5-7.

20 TSN, October 5, 2012, p. 9.

21 TSN, January 25, 2013, pp. 4-7.

22 TSN, January 25, 2013, pp. 8-10.

23 People v. Togahan, 551 Phil. 997 (2007).

24 People v. Matignas, et al., 428 Phil. 834 (2002).

25 People v. Orosco, 757 Phil. 299, 310 (2015).

26 People v. Abierra, 833 Phil. 276 (2018).

27 People v. Madelo Espina, 383 Phil. 656 (2000).

28 CA rollo, p. 127.

29 People v. Palema, G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019,

30 People v. Mangulabnan, 99 Phil. 992 (1956).

31 People v. Ebet, 649 Phil. 181 (2010).

32 People v. Ibanez, 710 Phil. 728 (2013).

33 People v. Madrelejos, 828 Phil. 732 (2018).

34 People v. Cando, 398 Phil. 225 (2000); and People v. Ulep, 474 Phil. 790 (2004).

35 448 Phil. 749, 788 (2003).

36 635 Phil. 608 (2010).

37 818 Phil. 1021, 1032-1033 (2017).

38 A.M No. 15-08-02-SC or the Guidelines for the proper use of the phrase "without
eligibility for parole" in indivisible penalties.

39 People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).

40 Id.

41 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).

2. Abuyo y Sagrit v. People, G.R. No. 250495, July 6, 2022

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 250495. July 06, 2022 ]

LEO ABUYO Y SAGRIT, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

The law of nature — the "foundation of the privilege to use all reasonable means to repel an
aggression that endangers one's own life and the lives of others" — does not require the accused
to use unerring judgment when they had the reasonable grounds to believe that they were in
apparent danger of losing their lives or suffering great bodily injury.1 We observe this doctrine
in the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 before this Court assailing the Decision3 dated June 28,
2019 and the Resolution4 dated November 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 41325.

ANTECEDENTS

On August 16, 2011, at around 7:30 p.m., petitioner Leo Abuyo y Sagrit (Leo) and his wife were
heading home on board their motorcycle. Suddenly, Leo saw Cesar Tapel (Cesar) and his son,
Charles Tapel (Charles), who were armed with a fan knife (balisong) and a gun, respectively.
Thereafter, Cesar and Charles blocked Leo's way. However, Leo swerved the motorcycle to the
left and sped towards the house of his father, Leonardo Abuyo (Leonardo). Charles followed and
went outside Leonardo's house which is just beside that of Leo's house. Furious, Charles kicked
the bamboo fence of Leonardo's house, pointed his gun to people, and yelled for Leo to come
out. Leonardo tried to pacify Charles, but Cesar arrived and stabbed Leonardo in the lower left
part of his chest. Leonardo ran towards Leo's house, but Cesar still pursued him with the fan
knife. At that instance, Leo went outside and chased Cesar to the former's house. In their
confrontation, Cesar tried to stab Leo. As a defense, Leo got hold of a bolo on top of the table
and hacked Cesar's right hand. Consequently, Cesar dropped the fan knife. Cesar managed to
pick up the fan knife but Leo stabbed him again in the lower part of his stomach. Later, Cesar
died due to stab injury on his left abdomen and multiple lacerated wounds on his right
hand.5 Leo voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities after the incident.6 Accordingly,
Leo was charged with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte,
Branch 38 (RTC), thus:

That on or about 7:30 o'clock (sic) in the evening of August 16, 2011 at Purok 1, Brgy.
Dogongan, [M]unicipality of Daet, [P]rovince of Camarines Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, while armed
with stones and bladed weapon (bolo), did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one CESAR TAPEL y BACERDO, hitting the latter on his left abdomen
and other parts of his body that resulted to his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Leo pleaded not guilty.8 At the trial, Leo contended that he merely acted in self-defense and
defense of a relative.9 In a Judgment10 dated December 8, 2017, the RTC convicted Leo of
Homicide and ruled that he failed to prove all the elements of self-defense. The RTC found that
Leo employed means that was not reasonably necessary to repel the unlawful aggression.
However, the RTC appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,11 to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Leo Abuyo y Sagrit GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and he is sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months[,] and one (1) day prision correccional[,] as minimum[,] to eight
(8) years of prision mayor[,] as maximum.

The accused is further adjudged to pay the heirs of Cesar Tapel y Bacerdo civil indemnity of
[P]50,000.00, moral damages of [P]50,000.00[,] and temperate damages of [P]30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.12

Leo elevated the case to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 41325. In a Decision13 dated June
28, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification as to the award of damages, viz.:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment
dated December 8, 2017 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38 of Daet, Camarines
Norte finding the accused-appellant Leo Abuyo y Sagrit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Leo Abuyo y Sagrit is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two
(2) months[,] and one (1) day of prision correccional[,] as minimum, to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Cesar Tapel the amounts of [P]75,000.00
as moral damages, [P]75,000.00 as civil indemnity[,] and [P]50,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.14

Leo sought reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution15 dated November 12, 2019. Hence,
this petition.16 Leo maintains that the means he employed was reasonably necessary to repel the
unlawful aggression from Cesar and Charles, who were both armed and had clear intent to kill
him.17

RULING

The petition is meritorious.

The admission of self-defense or defense of a relative frees the prosecution from the burden of
proving that the accused committed the crime. The burden is shifted to the accused to prove that
their act was justified. These justifying circumstances must be clearly established through
convincing evidence. They cannot be appreciated if uncorroborated by competent evidence or is
patently doubtful. Here, Leo admitted to be the author of Cesar's death but invoked the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative.18 As such, the burden of evidence shifts
to Leo to prove these defenses.19 In self-defense, the following elements must concur: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.20 In defense of a relative, the accused likewise needs to establish the
first two requisites of self-defense. In lieu of the third requirement, however, the accused must
prove that "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the
defense had no part therein."21

The first requisite of "unlawful aggression on the part of the victim" is the indispensable element
of both self-defense and defense of a relative.22 If no unlawful aggression attributed to the
victim was established, the defenses are unavailing for there is nothing to prevent or repel.23 For
unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety.24 Anent
the second requisite, "reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression" envisions a rational equivalence between the perceived danger and the means
employed to repel the attack. Yet, the Court recognized that in self-defense or defense of a
relative, the instinct for self-preservation will outweigh rational thinking. Thus, "when it is
apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to
sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences."25 The third requisite
of "lack of sufficient provocation" requires the person invoking self-defense to not have
antagonized the attacker. A provocation is deemed sufficient if it is "adequate to excite the
person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity."26

Here, it is undisputed that the first and third requisites of self-defense and defense of a relative
are present. There was unlawful aggression when Cesar attacked and pursued Leonardo, and
turned and attempted to stab Leo. In these circumstances, Leo had the right to repel the unlawful
aggression in order to protect himself and his father. Also, there was no provocation on the part
of Leo since the attack originated from Cesar and Charles. Leo and his wife were peacefully
traversing their way home when Cesar and Charles blocked their way and chased them.
Similarly, Leo was already in his father's house when Cesar and Charles started the commotion.

Nonetheless, the CA and the RTC held that Leo failed to prove the second requisite of
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression.27 Notably, this requisite does not imply material commensurability between the
means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence which presupposes
the consideration not only of the nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender and the
assailant – but of the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis-à-vis the unlawful
aggression.28 Moreover, the law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each
particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in
accordance with the rules of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any
reasonable doubt as to whether or not they employed rational means to repel the aggression.29
Corollarily, the courts should not demand that the accused conduct themselves with the poise of
a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. It must be assumed that one who is
assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate, and make comparisons
that can easily be made in the calmness of reason. The accused had no time to reflect and to
reason out their responses. The test is whether the accused's subjective belief as to the imminence
and seriousness of the danger was reasonable or not,30 and the reasonableness of the accused's
belief must be viewed from their standpoint at the time they acted.31 The right of a person to
take life in self-defense and defense of a relative or a stranger arises from their belief in the
necessity for doing so; and such belief and reasonableness thereof are to be judged in light of the
circumstances as they then appeared to the accused, not in light of circumstances as they would
appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature arid
imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill.32

In this case, the Court finds that Leo used reasonable means to defend himself and his father. The
facts show that even after Leo hacked Cesar's right hand, Cesar's unlawful aggression did not
cease when he regained possession of the knife. At that point, Cesar's determination to kill Leo
and Leonardo was aggravated — more imminent and more dangerously real — into a fixed
mindset to subdue Leo's opposition. The CA and the RTC's reasoning that Leo could have
grabbed Cesar's knife when it fell off, and that Leo could have escaped and run away33 is
unfathomable to a person juxtaposed in the same pressing situation. For one, there is no
indication that the knife was remotely displaced from Cesar's location. In fact, Cesar
immediately regained possession of his knife. The weapon did not fall far from Cesar's control.
Cesar only lost grip of the knife momentarily. Yet, the CA and the RTC are still baffled why Leo
did not strike another less fatal blow, enough to disable or disarm Cesar from pursuing further
attacks, thus:

RTC Judgment

[Leo] testified that after [Cesar] stabbed his father, the latter ran towards [Leo's] house. Cesar,
however, pursued and followed his father.1a⍵⍴h!1 When [Leo] tried to stop Cesar, the latter
turned to him and tried to stab him with a knife. [Leo], however, was able to get hold of
a bolo and, with it, struck Cesar's right hand such that Cesar lost hold of his knife (TSN, July 10,
2012, p. 11). At this juncture, [Leo] had opportunity to secure Cesar's knife, or run away, or
strike Cesar in order to – and merely to – disable him from further attack. However, [Leo] did
not, and instead stabbed Cesar at the stomach after seeing that the latter was able to get back the
knife. He could have struck Cesar's hand again, but this did not come to his mind allegedly
because of fear (TSN, July 10, 2012, p. 13). Be that as it may, stabbing Cesar at the stomach with
a bolo is far from being a reasonable means to carry out [Leo's] intention to repel or parry Cesar's
thrusts.34 (Emphasis supplied)

CA Decision

[Leo] argues that stabbing Cesar on the stomach was reasonable, considering that Cesar was
again in possession of the knife and was attempting to stab him. Further, [Leo] was afraid of
Charles shooting him with his gun. OSG parries his arguments by stating that after Cesar bad
again picked up the knife, [Leo] could have just disarmed him again. Further, stabbing Cesar
would not have prevented a gun attack on him by Charles. Thus, stabbing Cesar on the stomach
was not necessary nor reasonable.

We agree with the OSG. As found by the trial court, [Leo] admitted that he had successfully
disarmed Cesar. Although Cesar was able to regain possession of the knife, stabbing Cesar on
the stomach was an extreme measure if the intention was truly to simply repel or parry the latter's
thrusts. As compared to Cesar, [Leo] had the upper hand. He had a bolo, which could readily
cause more damage than a fan knife. To escape, [Leo] could have simply disarmed Cesar again,
or even caused him injury to prevent him from further pursuit. Instead, [Leo] dealt him a fatal
wound, which was not warranted by the circumstances. Thus, the second requisite is lacking in
this case.35 (Emphasis supplied)

However, the CA and the RTC's identical reasoning is a product of tranquil minds basking in the
comfort of judicial chambers. Unlike magistrates, Leo, at the narrow crossroads of survival and
death, had no equanimity to think, calculate, and make comparisons that can easily be made in
the calmness of reason. Confronted with immediate threat and danger to his life and his father's
life, and terrorized by a looming vicious attack, he had no choice but to defend himself and his
father against their wounded yet more angered assailant. Moreover, Leo's father was already
wounded at that time. Leo's fear was compounded by such sight. The unavailability of any help
from Leonardo doubly impelled Leo to adopt whatever means available to him to defend their
lives against Cesar and Charles. Fear of death, and not criminal intent, is the powerful cause that
moved Leo to struck wildly at their would be killer. Leo stabbed blindly, thinking only to save
his life and his father's. If it appeared later that Leo had wounded Cesar in a vulnerable body
part, it was not because he was a cruel and bloodthirsty killer. The only reason was that Leo was
fighting desperately for his very life and the life of his father. Leo was animated only by his
mortal fear of the unyielding aggressor. Leo moved like a wild beast by the elemental instinct of
survival, obviously but understandably undiscerning of the situs of his strikes.36

In People v. Olarbe,37 the accused and his wife were awakened by the sound of a gunshot and
shouting from the deceased, who was holding a rifle and a bolo. The deceased forcibly entered
the accused's house. When the deceased aimed the gun at the accused, the latter grabbed the gun
and grappled for its possession. When the accused managed to wrestle the gun from the
deceased, he shot the latter. However, the deceased still managed to get his bolo from his waist
and turned his assault to the accused's common-law wife. The accused once again grabbed
the bolo and hacked the deceased causing his death. In that case, the Court explained that all the
elements of self-defense are present, viz.:

The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in
emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in
law for the consequences. Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not material
commensurability[.]38 (Emphasis supplied)
In Ganal, Jr. v. People,39 the deceased went to the house of accused armed with a knife and
started throwing stones. When the father of the accused tried to calmly ask the deceased to go
home, he pushed open the gate of the house and hit the accused's father in the chest, causing the
latter to fall and lose consciousness. Seeing this, the accused rushed inside the house, got his gun,
and fired a warning shot in the air. When the deceased continued moving closer to the accused,
the accused shot him once. When the deceased did not retreat and instead continued moving
forward, accused shot him four more times. The deceased died instantly. The Court ruled that the
accused's killing of the deceased was justified. The Court stressed that the instinct of self-
preservation prevailed upon the accused during the fateful incident.40

Similarly, the particular circumstances which confronted Leo at the time of the incident
condoned the means he employed to protect his father and himself. To reiterate, the measure of
rational necessity is to be found in the situation as it appeared to Leo at the time of the incident.
The law does not require that Leo should mete out his blows in such manner that, upon a calm
and deliberate review of the incident, it will not appear that he exceeded the precise limits of
what was absolutely necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat, or that he struck one blow
more than what was absolutely necessary to save his own life, or that he failed to hold his hand
so as to avoid inflicting a fatal wound where a less severe stroke might have served the
purpose.41 Under such conditions, Leo cannot be expected to reflect coolly nor wait after each
blow to determine its effects.

More importantly, three crucial facts reveal that Leo was impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation rather than the homicidal urge of one bent on killing. First, Leo never took
advantage of the opportunity to race off an attack against the disarmed Cesar who lost grip of the
knife. Leo could have preempted Cesar's repossession of the knife with swift, successive, and
injurious blows. Rather, Leo held his ground and was forced to act only when Cesar repossessed
the fan knife. Second, there was a threatening presence of Charles who was holding a gun that
could be fired at any given moment during the incident. If Leo was actuated by homicidal
intentions, he would have persisted in his attack against Cesar and thereafter, he would have also
raced off an attack against Charles to preempt a possible gunfire. Leo would have attempted to
kill Charles as well, but he did nothing of that sort. Leo only acted reactively and retaliated
blows only against the striking aggressor. Third, Leo voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities after the incident. As the Court repeatedly observed, unexplained flight is an
indication of guilt.42 The guilty flee when no man pursueth but the innocent are as bold as a
lion.43

In sum, the rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent the
attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury.44 Cesar's act of attacking Leo and Leonardo
with a fan knife was a very real danger to their lives. Charles' possession of a gun, which could
be fired anytime during the stabbing commotion, exacerbates the danger that lurks on Leo and
Leonardo's mortality. Leo had to repel the best way he can especially that Leonardo, who was
already injured, cannot be expected to aid in his defense. Lastly, that the stomach wound which
Leo inflicted upon Cesar proved to be fatal does not make the means he employed any less
reasonable under the circumstances. Taken together, Leo is entitled to an acquittal on the
grounds of self-defense and defense of relative.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2019 and the
Resolution dated November 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41325
are REVERSED. Petitioner Leo Abuyo y Sagrit is ACQUITTED of the crime of Homicide
and ORDERED to be RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from detention, unless he is being lawfully
held for another cause. Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation. The Director is directed to report to this Court the action
taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 People v. Olarbe, 836 Phil. 1015, 1028-1029 (2018).

2 Rollo, pp. 12-21.

3 Id. 27-36. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.

4 Id. at 39-40.

5 Id. at 28-29 and 51-53. See also TSN, June 14, 2012, pp. 4-14; and TSN, July 10, 2012,
pp. 6-12.

6 Rollo, pp. 29 and 52. See also TSN, September 10, 2014, p. 7; and TSN, June 9, 2015,
pp. 3-4.

7 Records, p. 1.

8 Id. at 24.

9 Rollo, pp. 29 and 51-52.

10 Id. at 51-57. Penned by Presiding Judge Roberto A. Escaro.

11 Id. at 54-57.

12 Id. at 56-57.
13 Id. at 27-36.

14 Id. at 36.

15 Id. at 39-40.

16 Id. at 12-21.

17 Id. at 17-19.

18 Id. at 29 and 51-52.

19 Labosta v. People, G.R. No. 243926, June 23, 2020, .

20 People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020, .

21 People v. Eduarte, 265 Phil. 304, 309 (1990).

22 People v. Fontanilla, 680 Phil. 155, 165 (2012).

23 Calim v. CA, 404 Phil. 391, 402 (2001).

24 Andal v. Sandiganbayan, 258-A Phil. 591, 596 (1989).

25 People v. Encomienda, 150-B Phil. 419, 434 (2003).

26 People v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434, 435 (1941).

27 Rollo, pp. 34 and 55-56.

28 Espinosa v. People, 629 Phil. 432, 438 (2010); and People v. Gutual, 324 Phil. 244,
259-260 (1996).

29 People v. Olarbe, 836 Phil. 1015, 1029 (2018), citing Jayme v. People, 372 Phil. 796,
803-804 (1999).

30 People v. Olarbe, id., citing Baker v. Commonwealth, 677 S. W. 2d 876.

31 People v. Olarbe, id., citing State v. Leidholm, 334 N. W. 2d 811; and Tanguma v.
State, App. -Corpus Christi, 721 S. W. 2d 408.

32 People v. Olarbe, id., citing 40 CJS Sec. 131.

33 Rollo, pp. 34 and 55-56.

34 Id. at 55-56.
 35 Id. at 34.

36 People v. Agripa, 284-A Phil. 93, 99-100 (1992).

37 836 Phil. 1015 (2018).

38 Id. at 1030.

39 G.R. No. 248130, December 2, 2020, .

40 Id.

41 Cano v. People, 459 Phil. 416, 436 (2003).

42 People v. Dejucos, 240 Phil. 425, 430 (1987); People v. Hecto, 219 Phil. 625, 635
(1985); and People v. Millarpe, 219 Phil. 508, 512-513 (1985).

43 People v. Espinosa, 259 Phil. 884, 890 (1989).

44 Masipequiña v. CA, 257 Phil. 710, 717 (1989), citing U.S. v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367, 370
(1907).

3. Turalba y Villegas v. People, G.R. No. 216453, March 16, 2022

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 216453. March 16, 2022 ]

OLIGARIO TURALBA Y VILLEGAS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

The Court resolves the petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the August 28, 2014 Decision [2] and
December 10, 2014 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35556, which affirmed
petitioner Oligario Turalba y Villegas' (Oligario) conviction for Carnapping, defined and penalized under
Republic Act (RA) No. 6539,[4] as amended.
Oligario was charged with Carnapping under the following Information:
That on or about the twentieth (20 th) day of November 2007, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of Gregorio Calimag [Gregorio], did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carnap, take, steal, and carry away one (1) 1996 model CRV Honda Wagon
with Plate No. RFC-269, belonging to [Gregorio], to the damage and prejudice of the latter. However, said
CRV Honda Wagon was recovered.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]When arraigned, Oligario pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits then ensued. [6]
The facts for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in their brief
filed with the CA, are as follows:
On November 20, 2007 at around 3:45 in the afternoon, [Gregorio] was driving his Honda CRV with Plate
No. RFC-269 from Kalaklan, Olongapo City and headed to Mulawain Bakery Shop at 18 th Street corner
Caron Street, West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, to buy some bread. Upon arriving at 18 th Street, he
parked his car ten (10) meters away across Mulawain Bakery but he left the car key inside the vehicle.
After about two minutes and while he was about to get hold of the bread he bought, he turned around
to check on his car but he noticed that his car was already moving towards Peping Mami along Caron
Street. He immediately flagged down and boarded a tricy[c]le to pursue his car. In the course of the
pursuit, Gregorio continuously shouted, "Carnaper yan harangin ninyo yan sasakyan, akin yan, carnaper
yan harangin ninyo yan sasakyan, akin iyan!" until the car was caught on a traffic congestion along Brill
Street corner 20th Street, West Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. Thereat, Gregorio immediately rushed inside
his car and got hold of [Oligario] for the latter not to be able to escape. He also instructed the tricycle
drive to immediately call the police.

It was around 3:50 x x x in the afternoon of November 20, 2007 when PO2 George Esmillarin of PNP
Station 1, Olongapo City, received a call from a concerned citizen informing their office that a carnapped
vehicle was being chased along Brill Street going to the direction of the Old Public Market. Upon
receiving said call, PO2 Reychard V. Valencia, together with SPO4 Danilo Cañutal, on board their service
mobile, immediately proceeded to the area to verify the report. Upon passing by Brill Street corner 20 th
Street, concerned citizens flagged them down and pointed to the carnapped vehicle. When they
proceeded to the car, they saw [Oligario] being cornered by Gregorio. Upon seeing the police officers,
Gregorio turned over [Oligario] to them. SPO4 Cañutal informed [Oligario] of his constitutional rights.
Thereafter, PO2 Valencia conducted a body search on [Oligario] where a butterfly knife of about seven
inches in length was recovered from him. They then brought [Oligario] and Gregorio to the police station
for further investigation.[7]In defense, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Labarcon Evangelista (Dr. Evangelista) testified and
narrated that she first met Oligario on October 24, 2007 at the Mariveles Mental Hospital for evaluation
and management of his mental condition. After tests, Dr. Evangelista assessed Oligario with psychosis
("nawawala sa sarili") due to use of alcohol and methamphetamine. She prescribed medication and
scheduled a follow-up checkup, but Oligario was not able to come back as he was already detained for
the carnapping incident.[8]
In its Decision[9] dated December 6, 2012, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City (RTC),
convicted Oligario of Carnapping, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds OLIGARIO TURALBA y VILLEGAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Carnapping defined and penalized under [RA No.] 6539[,] as amended[,] and hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, and to pay the
cost.

SO ORDERED.[10]The RTC ruled that all the elements of the crime are present. It is clear that Oligario
surreptitiously took and drove off Gregorio's vehicle without consent and with intent to gain. The RTC
gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witness there being no ill motive for them to falsely
charge Oligario. On the other hand, the RTC rejected Oligario's insanity defense considering that the
manner by which he perpetrated the offense suggests full consciousness of his criminal act. Dr.
Evangelista's medical assessment was rendered inconclusive and insufficient proof of the mental
condition of Oligario.[11]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, [12] and confirmed that Oligario's psychosis cannot exculpate
him from criminal liability. Prior to the commission of the crime, Dr. Evangelista only met with Oligario
once and was not yet able to identify the kind of psychosis he was afflicted with. [13] Oligario then filed a
motion for reconsideration,[14] which was denied by the CA in its Resolution [15] dated December 10, 2014;
hence, this petition.

Oligario maintained that he was suffering from psychosis, negating his voluntariness and free will, at the
time of the commission of the crime. [16] Dr. Evangelista sufficiently attested to his illness, and mentioned
in the Clinical Summary that his "condition could lead to unusual behavior, faulty judgment, irrational
thoughts, impulsive acts and break from reality."[17] Invoking the Court's ruling in People v. Rafanan, Jr.[18]
(Rafanan) and People v. Antonio, Jr.[19] (Antonio), Oligario argues that even if his insanity cannot
completely absolve him of criminal liability, it can at least be considered as a mitigating circumstance. [20]
In the Comment[21] filed by the OSG for the People, it was alleged that the issue of insanity is a factual
one, which is beyond the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Oligario was not able to prove his insanity prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
crime. The exempting circumstance of insanity is not easily available to an accused as insanity is the
exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity bears the burden to
prove it with clear and convincing evidence since the accused invoking the affirmative defense admits to
have committed the crime, but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. Oligario utterly
failed to present convincing evidence to establish his alleged insanity at the time of the carnapping
incident. His conviction must stand, and the penalty cannot be reduced in relation to the alleged
presence of a mitigating circumstance because the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) do
not apply to the law on carnapping.[22]
In Oligario's Reply,[23] he reiterated the allegations in his petition, and implored this Court to exercise its
discretionary power, in the higher interest of justice, to review the assailed ruling of the CA. [24]
We find no merit in the petition.

The RTC and the CA both found that all the elements of Carnapping are present in this case with Oligario
as the perpetrator. He did not present evidence to rebut the lower courts' findings. Oligario, however,
raised the defense of insanity in claiming that he should not be found criminally liable.

Insanity is an exempting circumstance under paragraph 1, [25] Article 12 of the RPC. An insane accused is
not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by
punishing an insane accused because by reason of their mental state, they do not have control over their
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. In our jurisdiction, the courts have
established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, they
acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or
that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.[26]
As a defense, insanity is in the nature of a confession and avoidance. [27] The person who asserts insanity
is, in effect, admitting to the commission of the crime. Consequently, the burden of proof shifts to him,
who must prove his defense with clear and convincing evidence. [28] Differently stated, after a plea of
insanity, "the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of
conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted
committing the crime."[29]
Insanity is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an exception rather than the
rule on the human condition. Insanity as a condition of the mind, is not susceptible of the usual means
of proof as "no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state of condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by [their] behavior." [30] Thus, the accused must prove
the following: first, that the insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or
discernment; and second, the insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission
of the crime.[31]
To establish insanity, opinion testimony is required which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused, has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his
own perception, or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. [32] We stress that an inquiry into the
mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the
felony is committed.[33]
In this case, Oligario failed to establish his mental state, much less his insanity. Aside from the testimony
of Dr. Evangelista, no other witness testified as to the mental condition of Oligario. On this matter, the CA
aptly observed:
In the case at bar, no witness was presented by [Oligario] to show that he exhibited any [myriad of]
symptoms associated with psychosis immediately before or simultaneous with the carnapping incident.
The record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of [Oligario]
prior to November 20, 2007. Although Dr. Evangelista opined that [Oligario] is suffering from psychosis,
she declared that it is difficult to assess the exact mental condition of [Oligario], having seen the latter
only once, and she could not even identify the kind of psychosis [Oligario] is afflicted with.

xxxx

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime. x x x

While it can be true that there was some impairment of [Oligario's] mental faculties, since he was said to
suffer from psychosis, We hold that such impairment was not so complete as to deprive him of his
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
All told, we find the evidence adduced by [Oligario] insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the
time he took the Honda CRV of [Gregorio]. A judgment of conviction must, perforce, be rendered since
[Oligario] had already admitted committing the crime. [34] (Emphasis supplied)Nonetheless, Oligario, citing
Rafanan and Antonio, argues that even if his insanity cannot completely absolve him of criminal liability,
it can at least be considered as a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 9,[35] Article 13 of the RPC.

In Antonio, the accused's insanity defense was not considered to exempt him from criminal liability. The
Court held that while there was some impairment of the accused's mental faculties since he was shown
to suffer from schizo-affective disorder or psychosis, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive
him of his intelligence or the consciousness of his acts. The accused's mental ailment was, however,
considered as a mitigating circumstance to lower the penalty imposed. [36] The Court similarly ruled in
Rafanan that a mitigating circumstance in accord with Article 13 (9) of the Revised Penal Code may be
considered where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence. However,
Rafanan's insanity defense was rejected by the Court due to the accused's failure to present clear and
convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on the
victim.[37]
Moreover, Oligario was charged with violation of RA No. 6539, a special law, which is not governed by
the rules of penalties under the RPC. The OSG appropriately invoked the Court En Banc's ruling in People
v. Simon[38] (Simon), where it was pronounced that there is no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under the RPC in special laws that impose different penalties from the RPC. The
Court further clarified that, while it is true that the penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, under RA No. 6539 is virtually
equivalent to the duration of the medium period of Reclusion Temporal, such technical term under the
RPC is not given to the penalty for Carnapping. Moreover, the other penalties for Carnapping attended
by the qualifying circumstance stated in the law do not correspond to those in the RPC. [39]
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, [40] if the offense is punished by a special law, the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from the prescribed penalty – the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed. [41]
Applying the edict of Simon and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty of fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, imposed by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA, is correct.

FOR THE STATED REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The August 28, 2014 Decision and December 10,
2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Oligario Turalba y Villegas is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, and is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-A-12.
[2]
Id. at 20-28. Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with the concurrence of Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Ramon R. Garcia.

[3]
Id. at 17-18.

[4]
Entitled "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING" (August 26, 1972).

[5]
Rollo, pp. 21.

[6]
Id.

[7]
Id. at 53-54.

[8]
Id. at 30.

[9]
Id. at 29-33. Penned by Judge Raymond C. Viray.

[10]
Id. at 33.

[11]
Id. at 31-32.

[12]
Id. at 20-28. The dispositive portion of the August 28, 2014 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated December 6, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)[13] Id. at 25-26.

[14]
Dated September 25, 2014. Id. at 62-66.

[15]
Id. at 17-18. Oligario's motion for reconsideration was disposed of as follows:
This Court, after a meticulous study of the arguments set forth in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
herein accused-appellant, finds no cogent reason to revise, amend, much less reverse, the Decision
promulgated on August 28, 2014. The Motion for Reconsideration is thus DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)[16] Id. at 8.

[17]
Id. at 9.

[18]
281 Phil. 66 (1991).

[19]
441 Phil. 425 (2002).

[20]
See rollo, pp. 9-11.
[21]
Id. at 80-94.

[22]
Id. at 86-92.

[23]
Id. at 100-104.

[24]
See id. at 100-102.

[25]
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

x x x x[26] People v. Roa, 807 Phil. 1003, 1011-1012 (2017), citing People v. Madarang, 387 Phil. 846, 856
and 859 (2000).

[27]
People v. Salvador, Sr., 834 Phil. 632, 645 (2018); and People v. Roa, id. at 1012.

[28]
People v. Salvador, Sr., id. at 646. See also the Court's Resolution in People v. Lota, G.R. No. 219580,
January 24, 2018.

[29]
People v. Roa, 807 Phil. 1003, 1012-1013 (2017).

[30]
Id. at 1012, citing People v. Madarang, 387 Phil. 846, 859 (2000). See also People v. Salvador, Sr., 834
Phil. 632, 645 (2018).

[31]
People v. Salvador, Sr., id. at 646.

[32]
Verdadero v. People, 782 Phil. 168, 179 (2016), citing People v. Opuran, 469 Phil. 698, 713 (2004).

[33]
People v. Salvador, Sr., 834 Phil. 632, 648 (2018).

[34]
Rollo, pp. 25-27.

[35]
Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxxx

9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.

x x x x[36] People v. Antonio, 441 Phil. 425, 435 (2002).

[37]
People v. Rafanan, 281 Phil. 66, 84-85 (1991).
[38]
304 Phil. 725 (1994).

[39]
See id. at 757-758.

[40]
Act No. 4103, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR
ALL PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE
A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" (December 5, 1993).

[41]
See Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, which provides:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: March 03, 2023

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4. |Homol y Romorosa v. People, G.R. No. 191039, August 22, 2022

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 191039. August 22, 2022 ]

ARLENE HOMOL Y ROMOROSA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

Grave abuse of confidence aggravates and qualifies the crime of theft. When the gravity of exploitation
of trust is not proven, the crime is only simple theft and the abuse of confidence shall be treated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. The Court applies this rule in resolving this Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] assailing the Court of Appeals-Cebu City's Decision [2] dated June 26, 2008 and Resolution [3]
dated December 16, 2009 in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 00080.

ANTECEDENTS

Dr. Jelpha Robillos y Jimenez (Dr. Robillos) hired Arlene Homol y Romorosa (Arlene) as a clinic secretary.
Also, Dr. Robillos tasked Arlene to collect and remit installment payments from customers who
purchased jewelry. On March 2 and 8, 2002, Arlene received a total of P1,000.00 from Elena Quilangtang
(Elena) for the gold bracelet that she bought. However, Arlene did not give the money to Dr. Robillos. On
March 14, 2002, Arlene resigned from work. The following day, Dr. Robillos reminded Elena of her unpaid
installments. Elena replied that she already paid to Arlene. Aggrieved, Dr. Robillos filed a criminal
complaint against Arlene. Finding probable cause, the public prosecutor charged Arlene with qualified
theft before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 11513,[4] to wit:
The undersigned, City Prosecutor I, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses ARLENE R. HOMOL of
the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That, on or about March 2, to March 8, 2002, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is a secretary/collector of Dra.
Jelpha Robillos, with intent of gain and with grave abuse of confidence which facilitated the commission
of the offense and without the consent of said Dr. Jelpha Robillos, the owner thereof and also her
employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away ONE
THOUSAND PESOS ([P]1,000.00), Philippine Currency, as partial payment from a customer which she
ought to remit to the said owner/employer being a collector, to the damage and prejudice of said Dra.
Jelpha Robillos, in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article[s] 308 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. [5]
(Emphases supplied)Arlene pleaded not guilty. At the trial, Arlene did not deny receipt of P1,000.00 but
insisted that she remitted it to Dr. Robillos.[6] On July 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Arlene of estafa
involving unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). The RTC held that Arlene misappropriated the payment and violated the trust of Dr. Robillos
and Elena,[7] thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Arlene Homol y Romorosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under subdivision No. 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the
[RPC] and penalized under the 3rd paragraph of the same article and, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days, as the minimum, to One (1) Year and (1) Day, as the
maximum, and to indemnify [Dr.] Jelpha J. Robillos the sum of P1,000.00, the amount misappropriated
by the accused.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphases supplied)Arlene elevated the case to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CEB CR No.
00080. Arlene argued that the RTC erroneously convicted her of estafa when the charge was for
qualified theft. Moreover, the Information is fatally defective for failure to allege juridical possession
which is an element of estafa.[9] On June 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings that all the
elements of estafa involving unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence were alleged and proven. The CA
ruled that Arlene was guilty of estafa because she was in possession of the money when she
misappropriated it. The CA explained that what distinguishes theft from estafa is the possession of the
thing. In theft, it is presumed that the personal property is in the possession of another, unlike in estafa,
where the possession of the thing is already in the hands of the offender.[10]
Arlene sought reconsideration but was denied.[11]
Hence, this recourse. Arlene did not dispute the facts but maintains that her right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation was violated. The charge was for qualified theft which translates only
to material possession. The Information did not allege juridical possession necessary for estafa. At any
rate, a mere employee does not have juridical possession over the amount supposedly misappropriated
and cannot be held liable for estafa.[12]
RULING

The Petition is partly meritorious.

It is fundamental that every element of the crime must be set out in the Information [13] to avoid surprise
on the part of the accused and to afford [them] the opportunity to suitably prepare [their] defense. [14] No
matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of
any offense unless it is charged in the Information on which [they are] tried or is necessarily included
therein.[15] More importantly, "[the allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial
matters and an accused's right to question [their] conviction based on facts not alleged in the
Information cannot be waived."[16] Here, the charge against Arlene is designated in the Information as
qualified theft. Yet, the CA and the RTC convicted Arlene of estafa involving unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to discuss first the distinctions between these two
crimes.

Theft is distinguished from estafa by the

manner in which the offender in each
case acquires possession of the property.

"Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against[,] or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter's consent."[17] If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes
qualified.[18] The crime of qualified theft under Article 308 in relation to Article 310 of the RPC
requires the confluence of the following elements, to wit:

1. There was a taking of personal property;

2. The said property belongs to another;

3. The taking was done without the consent of the owner;

 4. The taking was done with intent to gain;

5. The taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against person, or force upon
things; and

6. The taking was done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e.,
with grave abuse of confidence.[19]
On the other hand, the requirements to prove estafa involving unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC are the following:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same:

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial
on his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[20] (Citation omitted)
Theft should not be confused with estafa. In general, the two crimes are distinguished by the manner in
which the offender in each case acquires possession of the property. The thief takes the item without
the owner's consent. The estafador receives the thing and converts it to their own use or benefit.
"However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property." [21] The
misappropriation constitutes theft if the accused was entrusted only with the material or physical
(natural) or de facto possession of the thing. Whereas, the conversion constitutes embezzlement or
estafa if the accused has the juridical possession of the thing. [22] The next question now is whether the
Information for qualified theft alleges sufficient facts to sustain a conviction for estafa.

The prosecution failed to recite in the

Information facts constitutive of estafa.

It is an essential element of the crime of estafa that the money or goods misappropriated or converted
by the accused to the prejudice of another was received by him "in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same."[23] The
phrase contemplates receipt of the thing by virtue of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, [24] or
transactions where juridical possession of the item is transferred to the accused. [25] Mere receipt of the
property does not satisfy this element,[26] wherein the accused is entrusted only with material possession
of the thing.[27]
In this case, the CA and the RTC both held that the prosecution alleged and proved all the elements of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC. However, the Information is silent whether Arlene
received the money in a fiduciary capacity, or under an obligation to return the same. [28] The phrase in
the Information that Arlene "ought to remit"[29] the money is insufficient absent the allegation that this
duty is rooted in transactions where she acquired juridical possession of the thing. In contrast, the
Information alleged that Arlene received the money as a mere collector. [30] As such, the money merely
passes into Arlene's hands and her custody is only until the amount is remitted to Dr. Robillos. Arlene
acquires only physical or material possession over the unremitted funds. Verily, an employee who
receives money or property in behalf of the employer is not vested with juridical possession but only
physical or material possession.[31] An employee cannot be considered as an agent if the duty to collect is
imposed by reason of his employment,[32] thus:
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered
to be only in the material possession of the employee. The material possession of an employee is
adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So
long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the
offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion of personal property
in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft,
whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been
transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa. [33] (Emphases supplied and
citations omitted)Corollarily, Arlene cannot be convicted of a crime not embraced within the
Information. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the allegations sufficiently charged Arlene with qualified
theft.

The Information alleged all the

constitutive elements of qualified theft.
However, the prosecution proved only
simple theft absent evidence that the
abuse of confidence is grave.

There is no ambiguity in the Information. The designation of the offense and the recital of facts
sufficiently constitute the crime of qualified theft. Arlene was not denied of her constitutional right to be
fully apprised of the charge against her, and to suitably prepare a defense. The Information alleged that
Arlene, with intent to gain, took P1,000.00 belonging to her employer, Dr. Robillos, without the latter's
consent, thereby gravely abusing the confidence reposed on her as a collector. Apparently, the charge is
for the crime of theft "[s]ince there is no allegation that the taking was accomplished with violence or
intimidation against person or force upon things." The allegation that the taking is with grave abuse of
confidence categorizes the theft as qualified rather than a simple one. [34] It is settled "that the
Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly." [35] Again, Arlene could not have
been bewildered as to the nature of the accusation against her.

However, the Court finds that the prosecution established only simple theft. [36] First, Arlene received
P1,000.00 from Elena but failed to remit the amount to Dr. Robillos. Second, the money belongs to Dr.
Robillos as it comprised installment payments from customers who purchased jewelry. Third, the
absence of consent was shown in Dr. Robillos attempt to recover the unpaid installments from Elena.
Fourth, the furtive taking of the money, raised the reasonable presumption of intent to gain. Fifth, Arlene
got hold of the money in the performance of her duty as a collector without force, violence or
intimidation. Yet, the prosecution failed to establish the element of grave abuse of confidence.

The Court has explained that grave abuse of trust is a "circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the
commission of the crime of theft; hence, the imposition of a higher penalty is necessary." [37] In qualified
theft, the taking must be the result of a relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the accused and the offended party that has created a high degree of confidence between
them.[38] Thus, grave abuse of confidence by a thieving employee should be contextualized not only by
the relationship between the employer and employee, but also by the purpose for which the employee
was given the employer's trust.[39] In People v. Sabado,[40] the accused is guilty of qualified theft when he
gravely exploited the trust of his employer. The Court considered the accused's exclusive management of
the shop and access to the vault, to wit:
Theft here became qualified because it was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Grave abuse of
confidence, as an element of theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-appellant and the offended party that might create a
high degree of confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused. Accused-appellant, as
established by the prosecution, is an employee of the Pawnshop. Accused-appellant could not have
committed the crime had he not been holding the position of the trusted employee which gave him
not only sole access to the Pawnshop's vault but also control of the premises. The relevant portion of
the RTC's disquisition reads:
Based on the extant records[,] it appears that accused Luther Sabado was a trusted employee of
Diamond Pawnshop. In fact, the following circumstances show the trust and confidence reposed on
him by the shop owners, to wit: he manages the shop alone; he has the keys to the locks of the shop;
and he has access to the vault and knows the combination of the same. x x x.The management of
Diamond Pawnshop clearly had reposed its trust and confidence in the accused-appellant, and it was
this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of his
employer.[41] (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)In Viray v. People,[42] however, a house caretaker
was convicted only of simple theft for breaking into his employer's home to steal several valuables. The
Court found that the employer denied the accused access to the house which refutes the degree of trust
and confidence between them, thus:
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by
the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we disagree from its finding
that the same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to
sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, [w]e are one with the RTC
that private complainant did not repose on Viray['s] "confidence" that the latter could have abused to
commit qualified theft.

The very fact that petitioner "forced open" the main door and screen because he was denied access to
private complainant's house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant.
Without ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking,
it cannot be said that private complaint had a "firm trust" on petitioner or that she "relied on his
discretion" and that the same trust reposed on him facilitated Viray's taking of the personal properties
justifying his conviction of qualified theft.
To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for qualified theft, there must be an
allegation in the [I]nformation and proof that there existed between the offended party and the
accused such high degree of confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody
or vigilance of the accused. In other words, where the accused had never been vested physical access
to, or material possession of, the stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or
material possession thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property[.] [43]
(Emphases supplied and citations omitted)Similarly, the Court in People v. Maglaya,[44] refused to impose
the penalty prescribed for qualified theft when the accused was not given material possession or access
to the property. The Court determined that the accused did not act with grave abuse of confidence
despite his duties involving the handling and receiving of money from his employer's customers, viz.:
Although appellant had taken advantage of his position in committing the crime aforementioned, [w]e
do not believe he had acted with grave abuse of confidence and can be convicted of qualified theft ,
because his employer had never given him the possession of the machines involved in the present case
or allowed him to take hold of them, and it does not appear that the former had any especial confidence
in him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines to the prospective customers was entrusted, not to
appellant, but to another employee. [45] (Emphasis supplied)Here, it was not proven that Dr. Robillos had
special trust, or high degree of confidence in Arlene. The allegation in the Information that Arlene is a
"secretary/collector" of Dr. Robillos does not by itself, without more, create the relation of confidence
and intimacy required in qualified theft. More telling are the minuscule amounts involved and the fact
that Dr. Robillos allowed Arlene to resign without any question, discount the existence of a high degree
of confidence between them. The prosecution, likewise, failed to substantiate the gravity how Arlene
betrayed Dr. Robillos' supposed special trust to qualify, or facilitate the taking of the money. Dr. Robillos
principally hired Arlene as a clinic secretary while her task as a collector is foreign to her usual duties.
The circumstances do not show that Arlene's job was instrumental in facilitating the taking of the money.
There is no evidence that Arlene could not have committed the crime had she not been holding the
position of a secretary or collector. To reiterate, abuse of confidence must be grave. On this point, the
Court is convinced that Arlene took advantage of her position in committing the crime but not on the
level of grave abuse of confidence. Thus, Arlene is guilty only of simple theft.

At most, the abuse of confidence shall be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance since the
gravity of exploitation of trust was not proven.[46] Indeed, abuse of confidence is inherent in qualified
theft but not in simple theft since the circumstance is not included in the definition of the crime. [47]
Under Article 14 of the RPC, abuse of confidence exists only when the offended party has trusted the
offender who later abuses such trust by committing the crime. The abuse of confidence must be a means
of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief
that the former would not abuse said confidence. The confidence between the offender and the
offended party must be immediate and personal. [48] As discussed above, Arlene took advantage of her
position as a secretary or collector in committing theft but the gravity of exploitation of trust was not
proven.

Under Republic Act No. 10951,[49] the penalty for simple theft is arresto mayor to its full extent if the
value of the property stolen is over P500.00 but does not exceed P5,000.00. [50] As this penalty does not
exceed one (1) year, the Indeterminate Sentence Law becomes inapplicable. With the presence of the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, the imposable penalty must be within the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty which ranges from four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. Accordingly, this Court imposes upon Arlene the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day.
Applying the prevailing jurisprudence, the actual damages due to Dr. Robillos amounting to P1,000.00
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the RTC's Decision on July 26, 2004 until
full payment.[51]
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated June 26, 2008 and
Resolution dated December 16, 2009 in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 00080 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
in that Arlene Homol y Romorosa is found guilty of simple theft and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day. The award of actual damages to private complainant
Dr. Jelpha Robillos y Jimenez in the amount of P1,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of the Regional Trial Court's Decision dated July 26, 2004 until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 33-41.

[2]
Id. at 11-22. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with the Concurrence of Associate
Justices Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla (now a retired Member of the Court) and Florito S. Macalino.

[3]
Id. at 28-29. Penned by Executive Justice Franchito N. Diamante (Chairperson) with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Edgardo L. Delos Santos (retired Associate Justice of the Court).

[4]
Id. at 12; and Records, pp. 8-10.

[5]
Records, p. 122.

[6]
Id. at 122-123.

[7]
Id. at 129.

[8]
Id. at 129.

[9]
Rollo, pp. 20-21.

[10]
Id. at 11-22.

[11]
Id. at 28-29.

[12]
Id. at 33-41.

[13]
Rules of Court, Rule 110, Section 8.
[14]
Pielago v. People, 706 Phil. 460, 469 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

[15]
Rules of Court, Rule 120, Section 4.

[16]
Andaya v. People, 526 Phil. 480, 497 (2006) [Per J. Ynarez-Santiago, First Division].

[17]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 308, paragraph 1.

[18]
Id., Article 310.

[19]
People v. Bago, 386 Phil. 310, 334-335 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

[20]
Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332 (2008) [Per J. Chiao-Nazario, Third Division]; Ceniza-Manantan v.
People, 558 Phil. 104, 118 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; and Chua-Burce v. Court of
Appeals, 387 Phil. 15, 25-26 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

[21]
Santos v. People, 260 Phil. 519, 526 (1990) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

[22]
Id. at 525-526.

[23]
Pamintuan v. People, 635 Phil. 514, 522 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].

[24]
Id. at 523.

[25]
Murao v. People, 501 Phil. 53, 64-65 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], citing Manahan,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 484, 497-498 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].

[26]
Legaspi v. People, 842 Phil. 72, 81 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].

[27]
Pideli v. People, 568 Phil. 793, 806-807 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T., Third Division].

[28]
Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703, 707-708 (1956) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc].

[29]
Records, p. 122.

[30]
Id.

[31]
San Diego v. People, 757 Phil. 599, 608-609 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; and Balerta v.
People, 748 Phil. 806, 819 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division], citing Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals,
387 Phil. 15 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

[32]
People v. Mirto, 675 Phil. 895, 913 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
[33]
Benabaye v. People, 155 Phil. 144, 154-155 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].

[34]
Avecilla v. People, 285 Phil. 11, 20 (1992) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].

[35]
People v. Pulg, 585 Phil. 555, 562 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

[36]
People v. Euraba, G.R. No. 220762 [Notice], April 18, 2018.

[37]
People v. Mejares, 823 Phil. 459, 470 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[38]
People v. Cahilig, 740 Phil. 200, 209-210 (2014) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]. See also People v. Koc
Song, 63 Phil. 369, 371 (1936) [Per C.J. Avanceña, En Banc].

[39]
Tejolan v. People, G.R. No. 218972 [Notice], June 30, 2021.

[40]
813 Phil. 221 (2017) [Per J. Tijam, Third Division]. See also People v. Koc Song, supra note 37.

[41]
Id. at 228-229.

[42]
720 Phil. 841 (2013) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

[43]
Id. at 852-853.

[44]
141 Phil. 278 (1969) [Per C.J. Conception, First Division].

[45]
Id. at 285.

[46]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 14, paragraph 4.

[47]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 62.

[48]
Luis B. Reyes, The REVISED PENAL CODE, Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998, pp. 342-344, citing United
States v. Torrida, 23 Phil. 189, 192 (1912) [Per J. Trent, En Banc].

[49]
An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based, and
the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise
Known as "The Revised Penal Code," as Amended. Approved: August 29, 2017.

[50]
Republic Act No. 10951, Section 81, paragraph 5.

[51]
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
 Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: May 18, 2023

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