G.R. No.

200090 March 6, 2013

ERLINDA C. SAN MATEO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Sometime in May and July 2005, petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo ordered assorted yarns amounting to ₱327,394.14
from ITSP International, Incorporated through its Vice-President for Operations Ravin A. Sehwani. In partial payment
thereof, San Mateo issued 11 postdated Metrobank checks amounting to ₱134,275.00.

Whenever a check matured, however, San Mateo would either call or write to Sehwani requesting him not to deposit
the checks due to lack of sufficient funds. In consideration of their business relationship, Sehwani acceded to the
request. But San Mateo continued to fail to settle her account.

On October 6, 2005, Sehwani deposited Metrobank Check 917604197 dated July 25, 2005 but it was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. Sehwani immediately informed San Mateo of the dishonor, who asked him to defer depositing
the other checks since she w2s encountering financial difficulties. On October 8, 2005, Sehwani received a letter from
San Mateo explaining her predicament and reiterating her request to coordinate first with her office before depositing
any other check. She also offered to replace Metrobank Check 917604197 with a manager's check but failed to do
so.

In November 2005, Sehwani tried to follow up with San Mateo but she never returned his call. On November 7, 2005,
he deposited Metrobank Check 917604206 dated July 21, 2005 but San Mateo made a stop payment order. On
November 11, 2005, he received a letter from San Mateo apologizing for her failure to pay with a promise to
communicate on November 21, 2005. Since San Mateo failed to make payments, Sehwani deposited the remaining
checks which were all dishonored because the account had been closed. Sehwani attempted to contact San Mateo
but she never responded. He also sent demand letters to her last known address but she still failed to pay the value
of the checks.

On November 23, 2005, Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo’s residence at Greenhills, San Juan
but the security guard of the townhouse complex refused to accept the letter in compliance with San Mateo’s order.
Thus, the liaison officer left the letter with the security guard with the instruction to deliver the same to San Mateo.
Thereafter, he sent a copy of the demand letter to San Mateo by registered mail which was returned to his counsel’s
office with the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that San Mateo did not claim it despite three notices to her
dated December 12, 2005, December 22, 2005, and January 2, 2006, respectively.

On June 5, 2006, San Mateo was charged with 11 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 22. During trial, she
claimed that she has an agreement with Sehwani not to deposit her checks unless she gave a go signal. But Sehwani
ignored this agreement and deposited the nine checks which resulted in the closure of her account.

On August 27, 2009, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig City, Branch 74 found San Mateo guilty of 10
counts of violation of B.P. 22. She was sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of six months for
each count and ordered to pay the total value of the 11 checks amounting to ₱134,275.00.

In finding her criminally liable for 10 counts of violation of B.P. 22 but civilly liable for the total value of the 11 checks,
the MeTC declared that Metrobank Check 917604206 was dishonored not because of insufficiency of funds or closed
account but because of a stop payment order from San Mateo.

San Mateo appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 70 which affirmed her conviction on
June 1, 2010. The RTC ruled that the third element of notice of dishonor was duly established during the trial by the
following facts: (1) her unjustified refusal to claim the demand letter sent to her by registered mail despite three
notices from the postmaster; (2) her various letters to Sehwani requesting the latter to defer the deposit of her
checks; and (3) her statement in her Amended Affidavit that Sehwani’s act of depositing the nine checks resulted in
the closure of her account.
Undeterred, San Mateo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). On August 23, 2011, the CA affirmed the
RTC Decision and reiterated that all the elements for violation of B.P. 22 had been sufficiently proven in this case.1

On March 1, 2012, San Mateo filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court raising the following issues: (1)
whether or not the subject checks were issued for valuable consideration; (2) whether or not the demand letter sent
by Sehwani constituted the notice of dishonor required under B.P. 22; and (3) whether or not the penalty of
imprisonment is proper. In a Resolution dated April 23, 2012, the Court denied the petition for its failure to show that
the CA committed reversible error when it upheld the factual findings of both the MeTC and the RTC that all the
elements for violation of B.P. 22 had been sufficiently proven to convict San Mateo of the said crime.

On May 30, 2012, San Mateo filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 16, 2012, the Court granted the motion and
reinstated the petition.

We grant the petition.

It is a settled rule that the remedy of appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court contemplates only errors of law and not errors of fact.2 The issues of: (1) whether or not the subject checks
were issued for valuable consideration; and (2) whether or not the demand letter sent by Sehwani constituted the
notice of dishonor required under B.P. 22, are factual matters that belong to the proper determination of the MeTC,
the RTC and the CA. But when such courts have overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into
account, would materially affect the result of the case, this Court may re-examine their findings of facts.3

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.4

In this case, the third element is present and had been adequately established. With respect to the first element, the
Court gives full faith and credit to the findings of the lower courts that the checks were issued for value since San
Mateo herself admitted that she drew and issued the same as payment for the yarns she ordered from ITSP.
Besides, the Court has consistently pronounced that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of
checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation
of B.P. 22.5

But the Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Section 26 of B.P. 22 creates the
presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the
bank dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written
notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment.7

Here, there is no basis in concluding that San Mateo knew of the insufficiency of her funds. While she may have
requested Sehwani in her letters dated October 8, 2005 and November 11, 2005, to defer depositing all the checks,
with maturity dates of July and August 2005, otherwise, her account will close, such act did not amount to an
admission that, when she issued those checks, she knew that she would have no sufficient funds in the drawee bank
to pay for them.8

Upon the other hand, the records show that Sehwani tried to serve the notice of dishonor to San Mateo two times. On
the first occasion, Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo’s residence at Greenhills, San Juan which
the security guard refused to accept. Thus, the liaison officer left the letter with the security guard with the instruction
to hand it to San Mateo. But the prosecution failed to show that the letter ever reached San Mateo.

On the second occasion, Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo by registered mail which was
returned with the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that San Mateo did not claim it despite three notices to her.

It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not
themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be
a notice of dishonor.9 To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not
meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received such notice. It is not enough for the
prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual
receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused.10

In King v. People,11 the complainant sent the accused a demand letter via registered mail. But the records showed
that the accused did not receive it. The postmaster likewise certified that the letter was returned to sender. Yet
despite the clear import of the postmaster’s certification, the prosecution did not adduce proof that the accused
received the post office notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. The Court held that it was
possible that the drawee bank sent the accused a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence
that the bank did send it, or that the accused actually received it. It was also possible that the accused was trying to
flee from the complainant by staying in different addresses. But speculations and possibilities cannot take the place of
proof. The conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt.12

Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that she
knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise. For this reason, the Court cannot convict her with moral certainty
of violation of B.P. 22.

Nevertheless, San Mateo’s acquittal does not entail the extinguishment of her civil liability for the dishonored
checks.13 An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil
damages.14 For this reason, the trial court’s directive for San Mateo to pay the civil liability in the amount of
₱134,275.00 representing the total value of the 11 checks plus 12% interest per annum from the time the said sum
became due and demandable until fully paid, stands.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The assailed Decision dated August 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR 33434 finding petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo guilty of 10 counts of violation of B.P. 22 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered, however, to indemnify the complainant, ITSP International,
Incorporated, represented by its Vice-President for Operations Ravin A. Sehwani, the amount of P 134,275.00
representing the total value of the 11 checks plus 12% interest per annum from the time the said sum became due
and demandable until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 34-47.

2
Llenado v. People, G.R. No. 193279, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 330, 333.

3
Bax v. People, G.R. No. 149858, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 284, 289.

4
Rico v. People, 440 Phil. 540, 551 (2002).

5
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 466, 478.

6
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

7
Moster v. People, G.R. No. 167461, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 287, 297.

8
Sia v. People, G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 206, 226.
 9
Svendsen v. People, G.R. No. 175381, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 659, 666.

10
Alferez v. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 116, 123-124.

11
King v. People, 377 Phil. 692 (1999).

12
Id. at 710.

13
Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 69, 94.

14
Supra note 3, at 292-293.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the accused
issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was
actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within the five banking
days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to
make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a
prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.

Justice Panganiban, Third Division, Betty King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

There can be no prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant case
because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to or received by the petitioner.

Maximino Fuentes vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109849, p. 9, February 26, 1997; citing
Juan Castillo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 106472, p. 9, August 7, 1996.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

G.R. No. 196853

ROBERT CHUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIIlLIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Petitioner Robert Chua (Chua) was charged with 54 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (BP 22) for
issuing checks which were dishonored for either being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account.

Factual Antecedents

Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were long-time friends and neighbors. On different dates from 1992
until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of varying amounts to See pursuant to their rediscounting
arrangement at a 3% rate, to wit:
 PSBANK CHECK NO. DATED AMOUNT
1 018062 December 25, 1993 Php300,000.00
2 018061 December 23, 1993 Php350,000.00
3 017996 December 16, 1993 Php100,000.00
4 017992 December 14, 1993 Php200,000.00
5 017993 December 14, 1993 Php200,000.00
6 018138 November 22, 1993 Php 6,000.00
7 018122 November 19, 1993 Php 13,000.00
8 018120 November 18, 1993 Php 6,000.00
9 018162 November 22, 1993 Php 10,800.00
10 018069 November 17, 1993 Php 9,744.25
11 018117 November 17, 1993 Php 8,000.00
12 018149 November 28, 1993 Php 6,000.00
13 018146 November 27, 1993 Php 7,000.00
14 006478 November 26, 1993 Php200,000.00
15 018148 November 26, 1993 Php300,000.00
16 018145 November 26, 1993 Php 7,000.00
17 018137 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00
18 017991 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00
19 018151 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00
20 017962 December 08, 1993 Php150,000.00
21 018165 December 08, 1993 Php 14,000.00
22 018154 December 07, 1993 Php100,000.00
23 018164 December 07, 1993 Php 14,000.00
24 018157 December 07, 1993 Php600,000.00
25 018161 December 06, 1993 Php 12,000.00
26 018160 December 05, 1993 Php 12,000.00
27 018033 November 09, 1993 Php 3,096.00
28 018032 November 08, 1993 Php 12,000.00
29 018071 November 06, 1993 Php150,000.00
30 018070 November 06, 1993 Php150,000.00
31 006210 October 21, 1993 Php100,000.00
32 006251 October 18, 1993 Php200,000.00
33 006250 October 18, 1993 Php200,000.00
34 017971 October 13, 1993 Php400,000.00
35 017972 October 12, 1993 Php335,450.00
 36 017973 October 11, 1993 Php464,550.00
37 006433 September 24, 1993 Php520,000.00
38 006213 August 30, 1993 Php100,000.00
39 017976 December 13, 1993 Php100,000.00
40 018139 December 13, 1993 Php125,000.00
41 018141 December 13, 1993 Php175,000.00
42 018143 December 13, 1993 Php300,000.00
43 018121 December 10, 1993 Php166,934.00
44 018063 November 12, 1993 Php 12,000.00
45 018035 November 11, 1993 Php 7,789.00
46 017970 November 11, 1993 Php600,000.00
47 018068 November 18, 1993 Php 7,800.00
48 017956 November 10, 1993 Php800,000.00
49 018034 November 10, 1993 Php 7,116.00
50 017907 December 1, 1993 Php200,000.00
51 018152 November 30, 1993 Php 6,000.00
52 018067 November 30, 1993 Php 7,800.00
53 006490 November 29, 1993 Php100,000.00
54 018150 November 29, 1993 Php 6,000.00 1

However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient funds or
closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed on December 23, 1993 a
Complaint for violations of BP 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. He attached thereto a
2

demand letter dated December 10, 1993.

3

In a Resolution dated April 25, 1994, the prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of charges
4

against Chua. Accordingly, 54 counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City.

Proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court

During the course of the trial, the prosecution formally offered as its evidence the demand letter dated December 10,
5

1993 marked as Exhibit "B." Chua, however, objected to its admissibility on the grounds that it is a mere photocopy
6 7

and that it does not bear any proof that he actually received it. In view of these, Chua filed on April 14, 1999 a Motion
to Submit Demurrer to Evidence. Per Chua’s allegation, however, the MeTC failed to act on his motion since the
8

judge of said court vacated his post.

Several years later, the prosecution filed a Motion to Re-Open Presentation of Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion to
Allow Prosecution to Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003. It averred that while See
9

was still trying to locate a demand letter dated November 30, 1993 (which it alleged to have been personally served
upon Chua), the prosecution nevertheless decided to rest its case on February 24, 1999 so as not to further delay the
proceedings. However, sometime in February 2002, See decided to have his house rented out such that he emptied
it with all his belongings and had it cleaned. It was during this time that he found the demand letter dated November
30, 1993. The prosecution thus prayed that it be allowed to submit a supplemental offer of evidence to include said
10

demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as part of its evidence. Again, the records of the case bear no copy of an
MeTC Order or Resolution granting the aforesaid motion of the prosecution. Nevertheless, extant on records is a
Formal Offer of Evidence filed by the private prosecutor submitting the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as
11
additional evidence. In his objection thereto, Chua averred that the papers on which the demand letter dated
12

November 30, 1993 are written were given to him as blank papers. He affixed his signature thereon purportedly to
give See the authority to retrieve a car which was supposed to serve as payment for Chua’s obligation to See. In an
Order dated November 18, 2005, the MeTC refused to take cognizance of the supplemental formal offer on the
13

ground that the same was filed by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the public prosecutor. Be that as it
may, the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 eventually found its way into the records of this case as Exhibit
"SSS." 14

Later, the defense, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. It again pointed out that the demand letter
15

dated December 10, 1993 attached to See’s affidavit-complaint is a mere photocopy and not accompanied with a
Post Office Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Most importantly, it does not contain Chua’s signature that
would serve as proof of his actual receipt thereof. In view of these, the defense surmised that the prosecution
fabricated the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 to remedy the lack of a proper notice of dishonor upon Chua.
At any rate, it argued that while the November 30, 1993 demand letter contains Chua’s signature, the same should
not be given any probative value since it does not contain the date when he allegedly received the same. Hence,
there is simply no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period that the law affords an issuer to make good the check
from the date of his notice of its dishonor.

In an Order dated January 12, 2007, the MeTC denied the defense’s Demurrer to Evidence. The Motion for
16

Reconsideration thereto was likewise denied in an Order dated May 23, 2007. Hence, the trial of the case
17

proceeded.

In a Consolidated Decision dated May 12, 2008, the MeTC convicted Chua of 54 counts of violation of BP 22 after it
18

found all the elements of the offense obtaining in the case. Anent Chua’s receipt of the notice of dishonor, it
ratiocinated, viz.:

xxxx

The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sen[t] a written notice of dishonor of the subject
check to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In fact, the defense stipulated in open court
the existence of the said demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected in the face of the demand letter.
x x x In view of that stipulation, the defense is now estopped [from] denying its receipt thereof. Although there was no
date when accused received the demand letter x x x the demand letter was dated, thus it is presumed that the
accused received the said demand letter on the date reflected on it. It has been said that "admission verbal or written
made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof."x x x

[In spite of] receipt thereof, the accused failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment
"[w]ithin five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the said checks have not been paid by the drawee bank. As a
result, the presumption of knowledge as provided for in Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 which was the basis
of reckoning the crucial five (5) day period was established. 19

Hence, the dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds accused Robert Chua GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
fifty four (54) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and hereby sentence[s] him to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months imprisonment for each case and to restitute to the private complainant the total amount of the face value
of all the subject checks in these cases with legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the filing of the
informations until the full amount is fully paid and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 20

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

Aggrieved, Chua appealed to the RTC where he argued that: (1) the complaint was prematurely filed since the
demand letter dated December 10, 1993 had not yet been sent to him at the time of filing of the Complaint; (2) the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 has no probative value since it lacked proof of the date when Chua received
the same; and, (3) since Chua was acquitted in two other BP 22 cases involving the same parties, facts and issues,
he should likewise be acquitted in the present case based on the principle of stare decisis.
In a Decision dated July 1, 2009, the RTC likewise found all the elements of BP 22 to have been sufficiently
21

established by the prosecution, to wit:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficient funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause ordered the bank to stop payment.

As to first element, the RTC held that the evidence shows that Chua issued the checks in question. Next, on the basis
of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 bearing Chua’s signature as proof of receipt thereof, it was likewise
established that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds with the drawee bank at the time he issued the
checks, thus, satisfying the second element. It expounded:

Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be
shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the
amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. x x x

In the present case, a demand letter (Exh. "SSS") was sent to accused-appellant informing him of the dishonor of the
check and demanding he make good of the checks. The prosecution offered this in evidence, and the accused’s
signature thereon evidences his receipt of the said demand letter. Accused-appellant argues that there is no proof
that he received the same considering that there is no date on his signature appearing on the document. But as
borne out by the records of the proceedings, the defense even stipulated in open court the existence of the demand
letter. x x x

Thus, considering that the demand letter was dated November 30, 1993, the reckoning of the crucial five day period
was established. Accused failed to make arrangement for the payment of the amount of check within five-day period
from notice of the checks’ dishonor.22

Finally, the RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the third element when it presented a
bank employee who testified that the subject checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds or closed account.

Anent the defense’s invocation of the principle of stare decisis, the RTC found the same inapplicable since there is a
distinction between the present case and the other cases where Chua was acquitted. In the instant case, the
prosecution, as mentioned, was able to establish the second element of the offense by way of the demand letter
dated November 30, 1993 duly received by Chua. Whereas in the other cases where Chua was acquitted, there was
no proof that he received a demand letter.

Hence, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated May 12, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 23

Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)

Before the CA, Chua argued against the probative value of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 by pointing
out that: (1) for more than 10 years from the time the case was filed, the prosecution never adverted to its existence.
He thus surmised that this was because the document was not really missing but in fact inexistent – a mere
afterthought as to make it appear that the second element of the offense is obtaining in the case; (2) the subject
demand letter is not a newly discovered evidence as it could have been discovered earlier through the exercise of
due diligence; and, (3) his counsel’s admission of the physical existence of the subject demand letter and Chua’s
signature thereon does not carry with it the admission of its contents and his receipt of the same.

Unpersuaded, the CA, in its November 11, 2010 Decision brushed aside Chua’s arguments in this wise:
24
x x x [A]s aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, See could not have waited for a decade just to fabricate an
evidence against petitioner. The contention that petitioner’s counsel was tricked by the prosecution into stipulating on
the admissibility of the demand letter is without basis. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside
unless for good cause. They should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good
morals and sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made
them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and
undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case.
Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court’s sound discretion which,
unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal. 25

And just like the MeTC and the RTC, the CA concluded that the prosecution clearly established all the elements of
the offense of violation of BP 22. Ultimately, it ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated July 1, 2009 and
order dated October 30, 2009 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 26

Chua filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated May 4, 2011.
27 28

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURTS
THAT THE ACCUSED AT THE TIME OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DISHONORED CHECKS HAD KNOWLEDGE
OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE CHECKS UPON THEIR PRESENTMENT,
BASED MERELY ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DATE OF THE PREPARATION OF THE LETTER IS THE
DATE OF RECEIPT BY THE ADDRESSEE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE DEMAND LETTER DATED 30
NOVEMBER 1993 AS A NEWLYDISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 29

The Parties’ Arguments

Chua asserts that the second element of the offense charged, i.e, knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at
the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, was not proved by the prosecution. He argues that the presumption that the issuer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds only arises after it is proved that the issuer actually received a notice of
dishonor and within five days from receipt thereof failed to pay the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment. Here, the date when Chua allegedly received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was not
established by the prosecution. Citing Danao v. Court of Appeals, he thus contends that since there is no date of
30

receipt from which to reckon the aforementioned five-day period, the presumption that he has knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks did not arise.

In any case, Chua argues that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 is not a newly discovered evidence. He
points out that a newly discovered evidence is one which could not have been discovered even in the exercise of due
diligence in locating the same. In this case, See claims that he only found the letter after having his house cleaned.
This means that he could have found it early on had he exercised due diligence, which, however, was neither shown
by the prosecution.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that
Chua’s contention that there is no proof of the date when he actually received the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 involves a factual issue which is not within the province of a certiorari petition. As to the matter of whether the
subject demand letter is a newly discovered evidence, the OSG calls attention to the fact that the MeTC, RTC and the
CA all considered the said document as a newly discovered evidence. Hence, such finding deserves full faith and
credence. Besides, Chua was correctly convicted for violation of BP 22 since all the elements of the offense were
sufficiently proven by the prosecution.

Our Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The issues raised by Chua involve

questions of law.

The OSG argues that the issues raised by Chua involve questions of fact which are not within the province of the
present petition for review on certiorari. The Court, however upon perusal of the petition, finds that the issues raised
and the arguments advanced by Chua in support thereof, concern questions of law. "Jurisprudence dictates that
there is a ‘question of law’ when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances; on the other hand, there is a ‘question of fact’ when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues
raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other
words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these
facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue
is factual."
31

Chua raises two issues in this petition, to wit: (1) whether the MeTC, RTC and the CA correctly applied the legal
presumption that Chua has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time he issued the check based on his
alleged receipt of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 and his failure to make good the checks five days from
such receipt; and (2) whether the said courts correctly considered the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as
newly discovered evidence. As to the first issue, it is not disputed that the subject demand letter, while bearing the
signature of Chua, does not indicate any date as to his receipt thereof. There being no disagreement as to this fact,
the propriety of the conclusion drawn from the same by the courts below, that is, the date of the said letter is
considered as the date when Chua received the same for the purpose of reckoning the five-day period to make good
the checks, clearly refers to a question of law. Similarly, the second issue is one concerning a question of law
because it requires the application of the provision of the Rules of Court concerning a newly discovered evidence. 32

Nevertheless, assuming that the questions posed before this Court are indeed factual, the rule that factual findings of
the lower courts are not proper subject of certiorari petition admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the
lower courts failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect
the result of the case. The Court finds the said exception applicable in the instant case. Clearly, the petition deserves
the consideration of this Court.

The prosecution failed to prove all the

elements of the offenses charged.

In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential elements must be
present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." "Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove as
33

it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds,
which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within
five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. 34

In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts that the absence of the
date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 prevented the legal presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. On the other hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s
actual receipt of the subject demand letter is not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the date
of the demand letter (November 30, 1993). Moreover, the lower courts banked on the stipulation entered into by
Chua’s counsel as to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. By reason of such
stipulation, they all held that Chua could no longer impugn the said demand letter.

In Danao v. Court of Appeals, the Court discussed the importance of proving the date of actual receipt of the notice
35

of dishonor, viz.:

In King vs. People, this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg.
22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the
person who issued the check knew ‘at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.’ Because this element involves a state of
mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as
follows:

‘SEC 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.

Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the
insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment."

Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the
amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This opportunity, as this Court stated in Lozano vs.
Martinez, serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of the bum
check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption
or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no
way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period." (Italics in the original, emphasis supplied)
36

Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of BP 22 would
start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993.
The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof.
There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the inception of this case
Chua has consistently denied having received subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the
purported demand letter was still blank when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another
purpose. Given Chua’s denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the
November 30, 1993 demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however, adducing
any evidence as to the date of Chua’s actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that ‘[t]he prosecution must also
prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from
receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused." "The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its
37

existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear
proof of notice" which the Court finds wanting in this case.
38

Anent the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel, the MeTC stated:

In the course of the said proceedings, the defense counsel manifested that he is willing to stipulate as to the
existence of the demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected on the face of the demand letter. x x x

xxxx
The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sent a written notice of dishonor of the subject
checks to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In fact, the defense stipulated in open court
the existence of the said demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected in the face of the demand letter.
x x x In view of that stipulation, the defense is now estopped in denying its receipt thereof.
39

As earlier mentioned, this ruling of the MeTC was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

The Court, however, disagrees with the lower courts. It is plain that the stipulation only refers to the existence of the
demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. In no way can an admission of Chua’s receipt of the demand letter be
inferred therefrom. Hence, Chua cannot be considered estopped from claiming non-receipt. Also, the Court observes
that Chua’s admission with respect to his signature on the demand letter is consistent with his claim that See made
him sign blank papers where the contents of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 were later intercalated.

In view of the above discussion, the Court rules that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently prove the existence
of the second element of BP 22.

At any rate, the demand letter dated

November 30, 1993 deserves no weight
and credence not only because it does
not qualify as a newly discovered
evidence within the purview of the law
but also because of its doubtful
character.

As may be recalled, the prosecution had already long rested its case when it filed a Motion to Re-Open Presentation
of Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion To Allow Prosecution To Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence dated
March 28, 2003. Intending to introduce the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as a newly discovered evidence,
See attached to the said motion an affidavit of even date where he stated the circumstances surrounding the fact of
40

his location of the same, viz.:

2. When we initially presented our evidence in support of these criminal complaints, I was already looking for
a copy of the demand letter personally served by the affiant (See) and duly received by [Chua];

3. That despite diligent efforts to locate the demand letter x x x dated November 30, 1993, the same was not
located until sometime in February 2002 when I was having our old house/office located at C-5 Christian
Street, Grace Village, Quezon City, cleaned and ready to be rented out;

4. x x x [upon] showing the same to the new handling public prosecutor, he advised the affiant to have it
presented in Court. 41

In Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, the Court held that:

42

x x x The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the
evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that
the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be
properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the
evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now
submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence
depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often
equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the concept of due
diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a
timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due
diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.43
"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after
trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it
is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably
change the judgment." 44

In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a newly discovered
evidence within the purview of the law. Per See’s statements in his affidavit, the said evidence was already known to
him at the time he filed his complaint against Chua. It was also apparently available considering that it was just kept
in his house. Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable diligence, he could have promptly located the said demand
letter and presented it during trial. However, the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was already existing at the time he filed
the complaint, the same was not mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 was referred
to in the complaint, which per See’s own allegations, was also not actually received by Chua. In addition, the
prosecution failed to present the original copy of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly on
the basis of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 alone, the prosecution cannot possibly establish the
existence of the second element of the offense. Indeed, the surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of
the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 make it susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction was a mere
afterthought – a belated attempt to fill in a missing component necessary for the existence of the second element of
BP 22.

It may not be amiss to add at this point that out of the 54 cases for violation of BP 22 filed against Chua, 22 involve
checks issued on November 30, 1993 or thereafter. Hence, the lower courts grievously erred in convicting Chua for
those 22 cases on the basis of a purported demand letter written and sent to Chua prior to the issuance of said 22
checks. Checks can only be dishonored after they have been issued and presented for payment. Before that,
dishonor cannot take place. Thus, a demand letter that precedes the issuance of checks cannot constitute as
sufficient notice of dishonor within the contemplation of BP 22. It is likewise significant to note that aside from the
absence of a date, the signature of Chua appearing on the questioned November 30, 1993 demand letter is not
accompanied by any word or phrase indicating that he affixed his signature thereon to signify his receipt thereof.
Indeed, "conviction must rest upon the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense." In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot accord the demand letter dated November 30,
45

1993 any weight and credence. Consequently, it cannot be used to support Chua’s guilt of the offenses charged.

All told, the Court cannot convict Chua for violation of BP 22 with moral certainty.

Chua’s acquittal, however, does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. "An
46

acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages." For this
47

reason, Chua must be directed to testitute See the total amount of the face value of all the checks subject of the case
with legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the time the said checks became due and
demandable up to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. 48

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The assailed Decision dated November 11, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR No. 33079 which affirmed the Decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 36 and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 finding petitioner Robert Chua guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 54 counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Robert Chua is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt
and ordered RELEASED immediately / unless he is detained for some other legal cause. He is ordered, however, to
indemnify the private complainant Philip See the total value of the 54 checks subject of this case plus legal interest of
12% per annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until June 30, 2013 and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN** JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO***

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 2088 dated July 1, 2015.

** Per Special Order No. 2079 dated June 29, 2015.

*** Per Special Order No. 2087 (Revised) dated July 1, 2015.

1
CA rollo, pp. 136-137.

2
Id at 64-68.

3
Id. at 69-72.

4
Id. at 75-78.

5
See Formal Offer of Exhibits dated January 22, 1999, id. at 83-97.

6
Id. at 89.

7
See Comment to Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Exhibits, id. at 98-102.

8
Id. at 103-104.
9
Id. at 105-106.

10
Id. at 116-118.

11
Id. at 113-115.

12
See Admission/Objection with Comment to Additional Offer of Evidence by the Prosecution, id. at 120-121.

13
Id. at 119.

14
As mentioned in the MeTC Order dated January 12, 2007, id. at 131-133.

15
Id. at 122-130.

16
Id. at 131-133.

17
Id. at 134-135.

18
Id. at 136-140; penned by Judge Edgardo B. Bellosillo of MeTC, Branch 36, Quezon City.

19
Id. at 139.

20
Id. at 140.

21
Id. at 59-61; penned by Judge Bayani V. Vargas of RTC, Branch 219, Quezon City.

22
Id., unpaginated, between pp. 60 and 61.

23
Id. at 61.

Id. at 252-262; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices
24

Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

25
Id. at 259-260.

26
Id. at 262.

27
Id. at 263-272.

28
Id. at 292.

29
Rollo, p. 20.

30
411 Phil. 63 (2001).

Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes, G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 217,
31

225-226.

32
Particularly Section 1(b), Rule 37 and Section 2(b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court which provide as
follows:

Rule 37
 Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. – Within the
period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment
or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party:

xxxx

(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

Rule 121

Section 2. Grounds for a new trial – The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:

xxxx

(b) That a new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.

33
Rico v. People, 440 Phil. 540, 551 (2002).

34
Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, G.R. No.199067, November 11, 2013, 709 SCRA 215, 223.

35
Supra note 30.

36
Id. at 72-73.

37
San Mateo v. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 660, 667.

38
Alferez v. People, 656 Phil. 116, 124 (2011).

39
CA rollo, pp. 138-139.

40
Id. at 107.

41
Id.

42
G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 154.

43
Id. at 170, citing Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, 493 Phil. 194, 206 (2005).

44
Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Abay-abay, G.R. No. 198402, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 622, 629.

45
Cabugao v. People, 479 Phil. 546, 561 (2004).

46
San Mateo v. People, supra note 37 at 668.

47
Id.

48
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, GR. No. 189871,August 13,2013, 703 SCRA439,454-456.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the prima facie
presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2 of B.P. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum
check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to
make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.

Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572, June 20, 1997, Per Panganiban, J.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a
check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified
that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within the five banking days from receipt of
the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.

Justice Panganiban, Third Division, Betty King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the
contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest available
degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the
production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130,
Section 322 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x.

>>>>>>>>>>>>

The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and
are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

[G. R. No. 137191. November 18, 2002]

BEN B. RICO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 In our view, the principal issue for our resolution is whether or not petitioners guilt
has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner contends that he should be acquitted of all charges because he already
paid his obligations to Ever Lucky Commercial. He likewise avers that the prosecution
failed to establish all the elements of the crime, particularly that he had knowledge of
the insufficiency of his funds in the bank at the time he issued the checks. This failure,
according to petitioner, can be traced to the prosecutions inability to prove that notices
of dishonor were sent to him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for appellee, argues that the payments
made by petitioner refer to different transactions and not to those covered by the checks
subject matter of this case. The OSG also avers that the verbal demands made by
private complainant are more than enough to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in the bank at the time he issued the checks.
At the outset, we must stress that as a general rule, the factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect and finality, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or palpable error, or when the trial court failed to appreciate
[16]

certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the
result of the case. We find that the exceptions rather than the general rule apply in this
[17]

case. We also find the petition meritorious.

The law enumerates the elements of violation of B.P. 22, namely (1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. [18]

The first and third elements of the offense are present and proved in these
consolidated cases. But we find that the second element was not sufficiently
established.
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of
a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense. In several cases,
[19]

we have ruled that to hold a person liable under B.P. 22, it is not enough to establish
[20]

that a check was dishonored upon presentment. It must be shown further that the
person who issued the check knew at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment. Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge.

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date
of the check, shall be prima facieevidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee. (Italics and underscoring supplied)

In King vs. People, we held:

[21]

The prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also provides
that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or
makes arrangement for its payment within five banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Thus, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is
brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of
dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for its payment. [22]

Here, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court relied solely on the testimony of
prosecution witness Danilo Cac to the effect that private complainant immediately
demanded payment of the value of the checks after they were dishonored. Aside from
this self-serving testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the giving and
receiving of such notice. The nature and content of said demands were not
clarified. Even the date when and the manner by which these alleged demands were
made upon and received by petitioner were not specified. Worse, the records do not
show that formal and written demand letters or notices of dishonor were ever sent to
petitioner.
Where the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds does not arise due to
the absence of notice of dishonor of the check, the accused should not be held liable for
the offense defined under the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22.
[23]

As held in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals a notice of dishonor personally
[24]

sent to and received by the accused is necessary before one can be held liable under
B.P. 22. In that case, we stated thus:

Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the
prima facie presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot
apply. Section 2 of BP Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from
the mere fact of drawing, making, and issuing a bum check; there must also be a
showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such
maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to
make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.

It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the
criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. xx xx The absence of
a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand -
and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually
sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP
Blg. 22. (Underscoring supplied.)

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the
maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, then the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of
B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial five-
day period. [25]

As stated earlier, the prosecution not only failed to prove the receipt by petitioner of
any notice of dishonor, the records are also bereft of any indication that written formal
demand letters or notice of dishonor were actually sent to petitioner. In recent cases, we
had the occasion to emphasize that not only must there be a written notice of dishonor
or demand letters actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must
also be proof of receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere registered
receipt and/or return receipt.
Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, while Section 2 of B.P. 22
[26]

indeed does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in
conjunction with Section 3 of the law, i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds in or
credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of
dishonor or refusal. A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient
for conviction under the law. In our view, both the spirit and the letter of the Bouncing
Checks Law require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused
issued a check that is dishonored, but also that the accused has actually been notified
in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes must be
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. In Victor Ting
vs. Court of Appeals, we stated that when service of a notice is sought to be made by
[27]

mail, it should appear that conditions exist on which the validity of such service
depends. Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of
service. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove
receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and receipt by petitioner
of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five banking
days within which to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.
However, while petitioner is acquitted for violation of B.P. 22, he should be ordered
to pay the face value of the five dishonored checks plus legal interest in accordance
with our ruling in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals. There, the prosecution failed to
[28]

sufficiently establish a case to warrant conviction, but clearly proved petitioners failure
to pay a just debt owing to the private complainant. Thus, petitioner was ordered to pay
the face value of the check with 12 percent legal interest per annum, reckoned from the
filing of the information until the finality of the decision. It is well settled that an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages. The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases.There appears to be no sound reason to require that a separate
civil action be still filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have
already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. To require a separate civil action would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
and money on the part of all concerned. [29]

Finally, we agree that petitioners alleged prior payment is untenable. As found by

the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, it is unnatural and illogical for petitioner to
have paid more than his outstanding obligations. It is also unlikely that he would pay
substantial amounts of interest when nothing had been agreed upon on this matter. It is
quite striking how he could have generously paid more than what was due from him
when he could hardly pay private complainant in cash, and had to issue post-dated
checks. Moreover, he could have asked for the return of the checks as a matter of
sound business practice and procedure if indeed he already paid all the dishonored
checks. The fact that these checks remained in the possession of private complainant
contradicts petitioners allegation of payment. [30]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19764 is

MODIFIED. Petitioner BEN RICO is ACQUITTED of the charge for violation of B.P. 22
on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, he is ordered to pay private complainant
the face value of the checks in the total amount of P178,434.00, with 12 percent interest
per annum, from the filing of the informations until the amount due is fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

[1]
CA Rollo, pp. 89-97.
[2]
Records, pp. 209-221.
[3]
Supra note 1 at 123.
[4]
Records, p. 1.
[5]
TSN, April 22, 1994, July 18, 1994 and August 22, 1994, pp. 2-50.
[6]
Records, pp. 190-191.
[7]
TSN, August 22, 1994, pp. 59-60.
[8]
Id. at 61.
[9]
Records, p. 221.
[10]
Id. at 217.
[11]
Id. at 217-218.
[12]
Id. at 218-220.
[13]
CA Rollo, p. 94.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[16]
David vs. Manila Bulletin Publishing Company, Inc., 347 SCRA 68, 69 (2000).
[17]
Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 450, 456 (2001).
[18]
Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 143231, October 26, 2001, p. 4; Wong vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 100,
108-109 (2001); Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 75, 80-81 (2000).
[19]
Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572, 585 (1997).
[20]
Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 450, 458 (2001); Ting vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 551,
557-558 (2000); King vs. People, 319 SCRA 654, 667-668 (1999).
[21]
Supra note 20 at 668.
[22]
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, supra note 20 at 558.
[23]
Supra note 19 at 585-586.
[24]
Id. at 593-594.
[25]
Danao vs. Court of Appeals, supra note 20 at 458-459.
[26]
Supra note 18 at 83-84.
[27]
Supra note 20 at 561-562.
[28]
Supra note 18 at 84-85.
[29]
Padilla, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 565-567 (1984).
[30]
See Alberto Lim vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 143231, October 26, 2001, pp. 6-7.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

JAIME ALFEREZ, G.R. No. 182301

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MENDOZA, JJ.
PINGPING CO,
Respondents. Promulgated:

January 31, 2011

The petition is partly meritorious.

After a careful evaluation of the records of the case, we believe and so hold
that the totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioners conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 defines the offense, as follows:[13]

Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds.Any person who makes or

draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover
the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person

or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.

Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are, as
follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or
for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.[14]

In this case, the first and third elements of the crime have been adequately
established. The prosecution, however, failed to prove the second element.
Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish,
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds under the following circumstances:[15]

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing,

and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.

In Suarez v. People,[16] which is on all fours with the instant case, two
Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner
therein. After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence without leave of court on the ground that no notice of dishonor had been
sent to and received by him. When the case reached this Court, we acquitted
petitioner on reasonable doubt as there was insufficient proof that he received
notice of dishonor. We explained that:

The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer had received this notice,
and that within five banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay the amount of
the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The full payment of the
amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor
is a complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due process requires that a notice
of dishonor be sent to and received by the petitioner to afford the opportunity to
avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.

x x x. [I]t is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of

dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to
show that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact of
service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor
by the drawee of the check.
 A review of the records shows that the prosecution did not prove that the
petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Registry return cards must be
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of letters sent through registered mail.[17]

In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter,
together with the registry receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner.
However, there was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the
registry return card.[18] Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by
themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of
receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. [19] To be sure, the
presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet
the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received such notice. It
is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the
drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice,
because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such
notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. [20] The burden of proving notice
rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there
should be clear proof of notice. [21] Moreover, for notice by mail, it must appear that
the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the
addressee. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioner or his
authorized agent did receive the demand letter. [22] Possibilities, however, cannot
replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.[23] The consistent rule is that penal statutes
have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
[24]
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an
opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. [25] As there is insufficient proof that
petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge
of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.[26]

This is so even if petitioner did not present his evidence to rebut the
documentary evidence of the prosecution as he had waived his right to present
evidence for having filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. We must
emphasize that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt
each element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own
evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the defense. [27] The
failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by petitioner of the requisite notice
of dishonor and that he was given at least five (5) banking days within which to
settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.[28]

Nonetheless, petitioners acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all

elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not include the
extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. [29] In case of
acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
of which the accused was acquitted.[30] In a number of similar cases, we have held
that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil
damages.[31]

In view of the foregoing, we sustain the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, as to petitioners civil liability.

Finally, in answer to petitioners insistence that he should have been allowed

by the trial court to present his evidence on the civil aspect of the case, suffice it to
state that when petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, the
whole case was submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by
the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its
civil aspect.[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated

December 13, 2007 and Resolution dated March 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No.
00300 are MODIFIED. Petitioner Jaime Alferez is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, the civil liability imposed on
petitioner is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Amy C.
Lazaro-Javier, concurring; rollo, pp. 16-25.
[2]
Id. at 26-27.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 18.
[4]
Rollo, p. 17.
[5]
CA rollo, pp. 22-23.
[6]
Id. at 28-31.
[7]
Penned by Presiding Judge Gil R. Acosta; id. at 18-21.
[8]
Id. at 21.
[9]
Penned by Presiding Judge Eric F. Menchavez; id. at 14-15.
[10]
Id. at 16-17.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 19-24.
[12]
Id. at 6.
[13]
King v. People, 377 Phil. 692, 706 (1999).
[14]
Suarez v. People, G.R. No. 172573, June 19, 2008, 555 SCRA 238, 245; Moster v. People, G.R. No. 167461,
February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 287, 296.
[15]
Suarez v. People, supra, at 245; King v. People, supra note 13, at 708-709.
[16]
Supra.
[17]
Id. at 246.
[18]
Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 297-298.
[19]
Id. at 298, citing Rico v. People, G.R. No. 137191, November 18, 2002, 392 SCRA 61, 73.
[20]
Moster v. People, supra, at 299, citing Cabrera v. People, 454 Phil. 759, 774 (2003).
[21]
Cabrera v. People, supra, at 774.
[22]
Ting v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 481, 494 (2000).
[23]
Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 299.
[24]
Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 69, 94.
[25]
Id. at 92.
[26]
Suarez v. People, supra note 14, at 247.
[27]
Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 299; King v. People, supra note 13, at 711.
[28]
Moster v. People, supra, at 299.
[29]
Ambito v. People, supra note 24, at 94.
[30]
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 502, 513.
[31]
Ambito v. People, supra note 24, at 94, citing Bax v. People, G.R. No. 149858, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA
284, 292-293; Rico v. People, supra note 19, at 74; Domangsang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139292, December
5, 2000, 347 SCRA 75, 84-85.
[32]
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 30, at 512-513.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

G.R. No. 177438 September 24, 2012

AMADA RESTERIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
The remaining issue is whether or not the second element, that is, the knowledge of the petitioner as the issuer of the
check that at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, was existent.

To establish the existence of the second element, the State should present the giving of a written notice of the
dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the dishonored check. The rationale for this requirement is rendered in
Dico v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
13

To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must not only establish that a check was issued and that
the same was subsequently dishonored, it must further be shown that accused knew at the time of the issuance of
the check that he did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment.

This knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check is the second element of the
offense. Inasmuch as this element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the check which
is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge. Said section
reads:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer

pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that
the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount
of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this
section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there
is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the
crucial 5-day period.

A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can
ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A
mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the
prosecution. (Bold emphases supplied)
14

The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second element arising from the
presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the
offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
the payment in full of the check by the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the
check had not been paid. The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not giving
15

the proper notice of dishonor. The nature of this opportunity for the accused to avoid criminal prosecution has been
expounded in Lao v. Court of Appeals: 16

It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator ‘a compromise by allowing him to
perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated’ xxx
In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is
a ‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be
actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulate of fairness require – that the
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P.
22." (Bold emphases supplied)
17

To prove that he had sent the written notice of dishonor to the petitioner by registered mail, Villadolid presented the
registry return receipt for the first notice of dishonor dated June 17, 2002 and the registry return receipt for the second
notice of dishonor dated July 16, 2002. However, the petitioner denied receiving the written notices of dishonor.

The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to establish the fact that written notices of
dishonor had been sent to or served on the petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the
written notices of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry return receipts by themselves were not
proof of the service on the petitioner without being accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of the person or
persons who had actually mailed the written notices of dishonor, or without the testimony in court of the mailer or
mailers on the fact of mailing. The authentication by affidavit of the mailer or mailers was necessary in order for the
giving of the notices of dishonor by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of the notices of
dishonor to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense. No less would fulfill the quantum of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, for, as the Court said in Ting v. Court of Appeals: 18

Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the demand letter by the prosecution. As can be
noticed from the above exchange, the prosecution alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove
mailing, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return receipt. However, no attempt was
made to show that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry
return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony of private complainant as to
who sent the demand letter and when the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the
registry return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent through registered mail and that the same
was actually received by petitioners or their agents.

As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove
that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, § 45). The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when service
of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of such service
depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice, § 18). In
the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent through registered mail,
relying as it did only on the registry return receipt. In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by
the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with
Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the registry receipt, it
is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then with more reason should we
hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant case, the
prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand
letter was sent. xxx

Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given petitioners’
denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was indeed
sent through registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This, the prosecution miserably failed to
do. Instead, it merely presented the demand letter and registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the same was
equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the
letters (Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580).

Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of
the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides that "[a] registered article must not be delivered to
anyone but the addressee, or upon the addressee’s written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the
addressee’s name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at bar, no effort
was made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an
illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is
that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is
possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot
replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their
checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.

As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000, 311 SCRA 397), "penal statutes must be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an offense. Having failed to
prove all the elements of the offense, petitioners may not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
(Bold emphases supplied) 1âwphi1

Also, that the wife of Villadolid verbally informed the petitioner that the check had bounced did not satisfy the
requirement of showing that written notices of dishonor had been made to and received by the petitioner. The verbal
notices of dishonor were not effective because it is already settled that a notice of dishonor must be in writing. The
19

Court definitively ruled on the specific form of the notice of dishonor in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals: 20

Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees.

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,
however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay
would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of
the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a
check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.
The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. (Bold emphases supplied; italics in the original text)

In light of the foregoing, the proof of the guilt of the petitioner for a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing to
Villadolid the unfunded Chinabank Check No. LPU-A0141332 in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 did not satisfy the
quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt. According to Section 2 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, which does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; only a moral certainty is required, or that degree
of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This is the required quantum, firstly, because the accused
is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and, secondly, because of the inequality of the position in
which the accused finds herself, with the State being arrayed against her with its unlimited command of means, with
counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, "and with an attitude of tranquil
majesty often in striking contrast to that of (the accused) engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if
not for life."
21

Nonetheless, the civil liability of the petitioner in the principal sum of ₱ 50,000.00, being admitted, was established.
She was further liable for legal interest of 6% per annum on that principal sum, reckoned from the filing of the
information in the trial court. That rate of interest will increase to 12% per annum upon the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 4, 2006, and ACQUITS petitioner AMADA RESTERIO of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as
charged for failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BERNARDO VILLADOLID the amount of ₱ 50,000.00, representing the
face value of Chinabank Check No. LPU-A0141332, with legal interest of 6% per annum from the filing of the
information until the finality of this decision, and thereafter 12% per annum until the principal amount of₱ 50,000.00 is
paid.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the C8se was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Vice Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., who is on leave per Special Order No. 1305 dated September 10,
2012.

1
Rollo, pp. 34-39; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza
and Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla concurring.

2
Id. at 2-3.

3
Id. at 3.

4
Id.

5
Id. at 34.

6
Id. at 13-14.

7
Ting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140665, November 13, 2000, 344 SCRA 551, 556-557.

8
Rollo, p. 16.

9
Id. at 49.

10
G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476.

11
Id. at 489-490.

12
Rollo, p. 48.

13
G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 441.

14
Id. at 456-458.
 15
Id.

16
G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572.

17
Id. at 594.

18
Ting v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7, at p. 560.

19
Marigomen v. People, G.R. No. 153451, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 169, 180.

20
G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 75, 83-84.

21
1 Wharton, § 1, quoted in Salonga, Philippine Law on Evidence, 3rd Ed., 1964, p. 771.

>>>>>>>>>>

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due
process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he
would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as,
excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible
for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.

G.R. No. 115430 November 23, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZABETH GANGUSO Y DECENA, accused-appellant.