Re-Wiring the Past, For the Future

Audit and Accounting Challenge 2021

 Question 1 2

Behind the Wirecard scandal, EY failed to adequately check Wirecard’s cash balance and fulfil its duties as an
auditor…

For years, EY had been negligent with checking Wirecard’s cash balances in According to the ISCA Ethics Pronouncement (EP) 100 Part A, EY has
OCBC Bank… breached the following …

EY had initially planned to expand its roster of clients on

Between 2016 and 2018, the auditors from EY did not Germany Dax 30 index, as it audits fewer companies than its
independently confirm Wirecard’s cash balances from OCBC rivals in Germany.

Section 120
Bank Singapore, where it had claimed to have up to €1bn in

Objectivity
There was a vested interest in having Wirecard as a client and
cash. hence, raises the question over the EY’s objectivity when
performing the audit,
Instead, the auditors relied on documents and screenshots
provided by a third-party trustee and Wirecard itself. EY earned nearly €10m in the audits of Wirecard over the
past decade. This huge sum of money could have impaired
EY’s objectivity when performing the audit.

… hence, this negligence has resulted in…

EY’s failure to request for crucial information from OCBC

Professional Diligence and Due Care

directly where Wirecard claimed that it had up to €1b in cash

The inability to find the missing cash (€1bn) claimed to have This is a routine audit procedure which should have been

Section 130
been sitting in the Singapore Books in OCBC… performed that could have uncovered the fraudulent figures in
Wirecard’s books.
There was uncessary reliance on documents and screenshot
… which ultimately led to the discovery of a fraud in Wirecard provided by third-party trustee and Wirecard to prove the
and filed for insolvency – revealing that €1.9bn in cash existence of the cash existence claimed by Wirecard’s books.
probably did “not exist”.
This shows EY did not exercise its professional competence to
act diligently in accordance with ISCA 100 Part A
Source(s): Financial Times

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Question 1 3

…thus this scandal have been prevented had EY complied with the ISCA Ethics Pronouncement (EP) 100.

In addition, according to the ISCA Ethics Pronouncement (EP) Had EY conducted its audit in accordance and strictly withholding
100 Part C, EY has also breached the following … the principles stated in the ISCA EP 100…

Section 320.3 (c): “A professional accountant in business shall take

It would not have relied on documents provided internally and
reasonable steps to maintain information that: Represents the facts
Preparation and Reporting of

followed through with standard routine audit procedures

clearly and completely in all material aspects.”
Discovered and prevented the fraud earlier, protecting the interest
Section 320

EY would have known that cash within the business is one of the
Information

most important aspect to verify through sending a confirmation of stakeholders of the company

Yet, it relied on confirmation of bank records prepared by by This would have maintained and strengthened the trust of the
third-parties financial system in Germany and EY’s reputation as a Professional
Accounting Firm
“Cash is easy to audit. If investors can’t trust the cash
number, what can they trust?” – Financial Times Article
…However, there are various actions which EY could explore
moving forward
Section 330.2 (b) and 330.4: “In performing duties with appropriate
Acting with Sufficient Expertise

degree of competence and due care: – (b) if provided incomplete,

restricted or otherwise inadequate information for performing its Training its people to be tech- savvier and more aware of forensic
duties properly the task should not have been undertaken “ accounting
Section 330

EY should have known that bank confirmations and ... so that they would have the ability to flag out and investigate
statements provided by third parties is considered inadequate fraudulent behaviors and accounts early during the auditing process
information
Performing checks on audit engagements regularly
… and therefore, should not have continued to approve the
audit report … as this would ensure management and employees remains
Source(s): Financial Times
competent when conducting its audit

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Question 2 4

To obtain a license by Hong Kong authorities allowing Wirecard to dish out prepaid bank cards in the region, Wirecard
embarked on a ”round-tripping” scheme, inflating its revenue to compel authorities to consider their application…

Why did Wirecard need a license? How did they implement “round-tripping” What is the impact on the statements?

In a traditional “cash is king” society, Hong According to WallStreetMojo, “round-tripping” is an 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014
Kong has developed rapidly into digital and illegal way to inflate revenues by swapping assets or
mobile payments society with the Hong Kong shell transactions, that are done usually on a no-profit Revenue €2,016 €1,489 €1,028 €771 €601
Monetary Authority (HKMA) issuing stored basis through a mutual settlement or an agreement. million million million million million
valued facilities (SVF) licenses in 2016 and
virtual banking licenses in 2019.
Repatriation Growth 35% 45% 33% 28%

Funds Funds
EPS €2.81 €2.07 €2.16 €1.16 €0.89

Cash €2,859 €2,010 €1,489 €1,196 €818

9/10 85%
Wirecard Hong Kong Asian
Germany Subsidiary Subsidiary (B/S) million million million million million
Refer to Appendix A for detailed information Debt €1,510 €1,093 €614 €383 €105
HONG KONG HONG KONG
million million million million million
SHOPPERS HAVE USED SHOPPERS USED ”Round-tripping” involves moving a sum of money from
DIGITAL WALLETS IN DIGITAL WALLET IN- Wirecard HQ in Germany to a Hong Kong subsidiary to As a result of “cooking the books” made possible by the
THE PAST YEAR (2019) STORE (2019) prove to HKMA that there is a demand. The fund then “round-tripping” scheme, the revenue of Wirecard AG grew
moves along to another Asian subsidiary and repatriated by an average of 35% year-on-year from 2014 to 2018 and
back to the Germany’s operation as revenue. its cash balance grew 250% from €818 million to €2,859
million from 2014 to 2018. Earnings per share also grew
Wirecard saw this as an opportunity to capture the Edo Kurniawan, a 33-year old Indonesian, who ran from €0.89 to €2.81, a 216% increase.
growing market in Hong Kong but is restricted by the Wirecard AG’s Asia-Pacific accounting and finance
requirement to own a SVF or virtual banking license operations sketched out this practice. It was initially used However, despite all these exponential growth and large
issued by HKMA. In order to have its application to convince HKMA to issue a license to Wirecard. cash balance, Wirecard’s continued taking on heavy debts
approved without hiccups, Wirecard decide to ”cook its Eventually, it became a practice used by the entire group from all its various stakeholders which is highly
books” to show demand and revenue. to “cook their books”. uneconomical and should have raised suspicion.
Refer to Appendix B & C for financial metrics information
Source(s): Tofugear, WallStreetMojo, Financial Times, European Research Journal

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Question 2
…which Ernst & Young (EY) could and should have discovered if they had exercised their due diligence and tested for
various financial statement assertions.
EY failed to follow proper audit procedures
According to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), “The auditor has a responsibility to plan and
perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about
whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud”
Despite EY refusing to sign off on the 2019 financials of
Wirecard, they were criticised for not raising concerns about
the bank accounts of Wirecard during the previous periods
(2017 & 2018) where a supposed €1.9 billion was missing.
EY could have discovered it early
International Standard on Auditing (IAS) provides a rigorous
list of procedures which are formed at such level that proper
execution of the standards should have enabled the
discovery of the discrepancies, leading to the entire fraud
scheme.
Regardless of the cause, EY could and should have discovered
the fraud if they exercised their due diligence and tested for
various assertions with proper execution according to the
IAS.
Source(s): Cuneyt Eti (LinkedIn), Investopedia
Question 1 Question 2
5
1 Existence Assertion
EY failed to request information for years from a Singapore OCBC bank holding about €1 billion that Wirecard
claimed to have stored there. According to IAS 505 (External Confirmations), confirmation procedures were
listed that would have allowed EY to detect the discrepancy. A positive or negative confirmation letter could
have been sent to the Singapore OCBC branch. In a case of non-response, the auditor can utilise alternative
confirmation method or revise the assessed risk of material misstatement and modify planned audit
procedures which they EY auditors failed to do so.
2 Rights and Obligations Assertion
EY failed to confirm that Wirecard had rights and control over the cash assets that were held overseas.
Approximately €2 billion were said to be stored in Philippines banks but an investigation conducted later
turned up nothing. This money represented around a quarter of the total revenue Wirecard had between 2016
to 2019. EY could have tested for Wirecard rights towards the cash asset by having Wirecard to perform a bank
transfer of a partial sum of the €2 billion held in Philippines bank to another bank which EY auditors failed to
do so. KPMG auditors involved in the special audit later managed to discover the fraud using the same method.
3 Occurrence Assertion
EY failed to confirm the occurrence of the the transactions and events pertaining to Wirecard. When Wirecard
embarked on the “round-tripping” fraud scheme, a sampling of the transactions could have been tested to see
if a recorded sale were ordered by valid customers and were genuine and not overstated. This could have
uncovered the “round-tripping” fraud scheme as the auditors would have discovered a dormant Hong Kong
subsidiary and an invalid customer generating revenue for Wirecard.
Question 3 Question 4 Appendix
 Question 3
However, diving deeper into Wirecard’s corporate governance structure, its board of directors should have been
responsible for failing to detect the fraud scandal…
Wirecard’s current corporate governance board structure is as such…
Wirecard was run on a two-tier board system - run by executives on a
management board and a supervisory board of non-executives, whose
explicit duties are appointing, supervising and advising the managers.
Refer to Appendix D for detailed board structure
Wirecard’s Supervisory Board always had the mentality of “monitoring” and
“be informed”. It comprised of just three directors and the number eventually
rose to five in 2016. The company had no supporting committee like audit
committee and risk management committee until early 2019.
… with a compensation structure to align the interests
For the board of directors, it is impossible to perfectly observe the actions of
management. Thus, in order to ensure that management acts in the best
interest of the shareholders, their compensation is closely tied to the
performance of the company, which was the stock performance.
With its compensation structure, Wirecard’s management was under heavy
market pressure to continue showing a business growth consistent with
historical trends which showed tremendous growth.
Refer to Appendix E for detailed compensation structures
of compensation of the Management Board in FY 2018 was performance-
35% based compensation, measured by EBITDA growth and stock performance
equally.
Refer to Appendix F for detailed compensation of executives
Source(s): Wirecard, Washington Post, IDW Paper, The Financial Times
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
6
However, Wirecard’s board of directors failed to …
For a long time, there was no Audit Committee in the CG structure of
Wirecard prior to 2019, which explains why the Supervisory Board failed to
conduct their independent internal investigation of the several allegations
relating to Wirecard’s accounting practices much earlier.
Wulf Matthais was both the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the
Chairman of the Audit Committee. However, doing so may limit the
effectiveness of the Audit Committee to carry out its fiduciary duties and
responsibilities to Wirecard. Refer to Appendix D for detailed board structure
…which was a breach of duty.
Wirecard did not comply with the 90-day publication deadline for financial
statements provided for in the German Corporate Governance Code, instead
taking advantage of the longer statutory periods.
The board performed the “tasks incumbent on it pursuant to the law,”
implying a box-ticking mindset. It took yet more pressure from the FT before
Wirecard engaged KPMG for an independent audit in October 2019.
Hence, the board of directors had breached its duty of care as they failed to
conduct their independent internal investigation of the allegations relating to
Wirecard’s accounting malpractices and also failed to prevent management
from wrongdoing. Thus, they were responsible.
Question 4 Appendix
 Question 3 7

Hence, introducing our proposed recommendations – (1) Restructuring corporate governance boards with specific
measures in place to protect the interests of stakeholders

Having a supporting committee within the supervisory board… … complemented with appropriate continuous measures

Public entities should be legally required to establish an Audit Committee

On top of top of structure, the company should have had a strong corporate
comprised of suitably qualified individuals, comprising of financial experts.
culture that focuses on accountability and correct execution of the controls, so
The name of the financial expert should be disclosed for transparency and
future frauds would have not been created nor tolerated.
accountability purposes. Culture
Refer to Appendix H for Wirecard’s board expertise

The primary purpose of the audit committee is to provide oversight of the

financial reporting process, the audit process, the company’s system of The Audit Committee should communicate regularly with the auditor, without
internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations. the presence of the Management Board, whereby this exclusion should be set
forth in the Audit Committee’s procedural rules.
Each audit committee member shall have the right to request information WITH THE PURPOSE OF…
Communication
from the heads of the company’s central services that fall within the audit Fostering the confidentiality of communications between the auditor and the
committee’s responsibilities, e.g. the head of risk management, the head of supervisory board or the audit committee.
internal audit or the head of the compliance department etc.

Such requests must be channeled via the chair of the audit committee to Consolidated financial statements and group management report should be
ensure oversight, who must then provide the requested information to all published within 90 days of the end of the financial year be required by law,
other audit committee members and must also inform the management Procedures governed and vetted by the audit committee of the board.
board of the information request without undue delay.

Thus, with a compulsory supporting committee within the supervisory board, complemented with continuous measures in place, this would enhance the competence and capacity
of supervisory boards to act in the monitoring of entities. Hence, this would improve corporate governance structure of the board of directors.

Source(s): Gibson Dunn, IDW Position Paper, Deloitte Report 2018, CFA Institute

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Question 3 8

(2) Coupled with a revamp its internal control measures, with enhanced transparency to all stakeholders…

Introducing a new transparent compliance management system… …enhanced by the help of auditors for risk management.

A compliance management system, which is designed to prevent white-collar To provide enhanced support to the Supervisory Board in performing its
crime in the form of balance sheet fraud or misappropriation of assets. In monitoring function, auditors should audit the appropriateness and
addition, the Management ought to report publicly on the basic features of effectiveness of the compliance management system set up by the
the system and issue a statement confirming that it has established. Management Board as part of the audit of financial statements.

As part of its supervisory responsibilities, the Supervisory Board has the
responsibility to monitor the Management Board’s compliance and then also
examine whether the Management Board has fulfilled its duty to establish a
workable, appropriate and effective compliance management system.
To strengthen confidence in the accuracy and completeness of this
statement, the (group) statement on corporate governance should be made
a mandatory part of the audit of financial statements
THIS IS BECAUSE…

It is an important instrument of capital market transparency and could

A statement regarding the results of the examination carried out by the
serve as a basis for the admission of capital market-oriented companies in
supervisory board on the management board should be published, giving the certain segments of the stock market.
transparency and confidence to investors

Use of forensic elements and analytics by auditors as part of the audit of

Fundamental governance principles would require that discussions and actions internal compliance management system. This would be especially useful in
of executive meetings be recorded with minutes. Minutes not only promote the case of whistleblowers (similar to Wirecard’s case), to specifically assess
accountability and transparency; they also facilitate effective audit and and analyse flaws in accounting and management systems
regulatory reviews.

Thus, with a new compliance management system managed by the supervisory and management boards, coupled with audit procedures in check,
this would enhance the transparency and compliance procedures within public entities, hence restoring confidence among investors.

Source(s): Gibson Dunn, The Financial Times, IDW Position Paper

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Question 4 9

Furthermore, while Wirecard’s external auditor (EY) was indeed responsible for failing to uncover the vast fraud at
Wirecard…

As Wirecard’s external auditor, EY is expected to increase the financial … Yet, for the past decade, EY has failed to spot a series of fraud risk
statements transparency and makes disclosures more accountable… indicators and allowed Wirecard to continue its fraud for many years

The primary role of external auditors in CG is to protect the interest of

shareholders and evaluate the organization for compliance with regulations
by helping to facilitate a more effective oversight of the financial reporting
process by the board of directors
In accordance with International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240:
“An auditor conducting an audit in accordance with ISAs is responsible for
obtaining reasonable assurance that the financial statements taken as a whole
are free from material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error.”
Regardless of the cause, an auditor is responsible for financial statements
being free from material misstatement because auditing standards are formed
at such level that proper execution of the standards will enable the discovery
of discrepancies
2015
• EY brought in its anti fraud team to check PayEasy, a Philippines-based TPA that on
paper generated a lot of revenue for Wirecard but at the time lacked audited results.
• Even when Wirecard provided EY with false address of PayEasy and the partner’s
website was down, EY did not further investigate
2016
• Wirecard published incomplete and potentially misleading notes to its 2016 annual
report even though these would have been relevant for investors’ decisions.
• EY internally discussed the “missing disclosure” but ruled it was not material – in
which Rödl & Partner later found incomprehensible as the information omitted
would have been relevant to investors’ decisions
2020
• It was revealed that EY heavily relied on verbal assurances and failed for more than
three years to request crucial account information from the Singapore bank where the
cash was supposedly held

Nonetheless, it is plausible to give EY the benefit of doubt that they were unable to discover the fraud after so many years

“Even the most robust audit procedures may not uncover this kind of fraud”.
• Given that Wirecard had planned such an elaborate and sophisticated fraud, which involved multiple parties around the world in different institutions, it is
plausible that EY was unable to discover the fraud
• In the aftermath of the discovery of the fraud, EY also fully co-operated and supported the parliamentary inquiry committee (PIC) throughout the course
investigations
Source(s): Financial Times, International Standard on Accounting, European Journal of Business and Management Research

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Question 4 10

… there were other stakeholders involved, who were responsible for failing to uncover the fraud as well.

Internal Auditors BaFin

The primary role of a company’s Audit Committee is to provide oversight The primary role of BaFin is to ensure the stability and integrity of the
of the financial reporting process, the audit process, the company’s German financial system including identifying and eliminating financial
system of internal controls, and compliance with laws and regulations. crime. This includes promoting anti-money laundering in Germany.

Yet, the formation of the Audit Committee was too late and the internal Yet, BaFin failed to adequately supervise Wirecard and even downplayed
auditors were ineffective in carrying out its fiduciary duties and allegations and opened probes into accusers, which eventually resulted in
responsibilities: a recurring pattern and the fraud remained undetected for many years:

<2017 2018 2019 2020

Allegations of
accounting irregularities, Allegations of Formation of Audit Wirecard filed for
“Round Tripping” Committee insolvency Whistleblowers and journalists accuse Regulators side with Wirecard remains unscathed and
money laundering etc.
Wirecard of improprieties Wirecard continues expanding
No independent No independent
internal investigation
internal investigation
What BaFin Did:
• The Supervisory Board committees (e.g. the Audit Committee, the Risk and • Unprecedentedly banned short-selling in Wirecard stock for a period of time when
Compliance Committee) were not formed until the first quarter of 2019 the firm’s share price slid after allegations of false accounting surfaced, citing:
• The absence of the Supervisory Board committees, especially the Audit Committee, “Wirecard’s importance for the economy and the serious
in the CG structure of Wirecard prior to 2019 explains why the Supervisory Board threat to market confidence”
failed to conduct their independent internal investigation of the several
• Filed a criminal complaint against two FT journalists who reported the
allegations, which allowed the fraud to be undetected for many years
whistleblower allegations about Wirecard and its round tripping scheme
• Even after the formation of the Audit Committee, the effectiveness of the
Committee to carry out its fiduciary duties and responsibilities was limited as the • Assigned the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP), a small private-sector
Chairman of the Supervisory Board and Audit Committee is the same individual body, to audit Wirecard’s accounts instead of investigating by themselves. As only
one auditor at FREP was assigned to the Wirecard case, little progress was made.
Source(s): Financial Times, Practical Ecommerce, European Journal of Business and Management Research

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Thank You

Re-Wiring the Past, For the Future

Audit and Accounting Challenge 2021
Bibliography & References 12

Bibliography & References

1. Wiggenraad, P. & Lung, T. (2019). Digital payment in Hong Kong. Tofugear. Retrieved from
https://www.wirecard.com/uploads/knowledge-hub/white-paper/digital-payment-in-hong-kong.pdf
2. Thakur, M. & Vaidya, D. (n.d.). Round tripping. WallStreetMojo. Retrieved from https://www.wallstreetmojo.com/round-
tripping/
3. Spotting red flags: Wirecard edition. (2020, July 22). The Financial Times. Retrieved from
https://www.ft.com/content/f70686c7-473c-4a5b-90b0-89094b534394
4. Storbeck, O. (2021, June 24). Wirecard: a record of deception, disarray and mismanagement. The Financial Times.
Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/15bb36e7-54dc-463a-a6d5-70fc38a11c81
5. Storbeck, O., Kinder, T., & Palma, S. (2020, June 26). EY failed to check Wirecard bank statement for 3 years. The
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/a9deb987-df70-4a72-bd41-47ed8942e83b
6. McCrum, D. & Palma, S. (2019, February 7). Wirecard: inside an accounting scandal. The Financial Times. Retrieved from
https://www.ft.com/content/d51a012e-1d6f-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65
7. Jo, H. & et al. (2021, March 25). Corporate governance and financial fraud of Wirecard. European Journal of Business
and Management Research. Retrieved from https://www.ejbmr.org/index.php/ejbmr/article/view/708
8. Eckler, M. (2021, February 23). The Wirecard Fiasco: Digital Payments Gone Wrong. Practical Ecommerce. Retrieved
from https://www.practicalecommerce.com/the-wirecard-fiasco-digital-payments-gone-wrong.
APPENDIX
Audit and Accounting Challenge 2021
Appendix 14

Appendix Navigation Page

Main Deck Appendix

1. Behind the Wirecard scandal, EY failed to check Wirecard’s cash balance and A. APPENDIX A: A Flowchart Diagram of how Round-tripping Works by
fufil its duties as an auditor… WallStreetMojo
2. This situation have been prevented earlier if EY had complied with the ISCA B. APPENDIX B: Wirecard’s Key Financial Metrix from Wirecard AG 2018 & 2019
Ethics Pronouncement (EP) 100… Half Year Annual Report
3. To obtain a license by Hong Kong authorities allowing Wirecard to dish out C. APPENDIX C: Key Liquidity Financial Metrix from Wirecard’s AG 2018 Annual
prepaid bank cards in the region, Wirecard embarked on a ”round-tripping” Report
scheme, inflating its revenue to compel authorities to consider their D. APPENDIX D: Overview of Wirecard’s Management Board and Supervisory
application… Board
4. …which Ernst & Young (EY) could and should have discovered if they had E. APPENDIX E: Summary of Wirecard’s Compensation Structure
exercised their due diligence and tested for various financial statement F. APPENDIX F: Summary of Wirecard’s Compensation of Management Board
assertions. G. APPENDIX G: Summary of Incentives for Management Board to Manipulate
5. However, diving deeper into Wirecard’s corporate governance structure, its Earnings
board of directors was responsible for failing to detect the fraud… H. APPENDIX H: Wirecard’s Board Expertise and Skills Matrix
6. Hence, introducing our proposed recommendations – (1) Restructuring its
supervisory board with specific measures in place to protect the interests of
stakeholders
7. (2) Coupled with a revamp its internal control measures, with enhanced
transparency to all stakeholders…
8. Furthermore, while Wirecard’s external auditor (EY) was indeed responsible
for failing to uncover the vast fraud at Wirecard…
9. … there were other stakeholders involved, who were responsible for failing
to report the fraud as well

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 15

APPENDIX A: A Flowchart Diagram of how Round-tripping Works by WallStreetMojo

Source(s): WallStreetMojo

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 16

APPENDIX B: Wirecard’s Key Financial Metrics from Wirecard AG 2018 & 2019 Half Year Annual Report

Source(s): European Journal of Business and Management Research

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 17

APPENDIX C: Key Liquidity Financial Metrics from Wirecard’s AG 2018 Annual Report

Source(s): The Financial Times

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 18

APPENDIX D: Overview of Wirecard’s Management Board and Supervisory Board

Wirecard’s Management Board Wirecard’s Supervisory Board

Source(s): European Journal of Business and Management Research, Wirecard AG 2018 Annual Report

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 19

APPENDIX E: Summary of Wirecard’s Compensation Structure

Source(s): European Journal of Business and Management Research, Wirecard AG 2018 Annual Report

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 20

APPENDIX F: Summary of Wirecard’s Compensation of Management Board

Source(s): European Journal of Business and Management Research, Wirecard AG 2018 Annual Report

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 21

APPENDIX G: Summary of Incentives for Management Board to Manipulate Earnings

Source(s): European Journal of Business and Management Research

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix

 Appendix 22

APPENDIX H: Wirecard’s Board Expertise and Skills Matrix

Source(s): CGLytics Expertise Diagram and Skills Matrix

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Appendix