NOTES IN POLITICAL LAW (For
2019 BAR)
Jose Edmund E. Guillen, LL.B,
LL.M
Amendment vs. Revision
Amendment
- Refers to the a change that adds, reduces,
deletes, without altering the basic principle
involved; affects only the speci:ic provisions
being changed.
Revision
- Implies a change that alters a basic principle
in the Constitution; affects several provisions.
Lambino vs. Comelec
- In determining whether the Lambino
proposal involves amendment or a revision,
the Court considered the two-part test.
1) Quantitative Test – the Court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does
not consider the degree of the change
2) Qualitative Test – inquires into the
qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the Constitution.
- Main inquiry: whether the change will
“accomplish such far-reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision.”
Held: The Lambino proposal constituted a
revision, not simply an amendment of the
Constitution, because it involved a change in
the form of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and a shift from the present
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
Note:
- Majority of the justices had voted to declare
RA 6735 suf:icient and adequate for the
people’s initiative abandoning the ruling in
Defensor-Santiago vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
127325, March 19, 1997.
Steps in the amendatory process: [2]
(i) Proposal [3]
(1) Congress
▪ By a vote of 3/4 of all its members
(2) Constitutional Convention
▪ Which may be called into existence either
by a 2/3 vote of all the members of the
Congress, or (if such vote is not obtained)
by majority vote of all the members of
Congress with the question of whether or
not to call a Convention to be resolved by
the people in a plebiscite.
(3) People
▪ Through the power of initiative
▪ Requisite: A petition of at least 12% of
the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein.
▪ Limitation: No amendment in this manner
shall be authorized within 5 years
1
following the rati:ication of the
Constitution nor more often than once
every \ive years thereafter.
Republic Act No. 6735 [An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum]
Initiative – the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislation through an election called for the
purpose.
1) Initiative on the Constitution
2) Initiative on statutes
3) Initiative on local legislation
Procedure
▪ The essence of amendments directly
proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition of the people.
▪ Two essential elements:
1) The people must author and sign the
entire proposal; no agent or
representative can sign in their behalf.
2) As an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in the
petition.
▪ In Lambino Case, the great majority of the
6.3M people who signed the signature sheets
did not see the full text of the proposed
changes before signing; they were not
apprised of the nature and effect of the
proposed amendments. Failure to comply
with these requirements was fatal to the
validity of the initiative petition.
Note: People’s initiative applies only to an
amendment, not a revision of the Constitution.
(ii) Rati\ication
- Proposed amendment shall become part of
the Constitution when rati:ied by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not
earlier than 60 nor later than 90 days after
the approval of the proposal by the Congress
or the Constitutional Convention, or after the
certi:ication by the COMELEC of the
suf:iciency of the petition for initiative under
Sec. 2, Art XVII.
- Doctrine of proper submission: There will
no longer arise the question of whether the
time given to the people to determine the
merits and demerits of the proposed
amendment is adequate.
STATE AND ITS ELEMENTS:
State – a community of persons, more or less
numerous, permanently occupying a de:inite
portion of territory, independent of external
control, and possessing a government to
which a great body of inhabitants render
habitual obedience.
 -can there be a state without a government?
-can there be a government without a state?
Give an example
-has legal personality; has the capacity to do
business or join other states in making
international law (customary) or enter into
international agreements
• Montevideo Convention of 1933 [a Convention
on Rights and Duties of States,]: people,
territory, government, sovereignty
1. People
Suppose all the people living in the island are
women? Does it comply with the requirement of
statehood? No.
As a requisite for Statehood: Adequate number for
self-suf:iciency and defense; of both sexes for
perpetuity.
• Differentiate from inhabitants
o Art. XIII Section 1
o Art. II Section 15 and 16
o Art. III Section 2
• Citizens
o Art. II Section 1
o Art. II Section 4
o Art. III Section 7
• Electors
o Art. VII Section 4
o Art. XVI Section 2
o Art. XVIII Section 25
2. TERRITORY:
Does it comply with the requirement
of statehood if there are still boundary
disputes?
• The case of Palestinian statehood
1) Refer to Article one of the Constitution: where
exactly is the Philippine archipelago? What are
those islands that are included therein?
ARTICLE I
National Territory
The national territory comprises the
Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, \luvial, and aerial domains, including
its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
waters around, between, and connecting the islands
of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
• Treaty limits
o Treaty of Paris December 10, 1898
o Treaty of Washington November 7,
1900 between the US and Spain,
ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu
o Treaty of January 2, 1930 between the
US and UK, ceding the Turtle and
Mangsee Islands
2
2) 1973: all other territories belonging to the
Philippines by historic right or legal title
• Provision for the Sabah claim
• Legal title – all accepted modes of acquiring
territory
• 1987: all other territories over which the
Philippine has sovereignty or jurisdiction; it is
open to all modes of acquiring territory under
international law and also open to settling of
con:licting claims under international law
• United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) - 1982: the concept of archipelago
and archipelagic state
Archipelago Doctrine – based on the principle that
an archipelago, which consists of a number of islands
separated by bodies of water, should be treated as
one integral unit and the waters inside the
baselines are considered internal waters.
3) The territorial sea: 12 nautical miles; contiguous
zone: 24 nautical miles; exclusive economic zone:
200 nautical miles
Baseline – the line from the seaward limits of a
state’s territorial sea and certain other
maritime zones of jurisdiction are measured.
Normally, a sea baseline follows the low-
water line of a coastal state.
Internal Waters – include waters on the landward
side of the baseline of a nation’s territorial
waters, except archipelagic states. [not subject
to innocent passage]
Territorial Waters or territorial sea – a belt of
coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical
miles (22.2 km, 13.8 mi) from the baseline
(usually the mean low-water mark) of a
coastal state.
Contiguous zone – a band of water extending
from the outer edge of the territorial sea to up
to 24 nautical miles (44.4 km, 27.6 mi) from
the baseline, within which a state can exert
limited control for the purpose of preventing
or punishing “infringement of its customs,
:iscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial
sea.”
Exclusive economic zone – extends from the outer
limit of the territorial sea to a maximum of
200 NM (370.4km, 230.2 mi) from the
territorial sea baseline, thus it includes the
contiguous zone.
Continental shelf – comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
beyond its territorial sea throughout the
 natural prolongation of the land territory to
the outer edge of the continental margin, or to
a distance of 200 NM from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that
distance.
• Baselines: normal baselines and the straight
baselines (Article 7 (1) of the UNCLOS)
o Uses of baselines:
o Determine what constitute internal
waters and the scope of internal
waters
o Determine the 200 mile EEZ
o Archipelagic doctrine – the body of
water strudded with islands, or the
islands surrounded with water, is
viewed as a unity of islands and
waters together forming one unit.
The purpose of the doctrine is to
protect the interests of the
archipelago.
Low-tide elevations [UNCLOS, Article13]
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of
land which is surrounded by and above water at
low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-
tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a
distance not exceeding the breadth of the
territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the
low-water line on that elevation may be used as the
baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at
a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial
sea from the mainland or an island, it has no
territorial sea of its own.
Regime of islands [UNCLOS, Article 121]
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide.
2. XXX
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.
• Sovereignty over territorial waters subject to
right of innocent passage; but no such right
if referring to internal waters; but consider
Article 8 (2) where the effect of the straight
baseline method is the enclosing as internal
waters those areas which have not been
considered before as such, then there must be
the right of innocent passage. Here the
Philippines made its reservations upon
signing of the UNCLOS. SEE page 27-28.
Right of innocent passage – all States enjoy the right
of innocent passage through archipelagic waters. The
archipelagic State, may, however suspend
temporarily, without discrimination, the right to
innocent passage in speci:ied areas, when deemed
essential for the protection of national security
provided that such suspension shall take effect only
after due publication [Art. 52 & 53, UNCLOS].
4) The insular shelf, the continental shelf
o The land which is submerged under
water which may extend beyond 12
3
miles as long as it is not more than
300 feet deep. It is also known as
intercontinental shelf
• The exclusive economic zone: 200 nautical
miles- the coastal state has sovereign rights
to explore, develop, or exploit and conserve
the natural resources. If the Philippines will
not undertake any exploration, development
or exploitation of these marine resources,
then no country has the right to do so. China
should not and cannot under the law, bully us
regarding our EEZ
• Such as the production of energy from the
water, currents and winds
• Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect
to the establishment and utilization of
arti:icial islands, off-shore terminals,
installations and structures; preservation of
the marine environment, including the
prevention and control of pollution and
scienti:ic research
• Including also such other right recognized by
international law
o Other states are allowed to use the
zone for:
▪ Navigation and over-:light
▪ Laying of submarine cables
and pipelines
▪ Other lawful uses related to
navigation and
communication
• The Philippines has sovereignty over her
territory and that includes the territorial
sea but she has only sovereign rights over
her exclusive economic zone.
3. GOVERNMENT
- the agency or instrumentality through which the
will of the State is formulated, expressed and
realized.
• Differentiate from administration
• Constituent or ministrant functions?
Governmental or proprietary functions?
Functions [2]
(1) Constituent/Governmental – mandatory for
the Government to perform because they
constitute the very bonds of society, such as the
maintenance of peace and order, regulation of
property and property rights, the
administration of justice, etc.
- involves the exercise of sovereignty and
therefore compulsory
(2) Ministrant/Proprietary – functions intended
to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people, and which are merely
optional for the government to perform.
- connotes merely the exercise of
proprietary functions and thus considered as
optional.
• Administration of justice, how will you
classify it? Constituent
• Implementation of the land reform program –
may not be strictly constituent in the sense
discussed in the case of Bacani vs. NACOCO,
but take note of the urgency that the
constitution emphasizes social justice
• How about housing, how will you classify it in
terms of functions of the government?

De jure and de facto government?
• De jure – government has rightful title but
no actual power or control, either because
this has been withdrawn from it or because it
has not yet actually entered into the exercise
thereof.
• De facto –is a government in fact, that is, it
actually exercises power or control without
legal title.
• The government of Cory Aquino in
1986?
• Revolutionary? De:iance of the
existing legal processes?
• Despotic? There is still the Bill of
Rights in the Freedom constitution.
• Militaristic? The principle of civilian
supremacy is enshrined in the
constitution also.
• Temporary? Yes!
• De facto or de jure: Explain it in the
local context or international level
• In the latter it depends on the
recognition received by the
government from other states
• Is recognition by other states a
constitutive element that even with
the presence of the four under the
Montevideo Convention it is not yet a
state if not recognized? There are two
schools of thought here in
international law: the declarative
theory and the constitutive theory.
4. SOVEREIGNTY
- the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent
in a State by which the State is governed.
• Legal –the supreme power to make laws
• Political – sum total of all the in:luences in a
state, legal or non-legal which determine the
course of law.
o Imperium – refers to the state’s
authority to govern; in this capacity,
jure imperii – it enjoys immunity from
suit
o Dominium –the capacity of the state to
own property; in this capacity jure
gestium, the state descends to the level
of ordinary persons and thus becomes
liable for the consequences of its
actions.
4
• Jurisdiction is the manifestation of
sovereignty.
o Territorial –is the authority of the
state to have all persons and things
within its territorial limits to be
completely subject to its control and
protection. It is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. Any restriction upon it,
deriving from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the
restriction. All exceptions must be
traced up to the consent of the state
itself. There is no other legitimate
source.
o Personal –is the authority of the state
over its nationals, their persons,
property, and acts whether within or
outside its territory. Civil Code
provisions that mandatory laws
follow citizens wherever they go. This
is usually being followed in Taxation
Laws of the country as well as in laws
affecting marriages and its dissolution
o Extraterritorial –is the authority of
the state over persons, things or acts,
outside its territorial limits by reason
of their effects to its territory. Article 2
of the RPC.
▪ Commission of the offense on Philippine ship
or airship
▪ Forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note
of the Philippines
▪ Introduction into the Philippines of any forged
item mentioned in number preceding section
▪ While being public of:icer or employee, one
commits an offense in the exercise of his
functions
▪ Commits any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations de:ined in Title
one of Book 2 of the RPC.
o Universal Jurisdiction – being
exercised by states over offenders of
certain crimes and prosecute them
regardless of the place where the
crimes were committed.
SECTION 3. The State may not be sued without its
consent. [ARTICLE XVI, The 1987 Constitution]
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Dates back to the time of the monarchy
- the king could not be sued without his consent
• The king could not do any wrong
 • With the constitutionalism or republicanism,
who would give the consent?- Legislative
• There is no constitutional provision regarding
it before the 1973 constitution
• But already part of the legal system brought
to the country by the Americans
What are the reasons for this provision?
• Juridical and practical notion that the state can
do no wrong
• Holmes: not based on formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends (Kawanakoa v.
Polybank) (Republic vs. Villasor)
• Public funds cannot be the subject of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to
be sued had been previously granted and the
state liability adjudged.(Villasor)
• Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE)
The private respondent here argued that the
NLRC has no jurisdiction over it because it
enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations. The DFA
con:irmed the immunity being enjoyed by
UNRFNRE and the issue as to whether or not an
international organization is entitled to
immunity is a “political question” and the
determination by the executive department is
conclusive on the courts.
• The same conclusion is reached in the cases of
SEAFDEC V. NLRC and Callado v. IRRI. These
organizations are immuned from the legal
writs and processes issued by the courts or
tribunals of the countries where they are found.
• Metran v. Paredes: from the concept of
republicanism – when they surrendered some
of their rights which may come in con:lict the
higher rights and larger interests of the people
as a whole – in suing the state it seems like
they are suing themselves
• Practical reasons
Two important questions:
1) Whether or not it is a suit against the
state?
2) If it is a suit against the state, whether or
not there is consent.
How one will determine whether if it is a suit against
the state?
• No problem if the Republic of the Philippines is
named as the defendant in the suit.
• What if the suit is against the agency or the
public of\icial or an unincorporated agency?
Begoso v. Philippine Veterans Authority: there is a
failure on the part of the public of:icial to follow his
duty imposed by law appropriating funds for the
bene:it of the plaintiff; there was error in the
disapproval of the disability claim. Take note that
there is already an appropriations for payment of
those claims. The actuations here of the of:icials are
patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion cannot
apply.
5
Del Mar v. PVA: there is already funds appropriated
for the purpose but the functionary failed to release
it to the claimant as part of his statutory duty.
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.
vs. CA – the PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA are being
sued for their of:icials acts in refusing to grant the
renewal of the license of VMPSI due to the absence
of the certi:icate of membership from the PADPAO
Shauf v. Court of Appeals: the of:icial is being sued
for his discriminatory acts performed beyond his
authority; for acts contrary to law; he acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him
by law; acts done with malice and bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Republic v. Feliciano: classic example of a suit
against the state; the defendant is really the RP;
this is a suit for recovery of property which is an
action in personam not action in rem.
o Failure to invoke the defense of immunity
from suit is not fatal because it can be invoked
by the court sua sponte (of one’s own will or
volition even without any request from the
parties) or at any stage of the proceedings.
Republic v. Sandoval: the heirs of the 12 rallyists
:iled an action for damages for the death during the
rally. There is a recommendation by the Mendiola
Commission that the victims will be compensated.
There was also the pronouncement of the President.
o This is not a suit against the state because the
recommendation of the Commission does not
mean that liability already attaches to the
government
o The pronouncement or acts of the President is
not tantamount to waiver
o The republic here is sued by name but the
ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. The of:icers were discharging
their of:icial functions but their functions
ceased to be of:icial the moment they
exceeded their authority.
o The principle of immunity from suit does not
apply. The relief being demanded by the suit
does not require any af:irmative of:icial action
on the part of the state even though the
of:icers or the agents who are made
defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue
of a title of the state as its agents and
servants.
o The of:icers would be personally liable.
o When a suit against the state is proper: [3]
(1) When the republic is sued by name
(2) When the suit is against an
unincorporated government agency
(3) When the suit is on its face against a
govt. of:icer but the case is such that
the ultimate liability will belong not
to the of\icer but to the govt.
Suit against government agencies, of\ices or
entities:
• Determine if incorporated or not
• If incorporated, therefore it has a separate
legal personality; it can sue and be sued—
the “sue sue” provision
PNB V. CIR – Laborers and employees got a :inal
judgment from CIR and is seeking garnishment of
the PHHC funds deposited with PNB. Garnishment
is proper. PHHC has a separate personality with
sue-sued provision.
SSS V. CA – the property of one Socorro Cruz was
foreclosed due to the negligence of the regular
employee of SSS. The SC granted nominal damages.
The charter of SSS provides that it can sue and be
sued in court. The court seems to imply that that
SSS could have invoked the defense of Article 2180.
So, a government entity could be sued for tort but it
can put up the defense that it acted through its
regular employees and not through a special agent.
RAYO V. CFI of Bulacan – victims of :loods due to
the simultaneous openings of the dams. NPC as
operators of the dam is sued. NPC’s charter allows
it to sue and be sued and there is no quali:ication
as to the cause of action that can be :iled, thus tort
is included.
MALONG V. PNR – PNR is not performing any
governmental function, and may therefore be sued.
The court said that like any private common carrier
the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons
engaged in that private enterprise.
FAROLAN V. CTA – the Bureau of Customs, being an
unincorporated agency without a separate juridical
personality, enjoys immunity from suit. It is
invested with an inherent power of sovereignty,
namely the power of taxation.
ANGAT RIVER IRRIGATION SYSTEM (CB) –
function of maintaining an irrigation system is a
governmental function, thus it enjoys immunity
from suits. The System was a division of the Bureau
of Public Works. This is a 1957 case.
NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP. V. TEODORO (CB)-
here the agency is Civil Aeronautics Administration,
and it is held that its functions are proprietary in
nature.
• If there is an express consent in the form of
“sue-sue provision” the capacity to be sued in
this instance encompasses any kind of action,
including one from tort.
o Suability is made to depend not on the
separate personality of the entity but on the
express grant of authority to sue and be
sued
o That includes those corporations which are
performing governmental functions
▪ BERMOY V. PHILIPPINE NORMAL
COLLEGE (CB)
▪ OLIZON V. CENTRAL BANK (CB)
• This is also true with regards to municipal
corporations, which have their own original
charters. For LGUs, the provision in their
charters that they can sue and be sued is an
express waiver. Thus, they are suable for
damages suffered by private persons even
in the exercise of governmental functions.
(Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs.
Judge Firme et. al)
• However, LGUs share in the immunity of the
sovereign. So these municipal corporations
may not be liable for torts and damages
committed by their of:icers except when the
law expressly grants consent for their liability.
6
o Thus, even if the local govt. units are
suable because of their respective
charters, it does not automatically follow
that LGUs are also liable. Their liability
must still be proven with suf\icient even
in court. Most likely liability will depend
on the validity of the LGUs defense. If the
LGUs can prove that the acts for which
they are being sued are in the
performance of their governmental
functions, they would not be liable. But if
the acts were done pursuant to their
proprietary functions, then LGUs can be
liable for damages attributable to the
negligence of their of\icers and
employees. (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 scra
599)
o Because of its being an integral part in the
political subdivision of the govt., it shares in
the sovereignty of the state. Thus it cannot
be made liable even for torts in the
performance of its of:icial functions except
of course if the law expressly makes them so
liable.
o Take note however, that even if it is
performing governmental functions, it can
still be LIABLE, for torts and damages if
there is an express consent for such
liability.
▪ For instance, when it acts through a
special agent under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code
• If unincorporated, determine if the function
is governmental or proprietary
• If governmental, there is immunity from suit
Meltran v. Paredes (CB) – was created in order to
provide the public with means of transportation
more ef:icient, cheaper, and faster than those in
existence. It possesses no separate juridical
personality. So a suit against Meltran was in fact a
suit against the government whose consent has not
been given. Take note that the SC did not make any
attempt to analyze the nature of the functions being
performed by Meltran.
• In the subsequent cases, SC made a distinction
between unincorporated government agencies
performing governmental function and those
performing proprietary functions.
o Angat River Irrigation System Case (CB) -
the court was careful to point out the
governmental character of the functions of
the irrigation system. The agency is part of
the DPWH. Immunity here was upheld.
o National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro
(CB) – Civil Aeronautics Administration,
successor to the National Airport Corporation,
was performing proprietary function because
its function is “not to maintain a necessary
function of government, but to run what is
essentially a business, even if revenues be not
its prime objective but rather the promotion
of travel and the convenience of the traveling
public.”
• Take note the immunity is not lost if the
proprietary function is only incidental to the
main governmental function of the agency.
 o Bureau of Printing Case: the additional
printing job done for private parties was
found to be insigni:icant incident to the
printing job being done for the government
of:ices.
o Mobil Philippines v. Customs Arrastre
Service – the arrastre operation was found to
be an incident to the governmental task of
collecting revenues and duties. For otherwise,
the bureau could not perform its
governmental functions without necessarily
exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity
granted as to the end, should not be denied as
to the necessary means to that end.
• Worth noting that the functions of
Meltran and the CAA have really no
signi\icant difference but the resulting
decisions are different. As pointed out
earlier the SC in Meltran did not make
any distinction as to the functions it
performs, eventhough it is an
unincorported agency. Bernas submits
that both Meltran and CAA could very
well qualify for immunity under the
doctrine laid down in Mobil.
Suits against government of\icers
• The threshold question: whether liability will fall
ultimately on the government?
• Determine if the of:icer is performing his functions
within the scope of his authority
• If within, then he is acting as the agent of the state,
thus apply the threshold question
o Veterans Manpower Case – the suit against
the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
public of:icers acting in the discharge of their
of:icial functions.
o Larkins v. NLRC – the US of:icer was acting
for and in behalf of the US Government, which
by right of sovereign power, operated and
maintained the dormitories at the Clark Air
force Base for USAF members.
• If he exceeds his authority, then the state cannot
be made liable for his abuse
o Republic v. Sandoval – supra.
o Whether or not government immunity
from suit can be pleaded in a suit against
the government of\icers is made to turn on
whether ultimate liability will fall in the
government. If it does but it is against the
foreign state, then such suit is also
dismissable because of the sovereign
immunity being enjoyed by states.
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez – this involves
immunity of a foreign state and the
application of the threshold question of that
state being ultimately liable. The commanding
general and other of:icers of the US army are
sued for collection of back rentals on
apartments where they were billeted. This
case however seems not to have considered
the nature of the contract entered into by the
parties.
• If the of:icer commits the act with malice, ill will,
bad faith, any tortious act, or if there is an abuse of
authority, then he may be personally liable
o Shauf v. Court of Appeals
7
o Festejo v. Fernando (CB) – action for
damages against the Director of Public Works
for having caused the construction of an
irrigation canal without :irst securing a right
of way over plaintiff’s property. The suit was
for return and restoration of the property to
the owner. The restoration here is still
practicable, thus the court granted the prayer
at the expense of the public of:icer.
o The same abuse of authority happened in
Ministerio vs. CFI because the private
property was taken without the bene:it of
expropriation proceedings. In both cases
immunity could not bar the suit, however,
restoration is no longer practicable in the case
of Ministerio due to the long lapse of time
after taking. Moreover, personal responsibility
for the unlawful action would be dif:icult to
pinpoint.
o In Ministerio also the court declared that
doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve
as an instrument for perpetuating
injustice on a citizen.
o Both set of of:icers in Festejo and Ministerio
were acting in their of:icial capacities.
• The principle of quantum meruit – it applies
even if the contract is null and void due to lack
of legal requirements
o EPG Construction v. Vigilar – there is
already the :inished additional constructions
which the government can use.
Consent: how it is given and who is authorized to
give it? Basically LEGISLATIVE.
• Take note of the ruling in Festejo that the
unlawful act of an executive of:icer does not
divest the state of immunity because the
waiver must be controlled by the
legislative branch.
Express
• Given through a general law passed by Congress
• Sandoval: statement of the President that the
grievances of the farmers will be redressed or the
recommendation of the Commission is not a valid
waiver of immunity.
• CA 327 – claim maybe \iled with the Auditor
General (COA). If the auditor did not act within 60
days then the claimant could :ile his claim with the
RTC. If the auditor renders a decision then appeal
could be made to the SC, unless the claimant is a
public of:icial in which case he has to appeal to the
President.
o Now under the 1987 Constitution, all money
claims must be \iled with the COA which has
60 days within which to act. If not yet acted,
then the claimant has to wait. Then he has 30
days to appeal to the SC the decision of the COA.
• Act 3083 – money claim based on contracts,
express or implied
• Quasi-delict committed by special agents
o Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
– tortious acts: the state could be liable if it acts
through a special agent.
o If the tortious act was committed by a regular
employee, then the victim could only :ile a case
against the employee in his personal capacity.
• Special Law – Meritt v. Govt. of the Philippine
Islands
o Republic v. Purisima – RCA entered into a
contract with a freight company and there is a
 stipulation in the contract that in case of
breach, action must be :iled in the courts of
Manila. The freight company :iled a money
claim against RCA. RCA is not incorporated and
in fact it is an of:ice under the Of:ice of the
President. Consent can only be given through
a statute.
o Department of Agriculture v. NLRC – it is
worth noting in this case that the court made
the distinction as to the character of the
contract entered into by a government agency
which may result to a waiver of its immunity.
Distinction must still be made between one
which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done
in its proprietary capacity. Here, the contract
was entered into pursuant to its governmental
functions. But the claims of the respondents for
underpayment of wages, holiday pay and
overtime pay and similar items arising from
Contract of Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Department of Agriculture may be
sued for money claims based on a contract
entered into in its governmental capacity
because of the express consent contained in
Act No. 3083 provided that the claim be
brought :irst to the Commission on Audit in
accordance with CA 327, as amended.
Implied Consent: [4]
(1) When the government enters into a
business contract
o Take note of the Harry Lyons case (CB,
Bernas) – in relation to the principle in the
Mobil Case.
o The SC held in Lyons that the US had
waived its immunity by entering into a
contract of stevedoring services at the U.S.
Base in Subic. But it looks like that the
stevedoring function is only incidental to
its military function. The ruling here seems
to be in con:lict with the doctrine laid
down in Mobil. Although, one has to take
note that Lyons was decided in 1958 while
Mobil Oil in 1966.
(2) It must not be any kind of contract, but
must be a business contract. If the contract
is still pursuant to its governmental functions,
then the immunity stays.
o United States of America v. Ruiz –
contract for the repair of wharves and
piers at US Base in Subic was held to be
pursuant to its governmental function of
the US government
o Malong v. PNR supra. – when the
government organized the Philippine
National Railway, it divested itself of
sovereignty because the purpose for the
operation of the PNR is proprietary. It can
be liable for damages for the death of one
who fell from the train.
(3) When it would be inequitable for the state
to invoke its immunity, or when it takes
private property for public use without
any expropriation proceedings nor
payment of just compensation.
o Amigable v. Cuenca – no payment of just
compensation and the proper
expropriation proceedings
8
o Ministerio Case – supra.
o Santiago v. Republic (CB) – the
government as a donee, and it failed to
follow the conditions of the donation.
Therefore the donor is entitled to go to
court in order to recover the property
donated.
(4) When government \iles a complaint,
defendant may \ile a counterclaim against
it
o Froilan v. Oriental Pan Shipping – the
government :iled a complaint in
intervention for the purpose of asserting a
claim for af:irmative relief against the
plaintiff, to wit, for the recovery of a vessel.
o But not if the complaint in intervention
is for the purpose of resisting a claim
against the government, that may result
in the loss of its property or the
disbursement of funds.
Scope of the Consent: LIABILITY HAS ALREADY
BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURTS
• General rule: the consent is only up to the
judgment stage of the case when the decision
is already :inal and executor. The consent given,
expressly or impliedly does not extend up to
the satisfaction of a judgment that has
already become \inal and executor. Thus,
there is a need for another consent to be given
by the state which may take the form of an
appropriations law or ordinance.
• Exceptions:
1) When there is already an appropriation passed
by Congress or by the respective council of
the LGUs
2) The charter of the GOCC provides that it can
sue and be sued
o PNB v. Pabalan – GOCCs whose charters
provide that they can sue or be sued
consents that their funds can be garnished.
(Also Rizal Commercial Bank v. De Castro)
o Funds of the local government units which
have charters with provisions that it can sue
or be sued: their funds are public in
character, therefore there must be a
corresponding appropriation ordinance
duly approved by the Sangguniang Bayan
authorizing the payment of the amount for
which the LGU is liable
▪ Mun. of San Miguel Bulacan v. Fernandez
o As a general rule Mandamus cannot be
\iled to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to
pass an ordinance for the payment of a :inal
judgment. It is within the discretion of the
Sanggunian to decide whether or not to pass
an ordinance considering that public funds
may have been earmarked already for
governmental purposes. An exception to
that rule may be availed of as laid down in
the case of
▪ Mun. of Makati v. CA – where the
Municipality refuses to pay a :inal
judgment without any justi:iable reason,
then the remedy of mandamus may
prosper against the municipality for the
passage of the corresponding ordinance to
 and the corresponding disbursement of
funds.
• Take note that as to municipal corporations or
the LGUs, its funds cannot be subjected to
garnishment or execution; there has to be
an appropriations covering the payment
o Commissioner of Public Highways v. San
Diego (CB) – Disbursement of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations required by law.
• But the municipality or the entity cannot
simply refuse to pay without any valid
reason as when there is a showing that there
are available funds for the purpose. See the
Municipality of Makati case, supra.
• NIA v. CA, reiterating Meritt – consent to be
sued was granted through a special law, but it
does not automatically follow that the
government is liable for damages because
under the circumstances, the government was
not acting through a special agent. Article
2180 of the Civil Code in relation to Article
2176.
SEPARATION OF POWER
What is the objective of the doctrine of separation of
powers? [3]
• Prevent a concentration of authority
9
• To secure action, to forestall overaction, to
prevent despotism, and obtain ef:iciency
• Not independence but interdependence
o In Re: Manzano – Judge Manzano :iled a
petition allowing him to accept the
appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Farinas as
member of Ilococ Sur Committee on Justice
created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He is
the executive judge of the RTC. Petition is
denied. Violation of Section 12, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. – prohibits the
designation of members of the judiciary to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
o Administrative functions are those which
involve the regulation and control over the
conduct & affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the
Legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.
o “Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12
refers to the Government’s executive machinery
and its performance of governmental acts. It
refers to the management actions,
determinations, and orders of executive
of:icials as they administer the laws and try to
make government effective. There is an element
of positive action, of supervision or control.
o In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which
involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence “we can readily see that membership
in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice
would not involve any regulation or control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals.
Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise
any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is
purely advisory. A member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on
the administration of justice as long as the
group merely deliberates on problems
involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy
litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and
experiences of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to
legislate or administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
o Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima - RA
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). Section 12 of the law
provides for the setting up of a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee the
purpose of which is the approval of the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) to be
formulated by the Department of Finance,
Department of Budget and Management, NEDA,
 BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission.
After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and
regulations it shall become functus of[icio and
therefore cease to exist. W/N Section 12
violates the principle of separation of powers?
Congressional Oversight in the following:
▪
a) budget hearing or during
appropriations hearing
Question hour (Section 22, Article VI)
▪
▪ Investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of the law pursuant to the
power of congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation (Section 21)
S e p a r a t i o n o f P o w e r s ; L e g i s l a t i v e Ve t o ;
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional
per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement
laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers, but to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress—it may not vest itself, any of
its committees or its members with either executive
or judicial power, and, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the “single, :inely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures” speci:ied under
the Constitution, including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment; Any post-
enactment congressional measure should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation.
It is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of
its committees or its members with either executive
or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the “single, :inely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures” speci:ied under
the Constitution, including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-
enactment congressional measure such as this should
be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be con\ined to the
following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power
of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard
by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of con:irmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251, G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008
10
o Belgica et. al. vs. Ochoa Jr. et. al. – Whether or
not the 2013 PDAF article and all other
congressional pork barrel laws similar thereto
are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on a) separation of powers; b) non-
delegability of legislative power; c) checks and
balances; d) accountability; and e) local
autonomy
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project
identi:ication, fund release and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution; Towards this end, the
Supreme Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identi:ication on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance
on the same falters altogether.―Clearly, these post-
enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identi:ication, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators
to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by
virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one
form or another, authorized to participate in — as
Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the various operational
aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of
work and :inancial plans for individual activities” and
the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of
the separation of powers principle. The fundamental
rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot
be overstated — from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to
repeat, covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court
must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator identi:ication on
the guise that the same is merely recommendatory
and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same
falters altogether.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby declares
the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or
e n f o rc e m e n t o f t h e b u d g e t , u n re l a t e d t o
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.―The
Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well
as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of
the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and
thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget execution,
must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
That such informal practices do exist and have, in
fact, been constantly observed throughout the years
has not been substantially disputed here. Belgica vs.
Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 208566 November 19,
2013
Take note of the interplay (blending of powers)
b e t we e n t h e t h re e b ra n c h e s o f t h e
government:
• The President prepares the budget and
submits it to the Congress
o Congress will deliberate on the said budget
o It may decrease the budget for some
department or of:ices
o There are budget hearing conducted with
heads of different department being called
to testify on their respective budget
o Congress will approved the budget – GA bill
and submits to the President
o The president may veto some items in the
bill and send the bill with its vetoed items
back to Congress (Section 27, par 1 and 2,
Article VI)
o Congress may override the veto of the
President
o The SC may decide, if a complaint is :iled, if
the veto is constitutional or the overidding
of the veto is done within the limits of the
constitution
This is also an exercise of the mechanism of
▪
the checks and balances
• Congress may also refuse to give
concurrence to the grant of pardon or the
senate may refuse to ratify or concur in
the treaty entered into by the President
• Congress may refuse to con:irm the
appointment made by the President
• Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and other lower courts
(Article VIII, Section 2)
• The President may nullify the conviction
in a criminal case by pardoning the
offender (Article VII, Section 19)
• The judiciary in general has the power of
j u d i c i a l rev i e w – t o rev i e w t h e
constitutionality of the acts of the
executive and legislative branches as well
as those of the constitutional
commissions.
• Grant of amnesty by the president
o Requires concurrence by majority of all
them members of the congress (Article
VII, Section 19, par 2)
• Role of the courts:
o Memorize the words of Article VIII, Section
1, second paragraph
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
11
▪ Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government
▪ What is the effect of this provision to the
political question doctrine?
• It limits the scope of political question
but not abolished
• What is the de:inition of political
question?
o Tanada v. Cuenco – a question of policy;
those question which under the
constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity or by duly elected
representatives by delegation; issues which
are dependent upon the wisdom not
legality of a particular measure
o Sanidad v. Comelec –
Same; Amending process of the Constitution raises a
judicial question.—The amending process, both as to
proposal and rati:ication, raises a judicial question.
This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Same; Political question; Political questions are
associated with the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular act.—Political questions are neatly
associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act,
that matter is de:initely justiciable or non-political.
Same; Same; Issue of whether the President can
assume the power of a constituent assembly is a
justiciable question.—What is in the heels of the
Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process
confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, 73
SCRA 333, No. L-44640, No. L-44684, No. L-44714
October 12, 1976
o Daza v. Singson – Daza questioned his
replacement in the CA due to the
reorganization of the LDP. He contends that
the realignment was not registered with the
COMELEC. When the latter granted
registration, he contends that it must pass
the test of time to see whether it is
permanent or not. The issue regarding the
composition of the CA is a justiciable
question, not political.
• What is the basis for the exercise of power?
o Express conferment of power
o But not always the case that traditional exercise
of powers are lodged in that speci:ic department
▪ Example the power to impeach, which is
executive, and to decide impeachment cases
which is judicial is lodged in congress
▪ Also the power of investigation, which is more of
an executive and judicial function, but is being
exercise by congress
▪ Supreme Court exercises the executive power to
remove judges of the lower courts eventhough
they were appointed by the President
▪ The President may be authorized by the
Congress to exercise tariff powers and
emergency powers both of which are legislative
in nature, because the constitution allows it
o Under the doctrine of necessary implication –
the grant of express power carries with it all
other powers that may be reasonably inferred
from it.
▪ Angara v. Electoral Commission – the power of
the electoral commission to promulgate its own
rules of procedure was sustained by the SC
▪ Example is the power to cite one for contempt,
which is judicial in nature
• Take note that congress may exercise the power
to cite one in contempt when it conducts
investigation in aid of legislation under article VI,
Section 21
o Incidental power – although not speci:ically
granted by the constitution either expressly or
by implication, may be justi:ied as inherent or
incidental
▪ Example, the president may deport undesirable
aliens
▪ The contempt power of the court
▪ Illustration of political question and justiceable
question: Article XI Section 2 provides for the
grounds for impeachment
• Other high crimes or betrayal of public trust
o Failure of the Chief Justice to declare some of his
properties in his SALN, interpreted by Congress
as betrayal of public trust? This was questioned
before the Supreme Court as wrong
interpretation. Can the court intervene?
• Disorderly behavior
o A congressman was caught at the airport
possessing illegal drugs. It was used as a ground
for his expulsion from the house for disorderly
behavior. Can it be questioned before the court
as invalid ground?
▪ Power to declare martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
• Early cases indicate that the power is
discretionary and therefore not justiciable
o Barcelon v. Baker
o Montenegro v. Castaneda
• Then it was reversed in the case of Lansang v.
Garcia
o The court can intervene and see if the ground
invoked by the President are really present
• Then the court again reversed and returned to
the doctrine laid down in Barcelon v. Baker
o The power is discretionary on the part of the
President
• Under the present constitution, provisions were
already provided for the questioning of the
declaration before the Supreme Court
12
o Article VII, Section 18, illustrates the principle of
checks and balances
▪ The president can declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus
• Grounds of invasion and rebellion
• Limited to 60 days only
• Report to congress
▪ Congress can revoke the declaration of the
President. It can also extend the proclamation of
the President
▪ The Supreme Court can also nullify the
proclamation of the President if there is
insuf[icient factual basis for such declaration and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus
ABAKADA GURO Party v. Hon Cesar Purisima – R.
A. 9335 was passed by Congress to optimize the
revenue – generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC. Section 12 of the law provides for
the setting up of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee. The committee will become functus
of:icio after the approval of the implementing rules
and regulations.
Issue: WON the creation of a congressional
oversight committee violates the principle of
separation of powers? No.
It is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers.Any post-
enactment congressional measure should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
The rule is potestas delegate non delegari potest –
what has been delegated cannot be delegated
A further delegation of the power would constitute a
negation of the duty reposed on the delegate to
perform, in violation of the trust placed in the
delegate mandated to discharge it.
• Why then delegation is allowed? [3]
 i. Increasing complexity of the task of
government
ii. Growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problem demanding
its attention
iii. the need for specialization in a given :ield
▪ Example the regulation of common carriers
• Permissible delegation [5]
1) Tariff powers to the President – Article VI,
Section 28 (2)
▪ Garcia v. Executive Secretary: The President
issued an EO which imposed, across the board,
including crude oil and other oil products,
additional duty ad valorem. The tariff
commission held public hearing on said EO and
submitted a report to the President for
consideration and appropriate action. The
President, on the other hand, issued an EO which
levied a special duty of o.95 per liter of imported
crude oil and 1.00 per liter of imported oil
prodeucts.
Issue: WON the president may issue an EO
which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the
nature of revenue generating measures.
▪ The president is allowed by the Constitution
under Article VI, Section 28 (2) and pursuant to
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
2) Emergency power to the President – Article VI,
Section 23 (2)
▪ War and other national emergency
▪ Limited period only
▪ Subject to the restriction imposed by Congress
▪ To carry out a declared national policy of
Congress
▪ Cease only if withdrawn by Congress through a
resolution
▪ Or upon next adjournment
▪ Different from martial law power of the
president
3) Delegation to the people at large
▪ R.A. No. 6735 –The Initiative and Referendum
Act, commonly known as the Roco Law
13
4) Delegation to the Local Government
▪ R. A. No. 7160 – The Local Government Code
5) Delegation to Administrative Bodies
▪ The Administrative Code of 1987
▪ Tablarin v. Gutierrez – the requirement that all
those who are going to enroll in medical schools
must pass NMAT. Based on MECS Order No .52 S.
1985. The cut off score will be determined by the
Board of Medical Education. Passers of NMAT
will be given the required Certi:icate of
Eligibility for Admission (CEA)
• This is still a valid delegation of legislative power
• Even the requirement of 3 :lunk rule was
sustained as valid
▪ Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA-Vitaliano Saco
was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.
His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No.
797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The
petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the
Social Security System and should have been filed against
the State Fund Insurance. The POEA nevertheless
assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favour of the complainant.
Issue: Validity if Memorandum Circular No.
2 as violative of the the Non-delegation of
legislative power.
HELD: No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an
administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National
Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the
delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive order itself
which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
▪ Paci\ic Stream Laundry Inc. v. Laguna Lake
Development Authority
Issues: does LLDA have the implied power to
impose :ines as set forth in PD 984?
Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to
impose penalties violate the rule on non-
delegation of Legislative powers?
o There is no undue delegation of legislative power
because the power of LLDA to impose :ines is not
unrestricted. It is provided that if after
investigation it is proven that the discharge
failed to meet the water and ef:luent quality
standards, then the penalty is P1,000 per day, in
accordance with the amount of penalty
 prescribed under PD 984. There are adequate
statutory limitations on LLDA’s power to impose
:ines.
• Tests of Valid Delegation [2]
6) The Completeness Test
▪ The law must be complete in all its essential
terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing left for
the delegate to do when it reaches him but to
enforce it.
7) The Suf\icient Standard Test
▪ The law may not give all the details but may be
sustained if there is a suf:icient standard
▪ Standard is meant to map out the boundaries of
the delegate’s authority by de:ining the
legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued
and effected.
▪ The purpose is to prevent a total transfer of
legislative power from the lawmaking body to
the delegate
▪ It is indicated in the law itself
• Blue Sky Law –public interest
• R.A. No .51- to promote simplicity, economy, and
ef[iciency
• Hirabayashi v. United States (Cruz)–the
standard may not be found in the law itself, but
may be found in the Executive Order of the
President which maps out the national policy to
be followed in dealing with the Niseis
( American citizens of Japanese ancestry)
• People v. Vera – concerning the old Probation
Act, held to be unconstitutional due to
violation of equal protection clause. The
effectivity of the law would depend on the
ordinance to be passed by each province in order
to appropriate funds for the salary of the
Probation Of:icer. It would appear that the
effectivity of the act would depend on the action
of the Provincial Board.
• Ynot v. IAC – the questionable manner of the
disposition of the con:iscated property. It
depends on the discretion of the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission, the
Director of the Animal Industry. There is no usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or
limitations on the discretion of those of:icers in
the distribution of the meat products.
14
• Emmanuel Pelaez v. Auditor General – the two
tests must be applied concurrently.
Principles and State Policies (Article II Section 1-
28)
Principles – it is a standard to be observed
because it is required by justice, fairness or other
dimensions of morality.
Section 1
– democratic and republican state; sovereignty
resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
• Relate to Article V –Suffrage
• Article VI- Section 1 – legislative power vested
in Congress
o Not a pure democracy
o True that people are possessors of sovereign
power but they exercise it through their
elected representatives
o Their participation in the government
consists of:
▪ Suffrage
▪ Plebiscite
▪ Initiative and referendum
▪ Recall
o Features of republicanism
▪ Government of laws and not of men
• Villavicenio v. Lukban
▪ Periodic holding of elections
▪ Principle of separation of powers and checks
and balances
▪ Legislature cannot pass or enact
irrepealable laws
▪ Principle of transparency and accountability
▪ Bill of rights
Section 2
– a) renunciation of war; b) adoption of the generally
accepted principles of international law; c)
adherence to the policy of peace, freedom, and
amity with all nations
• Relate to the UN Charter, Article 2(4): refrain
from the use of force or the threat of force
o Exceptions:
▪ Article 51, individual and collective self-
defense
▪ Chapter VII, UN Security Council Resolution
on the use of force
▪ Kellogg Brian Pact – also known as the
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War,
rati:ied by 62 states which forbade war “as
an instrument of national policy.”
• Doctrine of incorporation
o International law has also the force of
domestic law
o Can be used to settle domestic disputes
o Principle of incorporation differentiate
from principle of transformation
▪ Applies only to customary laws and those
treaties which have become part of
customary law (even if not rati:ied by the
states)
▪ Which of the generally accepted principles that
the country accepts?
 • Can be done by the courts
• Mejoff v. Director of Prisons (CB)
• Kuroda v. Jalandoni (CB) – defendants herein
are Japanese of:icers accused of committing war
crimes and crimes against humanity during the
second world war. The principles of the Hague
Conventions and the Geneva Conventions have
already been part of customary international law.
• Agustin v. Edu (CB)
• Ichong v. Hernandez
• Gonzales v. Hechanova – the importation of rice
violates R.A. 2207 & 3452. Treaty or Executive
agreements with other countries should not
violate the law and the constitution. The
Executive Secretary has exceeded his authority,
even under the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief.
Section 3
– civilian supremacy at all times; military as the
protector of the people and the state; goal:
secure sovereignty and integrity of the national
territory.
• Relate to Article VII, Section 18 – powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief
• Relate to Article XVI, Section 4 – composition of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines
• Section 5: provisions on the Armed Forces
• Relate to Article XVI, Section 6 – maintenance of
one police force
Section 4
– government as protector of the people and people
as defenders of the state
• Government as servants of the people and not
vice versa
• The people may by law be required to render
personal (not proxy) military or civil service
o Under conditions provided by law
o Congress may pass a law which can provide
also for :lexibility in cases of conscientious
objectors
▪ The person refuses to render military
service because his religion or religious
beliefs prohibits them from carrying or
:iring guns or for saluting the :lag
▪ Ebralinag v. School Superintendent of Cebu
Issue: Whether school children who are
members or a religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from
school (both public and private), for refusing,
on account of their religious beliefs, to take
part in the :lag ceremony which includes
playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine :lag
and reciting the patriotic pledge.
Ruling: No, they cannot be expelled for this
reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard
to the observance of the :lag ceremony out of
respect for their religious beliefs, however
"bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.
▪ People vs. Lagman and Manayao case (CB)
15
Section 5
– What are the blessings of democracy?
• This is a new provision under the 1987
constitution.
• Hierarchy of rights: Life, liberty, and then
property
Section 6
–Separation of church and state
• Reinforced by:
o Article III, Section 5
o Article IX-C –religious sect cannot be
registered as a political party
o Article VI, Section 5 (2)- no sectoral
representative from the religious sector
o Article VI, Section 29 (2) – prohibition
against appropriation for sectarian bene\it
▪ Article VI, Section 28 (3) –ADE exempted from
real property tax
▪ Article VI, Section 29 (2) – appropriation for the
salaries of those working in government facilities
and institutions
▪ Article XIV, Section 3(3) – optional religious
instruction for public and high school students
▪ Article XIV, Section 4(2) – Filipino ownership for
educational institutions excepts for those
established by religious groups and missions
▪ Aglipay v. Ruiz – the stamps printed by the
g ove r n m e n t to c o m m e m o ra te t h e 3 3 rd
International Eucharistic congress in Manila did
not violate the separation of church and state
because the main purpose was to promote
Manila as the seat of congress and thus
attract tourists to it.
• Here the bene\it derived by religion from the
expenditure of public funds is merely
incidental to the public purpose.
Policy – a standard which sets out a goal to be
reached, generally an improvement in economic,
political and social features of the community.
Section 7
– independent foreign policy. The paramount
consideration shall be:
• National sovereignty
• Territorial integrity
• National interest
• Right to self-determination
Section 8
– freedom from nuclear weapons
• Relate to Article XVIII, Section 4 – treaties and
international agreements
• Relate to Article XVIII, Section 25 – expiration of
the Bases Agreement
o Not a ban to the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy
o Not a ban to nuclear capable vessels
o It must be determined that the vessel is
actually carrying nuclear weapons
Section 9
- Just and Dynamic Social Order
• Relate to the Preamble
• Relate to Article XII, Section 1 –the goals of the
national economy
Section 10 and Section 11
– promotion of social justice
• De:inition of Social Justice
o Calalang v. Williams – “Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated.”
• Relate to Article XIII, Section 1 –priority must be
given to the right of the people to human dignity
and reduction of inequality
• Relate to Article XIII, Section 2
• Relate to Article II, Section 26
• Relate to Article VII, Section 13, par 2 –
appointment of spouses and relatives within the
4th degree of consanguinity or af:inity
• Relate to Article IX, B, Section 7 - ban on
appointment to any other of:ice during tenure of
elective of:icials
• Relate to Article XIII, Section 17, 18 and 19 – the
creation of the Commission on Human Rights,
with the enumeration of their powers and
functions.
o CHR has no power to adjudicate
o Only the power to investigate and \ile cases
in court
Section 12
– sanctity of family life and protection of the family
• Family refers to hetero-sexual relationship
• Protection to the life of the mother and the
unborn
o Republic Act No. 10354- Reproductive
Health Law
▪ When does life begins?
• At the moment of conception? Conception takes
place at the moment of fertilization
• At the moment when the fertilized egg
embedded itself in the uterus of a woman?
• Can the Supreme Court decide this issue?
o Bernas: the constitution did not pin-point the
exact moment when conception takes place
o Roe v. Wade: the US Supreme Court did not
decide on the issue. The Texas statutes make
procuring an abortion a crime except by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Jane Roe alleged that she
was unmarried and pregnant and that she
was unable to get “legal” abortion in Texas
because her life did not appear to be
threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy.
▪ Legal basis is the right to privacy, zones of
privacy based on the provisions of the
constitution on freedom of expression and
personal liberty under the right against
unreasonable search and seizures
▪ The state compelling interest in the health of the
mother, the compelling point in the light of the
present medical knowledge, is at the :irst
trimester. For the period of pregnancy prior to
the compelling point the state cannot impose
regulation, if the mother decides to have
16
abortion, after prior consultation with her
physician
▪ With respect to potential life, the compelling
point is placed at about seven months (28
weeks) but may occur earlier at 24 weeks. The
fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. After
that period of time, the state may impose
regulation protective of fetal life after that
period, except when it is necessary to preserve
the life and health of the mother.
• It does not say that the unborn is a legal person.
o Article 41 of the NCC: For civil purposes, the
fetus is considered born if it is alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the
mother womb. However, if the fetus had an
intrauterine life of less than seven months, it
is not deemed born if it dies within twenty
four hours after its complete delivery from
the maternal womb.
• It does not assert that the life of the unborn is
placed on exactly the same level as the life of the
mother.
▪ Natural right and duty of parents
• Pierce vs. Society of Sisters (1925) – the SC
held that the compulsory public education
violated parental substantive due process
right though the government may require that
basis educational requirements be met in private
schools.
• Wisconsin vs. Yoder (CB) – the SC here
invalidated a law compelling school attendance
upon reaching age 16 as applied to Amish
parents who refused on religious grounds to
send their children to high school.
Section 13
– vital role of youth in nation building
• National youth Commission
• SK Elections – take of the latest amendments to
the law on SK
Section 14
– the role of women in nation building and
fundamental equality between women and men
• Relate to Article XIII, Section 14 – protection to
working women
• Relate to Article XIII, Section 11 – integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development,
priority among others must be given to women
• Relate to RA 7192 – Women in Development and
Nation Building Act
• Relate to RA 9262 – Anti Violence Against
Women and Children
• Relate to 8353 – Anti Rape Law of 1997
• Relate to RA 8505 – Rape Victim and Assistance
and Protection Act of 1998
• Relate to RA 10354- The Reproductive Health
Law
Section 15
–promotion of health
• Relate to Article XIII, Section 11
• Relate to RA 7883 – The Barangay Health
Workers Bene:its and Incentives Act of 1995 –
February 20, 1995
• Relate to RA 8344- Act Penalizing the Refusal of
Hospitals to Administer Appropriate Initial
Medical Treatment
• R. A. 9439 = An Act Prohibiting the Detention of
Patients in Hopitals and Medical Clinics
Section 16 *
– right of the people to balanced and healthful
ecology
• This provision is interpreted by the SC as self-
executing in the case of Oposa vs, Factoran
• Oposa v. Factoran (CB)–minors duly joined by
their parents had a valid cause of action in
questioning the continued grant of Timber
License Agreement for commercial logging
purposes because the case focuses on a
fundamental legal right: the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology as well as right to health
o It is inter-generational, for the next
generation to enjoy, not only the present
generation
• LLDA v. Court of Appeals (2 cases) –upheld the
authority of the LLDA to protect the inhabitants
of Laguna Lake Area from the deleterious effects
of pollutants coming from garbage dumping; also
the same exclusive authority to regulate the
exploitation of Laguna Lake, as against the claim
of the municipalities around the lake.
• MMDA v. Residents of Manila Bay – December
18, 2008, MMDA as well as LGUs have obligations
under the Clean Water Act or under the Solid
Waste Management Act
Section 17
– priority to ESTACS
• To foster patriotism, nationalism
• To accelerate social progress
• To promote human liberation and development
• This is just a :lagship provision for Article XIV.
Section 1 states that “the state shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and shall take appropriate
steps to make such education accessible to all.
o Right to quality education and even for free
up to the secondary level
o But subject to the right of the school to
impose reasonable standards and to make
education available only on the basis of merit
Villar v. Technological Institute of the
Philippines, 135 SCRA 706 (1985) – the
school denied enrolment to those students
activists who took in mass protests and who,
at the same incurred scholastic de:iciencies.
The denial based on failures of students in
their academic subjects is valid but not if
solely based on their participation in the mass
actions.
▪ Togonan v. Cruz Pano, 137 SCRA 245 – nursing
student who was denied readmission after she
failed a subject during her previous provisional
admission. The SC upheld the right of schools of
higher learning to choose the students which it
thinks could best achieve their goal of excellence
and truth, while af:irming the right of students to
quality education.
▪ DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 (1989) – the
SC upheld the DECS three :lunk rule for the
NMAT exams. The SC reiterated the ruling in the
case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730
17
Section 18
– protection to labor
• This proclaims the primacy of the human factor
over the non-human factors of production.
Primacy of human dignity over things
• Relate to Article III, Section 8 – the right to form
unions and associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law
• Relate to Article XIII, Section 3 – full protection
to labor, the enumeration of the rights of all
workers.
• Section 2(5), Article IX-B – the right of self-
organization of government employees
• Protection to labor does not indicate promotion
of employment alone. Of paramount
consideration also is the government’s
constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for
protection of the workforce, local or overseas; to
ensure also that such employment be above all,
decent, just and humane. There is always the
interplay of the police power of the state being
exercised vis-à -vis protection to labor.
o JMM Promotion and Management v. CA, 260
SCRA 319
o Philippine Association of Service Exporters v.
Drilon, 163 SCRA 386
Section 19
– self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipino
• Relate this provision to the goals speci:ically
enunciated in Article XII
Section 20
– indispensable role of private sector
• Relate to Article XII, Section 6
• These provisions reveal that the economic
policy of the Philippines is one closer to
socialism than capitalism. Balance the private
sector’s pursuit of pro:it with the concern of
the state to promote distributive justice.
• The use of distributive justice is based on the
Aristotelian notion of giving to each one what
is due him on the basis of personal worth and
value, and not merely what he has contracted
for.
o Garcia v. BOI – the BOI approved the transfer
of the site of the petrochemical plant from
Bataan to Batangas and shift of feedstock
from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG.
The plant was to be a joint venture between
the PNOC and the BPC which is a Taiwanese
group. According to BOI, it is the investor
which has the :inal say as to the site and the
feedstock to be used. The SC held that the
BOI gravely abused its discretion in
approving the transfer. No cogent advantage
to the govt. by the transfer. Repudiation of the
independent policy of the govt. expressed in
numerous laws and the constitution to run its
own affairs the way it deems best for the
national interest.
▪ Was it prudent for the court to venture into
decisions by the executive that affects economic
policies. Was the court too interventionist in this
regard?
o Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 – the WTO
agreement does not violate Section 19, Article
 II nor Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII
because the said sections should be read in
relation to section 1 and 13 of Article XII.
▪ Pursuit of trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity
▪ Sections of Article II are not self-executing; they
do not embody judicially enforceable rights, but
merely guidelines for legislations
▪ Here the court said that it lacks authority to
wade into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy-making.
Section 21
– promotion of comprehensive rural development
and agrarian reform.
• Relate to R.A. 6657 as amended by
RA 9700.
• Association of Small Landowners in
the Phils. v. Sec. of the DAR
o Both an exercise of the police power and
eminent domain
Section 22
– promotion of the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of
national unity and development.
• Relate to Section 5(2) of Article VI –
sectoral representation in congress
for indigenous cultural communities
• Relate to R. A. 8371 – An Act to
Recognize, Protect and Promote the
R i gh t s o f I n d i g e n o u s Cu l t u ra l
Communities/Indigenous Peoples,
Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
o What is the concept of Free Prior Consent in
the IPRA? Under what conditions it is
applicable and mandatory?
- The consensus of all members of the ICCs/
IPs to be determined in accordance with their
respective customary laws and practices, free
from any external manipulation, interference
and coercion, and obtained after fully
disclosing the intent and scope of the activity,
in a language and process understandable to
the community
- required for the exploration, development
and use of natural resources; displacement
and relocation; and the entry of military
personnel, as well as for research and
bioprospecting; archaeological explorations;
and policies affecting Indigenous people
o The City Govt. of Baguio City v. Atty. Brian
Masweng et. al. – demolition advice and
order were issued against settlers in Busol
Forest Reservation, who are claiming that the
land they are occupying is part of their
ancestral land, they being members of
indigenous cultural communities. The NCIP
issued TRO and injunction against the City
Of:icials. The SC held that Proclamation No.
15 did not recognize the vested rights of the
settlers over a portion of the reservation. Take
note that according to the SC the NCIP has
authority to issue TRO and injunction on this
matter.
Section 23
18
- non-governmental, community-based or
sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare of the nation
• Relate with Section 15 and 16 of Article XIII
Section 24
– the role of communication and information in
nation-building.
• Relate with Section 10 of Article XVI
• Relate with Section 11 also:
o Ownership and management of mass
media – Wholly owned by Filipinos or
Filipino corporations
o Congress can regulate or prohibit
monopolies in media
o No combination in restraint of trade
or unfair competition
o Advertising industry – 70% Filipino
o w n e r s h i p ; a l l e xe c u t i v e a n d
management positions must be held
by Filipino citizens
Section 25
– the state shall ensure the autonomy of local
government
• The ful:illment of the mandate was placed in
the hands of the legislature.
• Relate to Article X
• Congress enacted R. A. 7610 – the Local
Government Code
o Basco v. Pagcor – the local autonomy simply
means “decentralization” and does make the
local governments sovereign within the state
or an imperium in imperio
o L i m b o n a s v. M a n g e l i n – t h e c o u r t
distinguished between decentralization of
administration and decentralization of power.
The latter is abdication by the national
government of governmental powers while
t h e fo r m e r i s m e re ly d e l e g a t i o n o f
a d m i n i s t r a t ive p o w e r s t o t h e l o c a l
government unit in order to broaden the base
of governmental powers.
Section 26
– guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service and prohibit political dynasties
as may be de:ined by law.
• Relate to Section 13, Article VII – prohibitions
against the President, the VP, members of the
cabinet, their assistants and deputies.
• Relate to Section 1 and 2 of Article XIII –
reduction of inequalities and equitable
distribution of wealth and political power for
the common good; creation of economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative
and self-reliance
Section 27
– honesty and integrity in the public service; take
positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption
Section 28
– policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest
• Complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern in
Article III, Section 7
• Relate to Sections 12 and 20 of Article VI –
disclosure by the members of congress
 • Relate to Section 20, Article VII – borrowing ▪ One of the issues raised by the petitioners is
power of the President violation of Section 28, Article II.
• Relate to Section 4, Article IX-D – submission
by the COA of report to congress and the
President regarding the :inancial condition
and operation of the government
• Relate to Sections 4-15 and 17 Article XI – the
role and powers of the of:ice of the
Ombudsman and the graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan.
• Relate to Sections 12 and 21 Article XII –
contracting of foreign loans by the President
o Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission -
o Valmonte v. Belmonte – petitioners are members
of the media. They requested from the respondent
as head of the GSIS information regarding clean
loans granted to members of congress guaranteed
by Mrs. Imelda Marcos before the February 7,
1986 elections. The request was refused on the
ground of con:identiality. The funds being held by
GSIS assumed a public character and the
borrowers were holding public of:ice. The
information being sought clearly is a matter of
public concern. GSIS, as a juridical entity cannot
invoke right to privacy because the basis of right
to privacy is injury to a person’s feelings and
sensibilities. GSIS , cannot also claim right to
privacy of the borrowers because the right is
personal. The borrowers also cannot claim the
right because of the public of:ices they were
holding at the time they made the borrowing.
o The GSIS was exercising proprietary function,
thus it would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and right of
information.
o Aguino-Sarmiento v. Morato -
o The Province of North Cotabato et. al. v. Govt of
the Phils. Peace Panel – On August 5, 2008, the
Govt. of the Republic of the Phils (GRP) and the
MILF through the Chairpersons of their respective
negotiating panels were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur.
▪ MOA-AD grants to the “Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity” (BJE) the authority and jurisdiction over
the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the
Bangsamoro. It also provides for the BJE’s
capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment
of the Central Govt. to ensure the BJE’s
participation in meetings and events in the
ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Govt.
over external defense.
▪ The agreement contains a “suspensive clause”
(paragraph 7 on government) that any provision
of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force
upon the signing of the Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework with due regard to non-
derogation of prior agreements and within the
stipulated timeframe to be contained in the
Comprehensive compact.
▪ Among the issues discussed in this case is
whether the suspensive clause of the MOA-AD, as
worded, is consistent with the limits of the
President’s authority to propose constitutional
amendments. The SC held in the negative.

19
1. The national baseline laws (RA 9522,
March 2009) is not a mechanism to
determine the territories of the Philippines.
- It does not reduce the territories of the
Philippines under Article 1.
- It is only a statutory tool to demarcate
the country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf under the UNCLOS III
(Rati:ied Feb. 27, 1984)
- Regime of Islands, UNCLOS, Art 121, are
islands that are maternally formed areas
of land, surrounded by water, which are
above water at high tide. This principle
forces claimant states to maintain peace
in the area, because no one country can
claim exclusive ownership of any of these
islands.
- Islands, above-water at high tide, capable
of sustaining human habitation. It can
generate territorial sea, EEZ
- Rocks- which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf. Only Territorial sea.
- LTEs and submerged banks don’t generate
any maritime entitlements.
2. Joint Venture Agreement with China for
exploration and development of marine
resources in the West Philippine Sea which is
within the EEZ of the Philippine.
Constitutional?
a) Art. XII, Sec. 2 – exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources shall
be undertaken
i. Directly by the state
ii. Co – production, joint
vent u re o r p ro d u ct i o n
sharing with Filipino
Citizens or 60% Filipino
Owned Corporation
b) Foreign – owned Corporation – technical
or :inancial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization
of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.
c) IDEAL vs Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM), Oct. 9, 2012, the court ruled that
the sale of Angat Hydro – Electric Power
Plant (AHEPP) to a foreign corporation
pursuant to the privatization mandated by
RA 9136 or EPIRA of 2001, does not
violate SEC. 2, ART XII.
However, it must be made clear in Operations
and Maintenance Agreement that the water
rights shall remain with NPC and cannot be
transferred to foreign corporation. NPA shall
continue to hold the water permit even as the
operational control and day – to – day
management of AHEPP is in the hands of K-
Water (Korean Corporation).
20
3. Immunity from Suit.
Once there’s express consent (GOCC, LGUs,
Chartered entities), it is irrelevant whether it
performs governmental or propriety
functions. It is suable.
➢ If unincorporated,
- then determine the function for which the
of:ice is being sued. If governmental then
cannot be sued without its consent.
i. However, Art 3038 is a form of express
consent. The government consents to be
sued upon any money claim involving
liability arising from contract, express
or implied, which could serve as a basis
for civil action between private parties.
ii. DA vs NLRC, Nov. 11, 1993, Contract for
security services entered into by DA. DA
is suable even if unincorporated and
performing governmental functions
iii. But even if there’s already :inal decision
by the court, the liquidated monetary
claim must be :iled :irst before COA. COA
has the primary jurisdiction for the
approval of monetary claim.
- The scope of express consent of GOCC is
up to execution of judgment.
- Although LGUs are chartered, the scope of
consent found in their charters is only up
to the :inality of decision. Another consent
is needed in the form if an appropriation
ordinance.
i. Mandamus generally cannot lie to compel
the Sanggunian to pass an appropriation
ordinance in order to satisfy an adverse
decision against the LGU.
ii. However, if there’s an available fund and
the Sanggunian has no valid reason for
their refusal, then mandamus can be
availed of.
4. Eminent Domain
- Taking should not be momentary period
o n ly, a n d n e e d n o t b e c o m p l e t e
deprivation of property. It is enough that
there’s imposition of additional burden or
right of way.
- There’s taking even in voluntary offer to
sell under the CARP (Hacienda Luisita,
Inc. vs. PARC)
i. Government leased the piece of land in 1993
by virtue of a 10 – year contract of lease. In
2003, the government :iled an expropriation
proceeding over the same parcel of land.
When is the date of taking? 2003. That’s
also the reckoning date for the
determination of just compensation.
- If only a portion of the property is taken,
Just Compensation includes not only the
market value but also the consequential
damages, if there’s still one after
deduction of consequential bene:its.

- The 20% tax discount granted in favor of

senior citizens is an exercise of police
power, not power of imminent domain. It WRIT OF POSSESSION: COMPARISON
is similar to price regulation and rate of
return on investment control laws which Rule 67, Sec. L o c a l RA 8974
protect consumers from oppressive 2; Government 100% of the
pricing systems (Manila Memorial Park, et value of the
al. vs Sec. of DSWD et al., Dec. 3, 2013).
-Complaint Code
:iled, 15% of the fair property based
-Due notice to market Value on the current
- However, the tax credit given to
LO as stated in relevant
commercial establishments (RA9527) for zonal of BIR
discount enjoyed by senior citizens -Deposit of the Tax Dec.
upon :iling of the
pursuant to RA 7432 (Senior Citizen Act) assessed value upon :iling of
complaint
is a form of just compensation for private as stated in expropriation RA 10752 –
property taken by the State for public use. Tax Dec. proceedings. Right of
(Com. of BIR vs. Central Luzon Drug. Way Act
Corp., June 26, 2006).

- The decision of the PARAD need not be

appealed to the DARAB Central. But if
appealed to the DARAB and one still
wants to question it before the RTC, then
it must be thru petition for determination
of just compensation not thru notice of
appeal. But the petition must be :iled
within 15 days from the time the would
be appellant received the decision of the
DARAB. It made beyond 15 days the
decision already became :inal and
executory.
- Right to repurchase expropriated
property once the speci:ied purpose is
ended or abandoned, is not automated. It
still depends on the character of the
expropriation.
i.e. there’s a condition that once the public
purpose has ended or abandoned, the
property will revert back to the public to
the landowner (Mactan – Cebu vs. CA,
Nov. 27, 2000).

- In agrarian cases, payment of just
compensation through a “trust account”
opened by LBP was declared invalid.
However, even if the landowner rejects
the valuation made by Landbank of the
Philippines, he can still withdraw the
amount deposited in the subject trust
account. To rule otherwise is oppressive
exercise of eminent domain considering
that the LO is already deprived of
possession of his land.
- If there’s delay in the payment of just
compensation, the interest is 12% per
annum until June 30, 2013. After that, it is
6% per annum.
- No recovery of property in case of non –
payment of just compensation, only case
to compel payment plus interest. Except
in Vicente Lim case applies – lapse of 51
years.
i. The above does not apply if the mode
of transfer is sale to the
government.
- Sec. 17, Art. XII, temporary takeover of
public utility [5]
i. President must be granted emergency
powers
ii. Temporary and only for a limited
period
iii. Required by public interest
iv. Under reasonable terms
v. Privately owned public utility or
business
This is an exercise of police power, so
there’s no payment of just
compensation. (Lopez vs. PIATCO,
May 5, 2003; David vs. Arroyo)
- Sec. 18, Art. XII, on the other hand, in an
eminent domain power
i. Interest of national welfare or defense
ii. Permanent takeover, transfer of
ownership
iii. Payment of just compensation
iv. Vital industries
- Provision that support the principle that
civilian authority is supreme over military

21
 - The nuclear free provision is not
absolute. “Consistent with the national
interest” can be determined by the
President and Congress. President is the
Chief Architect of foreign policy.
- ICC withdrawal without the participation
of Congress. It is within the broad power
of the President as Chief Architect of
foreign policy. No provision in the
constitution that requires Senate
concurrence in withdrawing from a treaty.
- Treaty, once rati:ied is transformed into a
domestic law. Any repeal or withdrawal
can only be done through majority of
quorum.
- President is mandated to faithfully
execute the laws and make sure that all
laws are faithfully followed. He has no
power to repeal or not implement it.
- Pacta Sunt Servanda- Party to a treaty in
obliged to comply with the provisions of
the treaty in good faith.
5. Art II, Sec 12 – “Sanctity of Family Life… equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.”
- Framers intended for “conception” to
refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization.
- No intention to ban all contraception for
being unconstitutional, only those that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited.
- The RH Law is in line with this intent
and actually prohibits abortion. By
u s i n g t h e wo rd “ o r ” i n d e : i n i n g
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
- Rede:ining the meaning of abortifacient
by the term “primarily” is invalid.
Abortifacient are those that primarily
induce abortion or destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother’s womb.
This violates Sec. 12 that includes the
de:inition in the IRR (Sec. 3.01(j) (Imbong
vs. Ochoa, April 8, 2014).
- The State may pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To
22
allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article
III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion.
Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
- Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law
obliges a hospital or medical practitioner
to immediately refer a person seeking
health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs.
These provisions violate the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. They are contrary to Section
29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or
the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is
the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
- The provisions in the RH Law compelling
non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service
providers to refer patients to other
providers and penalizing them if they fail
to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate
information and perform RH procedures
under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1)
and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also
violate (and inhibit) the freedom of
religion. While penalties may be imposed
by law to ensure compliance to it, a
constitutionally-protected right must
prevail over the effective
implementation of the law.
- Excluding public health of:icers from
being conscientious objectors (under Sec.
5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal
protection clause. There is no perceptible
distinction between public health of:icers
and their private counterparts. In
addition, the freedom to believe is
intrinsic in every individual and the
protection of this freedom remains even if
he/she is employed in the government.
- Using the compelling state interest test,
there is no compelling state interest to
limit the free exercise of conscientious
objectors. There is no immediate danger
to the life or health of an individual in
the perceived scenario of the above
quoted provisions. In addition, the limits
do not pertain to life threatening cases.
- The respondents also failed to show
that these provisions are least
intrusive means to achieve a legitimate
 state objective. The Legislature has
already taken other secular steps to
ensure that the right to health is
protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The
Population Act of the Philippines) and RA
9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
- WO N t h e R H L aw v i o l a t e s t h e
guarantee of religious freedom by
requiring would-be spouses, as a
condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
- NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which
requires would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, is a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. The law does
not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the
seminar. Those who attend the seminar
are free to accept or reject information
they receive and they retain the freedom
to decide on matters of family life without
the intervention of the State.
- Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/
Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the right
to privacy (marital privacy and
autonomy)
- YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law,
which permits RH procedures even with
only the consent of the spouse undergoing
the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy
and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family
as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious
c o nv i c t i o n s a n d t h e d e m a n d s o f
responsible parenthood and (b) the right
of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs
that affect them. The RH Law cannot
infringe upon this mutual decision-
making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.
- The exclusion of parental consent in cases
where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage
(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-
family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The
natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic ef:iciency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support
23
of the Government.” In addition, the
portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
“in the case of minors, the written consent
of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures” is
invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures.”
- H o w e v e r, a m i n o r m a y r e c e i v e
information (as opposed to procedures)
about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and
control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding
w h e t h e r t o a c c e p t o r re j e c t t h e
information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
- Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/
Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the due
process clause
- NO. The RH Law does not violate the
due process clause of the Constitution
as the de\initions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not
vague.
- The de:inition of “private health care
service provider” must be seen in relation
to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
de:ines a “public health service provider”.
The “private health care institution” cited
under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care
service provider.”
- The terms “service” and “methods” are
also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.
- The RH Law also de:ines “incorrect
information”. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”
and “knowingly” connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
- Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/
Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the
prohibition against involuntary
servitude
 - NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the
RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for
two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it
in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government
RH service providers to render pro bono
service. Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
- However, conscientious objectors are
exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their
religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Election of Of:icers – the constitution is silent as to
how the other of:icers of the senate and HOR will be
elected i.e. minority leader. Political question as to
the process or rules of selecting these of:icers.
(Baguilat vs. Alvarez, July 25, 2017)
The process of amending the constitution through
initiative and referendum is subject to judicial
review if there’s grave abuse of discretion (Lambino
vs. Comelec)
Repeal of a national law or passage of a law
through initiative and referendum cannot be
vetoed by the President.
Residence is identical with domicile. Be careful in
determining change of residence. It must be
clearly shown that he abandons his domicile of
origin and he intends to permanently reside in
the new address. (Poe-Llamanzares vs.
COMELEC)
- If there is no change of residence,
determine if there is still animus
revertendi.
The start of term, June 30, may be changed by
Congress. The same is true with the date of
election, 2nd Monday of May.
Voluntary renunciation of of:ice is not an
interruption. Be mindful if the term is 6 years,
and he is appointed to the executive branch. He
cannot run within the period of his term, even
though he resigns from his position in the
executive.
Parameters set in the case of Atong Paglaum.
1) Three different groups may participate in the
party-list system: (a) national parties or
o rga n i z a t i o n s , ( b ) re g i o n a l p a r t i e s o r
24
organizations, and (c) sectoral parties or
organization.
2) National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3) Political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do have not :ield
candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, with :ields
candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing
is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.
4) Sectoral Parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” lacking in
“well-de:ined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant,
:isherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-
de:ined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth.
5) A majority of the members of sectoral party or
organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector
they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-de:ined political constituencies”
must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of the sectoral parties or organization
that they represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-de:ined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors; or
must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona
:ide members of such parties or organization.
6) National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disquali:ied if some of
their nominees are disquali:ied, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains
quali:ied.
- Two percent thresholds is no longer
mandatory.
- N o t l i m i te d to m a rg i n a l i z e d a n d
underprivileged sectors.
Vacancy during the term that can validly trigger
special election. Senate, at least 18 months before
next election and 12 months for HR. If congress is
in session, senate or HR will pass a resolution. If not
 in session, Senate President or Speaker will write to
COMELEC.
Effectivity of increase in salary of the members of
the Congress will be upon expiration of the terms
of members of Senate who took part in the
passage of the law that made possible the increase.
Immunity from arrest
– whether or not Congress is in session is relevant
only if the imposable penalty is not more than 6
years. If more than 6 years immunity from arrest is
not applicable.
- There is a difference between the validity of the
issuance of the arrest by the MCTC, MTC, MTCC
and the enforceability of the warrant. The
latter is covered by the immunity provision.
Reapportionment
– the 250,000 requirement for population applies
only to cities. It is not required in the second
legislative district once there is a division into two
districts. (Aquino vs. COMELEC)
- Law creating legislative district does not
require a plebiscite for its effectivity. (Bagabuyo
vs. COMELEC)
- Exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. Regional
Assembly cannot create legislative district even
though granted authority by Congress. The grant
is unconstitutional. (Sema Case)
- Reapportionment in connection with the three
term-limit. There is a creation of new legislative
district or new district in the province. Can the
incumbent run in the newly created district if it
was created during his second or third term? No.
A provincial board member’s election to the
same position for the third and fourth time, but
now in representation of the renamed district, is
a violation of the three-term limit rule. (Naval
vs. Comelec, July 8, 2014)
Parliamentary Immunity
- Antero Pobre vs. Santiago
No matter how disrespectful the speech and
language, immunity still applies as long as made
during privilege speech or committee hearings
and :loor deliberations.
- But Senator Santiago can still be disciplined by
her fellow senators by 2/3 votes of all its
members on the ground of disorderly
behavior. “Of all its members” refers to all the
elected and sitting members regardless of
whether or not they are present during the
session. The same determination with the votes
of the senate in the impeachment trial.
- Differentiate the above from the suspension
imposed by the Sandiganbayan for 90 days for
violation of RA 3019 or plunder law for acts
committed before he was elected to Congress.
(Santiago vs. COMELEC)
- RA 3019 or Plunder Law requires only a validly
:iled information, The suspension here is
preventive in nature.
25
Sec. 16 (3) is punitive in nature and requires
2/3 votes of all its members. This is for acts
committed while being a member of Congress.
Incompatible Of\ice for Congress
– only refers to of:ices “in the government.” Not
prohibited to hold of\ices in the private sector
during weekends and holidays.
“Hold” – refers to permanent appointment or
temporary designation or membership in ad
hoc committees under the executive branch or
judiciary. Exception here is, if allowed by the
constitution.
➢ For Pres. VP, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants, the only exception is
if provided by the constitution. (Sec. 13,
Article VII).
➢ For other appointive of:icials, the exceptions
are: [2]
1) provided by law;
2) allowed by the primary functions of his
of:ice (Sec. 7, Art. IX – B)
Prohibited Of\ice
- prohibition lasts only during the term when the
of:ice was created or the emolument increased.
The next term is not covered.
- Prohibition does not apply if the increase in
salary applies to all of:ices. i.e. salary
standardization law.
Quorum – Basis for determining will be the
number of those who are members of the HR
and Senate within the territory of the
Philippines. It will not include those who are
outside the Philippines.
It is different from “majority of all the
members” or “2/3 of all the members” which is
based on all the elected members present or
outside the Philippines.
Con\lict between the journal and the enrolled bill
—enrolled bill will prevail except those matters
which are required by the constitution to entered
in the journal.
Electoral Tribunal
– the composition, proceeding and decisions of the
electoral tribunal are subject to judicial review
once there is grave abuse of discretion. Take note
of the valid ground by which you can be replaced
as member of the tribunal: death permanent
disability, defeated in the election, change of party.
- Who to sit in the tribunal under the parameters of
proportional representation is solely determined
by the Speaker of the HR or Senate President. This
can be within the scope of political question.
- Determination of jurisdiction of tribunal in
election contest: [3]
(1) Validly proclaimed
 (2) Taken oath
(3) Assumed of:ice (Ongsiako – Reyes vs.
COMELEC)
- As long as the three requisites are present, the
tribunal has jurisdiction even over party-list
representative (Jovito Palparan Case). It does not
matter how a member is elected – in the
legislative district or party – list election.
Commission on appointment
– relate with Art VII, Sec. 16 as to who are those
required to be con:irmed by CA.
“… and other ofPicers whose appointment are
vested in him in this Constitution” refers to those
of:icials whose appointments are stated in the
Constitution, such as regular members of JBC and
sectoral representatives appointed by the
President for three consecutive election after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
Investigation in aid of Legislation-
a) In aid of legislation
b) In accordance with duly published
rules
c) Rights of person appearing during the
investigation must be respected
- It is not required that upon the start of the
investigation there is already a draft of the bill
or amendments to be proposed. The court
cannot review on the ground of grave abuse of
d i s c re t i o n a s to wh e t h e r o r n o t t h e
investigation is in aid of legislation. Bengzon vs.
SBRC case is not controlling, or not the general
rule.
- The rules must be published every 3 years,
when the membership of the Senate and HR
changes.
- It is not suf:icient that the rules will be
published online. However, if there’s a
provision in the adoption of the rules that it
shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed, then the rules can be deemed
effective beyond the senate that adopted it.
- Once the Congress (18th, 19th) adjourns after
the last session day of the 3rd regular session,
the investigation is considered terminated.
Although Senate as an institution is a
continuing body, its day to day functions, such
as committee hearings, investigations and
deliberations are not. They are deemed
terminated upon adjournment. (Neri vs.
Senate ; Romero II vs. Estrada)
- The detention of a person declared in contempt
by the senate is terminated in two ways. [2]
(1) When the committee report is approved or
disapproved by the plenary
(2) Upon expiration of one (1) Congress, (after
three regular sessions when Congress
expires) (Balag vs. Senate of the Phils., July
3, 2018)
26
- Mere :iling or pendency of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislative inquiry. Sub
judice rule is not violated if the investigation
will proceed so long as the rights of the
resource persons are respected.
- The right of Congress to know through legislative
inquiry is not identical with the right of the
people to information on matters of public
concern. (Neri vs. Senate Committees)
- Generally, the right to privacy, being claimed by a
private bank over ordinary :inancial transactions
cannot prevail over the right of the people to
access information on matters of public concern.
(Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate committee
on Bank; Miguel vs. Gordon)
- A valid claim of executive privilege may limit
what Congress can know in a legislative inquiry.
Executive privilege however depends on the
kind of information being asked by congress
NOT on the position of public of:icial being
summoned to appear. That’s why Section 2B and
3 of E.O. 464 is unconstitutional.
- Know, therefore what are those information
which are privilege. Section 2A of E.O. 464.
“xxx Executive privilege covers all con[idential or
classi[ied information between the President and
the public of[icers covered by this executive
order, including: [5]
(1) Conversations and correspondence between the
President and the public of[icial covered by this
executive order;
(2) Military, diplomatic and other national security
matters which in the interest of national security
should not be divulged.
(3) Information between inter-government agencies
prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements;
(4) Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;
(5) Matters affecting national security and public
order. Xxx”
- Executive privilege when properly claimed is
available in Sec. 21 and 22.
- Legislative inquiry conducted on the law that
created the JDF with the objective of amending
the law and improving the provision that would
ensure transparency and accountability.
Congress, thru its committee invited the court
administrator. Will this violate the judiciary’s
independence and :iscal’s autonomy?
- Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms, invited
a general and a colonel to appear during its
investigation in connection with the cheating and
irregularities committed during the last
Presidential Election. The President as
Commander-in-Chief ordered the military men
 not to appear for it may affect national security.
(Gudani vs. Senga)
How to resolve if there’s a deadlock?
Question Hour
– if the ones being summoned by Congress are the
heads of executive departments (Secretaries of
DND, DOT, DOF), it does not necessarily follow that
the inquiry is a question hour. You still need to :ind
out from the facts if it is question hour or
investigation in aid of legislation. If the fact is silent,
then qualify it in your answer.
- Question Hour is basically an exercise of
oversight function of Congress. Other ways of
validly exercising oversight are appropriations
hearing, investigation in aid of legislation, and to
some extent, con:irmation hearing in the CA.
- Question Hour requires the consent of the
President, which said consent is not required in
investigation in aid of legislation. Thus, even the
person invited is a cabinet secretary he cannot
simply refuse to appear on the ground that he
has no consent from the President if it is under
Sec.21, Art VI. He must appear but during the
inquiry, he can refuse to answer the questions if
the kind of information being asked is covered by
executive privilege. The President should claim
the executive privilege for the said Cabinet
Secretary (Neri Case) and only he can claim it.
Origin Clause
– this refers to the bill, not the law subsequently
passed. As long as the bill :iled in the HR :irst, and
the HR acted on it, even though there is also an
anticipatory bill :iled before the Senate, the
provision is not violated. As long as the committee
hearing in the Senate is conducted only after the
receipt of the House version.
- Even if the law passed is the complete version of
the Senate, there is no violation of this provision
because the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. Amendment by substitution is
allowed by the Constitution.
Three Reading Rule – what is the exception that
will make possible the 3 readings in one day?
- Certi:ication of the President as to the urgency of
the bill is grounded on public calamity and
emergency. However, the Supreme Court
declared in Tolentino vs Sec. of Finance, that
“growing budget de:icit” can be an acceptable
ground. So other grounds may be considered by
analogy.
- The bicameral conference committee may
propose an entirely new provision, even
several provisions, referred to as “an
amendment in the nature of a substitute.”
General Rule: partial veto is not allowed except
in appropriations, revenue and tariff bills.
27
- In allowable partial veto, only an item not a
provision can be vetoed, except if the provision
is inappropriate.(The Doctrine of
Inappropriate Provision)
The provision is inappropriate if it is: [4]
(1) Rider
(2) It is unconstitutional
(3) It collaterally amends another law
(4) It has the effect of blocking or preventing
the action of the executive branch for
matters which are mandated already by
law.
Transfer of funds “within their respective
of:ices” – for example within the executive
department. It requires that the realignment of
funds must be to an existing project funded
under the GAA. If the project is not funded in the
GAA, funds cannot be transferred to them. The
transfer will be unconstitutional. (Araullo vs.
Aquino)
“Appropriation made by law” requires two
elements: [2]
1) Set apart determinate or determinable amount
of money;
2) Allocates the same for a particular purpose. All
post-enactment measures that are necessary
for the implementation or enforcement of the
a p p ro p r i a t i o n m a d e by C o n g re s s a re
considered intermediate appropriations which
are not constitutional because they are made
by individual legislators after the GAA is
passed. For this reason the 2013 PDAF article
does not constitute “Appropriation made by
law.”
- The power to appropriate cannot be delegated to
individual legislator. It violates non-delegability
principle. (Belgica et al. vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013)
In the case of Belgica vs. Ochoa, the SC did not apply
res judicata inspite of its previous decision
upholding the validity of the CDF (Philconsa) and
PDAF as enacted in the GAA. There was no identity
in subject matter. Previous cases only involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF and
2004 PDAF articles in the GAA, while the instant
cases call for a more expansive review of the entire
Pork Barrel System.
Congressional Pork Barrel in the 2013 PDAF Article.
These are the violations: [5]
1) The Principle of Separation of Power
2) The Principle of non-delegability of
Legislative Power
3) Deprives the President of the exercise of his
prerogative of item-veto, impairs the system
of checks and balances
4) Post-enactment features dilute
Congressional oversight and violate Sec 14,
Art. VI of the Constitution (cannot intervene
in any matter before any of:ice)
5) Individual legislators are authorized to
intervene in purely local matters and subvert
genuine local autonomy
Presidential Pork Barrel- is limited to Malampaya
funds and the President Social Fund. Malampaya
Funds – Sec. 8 P.D. 910 which provides “and for such
other purpose as maybe hereafter directed by the
President” – invalid delegation of legislation power.
Sec. 12 of PD 1869- Presidential Social Fund (PSF)
may be used:
1) “to :inance the priority infrastructure
development project;”
2) “to :inance the restoration of damaged and
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Of:ice of the
President”
The second use of the PSF is a valid
delegation.
Q: An act increasing the vote requirement for the
amendment and repeal of laws to 2/3 vote of all
members of Congress voting separately.
Constitutional?
➢ Unconstitutional. Majority of each house
shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Q: An act requiring that the commission on
appointments shall only reject a nominee of the
President by 2/3 votes of those present during the
deliberations. Constitutional?
➢ Unconstitutional. MAJORITY VOTE of all
members. [Section 18, Article VI]
Q: The grant of emergency powers to the
President contains the following conditions: a)
For limited period, & b) That if not withdrawn by
Congress, it shall terminate on the last session
day of the present session of Congress.
Constitutional?
➢ YES. “xxx (2) In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.” [Section 23,
Article VI]
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
PET – is the sole judge of all contest relating to
the election, returns, and quali:ication of
President and Vice President.
- Can be through election protest or quo
warranto
- Comes into play only after the President and
Vice President had been elected and
proclaimed.
- Election protest 30 days, quo warranto
within 10 days after the proclamation (Poe-
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC)
Domicile –
28
3 types:
1) Origin – acquired at birth
2) Choice – the one chosen after abandoning
the old domicile
3) By operation of law – which the law assigns
to an individual independently of his
intention. Only one domicile at any given
time.
Acquisition for new domicile.
Requisites: [3]
1) Actual removal or an actual change of
domicile
2) Bona :ide intention of abandoning the former
place or residence
3) Establishing a new one and de:inite act which
correspond with the purpose.
➢ Can be considered a resident even before the
granting of dual citizenship or the cancelation of
his foreign citizenship or foreign visa.
➢ However, re-acquisition of citizenship is not a
mode of reestablishing domicile. RA 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence.
Under the constitution, there is no way that the
Senate President or the Speaker of the HR will
BECOME president without an election.
Know the difference if the President, Vice President,
Senate President and Speaker all die or are killed or
permanently incapacitated at the beginning of their
terms compared to “in the middle of their terms”.
SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from of:ice, or resignation of the President,
the Vice-President shall become the President to
serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from of:ice, or
resignation of both the President and Vice-
President, the President of the Senate or, in case
of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been
elected and quali:ied.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve
as President in case of death, permanent disability,
or resignation of the Acting President. He shall
serve until the President or the Vice-President shall
have been elected and quali:ied, and be subject to
the same restrictions of powers and
disquali:ications as the Acting President.
Q: A bill is passed by Congress mandating that once
the Pres., VP, Senate President and Speaker of the
House die at the time, then the Chief Justice of the
SC shall become President until the expiration of
the term of the President . Under any
circumstances he is not eligible for re – election. Is
the law valid? NO.
➢ Under the Constitution, any designated
survivor must only serve as ACTING
 PRESIDENT until the new President is duly
elected in a special election.
Q: The executive agreement permits Indonesian
military troops to participate in War Games
with Filipino Marines off the coast of
Batangas in order to enhance the landing and
attacking capabilities of the troops of both
countries. Does this agreement require Senate
concurrence?
➢ YES. The Constitution prohibits the entry of
foreign military bases, troops or faculties
except by way of a treaty concurred in by
the Senate, a clear limitation on the
President’s dual role as defender of the state
and as sole authority in foreign relations.
(Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jan. 12, 2016)
Q: Supposed the troops involved are American
Troops, should the agreement be concerned
in by the Senate?
➢ Not anymore. Two reasons:
a) The agreement is no longer the instrument
that allows the presence of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities.
b) It merely aims to implement an existing
law on treaty (MDT and VFA)
Temporary incapacitated under Sec 11.
Congress can only act and decide as to the
\itness of the President after the SECOND letter
from majority of the cabinet members.
Prohibition on HOLDING any other of:ice during
their tenure (both in the government and outside
of government) applies to President, Vice
President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistant secretaries.
- to “hold” means both temporary or permanent
capacities, even only as OIC. (Funa vs. Exec.
Sec. Ermita). The only exception here is, if
provided by the Constitution. The exception
under the Civil Service (Art IX- B) “unless
otherwise provided by law and the primary
function of his of[ice does not apply”
- however, it does not cover ex-of:icio capacity
and without additional compensation as
provided by law and primary function of his
of:ice.
The President is not eligible for any re-election.
Two possible interpretations here.
Residual Power
– can be validly claimed by the President if
there’s no violation of the Constitution, Law or
separation of powers. (Marcos vs. Manglapus).
Cannot be allowed if it violates separation of
powers (Review Center Assoc. of the Phil. vs.
Ermita) or if it violates the constitution
(Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP. Peace
Panel)
- Residual Power was validly claimed in the
President’s Act of Creating the Phils. Truth
29
Commission (Biraogo vs. PTC of 2010)
President is bound by the faithful execution
clause (Sec. 17) to know that laws have been
faithfully executed, he must investigate, and to
investigate effectively he needs to set up an
investigation body, thus, the PTC.
The two months ban before the next Presidential
election and up to the end of his term does not
apply to appointments of the justices of the SC
and by implication, the judiciary (De Castro Case)
- The appointments also of relatives within the
4th Civil degree of consanguinity and af:inity
does not apply to the judiciary ( Sec. 13)
Memorandum Circular No. 04, August 22, 2016,
Courtesy Resignations of Presidential Appointees,
does not apply to career of:icials, judiciary, Of:ices
created under the Constitution. For instance, the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo.
- Temporary appointments do not enjoy security
of tenure but positions which are primarily
con:idential, highly technical and policy
determining are protected by security of tenure
(Corpus vs. Cuaderno). However, cabinet
members are unique under the class of of:icial
occupying primarily con:idential positions.
Their term simply expires once President
wants to change them.
Power of Control. The President exercises power of
control over the City Prosecutor. Thus, he can order
the Sec. of DOJ to reverse the decision of the
prosecutor but he cannot order the dismissal of the
Prosecutor without valid cause and compliance with
due process.
- This includes the authority to recognize the
executive department, which incidentally may
include abolition of an of:ice. This can still be
justi:ied under his residual power.
- This power to re-organize can be delegated to
cabinet secretaries.
- The alter ego doctrine is applicable to acts of
Board of Directors of a GOCC, even if not all the
members of the said GOCC are government
of:icials sitting as ex- o:icio members of the BOD.
- The power of general supervision over local
government does not exclude the authority of
the President to suspend or dismiss an of:icial
through an administrative case.
- Powers as Commander-in-Chief. If there’s a
direct order from the President to the General or
Colonel not to attend the Senate Inquiry in aid of
legislation without the consent of the President,
then it is a valid order based on his power as
Commander-in-Chief. Usually not limited by the
same degree of restriction attended to executive
privilege or executive control. (Gudani vs. Senga).
- Sequence of graduated powers: from the most to
the least benign: calling out, suspension of the
 privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus, declaring of
Martial Law. The graduation refers only to
hierarchy based on scope and effect, not to order
of priority. It really depends on the President
which power to use :irst.
- Martial and Suspension of the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus need separate proclamation.
“Appropriate proceeding” does not refer to
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. It is a
unique proceeding solely for the purpose of
determining the suf\iciency of the factual basis.
It can be denominated as a complaint, case,
petition or matter to be resolved by the court.
Suf\iciency of factual basis test
– totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Not required that there should be
absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written report. It is
simply whether the facts in his possession prior to
and at the time of the declaration or suspension
are suf:icient for him to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege. It is enough that there is
probable cause for the President to believe that
there is actual rebellion or invasion.
- Note of the differences between the judicial
power to review and the review made by
congress, as to its scope, degree of correctness of
facts, passiveness and in placed mechanism for
review.
- Eachone is independent of the other, and can
proceed independently.
- There is no limit as to how many times the
President may ask for extension and Congress
granting it.
- Void for vagueness doctrine as a ground in facial
challenge cannot be used for questioning the
declaration of Martial Law or Suspension of the
Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus. It applies only
in cases that challenge government regulation and
restriction on speech and expression.
- Even if the arrest is illegal but once there’s Martial
Law and the privilege of the writ is suspended, the
person arrested or his family cannot do anything
to question the legality of the arrest within the
need 72 hours from the time of the arrest. No
habeas corpus, no petition for bail. Judicial
remedies can be availed only after the lapse of 72
hours. But only if the person was arrested for
rebellion or invasion.
- In David vs. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court
quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s (Justice
Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee
on Justice on march 13, 2006, stated that under a
valid declaration of martial law, the President as
Commander in Chief may order the “(a) arrest and
seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on
public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of the news
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees xxx”.
30
Worthy to note, however, that above-cited acts that
the President may perform do not give him
unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of
civilians during martial law. This is because
martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, neither does it supplant the
operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies.
- If the person is arrested for any other crime, and
the warrantless arrest is valid, then article 125 of
RPC applies. If the warrantless arrest is not valid,
Art 125 does not apply, suspect must be released
immediately even before inquest proceedings. If
not released, then he can :ile petition for the
issuance of the Writ of habeas corpus.
- If the arrest is by virtue of a warrant, Art. 125 and
HC is unavailing.
- Terrorism (RA 9372) and rebellion (Art 134 or
RPC) are not mutually exclusive of each other. But
one cannot absorb the other because of
differences in elements.
President’s power under Sec. 18, Art VII are not
exactly the same as declaring State of National
Emergency (David vs Arroyo), or state of Emergency
in three provinces in Mindanao (Ampatuan vs. Puno)
or State of Rebellion (Sanlakas vs. Executive Sec.). The
Constitutional basis of the :irst two is Sec. 18, Art. VII
(Calling out power) while the last one is Sec 4, Chap2,
Book II, Administrative Code of 1997.
- In this declaration, the President does not exercise
emergency powers, such as promulgating
“decrees” or regulations and take over public
utility companies under Sec. 17 of Art XII, which
requires congressional grant of emergency
powers.
- Provincial governor does not exercise any calling
out powers.
LIMITATIONs to the pardoning power of the
President: [6]
1) Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment
(Sec 19, Art. VII)
2) Cannot be granted in cases of violation of
election laws without favorable
recommendation of the Commission on
Elections (Sec. 5, Art. IX- C)
3) Can be granted only after conviction by :inal
judgment
4) Cannot be granted in cases of legislative
contempt (as it would violate separation of
powers), or civil contempt (as the State is
without interest in the same)
5) Cannot absolve the convict of liability
6) Cannot restore public of:ices forfeited
(Monsanto vs Factoran, supra)
- No reinstatement if convicted in a criminal case
(Monsanto vs. Factoran) But if an employee is
dismissed in an administrative case but
subsequently was acquitted in a Criminal Case
because he is completely innocent, and not only
because of reasonable doubt, then the grant of
 absolute pardon in administrative case can result
to reinstatement. (Garcia vs. COA)
Power of the President over foreign affairs in
relation to withdrawing from the ICC
- President as the Chief Architect of foreign affairs. It
is a political question. The Constitution does not
require any concurrence by the Senate in the
act of withdrawing.
- On the other hand, the President is bound by the
faithful execution clause. He shall faithfully
execute the laws. When the Senate rati:ied the
Rome statute, it becomes part of domestic law
which the President is duty bound to execute.
- Application of pacta sunt servenda.
- Treaty and executive agreements. Concurrence
by the Senate for Visiting Forces Agreement does
not require that the US Senate must also make
their approval to the same. It is enough that the US
accepts it as a binding agreement.
- Every treaty or international agreement is
deemed valid upon signing by the heads of
s t a te o r t h e i r re p re s e n t a t ive . S e n a t e
concurrence is only for its effectivity and
enforceability.
The decision of President Duterte to allow President
Marcos to be inferred in the LNMB is beyond the
ambit of judicial review.
- The interment of President Marcos is not
repugnant to the avowed policy of RA 10368,
which seeks to recognize the heroism of the
human right violation victims (HRVV) during
martial law. 1) RA10368 does not prohibit the
burial, 2) interment will not confer upon him the
title of hero, 3) the state will continue to
implement and comply with obligation under RA
10368.
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
The inversely proportional relationship of power of
judicial review and political question. When the
former was expanded under the 1987 constitution,
the latter is deemed restricted in scope.
Master the safeguards of judicial independence (See
your Memory Aid)
Judicial power is not the same as judicial review. The
former is found in Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) while the latter
is the power of the courts to test the validity of the
executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution.
- Judicial Review can be exercise by the lower courts
as implicitly recognized in Sec. 5, Par. 2, Art. VIII, on
the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
- JudicialReview may be limited by political
questions, separation of power (judicial legislation
31
is not allowed) and prohibition on giving of
advisory opinions
- In David vs. Arroyo, the SC laid down the exceptions
to the rule on not deciding moot and academic
issues: [4]
(1)There is grave violation of the Constitution;
(2)There is an exceptional character of the
situation and paramount public is involved.
(3)The constitutional issues raised require
formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar and the public; and
(4)The case is capable of repetition yet evasive
review.
Standing. Interest here means material interest. It is
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a
mere expectancy or a future, contingent subordinate
or consequential interest.
Elements of standing [3]
(1) The petitioner must have personality suffered
some actual or threatened injury which can be
legal, economic, or environmental;
(2) The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and
(3) The injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action (Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Phil. vs. COMELEC, GR
132922, April 22, 1998)
To summarize the Rules on the Liberal Approach
on Locus Standi, take note of the following: [5]
1) For taxpayer, there must be claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional
2) For voters, there must be showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in
question
3) For concerned citizen, there must be
showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be
settled.
4) For legislators, there must be a claim that the
of:icial action complained of infringes their
prerogative as legislators.
5) Government of the Philippines is a proper
party to question the validity of its own laws.
Facial challenge (based on overbreadth and void
for vagueness) generally applies only in the area of
freedom of expression. Against a legislative act, it is
the most dif:icult challenge to mount successfully
since the challenge must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the act would be
void. (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan)
- Facial challenge is not only applicable to protected
speech, but also to religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievance. All of these are component
right of the right to one’s freedom of expression
(Imbong vs. Ochoa).
Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
Jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
 positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility (Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs.
IAC).
Operative fact doctrine applies only if its
application will promote equity and fair play, such
as it will prevent double jeopardy or unjust
enrichment on the part of the government.
Deliberate Process Privilege. Privilege documents
or communications and not subject to disclosure:
1) Court actions such as the result of the raf:led
of cases and actions taken by the court on
each case included in the agenda of the
Court’s session on acts done material to
pending cases;
2) Court deliberations on cases and matters
pending before the court;
3) Court records which are “predecisional” and
“deliberative” in nature;
4) Con:idential information secured by justices,
judges, court of:icials and employees in the
course of their of:icial functions;
5) Records of cases that are still pending for
decisions are privilege material that cannot
be disclosed.
➢ Regular members of the JBC need con\irmation
by CA.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Maria Lourdes Sereno
(May 11, 2018)
- The origin , nature and purpose of impeachment
and quo warranto are materially different.
Impeachment is political in nature, while QW is
judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the
courts
Quo warranto Impeachment
1) Causes of action :
Usurping, intruding Commission of
or unlawful holding a an
public of:ice impeachable offense
2) Reliefs sought
- Cease to hold public
of:ice which she is
Removal from public
ineligible to hold
of:ice that he/ she is
legally holding
3) Mode of initiation
- Filing of a petition
before the court
Filing of a complaint or
4) Limitation petition before the HR
- One year prescriptive cannot initiate more
period applies to than one proceedings
other parties but not against the same public
against the state of:icial within one year.
32
- Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which
an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable of:icial may be removed from of:ice.
➢ Sec 2, Art. XI uses the words “members of the
SC may be removed from the of:ice.”
- TheSC’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
1) The courts exercise of its jurisdiction over
quo warranto proceedings does not preclude
the HR from proceeding with its own
investigation or the senate from conducting
trial should the articles of impeachment be
transmitted to it.
2) An act or omission committed prior to or at
the time of appointment or election relating
to an of:icial’s quali:ications to hold of:ice as
to render such appointment or election
invalid is properly the subject of quo
warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. On the contrary, acts or omission,
even if it relates to the quali:ication of
integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected of:icial, cannot be subject of a
quo warranto proceeding, but of something
else, which may either be impeachable if the
public of:icial concerned is impeachable and
the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
- Failure to submit SALNs goes into the very
quali:ication of integrity.
➢ The JBC required the submission of at least 10
SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent which,
the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less considered for
nomination.
- Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven
integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
- The effect of a :inding that a person appointed to
an of:ice is ineligible thereof is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color
of title that confers on him the status of a de facto
of:icer.
- The SC’s supervisory authority over the JBC
includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its
own rules.
- In simultaneous vacancies in the SC or CA or
Sandiganbayan, or even closely successive
vacancies, the President is not bound to follow the
clustering of nominees for each particular vacancy.
The discretionary power of the President to
appoint cannot be limited by grouping of
nominees intended for a particular vacancy.
(Aguinaldo vs. Aquino, Nov. 29, 2016)
The unanimity rule on integrity (Sec. 2, Rule 10 of
JBC - 009) can result to a deprivation of the
requirement of due process.

Rule-making power of the SC is not the same as
judicial legislation. The latter takes place when a
court steps in to craft missing parts or to :ill in the
gaps in laws or when it oversteps its discretional
boundaries and goes beyond the law to coin
doctrines or principle where none was before.
Procedural changes such as in the issuance of SC
Circular No. 1-91 which orders that appeals from
decisions of Administrative bodies shall now be
:iled with the CA, within 15 days from notice of
decision, does not diminish, increase or modify the
substantive right of appeal (First Lepanto Ceramics
vs. CA).
Congress cannot pass a law exempting a certain
government entity, local or national government units
from payment of docket and legal fees because under
Sec. 5, Art VIII of the Constitution, only the SC has
the power to promulgate its rules on pleadings,
practice and procedures in court. This power is no
longer shared with Congress.
The requirement that are collegial courts must reach
their conclusions and decisions only after
consultation does not apply to administrative cases
(Presidential Bank vs. Castro, 158 SCRA 646)
Take note of Sec. 1 of the Rule on Writ of Amparo. Can
be committed by a private individual or entity. The
same is true with Writ of Habeas Data.
The writ can be issued only if there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of
the right sought to be protected. Right to one’s
dwelling, if ordered by the court to vacate through an
executory judgement, does not constitute right to life,
liberty and security.
The same conclusion if one is denied his right to
travel because he has a pending criminal case in
court.
This Writ also shall not issue when applied for as
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or
when it will inordinately interfere with these
processes.
It is not a people remedy to regain parental authority
and custody of minor child who was legally put up for
adoption.
ARTICLE IX
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
The requirement that the appointee must not have
been a candidate in the immediately preceding
e l e c t i o n r e f e r s o n ly t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f
commissioners of CSC, COMELEC, COA as well as
Ombudsman and his deputies. On the other hand,
the one year ban from being appointed in
government service refers to those who lost in the
33
immediately preceding election and it applies to all
other of:icials in the government.
If a Commissioner is appointed when congress is not
in session (ad interim) and he is by-passed by the
Commission on Appointments, his reappointment is
not prohibited by the Constitution (Matibag vs.
Benipayo). Promotional appointment also does not
violate the prohibition on re-appointment because it
is not the same as the original appointment to being a
commissioner.
All three commissions enjoy \iscal autonomy.
The “No Report, no Release Policy,” of DBM
cannot be validly enforced against them. But
:iscal autonomy does not imply that their
budget cannot be decreased by Congress
compared to the previous year.
Only the SC’s budget cannot be decreased
because the Constitution speci\ically states
so.
CSC Chairman cannot sit even only as ex o:icio
member of the Board of Trustees or Board of
Directors of GSIS, PhilHealth, MHDF, and ECC.
- He will be exercising powers which are no
longer derived from his being Chairman.
- He will be receiving per diem.
- It will affect the independence of the
commission because GOCCs are under the
control of the President (Funa vs. Chairman,
CSC)
Decisions of COMELEC and COA can be questioned
before the SC through petition for certiorari within
30 days from receipt while that of the CSC to the
Court of Appeals by certiorari within 15 days
from receipt thereof. Decisions of the CA can be
raised before the SC through petition for review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (SC
Revised Circular 1-91 as amended by revised Admin
Circular 1-95, June 1995)
Only employees of GOCC, with original charter
are under the jurisdiction of the CSC. Employees of
GOCCs incorporated under the Corporation Code of
the Philippines will be under the Labor Code, or
NLRC regarding matters affecting their employment
and security of tenure.
Position considered as primarily con:idential, highly
technical and policy determining enjoy the
protection of security of tenure (Corpus vs.
Cuaderno). However, for primarily con\idential
positions, the ground for dismissal will simply be
loss of trust and con\idence.
Take note of the higher level of eligibility—the
CESO, a the highest rank being CESO I. Security of
Tenure sets in only if the CESO rank quali:ies to
what is required by the position. The position of
Chief Public Attorney carries a Salary Grade 30, so
even one is a CESO holder, if it is only CES Level III,
SG 28, the appointment is only temporary and
cannot be protected by security of tenure if another
 person with CES Level corresponding to the
position if appointed.
The classi:ication of a particular position as policy –
determining, primarily con:idential and highly
technical amounts to no more than executive or
legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon
the courts, the true test being the nature of the
position. (PAGCOR vs. Rilloraza)
The power to appoint is discretionary and CSC is not
a comanager or surrogate administrator of the
government of:ices and agencies (UP and De Torres
vs. CSC).
Only appointive of:icial may occupy any other of:ice
during his tenure if provided by the law and the
primary function of his of:ice. Elective Of\icials
cannot.
CSC now is considered as “party adversely affected”
which can appeal the decision of the court
exonerating an employee who was previously
dismissed (CSC vs. Dacoycoy, PNB vs. Garcia) In NAB
vs. Mamauag, et.al, it was also pointed out by the
court that a private complainant cannot :ile an appeal
because in an administrative case, he is only a
witness. If the agency is allowed to appeal, it must
not be the person or the authority who rendered the
decision which is the subject of the appeal, otherwise
it is violative of procedural due process because the
judge is also the same person who appeal the
decision. The one who can :ile the appeal should be
the personnel who serve as the prosecutor in the
case.
Employees under the jurisdiction of CSC can
organize but they cannot strike. For it to be
considered strike, two elements must be present: a)
stoppage of work, b) presence of compelled
demand to the government in the form of forced
concession or bene\its. Absence of one, the action
will still be considered as protected under the right of
freedom of expression.(Villaviza vs. GSIS)
The requirement that all election cases shall be heard
and decided by division :irst refers only to the
exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial
power, i.e. election protest and pre-proclamation
controversies. Administrative function refers to
paragraph 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Sec. 2, Art. IX-C,
while paragraph 2 of the same section refers to the
exercise of quasi- judicial function. Deciding a
petition for correction of a manifest error is only an
exercise of administrative function.
Decision of the COMELEC in the exercise of its
administrative function may be challenged before the
courts in an ordinary civil action or before the CSC if
it involves appointments of personnel or personnel
action.
Only :inal orders of the COMELEC en banc in the
exercise of its quasi- judicial function may be
brought before the SC. The notice to remove
Campaign Material (Team Buhay Team Patay) indeed
is not an exercise of quasi- judicial function and not
34
yet a :inal decision of the COMELEC en banc. But it
can be questioned before the SC under Sec. 5(1), Art.
VIII of the Constitution, that is, Petition for Certiorari
as there is a violation of the constitutional rights of
the Diocese of Bacolod.
Take Note whether or not it is the COMELEC* or the
MCTC or RTC which has jurisdiction over the election
protest*, COMELEC can issue TRO and Injunction only
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The right
of the party to seek execution pending appeal is
strictly construed.
*Original and exclusive jurisdiction over election
Contests: Regional/Provincial/City – COMELEC
If COMELEC en banc denied due course to the COC on
the ground of :inal conviction in a criminal case with
perpetual disquali:ication, it is an exercise of
administrative function, thus not required to be
decided by division \irst.(Romeo Jalosjos vs.
Comelec). Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC that allows convict to
run for public of:ice after lapse of two years from the
time he serves his sentence does not include cases
wherein the law imposes an accessory penalty of
perpetual disquali:ication form holding public of:ice
(Jalosjos vs. COMELEC)
Sec. 78 – Petition to deny due course to COC or
Petition to declare COC as null and void. Knowledge
by electorate of a candidate’s disquali:ication is not
necessary before a quali:ied candidate who place
second to the one whose COC was declared as null
and void, can be proclaimed as the winner. The ruling
in Labo vs. COMELEC is no longer controlling
(Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al.)
In the same Maquiling also the court ruled that after
one’s repatriation under R.A. 9225 and renunciation
later of his foreign citizenship for the purpose of
running for elective post, the use of a foreign
passport in travelling abroad will have the effect of
negating the act of renunciation and reverting the
person back to being a dual citizen. Thus, as dual
citizen, he is not quali:ied to run for public of:ice.
Difference of Sec 68 and 78.
Under Sec 68, there is a valid COC :iled but he cannot
continue as a candidate or if he wins he cannot sit
and assume of:ice because he is disquali\ied due to
the commission of prohibited acts before or
during election (vote- buying, terrorism,
overspending, etc) and his being a permanent
resident in a foreign country. Substitution may
happen. The law on succession applies, so the vice-
governor or vice mayor will become governor or
mayor even if the case was decided and became :inal
and executory only after the election.
Under Sec. 78, the COC is null and void from the
beginning due to material misrepresentation. No
substitution will happen and the second highest
vote getter will be proclaimed a winner.
Petition to deny due course to the COC – on the
ground the ground that he is an American Citizen,
inspite of his acquisition of dual citizenship under RA
9225 but he continued to use his American Passport
after his renunciation of his foreign citizenship when
he :iled his COC. His continued use of American
passport has the effect of vacating his
renunciation of the his foreign citizenship. (Casan
Maquiling vs. Rommel Arnado, (April 16, 2013)
The power of the COMELEC to investigate and
prosecute election offenses is no longer exclusive.
It is already concurrent (Sec. 43, RA 9369) with other
prosecution arms of government. Creation of a joint
panel (COMELEC and DOJ) to investigate election
offenses is valid. The :indings of the panel will still be
approved by the COMELEC in accordance with its
rules of procedure.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
All commissioners of the COA can be both lawyers
and CPAs.
Promotional appointment is not a prohibited re-
appointment. However, promotional appointment is
valid only if the vacancy in the position of the
chairman is due to death, resignation, permanent
incapacity and removal due to impeachment wherein
he was not able to :inish his term. No promotional
appointment can be valid if the vacancy happens
due to the expiration of term (Funa vs. COA, Villar)
COA has jurisdiction over GOCC with original Charter
and GOCC without original charter on post audit
basis. COA also can have jurisdiction over NGOs
which receive subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly
from or through the government, which are required
by law or the granting institution to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
Expenditures may be disallowed by COA even if it is
not irregular or illegal as long as it is unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. [iieeuu]
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated if
after the :iling of the complaint, the same is referred
already to the committee on justice. Consolidation
of complaints and referral to the COJ at the same time
is valid.
The SC can review impeachment proceedings under
Sec. 5 (2), Art VIII of the Constitution. But may not
do so if the issue is whether or not a particular act
committed by an impeachable of:icer is considered a
betrayal of public trust, other high crimes or culpable
violation of the constitution. It is solely within the
jurisdiction of the HR to decide what is included
those offenses. It may be dif:icult to point out that HR
committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision to
include the infraction committed as impeachable
offense.
Q: The Solicitor General :iled an impeachment case
against the Chairman of the Comelec because of
his extra-marital affair with his executive assistant
who is also married. The affair started when both
35
of them were always making overtime in the of:ice
in preparation for the national elections. The
President endorsed the impeachment complaint
reasoning that the action of the Comelec chairman
is clearly a betrayal of public trust.
1. Should the impeachment complaint be
forwarded to the committee on justice?
➢ There is no showing that the complaint was
endorsed by a member of the HR. The
president’s endorsement is not relevant.
2. Can a disbarment case against the Comelec
chairman be :iled even before the :iling of the
impeachment proceedings?
➢ The Chairman of the Comelec must be a
lawyer and he must possess such
quali:ication while holding of:ice. Once he is
disbarred, then it follows that he cannot hold
on to the of:ice anymore. The constitution
mandates that he is an impeachable of:icer.
3. Supposed the case :iled is quo warranto, will
it prosper?
➢ Acts committed during his incumbency as
chairman of the Comelec cannot be a ground
for quo warranto for the latter can only be
:iled if a public of:icial is ineligible to occupy
such of:ice of disloyal to the country.
➢ That means that the grounds must be
present before he assumed of\ice and not
for acts committed while in of:ice.
- The provision in the constitution which says that
the HR will promulgate its rules on impeachment
does not necessarily mean that the HR must
publish the rules in a newspaper of general
circulation or in the of:icial Gazzette. It is within
the discretion of congress to determine how to
promulgate its impeachment rules. Thus, there is
no violation of due process if the rules of
impeachment were promulgated only one after
the consolidated complaints were referred to the
Committee on Justice. (Guttierrez v. HR
Commission on Justice)
Under RA 10660 which amended PD 1606, even
though the public of:icial has a Salary Grade 26 or
lower, if he is among those enumerated in the law, to
be under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
RTC will not take jurisdiction i. e. President, directors,
trustees or manager of GOCC, state universities or
educational institution or foundations.
Take note of Sec. 2 which amends Sec. 4(c) of PD
1606: “Civil and Criminal cases :iled pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order No. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A issued in 1986 (PCGG Cases).
a. RTC will have exclusive original jurisdiction
where the information does not allege (1) any
damage to the government or any bribery or (2)
alleges damage to the government or bribery
arising from the same or closely related
transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding
One million pesos (1,000,000).
OMBUDSMAN
The president has no power to dismiss the deputy
ombudsman as it will violate the independence of
the of\ice. But the Special Prosecutor can be
dismissed by the President (Gonzales III vs. OP, MR)
The Ombudsman can investigate any act committed
by a public of:icial even though it is committed not
in connection with the function of his of\ice. (Art.
XI, Sec. 13) Rape, for instance committed when the
public of:icial is on vacation or on a weekend.
Of:ice of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
GOCC with original charter (Khan vs. Ombudsman)
Sec. 13 (2). But there is no distinction made in Sec. 12
of the constitution as to the kind of GOCC. To be safe,
the distinction made in Leyson vs. Ombudsman can
be helpful.
1) an agency organized as stock or non-stock
corporation
2) vested with functions relating to public needs,
whether governmental or proprietary
3) owned by the government directly or through
its intrumentalities, either wholly or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporation,
to the extent of at least 51% of its capital
stock
Finality and execution of decision.
- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a \ine not equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be \inal,
executory and unappealabe. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals
on a veri\ied Petition for Review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, within :ifteen (15) days from
receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
(Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino vs. CA, G.R. No.
175895 : April 12, 2007)
1. It is already settled in the case of Carpio
Morales v. Binay et. al. that the CA can issue a
TRO or injunction to stop the execution of the
decision of the Ombudsman. Thus the
provision in the Ombudsman law which states
that only the SC can review its decision or
stop its execution is unconstitutional for
encroaching on the rule making power of
the SC.
- The CA in this case issued the TRO because of
the application of the condonation doctrine
which affects only administrative cases and
not criminal cases. After the Binay ruling, the
SC already abandoned the condonation
doctrine.
2. However, one must take note that generally the
:indings of fact of the Of:ice of Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence. The factual :indings of the Of:ice of
Ombudsman are generally accorded great weight
and respect, if not :inality by the courts, due to its
special knowledge and expertise on matters
within its jurisdiction.
- So the challenge here once given a question on
this is to determine whether or not there is
36
substantial evidence to support the decision of
the Ombudsman.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he
shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal. (Edmundo Jose T.
Buencamino vs. CA, G.R. No. 175895 : April 12, 2007)
The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases is immediately executory even though there is
a pending motion for reconsideration. The refusal or
failure by any of:icer without just cause to comply
with an order of the of:ice of the Ombudsman shall be
ground for disciplinary action against said of:icer.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the
state. The onus to overturn by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is part of the inalienable
public land, rests with the applicant. (Director of
Lands vs. IAC)
The classi:ication and reclassi:ication of public lands
are the prerogative of the Executive Department.
The President, through a presidential proclamation
or executive order, can classify or reclassify lands to
be included or excluded from the public domain.
- Mere notations appearing on the survey plans or a
CENRO certi:ication is insuf\icient to prove that
the land is already an alienable one. What are
required now are: [2]
1) CENRO OR PENRO certi\ication; and
2) a copy of the original classi\ication approved by
the DENR Secretary and certi\ied as true copy by
the legal custodian of the of\icial records.
Unclassi:ied lands of the public domain, no matter
how long it remained as unclassi:ied cannot be
automatically deemed agricultural land. There
must be a positive act of the Executive Department
declaring that the subject land is already alienable.
(Secretary of DENR v. Yap)
The exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources can be done in two ways: [2]
(1) directly by the state; and
(2) by entering into co-production, joint
venture and production sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or
corporations or associations at least sixty
(60) percent of whose capital is owned by
Filipinos.
Foreign owned corporations can only participate in
these activities through service contracts involving
technical or \inancial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country.
Requisites: [3]
1) service contract shall be written in accordance
with a general law that will set a uniform terms,
conditions and requirements. P.D. No. 87, the Oil
Exploration and Development Act Act of 1972 is
an example of this general law
2) the President shall be the signatory for the
government
3) The President shall report the agreement to
Congress within 30 days from the execution of
the agreement
In the determination of 60% Filipino ownership, the
SC in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration in the
case of Gamboa v. Teves et. al., reiterated that the term
“capital “in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as
well as with full bene:icial ownership. This is
precisely because the right to vote in the election of
directors, coupled with full bene:icial ownership of
stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.
➢ The 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of
Filipino citizens must apply separately to each
class of shares, whether common, preferred
non-voting, preferred voting or any other class of
shares.
In the case of Narra NIckel Mining and Development
Corp. Vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., the SC
explained that in case of doubt as to the 60-40
Filipino ownership, the grandfather Test can be
applied as a supplement to the control test.
Grandfather Rule determines the actual Filipino
ownership and control in a corporation by tracing
both the direct and indirect shareholdings in the
corporation.
The Grandfather Rule applies only when the 60-40
Filipino foreign ownership is in doubt or where
there is reason to believe that there is non-
compliance with the provisions of the constitution on
the nationality restriction. Doubts can be inferred
from the following:
1. The three mining corporations had the same
100% Canadian owned foreign investor
2. T h e s i m i l a r c o r p o ra t e s t r u c t u re a n d
shareholders composition of the three
corporations
3. A major Filipino shareholder within the
corporate layering did not pay any amount with
respect to the subscription
4. The dubious act of the foreign investor in
conveying its interests in the mining
corporations to another domestic corporation,
among others
There are two exceptions provided by the
constitution wherein a foreigner can own private
lands in the country. First, is by legal succession and
second is to former natural born citizen who lost
his citizenship. The limit of the area for the second
37
exception is 5,000 square meters for urban areas
and 3 hectares in rural areas.
Take note of the case of IDEALS vs. PSALM wherein
the SC ruled that in the sale of the Angat Hydro
Electric Plant to a foreign corporation, NPC cannot
transfer the water rights to a foreign buyer.
Because of the possession of these water rights NPC
remain in control of the operation of the dam even if
the day to day management of the dam is placed in
the foreign corporation. The generation of electric
power by a foreign owned company using waters
already appropriated by the NPC by virtue of its
permit is valid.
It is not prohibited under the constitution to set a
corporation for the purpose of engaging in the public
utility business with a Filipino owned capital of less
than 60%. The 60% Filipino ownership is required
only if the subject corporation will get a franchise,
certi:icate or any form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility. Mere incorporation is not
prohibited.
Under the Public Land Act mere open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of an
alienable land (agricultural) of the public domain
under a bona :ide claim of acquisition or ownership
for at least 30 years automatically changes the
character of the land from public land to private
land. The possessor can claim to have already an
imperfect title to the land and he has to :ile a petition
in court for con:irmation of his imperfect title in
order to have full ownership and title to the subject
land. Thus after the lapse of 30 years, a Filipino
owned corporation can buy the said land and have it
registered in its name. At the time the corporation
buys the land it is no longer part of the public
domain, thus the prohibition that Filipino
corporations cannot acquire lands of the public
domain does not apply.
Escheat proceedings and Action for reversion are
remedies to recover private lands from disquali:ied
aliens.
➢ the action of the state for reversion to public
domain of land fraudulently granted to private
individuals is imprescriptible
➢ only the state here is the proper party, not private
persons eventhough they are applicants for sales
patents
➢ estoppel against the state is not favoured; it may
be invoked only in rare and unusual circumstances
as it would operate to defeat the effective
operation of the policy to protect the public
➢ in an action :iled by a former Filipino owner
against the foreigner, pari delictu will not apply.
In the revocation of Rappler’s Certi:icate of
Incorporation, the CA stressed that the foreign equity
restriction on mass media implies zero foreign
control. Any appearance of control that will in:luence
the corporate actions and decisions of Rappler is
already a violation. It does not matter therefore
whether the approval of Omidyar is required only
when the action taken by Rappler will prejudice the
rights of Omidyar because it will still nonetheless be
required to secure approval of at least 2/3 of the PDR
holders before Rappler can carry out or implement
any action which has the effect of altering, modifying
or otherwise changing Rappler’s Articles of
Incorporation or By-Laws.

38
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
93. Requirement of notice and hearing: There is
no constitutional requirement for a hearing in
the promulgation of a general regulation by
an administrative body.
i. where the
rule is procedural
ii. where the rules
a re m e re ly l e g a l
opinions
iii.where the class to be affected is large
and the question to be resolved involve
the use of discretion committed to the
rule-making body – meaning it is in the
exercise of the agency’s delegated rule
making powers
iv.w h e r e t h e r u l e s a r e m e r e l y
interpretative
v. provisional increase in the rates
imposed by the ERB, subject to the :inal
disposition of whether or not to make it
permanent, after the conduct of hearing
-However, take note that notice and hearing is
required if the administrative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation which is designed to
implement a law by providing its details and such
rule substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those concerned.
i. Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
37-93, which imposes new tax rate on
cigarettes locally manufactured
ii.where the rules and/or rates imposed
by an administrative agency apply
exclusively to a particular party,
predicated upon a :inding of fact, the
agency performs a function partaking of
a quasi-judicial function
iii.imposition of :ine as it is clearly
punitive in nature in the exercise of the
agency’s quasi-judicial functions
DepEd issued D.O. No. 54, which provides for the
organization of PTAs at the school level and the
cessation of the recognition of existing PTCAs. Is D.O.
No 54 valid inspite of lack of public consultation
before its issuance?
-Notice and hearing are not essential when an
administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-
making power. Previous notice and hearing are
required when limitation or loss of life or vested
property rights takes place in consequence of a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. It is not
essential to the validity of general rules or regulation
promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of
persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise. (Quezon City PCTC Federation Inc. v.
DepEd, Feb. 23, 2016)
94. In quasi-judicial proceedings before the
NLRC and its arbitration branch, procedural
rules governing service of summons are not
strictly construed. Substantial compliance
thereof is suf:icient. The constitutional
requirement of due process with respect to
service of summons only exacts that the
service of summons be such as may
39
reasonably be expected to give the notice
desired. Once the service provided by the
rules reasonably accomplishes the end, the
requirement of justice is answered, the
traditional notion of fair play is satis:ied, and
due process is served. (Oyster Plaza Hotel v.
Melivo, October 5, 2016)
95. The grant of quasi-judicial function cannot be
made through an administrative order only.
There must be an enabling statute or
legislative act conferring quasi-judicial
powers on the agency. The agency’s power to
formulate rules for the proper discharge of its
functions is always circumscribed by the
enabling statute. Otherwise, any agency
conferred with ruke-making power may
circumvent legislative intent by creating new
powers for itself through an administrative
order.
96. Does the :iling of a motion for reconsideration
to raise the lack of opportunity to be heard
cure the defect in procedural due process?
-No. The general rule is that the :iling of an MR cures
the defect in procedural due process because the
process of reconsideration itself is an opportunity to
be heard. However, the mere :iling of a motion for
reconsideration cannot cure due process defect,
especially if the motion was :iled precisely to raise
the issue of violation of the right to due process and
the lack of opportunity to be heard on the merits
remained. (Fontanilla v. COA, June 21, 2016)
97. The Doctrines of Prior Resort or Primary
Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies apply only if the agency is
exercising its quasi-judicial function. It is not
applicable if the agency is exercising its quasi-
legislative functions. In the latter, the aggrieve
party can question the subject decision in
court.
98. In the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or
Prior Resort, both the court and the
administrative agency have concurrent
jurisdiction but the court opts not to exercise
its jurisdiction considering that the agency is
more knowledgeable and has an expertise on
the subject matter. The case, if :iled in court
:irst, will simply be held in abeyance, and it
will be referred to the administrative body. In
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the case will be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
ELECTION LAWS
99. In determining the application of the
prohibition regarding three term limits, take
note of the different situations enumerated by
the SC in the case of Abundo Sr. Vs. Comelec:
1. Assumption of of[ice by
operation of law - the term during
which the of:icial assumed and serve
the remaining period will not be
counted in the determination of the
 three term limit. He was not elected
to the said position that he assumed
2. Recall election – If he
wins in the recall election, he will
only serve the remaining period of
the term, so there is an interruption
as before he run in the recall he was
already a private citizen.
3. C o n v e r s i o n o f a
municipality to city - the three limit
will apply if the mayor of the
municipality continuously exercise
the functions of the of:ice even after
the municipality is already made a
city. There is no interruption to speak
of
4. Preventive Suspension -
the period during his preventive
suspension cannot be considered as
an interruption as he is still in
possession of the of:ice, although he
cannot exercise the functions and
prerogatives of the of:ice during his
suspension.
5. Election Protest - the
application of the three term limits
will be affected by the issue of
whether or not he was able to fully
serve the term for which he was not
validly elected. If he was able to fully
serve, then the three term limit
applies. If not, then there is a gap.
The cases of Lonzanida v. Comelec,
Ong v. Alegre, Rivera III, and Dizon v.
Comelec are illustrative in this regard.
Analyze the situations below:
mayor up to June 30, 2007. However, LD
:iled her COC for the May 2007 elections. Is
she quali:ied to run for the 2007 for the
position of mayor of Igbaras, Iloilo? Give
your reason.
3.Supposed in the same set of terms in
number 2 above, LD was not proclaimed as
winner in the 2001 election. She :iled an
election protest before the RTC which
together with Comelec ruled against her.
The Supreme Court, however decided that
LD actually won the 2001 election. The
decision of the SC became :inal and
executory only on April 11, 2003 and LD
was installed as mayor on April 15, 2003. In
the 2004 election LD :iled her COC for
mayor. Is she quali:ied to run for mayor in
the election of 2004? Explain.
100. Another situation involving redistricting may
be relevant in the determination of the three
term limit. If another district is created and
the public of:icial run in the new district after
having been an incumbent in the old district,
it is important to determine the composition
of the constituent of the two districts. If the
difference in the population of the two
districts is only less than 10%, then the three
term limit prohibition will apply. ( Naval v.
Comelec, July 8, 2014)

1.Colas was elected and served as

mayor of Igbaras, Iloilo for terms
1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004.
During the 1998 mayoralty election, or
during his supposed second term, the
Comelec nulli:ied
Colas’ proclamation on the ground that there was
material misrepresentation in his COC. However,
Comelec’s decision become :inal and executor on July
4, 2001 when Colas was already starting to serve the
2001-2004 term as mayor–elect of Igbaras. In 2004, Don’t settle for what is mediocre
Colas :iled his COC for the same position as mayor for mediocrity is not a virtue. Always aim
arguing that he was not validly elected for the for excellence. Scratch for every inch of the
1998-2001 term, thus he did not violate the three scrimmage. With faith, grit and
term limit rule. Is Colas quali:ied to run as mayor for determination you will surely succeed.
the 2004 election? Reason out.

2.LD was elected and served as mayor jeeg101319

of Igbaras, Iloilo for terms 1995-1998,
1998-2001, and 2001-2004. In the 2004
election, she again ran for mayor and won.
She was proclaimed by the Comelec. A
petition for quo warranto was :iled against
her on the ground that she was disquali:ied
to run for the 2004 elections because of the
three term limit rule. Comelec and the court
ruled against LD, however the decision
became :inal and executory only on
February 14, 2007. Upon receipt of the
decision, LD immediately stepped down as
mayor and the vicemayor assumed as

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