The Universal Genocide

Zachary Stefani

209733684

February 22nd 2013

The title, although appearing brash and insensitive, is simply a play on the intention of this

paper, which is to critique the conception and use of the universal audience. The main focus of

this essay is to show that the universal audience is harmful to both its own intentions and to

society. This paper will be using Perelman’s conception of the universal audience as opposed to

the classic philosophical approach. The distinction is unimportant and so will not be explained.

The audience of an argument is defined as “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to

influence by his or her argument” (Perelman 107). This definition is closely related to the

rhetorical aspect of argumentation and is governed by rhetoric as well. Although the

centralization of persuasion is a somewhat cynical view of the goals of argumentation, it plays an

integral role in determining the universal audience. The universal audience, in contrast to the

particular audience, “is a mental construct that the speaker constructs” in order to select

appropriate appeals and arguments (Perelman 108-109). Another term that requires elucidation is

simulation. Simulation is used to express an empty pseudo-framework that does not consist of

any meaningful aspects of the reality it is trying to capture. The universal audience is

counterproductive and harmful because it promotes simulation in lieu of meaning and it results in

negative phenomenon including loss of individuality and lack of social progression.

The use of the universal audience creates a circular method of argumentation that ultimately

results in a simulated and incorrectly based argument. An individual’s mind is only accessible to

that individual. The only evidence we have to judge a person is based on their speech and their

actions; we judge people based on their behaviour and anything that they externalize. When we

argue we change our delivery, our argumentative style and our arguments themselves based on

persuading our audience, or at least we should, according to the rhetorical approach. If we are

engaged in an argument we must change our behaviour in order to persuade our audience based
on our conception of them and their beliefs. That means that our audience has adopted the same

approach and is therefore altering their behaviour in order to persuade us based on their

perception of our belief system.

This is more than just an exhausting exercise in recursion; it is evidence that our universal

audience is just a distorted version of ourselves and, furthermore, it has taken something with

meaning and removed it into a simulated circle of simulated people. We are trying to persuade a

being that has adopted a false demeanor based mostly on our own belief system (in an attempt to

persuade us) and vice versa. It is an entirely circular process that removes meaning and adds

nothing more than a deformed reflection of our beliefs incorrectly portrayed by our argument

partner.

Before this argument continues it is important to note that this applies to the particular and the

universal approach. As Tindale states “Perelman begins with a particular audience and then looks

at its universal features.” (Tindale 89), which means that you create the conception of the

audience based on the people you are arguing with and then remove the irrelevant aspects and

argue to persuade the ideal. The circularity critique is still valid as it targets exactly this creation

process of the audience and not its relativism. The circularity gets carried with the falsely

modeled pattern of behaviour into the universal sphere of audience. Tindale seems to view the

Universal Audience as one that only philosophers attempt to address (Tindale 89), so it may be a

moot point in regards to everyday common arguments.

This argument is further elucidated by comparing Roland Barthes’ description of myth in his

essay “Myth Today” to Perelman’s universal audience. Although it is more of a semiological

exercise it exemplifies the same disturbing circularity that is shown in the Universal Audience.
The formation of myth arrives out of the same viral need to persuade that taints the Universal

Audience.

Myth arrives in six parts (or possibly five- this will become clear shortly), which can be broken

down into two groups of three. The first group of three make up the Sign; the signifier, the

signified and the meaning, are the three components of the sign. The signifier is the object; the

signified is the concept that can be attached to that object and the meaning is the combination of

those two components (Barthes 114). For example, a picture of a single rose, in a vase, with

candles and two table settings would be the signified and the actual existence (in time and space)

of this single rose, in a vase, with candles and two table settings is the signifier. The relationship

between the picture and the real thing makes up the meaning of the picture. The second half of

the myth is the viral part and it is what turns meaning into simulation, we will call it the Myth.

The Myth, like the sign, is made up of three components. The signifier (which is redubbed the

form) the signified (which is redubbed the concept) and the final part (which can be labelled

myth itself) are the three parts. It is considered viral because it leeches onto the meaning of the

Sign and attempts to use it as its form (which, remember, is the signifier of the myth)(Barthes

115). In order to use the meaning as the form it must empty it of all its meaning and give it a new

simulated concept to fill the void. Continuing on with the previous example, when myth gets a

hold of the picture of a single rose, in a vase, with candles and two place settings it removes the

original meaning (the actual existence of this scene) and gives it a new meaning. Say it’s nearing

Valentine’s Day and the picture is put on the front of Cosmo magazine. The meaning is gone, the

myth has been created (presumably the myth would be that the day of lovers is approaching and

you had better find a lover). The most important part is that the meaning of the original Sign has

been hollowed out and distorted and replaced by a new simulated meaning. The intent produced
by the myth-producer (in this case the employees at the magazine) is what has distorted the true

meaning of the picture. (Barthes 124).

The Universal Audience performs this same dastardly feat by removing the meaning of an

argument and placing it in the infinitely circular and harmfully misleading realm of audience/

self analysis. Like in myth the hollowing out of meaning is motivated by the attempt at

persuasion. The myth-producer attempts to create an alibi between meaning and form, allowing

them to be constantly interchanged and equally valid. This is what makes a myth effective: the

ability to see and validate both the fact that this picture did exist and that I should find a lover for

Valentine’s Day. (Barthes 124-125).The Universal Audience does the same thing; the original

argument becomes distorted by the fact that it is viewed through the deceptive lens of behaviour

based audience observation. Both universal audience and myth attempt to pass off their “myth”

as a natural occurrence when in fact it is not. Since the objective of an argument becomes

persuasion and the persuasion is directed towards a simulated/ incorrectly constructed image the

process becomes simulated and incorrect (incorrect meaning it appeals to something that should

not be appealed too).

The universal audience propagates, and festers into, a tendency to argue towards the lowest

common denominator, resulting in a weaker form of argument. This argument will be known as

the “rabble” critique, as the term “rabble”, borrowed from Nietzsche, refers to the masses that eat

away at the different and demand conformity. The Universal Audience is used as a conceptual

framework, which judges what arguments are to be considered reasonable. The universal

audience, claims Perelman, “does not depend on the number of persons who hear the speaker but

upon the speaker’s intention...” (Perelman 109). If the speaker’s intention is to persuade his

audience, the onus of his argument is limited to the bare minimum required in order to gain
acceptance of that audience. For example, If Jack was arguing for why capitalism was great and

his audience was a class of first graders, Jack would not reference the free market or privately

owned businesses. He could simply say “Your Mommies and Daddies will lose their jobs if

capitalism collapses” and the first graders would clap, laugh and drool themselves into

acceptance. Jack has offered little information about capitalism and in fact has restricted his

ability to produce a more worthwhile argument. Now take a university class and add them in

with the first graders. Presumably, Jack would be required to direct his arguments to a

preconceived universal audience that consists of both first graders and university students. If

Jack caters his arguments towards the university students the first graders will be unconvinced

due to confusion; and, hopefully, the university students would be unconvinced by the “Mommy,

Daddy” argument. So what is Jack to do? Jack would have to find a commonality between the

first graders and the university students, that would persuade both groups, but because the first

graders are so lacking in knowledge they would impede the development of a cogent and

superior argument for the benefits of capitalism. If the first graders were removed from the

equation a higher level formulation of the argument could be developed. This is a very common

occurrence, not everyone is capable of the same level of thinking, therefore when considering the

Universal Audience the arguer is required to objectively weaken their arguments in order to cater

to the lowest common denominator.

It may be assumed that this critique is targeted at the particular audience and not the universal

audience, but this would be a premature assumption. Perelman states “the concept of the

universal audience implies that the quality of the argument depends on the quality of the

audience that accepts the thesis of the speaker” (Perelman 108). The audience that accepts the

argument is the preconceived audience that the argument was meant to address. Perelman states
that “the elite audience embodies the universal audience only for those who acknowledge this

role of vanguard and model” (Perelman 108). This means that the arguer must assent to the

authority of a model or standard within a certain field and only then is it included in the universal

audience. Even if this transcends the simple methodological criteria for proof and is included to

mean that the arguer is bound to argue towards an expert panel the “rabble” problem still stands.

In other words, if the appeal to an “elite” audience is involved solely as a guide to what should

count as support for a claim (meaning the field dictates the proof) there is no threat to the

“rabble” critique because no matter the field there will always be a degradation of acceptance.

For example, within the scientific community the theory of gravity is argued with simple

arguments (apples fall towards the earth) and complex arguments (F = mg). The first argument is

easier to formulate, easier to understand and easier to argue against than the second.

Furthermore, if the “elite” audience is supposed to appeal to a higher standard of judge then the

problem still persists. Assume Jack is arguing with his professors (Jack cannot conceive of any

higher authority) and his universal audience is one that has the attribute of near perfect reason

and intense critical analysis, Jack would only be obligated to satisfy this standard. There is still

no necessity to transcend this minimum requirement. Jack may be capable of creating arguments

that surpass the understanding of these great professors, the same way he formulated arguments

above the understanding of the first graders, but he won’t. His potential will go unactualized

because he is only required to pander to his need to persuade. Certainly, understanding is an

important part to the development of an argument but using it as the bar in which to judge the

goodness or badness of an argument creates malaise and unsatisfactory progression.

Not only does the appeal to the judgement of others lower the opportunity for superior

arguments, it also stifles the creative freedom of the individual argument producer. The argument
producer is constantly berated with the thoughts of other people; namely the thoughts that require

attention in order to persuade. Anytime a person is required to alter their own ideas in place of

someone else’s the argument becomes less individual and more suited for the rabble.

To conclude, the universal audience is based within a simulated social misunderstanding and

promotes a standard that demands only minimal satisfaction while crushing individuality. It is

important to note that these critiques revolve around the rhetorical and behavioral aspects of the

universal audience and although they are not central to the concept they are necessary for its

creation. Admittedly, there is some disharmony in the critical style within the paper. The first

argument (universal audience as simulation) attacks the universal audience from a descriptive

standpoint and the other critiques attack it from a normative standpoint. Arguably, the universal

audience can be regarded as either normative or descriptive so it was important to address both

perspectives. The conception of the universal audience is manufactured through a simulated

social/ argumentative practice; it cannot be viewed as descriptive because it is not a natural

representation of argument (“natural” meaning to appeal to a meaning outside of its framework).

If the theory is normative it lacks in its ability to create individuality and progression in its

arguments and should not be considered beneficial.

 Bibliography

Barthes, Roland, and Annette Lavers. "Myth Today." Mythologies. New York: Hill and Wang,

1972. N. pag. Print.

Gilbert, Michael A. Coalescent Argumentation. Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1997. Print

Perelman, Chaïm, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.

Notre Dame, [Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1969. Print.

Tindale, Christopher W. Acts of Arguing: A Rhetorical Model of Argument. Albany, NY: State

University of New York, 1999. Print.