CCID Fight

Case 3:23-cv-00272-HTW-LGI Document 119 Filed 12/05/23 Page 1 of 35
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE

ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
No. 3:23-cv-272-HTW-LGI
v.
TATE REEVES, in his official capacity as

Governor of the State of Mississippi, et al.,
Defendants.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The United States filed a motion to intervene in this action on July 12, 2023. That
motion is fully briefed. 1 Because its intervention motion remains pending, the United States
submits this Statement of Interest in support of Plaintiffs’ pending motion to preliminarily enjoin
Sections 4 and 5 of House Bill 1020, ECF No. 110, 2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which
authorizes the Attorney General “to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending
in a court of the United States.” The United States’ proposed Complaint in Intervention also
1
U.S. Proposed Compl. in Intervention, ECF No. 69-2; U.S. Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 70; Defs.’
Br.’s in Opp’n, ECF Nos. 73 & 74; U.S. Reply, ECF No. 79.
2
On November 13, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction re HB 1020 § 4
and § 5, ECF No. 110.
alleges that Sections 4 and 5 of House Bill 1020 violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Municipal courts throughout Mississippi are local bodies subject to local control. These
courts have jurisdiction over local municipal ordinances, city traffic violations, and misdemeanor
crimes. The judges overseeing these courts are typically appointed by the governing bodies for
each municipality. Under state law, in all cities with populations greater than 10,000, like the
City of Jackson, all municipal court judges and prosecutors are appointed by the municipality’s
elected officials, who in turn are accountable to the municipality’s voters. And the judges they
appoint must be electors from the county where the municipality is located. Taken together, this
structure, mandated by state law, reflects the distinctly local character and control of municipal
courts in Mississippi.
House Bill 1020 targets only the City of Jackson for taking away some of this local
control over its court system. It doubles the area of a previously created infrastructure
improvement district within Jackson (the Capitol Complex Improvement District, or CCID) and
creates a new court to serve concurrently with the Jackson Municipal Court within the CCID’s
boundaries. Unlike Jackson’s existing municipal court, however, and most other municipal
courts statewide, the State chose not to give appointment power over the CCID court to the
municipality’s elected officials. Instead, the power to appoint the CCID’s sole judge lies with
the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, who is elected from a district that does not
include Jackson, and the power to appoint the CCID’s two prosecuting attorneys with the
3
Should the Court grant the United States’ motion to intervene while Plaintiffs’ motion is
pending, it intends to file a motion for preliminary injunction specifying the relief sought.
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Mississippi Attorney General, who is elected statewide. Unlike every other municipality in
Mississippi, this targeted legislation substantially diminishes Jacksonians’ control over this
quintessentially local court system.
House Bill 1020’s disparate treatment of Jackson from the rest of the State violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection, and a preliminary injunction preventing
appointment of the CCID judge and prosecuting attorneys by statewide officials is warranted.
House Bill 1020 violates the Equal Protection Clause in two ways. First, the factors articulated
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), demonstrate that House Bill 1020 was enacted with an impermissible discriminatory
purpose, subjecting the law to strict scrutiny which it cannot survive. These factors include the
State’s long history of resistance to Black self-governance paired with contemporaneous
statements and procedural and substantive departures during the bill’s enactment, as well as the
resulting disparate impact to the City of Jackson. Taken together, the mosaic of factors shows
that House Bill 1020 was motivated, at least in part, by race. Stripping local control from the
Black-majority City of Jackson is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, the legislation places Jacksonians in a class different from all other
Mississippians with respect to their exercise of local control. It does so without a rational basis
tying the legislation’s chosen means to its intended ends. Creating a new court analogous to
Jackson’s existing municipal court but removing local control over appointment of the court’s
judge and prosecutors is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Because Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, would be irreparably harmed without preliminary
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relief, and the balance of equities and public interest favor an injunction to maintain the status
quo, this Court should grant a preliminary injunction.
II. Factual Background
A. House Bill 1226 (2017)
In 2017, the Mississippi Legislature created the Capitol Complex Improvement District
(CCID). See H.B. No. 1226, 2017 Miss. Laws Ch. 444. The purpose of the district, comprised
of State-owned properties and facilities within the City of Jackson, was to “implement, supervise
and administer certain infrastructure improvement projects.” Id. The original March 2019
master plan for the CCID, prepared for the Mississippi Department of Finance and
Administration (DFA), included various construction, reconstruction, traffic, lighting, and utility
projects for that area. See Capitol Complex Improvement District Master Plan, Miss. Dep’t of
Fin. & Admin. (2019), https://perma.cc/JK8V-QGL8. Neither the enacting legislation nor the
2019 master plan evinced an intent that the CCID would or could become a distinct judicial or
prosecutorial district. 4
B. House Bill 1020 (2023)
Six years after it created the CCID, the legislature enacted House Bill 1020, Reg. Sess.,
2023 Miss. Laws. Ch. 546 (“HB 1020”), which is the focus of this litigation. It effectively
overrode the local control that voters and elected officials in Jackson and Hinds County had over
their local justice system, while leaving the same judicial and prosecutorial structures untouched
4
In 2021, the legislature enacted Chapter 403 (H.B. 974), which transferred authority over the
CCID from the DFA to the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (DPS). See H.B. 974 § 2,
http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2021/pdf/HB/0900-0999/HB0974SG.pdf. H.B. 974
provided the Capitol Police with “jurisdiction relative to the enforcement of all laws of the State
of Mississippi on the properties” and the ability to “make arrests for any violation of any law of
the State of Mississippi which occurs within the boundaries of the district.” H.B. 974 designates
DPS as the “lead agency” for coordination and enforcement purposes within the CCID. Id.
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everywhere else in Mississippi. 5 It did so in two ways. First, on the county level, it attempted to
make Hinds County the only county in Mississippi where a portion of the non-emergency circuit
court judges, who are ordinarily elected by county residents, would be appointed by a statewide
official. See HB 1020 § 1; Saunders v. Mississippi, No. 2023-CA-00584-SCT, 2023 WL
6154416, at *11 (Miss. Sept. 21, 2023). The Mississippi Supreme Court invalidated the
provision on state constitutional grounds. See Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416, at *10-11 (Miss.
Sept. 21, 2023). Claims against that provision are now moot.
Second, HB 1020 made two coordinated changes to Jackson’s municipal court system.
First, it more than doubled the area of the existing CCID, expanding it beyond the original
boundaries that “were drawn to capture a majority of the State-owned properties and State of
Mississippi offices and facilities operating within [Jackson].” Capitol Complex Improvement
District Master Plan 2023 Update 1, Miss. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. (Oct. 2023),
https://perma.cc/G8ST-R8WA (CCID Master Plan 2023 Update); HB 1020 § 8. The racial
implications of this expansion are stark—carving out a majority-White enclave from the
majority-Black City of Jackson. This is apparent, both statistically in terms of the demographic
characteristics and geographically in terms of which areas were selected as part of the expansion.
The map below presents the boundaries of the original CCID and those of the expanded
district laid over the 2020 Census data 6 for the City of Jackson. Brooks Decl., App. A, at ¶¶ 3-
5
A more complete description of the state judicial system, particularly municipal courts can be
found at https://www.msbar.org/media/2223/understanding-the-court-system-brochure.pdf.
6
The United States requests the Court take judicial notice of the census data cited herein
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Courts have frequently recognized that “United
States census data is an appropriate and frequent subject of judicial notice.” Hollinger v. Home
State Mut. Ins. Co., 654 F.3d 564, 572-73 (5th Cir. 2011).
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10. As the map indicates, the district’s boundaries move mostly north and east grabbing
population concentrations that are overwhelmingly White in composition.
Id. at Att. C.
The census statistics support the visual impact of the map.
Total White NH (%) Black NH (%)

City of Jackson 153,701 25,424 (16.5) 122,131 (79.5)
CCID (HB 1226)(2017) 14,374 6,184 (43.0) 7,183 (50.0)
CCID (HB 1020)(2023) 26,457 12,698 (48.0) 12,038 (45.5)
Population added by HB 1020 12,083 6,514 (53.9) 4,855 (40.2)
Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10.
Even though White residents are 16.5% of the City’s total population, they are 53.9% of the
population added to the CCID. The White population percentage within the CCID rose from
43.0% under the 2017 boundaries to 48.0% under HB 1020. More significantly, as the data
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above indicate, 6,184 of the City’s total White population of 25,424 resided in the original
CCID, but under HB 1020, this number increased to 12,698, a jump from 24.3 to 49.9% of the
total number of White city residents.
HB 1020’s second change to Jackson’s municipal court system was the creation of a new
court functionally equivalent to a municipal justice system within this expanded CCID area. See
HB 1020 § 4. Mississippi law long predating HB 1020 established that every municipality in the
State with a population of at least 10,000 is to be served by a municipal court. Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 21-23-1—21-23-3 (1979). 7 These courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanor crimes,
municipal ordinances, and city traffic violations. Id. § 21-31-7. There are currently 239
municipal courts. About the Courts, State of Miss. Judiciary, https://perma.cc/GJK6-Y5JA. 8
The number of municipal judges and prosecutors varies by the size of the relevant municipality,
but in all municipalities with a population of at least 10,000, Mississippi law provides that these
officials “shall be appointed by the governing authorities of the municipality at the time provided
for the appointment of other officers,” Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-3, and “shall be a qualified
elector of the county in which the municipality is located,” Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-3. The
Jackson Municipal Court currently has six municipal judges 9 who are appointed by the mayor of
Jackson and confirmed by a majority vote of the Jackson City Council. 10
7
Appointment of a municipal judge and prosecutor is discretionary in a municipality with a
population under 10,000. Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-5. However, “without a municipal judge, a
town cannot enforce its municipal ordinances.” Op. Atty. Gen. Hatcher, 1999 WL 1075209
(Miss. A.G. Sept. 24, 1999). See also About the Courts, State of Miss. Judiciary,
https://perma.cc/GJK6-Y5JA (most municipal judges of the State’s 239 municipal courts are
appointed by governing bodies of municipalities).
8
The Mississippi Bar Association, https://www.msbar.org/media/2223/understanding-the-court-
system-brochure.pdf, reports that there are 226 municipal courts.
9
Jackson Municipal Court, https://perma.cc/A9GQ-Z7A6.
10
Jackson, Miss., Code § 11-32 (1971); Ord. No. 1996-53(1), § 1, 9-24-95 (referencing Miss.
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Starting on January 1, 2024, however, HB 1020 creates a targeted exception to local
control over municipal courts in Mississippi. It creates a “CCID inferior court” within Jackson
overseen by a judge who has jurisdiction similar to that of Mississippi’s municipal courts, and
prosecuting attorneys empowered to practice in the CCID court in the same way as other district
attorneys throughout the state. HB 1020 §§ 4-5. In most substantive respects, the CCID court is
crafted to be similar to the already-existing Jackson Municipal Court. The CCID court judge is
empowered “to hear and determine all preliminary matters and criminal matters authorized by
law for municipal courts” and has “the same jurisdiction as municipal courts to hear and
determine all cases charging violations of the motor vehicle and traffic laws of this state, and
violations of the City of Jackson’s traffic ordinance or ordinances related to the disturbance of
the public peace,” provided such cases arise within the CCID. Id. § 4(1)(a); see also Miss. Code
Ann. § 21-23-7(1) (jurisdiction of municipal judge). The compensation for a CCID judge and
support staff is likewise tied to the compensation “paid to municipal court judges and their
support staff in the City of Jackson,” and the judge must “possess all qualifications required by
law for municipal court judges,” one notable exception being residency in the City of Jackson.
HB 1020 § 4(2)-(3). HB 1020 also creates two prosecuting attorney positions for the CCID
court, who are empowered to prosecute cases in that court “in the same manner and with the
same authority of law provided for district attorneys and county prosecuting attorneys by filing
an indictment or any other criminal action that accrues or occurs, in whole or in part, in the
CCID.” Id. § 5(1).
Code. § 21-23-3).
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But unlike all municipal court judges in the State, the CCID judge established by HB
1020 must be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, a state official,
instead of being appointed by local elected leaders in the municipality of Jackson, where the
court exercises jurisdiction. Id. § 4(2). In Mississippi, supreme court justices are elected from
three multi-member districts, with each electing three justices to the Court for staggered eight-
year terms. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-3-1 (districts); Miss. Const. art. 6, § 145B (number of justices);
Miss. Const. art. 6, § 149 (terms); see Supreme Court, State of Miss. Judiciary Admin. Office of
the Cts., https://perma.cc/2VGR-22AU; Mississippi Supreme Court Judicial Map, State of Miss.
Judiciary Admin. Office of the Cts., https://perma.cc/VE7R-CZV5. The longest-tenured Justice
serves as Chief. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-3-11. The current Chief Justice comes from District 2,
which does not include Hinds County. See Supreme Court Justices, State of Miss. Judiciary
Admin. Office of the Cts., https://perma.cc/BB9D-TD5L.
Like the CCID judge, the prosecuting attorneys in the CCID would be the only local
prosecutors appointed by a statewide official within a municipality where State law requires
municipal prosecuting attorneys to “be appointed by the governing authorities of the
municipality [].” Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-3. The two CCID prosecuting attorneys are to be
appointed by the Mississippi Attorney General. HB 1020 § 5(1). The current Mississippi
Attorney General, Lynn Fitch, was first elected in 2019 with 57.8% of the statewide general
election vote, 11 but in Jackson, 83.4% of the vote went to her general election opponent. 12 She
11
Mississippi Secretary of State, 2019 General Election Certified Results,
https://sos.ms.gov/elections/electionresults_aspx/elections_results_2019_certifiedG.aspx.
12
Past Election Results, Hinds County,
https://www.co.hinds.ms.us/pgs/apps/electionresults.asp?YearId=2019 (percentage excludes
write-in votes). In Hinds County, her opponent received 73.6% of the vote.
https://www.co.hinds.ms.us/pgs/elections/11052019Summary.txt.
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was reelected on November 7, 2023, with 63.4% of the statewide vote, but her general election
opponent received 83.5% of the vote in Jackson. 13 Thus unlike in every other municipality
where municipal prosecutors are appointed by local leaders, the CCID prosecuting attorneys
would be appointed by an official who would not be the candidate of choice of the majority of
Jacksonians.
C. Background on Local Control in Mississippi
Mississippi has a long, undisputed history of state-led resistance to Black citizens
participating in the political process and exercising control over local governing institutions.
This resistance has played a prominent role in the City of Jackson and Hinds County, where
meaningful progress in Black political participation and the election of candidates of choice goes
back less than 50 years.
In Hinds County, a decade of federal court litigation, including constitutional and Voting
Rights Act challenges, eventually led to the drawing of county supervisor district lines that
included two districts in which Black voters could elect their preferred candidates. See
Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors, 468 F. Supp. 285, 303-05 (S.D. Miss. 1979).
State and local resistance to Black self-governance also delayed the advance of Black
political participation in Jackson at the municipal level. In 1962, the Mississippi legislature
passed a bill that required all cities and towns organized under the state municipal code to adopt
at-large elections for aldermen. See Frank Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment
13
Unofficial Precinct Report, Hinds County,
https://www.co.hinds.ms.us/pgs/results/ElectionNightResults.asp (percentage excludes write-in
votes). In Hinds County, her opponent received 73.6% of the vote.
https://www.co.hinds.ms.us/pgs/results/Unofficial%20Election%20Results.pdf.
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in Mississippi after 1965 53 (1990); see also Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206, 213–14 (N.D.
Miss. 1975).
State resistance to Black political participation played a crucial role in suppressing Black-
preferred candidates’ election to the judiciary long after progress had been made in other areas of
state and local government. In 1986, the Attorney General imposed an objection under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act to the conversion of 24 single-member judicial districts to multi-
member districts with anti-single-shot voting requirements. 14
A year later, this Court found the use of multi-member districts for the election of judges
in numerous state courts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Martin v. Allain, 658 F.
Supp. 1183, 1204 (S.D. Miss. 1987). The decision led to the realignment of the Seventh Circuit
Court District to be coterminous with Hinds County and divided it into four, single-member
judicial subdistricts. See Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 341-42 (S.D. Miss. 1988)
(remedial phase); Hinds County, Mississippi, Facts about Mississippi’s Seventh Circuit Court
District and its Jurisdiction,
https://www.hindscountyms.com/sites/default/files/SEVENTH_CIRCUIT_COURT_DISTRICT
OF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JURISDICTION.pdf. Under these lines, Black voters began
having success electing their preferred candidates. By 1998, two of the Seventh District’s four
single-member subdistricts had repeatedly elected Black judges. Voting Rights Act: Evidence of
Continued Need: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 5566-71 (2006). In 2018, Black candidates succeeded in being elected to all four
judicial subdistricts in the Seventh Circuit. Jimmie E. Gates, Hinds County judicial runoffs
14
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/05/30/MS-1970.pdf.
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shake up Circuit Court makeup, Clarion Ledger (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:51 PM),
https://perma.cc/FKN2-YGQS.
Since the Seventh Circuit court’s realignment, the state has increased the overall number
of circuit judges statewide by approximately 20 percent, though it has declined to add any
elected judgeships to the Seventh Circuit itself. Instead, the seventh circuit’s heavy caseload has
been addressed on an ad hoc basis by a series of temporary appointments by the Chief Justice of
the Mississippi Supreme Court. Between 2004 and 2022, the Chief Justice appointed at least
fourteen special circuit court judges in Hinds County. 15
At the same time, politicians have increasingly criticized Black-led cities such as
Jackson, accusing city leaders of mismanagement, corruption, and an inability to address crime.
In 2003, gubernatorial candidate Haley Barbour, without consulting city officials, pledged to
unveil a “crime plan” for Jackson. Sid Salter, The Changing Face of Jackson, The Clarion-
Ledger, November 16, 2003, at 2G (reporting that Jackson city leaders asked Barbour why
Jackson had a specific “crime plan” but other municipalities in the state did not); Patrice Sawyer,
15
See Supreme Court appoints two special judges for Hinds County Circuit Court, State of Miss.
Judiciary Admin. Off. of Cts. (May 24, 2006),
https://courts.ms.gov/news/2006/052405HindsSpecialJudges.php; Supreme Court appoints
special judge for Hinds County Circuit Court, State of Miss. Judiciary Admin. Off. of Cts. (Aug.
29, 2007), https://courts.ms.gov/news/2007/82907Hindsspecialjudge.php; Supreme Court
appoints special judge for Hinds County Circuit Court, State of Miss. Judiciary Admin. Off. of
Cts. (Oct. 9, 2008), https://courts.ms.gov/news/2008/100808teeuwissen_specialjudge.php;
Supreme Court appoints Special Judge for Hinds County, State of Miss. Judiciary Admin. Off. of
Cts. (Dec. 30, 2010), https://courts.ms.gov/news/2010/12.30.10Hinds Special Judge.php; Four
special judges appointed to assist Hinds Circuit Court, State of Miss. Judiciary Admin. Off. of
Cts. (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://courts.ms.gov/news/2020/08.04.20%20Hinds%20Circuit%20appointment.php;
Four special judges appointed to assist Hinds Circuit Courts, State of Miss. Judiciary Admin.
Off. of Cts. (Sept. 22, 2022),
https://courts.ms.gov/news/2022/09.22.22%20Hinds%20Circuit%20special%20judges%20appoi
nted.php.
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Election 2003, The Clarion-Ledger, October 5, 2003, at 1A (reporting that Jackson’s mayor was
“not familiar with Barbour’s crime plan” and that the Hinds County Sheriff was “not privy to any
parts of the plan”). At the end of his term, Barbour’s successor, Phil Bryant suggested that
unilateral executive action might be necessary if local leadership in Jackson proved
uncooperative. Justin Vicory, Lumumba, Phil Bryant trade jabs over weekend homicides at
church, Walmart, Clarion Ledger (Jan. 14, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://perma.cc/228N-PAND.
Discussing Jackson’s crime problems in 2021, Governor Tate Reeves claimed, “Many of
these murders and homicides … are being committed by individuals who appear to have been
arrested recently and let out on bail,” implying that judges in Jackson were contributing to the
crime problem by failing to ensure that violent criminals remained incarcerated pending trial.
Justin Vicory, Jackson mayor says state supplying additional police to help to fight crime not
enough, Clarion Ledger (July 15, 2021, 1:09 PM), https://perma.cc/K7K9-MEJ6. In 2023,
during a press conference where he promoted HB 1020, Governor Reeves justified state
intervention in local courts and law enforcement on the grounds that Jackson was the “murder
capital of the world.” Ross Reily, Gov. Tate Reeves calls Jackson the ‘murder capital of the
world’, Clarion Ledger (Feb. 16, 2023, 3:28 PM), https://perma.cc/Z76H-5T7X.
Amidst growing criticism of Jackson’s crime problems, state leaders withheld requested
resources for Jackson’s and Hinds County’s criminal justice systems. For example, in a
legislative session that allocated $3 million to the Capitol Police, the Mississippi legislature
declined to fund youth mental health programs, detention center improvements, and Jackson
Police Department initiatives. See H.B. 865, H.B. 1227, H.B. 1384, H.B. 1679, H.B. 943, H.B.
1519, 2023 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2023). Members of the local delegation introduced over
thirty bills—see, e.g., H.B. 1131 (2022) (add ADAs and criminal investigators in the Seventh
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Circuit); H.B. 988 (2002) (add Seventh Circuit judges) 16—seeking to improve the Hinds County
criminal justice system with increases in judges, ADAs, and criminal investigators between 2006
and 2022. The legislature rejected all. See also Section I.A.2.c., infra.
LEGAL STANDARD
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must show “(1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued,
(3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the
injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.”
Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 880 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 2018). Whether to grant a
preliminary injunction “lies within the discretion of the district court.” Apple Barrel Prods., Inc.
v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984).
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Claim that HB 1020
Violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because the culmination of factors analyzed
under an Arlington Heights framework demonstrate that HB 1020 was motivated, at least in part,
by race. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). As such, HB 1020 is subject to strict scrutiny which it cannot pass because the law’s
16
These bills, introduced by local delegation leaders, Senator John Horhn, and Representatives
Earle Banks, Christopher Bell, and Edward Blackmon, Jr., to address the local criminal justice
system infrastructure, are available at http://www.legislature.ms.gov/legislation/previous-
sessions, and included (all in their respective regular legislative sessions): H.B. 1288 (2006);
H.B. 1357 (2006); H.B. 1505 (2007); H.B. 1515 (2007); H.B. 992 (2008); H.B. 1202 (2008);
H.B. 1204 (2008); H.B. 1080 (2009); H.B. 991 (2010); H.B. 1166 (2010); H.B. 1254 (2011);
H.B. 1480 (2012); H.B. 665 (2013); H.B. 1093 (2014); H.B. 1230 (2015); H.B. 628 (2016); H.B.
642 (2016); H.B. 678 (2016); H.B. 775 (2017); H.B. 779 (2017); H.B. 780 (2017); H.B. 603
(2018); H.B. 624 (2018); H.B. 664 (2018); H.B. 412 (2019); H.B. 470 (2019); H.B. 555 (2019);
H.B. 389 (2020); S.B. 2778 (2020); H.B. 393 (2021); S.B. 2634 (2021).
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targeting of the majority-Black City of Jackson for loss of local control is not narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest. In the alternative, HB 1020 also fails rational basis review
as it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Under either test, Plaintiffs have a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
A. HB 1020 Unconstitutionally Discriminates on the Basis of Race in Violation of the

Equal Protection Clause.
Applying the well-established factors set forth in Arlington Heights reveals HB 1020 was
passed with an impermissible discriminatory purpose.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Legislation Enacted with a

Discriminatory Purpose.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any state to “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976). “Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. But “[t]his is not
to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of
the statute . . . .” Washington, 426 U.S. at 241. “Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.” Id. at 242. The ultimate inquiry is
whether legislation was enacted at least in part “because of,” and not “in spite of,” a law’s
“adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979). Although the law recognizes that “legislators and administrators are properly
concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations . . . racial discrimination is not
just another competing consideration. When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has
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been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.” Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. This belongs to the “unremarkable principle that the State may not
alter the procedures of government to target racial minorities.” Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 304 (2014) (plurality op.). Accordingly, the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids government action where “invidious discrimination would be the necessary
result of the procedural restructuring” of governmental authority. Id. (citing Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1969)).
Whether provisions that are “facially neutral but have racially disproportionate effects”
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is evaluated under the standard
articulated in Arlington Heights. Harness v. Watson, 47 F.4th 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2022) (en
banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2426 (2023); see also Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 230 (5th
Cir. 2016) (en banc). Arlington Heights contemplates two ways a plaintiff can prove such
ostensibly neutral laws were enacted with a discriminatory purpose. First, “sometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action
even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at
266. Aspects of HB 1020 display such a pattern. However, the Supreme Court also recognized
such “stark” cases are “rare,” and where “impact alone is not determinative,” id., “Arlington
Heights adopted a two-stage process,” Harness, 47 F.4th at 304. Thus, a plaintiff may also prove
discrimination under a burden-shifting framework. To do so, they must “prove by an evidentiary
preponderance that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in enacting the
challenged provision.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985)). If this
showing is successful, “the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the provision would
have been enacted without an impermissible purpose.” Id. (quoting Underwood, 471 U.S. at
- 16 -
228). Under either a “clear pattern” or discriminatory intent theory, “[i]f the government is
found to have acted with a discriminatory purpose, strict scrutiny review places the burden on the
government to prove that its actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.” Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2011).
When evaluating discriminatory intent, the Arlington Heights framework requires a
“sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. A discriminatory intent claim “need not be proved by direct
evidence.” Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982). Rather, “courts may consider both
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 235
(citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). The “true purpose” behind a challenged scheme
may be “cleverly cloaked in the guise of propriety,” and “[t]he existence of a right to redress
does not turn on the degree of subtlety with which a discriminatory plan is effectuated.” Lodge
v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1363 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Rogers, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); see
also Veasey, 830 F.3d at 235-36 (“[W]e rarely have legislators announcing an intent to
discriminate based on race.”).
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court established a non-exclusive list of evidentiary
factors to evaluate legislative intent. This analysis begins assessing with whether “[t]he impact
of the official action [] bears more heavily on one race than another,” which “may provide an
important starting point.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Where a law “continues to have a disparate racial impact,” factors pertinent to
determine discriminatory intent include “(1) the historical background of the decision, (2) the
specific sequence of events leading up to the decision, (3) departures from the normal procedural
sequence, (4) substantive departures, and (5) legislative history, especially where there are
- 17 -
contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body.” Overton v. City of Austin,
871 F.2d 529, 540 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267–68); see also
Harness, 47 F.4th at 308 (“Under Arlington Heights, the indicia to evaluate lawmakers’
discriminatory purpose are found in circumstantial evidence such as legislative history,
legislators’ public comments, a ‘clear pattern’ of otherwise inexplicable racial impacts, and a
‘series’ of invidious actions.”); Veasey, 830 F.3d at 231. A plaintiff need not prove
discrimination was the sole or primary purpose of legislation to demonstrate its invalidity.
Instead, “racial discrimination need only be one purpose, and not even a primary purpose, of an
official action for a violation to occur.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 230 (quoting United States v.
Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 433 (5th Cir. 2009)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
2. The Arlington Heights Factors Demonstrate that HB 1020 Has a

Discriminatory Purpose Forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
a. HB 1020 Has a Substantial Discriminatory Impact.
The “starting point” of the Arlington Heights analysis is “whether the challenged action
bears more heavily on one race than another.” Rollerson v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation
Dist. of Brazoria Cnty. Texas, 6 F.4th 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266) (internal quotation marks omitted). Census data establish that HB 1020’s targeting
of the majority-Black City of Jackson and Hinds County 17 has a substantial disparate impact.
The impact of HB 1020’s expanded borders for the CCID further gives rise to an
inference of discriminatory intent. In fact, the revision of the CCID boundaries is so “stark” as
17
Although Section 1 of HB 1020, which established four additional circuit judges for Hinds
County to be appointed by the Chief Justice and not elected as the Mississippi Constitution
requires, was invalidated on state-law grounds, see Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416, at *11, the
inclusion of this provision in the original text of HB 1020 and the foreseeable effects it would
have remain evidence of the discriminatory intent of the legislation.
- 18 -
to give rise to an inference that this is one of those “rare” cases where “a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when
the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
The boundaries of the expanded district surgically capture the predominantly White areas
of Jackson such that an intent to do so becomes all but self-evident. Moreover, the State has
proffered no rationale for how it chose to include or exclude areas for the expanded CCID, 18 and
the new areas do not advance the CCID’s original goal of capturing predominantly state-owned
land within Jackson. The CCID’s primary expansion northward captured almost exclusively
predominantly White areas but stopped before reaching predominantly Black areas of Jackson.
Its western border, which already abutted or began to capture majority-Black areas, remained
mostly unchanged in the expansion. In short, HB 1020’s selective expansion of the CCID
creates a new White-majority enclave within the Black-majority City of Jackson, demonstrating
the legislature’s intent to carve out a subset of the populace along racial lines. It creates a new
majority-White enclave no longer under the local control of the majority-Black City of Jackson.
That HB 1020 cuts a boundary so brazenly between where majority-White and Black residents
reside presents clear evidence that race was a factor in this legislation. Even if the Court
concludes this pattern is not enough to give rise to an inference of impermissible intent on its
own, it certainly weighs heavily when evaluating the totality of the circumstances for evidence of
18
Despite testimony during legislative hearings about the need to revise the CCID’s borders, the
State provided no rationale for why specific geographies were included while others were
excluded. See, e.g., Capitol Police Chief Bo Lucky, Judiciary B – Room 113, 10 October 2022;
9:00 AM, House Judiciary B Committee, Oct. 10, 2022, YouTube at 1:13:00,
https://youtu.be/qc6fTrAwW4E?t=4394 (calling existing lines irregular and muddled); Rep. Trey
Lamar, MS House Floor - 7 February 2023; 10:00 AM; YouTube at 8:30:11,
https://youtu.be/HtruSFI0avs?t=30611 (indicating the changes came at the request of law
enforcement).
- 19 -
intent. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (“reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter,” and “[i]n some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so
highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to segregate voters on the basis of race.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
b. Historical Background of the Decision
Since emancipation, Black Mississippians have faced a gauntlet of measures by state and
local leaders to undermine their political power, ranging from violent attacks to facially neutral
laws designed to dilute Black voting strength. See Section I.C., supra. Hinds County and
Jackson, both centers of Black political power in the state, have repeatedly borne the brunt of
such resistance. HB 1020 continues the long history in Mississippi of state resistance to Black
Mississippians exercising increasing levels of control over their elected and locally appointed
representatives. By creating a functionally equivalent municipal court in Jackson with a state-
appointed judge and state appointed prosecutors, HB 1020 deprives elected city officials of the
ability to appoint a judge and prosecutors accountable to the people they serve. Just like many
past efforts to undermine Black political power, HB 1020 singles out the majority-Black City of
Jackson for loss of local control of its judicial system and ability to self-govern and enforce its
own municipal laws.
c. Substantive Departures
Implementing HB 1020 will result in numerous substantive departures that further give
rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. The provision for creating appointed circuit
judgeships was contrary to the express guarantees of the Mississippi Constitution. See Saunders,
2023 WL 6154416, at *11. The appointment of CCID officials with the powers of municipal
- 20 -
judges and prosecutors by statewide rather than municipal officials departs from the procedures
used everywhere else in Mississippi. See Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-3.
Creating a new court system as a response to concerns over public safety is a significant
departure from other solutions typically employed—namely funding, staffing, and improving
existing systems. 19 And moreover a significant departure from what the City of Jackson and its
law enforcement officers specifically requested—again, funding, staffing, and improving
existing systems—which members of the legislature themselves acknowledged were priorities. 20
d. Procedural Departures & Legislative History
During the adoption of HB 1020, its proponents departed procedurally from standard
legislative processes, further evincing discriminatory intent under Arlington Heights. 429 U.S. at
267. Although, pursuant to the Mississippi Constitution and House Rules the normal, if not
19
The Mississippi Office of Forensics Laboratories, for example, has approximately “15,000
backlogged cases for analysis” that “may continue to increase without preventative and
corrective measures,” and that office’s “ability to continue operations and provide quality
services [] depends on availability of funding . . . needed to . . . recruit new talent, maintain
current talent, continue scientist training, and replace equipment.” Mississippi Department of
Public Safety Strategic Plan 2024-2028 at 10, https://perma.cc/PL3Y-Y7U4.
20
See, e.g., Judiciary B - Room 113, 10 October 2022; 9:00 AM, YouTube at 3:05:49,
https://youtu.be/qc6fTrAwW4E?t=11149 (more money needed and was requested to address
backlog); Judiciary B - Room 113, 21 November 2022; 9:00 AM, YouTube at 4:27 – 1:00:48,
https://youtu.be/mrBKZY8Be Y?t=267 (Jackson Mayor, police chief, and others asking for
more money to: address backlog; improve crime lab with ballistic technology; secure a new
holding facility and command center; hire new officers; install more cameras; fund JPD; add
more municipal court judges, prosecutors, and public defenders; repairs; and additional staffing);
Hinds County District Attorney Jody Owens, Judiciary B – Room 113, 10 October 2022; 9:00
AM, YouTube at 1:19:30, https://youtu.be/qc6fTrAwW4E?t=4770 (temporary funding in July
2022 allowing office to hire six extra ADAs “for a limited period of time” was a “game
changer”); Sen. Brice Wiggins, Judiciary A - Room 216, 23 February 2023; 3:00 P.M., YouTube
at 26:42, https://youtu.be/vj6QKjsksB8?t=1602 (spoke with DA Owens; data indicate that
assistance from State to address caseloads, criminal in particular, is working); but see MS Senate
Floor - 7 March 2023; 10:00 AM, YouTube at 2:20:32, https://youtu.be/4J 8j RMMJY?t=8430
(no effort to look into adding funds to synchronize 9-1-1 system in Jackson).
- 21 -
required, destinations for a bill affecting only a local judiciary is the House standing committee
on Local and Private Legislation and the House Judiciary committee, Bill sponsor Representative
Lamar directed the bill to the committee he chaired: the House Ways and Means Committee. 21
Rep. Lamar weaved this unusual path for the bill by pre-loading it with 1,000 extraneous pages
that he later removed with his own amendment. 22 In essence, he constructed the bill to allow
him to navigate it through a legislative process tailored to avoid scrutiny by the committees
normally designated to review such judicial legislation. Rep. Lamar’s departure from normal
procedure is even more suspect because nothing under House Rule 49 prevented this local bill
from being heard in more than one committee.
Black legislators were excluded from normal legislative procedures, and their criticisms
were all but ignored. The only Black member of the conference committee, and the only
member of that committee from Jackson, was Representative Earle Banks of Hinds County.
Rep. Banks was excluded from conference committee meetings in which revised versions of HB
1020 were prepared and is reported to have indicated that the committee never met with him on
HB 1020. 23 Finally, he received the final committee report for review only moments prior to the
21
Miss. Const. art. IV, § 89. (“No local or private bill shall be passed by either House until it
shall have been referred to” the “standing committee on local and private legislation”);
Mississippi House Rule 48 requires that “Bills . . . addressed to the House shall, upon
introduction, be referred by the Speaker to the committee having jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and shall be considered by the House only after having been reported by such
committee.” Rules of the House of Representatives, http://www.legislature.ms.gov/general-
information.
22
Rep. Trey Lamar, MS House Floor - 7 February 2023; 10:00 AM; YouTube at 6:22:41,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HtruSFI0avs&t=22960s.
23
Courtney Ann Jackson, House Bill 1020 conference report filed but recommitted for more
work, WLBT, (Mar. 28, 2023, 9:07 PM), https://perma.cc/F6LM-GJGV.
- 22 -
final committee meeting, and ultimately did not sign the final conference committee report on
HB 1020, the only committee member not to do so. 24
Despite the proffered purpose of HB 1020 to address the criminal docket backlog,
Senator Wiggins, who spoke extensively on the Senate floor in favor of the bill, never spoke with
the elected Hinds County circuit court judges, the very judges tasked with handling that docket.
In fact, he did not even know if anyone else in the Senate had done so. 25 Bill sponsor Rep.
Lamar was questioned repeatedly throughout legislative debates about why he had not reached
out to local officials before introducing HB 1020. Rep. Christopher Bell, who is Black, asked
why the Hinds County delegation was not consulted. Rep. Lamar responded that he would not
“name names,” but that he spoke to “several people who reside inside Hinds County.” 26 Rep.
Bell replied pointedly, “Do they look like me?” Amid laughter from the chamber, and his own
nervous laughter, Rep. Lamar deflected: “All God’s children are unique. . . . We all are God’s
children.” 27 Throughout the legislative session Rep. Lamar continued to evade similar questions
24
Michael Wines, Revised plan for justice system in Mississippi capital leaves same bitter
divide, The New York Times (April 10, 2023), www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/us/jackson-
mississippi-crime-police.html (reporting that Rep. Banks said that he was excluded from
committee meetings where the final versions of the bills were prepared, and that he was not
provided with proposed changes until minutes before the vote was to be held; refusing to sign the
conference report, Rep. Banks is reported to have said, “They decided what they were going to
do, and I was one vote out of six. . . . They really did not need me.”); Conference Report # 2,
House Bill 1020, http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2023/pdf/cr/HB1020CR 2.pdf (no
signature from Rep. Banks).
25
Sen. Brice Wiggins, MS Senate Floor – 7 March 2023; 10:00 AM; YouTube at 2:15:40 (Mar.
7, 2023), https://youtu.be/4J_8j_RMMJY?t=8140.
26
Rep. Christopher Bell and Rep. Trey Lamar, MS House Floor - 7 February 2023; 10:00 AM;
YouTube at 8:02:46 (Feb. 7, 2023), https://youtu.be/HtruSFI0avs?t=28966.
27
Id. at 8:03:12, https://youtu.be/HtruSFI0avs?t=28995s.
- 23 -
about whether bill sponsors reached out to the Jackson legislative delegation and other Black
local leadership regarding HB 1020’s changes. 28
During the legislative process, lawmakers also launched criticisms of Jackson’s
predominately Black local officials and residents. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268. An early
version of HB 1020 required the state Department of Public Safety and the City of Jackson to
enter a Memorandum of Understanding “detailing the expectations of both parties,” and if that
memorandum was not executed, the law provided that “any dispute related to the law
enforcement functions of the Office of Capitol Police within the boundaries of the City of
Jackson, Mississippi, shall be resolved in favor of the Commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety.” 29 During a committee meeting on HB 1020 in response to a question asking why
disputes would automatically be in the favor of the Capitol Police, particularly if it were the State
refusing execute the memorandum, Senator Wiggins, a proponent of HB 1020 and chair of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary A, turned to criticism of Jackson’s mayor, saying that “in the
law enforcement space, if you go back and you look at where things happen, at certain points
there tends to be a question of who’s in charge . . . somebody needed to be in charge, because
you have problems when that doesn’t happen. It is well-documented in the media and it’s well-
documented in the court system that there’s been issues with the City of Jackson and particularly
28
Id. at 8:42:33, https://youtu.be/HtruSFI0avs?t=31351 (responding to Rep. Ronnie Crudup’s
question whether “it would have been proper to get with the Jackson delegation and bring us to a
room and see what’s the best way to handle this,” Rep. Lamar said, “If you’re asking if I’ve
spoken with people of Hinds County, and Jackson [], the CCID, then the answer is yes, I have,”
but the allegation that the “whole Jackson delegation . . . and I say ‘delegation’ I don’t mean just
limited to people in this room are against the bill [is] not factual, either, because I’ve heard from
many people that are associated with Jackson, Jackson leadership, and just citizens of Jackson
that are in favor of this.”).
29
Committee Amendment No. 1, House Bill 1020,
http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2023/pdf/sam/HB1020_S_Cmte_Amend_01.pdf.
- 24 -
the Mayor entering into contracts, and so that language [in the bill] is to provide for the safety of
the citizens of Jackson so that they are no longer caught . . . between disputes between the City
of Jackson and I would say the mayor and Capitol Police.” 30 As another example, bill sponsor
Rep. Lamar suggested among other things during the House floor debate that the “best and
brightest” judges were not to be found in Hinds County. 31
e. Totality of the Circumstances & Lack of Nondiscriminatory

Explanation
In addition to the foregoing evidence, Arlington Heights makes clear that its list of
relevant factors is not exhaustive. See 429 U.S. at 268. Here, such additional factors would
include an automatic sunset provision such that no official other than the current Chief Justice,
who is not a resident of Hinds County, would appoint a CCID judge. Similarly, because the
current Attorney General’s next term also runs past the expiration of the CCID court provisions,
she will be the only individual to appoint CCID prosecuting attorneys. Moreover, she will be
able to appoint municipal-equivalent prosecutors in a jurisdiction where she was disfavored four-
to-one by voters in the municipality. See HB 1020 §§ 4(5) & 5(2) (“This section shall stand
repealed on July 1, 2027.”).
The totality of the circumstances demonstrate that race was a substantial or motivating
factor in enacting HB 1020. This thus turns the burden to the State to demonstrate that HB 1020
would have been enacted without an impermissible purpose. Harness, 47 F.4th at 304 (“Hunter
step two”). The State cannot satisfy this burden. There is no nondiscriminatory explanation for
straying from the State’s normal procedures that circuit court judges are elected by voters in their
30
Sen. Brice Wiggins, Judiciary A - Room 216, 23 Feb 2023; 3:00 P.M.; YouTube at 56:56
(Feb. 23, 2023), https://youtu.be/vj6QKjsksB8?t=3395.
31
Rep. Trey Lamar, MS House Floor – 7 February 2023; 10:00 AM; YouTube at 6:46:47 (Feb.
7, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/live/HtruSFI0avs?feature=share&t=24394.
- 25 -
district, and municipal-equivalent judges and prosecutors are appointed by local officials. As
explained above, the rationale of addressing crime may explain the creation of additional judicial
or prosecutorial resources, but not the decision to sidestep the otherwise standard statewide
practice that these officials are elected or appointed by individuals in the jurisdictions they serve
and must be from the jurisdictions they serve. See supra, Part I.A.2. Defendants thus cannot
show that the law would have passed absent a discriminatory purpose.
Taken as a whole, the Arlington Heights factors lead to an inference that HB 1020 was
enacted with a discriminatory purpose, motivated at least in part by race. As such, HB 1020 is
subject to strict scrutiny.
3. HB 1020 Fails Strict Scrutiny.
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State bears the burden to prove that HB 1020 is “narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.” Lewis, 662 F.3d at 348. Stripping local
control over the local court system in the largest majority-Black municipality in the State is not
narrowly tailored to any proffered government interest.
Even assuming for purposes of this Statement of Interest that Defendants have articulated
a compelling interest, 32 HB 1020’s CCID court provisions are not narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. HB 1020’s CCID court provisions make no substantive change, either subtraction
or addition, to the powers of the CCID court compared with the existing municipal courts to
detect, prosecute, or punish crime. See HB 1020 §§ 4(1), 5(1). Instead, it creates a duplicative
court that will likely be plagued by the same infrastructure and resource deficiencies impacting
32
Although the bill’s proponents have generally cited crime rates in Jackson as a rationale for the
legislation, the United States is not aware of any evidence put forth regarding crime rates within
the expanded CCID as compared with the rest of Jackson.
- 26 -
existing municipal courts, such as the lack of a holding facility where individuals who are
arrested can be booked, the lack of modern technology, and the lack of attorney and other staff
resources needed to process evidence and prepare cases to be tried. See, e.g., examples cited in
Section I.A.2.c., supra. Moreover, to the extent the CCID court provides an additional resource,
it did not require removing local control. Such a usurpation is not narrowly tailored to a
compelling interest as the Equal Protection Clause demands. Thus, Plaintiffs are likely to
succeed on the merits.
B. In the Alternative, HB 1020 Impermissibly Discriminates Against Jacksonians in

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Where a law differentiates between classes of persons not based on an inherently suspect
characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the classification rationally further a
legitimate state interest. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). Indeed, “most laws
differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons,” and “[t]he Equal Protection Clause
does not forbid classification. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating
differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Id. (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). However, “the classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”
F.S. Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415; see also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966)
(“Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require
that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is
made.”).
In addition to being racially motivated, as described above, HB 1020 singles out only the
people of the City of Jackson for loss of control over their judicial system. No other residents of
- 27 -
any other municipality are targeted in this way. This discrimination against those residing only
in the City of Jackson creates a functional classification between Jacksonians and other
Mississippians and therefore it must “rationally further a legitimate state interest.” Nordlinger,
505 U.S. at 10. This requires “a plausible policy reason for the classification” and that “the
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been
considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” Id. at 11. Importantly here, it also
requires a rational connection between the State’s purported ends and the means used to achieve
it; “The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). Accordingly, Mississippi’s reallocation of appointment
power away from local elected officials to statewide officeholders in Jackson alone, while
retaining local control in all other Mississippi municipalities, “cannot survive constitutional
scrutiny unless there is a rational basis for distinguishing between [Jacksonians] and [residents]
in every other [Mississippi] municipality.” City of Greensboro v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of
Elections, 120 F. Supp. 3d 479, 487 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
The classification HB 1020 draws between Jacksonians and all other municipal residents
in Mississippi, depriving the former of local control over the municipal judge system by having
the Chief Justice and Attorney General appoint the CCID court officials in Jackson while
maintaining local control everywhere else, is “so attenuated” from any legitimate rationale “as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
HB 1020 singles out Jackson residents from their counterparts everywhere else in
Mississippi. The CCID court and its officials are in all but name a municipal court, judge, and
prosecutors. The statutory definitions of the CCID judge’s substantive jurisdiction as well as the
- 28 -
powers and duties of the CCID judge and prosecuting attorneys are explicitly delineated to match
those of municipal judges and prosecutors. 33 If the law’s new titles for existing roles are put
aside, it becomes clear HB 1020 simply added a municipal judge and prosecutors to Jackson,
only with a more limited geographic jurisdiction than their preexisting counterparts.
Except for the CCID subdistrict of Jackson, which appears to function as a “city within
the city” 34 with a population of almost 26,500, in every municipality in the state with a
population over 10,000, such judges and prosecutors are “appointed by the governing authorities
of the municipality at the time provided for the appointment of other officers.” Miss. Code Ann.
§ 21-23-3. HB 1020’s automatic repeal provisions in advance of the next election for the sitting
Chief Justice’s seat and for the Attorney General ensures that, absent early departure from their
roles, these will be the sole individuals empowered to appoint the municipal CCID judge and
prosecuting attorneys.
33
See HB 1020 §§ 4(1), 5 (explicitly defining roles of CCID judge and CCID prosecuting
attorneys by reference to municipal judge and prosecutors); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-
7(1) (defining jurisdiction of municipal judge). The CCID judge’s substantive jurisdiction is
defined to include “all preliminary matters and criminal matters authorized by law for municipal
courts” and “the same jurisdiction as municipal courts to hear and determine all cases charging
violations of the motor vehicle and traffic laws of this state, and violations of the City of
Jackson’s traffic ordinance or ordinances related to the disturbance of the public peace” that
occur within the CCID. HB 1020 § 4(1)(a) (emphasis added). The qualifications and
compensation for CCID judges are likewise tied to those for Jackson’s municipal court. Id.
§ 4(2)-(3). And the CCID prosecuting attorneys also must “prosecute cases . . . in the same
manner and with the same authority of law provided for district attorneys and county prosecuting
attorneys.” HB 1020 § 5(1).
34
Rep. Robert L. Johnson III, MS House Floor – 7 February 2023; 10:00 AM, YouTube at
7:01:42 (Feb. 7, 2023), https://youtu.be/HtruSFI0avs?t=25302 (imploring the legislature not to
create a “city within a city,” as that is “not what the idea was behind the Capitol Complex”).
- 29 -
Mississippi law makes municipal judges of paramount importance to the overall system
of local government, because “without a municipal judge, a town cannot enforce its municipal
ordinances.” Op. Atty. Gen. Hatcher, 1999 WL 1075209 (Miss. A.G. Sept. 24, 1999).
Even assuming for purposes of this Statement of Interest that Defendants have articulated
a legitimate state interest, HB 1020’s CCID court provisions are not a rational means to advance
that interest. As discussed above, HB 1020 makes no substantive changes, instead, it only
creates a duplicative court for a subset of Jacksonians that will likely be plagued by the same
infrastructure and resource deficiencies impacting existing municipal courts. See, Section I.A.3.,
supra; see also, e.g., examples cited in Section I.A.2.c., supra. To the extent the CCID court
provides an additional resource, it did not require singling out the people of Jackson and
removing from them local control. Such an action is not rationally connected with the interest
served by the legislation that deprives Jackson, and Jackson alone, the full local control over
municipal courts that all other municipalities in Mississippi enjoy.
The relationship between the “asserted goal” of crime reduction and the means of
singling out Jackson to lose local control over municipal court positions “is so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. The decision in
City of Greensboro is instructive. As here, the North Carolina Legislature “withdr[ew] from the
City of Greensboro and its voters certain statutory rights available to all other municipalities and
municipal voters statewide.” City of Greensboro, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 483. In that instance it was
the right of a city council to change its structure, and the right of voters to initiate or reject a
restructuring through referendum. Id. Because the legislation itself and state officials did not
offer any “interest that is protected or promoted by excluding Greensboro and its voters from
rights given to other municipal voters,” id. at 488, the “unequal treatment of Greensboro voters
- 30 -
likely violate[d] their equal protection rights,” id. at 489. Moreover, like HB 1020, the
restrictions on Greensboro residents were “part and parcel of a larger statutory scheme that treats
Greensboro voters differently.” Id. at 488.
Ultimately, the State cannot draw the classification it has drawn between Jacksonians and
residents of other Mississippi municipalities with respect to local control over municipal-
equivalent courts. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
III. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent a Preliminary Injunction.
Plaintiffs have shown the “substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not
issued” required for a preliminary injunction. Jones, 880 F.3d at 759. Defendants’ removal of
Jacksonians’ local control over the municipal courts that govern them strikes at that heart of
democratic accountability and voters’ ability to influence local appointments by electing the
officials who appoint them. “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). Restrictions on the
fundamental right to vote are “routinely” found to constitute irreparable injury, and
“discriminatory voting procedures in particular are the kind of serious violation of the
Constitution . . . for which courts have granted immediate relief.” League of Women Voters of N.
Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (enjoining elimination of same-
day registration and counting wrong-precinct votes under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act)
(quoting United States v. City of Cambridge, 799 F.2d 137, 140 (4th Cir.1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Murphree v. Winter, 589 F. Supp. 374, 381 (S.D. Miss. 1984)
(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373–74 (1976)) (“[T]he deprivation of a fundamental right
constitutes irreparable harm requiring the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”).

- 31 -
It is no answer, as Defendants may suggest, that municipal judges are not directly elected.
Mississippi law establishes an intimate connection between municipal courts and the local
community, one key aspect of which is that judges and prosecutors “shall be appointed by the
governing authorities of the municipality.” Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-3; see also id. (generally
requiring municipal judges to be a “qualified elector” in the county where the municipality is
located). Moreover, local officials maintain the ongoing ability to oversee and remove municipal
judges, who are at-will employees. See Jones v. City of Hattiesburg, 228 So. 3d 816, 819 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2017). Municipal judges are thus accountable to local voters through local elected
officials, and the State’s creation of a municipal-equivalent court to have judges and prosecutors
play explicitly the same role, but severing local control over these officials, thus burdens the
rights of local voters.
This imposition of direct state intervention into the municipal justice system cannot later
be recompensed; every day that Jacksonians live with this arrangement constitutes a discrete,
irreparable denial of equal protection. Plaintiffs have accordingly demonstrated they will suffer
irreparable harm absent an injunction.
IV. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Support a Preliminary
Injunction.
The balance of equities and public interest also weigh in favor of a preliminary
injunction. “[E]nforcement of an unconstitutional law is always contrary to the public interest.”
Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Colmenero, No. 1:23-cv-917, 2023 WL 5655712, at *29 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 31, 2023), appeal filed, No. 23-50637 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d
638, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (alteration in original omitted); see also Ingebretsen ex rel.
Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he public interest
- 32 -
[is] not disserved by an injunction preventing [the] implementation” of an unconstitutional
statute.); Texas, 566 F. Supp. 3d at 690.
In addition, allowing the provisions of HB 1020 to proceed prior to a full hearing on the
merits of the claims here has the potential to create substantial confusion in Jackson’s municipal
justice system. Individuals subject to prosecution or preliminary matters in a court that is later
declared unconstitutional could raise complicated issues that would not be present if Jackson’s
existing municipal courts were allowed to proceed unchanged. The existing municipal judges
and prosecutors appointed by local leaders will continue to have jurisdiction both within and
outside the CCID, as they would have with HB 1020 in effect. Furthermore, an injunction would
not prevent the Mississippi legislature from enacting other measures intended to combat crime
that are consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, or from adding additional resources to the
existing circuit and municipal courts in Hinds County and Jackson, provided they do not
unconstitutionally burden the rights of voters in those jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court grant
Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction.
- 33 -
Dated: December 5, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
TODD W. GEE KRISTEN CLARKE

United States Attorney Assistant Attorney General
Southern District of Mississippi Civil Rights Division
/s/ Angela Givens Williams /s/ Victor J. Williamson

ANGELA GIVENS WILLIAMS (#102469) T. CHRISTIAN HERREN, JR. (AL 6671R63T)
MITZI DEASE PAIGE (#6014) JOHN A. RUSS IV (CA 192471)
Assistant U.S. Attorneys VICTOR J. WILLIAMSON (DC 495783)
501 E. Court St. J. ERIC RICH (MD 0012130218)
Suite 4.430 KAITLIN TOYAMA (CA 318993)
Jackson, MS 39201 JOHN POWERS (DC 1024831)
Phone: (601) 965-4480 ROBERT WEINER (DC 298133)
Angela.Williams3@usdoj.gov Attorneys
Mitzi.Paige@usdoj.gov Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave NW – 4CON
Washington, D.C. 20530
Phone: (800) 253-3931
chris.herren@usdoj.gov
john.russ@usdoj.gov
j.rich@usdoj.gov
victor.williamson@usdoj.gov
kaitlin.toyama@usdoj.gov
john.powers@usdoj.gov
robert.weiner@usdoj.gov
- 34 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 5, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
clerk of the court using the Court’s ECF system, which will send notification of this filing to
counsel of record.
/s/ Victor J. Williamson

VICTOR J. WILLIAMSON
Attorney, Voting Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
- 35 -
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE

ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS
VS. CASE NO. 3:23-cv-00272-HTW-LGI
TATE REEVES, in his official capacity

As Governor of the State of Mississippi, ET AL. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF STATE DEFENDANTS’

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION RE H.B. 1020 § 4 AND § 5 [DKT. #110]
INTRODUCTION
This Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction [Dkt. #110], which
seeks to halt State officials from implementing important provisions of state law authorizing the
establishment of a criminal court to enhance public safety by complementing the expansion of the
Capitol Police force. Plaintiffs contend that the Legislature’s establishment of a municipal court
to serve the Capitol Complex Improvement District (“CCID Court”) violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and seek immediate relief on that
basis. Plaintiffs’ request fails for multiple reasons: (1) they lack standing to obtain the
extraordinary relief that they demand; (2) their claim fails on the merits; and (3) they flunk all
remaining preliminary injunction requirements. Granting them relief would cause irreparable
harm to the people of Mississippi by exacerbating the very public-safety and criminal-justice
emergencies that the challenged law seeks to address.
To start, Plaintiffs have no basis to seek relief—especially extraordinary injunctive relief—
against the CCID Court provisions because they have failed to establish that the law will ever harm
1
them. None of the individual plaintiffs has shown that he or she is or will be a defendant processed
or prosecuted in any proceeding to be conducted in the CCID Court. Nor have the NAACP
plaintiffs shown that they or their members will suffer any actual injury from the CCID Court.
Plaintiffs claim that establishing the CCID Court is unlawful, but that does not establish their
standing. They have done nothing to show that the CCID Court will harm them or affect them in
any way that is different from how the law “affects” any other member of the public. This failure
to establish standing dooms Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, and their CCID Court
claims should be dismissed on that basis.
Next, even if Plaintiffs could show standing for injunctive relief, they cannot be granted a
preliminary injunction because their equal-protection claim fails on the merits. The challenged
CCID Court provisions are race-neutral on their face and rationally advance legitimate purposes.
The law is therefore constitutional unless Plaintiffs show that it was driven by a discriminatory
purpose and has a discriminatory effect. They have not made and cannot make either showing.
The Legislature established the CCID Court to address Jackson’s clearly-recognized, ongoing
public-safety and criminal-justice emergencies. Those emergencies gravely affect not just those
living in Jackson, but all Mississippians: the many Mississippians who work in and visit Jackson;
the many Mississippians affected by public-safety and criminal-justice problems that cannot be
confined to Jackson; and every Mississippian who is entitled to a functioning capital city or is
concerned for the future of their capital. Plaintiffs disregard these realities and rely instead on
tired talking points claiming that the challenged law was improperly motivated by race—despite
widespread acknowledgement of Jackson’s glaring crime problem and the need for decisive action.
Plaintiffs’ claims are irreconcilable with the grim reality that so many Jacksonians and non-
Jacksonians alike must constantly confront the consequences of Jackson’s ongoing crime problem,
2
“dysfunctional city government,” Dkt. #45 at 10, and perpetual inability to sustain basic city and
human services—problems that affect all Mississippians, regardless of race. The Legislature acted
to address those problems, without regard to race. The CCID Court provisions satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ motion flunks all of the remaining preliminary injunction factors. For
reasons already explained, Plaintiffs cannot show that they stand to suffer any imminent injury as
a result of the challenged CCID Court provisions. The challenged law does not affect any plaintiff
in any personal way. Plaintiffs’ vague notions of constitutional injury are substantially outweighed
by the public interest in enhancing public safety and supporting the criminal-justice system in
Jackson—interests that Plaintiffs ignore. As this Court has recognized, “Jackson has a crime
cancer”—a “crime problem [that] is sweltering, undisputed and suffocating”—and “[t]he criminal
justice system in Hinds Count is in crisis.” Dkt. #45 at 9-10, 21. But on the equitable factors,
Plaintiffs do little more than repeat their claim of an equal-protection violation. That cannot carry
their burden on the distinct factors of irreparable harm, the equities, and the public interest. Those
are separate requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, and Plaintiffs have not satisfied them.
The defendants respectfully submit that the Court should rule promptly. The State is
entitled to resolution of these issues that have now been mired in this baseless litigation for months.
The law at hand is tremendously important—to the State, to Jackson, and to the many thousands
of citizens affected by crime in the State Capital. Each day of delayed resolution is a grave threat
to public safety. If the Court does anything but summarily deny Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction, it should issue a reasoned opinion to facilitate appellate review.
3
For these reasons and those set forth herein, Plaintiffs fail to make the requisite showing
for a preliminary injunction. Their motion should be denied, and their CCID Court claims should
be dismissed for lack of standing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Factual Background. On April 21, 2023, H.B. 1020 was signed into law. Dkt. #34-1 at
2193-2226. H.B. 1020 “is aimed directly at the City of Jackson’s ‘crime cancer.’” Saunders v.
State, No. 2023-CA-00584-SCT, 2023 WL 6154416, at *4 (Miss. Sept. 21, 2023) (quoting this
Court’s Order herein, Dkt. #45 at 10).
Among other things, the challenged law requires the establishment of one inferior criminal
court to serve the CCID. 2023 H.B. 1020, § 4(1)(a). The CCID Court shall function as a municipal
court, having the same jurisdiction as municipal courts to hear and determine criminal matters
accruing within the CCID. Id. The law provides that any person convicted in the CCID Court
“may” be placed in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ Central Mississippi
facility. Id. § 4(1)(b). It requires the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court to appoint to
the CCID Court a judge having all qualifications required by law for municipal court judges, and
it requires the Administrative Office of Courts to provide compensation for the judge and support
staff. Id. § 4(3). The law further requires the Attorney General to designate two attorneys to serve
as prosecuting attorneys for the CCID court. Id. § 5(1). Additionally, the law authorizes the Hinds
County District Attorney to prosecute cases in the CCID court. Id. § 5(2). And it expressly
provides that the Hinds County District Attorney shall not be prohibited from filing criminal
indictments or actions in other appropriate courts for matters that accrued within the boundaries of
the CCID. See id. Finally, the law provides that all of the above-mentioned provisions shall take
effect January 1, 2024, and “shall stand repealed on July 1, 2027.” Id. §§ 4(1)(a), 4(5), 5(3).
4
The events of 2020 brought to the capital city a new emergency concomitant with the
COVID-19 pandemic—namely, an unprecedented surge in crime. As this Court has recognized,
“[i]n 2020, Jackson reported 130 homicides—a record number at that time. In 2021, Jackson
surpassed that record with at least 155 reported homicides—‘the highest per capita murder rate in
the nation . . . . [h]igher than Birmingham, Atlanta, Detroit, and even Chicago.’ [Citations
omitted.] In 2022, even with a 14% decline in homicides, Jackson reported 138 homicides that
year, and Jackson’s ‘homicide rate still managed to surpass every other major city in the U.S. for
the second straight year.’” Dkt. #45 at 9. As this Court has further noted, “[h]omicides may be
the headline grabber, but Jackson’s other violent crime categories battle for equal condemnation:
Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Sexual Assault, and Burglary rates continue to be among the
highest nationwide, per capita.” Id. In the words of this Court, “Jackson has a crime cancer”—a
“crime problem [that] is sweltering, undisputed and suffocating.” Id. at 9-10. 1
The city’s escalating crime rate is attributable in part to Jackson’s failure to provide an
adequately staffed police force. As this Court has recognized, Jackson’s “police presence is crying
for reinforcement.” Dkt. #45 at 9. Estimates have placed the necessary number of police officers
for Jackson at approximately 600. See Dkt. #34-4 at 15-16. But “Jackson now has a police force
of approximately 258 sworn officers.” Dkt. #45 at 9. It is no surprise that “one of the factors
leading to the surge of crime in Jackson is a shortage of officers from dispatcher to sworn officers.”
See Dkt. #34-4 at 7. See also id. at 19, 76. 2
1
Jackson’s ongoing crime epidemic has been widely reported. The following sampling of additional reports
is illustrative: Dkt. #34-4 at 3, 10, 20, 29-30, 31-33, 34-38, 39-40, 41-44, 45-46, 47-65, 67, 86-88.
2
As this Court stated in United States of America v. City of Jackson: “Jackson is better than that. The
majority of its citizens have remained loyal to this metropolis, convinced that they will solve the crime
problem which has placed Jackson number one in homicides per capita in 2021 and 2022; the fastest
shrinking city in the United States as described in the latest United States Census Bureau data[ ], because of
white and black flight premised on fears generated by a perceived lack of police protection; a declining tax
5
Against this backdrop of escalating crime and a good-faith effort by stakeholders to seek
solutions, H.B. 1020 was introduced in the House at the outset of the 2023 Legislative Session.
See Dkt. #34-1 at 1. Originally a revenue bill assigned to the House Ways and Means Committee,
H.B. 1020, as initially approved by the House, provided for two new inferior courts within the
CCID, each to be staffed by a judge to be appointed by the Chief Justice. Dkt. #34-1 at 6. A
competing version of the bill approved by the Senate provided for temporary special judges
through 2026 with a new elected, permanent circuit judge to take office in 2027. See Dkt. #34-1
at 2299-2309. See also Video 5. 3 Over nearly four months from January to April 2023, the
Legislature reviewed, negotiated, amended, and debated H.B. 1020. See Dkt. #34-1 at 1-2. See
also Videos 1-8. As the submitted videos of the hours-long floor debates confirm, the debate was
robust and exhaustive. H.B. 1020 passed in the House by a vote of 76-38 and in the Senate by a
vote of 34-15. Dkt. #34-1 at 2227-2228.
H.B. 1020’s CCID Court provisions are consistent with a multifaceted effort by the
Legislature to address Jackson’s undeniable crime problem. To complement the expanded role of
the Capitol Police in protecting Jackson’s State Capitol Complex, central business district, medical
corridor, and surrounding areas, the Legislature deemed it appropriate to establish an additional
municipal court specifically tasked with serving the CCID. To that end, § 4 of challenged law
“creates an inferior court for the CCID, which shall have the same jurisdiction as municipal
courts,” Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at *4.
base; and a challenging water/sewage system, which for decades, has frustrated Jacksonians and caused too
many to go elsewhere.” No. 3:22-cv-00686-HTW-LGI (S.D. Miss., July 21, 2023), Dkt. #38 at 3.
3
All video clips cited herein are keyed to the Appendix appearing at Dkt. #50 at 35-36.
6
As the Mississippi Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he [CCID], which overlays a portion of
the City of Jackson and includes the State Capitol and other state buildings, had been created by
earlier legislation.” Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at *4. By its terms, H.B. 1020’s establishment
of the CCID Court provides the heart of the capital city with additional judicial resources for
processing and adjudicating certain criminal matters accruing in the CCID. Specifically, for
crimes committed in the CCID, the CCID Court—like all municipal courts in Mississippi—will
be authorized to handle preliminary matters (such as initial appearances and felony preliminary
hearings), to set bail in misdemeanor and felony cases, to hear and determine misdemeanor cases,
and to sit as a committing court in felony cases. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-23-7(1). Coupled
with statutory provisions expanding the jurisdiction of the Capitol Police, and as discussed in
greater detail infra, the CCID Court will provide the capital city’s criminal justice system with
additional needed operational bandwidth to accommodate the increased Capitol Police presence.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the Legislature’s establishment of the CCID
Court does not violate the Mississippi Constitution. Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at *9-10. To
the contrary, the Court concluded that a “clear constitutional mandate” to create such a court
“cannot be denied.” Id. at 7. Mississippi’s Constitution “does not merely permit but actually
directs the Legislature to establish . . . inferior courts [such as the CCID court] as needed.” Id.
(italics in original). “The bottom line is that the Legislature took decisive action to craft [the CCID
Court], an act it deemed necessary to serve the CCID.” Id. at 9.
Procedural Background. On April 21, 2023, six alleged residents of Jackson and three
NAACP entities filed Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against
Mississippi Governor Tate Reeves, Mississippi Department of Public Safety Commissioner Sean
Tindell, Chief of the Mississippi Department of Public Safety Office of the Capitol Police Bo
7
Luckey, Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court Michael K. Randolph, and Mississippi
Attorney General Lynn Fitch, in their official capacities. Dkt. #1. (Plaintiffs later voluntarily
dismissed their claims against Governor Reeves. Dkt. #44.) Plaintiffs claim that certain provisions
of H.B. 1020 violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 46-50, ¶¶ 131-
49. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 50-51, ¶¶ A-J.
Following numerous hearings on a bevy of motions in this hotly-litigated case, Plaintiffs
on November 13, 2023, filed a long-delayed motion for preliminary injunction regarding §§ 4 and
5 of the challenged law, viz., the CCID Court provisions. Plaintiffs seek generally to halt State
officials from implementing the CCID Court and, specifically, to enjoin the appointment of its
judge and prosecutors. While §§ 4 and 5 of the law do not take effect until January 1, 2024, nothing
prevented Plaintiffs from seeking earlier injunctive relief as to these provisions. Instead, Plaintiffs
now seek eleventh-hour injunctive relief, manufacturing an artificial “emergency.” Defendants
Commissioner Sean Tindell, Chief Bo Luckey, and Attorney General Lynn Fitch (collectively
“Defendants”) file this response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK

STANDING TO OBTAIN A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
A. Plaintiffs cannot show any actual or imminent, concrete and particularized injury.
To maintain any lawsuit in federal court, plaintiffs must establish Article III standing by
showing injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992). But plaintiffs bear a heavier burden where they seek prospective injunctive
relief. Plaintiffs must always show an injury, traceable to the defendant’s conduct, that is
“concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1147 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). But when plaintiffs seek relief aimed at future conduct,
8
their “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,” and “[a]llegations
of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Id. (quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). 4
Here, none of the individual plaintiffs has standing to seek a preliminary injunction because
none can show any concrete, imminent injury flowing from the challenged CCID Court provisions.
The individual plaintiffs purport to be residents of and registered voters in Jackson. Dkt. #1 at 6-
9, ¶¶ 16-21. They do not claim any specific anticipated future status as a criminal defendant in
any CCID Court proceeding. While they allege generally that they “are threatened with
prosecution and conviction” by the CCID Court, Dkt. #111 at 8, n.5, Plaintiffs have neither shown
nor alleged that they are in actual or imminent danger of experiencing any concrete and
particularized injury resulting from the establishment of the CCID Court or the challenged
appointment of a judge or prosecutors for that court. None of the individual plaintiffs can show
that he or she is or will be a party to any CCID Court proceeding. For this reason alone, this Court
should deny Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and dismiss their CCID Court claims.
B. Plaintiffs’ alleged status as voters does not confer standing.
Plaintiffs contend that their status as registered voters in Jackson gives them standing, see
Dkt. #111 at 8, n.5, but that assertion is baseless, as Plaintiffs’ right to vote is not impaired or
implicated at all in this matter. Sections 4 and 5 of the challenged law do not alter the manner in
which any existing municipal judge or prosecutor is selected. Nor does the law “prohibit or in any
way limit” the elected Hinds County District Attorney from prosecuting cases in the CCID Court.
See H.B. 1020, § 5(2). Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that municipal voters have a
4
See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494
(1974); Stringer v. Whitley, 942 F.3d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 2019); Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959
F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
9
right to elect officials with the exclusive authority to select municipal court personnel—or that any
alleged “stripping” of local authority by the State confers standing. Cf. Stallworth v. Bryant, 936
F.3d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting theory of standing that “Jackson voters have a right to
elect officials with the exclusive authority to select municipal airport commissioners”). Given the
foregoing, and since Mississippi’s Constitution does not provide for a right to elect municipal
judges or prosecutors, Plaintiffs’ purported status as registered voters does not confer standing.
C. Plaintiffs cannot establish “stigmatic-injury” standing or standing predicated on a

purported loss of “benefits” by all citizens of Jackson.
Plaintiffs assert that the challenged law “treats them like second-class citizens and imposes
a stigmatizing injury sufficient for standing.” Dkt. #41 at 7. They cite Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737 (1984), for the proposition that “‘[s]tigmatic injur[ies]’ provide standing to ‘those persons who
are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.’” Id. But “to
plead stigmatic injury standing,” a plaintiff “must plead that he was personally subjected to
discriminatory treatment.” Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2017). “Being subject to
a racial classification differs materially from having personally been denied equal treatment,” and
“racial classification alone” does not “amount[] to a showing of individualized harm.” Id. Where
the plaintiff fails to plead that he was “personally subject to discriminatory treatment,” he “fails to
plead injury” and lacks “stigmatic-injury” standing. See id.
Here, Plaintiffs have neither shown nor alleged that any of them have been “personally
subjected” to any “discriminatory treatment” as a result of the CCID Court. They allege only that
the challenged law will “single out” Jackson residents as a whole “for prosecution in a second-
class criminal justice system.” Dkt. #111 at 7. Having failed to show that they will be personally
subjected to some discriminatory treatment via the establishment of the CCID Court, Plaintiffs
cannot establish standing via any alternative theory of “stigmatic injury.”
10
Plaintiffs further assert that they “stand to lose the benefits they enjoyed from having
locally accountable prosecutors and judges.” Id. at 8 n.5. But in truth, Plaintiffs will continue to
enjoy the same “benefits” of local control of Jackson’s criminal-justice system. First, the
challenged law does not eliminate a single elected judgeship or prosecutor’s office in Jackson or
Hinds County. Neither the occupants of these offices nor the offices themselves are jeopardized
by any provision of this law. Second, local citizens will in fact retain electoral control over the
decisions of the CCID Court judge and prosecutors. Any defendant aggrieved by the judgment of
the CCID Court may appeal that judgment to the Hinds County Court and, ultimately, to the Hinds
County Circuit Court—both of which are presided over by locally-elected judges. See Saunders,
2023 WL 6154416 at *8-9. Ultimately, it is the Hinds County Circuit Court that will have
“controlling authority via the appellate process.” Id. at *9. Furthermore, pursuant to § 5(2) of the
law, the “Hinds County District Attorney shall be authorized to prosecute cases in the CCID
inferior court.” Thus, there will be no loss of “benefits” to confer standing on Plaintiffs.
Under settled federal standing law, none of the individual plaintiffs has experienced or will
experience any actual or imminent, concrete and particularized harm as a result of the CCID Court.
Thus, none of them has standing to seek a preliminary injunction.
D. Plaintiffs cannot establish associational or organizational standing.
None of the three NAACP entity plaintiffs has associational or organizational standing to
seek preliminary injunctive relief. Associational standing requires an association to show that its
members would independently meet Article III standing requirements. Tex. Democratic Party v.
Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2006). Organizational standing requires an organization to
establish standing in its own name by meeting the same standing test that applies to individuals.
Tenth Street Residential Ass’n v. City of Dallas, Tex., 968 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir. 2020). The
11
NAACP plaintiffs do not make the showings required under either doctrine. Because their
members cannot independently establish standing, see supra, the NAACP plaintiffs lack
associational standing. Similarly, the NAACP plaintiffs have not shown any concrete, imminent
injury arising from the CCID Court. They have not explained how this law has caused or will
cause them to undertake any actions that “differ from the [NAACP]’s routine lobbying activities,”
nor have they identified “any specific project that [they] had to put on hold or otherwise curtail in
order to respond to” this law. N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Tex., 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010).
Thus, the NAACP plaintiffs likewise lack organizational standing.
Having failed to show any concrete, imminent injury caused by the challenged law,
Plaintiffs lack standing to obtain a preliminary injunction halting State officials from implementing
§ 4 and § 5 of the law. This Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to issue such relief and should
deny Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and dismiss their CCID Court claims.
II. ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE

NONE OF THE GOVERNING FACTORS SUPPORTS A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted;
(3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm to the nonmovant that may result
from the injunction; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Beswick v.
Barr, Civil Action No. 5:20-cv-98-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 3520312, at *3 (S.D. Miss. June 29,
2020). The last two requirements merge when the government is the opposing party. Pacharne
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 565 F. Supp. 3d 785, 802 (N.D. Miss. 2021). A preliminary injunction
is an “extraordinary remedy and should be granted only if the movant has clearly carried the burden
12
of persuasion with respect to all four factors.” Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878
F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs fail to satisfy any of the preliminary injunction factors.
A. Plaintiffs are likely to fail on the merits of their only claim—an equal-protection
claim—so the Court should deny a preliminary injunction.
1. The challenged CCID Court provisions are race-neutral and rationally advance
legitimate purposes; therefore, the law is constitutional.
As acknowledged by the Mississippi Supreme Court, “it is obvious from [the] face [of H.B.
1020 that] this legislation is aimed directly at the City of Jackson’s ‘crime cancer.’” Saunders,
2023 WL 6154416 at *4 (quoting this Court’s Order herein, Dkt. #45 at 10). Even Plaintiffs no
longer dispute that Jackson has a pressing crime problem, though they would apparently argue that
only felonies—and not misdemeanors—are committed in Jackson. See Dkt. #111 at 21. That
argument belies the conditions on the ground in Jackson, where—in the words of former Jackson
Police Chief James Davis—misdemeanor offenders “are terrorizing the city of Jackson.” See
2/07/22 Mississippi Free Press Article (Ex. “A”).
As this Court has recognized, Jackson’s “police presence . . . is crying for reinforcement.”
Dkt. #45 at 9. Part of recent legislative efforts to alleviate Jackson’s crime problem involved
providing such reinforcement by expanding the Capitol Police force and the geographic boundaries
of its primary jurisdiction, the CCID. When Defendant Capitol Police Chief Bo Luckey assumed
command in May 2022, the Capitol Police force had approximately 63 officers and fielded 200-
400 service calls per month. Decl. of Luckey at 2, ¶ 4 (Ex. “B”). In the past year and half, the
Capitol Police force has more than doubled in size, presently standing at approximately 160
officers with plans to increase that number to as many as 230 officers. Id. The Capitol Police
force now fields 17,000-18,000 service calls per month. Id. Before the expansion, in 2021, Capitol
Police made two felony arrests and issued no misdemeanor charges. Id. at 2, ¶ 5. Between January
13
1, 2023, and early November 2023, Capitol Police made approximately 610 felony arrests and
issued approximately 223 misdemeanor charges. Id. These numbers are only expected to increase,
as the CCID—the primary jurisdiction of the Capitol Police—will double in size from
approximately nine square miles to approximately 18 square miles effective July 1, 2024. Id. at
1-2, ¶ 3. See also H.B. 1020, § 8.
To complement the expanded role and jurisdiction of the Capitol Police, the Legislature
deemed it appropriate to establish an additional municipal court specifically tasked with serving
the CCID. To that end, § 4 of the challenged law “creates an inferior court for the CCID, which
shall have the same jurisdiction as municipal courts,” Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at *4, and
provides for the appointment of a judge for that court. Section 5 provides for the designation of
two new prosecutors for the CCID Court and further authorizes the Hinds County District Attorney
to prosecute cases in the CCID Court.
While the ultimate objective of any law enforcement presence is deterrence of crime, that
can be achieved only if a complementary judicial apparatus exists to efficiently process felony
arrests and adjudicate misdemeanors. To that end, the CCID Court will provide important practical
benefits. For example, it will ensure that initial processing of the additional 600+ felony cases per
year generated by the Capitol Police are not added to the existing backlog of criminal cases pending
in the Hinds County court system. Decl. of Luckey at 3, ¶ 9 (Ex. “B”). Additionally, it will
increase the ease and speed with which Jackson citizens can complete the necessary witness
affidavit paperwork required for the prosecution of certain crimes not witnessed by the police. Id.
at 3, ¶ 10. Further, it will provide Capitol Police with an additional needed judicial vehicle for
obtaining search warrants necessary to investigate crimes—warrants that some Hinds County
14
judges categorically refuse to sign for Capitol Police officers under any circumstances. Id. at 3, ¶
11.
The CCID Court provisions are race-neutral. That is, they apply equally to people of all
races. Because this law does not implicate any fundamental right or suspect classification, it is
subject only to rational-basis review. See Harris v. Hahn, 827 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2016).
“Statutory classifications are given broad deference under rational basis review and will survive if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The burden is on the one attacking the legislative
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it whether or not the basis
has a foundation in the record.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to invalidate the CCID Court provisions. The State of
Mississippi has a legitimate interest in ensuring that sufficient judicial capacity exists in the CCID
to process arrests made in the CCID by the expanded Capitol Police force. Such additional
capacity increases the likelihood that crime victims and defendants alike will have timely access
to justice in the CCID. The CCID Court provisions are rationally related to the State’s legitimate
interest. By providing additional capacity to adjudicate misdemeanor offenses and handle
preliminary felony proceedings, the CCID Court ensures that the expansion of the Capitol Police
force is paired with a concomitant enlargement of judicial resources in the CCID. Because the
challenged law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, it does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause and is constitutional.
2. Plaintiffs cannot show discriminatory effect or discriminatory purpose.
Plaintiffs contend that the CCID Court provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause
because it discriminates based on race. See Dkt. #111 at 8. To prevail, Plaintiffs must show that
15
the judge and prosecutor appointment provisions of §§ 4 and 5 of the law have a “discriminatory
effect and . . . discriminatory purpose.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
Plaintiffs do not make either showing, so their merits argument doubly fails.
First, Plaintiffs cannot show discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs have not established that
the CCID Court provisions have any “discriminatory effect.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. To
claim that this law has a “disparate impact . . . on the Black [sic] citizens of Jackson,” Plaintiffs
argue that Jackson has a higher percentage of black residents than other parts of the State and that
only “[t]he overwhelmingly Black [sic] residents of Jackson . . . will be stripped of the right to
vote, directly or indirectly, for their prosecutors and criminal court judges, and to have those
officials reside in their city or county.” Dkt. #111 at 11. But Plaintiffs’ right to vote is not
implicated at all in this matter. As noted supra, §§ 4 and 5 of the challenged law do not alter the
manner in which any existing municipal judge or prosecutor is selected. Nor does Mississippi’s
Constitution provide for a right to elect municipal judges or prosecutors, or mandate where those
officeholders reside.
Plaintiffs argue that the challenged law will subject Jackson’s black citizens to judges who
are not “accountable and responsive to their community.” Dkt. #111 at 7. But there is no legal or
factual predicate for assuming that the CCID Court judge will dispense justice in a racially-
discriminatory manner. To the contrary, as one federal court recently reaffirmed, “the law
presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced in matters over which he or she presides.”
Reese v. Ohio, Case No. 3:21-CV-993, 2023 WL 5611611, at *10 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2023). 5
5
See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (There is “a presumption of honesty and integrity in
those serving as adjudicators”); O’Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 702 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring) (reaffirming “principle that since state judges are required to uphold the United States
Constitution, federal courts should not presume that they will do otherwise”); Kinney v. S. Miss. Planning
& Dev. Dist., Inc., 202 So. 3d 187, 194 (Miss. 2016) (reaffirming presumption that “a judge, sworn to
administer impartial justice, is qualified an unbiased”).
16
Plaintiffs’ entire claim is predicated on the assumption that a judge who is not selected locally
cannot administer fair and impartial justice. Yet, paradoxically, Plaintiffs seek relief from a federal
court system populated exclusively by unelected judges appointed by the President.
Regardless, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the citizens of Jackson will in fact retain a
“political check” on the CCID Court. As noted supra, any defendant aggrieved by the judgment
of the CCID Court may appeal that judgment by trial de novo to the Hinds County Court and,
ultimately, to the Hinds County Circuit Court—both of which are presided over by locally-elected
judges. See Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at *8-9. See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-51-81.
Ultimately, it is the Hinds County Circuit Court that will have “controlling authority via the
appellate process.” Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at *9. Thus, locally-elected judges will in fact
have the final say on any judgment entered by the CCID Court judge, providing the so-called
“political check,” Dkt. #111 at 7, that Plaintiffs erroneously claim is lacking under this law.
Plaintiffs’ claim has another fundamental problem. Equal-protection principles require
comparing those who are “similarly situated.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. Plaintiffs have given
no reason to believe that the City of Jackson is similarly situated with any other municipality in
Mississippi. They do not even try to make that showing. And indeed Jackson is not similarly
situated to any other city or town in the State. It is by far the State’s most populous city; the seat
of State government; and the home of the State Capitol, museums, a medical center, State office
buildings, and multiple universities. Unfortunately, Jackson also has a significant crime
problem—one this Court has characterized as “sweltering, undisputed and suffocating.” Dkt. #45
at 9. This reality is heightened by Jackson’s size and by the apparent unwillingness of local leaders
to acknowledge and address the City’s many problems that hurt all Mississippians. For numerous
reasons previously described—which have nothing to do with race—Jackson is unique among
17
municipalities in Mississippi. No other locality in the State is similarly situated. Plaintiffs “have
not satisfied their burden of pointing to similarly situated comparators,” Lindquist v. City of
Pasadena Tex., 669 F.3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2012), a burden they cannot meet due to Jackson’s
unique status among Mississippi cities. Because Plaintiffs have not established a discriminatory
effect, their equal-protection claim fails for this reason alone.
While conceding that the challenged law is race-neutral on its face, Plaintiffs nevertheless
argue that “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,” should obviate the need for
any proof of discriminatory intent or purpose in this case. Dkt. #111 at 10-11. In support, Plaintiffs
cite only Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), which avails them nothing. In Gomillion,
the Supreme Court held that while race-neutral on its face, an Alabama law evidenced
discriminatory intent where it altered the shape of a city from a square to a 28-sided figure,
disenfranchising all but four or five of 400 black voters while not removing any white voters. See
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340-48. Plaintiffs marshal no evidence of such racial animus here. The
CCID Court provisions apply equally to all citizens of Jackson—both black and white alike.
It bears noting that, on Plaintiffs’ disparate-impact reasoning, every legislative action ever
taken with regard to Jackson alone would—given the city’s racial demographics—by definition
have a discriminatory effect. That is not a legally sound predicate upon which to establish
discriminatory effect, nor does it prove invidious racial discrimination. Cf. Hearne v. Bd. of Educ.
of City of Chicago, 185 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 1999); Moore v. Detroit Sch. Reform Bd., 293 F.3d
352, 369 (6th Cir. 2002). An equal-protection claim requires a demanding showing, and Plaintiffs’
facile approach falls exceedingly short.
Second, Plaintiffs cannot show discriminatory purpose. Plaintiffs have not established
that the CCID Court has any “discriminatory purpose.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. As noted,
18
the law is race-neutral on its face and advances legitimate objectives. Plaintiffs make several
arguments to show discriminatory intent, Dkt. #111 at 11-19, but each fails. And the burden of
proof is squarely on Plaintiffs. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324-35 (2018).
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs skip over several points of blackletter law. These errors
permeate their discriminatory-intent argument.
State legislators are entitled to a presumption of good faith. See Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 915 (1995). See also Fusilier v. Landry, 963 F.3d 447, 464 (5th Cir. 2020) (“state
legislatures are afforded a presumption of good faith”). Furthermore, the subjective motivations
of particular legislators in voting for a bill are not a sufficient basis from which to infer the purpose
of the entire Legislature. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (“What
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores
of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”); Fusilier,
963 F.3d at 466 (overemphasizing statements of individual legislators deemed improper).
Plaintiffs reject the presumption of legislative good faith. The undercurrent running
through their filings is that white legislators enacted the challenged law with racially
discriminatory intent—specifically, that despite not eliminating a single municipal judgeship or
prosecutor’s office in Jackson or Hinds County, they wished to prevent the black citizens of
Jackson from selecting the judge and prosecutors for the CCID Court. But the objective facts tell
a very different story. Jackson is the State capital and is by far Mississippi’s largest city. As this
Court has recognized, “Jackson is the seat of State government, the home of the State Capitol,
multiple hospitals and medical providers, museums, several universities, and a plethora of retail
and restaurant establishments.” Id. at 8-9. The City of Jackson and Hinds County have both
suffered undeniable crises of local leadership in recent years. Citizens of Jackson have been forced
19
to contend almost continuously with all manner of infrastructure and related issues, including
numerous and prolonged city-wide water outages, widespread sewage failures, indefinite
disruption to garbage collection, ubiquitous potholes, urban blight, growing vagrancy, “a
dysfunctional city government,” Dkt. #45 at 10, physical fights at multiple county-board-of-
supervisors meetings, ineptitude in the administration of county elections 6—and a widespread
increase in crime. These problems affect not only the residents of the City of Jackson, but also the
many people who commute to Jackson from surrounding areas daily to work and do business, as
well as the many people who travel to Jackson to visit the state capital for medical care, retail
opportunities, and tourism attractions. The fallout from Jackson’s problems does not stop at the
city limits.
All of these attributes make Jackson unique among Mississippi cities—and thus the
problems in Jackson warrant action from the State. The State has a strong interest in the wellbeing
of all area citizens and in creating conditions under which the capital city functions like a real city,
with adequate resources to address not only infrastructure and related issues but—perhaps most
importantly—surging crime. Alarmed by Jackson’s “dysfunctional city government,” Dkt. #45 at
10, the Legislature justifiably is—in the words of this Court—“nervous about sending money to
Jackson.” Id. Prudence and fiscal stewardship dictate that the State consider viable alternatives.
H.B. 1020 is an effort to focus additional resources on the Jackson-area crime problem—a
problem the Legislature is entitled to address for the safety and wellbeing of all Mississippians
who live in, live around, travel to, or care about Jackson. There is nothing discriminatory about
6
See, e.g., Dkt. #34-5 at 9-10, 11-14, 15-17, 18-21, 22-28, 29-39, 40-42, 43-46, 47-53, 54-61, 62-65, 66-
67, 68-75, 76-79, 80-83, 84-87. See also Lumumba v. City Council of Jackson, 358 So. 3d 318 (Miss.
2023); 11/08/23 WAPT Article (Ex. “C”); 11/09/23 AP Article (Ex. “D”).
20
that. And every provision of this law—including the CCID Court provisions of §§ 4 and 5—is
facially race-neutral and affects both black and white citizens equally.
With those points in mind, Defendants address, in turn, Plaintiffs’ assertions regarding
discriminatory intent.
Plaintiffs first argue that “substantive departures” and “procedural departures” from “the
normal legislative procedures” suggest discriminatory intent. Dkt. #111 at 12-17. As set forth
below, Plaintiffs’ accusations of “departures” are meritless and fail to establish the “numerous and
radical procedural departures that may lend credence to an inference of discriminatory intent” in
this context. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 238 (5th Cir. 2016). Moreover, as the Mississippi
Supreme Court recently noted, “Article 6, Section 172, of the Mississippi Constitution does not
merely permit but actually directs the Legislature to establish . . . inferior courts as needed.”
Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at *7 (italics in original). The establishment of the CCID Court
reflects a good-faith effort by the Legislature to fulfill its constitutional mandate by coupling
enhanced law enforcement resources with enhanced judicial resources.
Alleged “substantive departures.” First, Plaintiffs argue that the appointment of a judge
and prosecutors for the CCID Court “sharply depart[s] from the State’s distinguished tradition” of
retaining “local control over the criminal justice system.” Dkt. #111 at 12. But as explained supra,
Jackson residents will in fact retain local control over the CCID Court, since every judgment
entered by that court will be subject to an appeal of right—first by trial de novo to the locally-
elected County Court, then to the locally-elected Circuit Court. Thus, locally-elected judges will
have the final say on any conviction rendered in the CCID Court.
Plaintiffs contend that any novel attempt by the Legislature to address Jackson’s unique
crime problem can only be rooted in racism. This is not a fair or valid assumption. The U.S.
21
Supreme Court has recognized that governments “may need many innovations, numerous
combinations of old and new devices, [and] great flexibility . . . to meet changing urban conditions.
We see nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimentation.” Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of
Metro. Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1970) (quotation marks omitted). It stands to reason that the
deterrent effect of an increased police presence in any locality is only as effective as the court
system that exists to process arrests, including arrests for misdemeanor offenses. As set forth
supra, the CCID Court is the judicial complement to the expansion of the Capitol Police.
At no time in its post-Reconstruction history has Jackson been locked in such a downward
spiral as it is now. One of the principal causes of this decline is crime in the area now designated
as the CCID—an area frequented by the many Mississippians who visit the State Capitol, tour the
State’s museums, shop in Fondren’s retail district, and seek medical care at the many hospitals and
clinics in Jackson’s medical corridor. Most who reside in this State are painfully aware of this
problem. 7 They hear of crimes occurring in Jackson and—fearing for their safety and the safety
of their loved ones—take their livelihoods, their business, and their tax dollars elsewhere.
Unless the situation in the heart of the city is improved—such that Mississippians feel safe
to live, work, and visit there—Jackson’s current dire trajectory will not change. Its tax base will
continue to erode to a point of no return. Key to enhancing public safety in the CCID is the
7
They recall 69-year-old Carolyn Temple, pistol-whipped, robbed, and fatally shot while retrieving empty
garbage cans from the curb of her friend’s driveway in the CCID in 2015. 1/12/15 Clarion-Ledger Article
(Ex. “E”). They remember 23-year-old Chelsie Lynn Kirschten, shot to death while she sat at a stoplight
at the intersection of Fortification and State Streets next to Baptist Hospital in the CCID in 2017, by a
random man who “fired a single gunshot through the front driver side window of the car then ran off.”
8/18/17 WLBT Article (Ex. “F”). They know the ordeal of WAPT news anchor Megan West and her
family, held at gunpoint—a gun to her child’s head—by attempted carjackers while trick-or-treating in the
CCID on Halloween in 2021. 11/01/21 WLBT Article (Ex. “G”). The list goes on. This is not to mention
the myriad accounts of misdemeanor crimes—petty theft and the like—that drive safety-conscious citizens,
both black and white, out of Jackson.
22
reassuring presence of the Capitol Police. And critical to the effectiveness of the Capitol Police is
additional judicial capacity to adjudicate misdemeanors and process felony arrests in the CCID. 8
Plaintiffs further assert that § 4 of the challenged law is a substantive departure from
existing law because it provides that “[a]ny person convicted in the CCID inferior court may be
placed in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, Central Mississippi facility.”
H.B. 1020 § 4(1)(b) (emphasis added). Dkt. #111 at 14-17. Plaintiffs argue that this provision
strips CCID Court defendants of civil rights guaranteed by State law and chills their First
Amendment rights. This argument is baseless. The issue at hand is whether the inclusion of this
State-custody confinement provision in the challenged law is evidence of racial animus by the
Legislature. Anyone who appreciates the state of affairs with the Hinds County jail will understand
that it is not. The Hinds County jail—i.e., the Raymond Detention Center—has in recent years
been plagued by “fights, escapes and other security problems.” 10/17/23 AP Article (Ex. “H”).
“In July 2022, U.S. District Judge Carlton Reeves ordered a rare takeover of the jail in Raymond
after he said deficiencies in supervision and staffing led to ‘a stunning array of assaults, as well as
deaths.’” Id. Applying the presumption of legislative good faith, it is only fair to conclude that
the Legislature provided the option for jailing convicted misdemeanants in State custody not
because of racial animus, but because of the uncertain status of the Hinds County jail. The City
of Jackson stopped operating its own jail in 1993, relying on “the county to handle all its jail
8
To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the Capitol Police force is itself somehow inherently “racist,” that
assertion is baseless. It bears noting that approximately 75% of the Capitol Police force is black, including
two of its three Assistant Chiefs and multiple command-level officers. Decl. of Luckey at 3, ¶ 8 (Ex. “B”).
The Capitol Police has experienced a significant improvement in community relations in recent months,
with support for the force being vocalized by Jackson citizens across racial lines. Id. at 4, ¶ 12. This may
be attributable in large part to Chief Luckey’s ongoing efforts at community engagement and professional
partnering, which include regular public forum meetings with Jackson residents, as well as the positive and
professional working relationship that Capitol Police has developed with the Jackson Police Department
and the Hinds County Sheriff’s Office. Id. Plaintiffs’ disparagement of the Capitol Police has no basis in
reality.
23
needs.” 2/07/22 Mississippi Free Press article (Ex. “A”). Given the lack of a city jail and the
precarious status of the Hinds County jail, it was only prudent for the Legislature to provide the
option for State custody should that become necessary. And that is all it is—an option. The
challenged law does not require convicted misdemeanants to be held in a State penitentiary. Nor
does it mandate that they be housed in general population with convicted felons as opposed to a
special segregated unit. Finally, it is worth noting here that, as a general rule, anyone convicted
of a misdemeanor in the CCID Court has that conviction stayed during the pendency of any
properly-perfected appeal—meaning they will not serve time in jail unless and until a locally-
elected Hinds County judge affirms their conviction. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-35-1.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not asserted any claim in this lawsuit for alleged deprivation
of state-law civil rights. And if they had, this Court would not have jurisdiction over such claims.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Nor have Plaintiffs asserted
any claim in this lawsuit predicated on the First Amendment. Rather, all of Plaintiffs’ claims are
predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment exclusively. See Dkt. #1 at 46-50.
Alleged “procedural departures.” Plaintiffs also claim that the original version of H.B.
1020 should not have been assigned to the House Ways and Means Committee. See Dkt. #111 at
17. But as Plaintiffs now acknowledge, see id., the original version of H.B. 1020 was a revenue
bill that brought forward hundreds of code sections on state revenues. See Dkt. #34-1 at 4-1043.
Assigning revenue bills to the House committee charged with handling revenue bills is proper.
Plaintiffs also contend that a Democrat member of the House conference committee on H.B. 1020
was excluded from committee meetings. Dkt. #111 at 17 (citing Dkt. #41 at 19, which cites Dkt.
#12-2 at Ex. T). But the newspaper-article source of Plaintiffs’ accusation further states that Rep.
Banks said that “he was able to add provisions that would benefit the city” and “requested the
24
changes” after the final version “was handed to him” before the deadline. Dkt. #12-2 (Ex. T) at
153. Even if Plaintiffs’ characterization of Rep. Banks’s reported statements was not misleading,
it would not matter. Statements of a law’s opponents are not valid evidence to prove that the law’s
supporters acted with discriminatory intent. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 233.
Plaintiffs further accuse the Legislature of violating Section 89 of the Mississippi
Constitution by failing to run H.B. 1020 through the “Local and Private Legislation Committee.”
Dkt. #111 at 17. But H.B. 1020 is not “local and private legislation,” so there was no such
violation. See, e.g., Sec’y of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 995 (Miss. 1994) (“a general
State problem, though confined to a specific geographical area, may require and benefit from State
action, without that action violating the constitution”). See also Loden v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
279 So. 2d 636, 639 (Miss. 1973); Culley v. Pearl River Industrial Comm’n, 108 So. 2d 390, 397-
98 (Miss. 1959). And Plaintiffs have not asserted (let alone proved) any claim for a violation of
Section 89. Nor have they cited any authority for the proposition that the Legislature cannot
establish a new inferior court at its discretion in any given municipality. To the contrary,
Mississippi’s Constitution expressly authorizes such legislative action. Saunders, 2023 WL
6154416 at *7 (citing MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 172). There is nothing irregular about acting
consistent with the State Constitution.
Alleged “legislative history.” Plaintiffs argue that legislators “publicly expressed” their
discriminatory intent behind the challenged law. Dkt. #111 at 18. But their weak anecdotal
references to statements by two legislators prove no such thing. Dkt. #12 at 7-8. During protracted
floor debate on an early version of H.B. 1020, Rep. Lamar argued that the Legislature should not
limit the “talent pool” of special judges by excluding the “best and brightest” judges from “Holmes
County or Madison County or wherever they may be.” See Dkt. #41 at 23 & n.11. But that quote—
25
excised from an argument that special judges could come from the home counties of principal
opponents of H.B. 1020—fails to prove that Rep. Lamar’s comments were racially motivated.
Plaintiffs point to only one other quotation attributed to Rep. Lamar. They cite a March
24, 2023, article reporting that Rep. Lamar expressed a belief that “four judges should be able to
get the job done in Hinds County.” Id. at 24. See also Dkt. #40-1 at 852. Plaintiffs argue that
because Rep. Lamar reportedly declined to elaborate to the author on this comment, he was
engaging in “a standard ploy of racial demagoguery” and that his view could be motivated only by
racial discrimination toward the black citizens of Hinds County. See id. That is a baseless non
sequitur. And other snippets from Plaintiffs’ own cherry-picked newspaper articles further
undercut their attempt to vilify Rep. Lamar. See, e.g., Dkt. #12-2 at 88. To the extent any question
remains about the sincerity of Rep. Lamar’s convictions, his closing remarks from the House floor
on March 31, 2023, are perhaps the most demonstrative. See Video 8 (Part 2) at 1:33:23-1:40:24
(“I’m doing this for the right reasons, in my heart, and that’s it . . . . And we are all . . . all of us,
equal children of God. I believe it’s the right thing to provide protection from criminal activity
and help the capital city of Mississippi. And it is my hope, and it is my prayer, that this bill will
assist.”). See also Video 9. While Plaintiffs may disagree with Rep. Lamar’s position, there is no
evidence that his support for the law was motivated by racial discrimination. Indeed, perhaps most
telling is that Plaintiffs’ so-called proof of “public expressions” of discriminatory intent consists
of their imaginative spin on two statements made by one legislator as H.B. 1020 made its way
through a robust, months-long legislative process. Regardless, anything Rep. Lamar said about
H.B. 1020 fails to prove that the entire Legislature’s motive was unlawful.
Plaintiffs’ only other piece of anecdotal proof of legislative statements is even weaker.
They suggest that a single statement—made eight years ago, by one legislator, on a proposed
26
constitutional amendment that was voted down by the State’s entire electorate—shows that
discriminatory intent motivated other legislators to back H.B. 1020 in 2023. Dkt. #41 at 24. That
eight-year-old quote proves nothing about any motivations behind this law. See Dkt. #12-2 at 90.
And in any event, one legislator’s statements cannot be extrapolated to cast doubt on the
motivations of an entire Legislature. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321,
2349-50 (2021). Nor are legislators’ statements made about unrelated legislation probative of
discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State for State of
Alabama, 992 F.3d 1299, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021). See also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of
the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (statements “remote in time and made in unrelated
contexts—do not qualify as ‘contemporary statements’ probative” of discriminatory motive).
Alleged “specific sequence of events.” Plaintiffs contend that the “sequence” of
legislative “events” that produced the challenged law suggests discriminatory intent. Dkt. #111 at
18. But this law was the product of an intensive, protracted, and well-documented legislative
process that is a matter of public record. See Dkt. #34-1. See also Videos 1-8. Plaintiffs’ few
cherry-picked complaints about what the Legislature did and did not do in that process fail to prove
that legislators unlawfully “focus[ed] on race.” Dkt. #111 at 18. Rather, the legislative record
proves that legislators engaged in “sincere” and “serious legislative debate on the wisdom” of this
law. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2349. As a result of the legislative process and the robust debate
during H.B. 1020’s evolution, the version of H.B. 1020 that was enacted varied materially from
the version first introduced, reflecting certain preferences of the bill’s opponents.
Alleged “historical background.” Plaintiffs argue that Mississippi’s history is somehow
ipso facto indicative of discriminatory purpose. Dkt. #111 at 19. Plaintiffs rely primarily on a
case decided more than 35 years ago about events dating back 60 years. See id. But “[p]ast
27
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself
unlawful.” Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324. See also Veasey, 830 F.3d at 232 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(“historical evidence” provides “little probative value” when it is not “reasonably
contemporaneous” to a challenged enactment); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 216 (5th Cir. 2019) (as to things cited in long-ago judicial opinions:
“presumption of legislative good faith” is “not changed by a finding of past discrimination”).
Plaintiffs further assert that the State of Mississippi has discriminated against Jackson’s
citizens and leadership in funding and in purported efforts to secure control of Jackson’s
infrastructure. Dkt. #111 at 19. The facts do not bear out Plaintiffs’ allegations, which just parrot
political talking points that have no basis in truth. For instance, the purported State-attempted
“takeover” of Jackson’s ever-failing water system, see id., refers to 2023 S.B. 2889, a utility bill
that died in the Legislature in March 2023. See Dkt. #50-1 at 138-194; Dkt. #50-2 at 1-159. The
State is not “taking over” Jackson’s water system, which—as this Court well knows—is currently
under federal control. See Dkt. #50-6 at 107-143. In fact, the State has made considerable efforts
in recent years to aid the City of Jackson in dealing with its extensive recurring water issues,
including providing overwhelming State support to avoid a total collapse of Jackson’s water
system in 2022. See Dkt. #50-7. Nor has the State deprived the City of Jackson of access to federal
ARPA funds. See id. at 1-195. The principal legislation paving the way for the appropriation of
such funds passed on a bipartisan vote with the unanimous support of black members of the
Mississippi Legislature. Dkt. #50-2 at 165-168. The tired partisan theme that the State is intent
on harming its capital city—with racist motives, no less—is unfounded.
As a final point here: The fact-intensive nature of Plaintiffs’ claims of intentional
discrimination militates against blocking State officials from implementing a state law with a
28
preliminary injunction. Where the plaintiffs’ success on the merits will “require a difficult battle”
in proving that the actions in question were done with a certain motive, the “likelihood of success
prong” has not been satisfied. Cf. Fleishut v. Avondale Indus., Civ. A. No. 94–3500, 1995 WL
27464, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1995). A preliminary injunction “should not be granted unless the
question presented by the movant is free from doubt.” See Metal Mgmt. Miss., Inc. v. Barbour,
Civil Action No. 3:08-CV-00431 HTW-LRA, 2008 WL 3842979, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 13,
2008). This matter is—at best for Plaintiffs—rife with doubts regarding their ability to prove any
discriminatory effect or intent in connection with the challenged law.
B. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate irreparable harm.
Plaintiffs’ failure to show irreparable harm also precludes a preliminary injunction.
Irreparable injury is a separate preliminary injunction requirement: Plaintiffs cannot satisfy it
simply by pointing back to a showing on the merits requirement for injunctive relief. See White v.
Calrucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Without question, the irreparable harm element
must be satisfied by independent proof, or no injunction may issue.”).
As noted, the individual plaintiffs purport to be residents of and registered voters in
Jackson. Dkt. #1 at 6-9, ¶¶ 16-21. They do not claim any specific anticipated future status as a
defendant in any CCID Court proceeding. Plaintiffs have neither shown nor alleged that they are
in actual or imminent danger of any concrete and particularized, real-world injury from the
establishment of the CCID Court or the challenged appointment of a judge and prosecutors for that
court. No individual plaintiff has shown that he or she will be a party to any proceeding to be filed
or adjudicated in the CCID Court. Nor have the NAACP plaintiffs offered any proof that they or
their members will suffer any irreparable injury from the challenged law. To the extent Plaintiffs
29
contend that their right to vote is harmed, that argument fails because—as set forth supra—the
CCID Court provisions do not affect voting rights.
The mere “possibility” of irreparable injury does not support preliminary injunctive relief.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Rather, “plaintiffs seeking
preliminary relief [must] demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an
injunction.” Id. (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103) (emphasis in original). There is no evidence that
Plaintiffs will experience any irreparable harm from the establishment of the CCID Court.
Plaintiffs allege that “irreparable injury is present as a matter of law where” their equal-protection
rights have been violated. Dkt. #111 at 20. But that presupposes an equal-protection violation,
which—as shown above—has not occurred here.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs had well over six months to prepare and file their motion for
preliminary injunctive relief targeting §§ 4 and 5 of the challenged law. Yet Plaintiffs waited until
November 13—a month and half before the January 1, 2024, implementation date—to file the
instant motion, thereby “manufacturing an ‘emergency.’” Segars Props., LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-4895-L, 2014 WL 61159, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014).
Plaintiffs’ “decision to wait until the eleventh hour undermines their conclusory assertion that there
is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ dilatoriness “weigh[s] ‘heavily’ against a finding of irreparable injury.” Greenthal v.
Joyce, Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-41, 2016 WL 362312, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2016).
C. The harm to the State in granting an injunction would far exceed any purported harm
to Plaintiffs, and the public interest thus favors denying Plaintiffs’ motion.
As noted above, the balance of the equities and the public interest merge when the
government is the opposing party. Pacharne v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 565 F. Supp. 3d 785, 802
(N.D. Miss. 2021) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). Those features strongly
30
weigh against a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction would undermine legislative
efforts to mitigate Jackson’s ongoing public-safety and criminal-justice emergencies.
First, H.B. 1020 is a duly-enacted law of the Mississippi Legislature—viz., the people’s
representatives. It reflects the will of the people of the State, and the Mississippi Supreme Court
has upheld the CCID Court’s constitutionality under state law. Saunders, 2023 WL 6154416 at
*9-10. The State is harmed any time that will is enjoined by a federal court on behalf of a handful
of individual plaintiffs who are unhappy with the actions of the Legislature. See Abbott, 138 S.
Ct. at 2324 n.17 (“the inability to enforce its duly enacted plans clearly inflicts irreparable harm
on the State”). H.B. 1020 became state law on July 1, 2023. It is the status quo. An injunction
barring any portion of the law set to become effective January 1, 2024, will change—not
preserve—the status quo of Mississippi law.
Second, the City of Jackson—the seat of State government—is engulfed in a public-safety
emergency stemming from a significant increase in crime, and a preliminary injunction would
undercut efforts to address that emergency. The challenged law is part of a broader legislative
effort to address this ongoing public safety crisis with the objective of creating a safer capital city
for all Jacksonians and all Mississippians. It provides additional judicial resources designed to
further this effort by ensuring that the expansion of the Capitol Police force is supported by a
concomitant expansion in judicial resources, both to adjudicate misdemeanor crimes and to process
felony arrests. If the citizens of Jackson have a public interest in a properly-functioning water and
sewer system—as they certainly do—then by the same token, a properly-functioning criminal
justice system must also be in the public interest. The harm in enjoining State officials from
implementing the challenged law far exceeds any harm that the law could cause Plaintiffs. And
the harm to the State is not speculative. Temporary space has already been secured to
31
accommodate operation of the CCID Court at the War Memorial Building beginning January 1,
2024. Decl. of Kornbrek at 1, ¶ 3 (Ex. “I”). WFT Architects, P.A., has been retained to design a
permanent space to house the CCID Court at the old Wright & Ferguson Funeral Home on High
Street downtown, where renovations are already under way. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 5-6.
While Plaintiffs claim to “share in the desire to make [Jackson] a safer place to live and
work,” Dkt. #111 at 21, they ask this to Court enjoin State officials from implementing a key
component of the Legislature’s considered effort to alleviate Jackson’s crime problem—all based
on the tired trope that the CCID Court will somehow usher in a revival of “Jim Crow,” id. at 16.
The thrust of Plaintiffs’ misplaced argument is that because the CCID Court will not adjudicate
felony cases to final judgment, it can therefore serve no purpose in alleviating Jackson’s crime
problem. That argument fails for the many reasons discussed supra.
Plaintiffs further posit the blanket assertion that the CCID Court will operate with a “lack
of local responsiveness” and will impose “felony punishments of misdemeanants.” Dkt. #111 at
24. That is baseless. As noted supra, the CCID Court judge is entitled to a presumption that he
or she will act in an unbiased and unprejudicial manner, upholding not only State law but the
United States Constitution.
Equally baseless is the claim by former Hinds County Circuit Judge Tomie Green that “the
CCID judge may well impose severe or unnecessary bail on many or all defendants” in the CCID
Court. Dkt. #110-4 at 4, ¶ 9. In considering what Judge Green views as “severe or unnecessary
bail,” it bears noting that during her time on the bench, she was criticized by a former Hinds County
District Attorney for releasing capital murder defendants on reduced bail without notifying
prosecutors. 8/07/18 Clarion-Ledger Article (Ex. “J”). See also Misc. Articles (Composite) (Ex.
“K”). Judge Green states that she “fear[s]” and “worrie[s]” that the CCID Court will lead to
32
increased appeals to Hinds County’s locally-elected judges. Dkt. #110-4 at 3-4, ¶ 9. Should her
speculative concerns come to fruition, the Legislature can address any issues with increased
appeals in due course. Judge Green further states—erroneously—that H.B. 1020 “requires the
CCID Inferior Court to sentence people to time in the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility.”
Id. at 4, ¶ 11 (emphasis added). But the law clearly provides that convicted misdemeanants
“may”—not “shall”—be placed in State custody in the unlikely event that imprisonment is ordered
at all. H.B. 1020, § 4(1)(b). At best, Judge Green’s statements reflect a policy disagreement
between her and the overwhelming majority of the Mississippi Legislature.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that a preliminary injunction should issue now to avoid
“unseating the appointed CCID Inferior Court prosecutors and judge, possibly after they have
begun to charge and try cases.” Dkt. #111 at 24. But that is no reason to deprive the public in the
meantime of the benefit of these additional judicial resources authorized by the Legislature. The
transfer of cases is not a novel occurrence, and the municipal court system can adapt if needed.
As this Court found previously, “[t]he criminal justice system in Hinds County is in crisis.”
Dkt. #45 at 21. Action is needed now. The harm in enjoining State officials from implementing
the CCID Court far exceeds any purported harm that could be experienced by plaintiffs who have
shown only that they live and vote in Jackson. Weighed in the balance against the legitimate
legislative policy considerations of law and order, public safety, and increased access to justice,
Plaintiffs’ claim that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest rings hollow.
III. IF THE COURT GRANTS A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, IT SHOULD BE

APPROPRIATELY LIMITED IN SCOPE.
The Constitution and equitable principles dictate that injunctive relief must be “tailored to
redress” a “particular injury.” Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018). And equity requires
that injunctive relief be no broader than “necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”
33
See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (emphasis added; quotation
marks omitted). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury.”
Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974).
Further, it is well settled that “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the
violation established,” and that a “court must narrowly tailor an injunction to remedy the specific
action which gives rise to the order.” Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, Tex., 969
F.3d 460, 478 n.39 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). An injunction cannot “encompass
more conduct than was requested or exceed the legal basis of the lawsuit.” Scott v. Schedler, 826
F.3d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 2016). See also E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760, 769 (5th Cir. 2021) (same).
Generally, “injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to
provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Lion Health Servs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 693, 703
(5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). As a matter of law pursuant to FRCP 65, a preliminary
injunction is only binding upon the parties, their respective agents/employees, and those acting in
concert with them. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
If the Court is inclined to grant a preliminary injunction, any relief should be limited to the
named individual plaintiffs and members of the NAACP-entity plaintiffs who can demonstrate
irreparable harm. This is not a class action, nor do Plaintiffs seek to make it one. A preliminary
injunction granted only as to the named plaintiffs would provide full relief. Any injunction should
be narrowly tailored to enjoin the prosecution of the named plaintiffs in the CCID Court. It should
not be so broad as to apply to non-plaintiffs or prohibit the appointment of a CCID Court judge,
the designation of CCID Court prosecutors, or any other provision of state law establishing the
CCID Court. Defendants respectfully submit that any broader injunction would exceed the bounds
of this Court’s jurisdiction under Article III and the limitations of equitable relief.
34
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction
[Dkt. #110] in its entirety and dismiss Plaintiffs’ CCID Court claims.
THIS the 7th day of December, 2023.
Respectfully submitted,
SEAN TINDELL, in his official capacity as

Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of
Public Safety; BO LUCKEY, in his official capacity
as Chief of the Mississippi Department of Public
Safety Office of Capitol Police; and LYNN FITCH,
in her official capacity as Attorney General of the
State of Mississippi, DEFENDANTS
By: LYNN FITCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL

FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
By: s/Rex M. Shannon III

REX M. SHANNON III (MSB #102974)
Special Assistant Attorney General
REX M. SHANNON III (MSB #102974)

GERALD L. KUCIA (MSB #8716)
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION
Post Office Box 220
Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0220
Tel.: (601) 359-4184
Fax: (601) 359-2003
rex.shannon@ago.ms.gov
gerald.kucia@ago.ms.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS SEAN TINDELL,

in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Mississippi
Department of Public Safety; BO LUCKEY, in his
official capacity as Chief of the Mississippi Department
of Public Safety Office of Capitol Police; and LYNN FITCH,
in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Mississippi
35
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Rex M. Shannon III, Special Assistant Attorney General and one of the attorneys for the
above-named defendants, do hereby certify that I have this date caused to be filed with the Clerk
of the Court a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing via the Court’s ECF filing system,
which sent notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
THIS the 7th day of December, 2023.
s/Rex M. Shannon III

REX M. SHANNON III
36

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Case 3:23-cv-00272-HTW-LGI Document 119 Filed 12/05/23 Page 1 of 35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE

TATE REEVES, in his official capacity as

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF

quintessentially local court system.

Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection, and a preliminary injunction preventing

State’s long history of resistance to Black self-governance paired with contemporaneous

Black-majority City of Jackson is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government

interest and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

quo, this Court should grant a preliminary injunction.

II. Factual Background

A. House Bill 1226 (2017)

B. House Bill 1020 (2023)

official. See HB 1020 § 1; Saunders v. Mississippi, No. 2023-CA-00584-SCT, 2023 WL

https://perma.cc/G8ST-R8WA (CCID Master Plan 2023 Update); HB 1020 § 8. The racial

population concentrations that are overwhelmingly White in composition.

The census statistics support the visual impact of the map.

Total White NH (%) Black NH (%)

total number of White city residents.

§§ 21-23-1—21-23-3 (1979). 7 These courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanor crimes,

municipal courts. About the Courts, State of Miss. Judiciary, https://perma.cc/GJK6-Y5JA. 8

Jackson and confirmed by a majority vote of the Jackson City Council. 10

Starting on January 1, 2024, however, HB 1020 creates a targeted exception to local

CCID.” Id. § 5(1).

Judiciary Admin. Office of the Cts., https://perma.cc/VE7R-CZV5. The longest-tenured Justice

Admin. Office of the Cts., https://perma.cc/BB9D-TD5L.

municipal prosecuting attorneys to “be appointed by the governing authorities of the

C. Background on Local Control in Mississippi

Mississippi has a long, undisputed history of state-led resistance to Black citizens

back less than 50 years.

member districts with anti-single-shot voting requirements. 14

District and its Jurisdiction,

OF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JURISDICTION.pdf. Under these lines, Black voters began

fourteen special circuit court judges in Hinds County. 15

unilateral executive action might be necessary if local leadership in Jackson proved

world’, Clarion Ledger (Feb. 16, 2023, 3:28 PM), https://perma.cc/Z76H-5T7X.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must show “(1) a substantial likelihood of

v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984).

substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

A. HB 1020 Unconstitutionally Discriminates on the Basis of Race in Violation of the

passed with an impermissible discriminatory purpose.

1. The Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Legislation Enacted with a

the statute . . . .” Washington, 426 U.S. at 241. “Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory

concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations . . . racial discrimination is not

393 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1969)).

discrimination under a burden-shifting framework. To do so, they must “prove by an evidentiary

When evaluating discriminatory intent, the Arlington Heights framework requires a

discriminate based on race.”).

In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court established a non-exclusive list of evidentiary

contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body.” Overton v. City of Austin,

discriminatory purpose are found in circumstantial evidence such as legislative history,

2. The Arlington Heights Factors Demonstrate that HB 1020 Has a

a. HB 1020 Has a Substantial Discriminatory Impact.

b. Historical Background of the Decision

representatives. By creating a functionally equivalent municipal court in Jackson with a state-

own municipal laws.

used everywhere else in Mississippi. See Miss. Code Ann. § 21-23-3.

law enforcement officers specifically requested—again, funding, staffing, and improving

existing systems—which members of the legislature themselves acknowledged were priorities. 20

d. Procedural Departures & Legislative History

from being heard in more than one committee.

HB 1020, the only committee member not to do so. 24