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Unit-02 COI
Unit-02 COI
Unit-02 COI
Unit-02
Part V, Chapter II of the constitution between Articles 79 and 123 deal with
the provisions relating to the Union Parliament.
Article 79 provides that, ‘there shall be a Parliament which shall consist of the
President and two Houses to be known respectively as the Council of States
and the House of the People’.
The President is not a member of the Parliament but he is a constituent part of
the Parliament.
The President enjoys vast legislative powers.
The constitution prescribes that the President must be qualified to be elected
as a member of Lok Sabha.
Raja Sabha is the upper House of the Indian Parliament. In contrast to the House of
Lords of the English Parliament, Rajya Sabha is modelled on the American Senate.
It is considered as a non-federal feature of the Indian Constitution. The Schedule IV
of the constitution provides for the allocation of seats in Rajya Sabha for the States.
Points to Remember
• Rajya Sabha is the Federal House.
• Rajya Sabha is chaired by Vice-President, a non-member of the House.
• While the members of the House have a term of six years, the Chairperson has only
a term of five years.
• Rajya Sabha does to have financial powers.
• Members are elected by proportional representation system.
• Approval of Rajya Sabha is enough in case an emergency proclamation is made
during when Lok Sabha is dissolved.Functions of Rajya Sabha.
There is no need for the person to be a domicile of a State which he represents in the
Rajya Sabha because:
1. The constitution provides only for single citizenship.
2. Although a member who is not a domicile or native of particular State, he will
be representing the interests of the State which he represents in the House not
those of his State of origin.
Further, it may not be viable for any person to represent a State in the House unless
he had a practical knowledge about and standing in the State, so as to get elected
from the State.
Vacation of Seats
Article 101 In the Parliament, a seat may fall vacant in case a member:
• Resigns by writing under his hand addressed to the Chairman or the Speaker or;
• Dies or;
• Disqualified on the grounds given in Article 102 or;
• Disqualified on the ground of defection or;
• Becomes a member of Houses—both Lok Sabha and legislature of a state or;
• Is absent for a period of sixty days without permission of the House.
Session
The meeting of the House of Parliament held period of time is known as a Session
of the House. A period from date of commencing the first sitting of the House is till
the date on which the President prorogues the House or in case of Lok Sabha
dissolves, the House is a Session of the Parliament.
A session of the House consists of several ‘sitting’ of the House. The meeting of the
House held to transact a business every day is known as a sitting of the House. Every
sitting close when the Presiding Officer of the House adjourns the House.
Usually, there are three sessions of the Parliament every year namely, the Budget
Session, Monsoon Session and Winter Session.
Quorum is the minimum number of members to be present for any siting of the
House to be conducted. According to Article 100, the quorum for any sitting is one-
tenth of the total membership of the House.
In case of state legislatures, Article 189 prescribes that the quorum shall be ten
members or one tenth of the total number of members of the House, whichever is
greater.
Lame duck Session: The last session of a dissolved Lok Sabha is known as a lame
duck session. The session is held after the general election to the Lok Sabha and so
in effect it is the first session after the general election.
The session is meant for bidding farewell to those members of the dissolved house
who have not contested the election or been elected again in the general election. No
major legislative business is transacted in the session as the House has no mandate
and the new House after the general election is yet to be constituted. Hence, the
session is known as ‘Lame duck session’ and the members are known as ‘Lame
ducks’.
Summoning of the House: Summoning of the House refers to the calling the
Houses for the session. It is the power of the President to be exercised with the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers.
Proroguing the House: This is also the power of the President which exercise with
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. When prorogued the session comes
to an end. The President can prorogue the session of the House at any time.
Adjournment Sine die: When the Presiding Officer adjourns the House without
fixing any time or any date for the next meeting it is called adjournment sine die.
Sine die means without setting a day (for the next meeting) or in other words where
the adjournment is for an indefinite period. Usually on the last day of the session the
House is adjourned sine die.
Dissolution: Dissolution ends the life of the Lok Sabha. A new Lok Sabha takes its
place after the general elections are held. Rajya Sabha being a permanent chamber
cannot be dissolved. Only the Lok Sabha is subjected to dissolution.
According to Article 53, ‘the President shall exercise the executive power either
directly or through officers’ subordinate to him, in accordance with the constitution’.
In this article the following expressions need to be noted:
(a) Executive power
(b) Exercise the powers in accordance with the constitution
(c) Exercise the powers directly
(d) Exercise through officers’ subordinate to him
Therefore, the Prime Minister will not be eligible for voting in the election to the
office of the President, in case he happens to be a nominated Member of Parliament.
Thus, the President is elected indirectly and the citizens do not play any direct role
in the election.
Single Transferable Vote System: Single transferable vote means that each voter
will have only one vote whatsoever number of candidates contesting in the election.
In the election of the President each elector marks only his preference and does not
vote for any one candidate alone. For instance, if there are four contestants in the
election, then the elector indicates four preferences in succession as his first, second,
third and fourth preference.
At the time of declaring results, the candidate who secures the quota of ‘first
preference’ votes as calculated above will be declared elected. In case no candidate
has secured the required quota of ‘first preference’ votes, then the candidate who
secured the least number of votes is excluded from the election.
Although the President of India is not elected by the people directly, India is still a
‘Republic’. The constitution prescribes certain conditions which injects the
republican character into the constitution and makes it a truly republican
constitution. The conditions are as follows:
1. The Electoral College to elect the President includes the elected members of the
State Legislative Assembles also.
2. A special formula has been prescribed to calculate the value of the votes of the
MLAs and MPs.
3. The President is elected by a system of proportional representation.
Eligibility for re-election
The President is eligible for re-election. The explanation in Article 58 excludes the
office of the President from being considered as an office of profit for the purpose
of election to the office of the President. Further, Article 57 expressly provides that
the President is eligible for re-election.
Oath of Office
Before entering upon the office, the President is administered an oath of office by
the Chief Justice of India in accordance with Article 60. In case the Chief Justice is
absent, the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court available shall administer the
oath.
According to Article 60, the President takes the oath to ‘preserve, protect and defend’
the constitution and ‘devote to the service and well-being of the people of India’. It
implies that the founding fathers of the constitution envisaged an important role to
the President.
The Prime Minister is appointed by the President. Usually the President appoints the
leader of the party that enjoys the majority support of the Lok Sabha as the PM.
However, in case of a hung Parliament in which no political party gains the required
majority the President has to apply his discretion. In such circumstances, the
President follows a convention. He invites the leader of the single largest party in
the Lok Sabha to form the government. When he fails to form the government,
President may call the leader of the alliance of parties formed before the election.
In case the alliance also fails to make, only then he appoints the leader of the post-
election alliance. This convention was evolved to avoid the ‘horse-trading’.
According to Article 78, the following are the duties of the PM:
1. To communicate to the President all decisions of the Council of Ministers
relating to the administration of the affairs of the union and proposals for
legislation. To furnish such information relating to the administration of the
affairs of the Union and proposals for legislation as the President may call for.
If the President so requires, to submit for the consideration of the Council of
Ministers any matter on which a decision has been taken by a minister but
which has not been considered by the Council.
2. He is the leader of the House in which he is attending, irrespective of whether
he is the member of that House. As the leader of the House he is responsible
for maintaining the decorum and discipline in the House, especially the
conduct of the ruling party members. He has to ensure that the members
belonging to the opposition party and other independent members are given
with adequate opportunity to speak and ensure the ministers participate in the
discussions in the House responsibly. In the process, he needs to
wholeheartedly support the Speaker of Lok Sabha or the Chairman of Rajya
Sabha.
3. He is the ex-officio chairperson of the NITI Ayog, entrusted with the planned
development of the country.
Prime Minister: Role
Head of the Council of Ministers
Channel of communication between the Council of Ministers and the
President
Leader of the House in which he is attending
Ex-officio chairperson of the NITI Ayog
According to Article 130, the seat of the Supreme Court is in Delhi. However, the
court may sit in such other place or places, as the Chief Justice of India (CJI) may
from time to time, appoint, with the approval of the President.
Article 129 declares that the Supreme Court is a court of record. According to the
Law Dictionary, ‘A court of record is a court whose records are admitted to be
evidentiary value and are not questioned when they are produced before the court.’
The attributes of a court of record are that:
• Its judgments and proceedings are enrolled for perpetual memory and testimony.
Its record has evidentiary value and cannot be questioned when produced in a court.
It is conclusive evidence of what is contained in it.
• A court of record has the power to punish for contempt. Article 129 confers the
power to punish for its contempt. According to Contempt of Court Act, there are two
types of contempt namely civil contempt and criminal contempt.
Article 142 (2) provides that the Supreme Court has ‘all and every power to make
any order for the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself, subjected to
the provisions of any law made by Parliament’.
Appointment of Judges
According to Article 124 (2), the power to appoint the judges of Supreme Court is
vested in the President. A judge of Supreme Court is appointed by the President by
a warrant under his hand and seal.
The President, in appointing the judges has to consult ‘such of the judges of the
Supreme Court and of the high courts in the States as the President may deem
necessary’.
There are two important issues in relation to the appointment of the judges of
Supreme Court namely:
1. Appointment of Chief Justice of India
2. Appointment of other judges.
The principle of seniority followed in the appointment of the Chief Justice, was not
a mere practice but had been an established convention as it was followed for 22
years
• The Law Commission recommended for considering the merit of the judge
but the merit is not in the view of the executive. The supersession of the three
senior judges was not on the reason of their merit determined by the Law
Commission. They were superseded, for they had decided the Keshavananda
Bharti case against the will of the government.
• It was argued the social philosophy of the judges must be taken into account
while appointing the judges. This means the judges must be subscribing to the
view of the executive. This would be a kind of spoils system which would
amount to packing of judiciary.
The event of superseding the judges had been viewed as a blow on the independence
and impartiality of the judiciary. After the general elections 1977, the Janata Party
came to power. The Janata Party was against the supersession of the judges and once
coming to power the party revived the practice of appointing the senior most judge
of the Supreme Court as Chief Justice. Hence, the practice of appointing the senior
most judge as Chief Justice was restored.
• Article 124 lays down that the President ‘shall consult the Judges of the
Supreme Court and of the high courts in the States as the President may deem
necessary’. In case of the appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice
‘the Chief Justice shall always be consulted’ [Article 124(2)].
• The term ‘consult’ in Article 124 became the bone of contention between the
executive and the judiciary. In 1977, in the Sankalchand Seth case, the
Supreme Court ruled that the President has to consult the constitutional
functionaries, but the advice was not binding on the President. The President
can differ with the opinion of the constitutional functionaries and take
contrary view.
• Later, in 1982 in the S. P. Gupta versus Union of India case (Judges Transfer
Case), the Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the Sankalchand view and
ruled that the consultation is not binding on the President. It implies that the
power of appointing the judges is the sole prerogative of the Union
government.
In 1993, in the SCARA versus Union of India case, the Supreme Court overruled the
Sankalchand Seth case judgement. The court held that the Chief Justice must have
supremacy in matters of the appointment of judges.
In 1998, the President referred to the Supreme Court, nine issues relating to the
appointment of Supreme Court judges and transfer of high court Judges for its
opinion exercising his power under Article 143. The President sought clarification
on the consultation process relating to judge’s appointment and transfer. The court
ruled as follows:
1. The President has to consult the Chief Justice while appointing a judge of
Supreme Court and the consultation is binding.
2. The consultation process requires ‘consultation of plurality of judges’. The
sole opinion of the CJI does not constitute the ‘consultation’ process.
3. Therefore, the Chief Justice of India should consult a collegium of four senior
most judges of the Supreme Court before giving his opinion. The CJI should
not send the recommendation to the government, even if two judges give an
adverse opinion.
4. ‘The collegium should make the decision in consensus and unless the opinion
of the collegium is in conformity with that of the Chief Justice of India, no
recommendation is to be made’.
5. Regarding the transfer of high court judges, in addition to the collegium of
four senior most judges, the Chief Justice of India was obliged to consult the
Chief Justice of the two high courts (one from which the judge was transferred
and the other receiving him).
6. In regard to the appointment of high court judges, the CJI was required to
consult only two seniors most judges of the apex court.
7. The transfer of judges of the high courts was judicially reviewable, only if the
CJI had recommended the transfers without consulting four senior most
judges of the apex court and two Chief Justices of the high courts concerned.
8. The requirement of consultation by the CJI with his colleagues does not
exclude consultation with those judges who are conversant with the affairs of
the high court.
9. Strong and cogent reasons must exist regarding a person’s name not being
recommended. Only positive reasons may be given. The views of the other
judges consulted by the CJI should be in writing and the same should be
conveyed to the government, along with the recommendation by the CJI
(Judgment dated 28 October 1998).
On receipt of the resolution, the President passes the order removing the judge
Under the Indian constitution, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be classified as
five types namely:
(i) Original jurisdiction
(ii) Appellate jurisdiction
(iii) Writ jurisdiction
(iv) Advisory jurisdiction
(v) Revisory jurisdiction
However, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be enlarged in accordance with
Article 138. Article 138 provides that the Parliament can enlarge the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court by conferring powers and jurisdiction with respect to the matters
in the Union List in Schedule.
Further, the Parliament can confer upon the Supreme Court, such powers and
jurisdiction in accordance with any international or bilateral agreements to which
India is signatory.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court between Articles 131
and 136 also provide for judicial review. The scheme of dividing the legislative
powers between the Parliament and the state legislatures is provided in Article 246.
It is the power of the judiciary to review and determine the validity of any law. If the
court is satisfied that the law conflicts with the constitution, the court has the powers
to declare the law as ultra vires the constitution and therefore, void. The power of
judicial review serves the following purposes:
• It seeks to protect the private rights (fundamental rights) of the individuals.
• It legitimizes the government actions.
• It helps in upholding the Rule of Law.
• It helps to ensure that provisions of the constitution are abided by.
• It prevents arbitrary us e of power or action.
• It ensures just standards of procedures
Public Interest Litigation
A writ petition under Public Interest Litigation is entertained by a High Court under
Article 226 of the Indian Constitution or in the case of breach of any fundamental
right by the Supreme Court under the Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. For filing
a case under Public Interest Litigation, it is not necessary to file a regular writ
petition where a case is filed through a lawyer. Sometimes, judges themselves have
taken initiative in the cases, depending upon the reports in the newspapers or
television
The field of Public Interest Litigation is quite vast. The following are the possible
areas where a Public Interest Litigation can be filed:
• Where a factory / industrial unit is causing air pollution and people nearly are
getting affected.
• Where, in an area / street, there are no street lights causing inconvenience to
the commuters.
• Where some ‘Banquet Hall’ plays a loud music, in nights causes noise
pollution.
• Where poor people are affected because of the State Government’s decisions
to impose heavy taxes.
• For abolishing child labour, and bonded labour.
• Where rights of working women are affected by sexual harassment.
• For maintaining roads, sewages, etc in good conditions.
For removal of big hoarding and signboards from the busy roads to avoid traffic
problems
Judicial Activism
Judicial activism means any action of the judiciary which is beyond its constitutional
mandate or expanding the jurisdiction of the courts or the courts acting ‘suo moto,’
taking up cases on its own without being moved by any aggrieved person.
The Golak Nath case and Kesavananda Bharti case are examples of judicial activism.
In Golak Nath case, the Supreme Court by a majority view ruled that the fundamental
rights are ‘immutable and beyond the reach of the amendatory process’.
The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, commonly known as The Lokpal Act, is
an anti-corruption Act of Indian Parliament in India which "seeks to provide for the
establishment of the institution of Lokpal to inquire into allegations of corruption
against certain important public functionaries including the Prime Minister, cabinet
ministers, members of parliament, Group A officials of the Central Government and
for matters connecting them".
The Bill was tabled in the Lok Sabha on 22 December 2011 and was passed by the
House on 27 December as The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, 2011. It was
subsequently tabled in the Rajya Sabha on 29 December. After
a marathon debate that stretched until midnight of the following day, the vote failed
to take place for lack of time. On 21 May 2012, it was referred to a Select Committee
of the Rajya Sabha for consideration. It was passed in the Rajya Sabha on 17
December 2013 after making certain amendments to the earlier Bill and in the Lok
Sabha the next day. It received assent from President Pranab Mukherjee on 1
January 2014 and came into force from 16 January.
STATE EXECUTIVE
The State Executive consists of the Governor, who is the head of the State, and the
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its head.
The pattern of the State Executive is very similar to that of the Central Executive
which is based on the fundamental principle of accountability of the Executive to
the Legislature. Like the Centre, the States also have parliamentary form of
government. The constitutional provisions dealing with the State Executive are more
or less word to word similar to the constitutional provisions dealing with the Central
Executive except for some differences arising out of the fact while the Constitution
confers some discretion on the State Governor, it confers none on the President.
Arts. 153 to 167 and 213 deal with the composition and powers of the State
Executive.
GOVERNOR
The Governor is the constitutional head of the State. He appoints the Chief
Minister and other Ministers and discharges several important functions in
relation to the State Legislature. The Governor assures continuity in the State
Administration, as having a fixed tenure, he stays in office while the Chief
Minister may come and go from time to time.
The Governor acts as the agent of the Centre when a proclamation of breakdown
of constitutional machinery in the State is issued under Art. 356. The State
Governor is thus a key functionary in the system envisaged by the Constitution.
A citizen of India who has completed the age of 35 years is eligible to be appointed
as the Governor [Art. 157]. Before entering upon his office, a Governor has to make
and subscribe, in the presence of the Chief Justice of the State High Court, an oath
or affirmation in the prescribed form. In the absence of the Chief Justice, the oath
may be taken before the senior-most Judge of the High Court available at the time
[Art. 159].
Even where Governor’s bona fides are questioned in the matter of exercise of his
discretionary powers of appointment and dismissal of the Chief Minister, he cannot
be called upon to enter his defence. According to the Bombay High Court, “the
Governor while taking decisions in his sole discretion, enjoys immunity under
Article 361…” The Governor holds his office during the pleasure of the President
under Art. 156.
The Governor may resign at any time by writing to the President [Art. 156(3)]. In a
contingency for which the Constitution makes no provision, such as death of the
Governor, the President may make such provision as he thinks fit for discharge of
the functions of the Governor of a State [Art. 160]. Thus, the Chief Justice of the
High Court can be appointed temporarily to discharge the functions of the Governor
of the State.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
On lines similar to the Centre, each State has a Council of Ministers, with the Chief
Minister at its head. The provision regarding the Council of Ministers is mandatory
and the Governor cannot dispense with this body at any time [Art. 163(1)]. This
proposition has now been reiterated by the Supreme Court which has held that the
Council of Ministers continues to stay in office even when the Legislature is
dissolved by the Governor.
The function of the Council of Ministers is “to aid and advise the Governor in the
exercise of his functions except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution
required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion [Art. 163(1)]. The
phrase “by or under” the Constitution means that the need to exercise discretionary
power may arise from any express provision of the Constitution or by necessary
implication.
It has been judicially held that the Council of Ministers comes into existence to aid
and advice the Governor as envisaged by Art. 163(1) as soon as the Chief Minister
is appointed and sworn in by the Governor.
A few judicial pronouncements on the scope of Art. 164(4) may be taken note of
here.
Shri T.N. Singh who was not a member of either House of the State Legislature was
appointed the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. The High Court rejected the challenge
to his appointment in view of Art. 164(4) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court
upheld the High Court. A non-member can be appointed as Chief Minister for a
period of six months.
Before a Minister enters upon his office, the Governor administers to him the
prescribed oaths of office and secrecy [Art. 164(3)]. What happens if a Minister
breaks the oath taken by him at the time of his induction into the office of the
Minister?
A Minister (Mr. Balakrishna Pillai) in the Kerala Government was reported to have
said at a public meeting that people should resort to terrorism and wage a war against
the Central Government on the Punjab model to achieve their objectives. A citizen
of India filed a petition in the High Court for issue of quo warranto61 preventing the
Minister from exercising the authority of his office on the ground that his speech
amounted to a breach of the oath taken by him at the time of assuming office as a
Minister and he thus forfeited his right to continue as a Minister. The Minister
resigned his office. The Court however dismissed the petition.
The pattern of interaction between the Executive and the Legislature in a State is
similar to that existing at the Centre. A few broad features of this may be
recapitulated here.
The Ministers are members of the Legislature and responsible to the Legislative
Assembly. They stay in office so long as they are able to command the confidence
of the majority in that House.
The Legislature has ample opportunities of criticizing and shaping the policies of the
Executive. It is a recurring process and opportunity is taken in this respect inter alia
at the time of legislation, discussion of the Governor’s speech and his messages and
consideration of demands.
Further, the Legislature is entitled to fix the emoluments of the Ministers. The
ordinance-making power of the Executive is also subject to legislative control.
As at the Centre so in the States, the Executive also has ample opportunities to
control the Legislature. It summons and prorogues the Houses and may dissolve the
Assembly. It initiates practically all legislation and enjoys a veto power over
legislation. It plays a leading part in discussion on financial matters in the Legislature
and initiates all demands.
Under the Constitution, there are several categories of action which the Governor
may take in his discretion, viz. :
(1) Art. 200 requires him to reserve for the President’s consideration any Bill which
in his opinion derogates from the powers of the High Court;
(2) To reserve any other Bill [Art. 200];
(3) To appoint the Chief Minister of the State;
(4) Governor’s report under Art. 356;
(5) Governor’s responsibility for certain regions such as the Tribal Areas in Assam
and responsibilities placed on the Governor’s shoulders under Arts. 371A, 371C,
371E, 371H.
Another bone of contention has been the question of dissolving the House. He is to
take a decision to dissolve or not to dissolve the House on a consideration of the
totality of circumstances. He may refuse to accept the advice of the Ministry which
has lost the majority support if in his view an alternative stable government can be
formed. The Governor may, however, be bound to accept the advice for dissolution
by a Ministry having a majority support.
The discretionary element in the matter of dissolution can be reduced if, as suggested
earlier, a convention is adopted to grant dissolution to a defeated Chief Minister if
he had a majority earlier. There is however great reluctance in the public to hold
frequent elections as holding of an election in India is a very costly proposition.
Therefore, dissolution of the Assembly ought to be resorted to only as a last resort.
This enhances the discretion of the Governor instead of reducing it. This also
encourages the cult of defection of members from one party to another.
The State Executive has power to appoint judges to the subordinate Courts in the
State [Art. 233-237]. Besides, the question whether a member of the State
Legislature has become subject to a disqualification or not is formally decided by
the Governor [Art. 192].
The State Executive has ordinance-making power similar to that enjoyed by the
Central Executive.
According to Art. 213(1), which is in pari materia to Art. 123, which has already
been discussed earlier, the State Governor may promulgate such ordinances as the
circumstances appear to him to require when—(1) the State Legislative Assembly is
not in session; or if the State has two Houses, when one of the Houses is not in
session; and (2) the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it
necessary for him to take immediate action.
According to the provision to Art. 213(1), the Governor cannot, without instructions
from the President, promulgate any ordinance if:—(a) a Bill to that effect would,
under the Constitution, have required the previous sanction of the President for its
introduction into the State Legislature; or, (b) if the Governor would have deemed it
necessary to reserve a Bill to that effect for the President’s consideration; or, (c), an
Act of the State Legislature to that effect would have been invalid under the
Constitution without receiving the President’s assent.
STATE JUDICIARY
The primary duty of the Judiciary is to uphold the Constitution and the Laws without
fear or favour, without being biased by political ideology or economic theory. The
State Judiciary consists of a High Court and a system of subordinate courts. The
High Court is at the apex of the State judicial system. The High Court’s come below
the Supreme Court in India’s judicial hierarchy.
The institution of the High Courts is fairly old as it dates back to 1862 when under
the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, High Courts were established at Calcutta, Bombay
and Madras. In course of time, other High Courts also came to be established.4 The
Constitution builds the structure of the High Courts, on the pre-existing foundations.
At present, each State in India has a High Court [Art. 214]. Parliament may,
however, establish by law a common High Court for two or more States [Art 231(1)].
The High Courts enjoy civil as well as criminal, ordinary as well as extraordinary,
and general as well as special jurisdiction. The High Courts enjoy an original
jurisdiction in respect of testamentary, matrimonial, company and guardianship
matters.
The Central Executive and the State Executive provide the political input in the
process of selection of the Judges. Since the inauguration of the Constitution, the
question has been considered by some authorities: how to ensure that the Judges are
selected on non-political considerations? It is thought that it is necessary for securing
the independence and objectivity of the Judiciary that Judges be selected on merit
and not on political considerations.
The matter was considered by the Law Commission as early as 1958. In its XIV
Report, the Commission opined that the High Court Judges were not always
appointed on merit because of the influence of the State Executive. Accordingly, the
Commission suggested that the Chief Justice of the High Court should have a bigger
role to play in the matter of appointment of the Judges; that it should be only on his
recommendation that a Judge be appointed, and also that concurrence, and not only
consultation, of the Chief Justice of India be needed for this purpose.
The Government of India did not accept this recommendation. On the other hand, it
stated that, as a matter of course, the High Court Judges had been appointed with the
concurrence of the Chief Justice of India.
Legal History was made in India when in Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India,
for the first time, the Supreme Court quashed the appointment of Shri K.N.
Srivastava, Secretary (Law and Justice), Mizoram Government, as a High Court
Judge on the ground that he was not qualified to be appointed as such.
The appointment of Shri Srivastava as a High Court Judge was challenged through
a writ petition moved in the Gauhati High Court by a practicing advocate and the
High Court granted a stay on the warrant of appointment. Shri Srivastava then moved
the Supreme Court against the High Court order and moved a transfer petition of the
writ petition from the High Court to the Supreme Court.
Referring to Art. 217(2)(a), the Court pointed out that the question was whether Shri
Srivastava had held a judicial office for 10 years. The term ‘judicial office’ has not
been defined in the Constitution but, according to the Court, holder of ‘judicial
office’ under Art. 217(2)(a) means a person who exercises only judicial functions,
determines causes inter partes and renders decisions in a judicial capacity. He must
belong to the judicial service which as a class is free from executive control and is
disciplined to hold the dignity, integrity and independence of judiciary.
The Court made it clear that ordinarily the domain in such matters lay wholly with
the constitutional authorities but in exceptional circumstances like the present, where
the incumbent did not fulfil the qualification prescribed for the office, it became the
Court’s duty to see that no ineligible or unqualified person was appointed to a high
constitutional and august office of a High Court Judge.
TRANSFER OF JUDGES
The question of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another has raised
controversies from time to time. During the emergency of 1975, 16 High Court
Judges were transferred from one High Court to another. It was widely believed that
the Government did so as a punitive measure to punish those Judges who had dared
to give judgments against it.
Article 222(1) empowers the President to transfer a Judge from one High Court to
another after consulting the Chief Justice of India. Under Art. 222(2), the transferred
Judge is entitled to receive, in addition to his salary, such compensatory allowance
as may be determined by Parliament by law, and until so determined, as the President
may fix by order.
As the phraseology of Art. 222(1) stands, neither the consent of the Judge is
necessary to his transfer nor is the opinion of the Chief Justice binding on the
Government. A Judge of the Gujarat High Court was transferred to the Andhra
Pradesh High Court without his consent. He challenged his transfer through a writ
petition in the High Court and the matter came ultimately before the Supreme Court
in India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth.
JURISDICTION AND POWERS
As a Court of record, the High Court is entitled to preserve its original record in
perpetuity. Besides, as a Court of record the High Court has twofold powers:
(i) it has power to determine the question about its own jurisdiction; and
(ii) it has inherent power to punish for its contempt summarily.
The Constitution thus maintains the status quo existing on January 25, 1950, in
respect of the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts. The reason for this is that
the High Courts are institutions of respectable antiquity that these courts had been
in existence much before the advent of the present Constitution and they are not new
bodies created for the first time by the Constitution. The status quo in respect of the
High Courts is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and any law made by the
appropriate Legislature in pursuance of its powers under the Constitution [Art. 225].
This power of superintendence and control over all Subordinate Courts and tribunals
is both of administrative and judicial nature, and, such power could be exercised suo
motu. However the power of superintendence does not imply that the High Court
can influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in a particular
manner. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
traced the High Court’s history of the power of Superintendence now elevated in the
Constitution as Art. 227. The court pointed out that the material part of Art. 227
substantially reproduces the provisions of S.107 of the Government of India Act,
1917. The power of the High Court was not merely ‘administrative superintendence’
apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional
jurisdiction on the High Court. It was noticed that S. 107 was reproduced as S. 244
in the Government of India Act, 1935 which, in turn, was reproduced with some
modification as Art. 227 of the Constitution.
In the modern era of welfare state, when there is governmental action on a vast scale,
a procedure to obtain speedy and effective redress against an illegal exercise of
power by the Executive is extremely desirable. Through writs, the High Courts are
able to control, to some extent, the administrative authorities in the modern
administrative age. The writ system provides an expeditious and less expensive
remedy than any other remedy available through the normal Court-process.
The power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Art. 226 is an original
power whereas the power of the Supreme Court while entertaining an appeal under
Art. 136 is an appellate power.
A High Court exercises its writ jurisdiction throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises its jurisdiction. The High Court can issue a writ—
(1) To a person or authority having its location or residence within the Court’s
territorial jurisdiction; or,
(2) If the cause of action either wholly or partly arises within the High Court’s
territorial jurisdiction.
Although in view of Section 141 CPC the provisions thereof would not apply to writ
proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) CPC and Article 226(2) being in
pari materia, the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered on interpretation of
Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also.
The Supreme Court has emphasized time and again that the power of the High Court
under Art. 226 is supervisory in nature and is not akin to appellate power. The main
purpose of this power is to enable the High Court to keep the various authorities
within the bounds of their powers, but not to sit as an appellate body over these
authorities.
While exercising power under Art. 226, the High Court cannot go into the
correctness or merits of the decision taken by the concerned authority but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made; it only ensures that the authority arrives
at its decision according to law and in accordance with the principles of natural
justice wherever applicable.
Public Interest Litigation relates to the nature of the proceedings and has no inbuilt
implications as to the forum competent to deal with such litigation. In practice,
however, PIL is, almost invariably, filed in the High Court under Article 226 or the
Supreme Court under Article 32. When the complainant invokes the jurisdiction of
the High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively, many
of the principles applied by the Courts while reviewing under Article 226 or Article
32 are applied.
For example, the principle that questions concerning title to property where there is
a factual dispute, the High Court or the Supreme Court will not take upon itself the
burden of resolving such dispute; and more so when a civil suit relating to the same
dispute and same property was pending.
THE WRITS
(i) HABEAS CORPUS
The writ of habeas corpus is used to secure release of a person who has been detained
unlawfully or without legal justification. The great value of the writ is that it enables
an immediate determination of a person’s right to freedom. Detention may be
unlawful if inter alia it is not in accordance with law, or the procedure established
by law has not been strictly followed in detaining a person, or there is no valid law
to authorize detention, or the law is invalid because it infringes a Fundamental Right,
or the Legislature enacting it exceeds its limits.
Detention should not contravene Art. 22, as for example, a person who is not
produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of his detention is entitled to be
released. The power of detention vested in an authority, if exceeded, abused or
exercised mala fide makes the detention unlawful.
QUO WARRANTO The writ lies only in respect of a public office of a substantive
character. The writ does not therefore lie to question the appointment of a college
principal as it is not a public office.
The writ calls upon the holder of a public office to show to the Court under what
authority he is holding that office. The Court may oust a person from an office to
which he is not entitled. It is issued against the usurper of an office and the
appointing authority is not a party. The Court can thus control election or
appointment to an office against law, and protect a citizen from being deprived of a
public office to which he may be entitled.
MANDAMUS
Mandamus is a command issued by a Court commanding a public authority to
perform a public duty belonging to its office. Mandamus is issued to enforce
performance of public duties by authorities of all kinds. For example, when a tribunal
omits to decide a matter which it is bound to decide, it can be commanded to
determine the questions which it has left undecided. Although the Court ordinarily
is reluctant to assume the functions of the statutory functionaries it will step in by
mandamus when the State fails to perform its duty. It shall also step in when the
discretion is exercised but the same has not been done legally and validly. And even
though existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to exercise jurisdiction under
Art. 226, it will not ordinarily do so unless it is found that an order has been passed
wholly without jurisdiction or contradictory to the constitutional or statutory
provisions or where an order has been passed without complying with the principles
of natural justice.
SUBORDINATE JUDICIARY
In each State there is a system of subordinate courts below the High Court. The
Constitution makes a few provisions in Articles 233 to 237 to regulate the
organization of these courts and to ensure independence of the subordinate judges.
The Supreme Court has emphasized again and again on the maintenance of
independence and integrity of the subordinate judiciary which is closest to the
people. Accordingly, the Court has through its various decisions promoted the
independence of these courts from executive control and, to this effect, has expanded
the control of the High Courts over the subordinate judiciary, so as to strengthen the
independence of the subordinate courts from executive control.
APPOINTMENT OF DISTRICT JUDGES
Under Art. 233 (1), appointment, posting and promotion of district judges in a State
are made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. Under Art. 233(2), a
person not already in the ‘service of the State’ is eligible to be appointed as a district
judge only if— (i) he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader,
and (ii) is recommended by the High Court for such appointment. From the tenor of
Art. 233, it appears that there are two sources of recruitment of district judges, viz.;
(i) service of the Union or the State;
(ii) Members of the Bar.