Transocean Field Ops Manual

Title:
FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL
Revision Status:
Level: L1B
Classification: HANDBOOK
Manual Number: HQS-OPS-HB-05
Issue Number: 01
Revision Number: 01
Revision Date: NOVEMBER 11, 2005
Transocean
NONCONTROLLED
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-HB-05 SUBSECTION: N/A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 1 ........................................................................................................... GENERAL
SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION
SUBSECTION 2 THE OPERATIONS GROUP FUNCTION
SUBSECTION 3 OPERATIONS GROUP ORGANIZATION, ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
SUBSECTION 4 OPERATIONS DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION AND
DESCRIPTION
SUBSECTION 5 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
SECTION 2 ..............................................................................................ADMINISTRATION
SUBSECTION 1 CERTIFICATES AND SURVEYS

SUBSECTION 2 FIELD OPERATIONAL REPORTING
SUBSECTION 3 OPERATIONAL EVENT REPORTING
SUBSECTION 4 REQUEST FOR ENGINEERING ACTION
SUBSECTION 5 MODIFICATIONS, UPGRADES AND CERTIFICATION OF
EQUIPMENT
SUBSECTION 6 REMOTE OFFICE START-UP AND CLOSE-DOWN
SUBSECTION 7
APPENDIX 1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – SALE OF OWNED OR
TRANSFER OF MANAGED INSTALLATIONS TO A
SECOND PARTY
SUBSECTION 8 REVISIONS TO HQS OPERATIONS GROUP LEVEL 1
MANUALS
SUBSECTION 9 DOCUMENT RETENTION AND CONTROL
SECTION 3 ..................................................................................................... OPERATIONS
DRILLING RELATED OPERATIONS
SUBSECTION 1.1 WELL CONTROL – INCIDENT PREVENTION AND

MANAGEMENT
SUBSECTION 1.2 WELL CONTROL – EQUIPMENT
SUBSECTION 1.3 DRILLER’S KEY RESPONSIBILITIES
SUBSECTION 1.4 PUMPING FLAMMABLE OR COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS
SUBSECTION 1.5 SIMULTANEOUS DRILLING AND PRODUCTION
OPERATIONS
SUBSECTION 1.6 WELL TESTING
Hardcopies are printed from an electronic system and are not controlled
ISSUE NO: 01 REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF
REVISION DATE: NOVEMBER 11, 2005 1 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX 1RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – WELL TEST PLANNING

INFORMATION CHECKLIST
APPENDIX 2 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – WELL TEST HAZID
EXAMPLE
APPENDIX 3 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – WELL TEST - DST
EXAMPLE FLOWCHARTS
SUBSECTION 1.7 WELL PLANNING
APPENDIX 1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – INTRODUCTION AND
CHECKLISTS
APPENDIX 2 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – SITE SPECIFIC
CONDITIONS
APPENDIX 3 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – DP PLANNING
CHECKLIST
SUBSECTION 1.8 PERSON IN CHARGE
SUBSECTION 1.9 SURFACE BOP OPERATIONS FROM FLOATING
VESSELS
SUBSECTION 1.10 TRIPPING
SUBSECTION 1.11 CARE AND HANDLING OF TUBULARS
MARINE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RELATED OPERATIONS
SUBSECTION 2.1 MARINE OPERATIONS

APPENDIX 1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – NAVIGATIONAL
PRACTICES
APPENDIX 2 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – BRIDGE OPERATIONS
(SELF-PROPELLED INSTALLATIONS)
APPENDIX 3 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – OFFICIAL LOG BOOKS
APPENDIX 4 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – OPERATIONS WITH
OTHER VESSELS
APPENDIX 5 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
SUBSECTION 2.2 INSTALLATION MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN
WATER
SUBSECTION 2.3 LOCATION APPROVAL
APPENDIX 1 PROCEDURE - TOWING OF SEMI-SUBMERSIBLES
APPENDIX 2 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE - INSTALLATION
LOCATION APPROVAL AND MOVE REPORT
APPENDIX 3 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE - VOYAGE PLANS
APPENDIX 4 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE - OPERATOR FURNISHED
DATA
APPENDIX 5 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE - SELF-ELEVATING
INSTALLATIONS IN FIELD MOVES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX 6
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE - SELF-ELEVATING
INSTALLATION RIG MOVER CERTIFICATION
APPENDIX 7 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE - ANCHOR HANDLING
VESSELS
SUBSECTION 2.4 24 HOUR OPERATIONAL MANNING
SUBSECTION 2.5 RISER OPERATIONS
APPENDIX 1 PROCEDURE – RISER SPACEOUT
APPENDIX 2 PROCEDURE – RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL
APPENDIX 3 PROCEDURE – RISER CONNECTED MODE
OPERATIONS
APPENDIX 4 PROCEDURE – TENSIONER RING OPERATIONS
APPENDIX 5 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – RISER STORM HANG
OFF
APPENDIX 6 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – DEEPWATER WELL
HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
APPENDIX 7 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – GUIDELINES FOR
MOVING ONTO A PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED SUBSEA
WELLHEAD
SUBSECTION 2.6 DYNAMIC POSITIONING WELL SPECIFIC
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES (WSOG)
APPENDIX 1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – WELL SPECIFIC
OPERATING GUIDELINES
APPENDIX 2 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – WELL SPECIFIC
OPERATING GUIDELINES – DST EXAMPLE
APPENDIX 3 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – DYNAMIC POSITIONING
WATCH CIRCLES
APPENDIX 4 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – PERSONNEL
APPENDIX 5 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – DP COMMUNICATION
AND ALARMS
APPENDIX 6 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – DP DOCUMENTATION
AND REPORTING
APPENDIX 7 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – DP OPERATIONS AND
TRIALS
APPENDIX 8 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – DP TECHNICAL ISSUES
SECTION 4 ................................................................................................................ ANNEX
SUBSECTION 1 DOCUMENT CONTROL / TABLE OF REVISIONS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT MATRIX
FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-HB-05 SUBSECTION: 1
GENERAL
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the company’s management system is to define and communicate

company leadership’s values, beliefs and expectations. This provides direction so that
people can align their efforts and determine the best methods to achieve the desired result.
The company management system establishes consistent performance standards across

the company’s worldwide operation; describes processes for monitoring results, improving
performance, and capturing and sharing lessons learned; and provides people with the
opportunity to align their understanding of expectations, make personal commitments, and
to apply their efforts to meet performance standards.
The Company Management System includes performance standards established at all

three levels: Level 1 – Corporate, Level 2 – Business Unit and Division, and Level 3 –
Installation.
This manual represents a Level 1B document within the Company Management System.
Its purpose is to communicate the Operations group performance standards. The VP
Engineering and Technical Services and the VP Technology and Performance are the
designated owners of this document and are responsible for its content and
implementation.
Recommended changes to the procedures in this manual are submitted to Quality Services
through the SMART process, (see the Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-
GOV, in Section 5.1). The SMART (System Management and Review Team) process
enables people at different levels in the Company (Corporate, Business Unit, and
Installation) to propose and implement changes to the Company Management System
through the individual Core Management Functions.
The relationship between this manual and the other Management System documents is
found in the Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV, in Section 5.2.
In the Responsibility Section of each Procedure detailed in this manual there is a letter (D),
(I), or (A) noted after each job category with a responsibility. These letters are designed to
be used in conjunction with the End User’s Matrix, in order for individuals with different job
categories to be able to quickly and easily review the End Users Matrix and locate each
section of each manual where they have responsibilities indicated. The meaning behind
each of these letters is detailed below:
(D) – Direct Responsibility:
This job category has a Direct Responsibility for a Policy/Procedure. This means that the
employee is responsible for performing some specific action(s) that are required.
GENERAL
INTRODUCTION
(I) – Indirect Responsibility:
This job category has an Indirect Responsibility for a Policy/Procedure. This means that the
employee is responsible for ensuring that some specific action(s) are performed that are
required.
(A) Aware:
This job category has a responsibility to be Aware of the Policy/Procedure in certain

situations.
GENERAL
THE OPERATIONS GROUP FUNCTION
The HQS Operations Group is divided into three key components, “Engineering and
Technical Services”, “Performance and Technology” and “Marketing”. The combined
group, which forms part of the Company’s management organization, is responsible for
providing all related services to Operations. This level 1B manual details specifically, the
Policies and Procedures relative to “Engineering and Technical Services” and
“Performance and Technology” which support the day to day Field Operations.
The roles of Engineering and Technical Services Group key areas are:
• Provide engineering services for the analysis, evaluation and design of installation
upgrades, new construction projects or major repairs and refurbishments.
• Ensure that Company assets are maintained in good condition and that they perform
to required standards.
• Monitor equipment related downtime performance and ensure that adequate
corrective or improvement measures are taken and that these measures are shared
across the fleet when appropriate.
• Provide engineering and technical support for the operations and marketing of our
assets and services.
• Maintain a technical leadership position in deepwater and technically demanding
drilling services.
• Provide project management services for new construction, major upgrade, major
repair and engineering projects.
• Foster a close technical relationship with clients, classification societies and regulatory
bodies.
• Ensure that materials and services required for daily operations or construction
projects are procured and delivered to the installations when needed.
The roles of Performance and Technology Group key areas are:
• Promote operational efficiency by making assessments of operations and verification

of compliance with Corporate Operations policies and procedures.
• Foster the identification and implementation of best practices and operational
standardization throughout the Company.
• Identify and assess new technology for application on Company installations.
REVISION DATE: DECEMBER 1, 2004 1 2
GENERAL
THE OPERATIONS GROUP FUNCTION
• Provide operational planning and well construction support to improve the service
delivery to the Company’s clients.
GENERAL
OPERATIONS GROUP ORGANIZATION, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1 DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
The Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer (COO), is responsible for the
performance of the Operations Group. The Vice President Engineering and
Technical Services and the Vice President Technology and Performance are
authorized to establish the policies and procedures and to ensure they are
communicated and implemented effectively. They have the responsibility to monitor
performance and identify corrective and improvement opportunities and to ensure
actions are followed up and completed.
2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The responsibilities for HQS Operations Group are summarized below:
2.1 THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO)
The President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is responsible for safe and efficient
operations and the financial performance of the Company and the following
operational considerations:
2.2.1 Assure that the value placed on safety in operations is never compromised at
the highest level of the Company.
2.2.2 Final approval of the necessary resources to maintain and improve the
Company’s operations.
The President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reports directly to the Board of
Directors.
2.2 EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER (COO)
The Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) is responsible for
safe, efficient operations and financial performance for operations and the following
operational considerations:
2.2.1 Ensure implementation of operating policies and procedures of the Company.
2.2.2 Assist the Marketing Department with contracts that support Company
operating policies, procedures and philosophies
2.2.3 Assist in the establishment of annual worldwide operating objectives and

goals.
GENERAL
2.2.4 Actively support and recognize the efforts of personnel.
The Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) reports directly to
the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
2.3 VICE PRESIDENT, TECHNOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE
The Vice President, Technology and Performance is responsible for the safe,
efficient operations and financial performance of activities worldwide and for
the following operational considerations:
2.4.1 Review and preliminary approval of relevant Company level 1A operating

policies, procedures and related documentation applicable to world wide
operations
2.4.2 Review and approval of relevant Company level 1B operating policies,

procedures and related documentation applicable to world wide operations.
2.4.3 Ensure a consistent approach to performance measurement, monitoring, and

improvement across all Business Units.
2.4.4 Oversee the identification and review of new technology for potential
application on Company installations.
2.4.5 Oversee global project management and integrated service activities offering
innovative technical and commercial solutions.
2.4.6 Monitor and assess the performance of key projects and operations to ensure
achievement of objectives.
2.4.7 Monitor and implement operating policies and procedures worldwide
The Vice President, Technology and Performance reports directly to the Executive
Vice President and C.O.O.
2.4 VICE PRESIDENT, ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES
The Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services is responsible for the safe,
efficient operation, maintenance, preservation and upgrade of Company Installations
worldwide, and the following operational considerations:
2.4.1 Review and approval of Company level 1A and 1B operating policies,

procedures, and related documentation applicable to worldwide operations.
GENERAL
2.4.2 Ensure that Engineering and technical support is provided for operations,
technology development and marketing needs worldwide.
2.4.3 Ensure that upgrade, maintenance and construction projects are properly
planned, engineered and controlled.
2.4.4 Monitor downtime performance of worldwide Installations and ensure

solutions are implemented and best practices are shared across the fleet
2.4.5 Review, approval and implementation of the maintenance management,

global procurement and materials management systems.
The Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services reports directly to the
Executive Vice President and C.O.O.
The Corporate Engineering and Technical Services Organizational Charts is located

on the Engineering and Technical Services web page at
http://www.rigcentral.com/hqs/eng/ .
GENERAL
OPERATIONS DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION AND DESCRIPTION
1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION
The document structure for Operations documents is shown below in Figure 1.4.2.
This includes the departmental policy and procedure manual and all supporting
manuals and documents. The manual and document types are identified by the third
set of letters in the document number using Figure 1.4.1.
Figure 1.4.1 Manual and Document Type and Identifiers
2 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Each manual and document shown in Figure 1.4.2 is accompanied by a brief

description. The description includes a summary of the content and, in the case of
supporting manuals, a reference to the policy(s) supported.
GENERAL
Figure 1.4.2 Operations Document Organization Chart
HQS-OPS-PP-01 OPP Manual: This manual contains ALL of the

Operations Group approved Policies, a summary of key
Operations Manual elements of procedures required to comply, references and
links to the supporting procedures for accessing the
Policies & Procedures
documents readily, as well as individual employee
responsibilities relating to each policy/procedure.
Policies and Procedures are prescriptive and subject to the

audit process.
Field Operations Manual: This manual contains the

HQS-OPS-HB-05 detailed field operations procedures and associated
Field Operations recommended practices (where applicable) developed and
implemented to ensure compliance with the Policies. The
Handbook purpose of this handbook is to provide the user with one
easy reference manual regarding Field Operations.
Well Control Manual: This handbook contains a copy

of all Policies and Procedures relating to Well Control
HQS-OPS-HB-01 issues detailed in HQS-OPS-PP-01 Sections 3
Well Control Subsections 1.1 and 1.2 as well as recommended
practices and supporting information required to implement
Handbook and maintain the Company’s Well Control Management
System. The purpose of this handbook is to provide the
user with one easy reference manual regarding Well
Control.
Surface BOP Operations From Floating

Vessels Manual: This handbook contains a copy of
HQS-OPS-HB-02
all Policies and Procedures relating to Surface BOP issues
Surface BOP detailed in HQS-OPS-PP-01 Section 3 Subsection 1.9 as
well as recommended practices and supporting
Handbook information required to implement and maintain the
Company’s Surface BOP Management System. The
purpose of this handbook is to provide the user with one
easy reference manual regarding Surface BOP Operations
from a Floating Vessel.
HQS-OPS-HB-03 Certificate And Survey Manual: This handbook

contains a recommended practice for compliance with
Certificate and Survey Company Policy, Classification Society Standards/Rules,
Flag State Requirements and Coastal State Legislation.
Handbook
Coatings Manual: This handbook contains a copy of

HQS-OPS-HB-04 all Policies and Procedures relating to Coatings issues
detailed in HQS-OPS-PP-01 Section 4 Subsection 5 as
Coatings well as recommended practices and supporting
information required to implement and maintain the
Handbook Company’s Coatings Management System. The purpose
Continued of this handbook is to provide the user with one easy
GENERAL
Figure 1.4.2 Operations Document Organization Chart (continued)
GENERAL
2.1 HQS OPERATIONS INTRANET SITE
Other documentation and information related to Operations is found on the

Engineering and Technical Services intranet site at
http://www.rigcentral.com/hqs/eng/ . This includes the following:
• Engineering and Technical Services Organization Chart and Team Members
• Contacts List
• Office Start-Up and Close-Down Checklists
• Fleet Spares
• Master Service Agreement
• Good Housekeeping Example Photographs
• Field Reporting Schedule
GENERAL
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
1 POLICY
Change to situations or unexpected events must be recognized and the

associated risks managed.
Reference: Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV.
2 PURPOSE
The purpose of this policy is to ensure personnel understand what is required to

plan, recognize and manage change by the following:
• Ensure all personnel involved with or affected by a task or process have the
knowledge and skills necessary to anticipate and recognize changes to or
deviations from the planned task or process.
• Ensure all personnel understand the importance of identifying and consulting
with all other personnel, departments, work groups, and so on, while planning
and performing the task.
• Ensure the task or process is interrupted when planned and/or unexpected
change occurs.
• When unexpected change occurs, ensure the plan is revised and
communicated to all involved or affected personnel prior to the task or
process resuming.
• Ensure proper review, approval and notification of affected parties occurs
prior to planned or expected changes.
• Ensure all personnel understand the tools and processes used for
anticipating, recognizing and managing the risk associated with the change.
3 SCOPE
This policy covers all personnel that work at any Company Installation, facility or
office.
4 PROCEDURE
The procedure which supports this policy is described in the HSE Policies and
Procedures Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01 and the Company Management System
Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV.

ADMINISTRATION
CERTIFICATES AND SURVEYS
1 POLICY
All Installations and facilities must comply with applicable Classification

Society Rules, Flag State Requirements and Coastal State Regulations.
Reference: Operations Policy and Procedures Manual, HQS-OPS-PP-01 Section 2,

Subsection 1.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure that all installations and facilities are maintained in accordance with
internationally recognised rules, standards, requirements and legislation and provide
the necessary documentation for the installation to:
• continue marine operations,
• freely engage in international operations,
• operate in certain local areas,
• obtain insurance cover, and
• meet contractual requirements.
3 SCOPE
This procedure applies to all installations and facilities owned, operated or managed
by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 GENERAL
All Installations and facilities must implement and maintain a system to manage and
control Surveys, Inspections, Certificates and Survey Documents. The system must
include the following:
• Classification and Regulatory certification maintained current and up to date,
• Classification and Regulatory certification documents are accessible and
available on the installation,
• Classification and Regulatory certification non-compliances are tracked,
followed up and closed out,
• Certificate and Survey document handling system meets the above
requirements. (Refer to the Certificate and Survey Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-03,
Section 1.8, Figure 1.8.1, Certificate and Survey Handling System for an
example).
ADMINISTRATION
4.2 REVIEW OF DISTRIBUTED CORRESPONDENCE
Any person in receipt of correspondence dealing with changes or proposed changes

or amendments to the following list, must route this correspondence to the
appropriate responsible Business Unit Manager for their review and action as
required:
• Statutory legislation,
• Regulatory rules and regulations,
• Flag state rules including maritime regulations,
• Classification and certification body rules,
• International standards.
4.3 INSURANCE POLICY RIG REACTIVATION REQUIREMENT
Units being reactivated from a stacked location shall be surveyed by an approved

surveyor hereon if the unit has been stacked for 180 days or more. All surveyor
recommendations shall be complied with prior to departure from the stacked
location.
While it is recognized that ABS or the other classification societies perform a survey
prior to reactivation, the focus is not the same. The classification societies are
almost exclusively concerned with the seaworthiness of the rig. Underwriters are
concerned not only with seaworthiness, but also with the operational capability of the
reactivated rig.
Documentation of a rig’s compliance with flag registry, classification society and ISM
protocol requirements typically may be sufficient to allow the surveyor to issue a rig
reactivation certificate (insurance underwriter version) without the need for an onsite
visit. Please contact the policy approved surveyors for exact requirements.
Policy Approved Surveyors
• Matthews Daniel Company

• Noble Denton & Associates
• John LeBourhis & Associates
• Global Maritime
• JF Moore International, Inc
• Falconer, Bryan & Associates Pte Ltd. - Far East / Australian operations only
• London Offshore Consultants Inc. - Australian operations only
ADMINISTRATION
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager has overall responsibility for ensuring the Installation is in
compliance with this Policy at all times. In discharging this responsibility, the Rig
Manager may delegate authority to nominated persons, as appropriate.
5.2 REQUIRED PERSONNEL (A)
The following personnel must be aware of this policy:

• OIM
• All installation and facility Supervisors
6 DOCUMENTATION
• Certificate and Surveys Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-03.
• Finance Manual, HQS-FIN-PP-01, Section 16 Subsection 3 Item 4.3
ADMINISTRATION
FIELD OPERATIONAL REPORTING
1 POLICY
All Installations and Facilities must report operational performance, financial

results, and other information as required in the Field Reporting Schedule
located on the HQS Engineering and Technical Services Web site.

Subsection 2.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure required information regarding field performance and events is

communicated within the Company, as per an identified reporting schedule.
3 SCOPE
This procedure covers Company personnel, Installations and facilities.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 GENERAL
1. English is the official language of the Company. Internal written

Correspondence and Company related documentation must be in the English
language. To the extent practical and necessary, Company policies,
procedures and work instructions must be published in the local language.
2. Reports must never be falsified. Corrected report(s) must be accompanied by

an explanation of why the change is being made.
3. Reporting requirements from other corporate departments are contained in

the respective manual e.g., accounting reports in the Finance Manual, HQS-
FIN-PP-01, personnel reports in the Human Resources Manual, HQS-HRM-
PP-01, incident and injury reports in the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01.
4. Copies of reports must be retained in accordance with the Company’s,

Corporate or Business Unit filing and document retention policy as applicable.
4.2 EMERGENCY REPORTING
1. Each Business Unit must document the procedures to be followed for

emergency response per the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01.
ADMINISTRATION
2. Reports of emergencies must be made on an immediate basis to the

Executive Vice President of Operations (COO), the Vice President
Engineering and Technical Services, and the Vice President Performance
and Technology. Examples of emergency situations include:
• Loss of life of one or more employees, third parties or visitors. (If this occurs,
the CEO and President must also be notified.)
• Any significant medical situation such as a serious disease.
• Civil unrest or detention of personnel.
• Any other situation that seriously jeopardizes employees, equipment or the
environment.
• Any event which triggers a Business Unit’s Emergency Response System
action.
4.3 HSE REPORTING
Reports regarding fatalities, serious injury, occupational illness, near hits, and
incidents involving environmental or property damage must be reported in
accordance with Incident Reporting requirements in the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-
01.
4.4 OPERATIONAL ABNORMALITY REPORTING
Each Business Unit Manager will either email or telephone a notification of an

“Operational Abnormality” within 24 hours of the event to the Senior Vice President
of Operations, the Vice President Engineering and Technical Services, and the Vice
President Performance and Technology., where any of the following has, or will
occur:
• Operations downtime or equipment failure that has lasted, or has the potential
to last, more than 6 hours.
• An environmental pollution problem or potential problem of note, i.e. a
reportable occurrence.
• Property damage in excess of $100,000.
• Problems or potential problems with Clients.
• Significant contractual problems.
• Injuries or illness that requires persons to be evacuated from their place of
work.
ADMINISTRATION
• Potential insurance claims as a result of property damage.

• Any other significant issues that are considered to have a material impact on
the Company’s well being.
The Company process for these reports is detailed the Operations Policies and
Procedures Manual, HQS-OPS-PP-01.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT MANAGER (I)
Business Unit Managers are responsible for ensuring that procedures are
established dealing with the submission of reports within the Business Unit and for
the forwarding of required reports to the Headquarters Office.
5.2 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER / DIVISION MANAGER (D)
Business Unit Operations Managers are responsible for assisting the Business Unit
Manager to establish procedures dealing with the submission of reports within the
Business Unit and for ensuring that established reporting requirements regarding
subjects under his/her responsibility are correct and submitted to the Headquarters
Office according to the prescribed schedule.
5.3 ALL BUSINESS UNIT DEPARTMENT HEADS / RIG MANAGER / OIM /

INSTALLATION DEPARTMENT HEADS (D)
Responsible for ensuring that reports under their area of expertise and specified to
be supplied are correct and submitted according to the established schedule.
6 DOCUMENTATION
The reporting matrix which is a listing of reports required to be submitted by

Business Unit management to headquarters offices is located on the HQS
Engineering and Tech Services Rig Central website.
http://www.rigcentral.com/hqs/eng/
ADMINISTRATION
OPERATIONAL EVENT REPORTING
1 POLICY – HQS-OPS-PP-01 SECTION 2 SUBSECTION 3
All Operational Downtime, Equipment Failure Events and other significant

events involving Transocean’ s full or partial responsibility must be recorded,
investigated and appropriate action taken to avoid reoccurrence.

Subsection 3.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure that:
• Downtime and other significant operational events are properly and consistently
recorded.
• These events are fully investigated, including the failure analysis of parts when
prudent, and that the lessons are learned and shared across the Company.
• Action is taken to prevent reoccurrence.
The data collected in these reports is also used for equipment performance studies.
3 SCOPE
This procedure is applicable to all the Company operated installations. The

procedure below applies to all installations using GRS version 4 or higher for
operations reporting.
4 PROCEDURE
Equipment failure events and other significant events that represent incidents are
indicators where performance can be improved. Incident analysis uses critical
information to establish what happens, but more significant it determines how
important it is to the company to act on it. Incidents analysis identifies corrective and
improvement opportunities that represent lessons learned. The following three steps
are required to be completed for incident analysis:
• Fact finding
• Management review of facts
• Communication of corrective and improvement opportunities
Refer to the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01.

ADMINISTRATION
4.1 DEFINITIONS
4.1.1 NON PRODUCTIVE TIME (NPT)
Non Productive Time (NPT) is defined as any event caused by people, equipment,
procedure or environmental conditions that interrupts the normal course and
progress of the operations.
As illustrated in Figure 2.3.1 below, NPT is divided between Company NPT, Waiting
On Weather (WOW) and non-Company NPT. The Company NPT is further sub-
divided between planned NPT (preventive maintenance, other planned work
stoppages) and unplanned NPT. For the purpose of this policy, only unplanned
Company NPT is called Down Time (DT).
Non-Company NPT is sub-divided into three categories, WOW, non-productive time

associated with hole problems with the well and all non-productive time for which
other parties are responsible for such as the client or Third Party.
WOW incurred during or as a result of a DT event must be accounted for as DT.
The following events are NOT considered to be downtime, whatever the contractual
rate:
• Planned delay of operations required to carry out scheduled preventive
maintenance.
• Planned shut down of operations to carry out planned modifications to the
Installation or planned inspections such as SPS surveys.
• Delays while preparing for a new contract except due to equipment downtime
during client acceptance testing.
• Delays due to damages to the Installation as a result of operational incidents
beyond the Company’s control such as work-boat damage to the installation or
punch-through on a jack-up Installation.
• Delays to operations progress due to operational difficulties beyond our control.
• Waiting on weather (WOW) except where such WOW occurs during an on-going
Company responsible DT event.
• Waiting on client orders, equipment, materials or third parties.
• Interruptions due to events beyond our control such as those caused by Force
Majeure, National strikes, security disruption or governmental orders.
• Time spent performing drills or other preventive actions.
• Time spent recovering from and investigating personal injuries or incidents.
ADMINISTRATION
Figure 2.3.1, Operational Event Reporting
NPT
Operational Event
Transocean Waiting On Non Transocean

NPT Weather (WOW) NPT
Client/3rd Party
NPT
Examples:
+ Waiting on client orders
waiting on client or 3rd party
material or equipment
DOWN TIME + National Strike
+ Interruption of operation due to
security or community issues
Planned Unplanned + Time lost as a result of work
boat colliding with rig
Examples: + Time deemed lost while pulling
+ service TDS legs on jack up
+ Slip & cut DL Equipment
+ waiting on Failure
BOP's while Examples:
performing + failure of eqt resulting
scheduled PM on DT on the critical path
+ inspecting + operations resulting
the TDS shaft Hole Problems
from in-hole failure of
+ testing eqt or NPT
To tubular (wash-out or
performing full break)
planned eqt Examples:
+ failure of off-line eqt + Well Control events
checks affecting parallel opera- + Stuck Pipe or
+ safety tions. + Other well events not
stand-off attributable to Transocean
Procedure or
Operational
Examples:
+ Fishing operations to
fish eqt dropped in hole
by Transocean personnel
+ lost time recovering
a stand of pipe dropped
due to operator error.
+ time spent making mud
with ops interrupted
following accidental mud
loss under To control.
Other event
under TO control
Examples:
+ strike of Transocean
personnel
ADMINISTRATION
4.1.2 EQUIPMENT FAILURES (EFR)
Equipment Failures (EFR) designate short and relatively ordinary Company

equipment related events incurring less than 3 hours of down time and costing less
than $25K to fix.
4.1.3 MAJOR EQUIPEMENT FAILURES (MEF)
Major Equipment Failures (MEF) designate equipment failures that resulted in 3 or

more hours of downtime or in equipment damage or repairs worth $25,000 or more
or which, in the opinion of the originator, are significant and worthy of follow-up
and/or sharing with others.
4.1.4 PROCEDURAL ERROR OR FAILURES (PEF)
Procedural Error or Failures/Company responsible (PEF) designate operational

events or well problems caused by human error or procedural mistake(s) under the
Company’s responsibility. Examples of this are: fishing objects dropped in the well,
pulling back a string due to an error in the assembly or recovering a stand dropped
in the derrick due to an operator error. For the purpose of clarification, fishing or
string recovery operations following wash-out or failure of Company owned or
supplied tubular must be reported as equipment downtime in the category drill string.
Other events include all other events such as waiting on equipment or people,
security issues, strikes etc…
They are classed in:

• Other Events/Company responsible (OET) if they are under our control. For ex.,
waiting on equipment to be supplied by the Company or strike of the Company
staff only, and,
• Other Events or Well Events / Client & Third Party responsible (OEC & HPR) if
they are beyond our control. Example of OEC are waiting on client equipment,
orders or materials, Force Majeure event, national or general strike, security
events etc., and examples of HPR are well control events not attributable to
Transocean.
NOTE: The reported DT hours must include all the process hours lost as a
result of the event independently of the contractual rate structure. Equipment
DT must include all the hours lost and not just the time spent repairing the
equipment. Non equipment DT must include all the hours spent returning to
the previously achieved point or until final abandonment of the well.
ADMINISTRATION
Examples are provided for illustration at the end of this policy. In case of doubt, the
Installations and Rig Managers must seek clarification from the Business Unit
Operations Manager.
4.2 REPORTING PROCEDURE
The Operational Events to be reported in GRS include:

• Company Equipment related events whether they resulted in down time or not;
these events are divided in Equipment Failures (EFR) and Major Equipment
Failures (MEF).
• Company Non Equipment related down time classed as “Procedural Error or
Failure/Company responsible” (PEF) and “Other Events / Company responsible”
(OET).
• Other non-productive times beyond the company’s control classified into:
– Hole Problems (HPR) non-productive time associated with problems in the
hole beyond the company’s control
– WOW – non productive time associated with waiting on weather
– Client / Third Party Event which are all other non-productive for which the
company is not responsible (OEC)
If an operational event results in actual or potential personal injury, environmental

damage or property damage, the event is considered an incident that must be
reported as per the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01. This includes determining the
actual and potential severity values for personnel, environment and property.
Detailed instructions on the procedures outlined below can be found in the GRS
User’s Manual.
4.2.1 EVENTS HAVING INCURRED NO DOWN TIME
Major Company Equipment Failures that incurred no DT but will cost $25K or more
in repairs or replacement and other significant events which, in the opinion of the
originator, should be shared with the rest of the Company must be reported in GRS
using an Operation Event Report (OER). The appropriate report type (MEF or PEF)
must be selected. No DT hours can be included.
ADMINISTRATION
4.2.2 COMPANY EQUIPMENT RELATED DOWN TIME
All Company equipment related downtime must be reported in the GRS daily
operation report (DOR 1) and in an Operations Event Report (OER of either EFR or
MEF type). Such events will most of the time be coded IADC code 8 but the DT can
and must be recorded even if code 8 is not used (in agreement with the client for
example).
Equipment related DT is only captured in GRS if an OER is open, assigned a valid

equipment type and the OER number is quoted on each of the corresponding daily
operation report line(s). This is independent of the operation, IADC or daily rate
codes used and of the actual contractual arrangement.
All the operations caused by the event must be included. In particular, WOW
incurred during or following an equipment DT (BOP repair for ex.) must be included
in the equipment DT event by attaching the OER number to the relevant WOW
report in the DOR 1.
4.2.3 NON EQUIPMENT RELATED COMPANY DOWN TIME
All Company Non-Equipment related downtime must be reported in the GRS daily
operation report (DOR 1) and in an Operations Event Report (either PEF or OET
type).
4.2.4 WOW, CLIENT / THIRD PARTY RESPONSIBLE OR HOLE PROBLEM

RELATED NON PRODUCTIVE TIME
WOW must be reported in the DOR 1 using the WOW code. It does not require an
OER. However filling in an OER is strongly encouraged whenever, in the opinion of
the reporter, the event is significant and worth sharing with others in the company.
Other non productive time for which the Company bears no responsibility (i.e HPR,
OEC), must be reported in DOR 1 as either wait on client/third parties or, as
applicable and agreed with the client, as the corresponding operations (fishing for
ex.). It is also mandatory that an OER is filled for these events. GRS would only
capture these events as non productive time if an OER is properly filled.
4.2.5 PLANNED INTERRUPTIONS (PMS OR SPS)
Planned interruptions must not be reported as DT but instead be described using the
appropriate code. They do not require filling an OER. Planned maintenance in
particular must be reported using the code Planned Maintenance and IADC 7 codes.
ADMINISTRATION
However, if the contract requires such interruption to be coded IADC code 8 and/or
to be on zero rate, it should be reported as such in the DOR1. This must not affect
the Company internal DT record and the corresponding period(s) must not be
counted as DT.
4.2.6 EQUIPMENT RELATED OER’S (EFR & MEF)
A single OER must be used to capture all the DT incurred as a result of a single
equipment failure. If the DT is interrupted by productive operations before resuming
for the same cause, the same OER should be used and the same number should be
quoted in the DOR 1 lines corresponding to the additional DT.
An OER must be created, a valid equipment type selected and the OER number
quoted in each line reporting the DT in the DOR 1 for the DT to be correctly
accounted.
4.3 NPT SUMMARY REPORT
The breakdown in the NPT summary report generated in GRS version 4.0 will be as
per the following naming conventions:
4.3.1 TRANSOCEAN DT
Totals all mechanical downtime hours (EFR and MEF) plus all procedural downtime
hours (PEF) for the selected period.
4.3.2 OTHER TRANSOCEAN NPT
Totals all hours incurred during unplanned events plus all other downtime hours
(OET) for the selected period.
4.3.3 WOW – NPT
Totals all Wait on Weather events for the selected period.
4.3.4 HOLE PROBLEMS
NPT totals the hours for all HPR type events for the selected period.
4.3.5 CLIENT / THIRD PARTY
NPT totals the hours for all OEC type events for the selected period.
ADMINISTRATION
4.4 GRS-ONLINE OER REVIEW PROCESS
As soon as an OER report is validated and released by the rig, it will become
viewable in GRS-OnLine. Via subscription & notification, GRS-OnLine users are
able to subscribe to be notified when a report is available on-line and has advanced
to a certain stage of the review process.
To subscribe to the OER review process, the GRS-OnLine users will have to:
• Select the rigs they want to subscribe to (only rigs within their "jurisdiction" will be
available for selection).
• OER report, select the type(s) of reports they want to subscribe to (MEF, PEF,
OET, HPR & OEC). Can select one or a number of these types of reports. Note
the EFR report is not selectable as this report has no comment boxes.
• For the OER report, select the review level at which they want to subscribe.
There will be no constraint on the level so that anyone who has accessed to the
rig can subscribe at whatever level they chose.
• Whether they want to be notified by email or when they log into GRS (or both?)
The subscribers will be notified as follows:
• Level 0 subscribers will be notified as soon as the report is approved/released by
the rig (OIM) and received in GRS-OnLine
• Level 1 subscribers will be notified as soon as a comment has been made (by
anyone) in the level 0 (normally Rig Mgr) comment box (whether on line or in
GRS Rig) or 10 days after the date of the report if no comment has been made
before that time.
anyone) in the level 1 (normally Division level) comment box or 15 days after the
date of the report if no comment has been made before that time.
anyone) in the level 2 (normally Field Support level) comment box or 20 days
after the date of the report if no comment has been made before that time.
anyone) in the level 3 (normally Business Unit Mgt level) comment box or 29
days after the date of the report if no comment has been made before that time.
• Level 3 and 2 subscribers shall be notified if any comments are entered in the
level 4 comment box.
ADMINISTRATION
NOTE 1: The entry of comments in level 3 will also trigger a notification to

level 0 to 2 that the review of the OER has been completed.
NOTE 2: All the comment boxes will be visible. Any of the users with write
access to the OER can enter his/her comments in any comment box (and not
just in the box corresponding to the subscribed level). Even non subscribers
having write access to the report can enter comments in any comment box.
NOTE 3: Subscribing does not entail any obligation to comment or participate

in the review process. However, the Business Unit shall ensure that the review
process can function and ends up with the notification of level 4 users as well
as the completion of the feedback loop notifying the rig and level 0 to level 2
users of the completion of the review.
The aim is to allow company individuals at various management levels to provide

feedback and insight into the Event in a structured manner. Through Subscription
and Notification system, the OER will follow a data flow based on the company
organizational structure and will be accessible via 5 possible levels of subscription.
Anyone having access to a rig can subscribe for events (or reports) issued by the rig
at any level. However, the "normal" process and level of subscription would be:
• Level 0 for Rig managers (or anyone who wants to be notified immediately when
the report is released).
• Level 1 for Division level personnel (Division Mgr or Division Ops mgr)
• Level 2 for Business Unit Field Support and MPI personnel
• Level 3 for Business Unit Mgt personnel (Ops Mgr or his delegate)
• Level 4 for HQ personnel and personnel interested to view the report only once
the review process has been completed.
NOTE: The completion of the review process does not equal and is
independent from the closing of the OER which shall be done by the Rig Mgr
(on-line or on GRS Rig). Closing of the OER shall be when the "OER Closed"
toggle has been activated.
4.5 CLOSING OF OER’S
The purpose of the OER is not only to report and account for the event but also to
analyze the root causes of the event, to identify what can be done to prevent
reoccurrence and to document the follow-up and corrective action. The OER must
be completed by or with the input of the on-board person(s) competent to analyze
the event. The failure and the remedial work carried out must also be reported in the
Maintenance system (EMPAC or CAMM) as applicable.
ADMINISTRATION
No such report must be considered complete and closed until all the causes of the
failure and the recommended remedial actions have been identified and listed in the
OER. If the analysis work has not been done at the time the daily report is being
filled and more time is needed to complete the report, the OER should be left open
until such time it can be completed as required. It is always possible to come back
on and amend an OER if facts or conclusions that should be included in the report
are uncovered after a report has been submitted.
All the MEF and PEF reports must be reviewed, commented and closed by the
Rig Manager. The Rig Manager is responsible to determine when an OER can
be considered as closed. An OER should be considered closed when all the
required corrective action has been carried out or when the tracking of the
follow-up action is being done by an alternative mechanism. For example, an
OER can be considered closed if the follow-up action is contained in a FOCUS
improvement action or a Request for Engineering Action or a warranty claim
has been issued.
4.5.1 FAILURE ANALYSIS
Failed components and failure report shall be sent to Business Unit Field Support for
failure analysis when the cause of failure is not understood and there is concern that
a similar significant failure may be repeated. When practical the complete
undisturbed assembly containing the failed part shall be sent in for examination. The
conclusions of the failure analysis must be entered into GRS where the information
can be shared across the Company.
In cases where the parts are not sent in for analysis they should be tagged and
retained for 14 days as a precaution in case Field Support, Engineering or other
interested parties determine the component requires failure analysis.
4.6 DOWN TIME SUMMARY AND RATE SUMMARY
The OIM and the Rig Manager must use the GRS NPT summary report on a regular
– preferably weekly- basis to ensure that all the NPT incurred during the period has
been correctly reported in GRS.
The NPT and DT summary captures technical information that is different from
the Rate sheet; the total DT does not necessarily correspond to the loss of
revenue. Both sets of information are different and must be maintained
independently.
ADMINISTRATION
4.7 DUAL OR PARALLEL ACTIVITY OPERATIONS
The failure of equipment used for off-line activity is accounted for as DT when it
affects the global and not just the main line activity.
On the Enterprise Class Installations, any DT that interrupts on going activities on

the secondary rotary is considered to be DT (except if the main operations are
already interrupted).
On the Express Class Installations, any DT at an auxiliary station that stops or slows
down the main operation must be reported as DT.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 DEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISORS (D)
Departmental Supervisors are responsible to provide the information required to

report the OER’s. Maintenance personnel must be involved in the reporting of
equipment related OER’s and must also report the work done as required in EMPAC
or CAMM and reference the OER number in any work-order related to the event.
5.2 INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (OIM & RIG MANAGER) (D)
Installation Management is responsible to review and approve all OER’s and to

ensure a suitable analysis, follow-up and closing as required in this procedure.
5.3 BUSINESS UNIT MANAGEMENT (BUSINESS UNIT MANAGER OR HIS

DELEGATE) (I)
Business Unit Management must define the follow-up process required in the
Business Unit following release of the report by the Rig Manager and verify that this
process is working effectively.
6 EXAMPLES
6.1 EVENTS HAVING INCURRED NO DOWN TIME
• Premature failure of a bearing in a thruster unit due to oil contamination. No DT

but the unit is unserviceable and will need to be pulled. Failure could have been
avoided if oil analysis and oil filtering equipment had been used. Open an OER,
select MEF as report type and Mooring/Station Keeping as equipment type, fill
report in and submit via GRS.
ADMINISTRATION
• Refurbished equipment found defective upon receipt on board. Fill in an MEF

OER in support of a warranty claim.
6.2 EQUIPMENT RELATED DOWN TIME
• The Installation experiences 2.0 hrs of downtime due to the requirement to

change out 2 pump liners while circulating at reduced rate as drilling cannot
continue during the repairs. Two hours of DT must be reported in DOR 1
(Corrective Maintenance, IADC code 8, repair rate) and an OER created
(automatically suggested by GRS; type EFR, Equipment type “Mud Pumps”).
The OER number must be quoted in the DOR line reporting the DT.
• In the case where the Company Representative and the Company OIM agree
that it must not be recorded as code 8 on the IADC report but as circulating time,
the activity report may be amended to show circulation, IADC code 5, but the
OER should be filled in and its number quoted in the DOR to account for the DT.
• The bit must unexpectedly be pulled to the shoe while a mud pump module is
being replaced. 3 hours are spent POOH, 4 hours waiting for the repair to be
completed and 3 hours to return to bottom. A total of 10 hours of DT must be
recorded as follows in the DOR 1:
− 3 hrs POH for repair, IADC code 6 changed to 8, repair rate, OER # quoted
− 4 hrs repair Installation, IADC code 8, repair rate, OER # quoted
− 3 hrs RIH to bottom, IADC code 6 changed to 8, repair rate, OER# quoted
If while the pump was being repaired, productive operations (picking up stands
for ex.) are carried out as requested by the company man, then the productive
activity must be reported in the DOR 1 and the repair time must be reduced
accordingly.
• The Installation experiences a problem with the H4 Connector on a subsea BOP
and it requires securing the well and pulling it to surface in 16 hours. After
correcting the problem in 12 hours the weather deteriorates and it is not possible
to run the BOP for 24 hours. The weather improves and the BOP is run and
tested in 32 hours. This incident should be reported on an OER as MEF
(equipment type BOP) for a total of 84 hrs. The time waiting on weather (WOW)
should be included with the overall DT in this instance as it resulted from the
failure and need to trip the BOP.
• A workboat hits and damages an Installation column; the operations are stopped
for the time necessary to inspect the column and do emergency repairs.
Because this collision is considered to be beyond our control, the time spent
doing so must NOT be considered DT and be reported in the DOR1 as Waiting
on Other; An OEC OER should be prepared.
ADMINISTRATION
6.3 NON EQUIPMENT RELATED DOWN TIME
• The Derrickman is transferring mud between the mud pits and accidentally
opens the wrong valve and dumps 450 bbls of water-based mud overboard. It
requires that operations halt to allow mud volume to be built in 6 hrs to allow
drilling to proceed. This incident should be reported on GRS as Waiting on the
Company. An incident report (PEF) must also be filled in.
• The pipe handler operator makes an operating mistake and drops a stand of
pipe. The time spent resolving this problem must be reported as Waiting on the
Company Personnel and not as equipment DT. The OER relating the event
must be classed as PEF.
6.4 HOLE PROBLEM, CLIENT & OTHER THIRD PARTY RESPONSIBLE NON
PRODUCTIVE TIME
• 2 hours are spent waiting on a logging tool to continue the operations. This
should be reported in the DOR 1 as waiting on client. An OEC type OER is
required.
• 3 days are spent in fishing operations as the result of the introduction of a new
tool that failed. The lesson can be shared with the rest of the company by filling
in an OER (HPR). The operations reported are the actual fishing operations and
are recorded as NPT (not DT) in the GRS statistics.
• 42 hours are spent pulling legs on a jack-up. The contract has a 24 hour
limitation after which repair or zero rate applies. This is NOT considered DT.
Report in DOR as normal operations, IADC code 23 “moving” and adjust rate as
required. If client requires this to be reported as IADC code 8, this can be done
without affecting the Company DT record.
6.5 PLANNED INTERRUPTIONS
• The BOP inspection and PM planned between wells cannot be completed in

time as a result of a very short field move. 5 hours are spent waiting for the stack
to be ready. Assuming no other productive operations could be performed
during this time, 5 hours of Preventive Maintenance (IADC code 7) must be
reported in the DOR 1. The code Wait on Company equipment must not be
used as it would result in the recording of non-equipment related DT.
• The contract requires a zero rate for any interruption including routine PM. Set
the GRS rate table to match “zero rate” to any IADC code 7 operation and report
all TDS lubrication, drill line slip and cut as IADC 7, planned maintenance.
ADMINISTRATION
These hours must not be counted as DT and the rate sheet must accrue
correctly.
7 REFERENCE
OER reporting section in GRS-Rig User’s Manual.
ADMINISTRATION
Figure 2.3.2, OER Reporting
NPT
Operational Event
Transocean Waiting On Non Transocean

NPT Weather (WOW) NPT
Code operations
as WOW with
relevant sub-code
No OER required. Client/3rd Party
If WOW occurred NPT
during or as a
result of an eqt Examples:
DT, quote the eqt + Waiting on client orders
OER no in the DOR waiting on client or 3rd party
material or equipment
DOWN TIME + National Strike
+ Interruption of operation due to
security or community issues
+ Time lost as a result of work
Planned Unplanned boat colliding with rig
Examples: + Time deemed lost while pulling
+ service TDS legs on jack up
+ Slip & cut DL Equipment code operations as
+ waiting on Failure Corrective Maintenance or Code operation using
BOP's while any other applicable code and standard operation codes
Examples: using waiting on Client /
performing attach the relevant OER# to
+ failure of eqt resulting client 3rd party or others as
scheduled PM each relevant DOR lines.
on DT on the critical path appropriate
+ inspecting + operations resulting
the TDS shaft OER required. Select MEF or
from in-hole failure of
+ testing eqt or EFR type and select Eqt type.
To tubular (wash-out or Fill in an OEC type OER and
performing Ensure date is correct and
full break) attach relevant operation.
planned eqt "update DT" at end of event.
+ failure of off-line eqt Required in GRS 4.0
checks affecting parallel opera-
+ safety tions.
stand-off Hole Problems
NPT
Code operations Procedure or In GRS 3.0
as Planned Maint. Operational Code operations as Wait on Examples:
or any other To equipment or personnel or + Well Control events
relevant code. Examples: any other relevant operation + Stuck Pipe or
No OER required. + Fishing operations to code and attach the relevant + Other well events not
fish eqt dropped in hole OER# to each relevant DOR attributable to Transocean
by Transocean personnel lines
+ lost time recovering
a stand of pipe dropped Code operation using
In GRS 3.0 OER required standard operation codes
due to operator error.
Open manually, if needed and (fishing or well control
+ time spent making mud operation for example)
select PEF.
with ops interrupted
Ensure date is correct and
following accidental mud
"update DT" at end of event.
loss under To control.
Fill in an HPR type OER and
Other event attach relevant operation.
code operations as Wait on To
Required in GRS v4.0
under To control equipment or personnel.
Examples: Report on a OET type OER.
+ strike of Transocean Attach the OER# to the
personnel relevant DOR operation lines.
ADMINISTRATION
REQUEST FOR ENGINEERING ACTION (REA)
1 POLICY
All requests for action to be taken by HQS Engineering Department must be

documented using the Request for Engineering Action (REA) process.

Subsection 4.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure that Engineering support is controlled so that work is properly prioritized,

adequate resources provided, progress monitored and quality assured.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure covers all employees, facilities and Installations owned, operated or
managed by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 GENERAL
The Request for Engineering Action (REA) is the internal process for requesting
assistance from the HQS Engineering Department. The REA should be used for
any work expected to take more than 4 hours of Headquarters Engineering
Department time.
4.2 REA PROCESS – BASIC STEPS
1. A need for assistance from HQS Engineering Department is identified at the

Installation level or above.
2. An REA form (see Figure 2.4.1) is completed that defines the problem or
engineering assistance required. A contact person is assigned. It is important
that this contact person is available to clarify any questions; this person may
or may not be the original requester.
3. This form should then be sent to the Business Unit Technical Field Support
group.
ADMINISTRATION
4. Upon Technical Field Support and Division/Business Unit approval, the form
is submitted to Engineering at the following mailbox:
REA@houston.deepwater.com.
5. Engineering confirms to the Contact Person and the Technical Field Support
Group REA receipt, acceptance, the Engineering “person in charge”, required
resources, response date, outside costs and any additional comments
required.
6. The Technical Field Support Groups and Engineering must interface closely
with each other to ensure the appropriate expertise is used regardless of
location.
7. REA status is available on the Engineering web site.
8. Upon completion of the task, the necessary information is forwarded to the

contact person with copies to the Technical Field Support Group, Business
Unit and Division Manager, Business Unit Operations Manager, (or
Marketing), as appropriate, and the REA is then closed by Engineering.
ADMINISTRATION
Figure 2.4.1, Request for Engineering Action (REA) Request Form
ADMINISTRATION
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 CORPORATE DIRECTOR, ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT (I)
The Corporate Director of Engineering and Technical Support must ensure

that an REA is submitted for all work (not including Projects) of more than 4
hours going through the Headquarters Engineering Department.
5.2 ALL CORPORATE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT HEADS AND

ADMINISTRATORS (D)
Responsible to ensure that this policy is followed in accordance with the REA
procedures.
5.3 BUSINESS UNIT AND DIVISION MANAGER (D)
procedures.
5.4 BUSINESS UNIT FIELD SUPPORT MANAGERS (D)
procedures. Identify when Engineering assistance is required and assist with
REA development.
5.5 BUSINESS UNIT FIELD SUPPORT DEPARTMENT HEADS (A)
procedures. Identify when Engineering assistance is required and assist with
REA development.
5.6 RIG MANAGER (D)
Be aware this policy exists and direct requests for Technical Support
accordingly.
5.7 HQS / BUSINESS UNIT MARKETING MANAGER (A)
To be aware that the policy exists and to direct any requests accordingly
ADMINISTRATION
6 DOCUMENTATION
The Request for Engineering Action form and reports may be found on RigCentral at
http://www.rigcentral.com/hqs/eng/tech_support/
ADMINISTRATION
MODIFICATIONS, UPGRADES AND CERTIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT
1 POLICY
Modifications and upgrades to Installations must be reviewed, approved and

carried out in a safe, planned, controlled and cost-effective manner. All
applicable drawings and documentation must be amended to reflect the
changes.

Subsection 5.
2 PURPOSE
The purpose of this procedure is to:

• Ensure Installations, Divisions and Business Units are aware of the correct
procedures and documentation required for review and approval of any
modifications or upgrades, and
• Ensure modifications, changes and upgrades are executed in a safe, and
professional manner, on time and within budget, with fit-for-purpose solutions.
• Ensure all Installation drawings and documentation are current.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure covers facilities and employees of the Company as well as

employees of any operator, contractor, or outside agency that work on any offshore
Installation owned, operated, and/or managed by the Company.
4 PROCEDURES
4.1 MODIFICATIONS
The Management of Change Enhanced Approach must be used for all proposed
modifications to an installation. The FOCUS Planning and Tracking Software is
used to develop plans, obtain approvals, monitor the progress, and track the
progress to completion. The Management of Change Enhanced Approach is
described in the Company Management System Manual HQS-CMS-GOV. More
detail and examples are also provided in the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01.
Modification requests must be approved in accordance with Company Management

System requirements and/or Business Unit FOCUS Approval Authority Limits. If
engineering support is required, a request must be forwarded to HQS-Engineering in
the form of an REA with drawings and any required documentation. (Refer to Figure
ADMINISTRATION
2.5.1). Guidance on when HQS-Engineering approval of the proposed changes is

required can be found in Table 2.5.1.
Company Equipment Standards, Engineering Standards and Recommended

Practices must be reviewed and followed where applicable. Consideration must be
given to the impact any modifications have on the future operation of the Installation
with regard to the Company’s safety, environmental, operational and maintenance
standards.
If necessary, a project manager (and possibly a project team) will be appointed to

develop and supervise the scope of work, gain the necessary approvals, and
monitor the cost involved with the modification(s).
Factors that may necessitate the assignment of a project team include:

• Project total value of $3M and above and longer than 2 weeks duration.
• Project with high risk and/or with customer requiring special attention.
• Project requiring substantial engineering input.
• Project with tight constraints on timing and cost.
Major or critical system changes or upgrades require consultation and HQS

Engineering approval prior to AFE approval and commencement. Issues that require
HQS Engineering approval are provided in Table 2.5.1.
HQS Engineering must be notified via Technical Field Support whenever the
modifications, changes or upgrades to the Installation are controlled by Class (ABS,
DNV, Lloyds) or IMO. Changes to documentation which has formerly been
submitted to Class or Regulatory Bodies (i.e. Vessels Operating Manual, Fire &
Safety Plan, Hazardous Area Drawings, Dynamic Positioning System Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis FMEA, etc) must be reviewed by Engineering in the event of
change.
Emergency repairs or modifications are NOT precluded by this policy and are to be
carried out at the discretion of the OIM and Technical Field Support in a manner
appropriate to the circumstance. As soon as practical after the emergency event,
the procedure outlined in this document must be implemented so that appropriate
long term repairs or modifications can be affected and documents updated.
Equipment, systems, spare parts and/or materials made redundant by modifications

and/or upgrades must be properly handled in compliance with the Supply Chain
Management Manual.
ADMINISTRATION
The physical condition and appearance of impacted or disturbed areas must be

returned to original condition upon completion of modifications, including but not
limited to coatings, insulation, joinery, protective coverings, and safety equipment
(guards, rails, etc.).
4.2 DOCUMENTATION
A “Modification Repairs Log” must be maintained onboard. Every modification,

change or upgrade should have a unique number, heading, and completion date.
The FOCUS Planning and Tracking System should be used to maintain the
“Modifications Repairs Log” by selecting the Core Management Function Field,
“Operations – Administration” and the Policy Topic, “Modifications, Upgrades and
Certification of Equipment” and the Source of Opportunity field "Modifications Repair
Log".
Copies of Documentation for significant modifications made to the Installation must

be sent to HQS Engineering Records, Business Unit office records and Installation
records. This includes equipment manuals, shipyard drawings, vendor drawings,
fabricator drawings, data books, and engineering calculations. Hard copies and
electronic copies (if available) should be submitted.
4.3 ALTERATIONS TO LIGHTSHIP
It is important that all Installations record alterations to the lightship weight since the
last inclining test or dead-weight survey. The objective is to ensure that alterations
of a permanent nature are recorded and included in stability calculations.
The position of additional weights in excess of 100Kgs should be recorded.
A lightship alteration logbook (register) must be maintained on every Installation.

The basis and first entry into each specific Installation log book must be the original
as built approved lightship weight and centre of gravity. Additional approved light
ship alterations must be listed in order of ascending date and after an approved
alteration has been completed.
An updated lightship report for each individual Installation must be forwarded

annually to HQS Engineering Department, Marine and Structural Engineering group
for the purpose of maintaining information on each Installation for technical,
operations, and marketing support tasks. Should the total modifications to the
lightship particulars exceed 5% of the variable load as shown in the approved
Installation Operating Manual, a copy of the log must be sent to HQS Engineering
for reference and action as required.
ADMINISTRATION
The lightweight corrections must be entered into the Stability programme as variable
loads until the Lightship weight changes are formally submitted to the Classification
society. Subsequent to approval by Class the Marine Operations Manual/ Approved
Installation Stability Manual must be updated and the new light ship weight and
centres of gravity revised in the Installation’s stability program.
For larger up-grade or modification projects, it is the designated project manager’s

responsibility to maintain all lightship alteration records and, where appropriate,
submittal to class society for review and modified lightship weight approval, inclusive
of Marine Operations Manual updates.
Major modifications to the Installation are subject to both Company and Certifying
Authority approval. Modifications of a minor nature which do not require approval
from the certifying authority must still be approved via the Company modification and
repair procedure.
4.4 CERTIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT
Equipment certification must be maintained as required by applicable Classification

or Regulatory rules. The classification society’s approved “hazardous area electrical
drawing” and “list of equipment in hazardous areas” must be kept current, showing
all new electrical equipment installation.
Rig Managers are responsible for ensuring that equipment certification is

maintained, that manuals and drawings are updated and certified by the appropriate
certifying agencies and any drawing or manual updated is filed at HQS Engineering,
Business Unit office and on the Installation.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 RIG OFFSHORE PERSONNEL (A)
Rig Offshore personnel need be aware that rig modifications have to undergo
an approval process.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager is responsible to ensure that this policy is followed. The Rig
Manager is responsible to review proposals, determine if additional expertise
is required.
ADMINISTRATION
5.3 BUSINESS UNIT FIELD SUPPORT MANAGERS (D)
The Business Unit Field Support managers are responsible to ensure that this
policy is followed. They also determine if Engineering review and assistance
is required. Implement an REA if required in accordance with the REA
procedures.
5.4 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT STAFF (D)
The Engineering and Technical Support Staff are responsible to ensure that
this policy and procedure is followed and the appropriate approvals are
obtained and documented.
ADMINISTRATION
Figure 2.5.1, Installation Modification Process Flow Chart
FOCUS
Tracking Software
Initiate FOCUS Proposal inclusive

of appropriate risk assessment
OIM
Reviews and Provides
Rig Level Approval
Rig Manager
Reviews Plan and Identifies Additional
Expertise Required
Is
YES Additional Expertise
Required?
NO
Rig Manager
Requests and Receives
Additional Expertise YES Is it
within Approval Authority
Limits?
Operations Manager
NO
District Manager
Conducts Review
Region Operations Manager
District Manager
Conducts Review
YES
Technical Field Support
Conducts Review
Is it
YES
within Approval Authority
Limits?
NO
REA Issued YES Is REA Required?
Region Manager
NO Conducts Review
Verify Approval
Authority Limits Actioned by
before Commencing Technical Field Support
with REA
YES Can Proposal
Is Approval Granted? NO
be Modified?
Actioned by HQS REA/Technical Support

Engineering Completed and Closed Out
y Implement the Plan
y Monitor the Plan
y Recognize Change in the Plan NO
y Interrupt Task to Evaluate the Change
Verify y Revise the Plan or Develop a New Plan
Approval Authority Limits
before Commencing
with Plan
Consider Exemption or
Complete the Plan
Proposal is Not Approved
ADMINISTRATION
Table 2.5.1, Items Requiring HQS Engineering Approval
MARINE AND STRUCTURAL

Item Application
Alteration or modification of the basic • Any structural modification which alters the hydrostatic
Installation structure, excluding like- characteristics, motions, or station keeping capabilities of
replacement of structural members and the Installation, including hull blisters and sponsons.
plating, which constitutes a repair to as-
built conditions. Special care must be • Addition of hull braces, struts or brackets as remediation of
exercised when cropping out basic cracking or other chronic defects.
Installation structure to avoid permanent • Alterations requiring welding to a derrick or highly loaded
deformation of surrounding structure. structure.
• Addition of marine riser tension, hook load, setback, or
pipe/riser rack capacity.
• Welding of high tensile steel requiring special attention for
the welding procedure and NDT control which is not
addressed in the approved construction portfolio for the
unit.
Variable load (as defined in the approved • Weight additions to the Installation which exceed the load
Installation operating manual) reduced capacity of the deck/location chosen for Installation.
by 5% or more as a result of proposed
modifications or when an inclining test or • Deadweight surveys.
deadweight survey is required by the • Inclining tests.
classification society.
Alterations that consist of or include • Crane Load Test Padeyes.
attachment points for suspension of
equipment, materials, or personnel in • Any padeye with SWL in excess of 6 mtonne.
excess of six metric tons safe working • Hangoff padeyes (derrick, substructure, moonpool).
load (SWL).
• Suspended walkways, work platforms,.
• Lifting equipment foundations.
Computational tasks. • Mooring analysis.
• Marine drilling riser analysis.
• Intact and damaged stability assessment and calculations.
• Site-specific assessment for self-elevating offshore
Installations.
• Structural and fatigue analyses.
• Assessment of marine operations which are beyond the
scope of the Installation operating manual.
• Evaluation of simultaneous marine operations
ADMINISTRATION
Table 2.5.1, Items Requiring Engineering Approval (continued)
ELECTRICAL / CONTROL
Item Application
When specifying modifications, • Power generation (main, emergency, UPS).
upgrades, new systems, or when
evaluating acceptance testing • Any alteration to protective devices (relay settings, fuse
proceedures sizes, overload devices)
• Any alteration that affects main power or control system
one-line diagrams.
• Dynamic positioning systems including position
references and other sensors and subsystems including
dock trials, sea trials, client acceptance and Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) studies and testing, DP
Operations manuals.
• Control systems (DP, VMS, PMS, ballast, drilling, BOP,
deadman, autoshear, ROV intervention, riser tensioner,
etc.).
• Monitoring systems (fire, gas, ESD, tank gauging, CCTV,
etc.).
• Communication systems (PBX, LAN, GMDSS, VSAT,
PA/GA, etc.)
Alterations to any Installation critical • Any software change affecting Installation critical systems
system software that require changes (DP, PMS, VMS, BOP Multiplex Controls, Integrated
or additions to the system software. Drilling Controls, Ballast, ESD, EDS, Riser Tensioner
Control, Deadman, Autoshear, Zone Management, etc.)
Alternations to main Power One Lines • Main Power One Line Diagram.
for addition of equipment or removal of
equipment. • All Power Distribution One Line Diagrams.
• Emergency Power One Line Diagrams
• All MCC’s
Analysis or Studies to support power • All including:
plant operation
• Short circuit, coordination and harmonic studies
• Transient and Steady State response testing
procedures
Variable Speed Drives • Selection of drive technology (type) and sizing
Power Quality • Selection of harmonic suppression equipment

• Selection of surge suppression equipment
ADMINISTRATION
MECHANICAL
Item Application
Alteration of fluid systems in such a way • Bilge and Ballast System
that the system pressure or temperature
rating is changed, the fluid system one - Any modification that alters the fluid system one-line
line diagrams require modifications or diagram (regulatory approval required).
modifications to regulatory-approved - Change in system working pressure and test pressure.
drawings becomes necessary.
- Replacement of ballast/salt water/bilge pumps with
equipment differing from system OEM specification.
- Alterations requiring pressure-drop and volume flow
rate calculations, including pump replacement with
equipment other than system OEM specification.
• Fire/Salt Water System
- Addition of new fire fighting stations or monitors
(pressure drop calculations required).
- Change in system working pressure and test pressure
- Replacement of fire pumps with equipment differing
from system OEM specification.
- Changes that effect the efficiency of any cooling
system.
- Changes in the fixed fire fighting systems (Halon to CO2
and/or extension of system coverage).
• Well Control Systems
- Any modification that alters the fluid system one-line
diagram
- Change in system working pressure and test pressure.
• Low Pressure Mud System (including processing)
diagram.
ADMINISTRATION
MECHANICAL (Continued)
Item Application
Alteration of fluid system in such a way • High Pressure Mud System
that the system pressure rating is
changed, the fluid system one line Any modification that alters the fluid system one-line diagram.
diagrams require modification or Alterations which increase the rated system pressure.
modifications to regulatory-approved - Alterations which require modification of routing for
drawings becomes necessary. pressure relief piping from systems of 5000 psi working
pressure and above.
- Alterations which require modification of controlled,
fluid system one-line diagrams.
- Alterations which require Installation of materials not
addressed by the approved construction portfolio.
- Alterations that require welding HP piping.
• Hydraulics/Pneumatics (Sub-Sea Systems, Tensioner
Systems, Starting Air, Installation Air, Instrument Air, etc.)
diagram (regulatory approval required).
- Addition of accumulators, reservoirs, receivers or
vessels which alter the capabilities or rated pressure of
an affected system.
- Alterations which result in changes to any controlled
system one-line diagrams and/or power requirement.
- Discharge piping systems, a change that might result in
an uncontrolled discharge of waste fluid to the
environment.
GENERAL
Alterations to structure, systems or Hazardous Area Designations.
equipment which are subject to review,
Firefighting and Lifesaving Equipment Plans.
and/or approval by classification or
regulatory bodies relevant to the Escape Routes
Installation.
Installation Operating Manual and any drawing in the
Installation Operating Manual
Structure fire protection.
Any vessel-critical plans.
Increase POB.
Change to Lifeboats and capacity of Lifeboats
ADMINISTRATION
REMOTE OFFICE START-UP AND CLOSE-DOWN
1 POLICY
Field office start-up and close-down must be managed in a planned and

organized manner.

Subsection 6.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure that remote office start-up and close-down is planned, approved and
managed in compliance with the appropriate Company policies and local laws.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure covers all employees of the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 PLANNING
1. Careful planning is of the utmost importance.
2. Every new field facility must be established in accordance with local laws and
the policies of relevant headquarters departments.
3. The Business Unit Manager must be proactive in the opening and closing of
field facilities. He must seek advice and assistance from the appropriate
headquarters departments.
4. As appropriate, the VP Performance and Technology must provide the

Business Unit Manager with approval or assist in obtaining the required
approvals from headquarters level management.
4.2 OFFICE START UP AND CLOSE-DOWN CHECKLISTS
Office Start-up and Office Close-down checklists are provided for persons involved.
They are located on the Company Intranet at http://www.rigcentral.com/hqs/eng/
These Checklists should not be considered all-inclusive and are provided with blank
spaces so they can be tailor-made to capture the requirements and needs of the
respective location.
ADMINISTRATION
Completed checklists should be retained in archives in accordance with local record

retention requirements.
4.3 BANK ACCOUNTS
The Company’s bank accounts are to be opened and closed pursuant to banking
resolutions adopted by the Board of Directors of each legal entity and strictly
according to the requirements detailed in the Finance Manual HQS-FIN-PP-01,
Section 6 Subsection 1.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 VP PERFORMANCE AND TECHNOLOGY (D)
The VP Performance and Technology is responsible for providing Business Unit

Manager required HQS approvals or assisting the Business Unit Manager with
obtaining required approvals from HQS level management as needed.
5.2 HQS TAX DEPARTMENT HEAD (D)
The HQS Tax Department Head is responsible approving the opening and closing
bank accounts.
5.3 HQS TREASURY DEPARTMENT HEAD (D)
The HQS Treasury Department Head is responsible for approving, in advance, any
banks to be used as corporate accounts as well as obtaining the required corporate
resolution(s) from the Board of Directors for same.
5.4 BUSINESS UNIT/DIVISION MANAGER (D)
The Business Unit and Division Manager are responsible for establishing and
communicating any required procedures to ensure this policy is communicated to
those who need to know and complied with by all personnel under his/her
supervision.
5.5 BUSINESS UNIT/DIVISION DEPARTMENT HEADS (D)
The Business Unit and Division Department Heads are responsible for ensuring that
all requirements of this policy under their area of responsibility are met.
ADMINISTRATION
6 DOCUMENTATION
6.1 FINANCE MANUAL
Finance Manual HQS-FIN-PP-01, Section 6, Subsection 1, Bank Accounts - General
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ADMINISTRATION
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE
Sale Of Owned Or Transfer Of Managed Installations To A Second Party
1 GENERAL
This Recommended Practice should help ensure that all aspects of title/possession
transfer are properly addressed and that Company confidential/sensitive information,
unauthorized software/hardware or other equipment not owned by the Company is
not transferred with any Installation sold or transferred to a second party.
Installation Sales are normally managed by HQS Planning Department and an

individual in the Planning Department is named to coordinate and act as the
Company focal point regarding the sale. When an Installation that is chartered or
managed by the Company is returned to its owner, the Region in which the
Installation is assigned usually takes the lead regarding the Installation’s return with
assistance from HQS as and when requested.
The Region Manager should receive a copy of the fully executed sale or transfer
document between the parties early in the process. Familiarity with the agreement is
very important. If an answer is not obvious, ask the sale/transfer coordinator. The
item may have been initially overlooked.
2 RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 COMPANY DOCUMENTATION
Installation documents that are typically of concern to the Region for removal and
transfer to a secure mainland location for review, archiving or disposal are:
• HSE Manuals
• Training Manuals and all other training materials
• Maintenance Standards
• Materials or Supply Chain Manuals
• Accounting Manuals
• Financial Reports, Budgets etc.
• Management Reports
• Safety/Incident Statistics
• Incident Reports
• POB Reports
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ADMINISTRATION
• All Medical Records

• Personnel Files
• Well Files
• “Incomplete Project” Files
• Litigation Files
• Insurance Files
• All Correspondence Files
• (Vendor/Client/Regulatory/Classification/Internal etc.)
• All Other Company Generic Manuals/Files
2.2 COMPUTER HARDWARE & SOFTWARE
All Computer Hardware and Software that does not have written approval to be
transferred with the Installation to a second party should be removed and transferred
to a secure Company mainland location for evaluation of its potential future use.
Below is a typical, but not all inclusive, list of items to be removed. The contents of
the list will vary based on the Hardware/Software resident on each Installation and
the terms of the transfer:
• Training Computers
• EMPAC and associated software
• Microsoft Office or similar
• Inventory Systems (hard copy of inventory may be left onboard the
installation, depending on accuracy and terms of sale/transfer agreement
• Purchasing Systems
• Maintenance Systems (Leave a hard copy of the maintenance history for
Buyer reference)
• Global Reporting System
• DP Software*
• Acoustic System Software*
• Engine Alarm Monitoring Software*
• Installation Office
• Networking Software
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APPENDIX 1
ADMINISTRATION
• Any other Company proprietary software
*NOTE: If OEM or the agreement does not approve/allow license transfer to

the new owner, remove to the secure Company mainland location.
2.3 MISCELLANEOUS
The Following additional actions should be completed before the Installation is

released to a second party:
• Make available to the second party non-proprietary
• As Built Drawings
• Vendor Drawings And Manuals
• Operating Manuals (Loading & Limitation)
• Technical Correspondence
• Remove all Company Logo Materials, Insignias to the maximum extent
possible (signs, books etc.) The transfer agreement may contain additional
terms on this subject.
• Termination of Company InMarsat and other communication Services and
remove Hardware, or transfer to a second party in accordance with
sale/transfer agreement
• Terminate Subscription services for satellite service such as DGPS and
recreational TV or, if sale/transfer agreement specifies, have the service
contracts assigned to the second party
• Terminate weather service subscriptions if applicable
• Terminate newswire subscriptions if applicable
• Terminate internet service subscriptions if applicable
2.4 LEASED OR THIRD PARTY EQUIPMENT
As to equipment on an Installation that does not belong to the selling/transferring

company, with some exceptions discussed below, this equipment should be
removed prior to the transfer. In any event, all such equipment should to be
inventoried and a list formulated of items, their owners, contacts, tasks and target
dates for removal. This list should be prepared in the very early part of negotiations
with the buyer, if not prior to putting the Installation up for sale. Other than
equipment belonging to another Transocean company which may or may not be
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ADMINISTRATION
included in the sale/transfer, such non-owned equipment falls into one of the
following categories.
2.4.1 OPERATOR OWNED OR OPERATOR SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT
This includes all items owned by the operator (bits, tubulars, stabilizers, mud, spare
parts, etc) which is usually easily inventoried based on the warehouse inventory
records. This can be material actually owned by the operator or might be leased by
the operator. This includes operator owned computer hardware and software.
2.4.2 OPERATOR'S THIRD PARTY (SERVICE COMPANY) EQUIPMENT
This is normally equipment that is shipped to the Installation (and operated) by a

third party contracted by the operator. ROV, Cement unit, mud logging unit, well
logging unit, communication hardware, etc.
2.4.3 COMPANY LEASED EQUIPMENT
This is equipment the selling/transferring company leases directly. It can include

communication equipment, tubulars, mud processing equipment,
oxy/acetylene/nitrogen bottles, trash compactors, transfer baskets, fire fighting
equipment, etc. These should all be removed from the Installation (preferably) or
the lease transferred to the buyer/transferee. This list needs to be prepared in the
very early part of negotiations with a buyer to avoid confusion when the Company
starts removing it just prior to the sale.
2.4.4 COMPANY'S CONTRACTOR'S EQUIPMENT
This includes hardware owned by a Company assigned contractor contracted to do

a job on the Installation and who has taken equipment to the Installation to complete
the work. This could include painting contractors who provide blasting nits, pumps,
garbage skiffs, spraying equipment, blasting grit, paint, brushes, etc which are their
property. This could also include any mechanical contractors who may be doing
engine overhauls, etc. as well as catering contractors who may own some of the
cleaning equipment, galley equipment, and foodstuff inventory.
2.4.5 CONSIGNMENT MATERIALS
In some regions the Company procurement staff have arranged for vendors to place
material in the Company warehouse and the Company is to pay for it only when the
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APPENDIX 1
ADMINISTRATION
Company uses it. If this exists, it should to be included in the sale/transfer

agreement or removed from the Installation prior to its sale/transfer.
2.4.6 EMPLOYEE OWNED EQUIPMENT
While it is not Company normal practice, some Regions allow or require the
Company employees to provide some of their own tools. If any industrial type
materials belong to the Company employees, we should see that these are removed
by the Company employee concerned.
2.4.7 GOVERNMENT OWNED EQUIPMENT
In some areas, the Company Installations carry weather monitoring hardware that
belongs to some branch of the local government. This should be removed prior to
the Installations sale/transfer.
2.5 INSTALLATION OWNED EQUIPMENT NOT PHYSICALLY LOCATED ON

THE INSTALLATION
This may include several classes of equipment as detailed in the following

categories:
2.5.1 INVENTORY OR INSTALLATION ITEMS STORED ONSHORE FOR

CONVENIENCE
These items should to be identified on a specific list in order to prepare Installation

sale/transfer contract. Do not assume an item will be either kept or sold/transferred
without reading the sale/transfer agreement. If they are stored at the Company
facility, the Company needs to agree with the buyer/transferee that the risk of
damage transfers to them at the time of the sale/transfer. The Company insurance
on the Installation should be terminated upon sale/transfer. The Company also will
have agreed on how long the Company will continue to store the equipment either
frees of charge or for some storage fee. The Company may have some obligation
even when the items are stored free of change, so read the sale/transfer agreement
and not the terms carefully. Understand it is in the Company’s best interest to get the
equipment off the Company’s property as soon as possible.
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ADMINISTRATION
2.5.2 EQUIPMENT SENT IN FOR REPAIR & RETURN
This equipment can be in the Company yard, at the vendor's being repaired or in
transit. These items should to be identified on a specific list in order that they may be
considered when drafting the Installation sale/transfer agreement.
2.6 OPEN PURCHASES
At the time an Installation gets sold, the Company will have many outstanding
requisitions and purchase orders. Since the Company in intending to transfer the
Installation, the Company may no longer need this material. Any open requisition
should be reviewed and, as necessary, cancelled and no purchase order issued.
Open purchase orders can be either cancelled or, if the sale/transfer agreement so
specifies, assigned to the buyer/transferee. These should to be discussed with the
buyer/transferee and handled in accordance with the sale/transfer agreement. With
a sale pending, proper management of the purchases should minimize the number
of open purchase orders approaching the time of the Installation sale.
2.7 CONTRACT LABOR
Some Installations have labour that is provided through a labour contractor. This is
usually via a contract with a Transocean company. This labour needs to be
removed from the Installation upon sale or, if the sale/transfer agreement calls for it,
the labour contract and related obligations should to be assigned to the
buyer/transferee.
2.8 COMPANY LABOR
HR needs to confirm the terms of the sale/transfer agreement, what is going to

happen with the Company employees assigned to the Installation and then the
Installation staff need to make sure all the related details are taken care of. This
may require certain of the employees to terminate and sign new employment
contracts with the buyer/transferee. The agreement may also require that the
Company continue to supply labour to the buyer/transferee for a period.
3 DOCUMENTATION

Subsection 9, Asset Management.
ADMINISTRATION
PROCEDURE
Revisions To Operations Manuals - SMART Process
1 POLICY
The method by which change to the company management system is formally

reviewed, communicated and executed is through the System Management
and Review Team (SMART) process.
Reference: Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV, System

Management and Review Team (SMART).
2 PURPOSE
To define the process for ensuring that all proposed revisions to HQS Operations
Group Management System Level 1 Manuals are appropriately reviewed and
approved prior to formal issue.
3 SCOPE
This procedure covers all level 1 manuals and their respective contents generated
by HQS Operations Group.
4 PROCEDURE
SMART is available to Corporate departments and Business Unit management for

making approved changes to the Company Management System through their
existing organizations and resources.
Proposed changes to the procedures in this manual are submitted to Quality

Services through the SMART process, (see the Company Management System
Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV, in Section 5.1). The SMART (System Management and
Review Team) process enables people at different levels in the Company
(Corporate, Business Unit, and Installation) to propose and implement changes to
the Company Management System through the individual Core Management
Functions.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 ORIGINATOR (DEPT HEADS) (A)
The originator is responsible for communicating all proposed changes to the

Business Unit QHSE Manager. Proposed changes originating from Headquarters
are submitted directly to the Corporate Quality Services department. Corporate
ADMINISTRATION
PROCEDURE
Revisions To Operations Manuals - SMART Process
Quality Services will coordinate with the various corporate departments that may be
affected by the proposed change.
5.2 OPERATIONS SMART MEMBER (D)
The Operations SMART Member is responsible for participating and coordinating the
SMART process to facilitate changes to the Operations Manuals as described in the
Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV, Section 5, Subsection 1,
System Management and Review Team (SMART) Process.
6 DOCUMENTATION
Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV, Section 5, Subsection1,

SMART(System Management and Review Team) Process.
ADMINISTRATION
DOCUMENT CONTROL
1 POLICY
The Company’s Management System will have control requirements for the
creation, revision, review, approval, distribution, notification and retention of
documents related to the Company’s documented management system.
References: Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV, Section, 5.3,

Document Control.
2 PURPOSE
Ensure that operational documents are retained and controlled in compliance with
Company requirements.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure covers all Installations and facilities owned, operated or managed by
the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 GENERAL
For the purposes of this procedure, operation "documents" affected by this policy
include:
a) Official Company correspondence
b) Formally distributed correspondence from any source
c) Reports
d) Records
e) Log books
f) Completed forms
g) Publications
h) Drawings
4.1.1 Documents that are identified as part of the Company Management System
must be developed, controlled and maintained by the procedures defined in
the Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV Section 5.4,
Document Control and the Human Resources Manual, HQS-HRM-PP-01,
Section 4, Facilities. Business Unit Managers must establish Business Unit
ADMINISTRATION
DOCUMENT CONTROL
specific Level 2 procedures pertaining to file indexes and retention periods.

The Business Unit Legal Representative must approve retention periods.
4.1.2 This procedure must apply equally to hard copy documents as well as those
maintained electronically on computer diskettes or drives including email.
4.1.3 Drawings (either original tracings or electronic format) for the Installations
from shipyards, fabricators, third parties, or generated internally within the
Company are not to be modified, updated, or changed in any way except by
the owner or originator as named in the drawing title block.
4.1.4 A hard copy, and electronic copy, if available, of all shipyard drawings,
fabricator drawings, third party drawings, or drawings generated internally
that represent the current condition of an Installation should be kept in HQS
Engineering department, in the Business Unit or Division the Installation is
operating in, and aboard the Installation. Any modifications or updates of
these drawings are to be sent to these departments for filing.
4.2 DOCUMENT RETENTION
4.2.1 All documentation must be filed and identified in a manner that ensures its
easy retrieval.
4.2.2 Files must be protected against damage and must not be removed from their
storage locations without proper approval. A record of removal must be kept.
4.2.3 Confidential correspondence must be properly protected from unauthorized

access.
4.2.4 Filed documentation should be disposed of after the expiration date of the
relevant retention period ensuring that records of a confidential nature are
properly destroyed.
4.2.5 Documentation sent to Houston for archiving must be retained as defined by

the procedures of the recipient department.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT MANAGER (D)
ADMINISTRATION
DOCUMENT CONTROL
The Business Unit Manager is responsible for establishing and ensuring compliance
with Business Unit specific procedures dealing with file indexes and retention
periods.
5.2 BUSINESS UNIT LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE (D)
The Business Unit Legal Representative is responsible for approving retention

periods.
6 DOCUMENTATION
Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV, Section 5.3, Document

Control.
Human Resources Policy and Procedure Manual, HQS-HMS-PP-01 Section 4,

under Facilities, addressing Records Retention.
Human Resources Records Retention Procedures Manual, HQS-HRM-PR-01.
HQS-OPS-HB-05 SUBSECTION: 1.1
OPERATIONS
Well Control - Incident Prevention and Management
1 POLICY
Prevention and management of well control incidents must conform to the

requirements detailed in the Well Control Manual and be carried out by
competent, well control certified personnel.
Reference: Operations Policy and Procedures Manual, HQS-OPS-PP-01, Section 3,

Subsection 1.1.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure that well control incidents are prevented, or where prevention is

unsuccessful, incidents are managed by competent, well control certified personnel
to reduce the risk of injury to personnel on the Installation and minimize damage to
the environment and equipment.
3 SCOPE
This policy applies to all Installations and employees of the Company, as well as
employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any
Installation owned, operated or managed by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
The well control incident prevention and management procedures are detailed in the
Well Control Manual HQS-OPS-HB-01. The requirements dictated in the Well
Control Manual must be compared to the well program to ensure that the correct
procedures are being applied e.g. in the case of HPHT, and include:
• Preparation
• Prevention
• Detection
• Remedy
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT/DIVISION MANAGER (I)
The Business Unit and Division Manager are responsible for ensuring that the
policies for Well Control – Incident Prevention and Management are being met.
OPERATIONS
Well Control - Incident Prevention and Management
They must satisfy themselves that the Rig Manager and OIM understand the policies
and how to operate and manage them on their Installations. The Business Unit
Manager and Division Manager must conduct independent assessments (PMAA)
and hardware audits, as they deem necessary.
5.2 RIG MANAGER / OIM / TOOLPUSHER (D)
The Rig Manager, OIM and Toolpusher are responsible for ensuring and verifying
the effective implementation of the policies and that all personnel involved with well
control are competent to fulfill their responsibilities.
5.3 DRILLER (D)
The Driller is responsible for effectively implementing this policy and ensuring his
direct reports involved with well control are competent to fulfill their responsibilities.
5.4 ASSISTANT DRILLER (D)
The Assistant Driller is responsible for effectively implementing this policy and
ensuring all his direct reports involved with well control are competent to fulfill their
responsibilities.
6 REFERENCES
Well Control Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-01
OPERATIONS
WELL CONTROL - EQUIPMENT
1 POLICY
All well control equipment must conform to the specification and testing
requirements detailed in the Well Control Manual.

Subsection 1.2.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure that the well control equipment is designed and tested to safely handle
well control incidents on the Installation.
3 SCOPE
This policy applies to all Installations owned, operated or managed by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
The key elements of Well Control – Equipment, are detailed in the Well Control
Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-01 include:
• Well Control Equipment Standards,
• Pressure Tests,
• Function Testing,
• Casing, Wellheads and Pressure Control Equipment.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT/DIVISION MANAGER (I)
The Business Unit and Division Manager are responsible for ensuring that the
policies for well control equipment are being met. They must satisfy themselves that
the Rig Manager and OIM understand the well control equipment and how to
operate and manage it on their Installations. The Business Unit Manager and
Division Manager must conduct independent assessments (PMAA) and hardware
audits, as they deem necessary.
5.2 RIG MANAGER / OIM (D)
The Rig Manager and OIM are responsible for ensuring and verifying the effective
implementation of this policy and procedure.
OPERATIONS
WELL CONTROL - EQUIPMENT
6 REFERENCES
Well Control Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-01
OPERATIONS
DRILLER’S KEY RESPONSIBILITIES
1 POLICY
Drillers must conduct drilling operations in compliance with the Driller’s Key
Responsibilities.

Subsection 1.3.
2 PURPOSE
There are certain procedures, basic to “good oilfield practice”, that should be clearly
communicated in writing to each Driller in order to ensure that drilling operations are
conducted in a safe and efficient manner, including clear communications,
systematic monitoring, record keeping and safe working practices at all times.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure covers all Installations owned, operated or managed by the

Company.
4 PROCEDURE - DRILLER’S KEY RESPONSIBILITIES
The following items represent the basic day to day key responsibilities of the Driller
with regards to monitoring the operation to reduce the chances of unwanted events
while ensuring appropriate information is available to handle the events safely and
efficiently should they occur. This list is not all encompassing and should be viewed
as a minimum requirement to be supplemented with other checks or controls as
required according to the operation on the Installation at the time.
4.1 DRILLERS MUST
1. Verify all well control equipment is lined up according to the Installation

operating procedures at the beginning of each tour.
2. Shut-in the well as quickly as possible if a kick is indicated or suspected.

Early recognition of the warning signals and rapid shut-in are the key to
effective well control. Shutting in the well quickly will minimize the amount of
formation fluid entering the well bore.
3. Flow check all drilling breaks as soon as they are detected and any time the
Driller has doubts about the stability of the well.
OPERATIONS
4. When tripping pipe, flow checks must be performed at the following times:
• At the bottom of the well, before any trip out of the hole.
• At the lowest casing shoe.
• Anytime the hole displacement is incorrect during a trip.
• Anytime the Driller (or the person performing the Driller’s functions)
has any concerns regarding the well status.
• If continuous volume monitoring of the hole volume is not possible,
then a flow check must be made, prior to pulling the HWDP or Drill
Collars through the BOP’s.
• If, in exceptional circumstances, boosting of the riser annulus is
necessary during tripping operations, a flow check must be made prior
to boosting the riser annulus. After completing boosting of the riser, a
flow check must be made to confirm the well is static prior to continuing
tripping operations. Boosting of the riser while drill pipe or BHA are
being tripped is not permitted.
5. Keep the hole full at all times:

• The trip tank must be used while tripping.
• Observe the flow path after each trip tank line up.
• Accurate trip fill-up records must be maintained.
• If the trip tank cannot be used: Refer to the appropriate section of the
Well Control Manual HQS-OPS-HB-01.
6. Not leave the drill floor during tour unless properly relieved.
7. Know the distance from the rotary table to the pipe rams and annulars in the
BOP stack at all times and post a space-out diagram in the vicinity of the
Driller's BOP panel. Drillers on floating units must be provided with tide
charts.
8. Know true vertical depth (TVD) and measured depth (MD).
9. Keep a complete record of all tools and tubulars run in the hole showing
made-up lengths, tool joints, ODs and IDs, serial numbers and fishing necks.
Driller must also make sure that the Installation has the fishing tools required
to retrieve the down hole tools supplied by the Company.
10. A hole cover must be installed at any time there is no drill string, casing or
wireline etc. in the hole.
OPERATIONS
11. If the Installation utilizes a manual derrick, obtain verbal confirmation from the
Derrickman that his safety harness is properly secured before tripping
operations begin.
12. Take and record slow circulating rates:

• At the beginning of each tour.
• Anytime the mud weight changes
• Anytime the bit or BHA has been changed
• As soon as possible after bottoms up following any trip
• At least every 1000 ft (305m) drilled. (Well Control Manual, HQS-OPS-
HB-01.)
• Following major mud pump or surface equipment changes/repairs.
13. Check and reset (if required) the crown saver device:
• At the beginning of each tour.
• After slipping and/or cutting drilling line.
• After handling long BHA components.
• After any other events when the settings have been changed.
Full function testing to be done based on the regular maintenance schedule.
14. Have drilling mud properties checked and recorded on a regular basis, at
least every 30 minutes, or immediately upon any noted change.
15. Constantly monitor speed, pump strokes, pressure, pit volume, trip tank,
penetration, mud weight and rotary torque to detect anything unusual or out of
the ordinary.
16. Avoid operating at or near critical rotary speeds as indicated by string

vibrations.
17. Secure the Driller’s mechanical brake in such a way to prevent the draw-
works drum from turning whenever the Driller’s position is left unattended,
e.g., chain for manual brakes. Brake should be locked during maintenance
on hoisting equipment.
18. An inspection of the derrick/mast for potential falling objects to be carried out
after jarring, sudden shock loads etc. e.g. dropped blocks and extreme heavy
OPERATIONS
weather or other similar incidents where the derrick/mast may have been
subjected to stress and strain.
19. Be responsible for air hoist man-riding operations being carried out above the
drill floor in the derrick/mast as well as below the drill floor in the cellar deck
/moon pool area. As such, they must ensure all the requirements of the man
riding policies in the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01, are adhered to.
20. At no time during any operation, should any type of weight hang on the
control handle for the Electro Magnetic Brake Controller.
21. The Driller must ensure that proper maintenance is carried out on all drilling
equipment according to the prescribed lubrication and maintenance schedule.
22. Tripping operations must be carried out in a planned and controlled manner
according to the requirements detailed in Section 3 Subsection 1.10 of this
manual.
23. The maximum allowable makeup torque and maximum pull in the case of a
stuck drill string in the hole must be governed by size, type and grade of pipe.
Maximum pull must be that given in the API specification RP7G and RP7G1.
Further reference is made to API bulletin 5A2, 5C2 and 5C3.
For each trip the maximum allowable pull at zero torque value for the string
must be calculated and clearly posted at the Driller’s position i.e. at 80% of
the API RP7G premium used tubular maximum allowable pull tables. Also
the reduced allowable pull must be calculated and posted for an appropriate
applied torque value e.g for 5” DP if 25K ft-lbs was applied; the maximum
allowable pull must be reduced to +/- 500,000 lbs which will result in a
maximum pull of 400,000 lbs with an 80% factor.
Care must be taken with mixed strings that the maximum allowable pull is not
exceeded in any part of the string.
For critical landing or drilling strings, tubular inspections can be made to

qualify remaining body wall (RBW), in which case 80% of the tensile at the
qualified RBW can be utilized as the maximum allowable pull. In these
instances an exemption form must be completed including the inspection
results and the maximum allowable values which must be approved by the
Operations Manager on a well by well basis. The approved values must be
clearly posted at the Driller’s position.
OPERATIONS
24. The Driller must only pull the drill string over the 80% posted maximum
allowable values under the direct supervision of the Toolpusher up to a
maximum of 90% of the API RP7G used tubular maximum allowable pull
tables.
25. Tubulars must be used within their design limits and maintained so as to
maximize useful life as detailed in Section 3 Subsection 1.11.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 RIG MANAGER (A)
Rig Manager is responsible for ensuring he understands Driller’s Key

Responsibilities and ensuring that the OIM is monitoring daily to verify that the
responsibilities are implemented safety and effectively. He is responsible for
communicating to the client representative these requirements.
5.2 OIM / TOOLPUSHER (D)
OIM and Toolpusher are responsible for ensuring they understand the Driller’s Key
Responsibilities and verify through daily monitoring that the Driller is meeting these
responsibilities in a safe and effective manner. The OIM and Toolpusher are
responsible for communicating to the client representative onboard these
requirements.
5.3 DRILLER (D)
The Driller is responsible for understanding and following the Driller’s Key
Responsibilities to ensure a safe and effective operation. During relief or handover,
the Driller is responsible for communicating and reinforcing the relevant Driller’s Key
Responsibilities in relation to the ongoing operation. The Driller is responsible for
training the Assistant Driller and crew to ensure they understand and meet their
roles as a team to meet the Driller’s Key Responsibilities.
The Assistant Driller is responsible for understanding and following the Driller’s Key
Responsibilities to ensure a safe and effective operation. The Assistant Driller is
responsible for assisting the Driller with training and supervising crew in their roles to
meet Driller’s Key Responsibilities.
OPERATIONS
6 DOCUMENTATION
There is a Company requirement for information regarding certain drilling operations

to be recorded on an approved form and made readily available and regularly
communicated to relevant persons. The Standing Instructions to Drillers (SID) and
shift hand over forms can be obtained from the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01
Section 4, Subsection 4.1, Communication, HSE Information.
OPERATIONS
PUMPING FLAMMABLE OR COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS
1 POLICY
Pumping of combustible liquids with the cement unit or mud pumps may only
be undertaken after the precautions prescribed by a Task Risk Assessment
(TRA) and supporting procedures, reviewed and approved by Business Unit
Operations Manager, have been implemented.

Subsection 1.4.
2 PURPOSE
To prevent explosion or fire and ensure the safety of personnel, the Installation and
the environment by minimizing risks associated with pumping such materials.
Identified risks include, but are not limited to the following:
• Exposure of personnel,
• Handling and storage of containers,
• Rupture of lines being pumped through, and
• Atomization of liquid caused by small leaks, coming into contact with an
ignition source.
3 SCOPE
This Policy covers Installations and employees of the Company as well as

employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore
Installation owned, operated and/or managed by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 DEFINITIONS
4.1.1 FLASH POINT
The Flash Point of a flammable fluid is the point at which there are sufficient
flammable vapors in the atmosphere to cause a flash fire when those vapors come
into contact with an ignition source.
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.4.1.1- Properties of Fluids per MSDS

Flash Point
Chemical Boiling Point [F] AIT [F]
[F]
Ethanol 148.5 867 52
Methanol 148.5 867 52
Glycol 385-388 752 230
Base Oil N/A N/A 156
Kerosene 338-617 ~ 410 95 -149
Diesel > 300 ~ 495 > 126
Gasoline 68 536 -40
4.1.2 FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS - FLASH POINT BELOW 100°F (37.8°C)
Example (Ethanol, Methanol, or Gasoline)
No flammable liquids will be pumped with a cement unit or mud pump without a REA
being issued to HQS Engineering for their review and approval received from HQS
Engineering prior to pumping.
4.1.3 COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS - FLASH POINT AT OR ABOVE 100°F (37.8°C)

AND BELOW 200°F (93.3°C)
Example (Diesel, Base Oil)
4.2 TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE FOR PUMPING

COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS
A Task Specific THINK Procedure inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment

(TRA) is required for pumping combustible liquids.
Task Specific THINK Procedures are utilized to execute activities that

represent a higher level of criticality, complexity and potential consequences due to
the identified hazards related to the tasks within the activity.
The Task Specific THINK Procedure is comprised of tasks, critical tasks, or

both.
OPERATIONS
A critical task is identified as a task that if not performed correctly can cause
significant loss (severity rating of 15 or higher, see HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01,
Section 4 Subsection 6.3) to people, the environment or property.
Task Specific THINK Procedures represent Level 3 Installation Specific

Procedures that are the basis for establishing effective and reliable preventive and
mitigating controls for tasks and critical tasks within activities.
The Task Specific THINK Procedures for pumping combustible liquid requires
the approval of the Business Unit Operations Manager or Division Manager in
addition to the normal approval of OIM and Rig Manager.
4.2.1 TASK RISK ASSESSMENT
The Task Risk Assessment provides a more detailed qualitative risk assessment to
demonstrate that risks related to specific tasks are as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP). Critical tasks within a given activity require all potential hazards be clearly
identified in the assessment so existing control measures can be verified, and/or
new control measures implemented to reduce the identified risks to ALARP.
The Task Risk Assessment is available to provide a higher level qualitative risk
assessment of the critical tasks described in the Task Specific THINK
Procedures. Normally only the critical tasks in a Task Specific THINK
Procedure are required to be further risk assessed with a Task Risk Assessment.
For a Task Specific THINK Procedure to pump combustibles, the Task Risk
Assessment should be performed for tasks and critical tasks.
Task Specific THINK Procedures for pumping combustibles is a Level 3 -

Installation Specific Procedure. The Task Risk Assessment is applied to further
demonstrate, in detail, the risks and hazards associated with critical tasks and tasks
have been reduced to ALARP.
The Task Specific THINK Procedures must address the following:

• Must know the flash point of liquid to be pumped.
• Identify routing of any temporary line installed to carry the fluid.
• Anticipated and maximum allowable pressures for the fluid being pumped.
• Contingency plan to remove the fluid should a downhole problem prevent
complete displacement.
• No Installation will use the cement unit to:
OPERATIONS
− Pump diesel or other combustible liquids from an open container

(displacement tanks) or receptacle that is located at the cement unit.
Containers or receptacles that are located outside the cement unit
room may be an open type. However, in these cases, the liquid must
be piped directly into the suction line(s) of the unit.
− Pump at pressure into any line, container or other receptacle that has
already had a liquid pumped through it until it has been completely
purged.
(See Controls heading 4.3 and Aeration of Fluids, heading 4.4 below for more
detailed description of requirements).
• Protective clothing and equipment must be used during the handling of
combustible or flammable liquids.
• MSDS sheets must be available (preferably before the liquid arrives onboard).
• Suspension of hot work in the vicinity of the operation.
• Once all testing is complete and the liquid is ready to be pumped, the area
must be cleared of all personnel not directly involved in the pumping
operation. Suitable barriers are to be erected to prevent personnel from
entering the area.
• No liquid will be pumped if the temperature is within 10°F (5.5°C) of its flash
point.
4.3 CONTROLS
4.3.1 HANDLING / STORAGE OF CONTAINERS
One of the highest risk factors identified is damage to the transport containers during
the actual time the containers are onboard the vessel. Containers should be
inspected (general condition, rigging, valves, pipework etc) as soon as they arrive
onboard.
Storage areas must have containment facilities to prevent free spillage and minimize
fire hazards.
When the material is to be pumped, the container should be located as close as

practical to the cement unit pump (preferably with containment facilities as
mentioned above).
OPERATIONS
4.3.2 PUMP COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS WITH CEMENT UNIT AND/OR MUD

PUMP(S):
If it becomes necessary to pump combustible liquids, the cement unit is preferred

over the Installation’s high-pressure mud pumps for the following reasons:
• The mud pump rooms are not normally hazardous area rated
• The pumps are normally remotely controlled, hence people would be required
to monitor for leaks
• Every Installation has a cement pump that can be used more safely for the
purpose
• The mud pumps do not normally have a pressure limiting device as most of
the cement pumps have
• The mud pumps displacement per stroke is much higher than a cement pump
increasing the risk in case of a leak.
However, if it becomes necessary to use the Installation’s high-pressure mud

pump(s) to pump combustible liquids, the TRA must include the following
precautions:
1. Responsible person monitoring mud pump while pumping.
2. Ensure emergency shut down is operational in pump room.
3. Cover pump body to prevent mist blow back in case of swab failure.
4.3.3 SPILL AND MIST
The release of combustible liquids to the open atmosphere is a major concern any
time that they are pumped. If this can be prevented, the hazard of a fire can be
greatly reduced. In order to reduce the potential for combustible liquid release to the
open, the following precautions should be observed:
• Visually inspect valves, pumps and unions before using.
• Ensure that all lines, unions and swivels are suitably snubbed.
• Pressure test all discharge lines / valves to 1.5 times the expected pressure.
NOTE: The testing medium must be water.
• Confirm that the Cement Pump high-pressure shutdown is operational and
set at required level.
• Cover all unions on hoses that will be pressurized with a suitable barrier, such
as water soaked cloth covers, to prevent flammable mist in case of failure.
• Cover pump fluid end to prevent flammable mist due to swab failure etc.
OPERATIONS
4.4 AERATION OF FLUID
• Prevent agitation of fluids that may allow foaming.

• Inspect all piping, gland-packing etc. that may cause air entering into the
system.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DIVISION MANAGER (D)
The Business Unit Operations Manager and Division Manager are responsible for
reviewing and approving Task Specific THINK Procedures inclusive of a Task
Risk Assessment (TRA) for pumping combustible liquids.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager is responsible for reviewing and approving Task Specific
THINK Procedures inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment (TRA) for pumping
combustibles prior to submitting to Business Unit Operations Manager or Division
Manager.
5.3 DRILLING DEPARTMENT SUPERVISORS (D)
The Drilling Department Supervisor is responsible for developing a Task Specific

THINK Procedure inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment (TRA).
6 REFERENCES
• HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01, Section 4 Subsection 2.1, Think Planning

Process, Heading 4.3.5, Task Specific THINK Procedure
• HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01, Section 4, Subsection 2.1), Heading 4.4,

Task Risk Assessment
• DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV) , Quantitative Risk Assessment, November

2002
OPERATIONS
SIMULTANEOUS DRILLING AND PRODUCTION OPERATIONS
1 POLICY
Operations in close proximity to producing wells must only be carried out

after a risk assessment is completed, appropriate risk prevention and
mitigation measures are implemented, and all relevant personnel are informed
of the risks and preventive and mitigating measures prior to beginning
operations.

Subsection 1.5.
2 PURPOSE
The purpose of this policy is to ensure:

• simultaneous drilling and production operations are carried out safely.
• all risks are identified, assessed, mitigated and managed at an acceptable.
level
• all relevant personnel are informed of the risks and mitigating measures.
3 SCOPE
This Policy covers all Installations owned, operated or managed by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
A Task Specific THINK Procedure inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment

(TRA) is required for operations involving moving on or off a platform or subsea
installation where wells are kept flowing and when conducting drilling operations
adjacent to producing wells. The Task Specific THINK Procedures requires
the approval of the Business Unit Operations Manager or Division Manager in
addition to the normal approval of OIM and Rig Manager.
The appropriate preventive and mitigating risk reducing controls must be confirmed
acceptable by the Business Unit Manager.
4.1 TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE

represent a higher level of criticality, complexity and potential consequences due to
the identified hazards related to the tasks within the activity.
OPERATIONS
The Task Specific THINK Procedure is comprised of tasks, critical tasks, or

both.
significant loss (severity rating of 15 or higher, see HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01,
Section 4 Subsection 6.3) to people, the environment or property.

Procedures that are the basis for establishing effective and reliable preventive and
mitigating controls for tasks and critical tasks within activities.
The Task Risk Assessment provides a more detailed qualitative risk assessment to
demonstrate that risks related to specific tasks are as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP). Critical tasks within a given activity require all potential hazards be clearly
identified in the assessment so existing control measures can be verified, and/or
new control measures implemented to reduce the identified risks to ALARP.
Procedures. Normally only the critical tasks in a Task Specific THINK
Procedure are required to be further risk assessed with a Task Risk Assessment.
For a Task Specific THINK Procedure for moving on or off a platform or
subsea installation where wells are kept flowing, the Task Risk Assessment should
be performed for tasks and critical tasks.
Task Specific THINK Procedures for moving on or off a platform or subsea

installation where wells are kept flowing and drilling operations adjacent to producing
wells are Level 3 - Installation Specific Procedures. The Task Risk Assessment is
applied to further demonstrate, in detail, the risks and hazards associated with
critical tasks and tasks have been reduced to ALARP.
4.1.2 MOVING ON OR OFF A PLATFORM OR SUBSEA INSTALLATION WHERE

WELLS ARE KEPT FLOWING

• Down-hole safety valves,
• Manned emergency shut-down (ESD) stations and communications,
• Online gas monitoring,
• Weather limitation criteria for Installation moves,
OPERATIONS
• Towboat available horse power,

• Back up anchors,
• Development of detailed procedures including responsibilities,
• Emergency response plans developed and
• Sea bed surveys used must be current and up to date.
This is not an exhaustive list of issues to be considered by management.
4.1.3 DRILLING OPERATIONS ADJACENT TO PRODUCING WELLS
If drilling operations are to be carried out in the vicinity of producing wells,

appropriate preventive and mitigating risk reducing controls must be discussed with
the client. The proposed plan must be confirmed acceptable by the Business Unit
Manager or his designee.

• Online gas monitoring,
• Manned emergency shut-down (ESD) stations and communications,
• Down-hole safety valves,
• Live wellhead protection from load impact damage,
• Dropped object avoidance procedures,
• Clearance from existing wells,
• Development of detailed simultaneous drilling and production procedures
including responsibilities and
• Emergency response plans developed.
This is not an exhaustive list of issues to be considered by management.
Full assistance with the appropriate preventive and mitigating risk reducing controls
mentioned above should be sought from the Operator involved.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
The Business Unit Manager is responsible for approving simultaneous drilling and
production operations prior to their commencement.
OPERATIONS
The Business Unit Operations Manager or Division Manager is responsible for

Risk Assessment (TRA) for simultaneous drilling and production operations.
5.3 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager is responsible for reviewing and approving Task Specific
THINK Procedures inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment (TRA) for
simultaneous drilling and production operations prior to submitting to Business Unit
Operations Manager or Division Manager.
5.4 DRILLING DEPARTMENT SUPERVISORS (D)
The Drilling Department Supervisor is responsible for developing a Task Specific

THINK Procedure inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment (TRA).
6 REFERENCES
Documentation associated with Task Risk Assessment is as follows:

• HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01, Section 4, Subsection 2.1, Heading 4.4, Task
Risk Assessment
OPERATIONS
WELL TESTING
1 POLICY
Well testing operations must be pre-planned including Hazard Identification

and Task Risk Assessments.

Subsection 1.6.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure safe and effective well test activities onboard all Installations. Particular
emphasis is placed on floating operations with additional planning required in view of
performance of moorings, DP systems and subsea test trees.
The large number of interfaces inherent in well testing necessitates effective

preplanning. These variables include, but are not limited to, Installation-specific
interfaces, well-test equipment to be used, well-specific issues, Client requirements,
third-party requirements, Business Unit-specific policies and location-specific
environment.
3 SCOPE
This procedure is applicable to all Installations conducting well tests.
4 PROCEDURE
At least one month prior to well testing, each Installation must conduct a hazard
identification risk assessment (HAZID) with operator and 3rd party personnel.
A HAZID (Hazard Identification) is a structured and systematic risk assessment of an

activity in order to identify the hazards associated with it. The activity, for example,
drilling a high pressure/high temperature well, would normally be split into a number
of tasks. Each task would be reviewed and risk assessed.
Dynamic positioned Installations must expand the scope of HAZID to incorporate

station keeping issues particular to dynamic positioning.
Each Installation will have written Task Specific THINK Procedures (TSTP) for well
test activities. These TSTPs inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment (TRA) must be
reviewed during the pre-well HAZID to ensure they remain relevant for the operation
being planned.
OPERATIONS
WELL TESTING

represent a higher level of criticality, complexity and potential consequences due
to the identified hazards related to the tasks within the activity.
The Task Specific THINK Procedure is comprised of tasks, critical tasks,

or both.
significant loss (severity rating of 15 or higher, see HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-
01, Section 4 Subsection 6.3) to people, the environment or property.

Procedures that are the basis for establishing effective and reliable preventive
and mitigating controls for tasks and critical tasks within activities.
The Task Risk Assessment provides a more detailed qualitative risk assessment
to demonstrate that risks related to specific tasks are as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP). Critical tasks within a given activity require all potential
hazards be clearly identified in the assessment so existing control measures can
be verified, and/or new control measures implemented to reduce the identified
risks to ALARP.
Procedures. The critical tasks in a Task Specific THINK Procedure are
required to be further risk assessed with a Task Risk Assessment.
The Task Risk Assessment is applied to further demonstrate, in detail, the risks
and hazards associated with critical tasks and tasks have been reduced to
ALARP.
4.1.2 TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURES FOR WELL TESTING
Task Specific THINK Procedures for Well Testing must address the following:
• Roles and responsibilities of the DPO and Driller must be clearly defined with
respect to DP station keeping. A well test specific well specific operating
guideline (WSOG) must be implemented.
• A pre-test meeting must be held on site with all relevant Installation, client and
service company personnel present. All support vessels in the vicinity and
helicopter operator must be informed of the time of commencement of testing.
OPERATIONS
WELL TESTING
• The maximum anticipated temperature during the well test must not exceed
the continuous temperature rating of the BOP elastomers.
• Perforating activities must be carried out in accordance with Company safety
and well control procedures and controlled by the Permit to Work system.
• For the initial test, well test tools must not be opened at night without approval
of the Business Unit Manager or his delegate.
• The Well Test Tree Control Station must be manned at all times.
• The complete gas detection system and safety equipment including ESDs,
fire-fighting systems, alarms and communication systems, must be verified as
fully operational prior to the commencement of testing operations.
• Drill pipe must not be used as a test string or completion string in a gas well
or in a well where H2S is present. In addition the Transocean’s drillpipe or
collars should not be used as a test string during well testing operations.
• Adequate volumes of kill mud/brine plus LCM material must be onboard the
Installation prior to perforating/flowing the well.
• There must be a means to circulate the contents of the test string, prior to
pulling out of the hole with the test string.
• All testing and or completion operations must conform to the principle of
double valve isolation inside the test or completion string and in the annulus.
• All surface well testing and completion equipment must be pressure tested
with water to its working pressure or 1000 psi above the maximum anticipated
surface pressure, whichever is the lesser, prior to flowing the well. A full
function test of all valves and automatic systems must be conducted and the
ESD system operation verified.
• All downhole testing and completion equipment, except tubulars, must be
pressure tested to the maximum anticipated operating pressure prior to
running in the well bore.
• Airlines to burners must have non-return valves fitted. The air supply must be
independent of the Installation air supply systems.
• On floating Installations where a passive motion compensator system is not
installed, a passive compensated lift frame must be used during well testing.
• On floating installations the BOP test string space out must be reviewed to
ensure that, following disconnection, the shear rams can be closed above the
SSTT, that two sets of pipe rams are able to close on the slick joint and that
the shear sub is located across the shear rams.
OPERATIONS
WELL TESTING
• On floating Installations, well test operations must be shut in down-hole when

Installation heave exceeds 5-foot total (double amplitude) measured at the
drill floor, the test string depressurized and the sub-sea tree shut in
preparation for disconnecting.
• Equipment testing and preparatory measures must be recorded. Original test
records must remain on the Installation.
Refer to Recommended Practices, in Field Operations Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-05:
• Section 3.1.6-Appendix 1 - Recommended Practice – Well Test Planning
Checklist
• Section 3.1.6-Appendix 2 - Recommended Practice – Well Test HAZID/Risk
Assessment
• Section 3.1.6-Appendix 3 - Recommended Practice – Well Test Example
Flowcharts
• Section. 3.2.6-Appendix 2 – Recommended Practice – Well Specific
Operating Guidelines – DST Example
Any deviation from the agreed well testing procedures must be managed using the
Management of Change process detailed in the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01,
Section 1.5, Management of Change.
5 RESPONSIBILITY

Risk Assessment (TRA) for well testing activities.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager is responsible for ensuring that Installation operations are
conducted in accordance with Company Policy and Procedures. The Rig Manager
is responsible for reviewing and approving Task Specific THINK Procedures
inclusive of a Task Risk Assessment (TRA) for well testing activities prior to
submitting to Business Unit Operations Manager or Division Manager.
5.3 OIM (D)
The OIM in conjunction with the installation department supervisors is responsible

for developing Task Specific THINK Procedure(s) inclusive of a Task Risk
Assessments (TRA) for well test activities.
OPERATIONS
WELL TESTING
5.4 INSTALLATION DEPARTMENT HEADS (D)
The Installation Department Heads are responsible for ensuring compliance with all
requirements of this Policy and Procedure as applicable.
6 REFERENCES
Recommended Practices within the Field Operations manual provide example

documents illustrating Well Test Operating Criteria, recommended performance
standards and Hazard Identifications (HAZID) related to Well Test operations.
• Field Operations Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-05, Section 3.1.6, Appendix 1,

Recommended Practice, Well Test Planning Checklist
Recommended Practice, Well Test HAZID/Risk Assessment
Recommended Practice, Well Test Example Flowcharts
• Field Operations Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-05, Section. 3.2.6, Appendix 2,
Recommended Practice, Well Specific Operating Guidelines – DST Example
• HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01, Section 4, Subsection 2.1, Heading 4.4, Task
Risk Assessment
• HSE Policies and Procedures Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01, Section 4,
Subsection 5.7, Safety Policies, Implementing and Monitoring, Hazardous
Materials
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
Well Test Planning Information Checklist
1 INTRODUCTION
A drill stem well test (DST) is a temporary well completion to gather information on
potential productivity of a formation. Since well testing involves bringing formation
fluids to surface special precautions are required to avoid loss of well control.
A higher level of safety awareness is required while conducting DST’s. The OIM
and Senior Toolpusher in conjunction with the Operator Representative and key
Service Company personnel should review all aspects of the program.
The review should concentrate on key areas such as communication, roles and
responsibilities of personnel, emergency response, expected test parameters
(temperature, pressure, etc.) and any required changes to the program.
It is the responsibility of the OIM to ensure that all personnel involved with well
testing operations understand the work to be performed and their roles and
responsibilities.
2 DOCUMENTATION
DST Operations Checklists should be completed by the OIM prior to every DST.
Problems that may arise should be brought to the attention of the Rig Manager for
resolution prior to opening the first DST for a particular well.
Completed checklists should be made part of the well report records and filed in
accordance with the Business Unit policy.
Sample DST Operation check lists are provided in Tables 3.1.6.1 through 3.1.6.5
below.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.1 - Example of a Schlumberger DST Landing String
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.1 continued – Example of a Schumberger Downhole Test String
Client : Various
Field :
Well :
Rig: Date: 11-Dec-01
EXAMPLE OF DOWNHOLE TEST STRING

Tensile DEPTH TO
TOOL DESCRIPTION O.D. I.D. Str. THREADS LENGTH BOTTOM
Inches Inches FEET FEET
5000.00
4 1/2" 533 Box
4 1/2" 533 Tubing (from x-over below 4.50 3.83 30.00
fluted hanger) 4 1/2" 533 Pin
4 1/2" 533 Box
Gauge Carrier 7.00 3.50 255,000 22.00
4 1/2" 533 Pin
4 1/2" 533 Box
4 1/2" 533 Tubing 3.50 3.83 7000.00
4 1/2" 533 Pin
X-Over 5.00 2.25 1.50
3 1/2" PH6 Box
3 1/2" PH6 Tubing 3.50 2.75 30.00
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Single Shot Reversing Valve (SHORT) 5.00 2.25 360,000 4.49
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" IF Box
Multi Cycle Circulating Valve (MCCV) 5.00 2.25 350,000 6.17
3 1/2" IF Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Pump Through Safety Valve (PTSV) 5.00 2.25 350,000 6.55
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
3 1/2" PH6 Tubing 3.50 2.75 30.00
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Data Latch (DGA + LDCA) 5.00 2.25 350,000 23.48
4 1/4" Taperd ACME
4 1/4" Taperd ACME
Intellegent Remote Dual Valve (IRDV) 5.00 2.25 300,000 20.41
3 1/2" IF Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
SCAR sample carrier 5.25 2.25 18.80
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Gauge Carrier 5.00 2.25 250,000 15.63
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Tubing Fill Tester Valve (TFTV) 5.00 2.25 360,000 5.60
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Seal Assembly ( in Permanent Packer) 5.96 2.44 20.00
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.6.1 – Basic Precautions for Dst checklist
TASK REMARKS
1. Prior to conducting any DST the BOPs and the gas
detection system should be tested.
2. Transocean’s drill pipe should not be used for DST.
3. Prior to testing a zone when high pressure is expected, the
OIM and the operator must meet to discuss the operation.
Any disagreement must be referred to the Rig Manager.
During the test the annulus pressure should be monitored to
ensure a leak does not develop in the drill stem.
4. All DST work must use a surface tree (flow head) that
enables the drill stem to be closed in. A minimum of two
primary surface pressure barriers must be used in the flow
path. The valves must be rated (W.P.) to at least 1.25 times
the maximum expected shut-in pressure. The primary shut-in
valves are located in the SSTT.
5. Special attention should be emphasized for H 2 S detection.
6. DSTs on floating units must always be conducted with the
drill stem hung-off in the BOPs, a subsea master valve
installed (E-Z tree or subsea test tree), a Pressure Controlled
Tester Valve installed that can be opened or closed by
annulus overpressure.
7. Should the client select not to run one of the above, an
Exemption must be filed with final approval by the Business
Unit Manager prior to opening the first DST.
8. The BOP pipe rams are closed around the slick joint
situated immediately below the master valve thus sealing off
the well annulus. Following emergency closure of the master
valve and disconnection of the hydraulic operator, the
blind/shear rams must be closed above the master valve
during temporary abandonment.
9. Ensure the shear rams can shear the flat pack, shear point.
10. Lock out rams that should not be allowed to close on the
tree.
11. Master valve strong enough to cut coil tubing and wireline.
12. When it becomes necessary to pull off location due to
rough seas or other emergencies, the well is closed in subsea,
pressure is bled off, the retainer valves closed and the
hydraulic latch assembly is disconnected , leaving the well
shut-in and safely under control.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.6.1 – Basic Precautions for Dst checklist (continue)
13. Discuss the function of annular pressure. Annular

Pressure activates the down hole ball valve in either the open
or closed position. Further annular pressure is monitored to
insure a down hole packer is holding and not leaking and if
necessary annular pressure can operate the SSTT unlatch
function.
14. Disconnection of the subsea test tree during a well test
may allow for small amounts of gas to be released into the
riser. Calculations considering mud weight in riser and water
depth must be made to insure any gas trapped between
retainer valve and master valve in SSTT will “U-tube” out the
bottom of the riser following a quick or emergency disconnect.
15. Ensure enough high-pressure flexible lines are used to
allow compensation for the maximum Installation heave in
which the test string must remain connected.
16. Ensure the EDS is set to the correct mode for each phase
of the operation.
17. Surface SSTT control station is to be manned at all times.
18. Airlines to burners must have non-return valves fitted. Air
supply must be independent of Installation air supply.
Revised December 31, 2001
Table 3.1.6.2 - PRECAUTIONS WHILE TESTING CHECKLIST
TASK REMARKS
1. When testing wells containing H2S, no gas, no matter how
small the amount, should be released into the atmosphere
unless it is burned immediately. Testing of wells with H2S is
not permitted unless the Installation is equipped and
personnel trained for H2S. A separate detailed HAZOP is
required.
2. When sampling, the separator must be properly grounded.
3. Always open up a well slowly, using the upper master
valve.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.6.3 – SPECIAL WELL CONTROL SITUATIONS CHECKLIST
TASK REMARKS
1. All Installations must develop a DST-Well Specific
Operations Guidelines that addresses DP-DST interactions
between the Driller, Well Test subcontractor and DPO. The
DP-WSOG must be agreed by the Operator/OIM and
implemented onboard the Installation.
2. A surface shutdown system is required in any well test
hook-up.
3. Steel hammers or sledgehammers should be banned; brass
is a must.
4. Never allow a flame or naked light inside the safety
perimeters. All hot work must be suspended.
5. Always pressure test the installation prior to well opening.
6. When designing a well testing set-up, make sure the
equipment planned can safely withstand and handle the
maximum wellhead pressure for the portion that may be
exposed to such pressure.
7. Thermal expansion of test string below BOP should be
taken into consideration. Check design of test string slipjoints
and test string weight in view of expansion of test string due to
temperature increase. Expansion may lead to unseating of
fluted hangar in wellhead and test string moving up in BOP
with potential damage to BOP components or re-positioning of
shear sub away from shear rams.
8. The pressure in the BOP needs to be evaluated before a
well test. BOP's are not designed to resist hydrostatic
pressure from outside. External pressure can lead to collapse
of components inside the BOP. Potential for severe down
time and operational risks (loss of BOP integrity and control of
well bore pressures) exists if BOP internal pressure is less
than external hydrostatic pressure.
9. The spacing between the various units comprising a well
test hook-up should be reviewed considering BOP
arrangement, Installation heave at drill floor, motion
compensator space out. Spacing should also consider
location of lubricators and bails with relation to Installation
floor and hook so as to allow access to the lubricator with
wireline tools.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.6.3 – SPECIAL WELL CONTROL SITUATIONS CHECKLIST (continue)
10. When reversing out do not allow the fluid to u-tube and
create negative internal pressure which might damage the
bonnet seals.
11. Extended bails for test provided by Operator if coil tubing
frame is not used. Use of slings not allowed as emergency
disconnect requires turning to the right.
12. Wind direction should be considered when blowing gas
into the atmosphere. Total lack of wind currents may create
hazardous conditions as gas mixes 1:10 with air potentially
creating hazards in non-hazardous rated areas. Combustible
gases can migrate towards lower pressure areas that are not
suitable rated. “No wind, no test” is a recommended practice.
13. DST tools must not be opened at night the first time
without permission of the Business Unit or Division Manager
as per the Field Operations Manual and Well Control Manual.
14. All units must be properly grounded to prevent risks of
ignition by static electricity.
Revised July, 2002
Table 3.1.6.4 – PRE-DST CHECKLIST
TASK REMARKS
1. Those items noted in the DST section of the Well Control
Manual (HQS-OPS-HB-01) must be checked.
2. Each operation must list the Installation specific equipment
required on location for DST. Items such as oil dispersant,
absorbents for spills, pup joints for correct space outs, brass
sledgehammers and fishing tools for testing equipment must
be included. Workboat with foam fire fighting capabilities plus
spill chemicals must be on location.
3. The DST landing string and tubing should be checked
internally and verified free of contaminants.
4. The subsea test tree configuration should be reviewed with
testing personnel to verify the shear rams can close above the
valve part of the subsea tree.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.6.4 – PRE-DST CHECKLIST (continue)
TASK REMARKS
5. A landing string diagram (Refer to Example) showing space
out and configuration must be prepared and reviewed by the
Testing Company, Operator and OIM. TEST STRING
CALCULATIONS MUST BE REVIEWED FOR STRETCH IN
THE EVENT OF COMPENSATOR LOSS.
6. The entire Installation (downhole and surface) should be

function and pressure tested at least 25 % above the
maximum anticipated pressure, and not to exceed the WP of
the equipment. Pressure tests must be personally witnessed
by the OIM or his designee.
7. Have a heightened state of alert when non-shearable
tubulars go thru the BOP.
8. Wind direction and speed should be sufficient to carry
burned products away from the Installation. Safe briefing
areas must be designed and known by all personnel. Crews
must know the location of the windsock and how to determine
wind direction. All crews must be briefed on escape routes to
safe briefing areas. Total lack of wind currents may create
hazardous conditions. Burner boom must face downwind.
9. Water curtains and fire-fighting equipment must be checked
and verified operational before opening the well.
10. All well testing units and gauge tanks must be electrically
grounded. All well testing equipment inclusive of air
compressors must be spark arrested and/or explosion proof. If
they are not, the equipment must be located outside the
hazardous area.
11. All breathing apparatus must be checked and verified
operational and sufficient for 30 minutes of use. The donning
and use of emergency breathing apparatus must be reviewed
until all personnel are proficient in its use.
12. The conditions for allowing helicopter landings while
flaring must be reviewed with the client and Helicopter
Company, and an agreed plan must be established.
13. Yokohama fenders must be removed from the water
during well testing. Past experience has resulted in a
Yokohama fender becoming oil soaked then burned and
impossible to extinguish resulting in Installation damage.
Revised Dec, 2003
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.6.5 – DST SAFETY PRECAUTIONS CHECKLIST
TASK REMARKS
1. Good house keeping is a top priority especially the
Installation floor and the DST Equipment area. Spillage of well
fluids must be kept to the absolute minimum.
2. No matches, lighters, or cigarettes are allowed outside the
quarters.
3. No welding, gas cutting, grinding other hot work while
flowing the well. Any hot work during the period the well is
shut in is to be done under a hotwork permit basis only
(inclusive of the welders bench area). Oxygen and acetylene
bottles must only be stored in the welding area during flaring
and not scattered around the Installation.
4. No needle gunning, chipping or power brushing while
flowing the well except in areas designated by the OIM and a
permit to work.
5. No crane operation without a permit to work. Booms to be
racked as applicable.
6. The doors of all enclosed spaces must be kept closed and
dogged. No one should enter a column except with a buddy at
the column entrance and with a supervisor’s knowledge.
7. All fluids from the well to be burned off as soon as feasible
and not to be kept in the gauge tank or separators for
extended periods of time or, in the case of Installations with
approved oil storage facilities, transferred to the storage tank.
8. Wireline engineers should not expose explosives while
flaring.
9. Portable explosive and H2S gas meters must be available
and operational. Several daily checks at equipment locations
end enclosed spaces must be taken.
10. Testing operators must review the proper slinging and
handling procedures for their equipment with the drill crews
and roustabouts. Extra care is to be taken when handling
bulky and heavy equipment.
11. Personnel not directly involved in the testing to stay away
from the drill floor and well testing areas.
12. No one is allowed in the derrick while flaring without a
work permit approved by the OIM.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.1.6.5 – DST SAFETY PRECAUTIONS CHECKLIST (continue)
TASK REMARKS
13. AII crews must be briefed in search and rescue
procedures:
• Buddy system with limitation on report in time
• Search in confined spaces only after gas free check,
buddy (lifeline) system and only with SCBAs and
established communications.
14. During crew change handover’s the Driller must make a
special effort to review the details of the work in progress and
obtain relevant information from the test operator on duty.
15. Pumping functions must not be disabled. The cementing
unit and one Installation pump must always be ready for
immediate use.
16. In case of extended flow periods, gauging surface test
lines in critical areas for wall thickness loss should be
addressed. This is especially important when solids are
expected to flow back (clean up test after sand frac).
17. Consideration should be given to removing non-essential
personnel from the Installation.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Well Test HAZID Example
1 WELL TEST HAZID
HAZIDs / RAs are conducted in co-operation with the Operator, 3rd party, Installation
Management and Installation Crew so as to conduct non-routine operations
knowledgeably and to develop a well specific action plan. HAZIDs / RAs generate
specific recommendations critical to the success of the Operator’s projects.
Significant recommendations may include:
• Ascertain whether the BOP shear rams can shear the completion jewelry
which may be across the BOP during a DST / Completion operation.
• Determine the operating limits for various stages of DST/ Completion
operation including:
• Flex joint angle
• Heave limitations
• Weather and sea state limitations
• An interface between the Subsea Test Tree Contractor and the Company
needs to be established. This includes the disconnect timing of the SSTT and
the time to clear the flex joint with the SSTT so as to establish watch circles
during DST/Completion operations.
• The interfaces between the DP Operator, Driller and SSTT crew need to be
identified and clearly outlined and authority levels defined.
NOTE: The accompanying examples are recommended to be used by the

Installation as a guide during their conduct of the HAZID.
2 DST- COMPENSATED COIL TUBING LIFT FRAME FOR AHC DRAWWORKS
The DEEPWATER PATHFINDER Class, SEDCO EXPRESS Class, DEEPWATER

NAUTILUS AND DEEPWATER HORIZON drilling units within the Company fleet are
outfitted with Active Heave Compensated (AHC) drawworks which combine the
activities of a standard drawworks and a drill string motion compensator. In the
process of conducting HAZID for DST operations the potential of a motion
compensator failure type event was raised which could potentially impose undue
stress upon the DST test tubing.
Investigation of similar type incidents with standard motion compensators revealed

this type of event had occurred in the past resulting in uncontrolled release of
hydrocarbons. Failure of the test tubing was located at the highest stressed location
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
near the top of the test string in near proximity to the drill floor. To address this
issue, the Company initiated engineering and construction of a passive
compensated coil tubing lift frame to be used in conjunction with the AHC drawworks
during DST/Completion operations.
The passive compensated coil tubing lift frame can operate as a stand alone passive
compensator or an additional in-line safety device in the event of an AHC drawworks
failure wherein the drawworks either stops compensating or fails “safe” by setting the
brakes. At this point in time the passive compensated coil tubing lift frame is
designed to stroke out, minimizing the added tension on the DST test tubing, and
allowing sufficient time to secure the test and disconnect the test string.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
HAZARD/CAUSE Consequences Safeguards Recommendation
COMMUNICATION Develop communication Examples during flow

• Prior flow period Health/Safety testing period with SSTT across BOPS. Ensure this
is posted through the Installation and communicated
• During flow period
to all parties.
Develop “Emergency Disconnect Procedure”, ensure

DISCONNECT SEQUENCE: Health/Safety this is posted through the Installation and
• Prior to perforating Financial Impact communicated to all parties. Develop evacuation
• After perforating – prior to plan.
SSTT Contingency - Ensure fishing equipment is on
• SSTT across BOP location if shearing is required.
• Shear Scenario
Develop Operating Procedure with and with out
Health/Safety compensator (determine setting criteria acceptable
RU on motion compensator Financial Impact heave to handle task). Ensure this is posted through
• Perforating Phase the Installation and communicated to all parties.
• Gravel Packing Phase
Prepare stackup drawing above Installation floor.
• SL Operations
Operating envelope for heave.
• CT lift frame/Flow Testing Spaced surface tree - > 10 ft above Installation floor
Accommodate space for CT lift frame, bails, elevator
Health/Safety
& etc.
Heave on Installation floor (Weather) Damage to Coflex.
Hose & Surface Tree
REVISION DATE: October 20, 2004 3 22
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Wellbore Displacement / Cleanup Phase

Step 1
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation
Scheduling of supply boat for Financial Impact Extra supply boat for this period. Work out detail
displacement of SOBM and completion Delay schedule.
brine.
Time required to clean the pits Financial Impact Extra crew and equipment may be needed to clean
Delay pits. Prepare a procedure ahead of schedule and
review with Installation personnel to ensure an
efficient / safe cleaning process is executed.
Brine contamination during Financial Impact Review and test the valves in the pits (leak resistant), Have the mud co.
displacement Healthy/Safety or ensure all the mud is removed from the rep. prepare a
Delay Installation. Need to develop a detail plan on how the proposal with client
brine must be stored and managed on the drilling supervisor
Installation. Ensure proper PPE equipment is approval on how the
(ordered) and worn by personnel who will come in completion fluid is
contact with the brine. Review the First-Aid brine going to be
treatment with brine in the eyes and on the skin. managed on the
Installation.
(Minimize
contamination,
losses, safety & etc.)
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Wellbore Displacement / Cleanup Phase - Step 2 (Continued)

Casing Leak Financial Impact Pressure Test casing Existing safeguards

(13 5/8” x 9 5/8” x 7 5/8”) Repair If leak - Isolate with packers, tieback casing satisfactory.
Step 3
Poor/bad cement job across tests zone. Financial Impact Centralization, spacer, mud & cement compatibility Existing safeguards
Repair – block check. satisfactory.
squeeze.
Step 4
Pickle: Xylene & Acid (10% HCL) Heath/Safety & Use dedicated pumping equipment. Existing safeguards
disposal Environmental Impact Gel spacer ahead/behind product. satisfactory and
Disposal tote tanks same as storage/mixing tank. may want to
Service Company must provide communication consider evaluating
radios for this operation and line to reverse fluids to alternative products
tanks. instead of Xylene
for pickle. Develop
a procedure of
collecting the
Xylene/Acid after
pumping on the
Installation.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Wellbore Displacement / Cleanup Phase - Step 5 (Continued)

Unable to shear tubulars during test. Health/Safety Financial All tubing string (3 ½”, 4 ½” & 5 ½”) except packers
Impact is shearable. Minimize time with non-shearable
items across BOPS.
Step 6
Plug filter equipment & contamination of Financial Impact Pit capacity on the Installation is not an issue to
completion fluid. hold both mud & completion brine. Procedure
(scrapers & brushes) BHA and high pump rate and
contingency Diatomaceous Earth (DE) and filters
on location. Ensure sufficient quantities of DE are
on the Installation.
Perforating Phase
Step 1
Unable to set Sump Packer. Financial Impact Make a bit/scraper/brush run across casing/ TOLS. Existing safeguards
(tag top of liners, Clear filter (brine) – Solids Free satisfactory.
stuck in casing, USIT/CBT log run across casing/TOLS
GR-CCL locators fails) Straight hole.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Perforating Phase (Continued)

Step 2
Damage while picking up perforating string Heath/Safety (Optional) Radio/phone silent while PU guns and
and TIH (handling “Live: gun, making up firing head.
damage to tools Safety joint above between firing head and gun
while, obstruction in Only essential people on Installation floor while
test string) making up firing head.
Procedure – Hold safety meeting on Installation
floor.
Rabbit all tubulars while tripping in hole
Step 3
Leak in perforating string (workstring, Financial Impact Pressure tests tubing against TFTV after the 3 ½” Existing safeguards
packer or test tools) (Unable to hold a test tools are picked up. Repeat the testing 3 ½” x satisfactory.
pressure test against the 4 ½” tubing 2 more times
TFTV on the perforating
string)
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Step 4
Downhole circulating valve mal-function Health/Safety Inspection/certification of equipment. The Consider perforate
(achieve under balance). Financial Impact circulating tool is very reliable. Previous over balance followed
(Unable to open experience with tool. by surge trip on the
circulating valve, failure to perforations.
close circulating)
Step 5
No pressure buildup after firing guns Financial Impact Contingency firing system – Pressure delay Confirm firing
(Guns fail to fire - Clear filtered brine – Solid free procedure
drop bar not reaching Rabbit all tubulars while TIH with perforating Existing safeguards
firing head – obstruction string satisfactory
in test string) If necessary – confirm by injection test
Problems with SL Operations (Retrieve Financial Impact SL lubricator rated for 10K psi. Define tool string &
Bar) (Guns fire with SL in hole, Subsea Lubricator included in Perf string. define sufficient
pull out of SL, pull out of SL can be cut by valves if rapid disconnect is lubricator length for
lubricator) required. tool string.
Existing safeguards
for pressure rating
satisfactory.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Step 6
Downhole circulating valve mal- Health/Safety Kill well by bullheading down test string. Existing safeguards
function, achieve under balance, kill Financial Impact satisfactory.
well, reverse circulate. (Unable to open circulating
valve, failure to close
circulating)
Step 7
Pull perforating string Heath/Safety If pull live gun: (Optional) radio/phone silent
(handling “Live: gun, while PU guns and making up firing head.
damage to tools while pulling Ensure bar is retrieved. Safety joint above
out of hole, stuck guns) between firing head and gun.
Only essential people on Installation floor
while removing the firing head.
If guns are stuck - Release perforating string

at CTR – tension release sub (85 Ksi). Wash
over guns and then latch guns.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Gravel Packing (Frac-Pack: Sand Control) Phase

Step 1
Damage to gravel pack assembly and Heath/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on Existing safeguards
TIH (Handling “Screen/Blank” Installation floor satisfactory.
Damage to tools while TIH, Screen table, tongs & etc.
Obstruction in test string)
Step 2
Leak in GP/FP string (workstring, Health/Safety Procedure – trip speed in hole & ball drop. Existing safeguards
packer or cross-over test tool) Financial Impact satisfactory.
(Unable to set packer, Tested during perforating stage (same string)
pressure test against cross-
over tool).
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Step 3
Problems during Gravel Pack (Frac- Heath/Safety/ Financial Procedure – Experience Supervisor (hold
pack Treatment) operations Impact safety meeting on the Installation floor).
(Pre-mature screen-out, failed Surface head – rated form 10K psi
to PU & reverse out, reverse Pop-off valves – Shut down pumping
out ceramic, proppant, cut Communication between operator and tool
surface choke out. man
Backup choke - Dual choke for reversing out.
Weather – Stimulation Boat Calm/good weather: 4’-6’ perform treatment

moored next to the off stimulation boat next to Installation. (NO
Installation DP required). Pumped only during good
conditions, pickle performed from skid
equipment.
Step 4
Install fluid loss device in GP assembly (Shur-
Problems retrieving tool out of hole & Heath/Safety/ Shot)
losing completion fluid Financial Impact 2 3/8” WP (0.794” clearance between screen
(Fluid loss, wash pipe inside and wash pipe)
GP screen).
Skid pump/blender must assist in mixing the
LCM pill to ensure the correct volume is
pumped (Contingency Only).
Procedure moving cross-over tool – Minimize
surging the formation with screen in hole.
125 Micron Poroplus - screen.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Running Test String Phase

Step 1
Damage and injury to personnel while Heath/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on
picking up DST tools and TIH (Handling downhole tools, damage Installation floor
to tools while TIH, Rabbits all tubulars while tripping in
obstruction in test string) hole
Step 2
Leak in Tubing (3 ½” & 4 ½”) Financial Impact Pressure tests tubing against TFTV
(Unable to pressure test tbg against after the 3 ½” test tools are picked up.
the TFTV on the perforating string). Repeat the testing 3 ½” x 4 ½” tubing 2
more times.
Packer leak Financial Impact 10 ft of seals

(Unable to test tbg/pkr on the Clear filtered (brine) completion fluid.
backside). Straight hole
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Running Test String Phase - Step 3 (Continued)

Step 3
Heath/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on

(Handling downhole tools, damage Installation floor.
to tool/umbilical while TIH,
obstruction in test string) Pre-stackup drawing confirmed by
Installation personnel prior to
equipment RU.
Use Weatherford – Flush Mounted
Rotary Table (or equivalent) with slot
to accommodate control lines &
umbilical without squeezing them when
hanging off string.
Clamps (protect) umbilical.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Step 4
Damage injury to personnel while picking Heath/Safety Procedure - Hold safety meeting on the
up surface tree and CT lifting frame (Handling equipment, Installation floor.
clearance on Installation, Pre- Stackup drawing- Verify required
damage to tool/umbilical elevations, work area.
while PU). Inspection/certification on all hoisting
equipment (elevators, bails & etc) equal or
exceed expected loads.
Leak of tree/surface lines. Financial Impact Pressure tests lines upstream/downstream to
choke manifold. Pressure from SSTT to
Health/Safety
choke (through surface tree).
(Unable to hold pressure test
system)
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Running Test String Phase (Continued)

Step 5
Unable to land seals into packer/fluted Financial Impact Stackup drawing with actual strapped BOP
hanger on wear bushing dimension.
Make a space out trip with adjustable fluted

hanger and painted slick joint. Have the
joint painted at least two days before task
This will provide strapped length from wear
bushing to middle and check against the
initial drawing.
Flow Testing Phase

Step 1
Downhole circulating valve mal-function Financial Impact Inspection/certification of tool. The Consider achieving
(achieve under balance). (Unable to open circulating circulating tool is very reliable. Previous an under balance
valve, failure to close experience with tool. with chemical
circulating) injection system.
Rock well with

diesel/SW – last
option. After shearing
fluid loss device.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Flow Testing Phase (Continued)

Step 2
No flow or stops (low pressure) during Health/Safety During startup- Spot methanol across SSTT.
initial unloading phase. (Hydrate, debris blockage, (Prevent hydrate - continuously inject
SSTT closed. line rupture, methanol until starts to flow).
increase in annulus
pressure or EDS). All lines are pressure tested prior to
unloading well.
Continuously monitor annulus pressure, do

not let it build up over “SHORT” shear valve.
Step 3
Flow Test Well:
• Installation Floor – Visual Health/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on Shut-in SSTT, as
Indication of problem w/ Potential fire/explosion Installation floor prior to opening up well. soon as possible,
wellhead or tubing notify Co. Man & Tool
All equipment must be pressure pusher.
• Installation Floor – Leak in coflex tested.
line or connection ESD installed on the Installation. Shut-in 1st surface
Sampling for CO2 & H2S. tree from panel if
• Surface leak/problem other than
Equipment design for maximum rate and accessible. If not
on Installation floor
pressure. accessible, shut in
• Well flowing on annulus (trip lubricator or SSTT.
tank)
Shut-in, ESD system
from affected area.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Flow Testing Phase - Step 3 (Continued)

Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on Shut-in at the same
around diverter, run below rotary, no time: Lubricator valve &
damage to umbilical for SSTT and SSTT
lubricator.
FLOW TEST WELL:

If pressure increase
• Annular pressure increase Health/Safety ALL EQUIPMENT MUST BE cannot be bled off
(rapid, not tie to changes in well Potential fire/explosion PRESSURE TESTED. immediately & stabilized,
flow) ESD installed on the Installation. then Shut-in: ESD
Sampling for CO2 & H2S. system. Prepare to kill
• Annular pressure decrease Equipment design for maximum rate and well by bullhead down
(rapid, not due to changes in pressure. the tubing.
well flow) Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on
around diverter, run below rotary, no Attempt to increase
damage to umbilical for SSTT and pressure with Installation
lubricator pump. If continued
decrease in annular
pressure, isolate
Installation pump from
BOP stack by closing
standpipe valve. Monitor
annulus pressure from
choke manifold gauge. If
pressure cannot be
stabilized immediately,
the Shut-in.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
FLOW TEST WELL:
• High pressure (between choke Health/Safety ALL EQUIPMENT MUST BE High pilot would trip shut
manifold and steam exchanger) PRESSURE TESTED down valve on choke
ESD installed on the Installation. manifold and master panel
Sampling for CO2 & H2S. (Well shut-in)
• Low pressure (between choke Equipment design for maximum rate
manifold and steam exchanger) and pressure. Low pilot would trip shut
Health/Safety Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals down valve on choke
on around diverter, run below rotary, manifold and master panel
• Heat radiation no damage to umbilical for SSTT (Well shut-in)
and lubricator.
Additional (portable spray)
HEATH/SAFETY Water spray (curtain) on Installation / must be installed to protect
Gas in riser (due to leak in landing string) Financial Impact HITEC flare boom - Protects life boat/ etc. The flare
Installation and personnel. The boom installed on the
calculations are acceptable Installation already includes
Heath/Safety (depends on wind direction) at water spray.
Financial Impact 30,000 BOPD rate (more water is
desirable). Plans are to test at lower
rates.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS

FLOW TEST WELL:

ALL EQUIPMENT MUST BE Install a deluge spray
• Methanol leak (chemical HEALTH/SAFETY PRESSURE TESTED system over the methanol
injection system) Financial Impact ESD installed on the Installation. tanks. Additional chemical
Sampling for CO2 & H2S. /foam (hand held fire
Potential Fire/ Explosion Equipment design for maximum rate and fighting equipment) for both
pressure. methanol and hydrocarbon
Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on fires. Drape the tanks with
around diverter, run below rotary, no damage caution barricade tape and
to umbilical for SSTT and lubricator. applied salt around the
manhole covers where
opening of tanks may
occur. Add dye to
methanol, help in locating
leaks. Stainless steel tubing
(eliminated) major problems
of hoses burning if a fire
occur. ESD was also tied
into the injection pumps to
shut them down in case of
emergency. Someone
present in the area and
every 30 minutes check
areas with gas detector for
leaks.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS

FLOW TEST WELL: Heath/Safety All equipment must be pressure tested High pilot would trip shut
down valve on choke
High pressure (between steam manifold and master panel
exchanger and separator) (Well shut-in)
Low pressure (Between steam Heath/Safety ESD installed on the Installation. Low pilot would trip shut
exchanger and separator) down valve on choke
manifold and master panel
(Well shut-in)
High Shell pressure (steam Heath/Safety Sampling for CO2 & H2S. Trip master panel (Well
exchanger) shut-in)
High Pressure, Low Pressure, Heath/Safety Equipment design for maximum rate Trip master panel (Well
High Level, Low Level (on and pressure. shut-in)
Separator)
High Pressure, High level (on p-tank) Heath/Safety Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals Trip master panel (Well
on around diverter, run below rotary, shut-in)
no damage to umbilical for SSTT and
lubricator.
FLOW TEST WELL: All equipment must be pressure tested Open dump valve (Start
ESD installed on the Installation. flow from p-tank)
• High Level Controller Heath/Safety Sampling for CO2 & H2S. Close dump valve (Stop
• Low Level Controller Heath/Safety Equipment design for maximum rate flow from p-tank)
• Level-Safety Low Heath/Safety and pressure. Close S.D.V. (Stop flow
Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals from p-tank)
• ESD Panels on around diverter, run below rotary,
Heath/Safety no damage to umbilical for SSTT and Trip master panel (Well
lubricator. shut-in)
• Gas Leak in riser
Heath/Safety
Low L.E.L. sound horn
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS

• High flow Heath/Safety Well is gravel pack (sand control) High L.E.L trip master
(Cut choke out surface ESD installed on Installation panel
choke w/ sand) Onsite supervision - Personnel monitoring (Well shut-in)
well at all times.
Trip master panel
(Well shut-in)
Well Kill / Temporary Abandonment Phase

Step 1
Downhole circulating valve mal-function, Financial Impact Kill well by bullheading down test string.
achieve under balance, kill well, reverse (Unable to open circulating
circulate valve, failure to close
circulating)
Step 2
DAMAGE AND INJURY TO Heath/Safety Procedure (Safety Meeting)

PERSONNEL WHILE RD CT LIFT (Handling equipment, Experience from RU equipment.
FRAME & SURFACE TREE/LINES: clearance on Installation,
damage to tool/umbilical
while RD).
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Well Kill / Temporary Abandonment Phase (Continued)

Step 3
Damage while POOH w/test string: Heath/Safety Hole starts taking fluid - Spot fluid loss Experience from RU
(Handling equipment). pill equipment
Experience from running/handling DST
tools during installation.
Step 4
Unable set packer plug and dump 50’ – Financial Impact Procedure spotting pill
75’ sand on top. (Debris inside packer prevents Skid pump/blender will assist in mixing
sting into packer, sand plugs the pill to ensure the correct volume is
workstring) pumped.
Clear filter (brine) – Solids Free
Large amounts of sand – pump using a
slurry using the skid pimp/blender
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Well Test - DST Example Flowcharts
1 FLOWCHARTS
This subsection provides a series of flowcharts that were developed for drill stem
testing, production testing and coiled tubing operations. These charts reflect an
appropriate thought process for conducting task risk assessment and THINK,
START, and FOCUS evaluations for these non-routine operations.
Figure 3.1.6.2 Example 1 - Operations with Cement, Coiled Tubing and STT
Approving Authority: Rig Manager
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.3 Example 2 - Operations with Coiled Tubing and Cement (With
Christmas Tree Installed)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.4 - Example 3 – DST (RIH or POOH)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.5 - Example 4 – DST (Flowing or Shutting In the Well)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.6 - Example 5 – Production Test with STT Installed
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.7 - Example 6 – Production Test with Christmas Tree Installed
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.8 - Example 7 – Gravel Packing (RIH, POOH Tests)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.9 - Example 8 – Gravel Packing (Displacing the Sand Slurry)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.10 - Example 9 – Stimulation’s with STT (Subsea Testing Tree)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.11 - Example 10 – Stimulation with Coiled Tubing and STT
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.12 - Example 11 – Stimulation with Christmas Tree
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.13 - Example 12 – RIH Production Packer with “Tail”
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.14 - Example 13 – Setting or Testing the Production Packer
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.15 - Example 14 – RIH / POOH Production String
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.16 Example 15 – RIH Production String with Completion Riser and
TIH
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.17 - Example 16 – Vertical Connection
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.18 - Example 17 – Running Christmas Tree / TRT / Tree Cap
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.19 - Example 18 – Coiled Tubing Jet Lifting with STT (with No
String Bottom Valve)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.20 - Example 19 – Coiled Tubing Jet Lifting with STT (with String
Bottom Valve)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.21 - Example 20 – Lifting with Christmas Tree
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6. 22 - Example 21 – Jet Lifting with Christmas Tree
Remarks:
A workover bop must be used (Christmas tree gate valves don’t cut coiled tubing).
2. Keep permanent communication between the driller and CT unit.
3. Observe unlatching angle of the workover bop, keeping top tension for EDS.
Clean riser with a diesel cushion to prevent hydrate formation.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.23 - Example 22 – Slickline Operations with STT
Remarks:
Use always short STT (15k) so that is still possible to close the shear rams with the STT
connected.
Keep permanent communication between the driller and the wireline operator.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.6.24 - Example 23– Slickline Operations with Christmas Tree

Installed (Well Killed)
Remarks:
Keep permanent communication between the driller and the slick line operator.
Keep top tension in case of TRT EDS.
OPERATIONS
WELL PLANNING
1 POLICY
All well construction activities must be pre-planned prior to commencement.

Subsection 1.7.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure adequate communication between the Client and the Company and
eliminate “assumptions” that may have a negative impact towards safety of
personnel, environment, equipment or operational performance.
To communicate Transocean’s methods of operation, understand the Client’s

expectations, identify risks / opportunities for operational improvement, required
resources and well-site information required for safe and efficient operations.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure is applicable to all Installations.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 When possible, prior to the well being spudded, the Rig Manager / OIM should
review the drilling program to confirm safe drilling and well control practices,
compliance with Company policies, and the ability of the Installation to perform
drilling operations within the environment and water depth of the location.
4.2 Pre-spud meetings should be held onshore and/or on the Installation with the
client and appropriate third parties encouraged to attend.
4.3 Well planning checklists that identify client and contractor issues and
responsibilities should be used to identify pre-spud meeting agenda issues. An
example is provided in the Appendix to this section.
4.4 Location site specific information must be received from the Operator including
bathymetry, metocean data, field layout, soil conditions, shallow hazards and
seafloor hazards. Rig Manager must attempt to receive this information from
the Operator at least one month in advance of the planned spud date in order
that Engineering has time to analyze and approve the location. Refer to
Installation Move, Location Approval and Reporting, Operator Furnished Data
in Section 3, Subsection 2.3, Appendix 4 of this manual.
4.5 Wellhead torque and bending limits must be obtained for DP Installation
operations. Rig Manager must attempt to receive this information from the
OPERATIONS
WELL PLANNING
Operator at least one month in advance of the planned spud date in order that
HQS Engineering has time to analyze and approve the location. Refer to Riser
Operations Procedure, Tensioner Ring Operation, Section 3, Subsection 2.5,
Appendix 4 of this manual.
4.6 If adverse weather conditions are anticipated, personnel must be made aware
of the hazards and determine the controls to be put in place.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER / DIVISION OPERATIONS

MANAGER (I)
The Business Unit Operations Manager and Division Operations Manager (where
applicable) are responsible for ensuring uniformity of Installation well planning
operations and receipt of site specific information for location approvals.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager is responsible for obtaining site-specific information for location
approvals, review of well plans and Client well pre-planning efforts and ensuring that
Installation operations are conducted in accordance with Company Policy and
Procedures.
5.3 OIM (D)
The OIM is responsible for ensuring that the provisions of this Policy and Procedure
are implemented on the Installation.
5.4 INSTALLATION DEPARTMENT HEADS (I)
6 REFERENCES
Well Pre-planning Recommended Practices:
Recommended Practice, Well Planning Checklists
Recommended Practice, Site Specific Information
Recommended Practice, DP Planning Checklist
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Well Planning - Introduction and Checklists
1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
As wells progress into more challenging environments, health, safety and

environmental concerns become more sensitive due to utilization of new
technologies, new applications of existing technologies as well as lack of historical
precedent. Unique features of deepwater wells such as tight tolerances, low fracture
gradients, extensive use of liners, and large changes in annular size (casing to riser
transition) require specialized equipment and/or procedures to maintain a high level
of drilling performance.
Well Planning is one of the most important tasks to be accomplished prior to

embarking on any project, task or work assignment. All levels of operational
management should identify and plan activities and resources needed to achieve the
Company’s Mission Statement and Core Values in consideration of the following:
• Needs and expectations of the Client and other interested parties

• Benchmarking/Performance of the work
• Learning from previous experiences
• Risk identification and analysis
The results of Well Planning should include identification of:
• Responsibility and authority for execution of the plans

• Skills and knowledge needed
• Opportunities for operational improvement
• Requirement for resources
Established Well Plans should be regularly reviewed and revised when necessary to
reflect feedback from the Client, Company personnel or other interested parties.
Floating drilling operations conducted from either semi-submersibles or drill-ships

should consider a number of factors to insure a successful and efficient operation
including:
• Water Depth
• Metocean Conditions/Installation Operability
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
• Location Remoteness
• Re-supply Requirements
• Infrastructure Support (work-boats, anchor boats, docks, helicopters)
• Prior Well and Post Well Locations
• Installation Equipment
• Station keeping
• Safety Experience
• Shallow hazards
• Hydrates
• Drilling Riser Capabilities
• Well Head Capabilities
• Medical Evacuations
• Loss of Power
Successful drilling services anticipate the most effective solutions to address the
shallow hazard, low fracture gradient, low temperature and other hole parameters,
station keeping, and logistic issues that are typically encountered in drilling
operations.
2 CHECKLISTS
The purpose of a well planning information checklist is to provide the Rig Manager
and other relevant persons (onshore as well as offshore) with a well planning
management tool. It is recommended that a checklist be used from the time of
contract review through to the pre-spud meeting to identify client and contractor
issues and responsibilities.
Non-conformances may be avoided if the checklist is conscientiously used. The

checklist provided in this subsection is an example and may not be all-inclusive. Rig
Managers should use the provided checklist as a “starting point” and make
necessary modifications as required.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
3 RECORDING, FILING AND RETENTION
A checklist should be completed by the Rig Manager or his designate prior to every
commencement of a drilling program. Problems that may arise should be brought to
the attention of the Rig Manager for resolution prior to commencement of operations.
The checklist should be completed and made part of every pre-spud meeting.
Completed checklists should be made part of the specific well files and retained in
accordance with Business Unit policy.
Figure 3.1.7.1 Sample Well Planning Checklist
Yes No N/A
ADMINISTRATION
1a Navigation restrictions – Restrictions are listed on the Insurance –
Risk Management website
1b War risk – Purchase additional coverage if warranted
1c Reactivation survey – Installation has been stacked over 180 days
1d Approved contractor – A data base of all Company approved
contractors can be found on the Insurance Risk Management
website
1e Special insurance requirements required by contractor or local
legislation
1f Certificate of Financial Responsibility if Installation is in USA
waters
1g Emergency contact numbers in the event of an injury or incident
1h Importation permit – Installation equipment list / Support
documentation
1I Working visas for all personnel going overseas
1j Installation classification documentation
1k Ensure The Company is in compliance with all local and country
environmental regulations
1l Ensure the operator has the APD ( Application for permit to drill)
1m Drilling Contract issues, Review the Company Marketing Manual
1n Ensure all MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet) are available on
the Installation.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1.7.1 Sample Well Planning Checklist (continued)
GEOLOGY
2a Surface location ( Co-ordinates) of the well
2b Bottom hole location ( Co-ordinates) & TVD
2c Location map within the block / field
2d Seismic map showing surface and bottom hole locations
2e Seismic sections with the main reflectors to show the structure of
the trap
2f Offset wells and hazards (faulting) delineated
2g Lithology and Stratigraphy column with depth uncertainty
2h Pore pressure profile
2I Formation fracture profile
2j Temperature profile
SITE CONDITIONS
3a Metocean data: Winds, currents, waves
3b Soil conditions
3c Site survey & hazards e.g. scouring
3d Proximity of any nearby pipelines
3e Shallow gas assessment
3f Nearby subsea facilities / suspended wells
3g Proximity to shipping lanes and / or MOD range
3h Mooring analysis
3I Operating envelope for the Installation
3j Environmental impact assessment
3k Impact on fishing activity
3l Water depth and rotary elevation
3m Riser analysis and conductor tension for the location
3n Potential diving operations at the location
POTENTIAL HAZARDS
4a Faults
4b Sand lenses
4c Sea floor hazards: Unconsolidated sediment, Geological features,
Gas seepage, Chemo-synthetic Communities, man made features
4d Below mud line hazards: Shallow gas reservoirs, Shallow water
flows, Gas hydrates, Buried faults or channels, Chaotic zones
4e Low fracture pressures
4f Overpressure zones
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
4g H2S
4h CO2
4I Lost circulation
4j Salt domes
4k Formation: Differential sticking, Well bore ballooning, Well bore
instability
DIRECTIONAL DRILLING PROGRAM
5a Well trajectory profile and plan view
5b Target criteria
5c Collision risk / clearance:
Spider plot
Anti-collision scan listing
Summary of close approach wells detailing F1 & F2 distances
Possible requirements for plugging adjacent wells
5d Surveying requirements
Tools planned for the well
Radius of error achieved at target and TD
MUD PROGRAM
6a Mud type: riserless drilling operations , riser attached drilling
operations
6b COSHH requirements
6c Environmental requirements, seabed sampling, oil on cuttings, etc
6d Rheological & fluid loss properties for each hole section
6e Need for lab/field testing of mud system (HPHT well)
6f Mud weight for each hole section
6g Hydrates, Cold ocean temperature mud formulations
CASING DESIGN
7a Wellhead design – Low pressure wellhead housing, High pressure
wellhead housing, wellhead torque considerations, liners, wear
bushings, tools, annular shut off, rigid lock down, ROV
intervention. Wellhead configuration
7b Riser tension / Conductor tension, Riser tensioner support ring-
Slip ring / KT ring
7c Comprehensive basis of casing design
7d Casing design similar to offset wells?
7e Design safety factors
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
7f Pressure testing requirements for casing string

7g Kick tolerance for casing strings
7h Leak off / formation integrity test for each section
7I Maximum wellhead pressures expected for each section
7j Effects of casing wear
7k Contingency liner or other contingency plan
CEMENTING PROGRAM
8a Foam cement: Placement techniques, annular control, foam
cement safety, tools and accessories.
8b Top of cement for every casing string, and the S.G. of the cement
slurries
8c Thickening time vs. planned mixing and displacement time
8d ECD vs. leak off test and fractures gradient
8e Cement placement method – inner string, one plug or two, subsea
or surface launch
8f Additional considerations – gas migration, salt formations,
temperature, etc
8g Conductor cement jobs
Maximum angle for PGB after cementing
Contingency plan for top up job
WELL CONTROL PROGRAM
9a Well control equipment pressure rating for each hole section
9b Well control equipment pressure testing requirements
9c Well control equipment temperature limitations
9d Ram configuration for each hole section
9e Kill and choke line configurations
9f Shallow gas plan
9g Diverter system equipment
9h Wellhead pressure testing
9I Wellhead pressure and temperature rating
9j Additional training requirements
9k Mud gas separator capacity / instrumentation
9l Controlled blowout study
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
WELL TESTING / DST

10a Programs
10b Likely reservoir fluids
10c Maximum formation pressure / temperature
10d Maximum wellhead shut in pressure
10e Maximum wellhead flowing temperature
10f Maximum anticipated flow rate for the well test / production
10g H2S, CO2, H2O, Cl content, GOR, density of fluid
WELL CONTROL
11a Bop ram size and configuration
11b Bop pressure and temperature rating
11c Bop pressure testing requirements
11d Completion fluid (type, S.G., inhibition)
11e Packer fluid (type, S.G., inhibition)
XMAS TREE
12a Tree metallurgy
12b Tree, tubing bonnet and tubing spool pressure and temperature
rating
12c Tree, tubing bonnet and tubing spool pressure testing
requirements
12d Tree and tubing spool valve configuration
12e Fire safe envelope
TUBING DESIGN
13a Design safety factors
13b Pressure testing requirements ( tubing, annulus, safety system)
13c Pressure, temperature and mechanical rating of tubing, tubing
hanger and downhole components
13d Tubing and tubing hanger downhole component metallurgies
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Well Planning - Site Specific Conditions
1 OPERATOR DATA
The Operator should provide site information in accordance with the INSTALLATION
MOVE, LOCATION APPROVAL AND REPORTING – Operator Furnished Data
Section 3 Subsection 2 Appendix 4 of this manual.
1.1 INSTALLATION POSITION
Every Company DP Installation is equipped with position reference systems that are
capable of globally positioning the Installation within the tolerances required by most
drilling contracts. It is the Operator’s responsibility to verify spud location (generally
through independent survey). The contracted surveyors may use the Installation’s
positioning equipment to verify location, provided their requirements do not require
any hardware modifications to the existing system, and provided the Installation's
equipment meets the relevant performance standards.
Required or preferred Installation heading must be specified. Predominant weather,

helicopter and supply vessel operations, communications, etc. may limit heading.
1.2 SOIL CONDITIONS
Surface and shallow sub-surface type of soil, density, undrained shear strength
and/or friction coefficient should be provided (not mandatory) by the Operator. If soil
properties are unknown, API RP2SK anchor holding power must be assumed for
mooring analysis. Note: Actual anchor holding capacity may be less than assumed,
resulting in the need for piggy-back anchors.
1.3 SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Special requirements, such as iceberg avoidance, surface stack operation, large

vessel shifts between wells without mooring system redeployment, fishing grounds,
cetacea activity, etc. must be specified.
1.4 SHALLOW HAZARDS
Shallow hazards can be divided into two categories: (1) seafloor hazards and (2)
below mud line hazards. These hazards can be mapped with combinations of data
from echo sounder, side-scan sonar, very high resolution seismic, ROV video, sonar
and sampling of surface and near surface material.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
SEAFLOOR HAZARDS may consist of:
• soft unconsolidated sediment conditions

• geological features
• chemo-synthetic communities
• man-made objects
• landslides
BELOW MUD LINE HAZARDS are typically mapped using reprocessed 3-D seismic.
Other data collection devices include air gun, water gun, sparker or other high
resolution sources. A high resolution 3-D survey can be acquired if the geology or
stratigraphy requires it. Below mud line hazards may consist of:
• shallow gas reservoirs

• shallow water flows
• gas hydrates
• buried faulting or channels
• low fracture pressures
• overpressured zones
• chaotic zones
2 SEAFLOOR HAZARDS
2.1 UNCONSOLIDATED SEDIMENT
An ideal drilling site would be reasonably level and would have competent sediment
for wellhead stability and good anchoring. Rapid deposition of sediment in some
areas can develop a soft, jelly-like soil. These soft sediments can affect wellhead
stability by shifting the point of support from the surface to the depth where the
formation firms up.
Bending forces on deepwater conductor and casing will increase due to the longer
moment arm. Special reinforcement may be necessary to stabilize the wellhead
equipment. This may require larger diameter, thicker wall, or higher grade conductor
pipe. The shear strength of the soil may be so low that conventional anchors will not
hold when tension is applied. In this case, specially designed “mud” anchors can be
used. Use of piggyback anchors could also be considered.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
2.2 GEOLOGIC FEATURES
Geologic features can affect the suitability of a location for drilling a well. Diapiric
ridges created by salt flows can interfere with the placement of anchors. Subsurface
faults can extend to the seafloor. Some of the features result from movement of
poorly consolidated material on the ocean floor. Slumps and debris flows can be
created from unstable slopes. Channels can be created from underwater currents.
Rapid sedimentation can trap water until the overburden is great enough to cause
expulsion of the fluid in the form of mud volcanoes and craters.
2.2.1 GAS SEEPAGE
Many seafloor features are manifestations of the presence of hydrocarbon gas near
the surface. The gas can be generated in situ by local biogenic activity, or it may
migrate from deeper areas where biogenic or thermogenic generation has occurred.
In a deepwater setting, temperatures are low enough and there is sufficient pressure
from the water column to form solid hydrates from gas and water. The hydrates,
having a gradient lighter than water, can migrate to the seafloor and build a stable
mound. Gas seepage from depth along fault planes may be blocked by mud or
hydrates until there is sufficient pressure buildup to exceed the low fracture gradient
of the near surface material. When gas forcibly escapes, blowouts, craters and mud
volcanoes can form at the surface.
2.3 CHEMO-SYNTHETIC COMMUNITIES
Seafloor gas vents can generate outcrops of carbonate rock in place and can also
be the site of chemo-synthetic communities of tube worms, clams, mussels and
bacterial mats. Tube worms take up the dissolved gases from the water that are
needed by their symbiotic bacteria. Coral colonies have also been found in the Gulf
of Mexico at depths of up to 1500'.
2.4 MAN-MADE FEATURES
Man-made features can pose hazards that would prevent the development of drilling
sites. These can include pipelines (existing and planned), wellheads, shipwrecks,
platforms, debris, etc. For example, the MMS (Minerals Management Survey)
requests a 150-meter (490') clearance around well sites and anchors from identified
features, whether natural or man-made. At greater water depths, this can require
that surveys be conducted for up to 16,000' around a proposed well site.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
3 BELOW MUD LINE HAZARDS
3.1 SHALLOW GAS RESERVOIRS
Shallow gas accumulations have been the source of severe accidents in some
offshore wells. As water depths increase, the difference between the pore pressure
and the fracture gradient becomes smaller. The reservoir pore pressure may be
abnormally high due to the length of the gas column. Shallow gas accumulations
will always be over pressured due to the lighter gradient of the gas column. The
amount of over pressure at the top of the gas accumulation is dependent on the
vertical thickness of the gas column.
In deep water, shallow gas reservoirs are best mapped with high resolution 3-D
seismic. The second choice would be a combination of seismic data from a mini air
gun or mini water gun and either high resolution 2-D or conventional 3-D seismic. In
an area with near horizontal bedding and small structural closure, the gas column
height and the corresponding overpressure will be low. Where there is significant
structural relief, even small stringers of gas saturated pay that are too small to show
up on shallow seismic can contain high overpressure.
To minimize the risk of encountering shallow gas reservoirs, drilling locations should
be selected outside seismic bright spots and mapped closed formation structures.
Drilling experience from offset wells can provide information on possible shallow gas
reservoirs. If possible, casing should be set above shallow gas zones to provide
maximum integrity of the wellbore so that pressure control equipment may be used.
When drilling riserless and penetrating shallow gas sands, weighted mud must be
available to control the well. If a riser is used, a diverter system must be installed to
ensure gas is vented away from the drill floor and cellar deck. The diverter system is
a safety system, not a primary control device. The system must provide only
enough time to keep well flow from the Installation drill floor until the well is brought
under control, the pressure bleeds down, the well bridges, personnel are evacuated,
or the Installation is moved off location.
In areas where there has not been prior drilling, it is sometimes desirable to drill a
pilot hole to surface casing depth to provide information on possible shallow gas
reservoirs. This makes it easier to dynamically control the well if flow occurs. The
size of the pilot hole is dependent on many factors such as water depth, depth to the
flowing formation, reservoir characteristics and the wellbore configuration. Typically
a 9 7 /8" or 12 ¼" hole is drilled. The pilot hole is usually drilled riserless. The pump
rate is held constant and the pump pressure is used as an indicator of flow, or a
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Pressure While Drilling (PWD) tool can be run. If a decrease in pressure is

observed, drilling is halted and an ROV is used to look for flow. If there is flow, mud
can be pumped to dynamically kill the well as drilling continues, or the well can be
displaced with mud heavy enough to prevent flow under static conditions. Although
the smaller hole enhances dynamic control, standard hole sizes and the shallow
subsea depths typically do not allow significant friction pressure to develop while
pumping at rates obtainable with Installation equipment. If excessive back pressure
is applied to the formation, it may lead to fracturing and lost circulation. In addition,
the soft sediments are prone to eroding quickly, even at relatively low pump rates.
3.2 SHALLOW WATER FLOWS
Shallow Water Flow (SWF) has been a major problem for deepwater wells drilled in
the Gulf of Mexico. A study of 123 wells (1998 OTC Paper No. 8301) indicated that
71 percent had SWF, with 25 percent failing to achieve full drilling objectives.
Geopressured sands found below cap rock seals are the most hazardous and
difficult to control. These sands are typically clean, with high permeability, and are
capable of sustained high flow rates. Unconsolidated sand is produced, enlarging
the hole size and making it difficult to properly cement the next string of casing to
contain the flow. Some common precautions used when drilling through possible
SWF intervals are:
• Kill fluids available

• Flow check
• PWD tool
If possible, drilling sites should be moved from areas where shallow water flows
occur. Seismic surveys can be used to track the continuity of sands and cap rock
seals from areas of known water flows to the proposed well site. Surface features,
such as mud volcanoes and craters, can be indicators of breaches in the cap rock
seal. The sedimentation rate in the area can be an indicator of potential shallow
water flow areas as well. Faster sedimentation will trap more water, and the soil will
tend to have differential compaction, leading to geopressured accumulations.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
3.3 GAS HYDRATES
Hydrates are ice-like solids of combined hydrocarbon gas mixtures with free water.
The water molecules in the hydrates form a cage that entraps the gas molecules
under certain conditions of temperature and pressure. Methane, ethane, propane,
n-butane, i-butane, carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and nitrogen are known
hydrate-forming components. The solid/gas ratio can be as high as 1:170 when it
decomposes. (One cubic foot of hydrate can generate 170 cubic feet of gas.) The
maximum sub-bottom depth for gas hydrate at a given water depth is determined by
the sea bottom temperature and the geothermal gradient. The base of gas hydrates
can also be detected with seismic BSR (Bottom Simulating Reflectors) if there is
high-resolution seismic data available for the shallow section.
Hydrates are usually confined to the edges of underwater basins and are not
typically found at drill sites in the GOM. Even if present, hydrates should not be a
significant problem for drilling the upper section of the hole because the use of
seawater and the limited drilling depth will maintain cooling of the borehole. This
tends to stabilize, rather than degrade, the hydrates. This section of the hole should
be isolated by casing before fluid circulation from deeper warm formations has an
opportunity to melt the hydrates.
When drilling with a riser with circulation returned to surface, the cuttings will
degrade when exposed to the air, and they will release hydrocarbons. If free gas is
encountered in the shallow section of the hole, it can form hydrates in the riser, BOP
or surface lines under certain conditions (e.g., a choke or flow restriction). This
could present problems with maintaining well control. Methanol is used for the
removal of hydrates that have formed. The injection of glycol can prevent hydrates.
Below the gas hydrate zone, the risk for potential gas occurrence should be judged
from usual accumulation criteria (migration route, trap and seal). Although there is
little evidence that hydrates form an adequate seal, the possibility should not be
ruled out. If the bottom of the hydrate zone can be mapped, it should be considered
a potential reservoir trap. The well location should be moved away from this
position, if possible.
3.4 BURIED FAULTS OR CHANNELS
Buried faults and channels provide a path for migration of water and hydrocarbons.
The fluids may overpressure zones and make them difficult to control while drilling.
Because of the low fracture gradient of near surface sediments, the pressure buildup
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
may approach and even exceed the fracture pressure. This can lead to surface
features (e.g., craters, mud volcanoes) that may be found in surface surveys. The
faults and channels could also provide a recharging capability that would reduce
long-term stability of the formation. In the case of shallow water flows, this could
contribute to the continued washing out of the wellbore, resulting in poor cement
integrity or loss of the hole.
3.5 CHAOTIC ZONES
Chaotic zones are characterized by highly disturbed bedding in the near surface
interval below mud line (BML). The term was coined in the days of 2-D seismic,
which didn’t have adequate resolution to discern details in these steeply dipping
structures. The evolution of 3-D seismic has made it possible to interpret many of
these intervals. Features that are often characterized as chaotic zones include
rotational slides, channel complexes, slump and debris flow. In shallow intervals
above 4000' BML in deepwater wells, high water content makes seismic
interpretation very difficult. Regional stratigraphic studies are often needed to
identify potential problem areas in these intervals. An exception is that gas charged
sands will show as high amplitude signals in the seismic evaluation. Chaotic zones
have been known to exhibit hole instability when sands are penetrated. This can
require the setting of several strings of casing to get through the zone and/or result
in the loss of significant amounts of mud if the well is controlled with mud while
drilling riserless. These intervals often cover a very large area and cannot be
avoided although knowledge of the stratigraphy can help place the well location to
minimize problem intervals.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Well Planning - DP Planning Checklist
1 DP PLANNING CHECKLIST
The Well Planning Checklist for DP Installations is included as an example only and
is intended to allow Business Units and Installations to take advantage of an
established checklist rather than having to create their own. Locally prepared
checklists should, however, include the elements listed on the prepared checklist.
The Rig Manager should approve all such locally created checklists.
2 RECORDING AND RETENTION
Completed checklists should be made part of the Installation’s Well Planning

reporting system and retained for the same length of time as the original report.
Table 3.1.7.1 Example DP Planning Checklist
DP Planning Checklist
Confirm spud in location Geographical co-
ordinates, Block and Well
ID.
Confirm location datum criteria
Confirm location criteria in
standard geodetic format (WGs
84)
Depth of Water Obtain tidal information
to assist with riser length
calculations
Sea bed Bathymetry Ensure suitable 1:500
and 1: 5000 up to date
charts available.
Identify suitable escape
route for Installation
towards deep water.
Verify lack of contours
that effect placing of
seabed transponders
Confirm proximity of nearest
surface unit
Confirm no seabed structures in Identify necessity for
vicinity Dropped Object HAZID
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Operations
Confirm nature of operation at (see documentation)
Location.
Confirm impact for any coastal USCG or HSE
state requirements upon vessel Inspections
arrival at location. Safety case etc.
Environment
Confirm contractual weather Ensure that weather
criteria. criteria matches weather
criteria of Capability pots
Confirm prevailing wind direction
Confirm prevailing current or
tidal information
Confirm availability of suitable
weather forecasting information
BOP
Confirm acceptable BOP To be confirmed in
landed heading conjunction with weather
and vessel heading
criteria
Documentation
Confirm as a minimum following 1. Blackout Recovery
vessel procedures in place and 2. Collision Contingency
up to date for new location 3. Emergency tow
Confirm if need for additional Enhanced station
procedures in event of special keeping requirements
Well, marine or DP ops. I.. dual
DP vessel ops
Confirm suitability of vessel Determine magnitude of
specific Riser Manual yellow and Red DP
Watch circles
Complete WSOG Develop with client.
Confirm suitability of current DP Client may require
documentation verification audit of
vessel documentation
Acceptance Trials
Independent 3rd Parties.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
DP Reference Systems
Confirm proximity of nearest DP Verify acoustic
unit and possible source of frequencies of other
acoustic interference users and identify
priorities
Confirm availability of suitable Identify if client has
differential stations systems requirements re DGPS
configuration, or
Confirm presence of scintillation
or other possible DGPS
interference
DP Operations
Confirm acceptability of the Ensure definition of
Company 4 level DP Alert status Degraded status
understood.
Confirm DP incident reporting IMCA or corporate
format structure to client. definitions of incident.
Comments:
Installation: _______________________ Signed: ___________________ Date: _______
OPERATIONS
PERSON IN CHARGE
1 POLICY
The “Person in Charge” during an emergency must be specified on the

Installation Station Bill.

Subsection 1.8.
2 PURPOSE
Section 14.8 of the MODU Code requires the person in charge during an emergency
be designated by the Company. This policy and procedure ensures communication
of the Chain of Command during an emergency onboard Company Installations and
clarifies the OIM / Master relationship on self-propelled Installations during an
emergency.
3 SCOPE
4 PROCEDURE
The Company designates the “Person in Charge” during an emergency as specified

on the Station Bill. During an emergency the “Person in Charge” determines from
available situation reports, written procedures, acceptable safe working practices
and advice from the onboard management team if there is a threat to personnel, the
Installation or the environment, then coordinates the appropriate response action.
Except for out of control well situations, Well Control operations are not an
emergency within the scope of this paragraph.
4.1 OIM / MASTER STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY
The OIM is the senior onboard manager, who reports directly to the shore-based Rig
Manager. It is his role to manage the overall operation and administration of the
Installation. The OIM must ensure contractual obligations to our client are met and
day-to-day operations are carried out in accordance with best industry standards as
well as the client’s and Rig Manager’s instructions. The OIM is responsible for
interface with Company shore based management and the onboard client
representative during an emergency.
OPERATIONS
PERSON IN CHARGE
4.2 MASTER - SELF PROPELLED INSTALLATIONS
The Master is responsible for DP station keeping, safe navigation and collision
avoidance, general safety and pollution prevention, Installation stability, regulatory
compliance, ISM/MODU Code compliance, implementation of emergency response
training and all marine operations issues.
4.3 NON SELF PROPELLED OR BOTTOM SUPPORTED INSTALLATIONS
The OIM / Master may be the same person.
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER / DIVISION MANAGER (I)
The Business Unit Operations Manager is responsible for ensuring uniformity of

Installation operations.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (I)
conducted in accordance with Company Policy and Procedures.
5.3 OIM (D)
5.4 MASTER (D)
The Master is responsible for ensuring compliance with all requirements of this
Policy and Procedure as applicable.
6 REFERENCES
• IMO Modu Code Section 14.8
OPERATIONS
SURFACE BOP OPERATIONS FROM FLOATING VESSELS
1 POLICY
Each surface BOP project from a floating vessel must be specifically reviewed
and approved by HQS Operations management in accordance with the
requirements established in the Corporate Surface BOP Operations from a
Floating Vessel Handbook.

Subsection 1.9.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure that Surface BOP projects are:

• Conducted in a safe and efficient manner.
• Conducted in accordance with the Company’s Policies and Procedures.
• Designed in accordance with applicable codes and recommended practices as
described in Surface BOP Operations from Floating Vessels Manual, HQS-
OPS-HB-02 and Engineering Standards, Surface BOP Drilling Systems, Riser
and Mooring Minimum Design & Analysis Standards, HOU-ENG-STD-01.
3 SCOPE
This procedure is applicable to all the Company Surface BOP Projects from floating
vessels.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 APPROVAL PROCESS
The Project Assessment Flowchart in contained in the Surface BOP Operations from
Floating Vessels Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-02 depicts the steps required to evaluate,
plan and approve a Surface BOP project.
4.1.1 BUSINESS UNIT / DIVISION SUPPORT STAFF
The Business Unit or Division sponsoring a Surface BOP project are required to
collect and furnish all relevant location and well data from the Operator.
4.1.2 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TEAM
An Engineering Support Team must be selected on a case-by-case basis, subject to

the scope and extent of work required to conduct the Surface BOP Project.
OPERATIONS
Generally a Projects Manager must be assigned with an appropriate complement of

staff according to the Engineering Disciplines required by the projects scope.
4.1.3 OPERATIONS SUPPORT
The HQS Drilling Technology Manager must consolidate all project data and prepare
a Project Specific Proposal for review by the VP of Performance and Technology.
The VP of Performance and Technology must assess the proposal, which may be
rejected, approved as presented or approved with amendment.
All new surface BOP Projects require approval from the VP of Performance and
Technology prior to making a firm commitment to the Operator.
4.2 SEA FLOOR ISOLATION UTILIZATION
All Surface BOP proposals and negotiations must clearly indicate that the use of a
sea floor shut-in device provides an important safeguard when conducting Surface
BOP operations.
4.2.1 SEA FLOOR ISOLATION REQUIREMENT EXEMPTION
For surface BOP operations in benign environments, the absence of a sea floor
shut-in device may be permitted subject to HQS management review and approval.
In the event a shut-in device is not utilized additional precautions must be

implemented to mitigate the risk of riser failure (i.e. adequate riser margin).
4.3 EXTRAORDINARY OPERATIONS
Conducting drillstem tests or other extraordinary operations in Surface BOP mode

requires separate management approval documented in accordance with the
Company’s Policies and Procedures.
4.4 OPERATOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES
The Operator must accept full liability for all pollution and property damage
associated with any Surface BOP component or system failure. This provision must
be clearly stipulated within the Contract.
OPERATIONS
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT / DIVISION
5.1.1 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DIVISION MANAGER (I)
The Business Unit Operations Manager or Division Manager sponsoring a Surface

BOP project must:
• Issue the appropriate request for HQS Engineering assistance (REA), clearly
detailing the required Engineering deliverables in accordance with the
• Collect and furnish all relevant location and well data from the Operator.
• Arrange and conduct with the Operator any required HAZOP relevant to the
project.
• Prepare Site specific operating guidelines in accordance with the Company’s
Policies and Procedures.
5.2 ENGINEERING SUPPORT
5.2.1 HQS ENGINEERING MANAGER (I)
HQS Engineering Manager must:

• Process any approved Surface BOP Request for Engineering Assistance in
accordance with the Company’s Policies and Procedures, applicable codes
and recommended practices as described in HQS-OPS-HB-02 and Company
Engineering Document: Surface BOP Drilling Systems Minimum Design &
Analysis Standards.
• If required, assign a dedicated Project Manager and an appropriate
compliment of Engineering staff according to the engineering disciplines
required for the project’s scope of work.
5.3 OPERATIONS SUPPORT
5.3.1 HQS DRILLING TECHNOLOGY MANAGER (D)
HQS Drilling Technology Manager must:

• Ensure that Surface BOP project Analysis and Design is conducted in
accordance with the Company’s Policy and Procedures.
• Facilitate as required the flow of information requests between Division /
Business Unit Support, Engineering Support, Operator, and any Third Parties.
OPERATIONS
• Consolidate all project data and prepare a Project Proposal for review by the
VP Performance and Technology.
5.4 VP PERFORMANCE AND TECHNOLOGY (D)
VP Performance and Technology must:

• Review the Surface BOP Project proposal to ensure compliance with the
• Ensure that the work can be performed in a safe and efficient manner with out
importing additional risk to the Company.
• At his discretion approve the Surface BOP Project.
6 REFERENCES
• Surface BOP Operations from Floating Vessels Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-02
• Engineering Standards, HOU-ENG-STD-01, Surface BOP Drilling System,
Riser and Mooring Minimum Design & Analysis Standards.
OPERATIONS
TRIPPING
1 POLICY
Tripping operations must be carried out in a planned and controlled manner.

Subsection 1.10.
2 PURPOSE
• Avoid damage and downtime.
• Ensure a safe operation and handling of pipe.
3 SCOPE
This Policy applies to all Installations owned and operated by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
Prior to tripping the Driller must receive a positive confirmation from the Derrickman
that he is safely secured, if applicable.
1. Trips in and out of the hole must take into account:

• Safety of personnel
• The environment
• Well bore integrity
• Safety of property
2. The trip tank must always be utilized and trip tank pump running during
tripping in order that the fluid in the hole can be monitored. The flow path
must be observed after each trip tank line up. Should the trip tank pump fail,
an alternative must be to use a mud pump while pulling pipe. The annulus
must be filled with mud before the change in mud level decreases the
hydrostatic pressure by 75 psi (500 kPa, 5 bar) or every 5 stands of drillpipe,
whichever gives a lower decrease in hydrostatic pressure. When pulling
HWDP or drill collars the hole must be filled every stand. The pit from which
the hole is being filled must be isolated from all other pits and the volume
closely monitored.
3. At no time must the speed of tripping take precedence over the above points.
4. Power slips must be utilized whenever practical and available.

OPERATIONS
TRIPPING
5. Thread compounds meeting the performance requirements of API bulletin

7A1 for rotary shouldered connections is a minimum Company standard.
6. New drill pipe strings must be “broken in” (make & break) either during the
manufacturing process or prior to use. It is a Company Standard that new
drill pipe strings are broken in as part of the purchase agreement. However,
this is not the case for BHA components and connection repairs.
7 All tubulars in the drill string must be torqued in accordance with API RP7G or
manufacturer’s recommendation.
8. Torque measuring equipment must be in good working order and be

calibrated.
9. The drill string must be tripped out of the hole on a different break each trip so
that every connection is periodically broken to observe thread and shoulder
condition.
10. The maximum allowable pull value for the string should be calculated and
clearly posted at the Driller’s position according to the requirements of
Driller’s Key Responsibilities detailed in Section 3 Subsection 1.3 of this
Manual.
11. The Driller must be familiar with the operation of the Jars in use and a data
sheet for the Jars is to be kept at the Driller’s position for reference.
12. The Driller must install and use manual tongs safely and correctly. Please
refer to the 11th Edition of IADC Drilling Manual, Chapter B, Section 3, Page
21, Paragraph D, “Proper Use of Drill-Pipe Tongs”, this subject also fully
covers page 22 and page 23.
13. The Driller must confirm the correct gallon count was achieved the last time
the BOP rams were functioned and set the motion compensator to half
stroke position before tripping large bore tools through a subsea BOP.
14. The Driller must visually confirm obstruction free status of the top drive
system prior to raising or lowering same.
OPERATIONS
TRIPPING
5 RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1 OIM (I)
The OIM is responsible to ensure that anyone acting as a Driller on his

Installation is aware of this Policy and complies with the required procedures.
5.2 DRILLER (D)
The Driller is responsible to comply with the required procedures.
When relieving the Driller, the Assistant Driller is responsible to comply with
the required procedures.
6 REFERENCES
• API Bulletin 7A1 : API RP7G : API Bulletin 5A2 : API Bulletin 5C2
• API Bulletin 5C3: 11th.Edition of IADC Drilling Manual
• Field Operations Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-05, Section 3, Subsection 1.3,
Driller’s Key Responsibilities
OPERATIONS
CARE AND HANDLING OF TUBULARS
1 POLICY
All tubulars must be used within their design limits and maintained so as to
maximize useful life.

Subsection 1.11.
2 PURPOSE
• Ensure safety of personnel and environment
• Preserve assets.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure covers all tubulars such as drill pipe, drill collars, heavyweight and
the like, owned or leased by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 CARE AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

4.1.1 Tubulars should be inspected at least once per year, if constantly used. At a
minimum, tubulars must be inspected according to the standards established
in the latest edition of API Recommended Practice 7G. However, many
Operators require their own specific higher levels of inspection, NS2 or TH
Hill’s DS1 Level 5, for example.
4.1.2 Thread protectors must be used on all tubulars.
4.1.3 Inspection and maintenance records should be maintained on the Installation.
4.1.4 A complete updated inventory of all tubulars on the Installation must be
maintained within the Global Reporting System (GRS) daily.
4.1.5 The Rig Manager and the Installation should maintain or have access to the
most current copies of the IADC Drilling Manual, as well as tubular related
API Specifications (API Specification 5D, Specification for Drill Pipe, API
Specification 7, Specification for Rotary Drill Stem Elements, and API
Recommended Practice 7G, Recommended Practice for Drill Stem Design
and Operating Limits). If the facility has access to the Company Intranet, the
API Specifications mentioned above can be accessed via Industry Regulation
and Standards section of the Technical Service/Engineering & Construction
Website.
OPERATIONS
• Tubulars must be protected from corrosion during long term storage. Long
term storage procedures are detailed in Equipment Maintenance Standard;
Long Term Storage procedures (HQS-OPS-TIB-070-01 ).
NOTE: The above instructions do not apply to riser elements.
4.2 HANDLING
4.2.1 Picking-up and laying-down of tubulars should be done using a lifting cap
shackled to the lifting line or a single joint elevator. Such lifting equipment
must include a swivel arrangement.
4.2.2 Any tubular lifted horizontally using slings must be slung at both ends and
taglines used. Use of open hooks is prohibited.
4.2.3 During tripping operations tubulars that are to be added to or removed from
the drill string must not be allowed to remain in the mouse hole.
4.2.4 A stabbing guide must be used during all trips.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT MANAGER / DIVISION MANAGER / RIG MANAGER (I)
The Business Unit Manager, Division Manager and Rig Manager are responsible for
being award of this policy and ensuring appropriate Installation and Facility
Supervisors comply with the required procedures.
5.2 OIM (I)
The OIM is responsible for ensuring that anyone acting as a Driller on his Installation
is aware of this policy and complies with the required procedures.
5.3 DRILLER (D)
The Driller is responsible for complying with the required procedures.
When relieving the Driller, the Assistant Driller is responsible for complying with the
required procedures.
OPERATIONS
5.5 SHORE BASED MATERIALS MANAGER (D)
The Shore Based Materials Manager is responsible for ensuring that the
requirements of this policy are complied with for all Company tubulars stored at his
Facility.
6 REFERENCES
• Technical Information Bulletin: Long Term Storage Procedures, HQS-OPS-TIB-
070-01
• API Specification 5D , Specification for Drill pipe
• API Specification 7m , Specification for Rotary Drillstem Elements
• API Recommended Practice 7G, Recommended Practice for Drillstem Design
& Operating Limits
• TH Hills DS1 Level 5
• IADC Drilling Manual
OPERATIONS
MARINE OPERATIONS
1 POLICY
All Installations must be operated in accordance with the approved

Installation-specific Marine Operations Manual (MOM), pre-established
practical operating limits and the contingency plans provided in the
Installation’s Emergency Response Manual.

Subsection 2.1.
2 PURPOSE
To communicate the standard of Marine Operations the Company expects for

protection of personnel, environment and the Installation.
3 SCOPE
This Policy covers all Installations and employees of the Company as well as
employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore
Installation owned, operated and/or managed by the Company.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 All Installations must comply with their Installation Marine Operations Manual
(MOM) and all applicable rules and regulations governing marine activities.
4.2 Any variations from the Installation specific Marine Operations Manual,
technical as well as operational, and/or regulatory requirements, must be
approved by the Rig Manager and Corporate Engineering Department prior to
commencement of such operation.
4.3 Installation-specific practical operating limits and limiting weather parameters
must be documented and communicated for functional operations during
adverse weather including consideration of no wind conditions during well
control or similar operations. Practical operating limits are typically less and
do not exceed the design limits reflected in the MOM. The decision whether
or not to perform any operation lies in the good judgement of the qualified
personnel onboard the Installation.
4.4 The OIM, Master and Maintenance Supervisor must be familiar with the
Installation’s Marine Operations Manual and practical operating limits and
ensure other supervisors are aware of requirements as applicable to their
responsibilities.
4.5 Full use of weather forecasts must be made in order to give accurate warning
OPERATIONS
MARINE OPERATIONS
of adverse weather.
4.6 Work must be planned to avoid exposing personnel and the Installation to the
effects of adverse weather. Personnel movements should be restricted during
adverse weather.
4.7 A standing order book containing written instructions on marine operations,
such as the use of collision lights, fog horns in reduced visibility, radar for
anti-collision, and navigational watch procedures when the installation is on
location or underway must be endorsed by all Masters and signed off as read
by all watch keeping personnel.
4.8 Marine manning must comply with the Installation’s minimum safe manning
certificate (MSMC). The positions on the MSMC must be filled by competent
and appropriately licensed and/or certified personnel.
4.9 Company self propelled installations must manage bridge operations in
accordance with International and Flag standards and navigated in
accordance with the established marine professional standards. At all time
the requirements of the International rules for collision avoidance must be
met. Bridge lookout requirements must be in compliance with STCW 95
section VII.
4.10 All Installations and facilities must be in compliance with relevant
Classification Society Rules, Flag State Requirements and Coastal State
Legislation. Marine reference documents required by the flag and coastal
states must be on board. The OIM is responsible for the maintenance of the
official logbooks, except where there is a Company appointed Master
onboard. In this case, it is part of the Master’s responsibility under Flag State
and statutory requirements to oversee the suitable entries in those logbooks
and reports.
4.11 Ultimate responsibility for the safety of the Installation and the personnel
remains with the Company OIM / Master and the Installation's owners at all
times (ref: Section 3 Subsection 1.8 of this manual).
4.11.1 Typically pilots and contract Installation movers provide advice only
and have no liability in the event of a navigational error leading to a
subsequent incident or loss.
4.11.2 The warranty surveyor has no direct authority or veto powers
regarding Installation mobilization.
4.12 All Company Installations must have contingency plans for the following
marine events:
4.12.1 Mooring at a non-drilling location
OPERATIONS
MARINE OPERATIONS
4.12.2 Minimum under-keel clearance in shallow water

4.12.3 Severe Weather
4.12.4 Actions on loss of power
4.12.5 Towing equipment inspection and operation
4.12.6 Ballast / Damage Control / Salvage
4.12.7 Operations with support vessels
4.12.8 Multiple vessel activities inside the 500 meters safety zone
4.13 On semi-submersible Installation’s, the ballast control room must be manned
by a certified competent person at all times.
4.14 All major ballasting operations must be carried out under the supervision of a
certified competent person. Particular note should be taken concerning
installation structural loading and the effect of free surface on stability.
4.15 Coastal States may have regulations regarding invasive species contained
within ballast water. When changing operating regions it is prudent to change
ballast water while at sea. A record of such change should be kept noting the
position where ballasting commenced and completed.
4.16 Floating Installations must conduct emergency ballast exercises at intervals
not to exceed 90 days. Emergency ballast exercise reports, inclusive of
scenario, actions, problems and overall exercise rating must be submitted to
the Rig Manager and Business Unit Technical Support Manager if any
significant problems have been noted.
4.17 All loading, unloading, bulk transfers and ballasting operations must be
immediately suspended in the event of a ballast system failure.
4.18 Each towed semi-submersible must have a main and secondary tow bridle
connected at the lower hulls for ocean voyages fitted with a deployment /
recovery system.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DIVISION MANAGER (I)

ensuring Business Unit uniformity of Installation marine operations.
OPERATIONS
MARINE OPERATIONS
5.2 RIG MANAGER (I)
conducted in accordance with the Installation Marine Operations Manual.
5.3 OIM (D)
The OIM is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this Policy and
Procedure are implemented on the Installation.
6 REFERENCES
Marine Operations Recommended Practices.

Recommended Practice, Navigational Practices
Recommended Practice, Bridge Operations (self-propelled vessels)
Recommended Practice, Official Log Books
Recommended Practice, Operations with Other Vessels
Recommended Practice, Emergency Preparedness
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Marine Operations - Navigational Practices
1 NAVIGATIONAL PRACTICES
All self propelled installations should be navigated in accordance with marine

professional practices, by competent and suitably licensed marine personnel. Non-
self propelled installations when under tow should ensure that the tow master and
tug personnel are competent and suitably licensed and operate in accordance with
marine professional practices.
In the absence of Flag State navigational standards, USCG or British MCA or IMO
standards should be used with procedures and formalities as outlined by the
Nautical Institute or equivalent professional maritime body.
A suitable Navigational library and chart folio should be maintained to allow the
Installation to be navigated to the nearest port of refuge or safe haven in the event of
any emergency. All relevant documentation affecting this eventuality should be kept
up to date. Chart corrections should be made using information from either USA or
British Admiralty or Coastal State Notice to Mariners and/or other similar information.
When arriving into port the Latest Notice of Mariners from that country whose chart
is in use should be onboard.
1.1 REFERENCES
All IMO documents required by the Flag and Coastal States must be on board. In
the absence of Flag State requirements, self propelled installations should use the
following publications as a guide to safe navigation, protection of the environment,
and the practice of good seamanship. The list of IMO documents below is limited
and may not satisfy Flag / Coastal State requirements.
• IMO - International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (2001
consolidated edition) with latest amendments (Transocean Catalog number
000000000220682)
• IMO - MARPOL 73/78 (consolidated edition 1997) with latest amendments.
(Transocean Catalog number 000000000283846)
• IMO - International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (1990
edition) (Transocean Catalog number 000000000019437)
• IMO - Ship’s Routing (sixth edition 1991) & Amendments (1993 Ed)
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
• International Conventions on Standards of Training, Certification and

Watchkeeping (1995 edition.) (Transocean Catalog number
000000000443182)
• ICS - Bridge Procedures Guide (3rd edition 1998) (Transocean Catalog
number 000000000039858)
• Nautical Institute - Bridge Team Management (1993 edition) (Transocean
Catalog number 000000000019299)
• Nautical Institute - Passage Planning 1994 (Transocean Catalog number
000000000019308)
• Nautical Institute - Bridge Watchkeeping 1994 (Transocean Catalog number
000000000019304)
• Nautical Institute - The Master’s Role in Collecting Evidence (1997 edition)
• American Merchant Seaman Manual (Transocean Catalog number
000000000443184)
• Merchant Marine Officers Guide (Transocean Catalog number
000000000443185)
• Weather for Mariners (Transocean Catalog number 000000000443186)
• A Mariners Guide to Radio Facsimile Weather Charts (Transocean Catalog
number 000000000443187)
• Pilot Service, Vessel Traffic Service and Port Operations (Transocean
Catalog number 000000000443188)
• American Practical Navigator Vol. 1&2 (Transocean Catalog number
000000000365100)
• The Mariners Handbook (Transocean Catalog number 000000000443189)
• Peril at Sea and Salvage (Transocean Catalog number 000000000443190)
• Pirates and Armed robbers (A Master's Guide Line) (Transocean Catalog
number 000000000443191)
• Guide to Port Entry. (Transocean Catalog number 000000000443192)
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
2 THIRD PARTY RELATIONSHIPS
2.1 TOW MASTER
When a non-self propelled unit is being towed, a third party Tow Master may be
contracted by the Company. The Tow Master is responsible for correct conduct of
the move and deployment of mooring equipment. He may also direct all vessels and
anchor movement.
The OIM / Master / Rig Mover are always responsible for the safety of the
Installation and the personnel.
2.2 PILOT
Where the services of a local Pilot are employed for the transit of an area of
navigational concern, i.e. controlled area, or inshore passage etc, the OIM, Master
or Tow Master should at all times ensure that the Pilot’s guidance is monitored.
Typically Pilots provide advice only and have no liability in the event of a
navigational error leading to a subsequent incident or loss.
2.3 WARRANTY SURVEYOR
The Warranty Surveyor, if present, is appointed by the Company to satisfy

requirements of the Installation’s insurance underwriters. The Warranty Surveyor is
not the underwriter and does not represent insurers. The Warranty Surveyor's
responsibility is to independently observe and report that move operations are being
conducted within the unit's marine operations manual and generally acceptable
marine practices. The Warranty Surveyor may offer expert advice on marine related
issues similar to a Harbor Pilot’s function. Use of Warranty Surveyors in an active
role is discouraged in order to minimize risks associated with conflict of interest. The
Warranty Surveyor has no direct authority or veto powers regarding Installation
mobilization as ultimate responsibility for the Installation remains with the OIM and
the Installation's owners at all times.
APPENDIX 2
OPERATIONS
Marine Operations - Bridge Operations (Self Propelled Installations)
1 GENERAL
These recommendations apply to all Drillships and Semi-submersibles that navigate

independently between locations and are certified as self-propelled by the respective
Flag State and Class.
2 BRIDGE MANNING
The Master and another competent deck officer should be in attendance during
close-in navigation periods. The deck officers’ duties will be to attend position
plotting, helm order verification, maneuvering logs or books and deck log entries,
communications and other duties with the Bridge Management Team, as directed.
The Master should ensure that personnel comprising the Bridge Team are fully
certified and aware of their responsibilities to ensure the safe and effective operation
of the installation at all times.
3 BRIDGE LOOKOUT /ANTI COLLISION WATCH
At the onset of periods of increased traffic density or reduced visibility the Master
should be called to the bridge to assess the situation and decide upon the need for
any additional lookouts or precautions. Both 3cm and 10 cm radars should be used
at all times to ensure maximum warning of the close approach by any surface
vessel.
4 COASTAL NAVIGATION
Coastal navigation should be avoided within areas of extensive underwater

obstructions, areas of shallow water, submarine exercise areas, fish havens and
historic wrecks.
When approaching a landfall position all means available should be used to verify
the vessel’s position as accurately as is possible. If landmarks are not sighted when
expected, close approach to the land should be made with the greatest caution. At a
minimum Tidal Atlases and Pilot books for the area should be consulted.
Some Coastal States have a 50 mile security zone where notification is required 72
hours in advance before entry. Similarly some Coastal States claim a 200mile EEZ
zone off shore. Coastal States claiming these zones can be found in the Admiralty
Annual Notice to Mariners No 12. Coastal State mandatory reporting requirements,
APPENDIX 2
OPERATIONS
local laws effective in Territorial waters (such as flying the coastal states Flag), and
navigational rules that supercede International rules are to be recognized as
applicable.
GPS and/or satellite navigation systems should not be relied upon to the exclusion
of radar and visual fixes of position relative to the Coast. When navigating in
oilfields or crowded locations the positions of Installations nearby should be checked
with the published information and charts but should not be relied upon for position
fixing to the exclusion of GPS and other means. The officer of the watch should
always be aware of the possibility of objects moving at very slow or unpredictable
speeds and directions.
When entering an area of activity, it is appropriate to inform Installations nearby of

the vessel's intentions and to be informed of other movements which may be in
conflict.
During inshore navigation, the following information should be available to the Bridge
team who should familiarize themselves with it.
• Tidal Stream information
• Pilot Book information
• List of Lights
• Weather forecasts
5 PILOTAGE
When entering any restricted or advisory Pilotage area, all Company Installations
should take a local Pilot whether it is mandatory or not.
It should be noted that the maneuvering of the vessel is to the Pilots Advice and
Master’s orders; hence there is no liability upon the Pilot for any incident in an area
of Pilotage. At all times the Bridge Team should monitor the Pilot’s activities and
plot the position of the vessel on a suitable scale chart. The Senior Watchkeeper
should be prepared to take over from the Pilot and call the Master if he is concerned
at any of the Pilot’s advice.
At all times during a Pilotage or any transit of narrow waters, the anchors, if fitted,
should be available for deployment in an emergency.
APPENDIX 2
OPERATIONS
All drafts should take into account the lowest point of the Installations structure, and
in the case of a vessel equipped with azimuthing thrusters, the draft should take into
account this additional depth of water required.
Overhead clearance for power lines and bridges should be evaluated prior to port
entry.
During a period of Pilotage a Bell Book/Time Book should be maintained from the
time the Pilot vessel approaches (or when the pilot is aboard if arriving by helicopter)
to the time the vessel is secured or has cleared any port area. This “Bell Book”
should be used to note the time, date and description or names of suitable
landmarks that the Installation passes during its passage. The document forms a
legal record in the event of any incident during the passage.
6 WEATHER REPORTS
A current weather report should be available to the Bridge team and considered in
the planning of any activity.
All Installations whether on location or on passage or off-contract should have

access to a weather forecasting service in the event of any critical activity coinciding
with an abnormal weather condition.
7 RECORDS AND REPORTS
All records or Reports should carry the signature of a person in authority, i.e. OIM or
Master. All such documents should be retained onboard.
8 PASSAGE PLANNING
Before undertaking any transit between locations every Installation should prepare a
suitable passage plan, in accordance with the Nautical Institute publication “Passage
Planning”. Upon completion of the plan and prior to commencement of the voyage
the plan should be submitted to the Rig Manager for final approval.
9 REPORTING IN TRANSIT
The Master of every Installation in transit between locations should make a daily
passage report to the Rig Manager.
APPENDIX 2
OPERATIONS
The report should be done in GRS and contain the following details:
• Time of Departure from location.
• Current position (Latitude & Longitude).
• Average speed for the day.
• Average speed for voyage.
• Fuel consumed last 24 Hours.
• Total fuel consumed to date.
• ETA next location and identity of next location.
• Any Navigational Equipment malfunction.
• Any propulsion equipment malfunction.
• Any power generation equipment malfunction.
• Anticipated weather for next 24 hours.
• Any urgent requirements.
10 WEATHER ROUTING
Any Installation when undertaking an ocean voyage should contract a weather

routing service to ensure the Installation is able to plan the voyage around any
weather disturbances. The frequency of the information transmission is at the
Master’s/OIM’s discretion but under no circumstances at intervals of more than 48
hours.
11 AMVER
All Company Installations should engage in the voluntary AMVER reporting scheme,
which is designed to enhance the safety of any Installation upon the high seas. It is
the responsibility of the Master/OIM to ensure that regular reports are submitted to
the scheme.
Some Coastal States such as Australia have reporting systems such as AUSREP
and REEFREP. In some cases participation in Coastal State systems is mandatory.
APPENDIX 2
OPERATIONS
12 BUNKER/FUEL RESERVES
Voyage planning should take into account a contingency fuel reserve.
Installations engaged upon voyages should allow for a reserve of at least 5 days
fuel. This figure should be usable fuel and not total fuel remaining in the bunker
tanks. A larger fuel contingency may be necessary in view of voyage planning and
time of year.
APPENDIX 3
OPERATIONS
Marine Operations - Official Log Books
1 GENERAL
The OIM is responsible for the maintenance of the official logbooks. It is the OIM /
Master’s responsibility under Flag State, Coastal State and IMO requirements to
insure the suitable entries are made.
2 MARINE LOG BOOK
Installations should maintain a Marine log book, or equivalent, in which records of

the Installation’s course, speed, fuel consumption and environmental details are
recorded at a minimum of every 6 hours. In addition details of the daily stability
status, deck loads, vessel draft, various consumables, and details of any daily
marine operations, emergency exercises, or visits by Class surveyors or P&I club
officials should be recorded.
3 FLAG STATE OFFICIAL LOG
The OIM/Master must maintain the Flag State Official Log book at all times. It must
be used to record all details of OIM’s/Master’s inspections, Personnel details, and
any details required by the Flag State. The book must be kept up-to-date and ready
for inspection by any Flag or Coastal state representative.
4 OIL RECORD BOOK (MODUS)
This document (normally titled Oil Record Book Part 1) must be maintained up to
date at all times. It is the responsibility of the OIM/Master to ensure the accuracy of
the contents.
5 OIL RECORD BOOK (DRILLSHIPS STORING OIL IN CARGO TANKS)
This document (normally titled Oil Record Book Part 2) must be maintained up to
date at all times. It is the responsibility of the OIM/Master to ensure the accuracy of
the contents.
6 GMDSS LOG BOOK (FLOATING INSTALLATIONS)
Unless the Flag State Administration provides a GMDSS log book, the Company
standard must be either the USA or British (MSA) log book.
APPENDIX 3
OPERATIONS
Marine Operations - Official Log Books
The OIM/Master must ensure that the GMDSS log book is completed as per
instructions and that all the designated daily, weekly and monthly checks are
completed.
7 MACHINERY SPACE RECORDS
Suitable Machinery records should be maintained on all Installations irrespective of

the degree of automation on onboard. Records should be used to confirm
equipment and plant status at minimum intervals of 12 hours.
8 CHART CORRECTION LOG (SELF PROPELLED INSTALLATIONS)
The status of the navigational charts corrections should be maintained.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Marine Operations - Operations With Other Vessels
1 SUPPLY VESSELS
All vessels approaching a Company Installation should advise their ETA at least 1
hour before arrival and may require the following information from the Installation.
• Installation Heading and anchor pattern
• Weather information
• Name of Standby Vessel
• Installation operations (ROV ops, overside work, flaring etc.)
• Control room and crane VHF working channels
• Whether the supply vessel should be worked on arrival or not.
The following points should be taken into consideration when planning supply vessel
operations:
• The type of load; heavy lifts; dangerous cargo
• Any requirement for a particular order of loading / offloading
• Operating limits and weather conditions
Time limitations and boat crew rest periods may apply. If supply vessels must
operate along side the Installation for extended periods, OIM/Master should confirm
that the supply vessel has sufficient watch keeping officers capable of maneuvering
the vessel.
Before any supply vessel closes within the 500-meter zone the status of the
following should be confirmed and defects reported to the Company OIM/Master:
• All propulsion and maneuvering control equipment
• Internal and external communication equipment
• Cargo handling equipment.
In marginal conditions a supply vessel should be asked to approach to a stand-off

position at least 50 meters from the Company Installation to assess the conditions
and the vessel’s ability to carry out cargo operations.
The following points should be taken into consideration before commencing any
supply vessel operations. In marginal weather conditions it is imperative for the
safety of both the supply vessel and Company Installation that the items below are
complied with:
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Visibility should be sufficient to allow the supply vessel Master a clear view of
the Installation throughout the cargo operation.
• Wind and current direction. Operations should be carried out down wind and
down current of the Installation whenever possible. This is to minimize the
risk of contact in the event of a failure in the supply vessel propulsion or
steering. An exception to this would be essential work on a potential shallow
gas operation, when the vessel should be kept upwind.
• The station keeping ability of the vessel including the type and power of the
propulsion and the experience of the personnel.
• The nature of the cargo and the expected duration of the operation.
The Master of a supply vessel always retains the right to refuse to come alongside
or to cease operations and move clear of the Installation on the grounds of the
safety of the vessel and its crew.
Once inside the 500-meter safety zone any change in the operational status of the
vessel equipment should be reported to the Installation and a decision taken to
continue or abort the cargo transfer operation.
Should the vessel or any member of the crew be involved in an incident/accident

whilst inside the 500-meter zone it must be reported to the unit OIM/Master.
Supply vessels are prohibited from anchoring within the 500-meter zone of any
Company Installation unless under exceptional circumstances and then only with the
express permission of the Company OIM/Master.
Any supply vessel losing an anchor, piece of cargo or equipment over the side within
the 500-meter zone should report this loss to the Installation OIM/Master.
Supply vessels working along side the installation when possible should secure their
marine radar systems to prevent unnecessary RF exposure of rig personnel and
exclude interference with the installations electronic equipment.
2 SUPPLY VESSELS IN DP MODE OPERATION
Supply vessels operating Dynamically Positioned may only be permitted along side if
deemed acceptable by OIM/Master. The vessel should comply with the IMCA
publications, M103 “Guidelines for the Design and Operation of DP Vessels”,
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
confirmed acceptable for close approach DP operations by the OIM/Master with

support from the Rig Manager as necessary.
For safety reasons a DP supply vessel using DP only should not work on the
windward side of a Company Installation without a Task Specific Think Procedure
(TSTP) in place that considers loss of supply vessel DP capabilities.
DP supply vessels should not approach a Transocean Installation when flowing a

well without approval.
The use of DP during actual cargo transfer operations is only acceptable with the
permission of the OIM/Master.
Information regarding the capabilities of the vessel and the state of readiness of her
equipment should be confirmed to the OIM/Master of the Company Installation
before operations commence and the Installation should pass similar information to
the supply vessel.
In weather conditions nearing DP supply vessel station keeping capabilities, the

OIM/Master of a Company Installation should request that two trained DP operators
be on the bridge at all times while the supply vessel is operating on DP within the
500-meter zone.
3 SEISMIC VESSELS
The presence of a seismic vessel is normally coordinated through the client. The
close approach of a seismic vessel to any Company Installation may have impact
both upon drilling and DP operations. Seismic activity may generate subsurface
sound waves that may impinge upon both acoustic positioning systems and possibly
critical well operations, i.e. logging, perforation.
4 STANDBY VESSELS
Every Company Installation that has an attendant Standby Vessel should develop a
suitable working relationship with that vessel to enhance the safety of the Company
personnel. In such activities the Standby Vessel should be fully aware of the day to
day operations and status of the Company Installation and be familiar with the
Installation’s Emergency procedures.
The main functions of standby vessels are:
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Act as a place of safety

• Rescue people from the water
• Provide medical aid for rescued people
• Monitor the Installation’s safety zone for anti-collision
• Provide on scene command in accordance with the Installation’s Emergency
Response Plan
• Monitor the performance of the Installation’s navigation lights & fog signals
• In normal operations, the standby vessel should remain outside the 500-
meter zone.
Whenever the vessel is required to perform close standby duties the vessel should
confirm to the Installation that it is fully functional in all respects to carry out the
required duties and that all rescue equipment is ready for use.
5 MULTIPLE DP VESSELS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS
This section provides generic guidelines regarding the operation of two DP vessels
operating in close proximity with each other.
5.1 REFERENCE MATERIAL

• IMCA M125 Safety Interface Document for a DP Vessel working near and
Offshore Platform (July 1997)
• Annex to M103 “Two vessel Supplement” by Poseidon Maritime Draft; (Aug
2000)
5.2 RISK
The operation should be subjected to a risk assessment for operational marine

exposure. Section 3.2.1, Figure 3.2.1.2 provides guidelines for conducting a risk
assessment.
5.3 MULTIPLE DP VESSEL OPERATIONS
5.3.1 POSITIONING OF VESSELS
During dual DP vessel operations, it is likely that the service vessel will be
considerably smaller than the Company DP Installation. The smaller of the two DP
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Installations will be more able to maneuver than the larger Installation, which will be
connected to the seabed and possibly bringing hydrocarbons to surface. It is
therefore critical that the smaller unit maintains visual contact with the larger vessel
to ensure that the stand off distance is not compromised.
5.3.2 WORKING ON WEATHER SIDE
When working on the weather side of the main vessel the Masters of the two vessels
should discuss the increased risk and either one will have the right to stop the
operation until the weather moderates. At no time will the service vessel operate in
such conditions that the vessel is using more than 50% thrust power on any unit
except for anything more than occasional peak demands.
5.3.3 MINIMUM REFERENCE SYSTEMS
When working within the 500-meter zone of the DP drilling Installation, the service
vessel, working in DP mode, should have at least two reference systems operating
on differing principles, active and selected into the DP. The use of dual identical
systems with no alternative on line should not be permitted as such a reference
system configuration comprises a single point failure.
5.3.4 PRE OPERATIONAL CHECKS
No vessel should enter the safety zone unless it is fully operational.
Before entering the 500-meter zone of the DP drilling Installation, the Master of the
DP service vessel should complete all necessary pre operational checks and then
confirm verbally to the Master of the DP drilling Installation that these checks have
been completed. The service vessel should also confirm there are no known defects
that compromise the operation of the vessel or the vessel’s DP station keeping
ability. The service vessel may then enter the 500-meter zone with the consent of
the OIM of the drilling Installation.
5.3.5 SERVICE VESSEL DP WATCHKEEPING
The Master of the service vessel should be required to ensure that the DP
Watchkeepers maintain an efficient watch and the full operability of the DP system.
If at any time there is a failure in any part of the system that could compromise the
station keeping ability of the vessel the Service Vessel DPO should immediately
contact the DP Drilling Installation.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
The OIM has the authority to request vessels to leave the 500 meter safety zone at
any time.
5.3.6 REFERENCE SYSTEMS
The use of DGPS as a sole reference system when working in close proximity to
another large Installation should be avoided. It is likely the DP drilling Installation
will mask the reception of differential signals at some stage during the operation. In
addition, the small separation distance could be reduced without any warning due to
a systematic error. During periods of scintillation DGPS will not be available
continuously due to signal attenuation causing position jumps.
The use of the laser based system Fan Beam is of significant advantage for use in
close proximity work alongside other fixed Installations. However, some systems
are not able to cope if there is significant movement between the two vessels due to
pitching and rolling. DP Operators should ensure the system remains locked on to
the correct target.
Artemis is based upon a line of sight microwave transmission system and has a long
history within the DP position reference world. Such system is used for position
referencing between vessels due to their reliability and accuracy. This system is
commonly used between FPSO’s and shuttle tankers.
5.3.7 COMMUNICATIONS
When vessels are operating in close proximity using DP systems it is important that
there are at least two distinct and independent means of communications between
the units. These means of communication should be regularly tested to ensure their
integrity.
5.3.8 AUTHORIZED PERSON
When Installations support multi vessel construction activities, pipe-lay, etc, there
may be several groups of persons on the bridge such as survey or construction
management. It is necessary to ensure that communication is correctly routed
during multi vessel operations.
The Master of each vessel should clearly identify to the other who is the authorized
person for the transmission and receipt of the various communications to ensure
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
that information received is channeled to the correct recipient, and that it is

understood.
The authorized person is responsible for making routine communications with the
other vessel and conveying operational issues.
In the event of an emergency each authorized person should immediately

communicate the nature of the emergency to the other and if possible the activity he
is about to initiate. The authorized person on the responding vessel should
immediately initiate his response to this emergency, cease all inter-vessel
operations, and prepare his vessel to leave the location.
5.3.9 CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
In the event of any change of environmental conditions or circumstances that require

the DP drilling Installation to alter its heading or adjust its position to minimize lower
flex joint angle, the authorized person should communicate this requirement to the
other vessel. Both vessels should then confirm they understand the requirement.
Changes of heading or location should be completed in 5 degree or 5 meter steps
only, unless both Masters are comfortable with larger increments. The vessels
should not move simultaneously but only after the other has completed the original
move.
5.3.10 PERMIT TO WORK (NOT APPLICABLE TO SUPPLY VESSEL

OPERATIONS)
To minimize risk to the Installation and the Vessel(s) involved during multi vessel
operations within the 500 meter safety zone such as pipe laying, derrick barge,
seismic boat or similar operations, it is recommended that such operations be jointly
pre- planned and documented under the Company’s Permit to Work system.
During such operations, vessels should not approach an Installation within 50

meters unless agreed by the OIM/ Master.
5.3.11 INFORMATION TRANSFER
Company Installations should pass on the following information to the vessel prior to
vessel(s) entering the Installation’s 500 metre safety zone:
• The operation(s) taking place on the Installation and those planned
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Any hazardous well features e.g. H2S, HPHT, or other relevant information
• Any Diving or ROV operations underway or planned
• The working VHF channel
• Warning if any acoustic logging programme is taking place or planned
• Status of Installation’s mooring system (if applicable) including:
− Installation’s anchor pattern (bearings and distances)
− Catenary and touch down points
− Anchor jewelry
• Any propulsion systems active
• Standby Vessel name
• Emergency Alarms signals
• Acoustic transponder channels in use
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.1.1 Multiple Vessel Activity Flowchart
Conduct Risk
Assessment e.g.
HAZOP, TRA
Review Risk
Assessment, ensure
controls in place
OIM issue PTW signed OIM suspends any

by appropriate parties conflicting PTW
Work Commences
Situation Changes e.g.

Situation constant
Adverse Weather
OIM issues new PTW

OIM suspends PTW
every 24 hours
Job completed, PTW

cancelled
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Marine Operations - Emergency Preparedness
1 BALLAST SYSTEM
Floating Installations must conduct ballast control drills (not applicable to jack-ups) at
intervals not to exceed 90 days as described in the HSE Manual, HQS-HSE-PP-01,
Section 4, Subsection 3.2, Emergency Response, Heading 4.3, Emergency
Response Drills and Exercises. It is recommended ”desk top problem solving” type
scenarios as well as the physical operation of emergency systems to deal with the
following events are included:
• Flooding of void spaces
• Flooding of pump rooms and adjacent spaces that would prevent access.
• Flooding of tubular bracing
Function tests specific to each Installation should include, but not be limited to, the
following as applicable:
• All valves in both bilge and ballast systems to be tested from the normal and
secondary control stations.
• Manual operation of valves.
• Checks on leak indication system .
• Manual sounding of all tanks to check remote readout indication.
• Checks of draft gauges against actual draft.
• Condition of valve operation indicator lamps.
• Ballast control emergency system operation.
• Watertight door status indicators.
2 SEVERE WEATHER
If severe weather is forecasted every OIM/Master should ensure that the Installation
is suitably prepared with particular reference to the watertight integrity and safety of
personnel.
Typically winds in excess of 60 Knots may threaten the safe movement of personnel
on exposed decks.
For Self-elevating Installations afloat, typically when 9 to 10 second plus period

swells in combination with 3m+ sea states are forecast, preparations should be
made for increased motions.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
The OIM/Master should monitor the approach of the weather system and use the
onboard equipment to assist in this matter. In addition he should also contact the
forecasting bureau direct to obtain the latest information on the approaching
weather.
In particular, decisions should be made regarding:

• Suspension of drilling Operations.
• Evacuation of non essential personnel.
• Verifying Installation stability.
• Deballasting to survival draft.
• Adjusting any mooring systems.
• Securing deck loads.
• Ensuring all internal and external watertight closures are secure.
• Limiting personnel access to external decks.
• Rigging safety lines where necessary.
Every Company Installation should develop suitable contingency procedures to

cover such a situation and determine a realistic time frame for the securing of the
Installation to a suitable status and the evacuation of non-essential personnel (Refer
to Installation Specific Emergency Response Manual).
It is important that an evacuation procedure is developed and maintained in line with

the local area resources.
Upon the passing of severe weather the OIM/Master should ensure a suitable
damage inspection is completed to verify the structural status.
3 ACTIONS ON LOSS OF POWER
Every Company Installation should develop specific procedures to cover the

activities to be initiated upon the total loss of power. Such procedures should cover
activities to secure the Installation and bring it back under-control at the earliest
opportunity. Such a procedure should be exercised at least every 90 days to ensure
all personnel are familiar with their duties.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
It is possible Dynamically Positioned self propelled vessels will be tested by the

client for a black out recovery and any lessons learnt from such an exercise should
be appended to the original procedure.
4 TOWING EQUIPMENT
The OIM/Master should be fully familiar with the rigging, operation and maintenance
of the emergency towing system. The system should be regularly checked and it is
important that the surrounding deck area is kept clear of any obstructions that will
impair deployment.
Use of Dedicated Emergency Towage equipment should be avoided for routine

harbor towage operations for wear and tear reasons. Where conventional towage
pendants are used as part of an emergency towage package their condition should
be regularly checked to ensure they have not been subjected to any friction sources
and possible degradation of strength.
5 SALVAGE
Where the OIM/Master deems it necessary to engage the assistance of a Salvor, he

should inform Company Management before the agreement is entered into.
However, if this is not possible the OIM/Master has the authority to enter into a
Lloyds Open Form (LOF) agreement including verbally agreeing that terms of LOF
apply. No other form of agreement is authorized without reference to Management.
This contract should not be used in any circumstance where there is sufficient time
for Management to negotiate a contract; e.g. vessel adrift in a safe condition and in
no danger.
An entry should be made in the Deck Log, Radio Log or other Official Document
(IADC) of the Time and Position, Condition of the Installation and Perils when the
agreement is entered into. This entry should also contain the name of the Company
representative (OIM/Master) making the agreement, the name of the Salvor,
Salvage Vessel, Owners and Master. These details should be transmitted to the
Company Management as soon as practical. All additional relevant information
should be logged to assist in making practical decisions and, later, in the arbitration.
Lloyds Open Form (summarized) Standard Form of Salvage Agreement (NO CURE
- NO PAY) is an agreement between the Master of the Distressed Vessel on behalf
of his Owners and the Master of a vessel capable of rendering a salvage service on
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
behalf of his Owners (the Contractor). Both Masters have the authority to make this
contract and once done it is legally binding. It may be oral (by Radio, agreeing the
terms of the LOF apply), or written (made by any available means, email, fax, etc.).
The mention of Lloyds Open Form implies all the clauses apply. The essence of the
contract is NO CURE - NO PAY. The contract is about Property only and does not
include LIFE, which should be saved at all cost except the jeopardy of other lives.
The contract is concerned with saving the Distressed Vessel and all the valuable
property aboard whoever the owners may be. The Master of the Distressed Vessel
should leave blank the VALUE in paragraph 1 of the form as this must be settled in
arbitration.
The Contractor may make reasonable use of any equipment on board the
Distressed Vessel to aid in the Salvage. It is in the Owner's (Master's) interest to
help the Contractor to salve the vessel as this effort must be taken into account at
arbitration as it reduces the general peril. Likewise any delays or non-cooperation
caused by the distressed vessel's Master or Owner may add to the peril and so to
the award to the Salvor. Unwarranted Delays caused by the Salvor to increase the
peril will count heavily against the award and should be noted by the Master of the
Distressed Vessel.
There is an allowance for the partial salvage of the vessel, all valuable items saved
to be taken into account at arbitration. Other clauses deal with the general
administration of the final award, objections, arbitration, etc.
Lloyds Open Form is generally used:

• Before connecting a salvage tug (not reconnecting a contracted tug);
• When a vessel is in danger of stranding due to insufficient or complete loss of
power;
• When a vessel has had a fire and is in danger of foundering or needs
assistance to control a fire;
• When a vessel needs to be pumped to stay afloat and is unable to pump out
using its own equipment.
This contract does not generally apply to tugs contracted to the same client or tugs
already contracted to the Company for any purpose where special clauses already
apply to salvage or redeployment. This contract does not apply to vessels under the
same management (Company).
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
6 RESPONDING TO A DISTRESS
Upon receiving a signal from any source that persons are in distress at sea, the
Master of a vessel at sea, that is in a position to provide assistance, is bound to
proceed with all speed to their assistance. If possible, the Master should inform the
distressed persons or the search and rescue service that he is responding to provide
assistance. If the OIM/Master decides that his vessel is in a position to provide
assistance but unable to render reasonable assistance, he should enter the decision
and reasons in the log book and inform Rescue Services accordingly. If several
vessels answer a call, the Distressed Vessel may requisition the most appropriate
vessels answering and release others from their duty to assist. Such release should
be noted in the Log Book with the time and position.
The OIM/Master of a drilling Installation may be able to offer Safe Haven, Helicopter
Landing and Medical Facilities even if moving the vessel to the scene is
unreasonable or impossible. This obligation is legal and binding by International
Convention on Salvage 1982, article 10 and article 98(1) of UN Convention for the
Law of the Sea, UNCOLS, 1982.
In the event of an OIM/Master deciding to respond to a distress, he should inform

the Rig Manager.
In responding to a distress the OIM/Master should ensure that by undertaking such

action he does not place his own Installation and crew at an unacceptable level of
risk.
7 PICKING UP SURVIVORS
When involved in international operations it is always possible that a Company

Installation may be involved in a distress operation and find itself in a position of
having to receive survivors. In many cases this operation may be very
straightforward and only involve a small number of personnel.
In some parts of the world there is a possibility that small boats laden with personnel
looking for relocation in other countries may be involved and may deliberately place
their vessel in a state of jeopardy to entice a larger vessel to their aid. In all cases
Masters must respond to save life. The legitimacy of personnel in such a situation
should be confirmed to the extent practical or possible. A close search of any items
brought onboard should be made for any concealed arms, contraband etc. It is
important for the Master to communicate the situation at the earliest opportunity to
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
the Rig Manager. The Rig Manager is responsible for making further necessary
contacts and notifications.
Upon picking up survivors, refugees, asylum seekers (“boat people”) the Installation,
if underway self-propelled, may have to deviate to a suitable port to discharge these
persons ashore.
OPERATIONS
INSTALLATION MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN THE WATER
1 POLICY
The running and retrieval of drilling riser while drifting with a current or
conducting Installation Moves with the BOP suspended (other than over a
template) requires Business Unit Manager approval.

Subsection 2.2.
2 PURPOSE
The purpose of obtaining Business Unit Manager approval is to ensure the financial /
contractual risks associated with running and retrieval of drilling riser while drifting
with a current or conducting Installation Moves with the BOP suspended is
recognized and appropriate measures taken to mitigate the risks.
3 SCOPE
This procedure is applicable to all floating Installations.
4 PROCEDURE
Submit through the Rig Manager a move specific plan of action including:
• Distance of Installation move
• Amount of riser proposed to be suspended
• Operating Procedures
• Transit conditions including:
− The maximum environmental conditions and Installation motions that
allow for riser recovery operations at all times without any adverse
effect on equipment, normal operations of the Installation or safety of
the Installation and/or personnel.
− The Current Profile must be taken into consideration.
− Riser dynamics must be taken into consideration.
• Riser hang off method (ie: use of riser hang off joint, flex joint and riser
capture system for Pathfinder Class).
• Bathymetry along proposed transit route from sonar scans.
All sea bed survey and weather information must be provided by client and must be
carefully reviewed when requesting Business Unit Manager approval.
OPERATIONS
HQS Engineering should be consulted when Installation moves with riser suspended
a proposed to extend beyond a drilling template.
A pre-Installation move meeting must be held prior to the move and attended by all
essential personnel, the client representative and crews involved in this operation.
Potential hazards to be discussed include but are not limited to the following:
• Raised sea bed.
• Object / Structures e.g. wellhead, wreck, mooring lines.
• Excessive current.
• Excessive Installation velocity.
• Power blackout.
• GPS failure (DP Installations).
• Failure in MUX system allowing LMRP to unlatch.
• Method to maintain pressure on control system.
• BOP Control system items including LMRP connector unlock, stab retract
and riser recoil system are switched off and safety tag installed on the panel.
• All crews involved in this operation are to have clearly defined responsibilities,
defined observations to be reported and plan of action.
During Installation move the maximum upper flex joint angle must not exceed 2.5
degrees. Larger flex joint angles during transit must reviewed by HQS Engineering.
During Installation move with the riser suspended, the riser must not experience a
“block current” greater than 0.3 knots so to minimize the potential of vortex induced
vibration and seal wear.
Keep one person in the moon pool and on the Installation drill floor at all times (with
radio) to ensure the riser remains in safe and secured position. Maintain
communication with bridge. Watch carefully for the riser angle or any riser
movement/vibration or any increase/decrease of string weight. Stop the Installation
move if any strange riser movement or vibration is observed.
An Installation specific Task Risk Assessment is required prior to making any move
with the BOP suspended.
In any condition, the riser must not come into contact with anything that results in a
lateral restraint such as the rotary table, the moonpool or the BOP frame bumper.
Speed must be adjusted as per observations at moonpool, drillfloor and riser angle.
OPERATIONS
Keep communication contact at all times between moonpool – drill floor – control
room – ROV.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
The Business Unit Manager is responsible for ensuring the financial / contractual
risks associated with making Installation Moves with the BOP/riser suspended are
considered prior to approving.
5.2 DIVISION MANAGER (D)
The Division Manager is responsible for evaluating the financial / contractual risks
associated with making Installation Moves with the BOP/riser suspended prior to
requesting the required Business Unit Manager approvals.
5.3 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager is responsible for obtaining Business Unit Manager approval and
ensuring that operations are conducted in accordance with Company Procedures.
5.4 OIM (I)
The OIM is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this Policy and
6 DOCUMENTATION
There is currently no documentation associated with this policy. However,

Engineering may have applicable documentation and reference sources from
previous Installation specific analysis.
OPERATIONS
LOCATION APPROVAL
1 POLICY
Mooring system analysis, riser system analysis, and jack-up site assessment
must be pre-approved by HQS Engineering or an HQS Engineering approved
Company for each location.

Subsection 2.3.
2 PURPOSE
The purpose for Location Approval is to:

• Provide sufficient information for review to identify hazards of mobilization,
• Ensure the Installation’s technical suitability for the proposed location
including,
− Method of self elevation
− Mooring analysis
− Riser analysis
• Obtain Underwriter’s surveyor approval of method of mobilization (if
applicable),
• Identify subsurface hazards to the Installation,
• Insure Insurance coverage is appropriate for the distance and mode of
mobilization,
• Insure the drilling location is not in an “excluded area” specified by
underwriters.
3 SCOPE
This procedure is applicable to all Installations.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 Notification via GRS must be provided at least 72 hours prior to a planned rig
move. For “difficult” locations where extensive Engineering analysis is
necessary technical information should be provided as far in advance as
practicable (refer to site assessment flow chart for guidance).
4.2 Coastal State Authorities should be notified as appropriate in the region of
operation.
OPERATIONS
LOCATION APPROVAL
4.3 Self elevating Installations must obtain a site assessment from HQS
Engineering, HQS approved Engineering Contractor for each new location.
4.4 Operator furnished data required for site assessment is described in
Appendix 4 of this section and is a part of this procedure.
4.5 Jack-up moves on platforms must be performed after the platform production
is shut-down. Should such shut-down of production not be obtainable,
EXEMPTION to this procedure is required to include a site specific risk
assessment and risk mitigating measures.
4.6 Operator furnished data necessary for mooring analysis is described in
Appendix 4 of this section and is a part of this procedure.
4.7 Self Elevating Installation move operations must be conducted by a person
authorized by Underwriter’s for the type of Installation being moved.
4.8 The Master / Tow Master / Barge Mover must prepare a voyage plan for each
ocean tow and self propelled voyage. All personnel involved in the transit
must be briefed on the Voyage Plan.
4.9 Non-Self Propelled Installations must obtain voyage plan approvals from a
Company approved Underwriter’s Warranty Surveyor for afloat Ocean tows
exceeding 1000 nautical miles.
4.10 Semi-submersible installations being towed must comply with the
requirements detailed in Section 3 Subsection 2.3 Appendix 1, Towing Of
Semi Submersibles.
4.11 All dry transport voyages must obtain voyage approval from HQS-Engineering
and an approved Warranty Surveyor.
4.12 Upon completion of each self-elevating and moored Installation move a
standard format Installation Move Report must be completed in GRS.
4.13 All Installations must obtain approval for mobilization and site conditions not
clearly addressed within the Installation’s Marine Operations Manual.
5 RESPONSIBILITY

ensuring Business Unit / Division uniformity of Installation marine operations.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (D)
OPERATIONS
LOCATION APPROVAL
The Rig Manager is responsible for ensuring:

• Installation location approval is obtained;
• the voyage plan is developed and communicated to Installation personnel
• warranty surveyor approval is obtained; if required,
• the Installation move is controlled by a person authorized by Underwriters; and
• an Installation move report is prepared in GRS.
5.3 OIM (D)
The OIM is responsible for ensuring that the marine operations of this Policy and
5.4 MARINE DEPARTMENT HEADS (D)
The Marine Department Heads are responsible for ensuring compliance with all
6 REFERENCES

Procedure, Towing of Semi-submersibles
Recommended Practice, Installation Move Notification, Approvals, Reports
Recommended Practice, Voyage Plans
Recommended Practice, Operator Furnished Data
Recommended Practice, Self-elevating Installations Field Moves
Recommended Practice, Self-elevating Installation – Rig Mover Certification
Recommended Practice, Anchor Handling Vessels
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Location Approval -Towing of Semi Submersibles
1 TOWING OF SEMI-SUBMERSIBLES
1.1 TOWING BRIDLE
Each towed Semi-submersible must have a main and secondary tow bridle
connected at the lower hulls for ocean voyages. Tow bridles must be fitted with a
deployment / recovery system. When multiple tugs are used in parallel, the main
tow bridle can be split or additional tow lines connected at each pontoon (e.g., for a 2
or 3 tug towing arrangement).
1.2 TOWING ON ANCHOR CHAINS / PENDANTS
Towing a semi-submersible on the forward anchors is not a recommended method

of towing, but can be approved on a case by case basis for very short field transits
by the OIM.
1.3 TOWING & ANCHOR HANDLING VESSELS
Towing and Anchor Handling Vessel(s) engaged in towing and or anchor handling a
Company Installation are subject to a Company / warranty surveyor survey at the
discretion of the OIM to ensure fitness for purpose prior to commencement of towing
or anchor handling operations.
Towing vessels must have a secondary means of connecting the tow, should the tow
wire fail. This may be a second tow drum, a work drum or a second tow vessel. A
secondary wire not available for immediate deployment e.g., wire stowed on a spare
reel separate from a work / tow drum is not acceptable.
Bollard pull requirements for AHTS vessels are recommended in Section 3

Subsection 2.3 Appendix 7, Recommended Practices – Anchor Handling Vessels.
Towing vessels must be equipped with multi-engine propulsion and steering,

suitable sized anchor handling winches and mechanical wire/chain stopper system
such as Triplex Jaws, Karm Forks or similar. Pelican hook arrangements for
deepwater anchor handling are prohibited.
Towing vessels are in service with increasingly larger bollard pull capabilities. It is
possible an attending towing / anchor handling vessel may have a bollard pull in
excess of the strength of the Installations towing bridle and fittings. Because of this
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Location Approval -Towing of Semi Submersibles
it is essential that the towing vessel Master is made aware of the towing bridle
capabilities and limitations. The maximum percentage of the towing vessel bollard
pull that is to be used must be agreed on before commencing towing operations.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Location Approval - Installation Location Approval and Move Report
1 GENERAL
As part of all Installation move preparations, Rig Managers should provide the
information outlined in this Section for the purpose of planning, approving and
reporting Installation move operations.
2 LOCATION APPROVAL INFORMATION AND DISTRIBUTION (ALL

INSTALLATIONS)
Installation requests for mooring analysis, riser analysis and jack-up site assessment
should be made to HQS Engineering or HQS approved Engineering Contractor.
GRS Installation Location Approval Information is shown in Figures 3.2.3.1 and

3.2.3.2 for Non Self Propelled and Dynamic Positioned Installations respectively.
These forms provide a planning check list of information required for mooring
analysis, riser analysis and jack-up site analysis.
3 APPROVALS
3.1 EXCLUDED AREAS OF OPERATION
Underwriters require specific approval for operation in areas excluded by “American

Institute Trade Warranties” shown in figure 3.2.3.3.
3.2 RIG MOVER APPROVAL (SELF ELEVATING INSTALLATIONS)
Self elevating Installation move operations are to be conducted by a Company

authorized person. Typically this is the OIM or Barge Supervisor who is approved by
the Underwriter’s and Company Business Unit Management for the type of
Installation being moved.
In cases where the assigned O.I.M. or Barge Supervisor is not “certified” for the type
of Installation being moved, a qualified rig mover should be in attendance.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
4 RIG MOVE REPORTS
4.1 SELF ELEVATING INSTALLATIONS
Upon completion of each location move a Rig Move Report should be completed in
GRS. Figure 3.2.3.4 illustrates the GRS Rig Move Report for self elevating
Installations.
4.2 MOORED SEMI SUBMERSIBLE / TENDERS / POSTED BARGES
Upon completion of each location move a Rig Move Report should be completed in
GRS. Figure 3.2.3.5 illustrates the GRS Rig Move Report for moored semi-
submersible Installations.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.1-Location Approval Information Non Self Propelled Installations, Page 1
INSTALLATION LOCATION APPROVAL INFORMATION

Non Self Propelled Installations
Vessel Name:
Type of Unit: (self elevating, barge, semi)
Region of Operation: (Brazil, GOM, West Africa, etc.)
Estimated Move Date:
Person in Charge / Title (OIM or Barge Supervisor)
Name of Operator:
New Location Name:
Coordinates:
Water Depth:
Name of Operator:
Departing Location Name:
Coordinates:
Water Depth:
Distance between Locations:
REA No.:
Tug Boats
a) Number of Tug Boats
b) Names: 1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4
c) BHP of boats
d) Continuous Bollard Pull of Boats
e) Special Move or Mooring requirements? (describe)
Site Specific Information

Comments:
Environmental Data
a) Has the operator supplied environment data? yes / no
Site Survey Data

a) Has the operator supplied site survey data? yes / no
b) Bathymetry yes / no
b) Site clearance / side scan sonar survey yes / no
c) Sub- bottom profiling & shallow gas survey yes / no
d) Drop cores, grab samples yes / no
e) other, list
Comments:
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.1- Location Approval Information Non Self Propelled Installations, Page 2
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.2-Location Approval Information – DP Installations
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.3, American Institute Trade Warranties

1. Warranted no port or place on the Eastern Coast of North America, its rivers or adjacent islands
(a) north of 52 N Lat
(b) in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, its connecting waters and the St. Lawrence River, in the area
bounded by lines drawn between Battle Harbour/Pistolet Bay; Cape Ray/Cape North; Port
Hawkesbury/Port Mulgrave; and Baie Comeau/Matane, between December 21st and April 30th,
both days inclusive.
(c) west of Baie Comeau, but not West of Montreal, between December 1st and April 30th, both
days inclusive.
2. Warranted no Great Lakes or St. Lawrence seaway or St. Lawrence River west of Montreal.
3. Warranted no port or place in Greenland or its adjacent waters.
4. Warranted no port or place on the Western Coast of North America, its rivers or adjacent island, north of
54 30' N. Lat. or west of 130 50' W. Long.; except the port of Ketchikan, Alaska, provided,
(a) that a qualified pilot having knowledge of local waters be on duty while the Vessel is in waters
north of 54 30' N. Lat. and east of 132 50' W. Long.’ and
(b) that the Vessel be equipped with operating Gyro Compass, Radio Direction Finder, Fathometer
and Radar.
5. Warranted no Baltic sea (or adjacent waters east of 15 E. Long.);
(a) north of a line between Mo and Vaasa between November 15th and May 5th, both days
inclusive.
(b) east of a line between Vilpuri (Vyborg) and Narva between November 21st and May 5th, both
days inclusive.
(c) north of a line between Stockholm and Tallinn between December 15th and April 15th, both days
inclusive.
(d) east of 22 E. Long. and south of 59 N. Lat. between December 15th and April 15th, both days
inclusive.
6. Warranted not north of 70 N. Lat. except when proceeding directly to or from any port or place in Norway
or Kola Bay.
7. Warranted no Bering Sea, no East Asian waters north of 46 N. Lat. and no port or place in Siberia except
Vladivostok and/or Nakhodka.
8. Warranted no Kerguelen or Croset Islands, nor water south of 50 S. Lat., except ports or places in
Patagonia, Chile and Falkland Islands, but liberty is given to enter waters south of 50 S. Lat. if
proceeding to or from ports or places not excluded by this warranty.
9. Warranted not to sail with Indian Coal as cargo:
(a) between March 1st and June 30th, both days inclusive.
(b) between July 1st and September 30th, both days inclusive, except to ports in Asia, not west of
Aden nor east of or beyond Singapore.
CL.A210
AMENDMENTS:
American Institute Trading Warranties attached hereto, extended to allow operations/navigations along the
east coast of North America and/or Newfoundland to not north of 60 deg. North and not west of 170 deg.
west, and along the west coast of North America to not north of 60 deg. north and not west of 70 deg. west.
Such operations/ navigations outside of these navigating limits is subject to the approval of Underwriters’
surveyor and additional premium payable if and as required by underwriters.
Extended to allow operations/navigations in the Barents, subject to underwriters’ prior advice and terms to be
agreed.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.4-GRS Rig Move Report Self Elevating Installations, Page 1
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.4-GRS Rig Move Report Self Elevating Installations, Page 2
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.5-GRS Rig Move Report Moored Semi-Submersible Installations, Page 1
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.5-GRS Rig Move Report Moored Semi-Submersible Installations, Page 2
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Location Approval - Voyage Plans
1 VOYAGE PLANS (ALL INSTALLATIONS)
The Master / Tow Master / Barge Supervisor should prepare a voyage plan for each
field move, ocean tow, dry-transport and self propelled voyage. All personnel
involved in the transit are to be briefed on the Voyage Plan.
The Voyage Plan should include but not be limited to the following items as
applicable:
• Routing, confirmed waypoints for the voyage
• Identified navigation dangers for the voyage
• Route charts and pilots
• Weather forecasting
• Historic weather data for the voyage and time of year
• Safe havens / shelter (contingency planning)
• Bunker ports
• Ballast water change out (Invasive species regulations)
• Medivac facilities along the route
• Propulsion output versus fuel consumption
• Fuel / lube oil safety margins
• Marine vessel support along the route (assist tugs etc)
• Communications
• Piracy Plan
• Stowaway Plan
• Damage control
• Salvage
• Tug selection and control
• Dry tow transport motion calculations
• Wet tow, maximum allowable motions
(what to do when motions reach maximum, change course, etc.)
Towing equipment (main and emergency) should be inspected and any defects
rectified.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Location Approval - Voyage Plans
As far as practicable, all transits should be planned to avoid close proximity to land,
other Installations or any fixed object. Due regard should be taken with regard to the
water depths along the proposed route and any hazards to navigation. Allowance
should be made for protrusions beneath the hull such as thrusters, spud cans, etc.
Stability and deck loads are to be within the limits defined in the Installation’s marine
operations manual.
Deck load items should be suitably secured for transit. Movements of deck load
should be kept to a minimum during transit. Cranes should be stowed and crane
movements while underway should be authorised by the Barge Engineer or Chief
Officer.
All navigational equipment (lights and shapes) including charts of the area of the
transit should be onboard and checked for operation.
The weather forecast provider should be advised of the transit route to insure
accurate forecasts.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Location Approval - Operator Furnished Data
1 CLIENT FURNISHED DATA
The Client should provide the data detailed below as far in advance of a planned
location move as practically possible so to allow sufficient review time by Company
Engineering and underwriters approving bodies.
1.1 GENERAL SITE INFORMATION
• Type of operation: exploration well or over platform

• Location Designation
• Geographical Coordinates
• Water Depth
• Identify platform, pipelines, cables, well heads, floating or fixed vessels or any
other relevant objects within a 3mile radius of the proposed location.
• bottom anomaly information
Metocean data, including references to data sources, shall be provided as indicated
below:
• Wind speed - at 10 meter above sea level 1-hour, 10-minute, 1-minute and 3-
sec gust
• Extreme environmental weather conditions 50 year return period data for the
proposed Installation location or the immediate vicinity to be provided. If such
return periods are not available the more stringent 100 year return condition
should be used for location approval purposes.
• Wave height - significant and maximum
• Wave period - significant and maximum wave energy associated
• Wave direction
• Tidal range, tidal streams and currents at 50% of water depth and bottom
currents
• Maximum storm surge
• Directional information on each item above
• Predominant swell conditions
• Hurricane, Monsoon, Typhoon or Ice information
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
1.2 FOR SELF – ELEVATING INSTALLATIONS
1.2.1 As built platform drawings:

• to determine hull / platform clearance, required air-gap limitations,
required skid out distance and if platform leg batter interferes with
unit's spud-cans.
1.2.2 The position of production risers, pipelines or power cables

• items that could compromise unit placement must be identified.
1.2.3 Previous jack-up history at the location

• including rig name, heading, penetration and applied leg loading.
1.2.4 A bathymetric close-grid survey

• over one square kilometer and centered over the proposed location.
• water depths should be corrected for l.a.t., such surveys should include
seabed features. (see figure 3.2.3.6 of this section for preferred line
spacing)
1.2.5 Side Scan Sonar:

• to ascertain the location is free from obstructions on the ocean bottom.
A divers survey or alternative R.O.V. survey can be considered
providing the surveyed area is at least 50 meters beyond the extreme
perimeter of the Installation footprint.
1.2.6 Shallow seismic (Boomer) data of 1 to 10 kHz frequency:

• To identify shallow hazards and near surface channeling which may
affect Installation emplacement.
1.2.7 Bore Hole Information (Geo-Technical Information)

• Bore-hole information should be made available including spud-can
penetration curves on the proposed location. Where possible bore
hole data should be correlated to cone penetrometer data.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• In the event that geo-technical bore hole information is not available,

information from within a 1 mile radius of the proposed location may be
considered if supported by an unobstructed shallow seismic tie back
line to the known bore hole. Such information may be deemed
unacceptable if the tie back line shows the existence of channeling,
variation of geophysical or acoustic properties or other discontinuities.
• In the absence of site specific bore-hole data or in known areas of

potential rapid penetrations / punch through, a core should be taken
from the specific drilling unit on location. Core samples should extend
to a point where the load penetration curve indicates the continuous
presence of soils capable of supporting the lesser of:
• 1.5 times the required bearing capacity of the unit for a depth of
8 meters below the expected maximum penetration, OR
• The estimated penetration plus 1.5 spud can diameters,
whichever is less.
• Recovered soil samples are to be analyzed on board by a qualified
geo-technical engineer.
• In cases where Installation difficulties or uncontrolled settlements are
predicted, HQS Engineering may recommend site-specific pre-loading
or pre-driving operations. These recommendations are intended to
minimize risk during pre-load or pre-drive operations, and may include
individual leg pre-loading, extended holding times, crust degradation or
a combination thereof.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.6, Jack-up Rig Site Survey Line Pattern
1.3 FLOATING INSTALLATIONS – OPERATOR FURNISHED DATA
Although not all locations will require specific assistance and/or approval from HQS
Engineering, the Operator should furnish the following information (as a minimum)
for each location.
1.3.1 Field bathymetry to a distance at least equivalent to the mooring pattern.
• The water depth at the well, seabed slope, and confirmation of the
conditions on the ocean floor constitutes the minimum acceptable
information.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
1.3.2 Current Omni-directional, non-seasonal data is a minimum. Seasonal and

directional data should be provided to optimize the mooring system. Since
riser analysis is nearly always required, speed and directional profiles to the
bottom should be available.
1.3.3 Required or preferred Installation heading. Predominant weather, helicopter

and supply vessel operations, communications, etc. may determine the
heading.
1.3.4 Surface and shallow sub-surface type of soil, density, undrained shear
strength or friction coefficient. The soil conditions are not mandatory.
However, if they are not given, conservative anchor holding and surface
casing support assumptions will be used for analysis.
1.3.5 Any area-specific special requirements, such as iceberg avoidance, surface

stack operation, large Installation shifts between wells without mooring
system redeployment, etc. should be specified to allow due consideration
during the mooring design and review processes.
1.4 PRE-SET MOORINGS
For the purpose of this subsection, a pre-set mooring spread is one that is installed
by an anchor-handling contractor in accordance with good offshore practice in
advance of the arrival of the Installation for hook-up and commencement of
operations.
In most cases, the analysis for a pre-set mooring spread are performed by a third
party contracted directly by the operator. In this case, any analysis should be
reviewed and accepted by HQS Engineering prior to hook-up of the Installation on
location.
When a pre-set mooring spread is to be used, the operator must furnish the
following information prior to hook-up of the Installation on location. While additional
information may be supplied, the following is considered the minimum acceptable
data set.
• Mooring analysis contracted directly by the Operator.
• Make, model, rating, serial number or other unique identification for each of
the components which comprise the mooring system, including anchors,
buoys, chain, wire, connectors and associated jewelry.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Certification and current inspection report for all components which can be
directly cross-referenced to the equipment employed for Installation mooring.
• Load test reports for any components designed and/or fabricated for the
particular location, for example tri-plates.
Mooring components furnished as part of an operator-supplied system must be of a

rating and quality consistent with the rating and quality of the Installation mooring
system and Transocean minimum standards.
2 VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS
In cases where HQS Engineering does not already have the information, Business
Unit / Division management should provide updated details of the Installation
characteristics and any modifications that may have affected the Installation’s
configuration when submitting a Request for Engineering Assistance. Modifications
may include leg length, weights, structural capacity or jacking capability, wind areas
or pre-load tank capacities.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Location Approval - Self Elevating Installations In Field Moves
1 SELF ELEVATING INSTALLATIONS – FIELD MOVES
This section provides guidance to OIM’s and Barge Supervisor’s to prepare Self
Elevating Installations for Field moving operations. These guidelines describe
recommended marine practices to ensure each location move is planned, prepared
and conducted in a safe and economical manner. These guidelines should be read
in conjunction with the Check Lists contained in Figure 3.2.3.7.
2 GENERAL
2.1 DISTANCE
Confirm distance between locations and calculate the estimated transit time. Ensure
weather forecasting service is available during the estimated transit time. Allowance
should be made for deviations around obstructions, shipping lanes or shallow areas.
2.2 OPEN LOCATIONS
Positioning equipment should be supplied and include a DGPS system stabilized by

a gyrocompass. One master DGPS unit and one back up DGPS unit should be
available. In cases where seabed obstructions such as wellheads, pipelines or
footprints are in the vicinity of the proposed location, such obstructions should be
displayed on the master DGPS screen and may also be marked with suitable buoys.
2.3 PLATFORM LOCATIONS
Prior to the move, confirm pipelines are suitably marked with buoys. In cases where
a platform approach is to be made on anchors, operators are to supply DGPS
positioning system on board the anchor handling vessel(s). The DGPS system
requirements are the same as for Open Locations above. The proposed anchor
pattern should be specified and agreed to ensure adequate clearance is allowed
between anchor line positions and pipelines / other obstructions. A platform visit
should be made in advance of the move to verify the geometry of the platform is as
expected, no cranes, overhangs or additions which might cause interference exist,
the proposed drilling slots are accessible and no production risers are fitted
externally to the platform docking face.
Prior to commencing final positioning or departure at a platform, agree and confirm

operational limitations including, but not limited to, daylight and status of production
wells and flow-lines.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Fields containing non lighted structures should not be entered in hours of darkness.
Non-daylight near platform Installation moving operations that may be considered on

a case by case basis are limited to:
• departure from a location with a clear and unobstructed exit path
• moving onto a lighted platform with anchors from a preposition location in the
immediate vicinity.
2.4 MOVE PLAN AND MEETING
The Rig Manager is responsible for the preparation of an Installation move plan that
addresses the operational and logistical aspects of the move. The move plan should
identify the responsibilities of the Company, Clients and subcontractors and identify
any site-specific procedures necessary. The move plan should also include
contingency plans as appropriate.
3 RESPONSIBILITIES
3.1 OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER (OIM)
The OIM is the person in charge and has overall responsibility for all personnel and
the Installation safety. The OIM has the right to veto any operation conducted on
board and any operation affecting the safety of the Installation. The OIM may
delegate the marine operations responsibility to a suitably qualified Marine
Superintendent / Rig Mover.
3.2 BARGE SUPERVISOR
The Barge Supervisor is the on board marine authority and is fully responsible to the
OIM to prepare the unit for moving operations. This includes, but is not limited to,
preparation of calculations for jacking and afloat conditions to ensure the load line
draft, variable loads and VCG are in compliance with the Installation’s marine
operating manual. The Barge Supervisor is to ensure the Installation and all
equipment is secured in accordance with good marine practice, pre-move
verifications of jacking, mooring and ballast systems have been conducted and the
Installation is in seaworthy condition prior to commencing move operations.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
3.3 WARRANTY SURVEYOR
The Warranty Surveyor, if present, is appointed by the Company to satisfy

requirements of the Installation’s insurance underwriters. The Warranty Surveyor is
not the underwriter and does not represent insurers. The Warranty Surveyor's
responsibility is to independently observe and report that move operations are being
conducted within the unit's marine operations manual and generally acceptable
marine practices. The Warranty Surveyor may offer expert advice on marine related
issues similar to a Harbor Pilot’s function. Use of Warranty Surveyors in an active
role is discouraged in order to minimize risks associated with conflict of interest. The
Warranty Surveyor has no direct authority or veto powers regarding Installation
mobilization as ultimate responsibility for the Installation remains with the OIM and
the Installation's owners at all times.
3.4 RIG MOVER
The Rig Mover is the Company recognized marine operations coordinator who
should liaise closely with the OIM and Barge Supervisor.
3.5 RIG MANAGER
The Rig Manager’s function, or any shore based managerial or supervisory staff,
when attending an Installation move is strictly to support the OIM. The Rig Manager
may assist with liaison with the client and shore management and act as delegated
by the OIM. The Rig Manager is not to assume command of the Installation move
operation, which is to remain with the permanent Installation crew.
4 PRE-MOVE MEETING
A pre-move meeting should be conducted on board the Installation prior to

commencement of jacking and moving operations.
4.1 ATTENDEES
The following attendees as a minimum are recommended to attend the pre-move

meeting:
• Offshore Installation Manager
• Barge Supervisor
• Marine Warranty Surveyor (if present)
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
• Company Marine Superintendent / Rig Mover (if present)

• Platform Installation Manager (for manned Installations)
• Operators Representatives
• Masters of attending marine vessels
• Installation crew members with key responsibilities.
4.2 AGENDA
An agreed written Installation mobilization plan including site specific procedures is

the expected result of the pre-move meeting. The following topics should be
discussed as a minimum:
• Maximum weather criteria for moving off and on location.
Particular care is required in areas where there are natural long swell periods, large
tidal ranges and significant current.
• A passage window should be agreed.
Departure from the old location should not occur without determining with certainty
that a "weather window" of sufficient duration exists to allow the Installation to
depart, move and jack up at the new location or at a safe and sheltered stand-by
refuge location. The "weather window" determination should be supported by area
weather forecast from a recognized weather forecasting service. Where weather
patterns do not conform to predictions, additional weather information should be
sought or the situation discussed directly with duty forecasters.
• Communications,
Clear VHF / UHF channels and lines of communications between the Installation and
attending vessels as well as with Installation key personnel to be agreed.
• Proposed towing route and navigation procedures.
• Proposed Heading at the arrival location.
Consideration of risks associated with hazardous gas, flaring operations, prevailing

current, prevailing wind directions, supply vessel and helicopter operations, etc.
• Available fuel and water on the Installation and attending vessels.
• Allowable Installation motions during departure, tow and arrival.
• Towing arrangements including contingencies and emergencies.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
• Tug connection points based on Installation layout, prevailing weather and

heading required.
• Anchor handling procedures (where required).
• Assignment of key personnel for jacking and winch operations.
• Acceptance criteria for position and heading tolerances on open locations.
− Watch keeping.
− Watertight integrity and tank sounding.
5 PRE-MOVE PREPARATIONS
5.1 CHECK LIST
The OIM should use a pre-move checklist detailing pre-move tasks and those
responsible for ensuring that tasks have been completed. Example pre-move check
lists are presented in Figure 3.2.3.7.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.7-Example Pre-Move Checklist #1
No Task To Be Completed Initial

1 Close mud pit dump valves and secure
2 Stow BOP's and secure
3 Secure Installation drill floor, tongs and other loose equipment
4 Remove stern handrails, remove and secure mud and cmt lines
5 Skid substructure in moving position
6 Secure substructure beams with clamps, chains, wedges as required
7 Replace handrails as required
8 Reconnect salt water and airlines
9 Secure top drive and block
10 Secure the mud pump room
11 Driller instructs crew for jacking operations at designated leg
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS

1
Pre -grease jacking motors if required
2
Secure all loose gear in the machinery spaces and work shops
3
Check operation of mooring winches
4
Disconnect the deep well pumps and raise & secure tower as required
5 Check all water tight doors to machinery spaces are properly closed and
secured
6
Assign power to the jacking system
7
Check oil in primary and secondary gear boxes
8
Pre-grease all main bearing on jacking system
9
Check oil level in skidder unit
10
Electrician to stand by in SCR room during jacking
11 Ensure that minimal required personnel are below decks during afloat
operations and pre-loading
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS

1 Remove all containers and heavy loads from the bow area
2 Prepare towing gear as required
3 Stow and secure all tubulars
4 Secure main deck cargo and equipment
Block stow as much deck load as possible within the control pipe bay
5
and within the inside deck load limits
6 Pick up and secure all loading hoses & vent lines
7 Prepare jetting lines as required
Close and secure all water tight doors above and below decks,
8
including quarters entry doors
9 Remove and secure mooring lines
10 Close and secure all main deck hatches and vents
11 Secure all items in the sack store
12 Secure all movable gas bottles and cutting sets
13 Secure welders area and steel rack
14 Place leg grease and brushes at each leg chords
Lay down all crane booms in the racks and secure main block and or
15
whipline
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS

1
Check operation of all pre-load dump and fill valves
2 Check that all required pre-load dump valve blanking caps are
secured
3 Check that all pre-load tanks that are not required for ballast are
stripped
4
Sound all tanks and void spaces and record soundings
5
Check all tank & void space manhole covers
6
Test the bilge system and ensure that bilge pumps properly prime
7
Charge all hand held radios, spare batteries and ensure operation
8
Complete and check all afloat and pre-load stability calculations
9
Check that all water tight doors and closures are secured
10
Check all leg wells for obstructions
11 Assemble all required charts, weather forecast, tidal data for
contemplated towing route
12 Test jacking panel, lamp test and alarms as required. Verify correct
functioning of RPD Measurement systems (if fitted) and recalibrate
as necessary
13 Calculate position of raw water tower for moving off location and
onto the new location
14
Grease skid rails as required
15 Ensure that jacking system bearings are greased during system
operation
NOTE: Watertight hatches and doors must remain properly closed and secured at all
times when the unit is afloat and until pre-loading operations are completed.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.7-Example Pre-Move Checklist #4 (continued)

16 Calculate required pendant wire length if anchors are used
17 Check Navigation lights and day shapes
18 Check all jetting equipment and function test
19 Check all towing gear is ready
20 Check and grease anchor fairleads if used
21 Check that rack grease and brushes are ready
22 Check mooring lines are disconnected and secured
23 Check that all dump valves are secured
24 Check sea chest for proper operation
Check that raw water tower is ready to be raised and disconnected

25
when required
26 Check that master dump valves are secured
27 Check that all equipment is properly secured
28 Test jacking system emergency stop
29 Test tow bridle deployment and recovery winch
30 Check all towing connections (smit brackets, bollards, bits)
31 Have heaving lines ready as required
32 Have sledge hammers ready at smit brackets

33
Have split pins, axe, hacksaw and knife at a ready place
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS

1 Have adequate personnel available for skidding
Hold meeting with all key personnel just prior to skidding, assign
2
supervisors, record topics discussed
3 Skid sub base transverse and confirm securing arrangements
Skid cantilever / substructure inboard to the normal moving position and

4
confirm securing arrangements
Verify that all pre-move check list have been completed and signed off by
5
the respective supervisors
Verify that all jacking, stability and pre-load calculations have been
6
completed
7 Verify that the bilge system has been tested
Verify that towing equipment and attending vessels are on location and
8
ready
Just before jacking operations commence have meeting with all key
9
personnel assign leg supervisors, chain of command.
10 Check radio communications with each leg
11 Elevate hull 1 to 2 feet to equalize motor torque
12 Lower hull to 10 feet air-gap (connect tugs / this may vary)
13 Lower hull to 5 to 7 feet hull draft

Barge supervisor to check and confirm watertight integrity witnessed by
14 either attending warranty surveyor or the Company attending Installation
mover
When watertight integrity is confirmed continue with planned move
15
operation
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS

1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
5.2 STABILITY CALCULATIONS
The Barge Supervisor should produce a full set of stability calculations covering
jacking up and down, afloat and pre-load operations. The calculations should verify
compliance with the marine operations manual for all operations.
5.3 WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY
Prior to becoming water-borne, all watertight and weathertight closures other than
those normally open during transit conditions should be secured.
5.4 SEA-FASTENINGS
Before the hull is jacked down into the water, drilling equipment and materials
carried on deck should be reduced to a minimum and arranged so that they should
not interfere with access or escape routes. Sea-fastenings on equipment should be
of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum loading likely to be imposed.
Transport quality chain and ratchet type boomers are the preferred way of securing
equipment and tubulars. Particular care should be taken to properly secure items in
the vicinity of tank vents or any pipework penetrating through the main deck. Drums
should preferably be secured in purpose built racks. Heavy items should be secured
as far as possible between the cantilever beams.
5.5 SAFETY EQUIPMENT
All safety equipment to be inspected prior to commencing Installation move

operations. Any special instructions pertaining to lifeboat and life raft use while the
unit is afloat should be discussed with ALL Persons on board.
5.6 GENERAL OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS
General operational instructions while afloat are addressed in each Installation’s

Marine Operations Manual. Compartment and watertight integrity compliance as
described in each unit's Marine Operations Manual should be strictly adhered to.
5.7 JACKING SYSTEMS
The OIM and Barge Captain should ensure the jacking system, leg rack teeth and
leg guides are properly attended and appropriately greased during all jacking
operations. Although greasing main bearings prior to jacking is a common practice,
main bearing greasing is better achieved with the system in operation and with the
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
use of designated high pressure grease units at each leg. Manufacturer’s

recommendations for operation of the elevating system should be followed.
5.8 CONNECTING OF ATTENDING MARINE SUPPORT VESSELS
5.8.1 SUMMARY
This Appendix provides guidance on how towline connections with attending tugs
should be handled to provide the safe conditions during this process.
5.8.2 BOW MAIN TOW BRIDLE
All self elevating drilling units should be fitted with a chain bridle connected to Smit
brackets on the bow area, the chain sections are connected to a suitably sized
triangular plate.
A pendant type fore runner wire of sufficient length (100 - 150 feet) is connected to
the triangular plate and the connecting end to an air winch wire for deployment and
recovery. The air winch wire should be connected at least 20 feet back from the
connecting end in order to allow tug deck crews to be able to secure the connecting
end in tug's shark jaws or other available deck securing devices and provide
sufficient slack to make the connection to the tug's main tow wire. The pendant wire
should be at least 60mm diameter.
5.8.3 PORT & STARBOARD QUARTERS OR STERN WIRES
All self elevating drilling units should be fitted with Smit bracket on the stern or
quarter connecting points and fitted on the hull edge with a closed Panama type
fairlead. A chafing chain should be provided from the Smit bracket clear through the
fairlead, connected to suitable sized (2 to 3 inch) pendant wires 100 to 150 feet in
length with either hard eye thimbles mechanically spliced or closed spelter type
sockets. Soft eye pendant wires connected to bollards or bits are not good marine
practice as they can not be readily released in case of tug failure.
The towing pendant wires are to be suspended outside the Installation hull with the
use of the cranes and secured against the outer hull handrails, coiling wire on the
main deck is a dangerous and unacceptable practice.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
5.8.4 Towing Wire Handling Practices
The port or starboard side pendant wire should be passed to an attending tug with
the crane. The practice of pulling in a pendant wire from a tug or slipping a pendant
from the unit's main deck should not be permitted.
A pick up sling of new manila rope of 25mm diameter or greater, with a spliced eye
termination and maximum 10 feet in length should be connected 10 to 15 feet from
the pendant end. This arrangement allows tug deck crews to be able to secure the
connecting end and provide sufficient slack to make the connection to the tug's main
tow wire. The handling sling also provides a weak link in case a tug runaway
situation occurs, which could cause serious damage to a crane.
The pick-up sling should be connected to a hook and short steel sling, (20 - 30 feet)
which in turn is connected to the crane block. To provide for quick release, shackles
should not be used between the short steel sling and pick-up sling.
Where the Smit bracket and fairlead are not within crane reach, a handling tugger
winch should be located inboard of the Smit bracket. The wire from the tugger is to
be passed through the bracket and fairlead, and outboard to connect to the pennant
wire at a point within reach of the crane. The tugger is then used to draw the
inboard end of the pennant into the Smit bracket for connection.
6 PULLING LEGS ON PLATFORM LOCATIONS
These guidelines are directed to the OIM and Barge Supervisor to minimize potential
for contact between the Installation’s hull and the adjacent platform during leg pulling
operations.
The guidelines start with the unit at 5 - 7 feet draft for the watertight integrity check.
• Once the watertight integrity check has been completed, lower the hull to
approximately 3 feet over the calculated floating draft, and observe the draft /
level indicators for approximately 15 minutes.
• If the legs do not begin to free themselves connect the jetting system to the
stern legs and commence jetting. A designated key person should remain at
the stern of the unit and observe movement / clearance between the stern of
the unit and the platform.
• If one of the stern legs begins to lose draft while the other does not, continue
to jet and pull the opposite leg to keep the unit as level as possible. If the rate
of draft loss increases, stop jetting and pull hull back down to an even keel. If
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
the hull draft holds at 2 feet or less over calculated draft and not at 3 feet over
calculated, leave that leg alone until the other stern leg reaches the same
point.
• If the hull draft remains at approximately 3 feet over calculated draft it may be
necessary to start jetting again. A stern leg should not be raised more than
20 percent of the total penetration depth without the other stern leg being
free. Once both stern legs appear to be losing hull draft bring them to a level
where they no longer lose draft. This would entail raising the hull stern to
decrease buoyancy pull on the stern legs, stop jetting on stern legs.
• Commence jetting on the bow leg. Pull down the hull on the bow. This will
move the stern of the Installation away from the platform. Once the bow leg
is pulling free, allow the bow to lose draft to a point where all leg penetrations
are more or less even. Ensure the Installation’s stern / platform distance is
constantly monitored and reported.
• If all legs lose draft at similar rates the unit should remain clear of the
platform.
• Once all the legs are free, bring them to a level that provides sufficient
stiffness to the unit to avoid excessive movement or wallowing in the spud-
can holes. At this time the aft assist vessels are connected and positioned
until the proper conditions exist to move off the location.
• Usually at slack tide, continue raising the legs until movement of the unit is
observed. The power settings and headings of the attending vessels are
adjusted to ensure a straight pull away from the platform. While still in the
immediate vicinity of the platform, the legs should continue to be raised
without interruption until at least 10ft clear of the seabed to avoid potential
contact with pipelines. Thereafter continue raising the legs to the desired
towing position and continue with moving/towing operations.
These guidelines will vary for each location and are very much dependant on leg
penetrations, soil consistency and internal resistance and distance between
Installation hull and platform.
Successful leg pulling is achieved by taking the necessary precautions, necessary

time and letting the jetting system do the majority of the work. This together with
limiting the amount of over pull, should allow less rapid and less forceful movements
of the hull as the legs become free, reducing the possibility of contact between unit
and platform in tight fit situations.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
7 PROCEDURES UNDER TOW
All operating criteria and guidelines for stability and watertight integrity contained in
the Installation’s marine operating manual should be complied with.
7.1 WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY
Once all pre-move preparations have been carried out and the Installation is
deemed "fit for tow", a complete watertight integrity check should be made with the
unit at approximately 5 feet hull draft. All tanks and lower deck spaces, especially
those containing through hull fittings should be inspected by the Barge Supervisor
and witnessed by either the Warranty Surveyor or the Company Installation-mover (if
present).
7.2 HULL DRAFT, TRIM, LIST
Once the Installation is afloat and prior to commencing towing operation the hull
draft on forward port and starboard and stern port and starboard should be obtained
and checked for consistency with the calculated afloat loading condition. Any
significant discrepancies should be immediately investigated and corrected if
required. Discrepancies that cannot be resolved should be advised to HQS
Engineering for guidance.
7.3 UNDER TOW MONITORING REQUIREMENTS
During the tow, conditions should be monitored on a regular basis and recorded in
the move report and / or the Installation’s official logbook as appropriate. The
following items should be included:
• Status of all closures required to be secured (every 2 hours)
• Draft readings (every 2 hours)
• Tank soundings (every 2 hours)
• Sea-fastening of all deck cargo and equipment below decks
• Status of towing equipment (main, secondary, emergency and recovery
system)
• Installation motions (compared with allowable motion parameters)
• Position report (obtained from lead tug - generally every 4 hours)
• Personnel below decks should be kept to a minimum
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
• In case of adverse weather situations roving deck parties should work in pairs
and in constant radio contact with the control room
8 WEATHER FORECASTING
Good quality weather forecasting is essential for safe towing operations. The
weather forecast services for each move should be obtained from a recognized and
reliable weather forecasting service such as Fugro, Noble Denton weather services,
Oceanroutes or Wilkins Weather. Direct communication with at least one forecaster
should be possible at all times.
8.1 WEATHER SERVICES
Weather forecasting services should be contracted to provide the following:

• Both site and route specific forecast
• Transmissions direct to the Installation twice each 24 hours
• Each forecast to provide real time, 24, 48 and 72 hour forecast outlook
• Immediate updates provided in the event of significant change in the forecast
• Receipt of the first forecast to be received 24 hours in advance of move
commencement
8.2 WEATHER FORECAST DATA
Weather forecast data should at a minimum contain the following information.

Information for wind, wave and swell components should contain the combined sea.
• Synopsis of weather system
• Wind speed and direction
• Wave height, period and direction
• Swell height, period and direction
• Current speed and direction
• Special remarks, thunder storms, rain, fog etc.
• Confidence level of the forecast (high, medium, low)
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
9 JACKING OPERATION PLANNING
Preparation and testing of the Installation’s jacking system should be conducted in

accordance to the unit's marine operations manual and jacking system
manufacturer’s recommendations.
Just prior to jacking operations, a meeting with all personnel involved should be
conducted to review jacking procedures and safety precautions associated with
jacking the unit. In this meeting the OIM and Barge Supervisor should clarify
individual’s responsibilities and tasks to be performed.
Each leg supervisor should have direct communications with the jacking panel
operator and be responsible for directing lubrication operations, notification of any
abnormalities and noting draft and leg position readings as requested.
10 LOCATION APPROACH AND FINAL POSITIONING
10.1 PLANNING
At the pre-move meeting held prior to commencement of Installation move

operations specific details regarding the Installation’s location arrival and approach
should be determined. Dependent upon an open or platform location the following
topics should be reviewed:
• Safe distance from field Installations
• Pipeline identification and marking requirements
• Weather criteria
• Approach plan including intended Installation heading at open locations
• Initial leg pinning
• Reposition of Installation to a standoff location
• Adjustments to raw water tower position as required
• Attending vessel disconnect and reconnect procedures when anchors are run
• Anchor deployment procedures (where required)
• Anchor pattern (where required)
• Bottom disturbance due to previous units on location, including sliding
problems
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
• Measurement techniques and acceptance criteria and tolerance for final unit
position
• Divers and / or R.O.V. requirements
10.2 MARINE SUPPORT / TOWING VESSELS
The marine support / towing vessels availability for each individual Installation and
area of operation should be reviewed prior to the start of each move. As a general
guide, units can be positioned on open locations with the use of two (2) attending
vessels. For platform locations, approach and final positioning will generally require
three (3) attending vessels. Where it is anticipated that strong currents will act on
the legs as they are lowered (generally in water depths greater than 55m) towing
vessels of higher capacity than normal may be required to maintain full control of the
Installation.
10.3 OBSTRUCTION CLEARANCE
When crossing pipelines or other subsea structures, an overall clearance of 30 feet

or half the available water depth (whichever is less) should be maintained below the
spud-cans. Leg lowering should not commence until a horizontal clearance of 50m
(where possible) has been obtained from any obstruction.
Pipelines in close proximity to the Installation should be marked with buoys clearly
identifying the distance and direction. Where spud-can / pipeline clearance is less
than 10m, adequate separations should be verified and confirmed by divers or
R.O.V. prior to lowering the leg.
10.4 TIDES
The magnitude and direction of tidal flow should be assessed for potential effects on
final positioning onto a platform. The final approach of the Installation to the Platform
should be scheduled to coincide with either slack tide or tidal flow running away from
the platform.
10.5 MOTIONS
Installation motions can have a major role in final positioning onto a platform.
Motions should never exceed the allowable motions described in each unit's marine
operations manual. In cases where close proximity between the Installation and
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Platform exist more onerous motion limits might be required to reduce the risk of
collision.
NOTE: To mitigate the risk of collision between an Installation and Platform

final positioning should not commence until tidal and motion limiting criteria
is understood and agreed by all responsible parties.
10.6 ANCHORS
When anchors are deployed, an exclusion zone of 100 meters from pipelines or
power cables should be maintained as far as practical. In cases where anchors
need to be placed within this exclusion zone, the position of the obstruction and the
proposed anchor drop position in relation to the obstruction should be positively
identified and confirmed by the field operator. Pre-installed anchors are preferred to
deploying the Installation anchors in such circumstances. Where pipeline or cable
positions cannot be confirmed it may be preferable to avoid the use of anchors in the
vicinity of obstructions and rely on towing vessels only.
As a general rule, anchors that are deployed crossing pipelines should be secured
on the anchor handling vessel's deck during crossing. The anchor tail chain or wire
should be suitably secured typically in a shark jaw type arrangement or suitable
sized pelican hook.
10.7 FINAL POSITIONING
On an Open Location, once the Installation is pinned in the final position, position
acceptance should be obtained from the on-board Company representative.
On a Platform Location, after the unit is pinned in the final position measurements
should be taken to confirm that the drilling package can reach the scheduled well
slots in longitudinal and transverse directions. This process should be repeated
after the unit is elevated to minimum air-gap and as penetration occurs during pre-
loading. Position acceptance should be obtained from the on-board Company
representative prior to the commencement of pre-loading.
On a Platform Location, during elevating operations and during the initial stages of
leg penetration, the relative position and distance between unit and platform should
be monitored to ensure that position tolerances are maintained.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
11 PRE-LOADING
11.1 GENERAL
Initial leg penetrations will depend on the soil conditions. The person in charge of
jacking should be vigilant and ensure that the unit remains level within the criteria
stated in the Installations Marine Operations Manual in all directions (typically 0.2
degrees).
11.2 BORE HOLE OPERATIONS
Depending upon the results of the site assessment, it may be necessary to conduct
coring operations to determine soil conditions or pilot hole drilling operations for
shallow gas where the seismic indicates a potential gas risk in the open hole section.
These operations would occur prior to pre-loading. In such cases the unit should
remain at draft or minimum air-gap subject to suitable weather conditions. Detailed
procedures for these activities are prepared on a case by case basis, which should
specify the appropriate weather limitations.
11.3 PRE-LOAD OPERATIONS
Pre-loading should be performed immediately following the move onto a new

location or after completion of coring / pilot hole drilling operation. This operation
replicates as nearly as possible the maximum on-bottom loading condition that may
occur during storm conditions. Each Installation should be pre-loaded either in
accordance with the Installation’s Marine Operations Manual requirements or as
directed by site specific data generated or approved by Houston Engineering.
Pre-load operations are strictly conducted at minimum air-gaps with an absolute

maximum allowable air-gap of 5 feet above the wave crest. Due regard should be
extended in calculating the tidal rise or fall. In cases where large tidal ranges exist it
may be necessary to develop special pre-loading procedures.
The towing vessels should remain connected until pre-loading operations are
completed in case rapid settlement or punch through should occur.
During pre-loading operations all required afloat closures are to remain secured. All
crane booms are to be racked and secured. No crane movements are allowed.
Helicopter operations should be suspended during pre-load operations. If a landing

is required in an emergency, pre-loading operations should be suspended and 5
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
percent of pre-load dumped to compensate for the helicopter landing and take-off
weight. Helicopter landings are not permitted during pre-load holding periods.
11.4 PRE-LOADING PROCEDURES & MINIMUM HOLDING TIMES
The pre-loading procedure and holding period are dictated by the actual soil
conditions encountered on each location. Typically pre-load holding time of 6 hours
is recommended, during which time the unit is not to settle. Individual site conditions
may require increased times or justify reduced times from the 6 hour typical value.
In deep soft clay soils where consolidation occurs, a rate of creep not exceeding 0.1
degree per hour in the second half of the pre-load holding period is generally
acceptable. HOWEVER, this rate of creep is not applicable when soil of significantly
weaker strength is present below the final level reached by the spud can. Requests
by Installation Management for reduced pre-load holding time should be considered
by Engineering on a case by case basis. Granting of such requests is dependent
upon evaluation of geo-technical, environmental parameters and field operating
experience. Supporting data should accompany the request.
Upon completion of pre-loading operations, the final leg penetrations are to be

recorded and compared with site assessment predictions. Any anomalies are to be
reviewed and recorded. In cases of doubt or concern, the Business Unit / Division
Manager is to be consulted.
12 CONTINGENCY & EMERGENCY PLANS
12.1 CONTINGENCY PLANS
Contingency plans should be presented and agreed upon at the pre-move meeting.
Contingency & emergency plans should be prepared at a minimum for the following
potential hazard scenarios:
• Excessive weather conditions.
• Towline breakage or failure of towing fitting.
• Attending tug(s) propulsion or equipment failure.
• Navigation or positioning equipment failure.
• Water ingress on board the unit.
• Failure or deficiency of raw water/cooling water supply.
• Unit's loss of main power.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
• Uncontrolled settlement / Punch through.

• Jacking system failure (electrical or mechanical).
• Shallow gas (where pilot hole drilling undertaken).
Contingency plans should address:

• Secondary or emergency towing arrangements that are readily deployed and
recovered by the attending vessels.
• Suitable alternate jacking locations or areas of refuge should be determined.
• Procedures to release attending vessel in case of propulsion or equipment
failures.
• Available salvage equipment on the Installation, alternative means of
pumping out compartments, available means to patch openings to the
environment.
• Available and alternate means to partially or fully evacuate personnel.
• Available and alternate means of escape or rescue (as required).
• Availability of helicopter and refueling facilities for emergency assistance or
medivac.
13 SCOUR
13.1 GENERAL
Scour can occur in areas of sandy soils subject to currents in excess of 2 knots. In
many cases high currents occur during spring tides and during storms. The risk of
scour is particularly high when spud can penetration into the seabed is less than the
depth of the maximum bearing area of the spud can.
Scour prevention methods (sandbagging or prelaid gravel bases) are to be provided

at locations where major scouring of surface sands could cause the Installation to
settle catastrophically into underlying softer soil that is unable to adequately support
the Installation.
If the Installation is supported on a foundation where scouring or erosion should not

adversely affect the foundation integrity, the Installation may be re-leveled should
minor settlement attributable to scouring occur.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
13.2 INSPECTION
If the final spud-can penetration is less than the spud-can height at full spud-can
diameter there is potential of scouring. This is especially true in soils with coral /
boulder outcrops. In such conditions an initial inspection of all spud-cans should be
made by means of divers or R.O.V. within one week of the unit's arrival. Checks
should thereafter be conducted at intervals not exceeding one month. Reports of
scour inspections should be submitted to Rig Manager and Business Unit
management for review.
Spud cans with penetrations of 4m or less into sandy soils in general should be
inspected for scour following severe storms with wind speeds of 50knots or sea
states of 7.5m or more.
14 MINIMUM TUG RECOMMENDATIONS
14.1 TUG BOLLARD PULL
Figures 3.2.3.8 and 3.2.3.9 provide field move towing recommendations per
geographical area for the number and size of tug boats. These values are typical
based upon past accepted practices.
14.2 TUG INSPECTION
Figure 3.2.310 provides a Minimum Tug Inspection format recommended for all
anchor handling tugs or anchor handling tug supply vessels presented to the
Company self-elevating drilling Installations for an in-field location move. All
presented vessels should be inspected prior to commencing move operations by the
Barge Supervisor and/or attending Rig Mover and witnessed by a marine warranty
surveyor (if in attendance). As a general guideline any presented vessel that can
not produce valid flag state and or classification society certification should be un-
conditionally rejected.
As a general policy only vessels with a minimum of two independent propulsion units
are acceptable for towing any Company self elevating drilling unit.
Any vessel presented for a single vessel tow should possess a spare tow wire
capable of rapid deployment. Actual as opposed to original tow wire lengths should
be ascertained.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
14.3 ITEMS TO BE INSPECTED
During inspection of older vessels and / or vessels in apparent dubious condition,

particular attention should be paid to the condition of towing winch, towing wire,
towing wire certification, bollard pull certification, visual condition of main engines
and general engine room condition. Thruster performance and functionality of
navigation and steering gear is to be checked.
Maximum continuous engine revolutions should be verified, and in tropical areas

verification of the operating efficiency of the engine cooling system under maximum
load should be made.
Specifically in benign areas around the tropical latitudes, an older fleet of vessels
exists, whose owners and operators will typically present the technical specification
of such vessels as in new condition and in particular quote the original brake horse
power BHP and bollard pull BP rating. These doubts can be diminished if recent
authentic bollard pull test certificates are available. Where this is not the case, a
general guideline is that a vessel built 15-20 years ago as a 4000 bhp/45 ton BP
would today realistically produce 75 percent of those ratings if properly maintained.
Inspectors are advised to calculate total available bollard pull from such vessels on
the basis of 75 percent efficiency of new listed specifications.
Inspectors are to place close attention to the general appearance of a presented

vessel. An older vessel well organized and maintained and with an apparent trained
and responsible crew should perform better than a new vessel apparently poorly
maintained and cared for.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.8, Self Elevating Drilling Units

Recommended Minimum Marine Vessel Requirements
Field Moves, Asia Operations
TYPE OF LOCATION OPERATING AREA BOLLARD PULL # OF VESSELS

Open Location with no obstructions Indian Region 120 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or Indian Region 150 ton continuous 2 vessels of 75 ton
platform locations combined
Open Location with obstructions or Indian Region 150 ton continuous 3 vessels of 50 ton
Open Location with no obstructions Vietnam, Malaysia 120 ton continuous 1
(Monsoon) Thailand
South China Sea
Open Location with obstructions or Vietnam, Malaysia 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
platform locations (Monsoon) Thailand combined
South China Sea
Open Location with obstructions or Vietnam, Malaysia 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
platform locations (Monsoon) Thailand combined
South China Sea
Open Location with no obstructions Indonesia 100 ton continuous 1
Brunei
Open Location with obstructions or Indonesia 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
platform locations Brunei combined
Open Location with obstructions or Indonesia 135 ton continuous 3 vessels of 45 ton
platform locations Brunei combined
Open Location with no obstructions Australia 120 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or Australia 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
Open Location with obstructions or Australia 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
Open Location with no obstructions Philippines 120 ton continuous 1
China, Korea
Open Location with obstructions or Philippines 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
platform locations China, Korea combined
Open Location with obstructions or Philippines 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
platform locations China, Korea combined
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.9, Self Elevating Drilling Units

Field Moves, World Wide Operations
Departure, In Field Tow and Positioning

Open Location with no obstructions West Africa 100 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or West Africa 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
Open Location with obstructions or West Africa 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
Open Location with no obstructions Mediterranean 120 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or Mediterranean 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
Open Location with obstructions or Mediterranean 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
Open Location with no obstructions Caspian Sea 120 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or Caspian Sea 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
Open Location with obstructions or Caspian Sea 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
Open Location with no obstructions Gulf of Suez 100 ton continuous 1
Red Sea
Open Location with obstructions or Gulf of Suez 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
platform locations Red Sea combined
Open Location with obstructions or Gulf of Suez 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
platform locations Red Sea combined
Open Location with no obstructions Arabian Gulf 100 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or Arabian Gulf 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
Open Location with obstructions or Arabian Gulf 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.9, Self Elevating Drilling Units (continued)

For Field Moves, World Wide Operations
Departure, In Field Tow and Positioning

Open Location with no obstructions Brazil 120 ton continuous 1
Argentina
Peru
Open Location with obstructions or Brazil 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
platform locations Argentina combined
Peru
Open Location with obstructions or Brazil 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
platform locations Argentina combined
Peru
Open Location with no obstructions Gulf of Mexico 100 ton continuous 1
Venezuela
Caribbean
Open Location with obstructions or Gulf of Mexico 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
platform locations Venezuela combined
Caribbean
Open Location with obstructions or Gulf of Mexico 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
platform locations Venezuela combined
Caribbean
Open Location with no obstructions Eastern Canada 160 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or Eastern Canada 200 ton continuous 2 vessels of 100 ton
Open Location with obstructions or Eastern Canada 240 ton continuous 3 vessels of 80 ton
Open Location with no obstructions North Sea 160 ton continuous 1
Open Location with obstructions or North Sea 200 ton continuous 2 vessels of 100 ton
Open Location with obstructions or North Sea 240 ton continuous 3 vessels of 80 ton
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.10-Minimum Tug Inspection Checklist
Vessel Name
Registered Owners
Vessel Type Tug / Anchor Handling Tug / Anchor Handling Tug Supply
Flag
Port of Registry
Classification ABS / Lloyds / BV / GL / DNV / Rina / Other -
Class Notations
Year Build
Builder
Length/Beam/Depth/Draft
Gross tonnage
Net tonnage
Main Engines No: Make: Type: BHP: BP:
Propulsion No: Make: Type: fixed/cpp Nozzles: yes / no
Rudders No: Make: Type: fixed / independent
Generators No: Make: KW:
Bow Thrusters No: Make: BHP: Thrust:
Stern Thrusters No: Make: BHP: Thrust:
Towing Make: Model: Hydraulic / Diesel

Winch Max Pull: Max Brake: No of Drums:
Drum 1 Capacity: Drum 2 Capacity: Drum 3 Capacity:
Main Tow Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Wire Break Strength: Cert. No:
Spare Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Tow Break Strength: Cert. No:
Wire
Work Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Wire Break Strength: Cert. No:
Pendant Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Wire No Available: Break Strength: Cert. No:
Shackles Type Amount: Type Amount: Type Amount:
SWL SWL SWL
Certified: yes / no Certified: yes / no Certified: yes / no
Cert. No: Cert. No: Cert. No:
Shark Type: Max. Load: Ton Tow Pins: yes / no
Jaws No: single / double set Type:
No: single / double set
Pendant Storage No: Capacity: #1 #2 #3 #4
Reels
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.3.10-Minimum Tug Inspection Checklist (continued)
Certificate Name Number Date Issued Expiry Date Endorsement Date

Certificate of Nationality or
Registry (flag state) **
Minimum Safe Manning
Certificate (flag state)
Radio License
(flag state) **
Certificate of Class
Hull & Machinery **
International Load Line
Certificate **
Tonnage Certificate
(this cert. has no expiry date)
Cargo Ship Safety
Construction Certificate
Cargo Ship Safety
Equipment Certificate
Cargo Ship Safety
Radio Certificate
International Oil Pollution **
Prevention Certificate I.O.P.P.
Bollard Pull Certificate Issued Date of Test Maximum Continuous
By:
Installation Name : _____________ Location Move Number: ____ Area of Operation:

_______________
Inspection Carried Out By:__________________________
Position : O.I.M. / Barge Supervisor / Company Installation Mover
Date & Place: ____ / _________ / 2004 / ______________
NOTE: Any vessel presented for inspection that does not have the above mandatory
certificates present (marked as **) or in valid dates must be rejected for towing and
or anchor handling operations. Vessels without bollard pull certificates or with
certificates older than 5 years must be down rated to 75% of the vessel’s original
specifications or old bollard pull test results.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
Location Approval - Self-Elevating Installation Rig Mover Certification
1 SELF-ELEVATING INSTALLATION MOVER CERTIFICATION
The Company’s goal is the assigned Installation Barge Supervisors or OIM’s

become suitably trained and recognized by Underwriter’s warranty surveyor as
qualified to move Self-Elevating Installations.
2 DEFINITIONS
• CERTIFYING AUTHORITY
Transocean employees that have completed the required training and satisfactorily
demonstrated to Business Unit management their competency to relocate self
elevating installations from and to platform and open locations will be recognized in
writing by the Business Unit Manager.
In addition, the Senior Barge Supervisor or OIM that is responsible for relocating and
jacking the self elevating installation must be approved by Underwriter’s warranty
surveyor.
• SENIOR BARGE SUPERVISOR
A Transocean Barge Supervisor will be promoted to Senior Barge Supervisor upon

recognition by the Business Unit and approval by Underwriter’s warranty surveyors
as competent to move self elevating installations.
In some cases, the Business Unit and/or Underwriter’s warranty surveyors may limit
a Senior Barge Supervisor’s or OIM’s approval to move a self elevating installation
to:
• a particular Installation
• a particular class of Installations
• “Open Locations Only” if experience and witnessed rig moves does not
support Open and Platform Location Certification.
• a specific Geographic Region of operation
3 QUALIFICATION
The safety of Company personnel and equipment are dependent upon the decisions
of Senior Barge Supervisors and OIMs that move self elevating installations. A
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
Location Approval - Self-Elevating Installation Rig Mover Certification
written recommendation from the Rig Manager followed by an interview by the

Business Unit Operations Manager and Business Unit Marine Superintendent (if
assigned) is recommended.
3.1 REQUIRED TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE
To become a “Senior Barge Supervisor”, the candidate should be able to

demonstrate a minimum level of training and experience as indicated below:
• Minimum 5 years working experience as Barge Supervisor or equivalent
acceptable to Business Unit Management.
• Transocean approved advanced stability course.
• Self Elevating Rig Movers simulation course.
• A candidate’s practical on board training should be assessed periodically by a
Senior Barge Supervisor, Warranty Surveyor or Business Unit Marine
Superintendent to evaluate and report on performance and recommend when
a candidate is ready to be certified.
• In full command, conduct 1 Self-elevating Installation move on open location
witnessed by a Senior Barge Supervisor, Warranty Surveyor or Business Unit
Marine Superintendent .
• In full command, conduct 1 Self-elevating Installation move onto a platform
location witnessed by a Senior Barge Supervisor, Warranty Surveyor or
Business Unit Marine Superintendent.
• In full command, conduct 1 Self-elevating Installation move for certification by
Underwriters Certifying Warranty Surveyor.
Barge Supervisors should maintain a suitable log book to record the rig moving
experience obtained. This log should include the level of responsibility exercised,
attending rig mover supervisors and subordinates in training involved during the move
and any specific features of the move.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
Anchor Handling Vessels
1 MINIMUM ANCHOR HANDLING VESSEL GUIDELINES
This subsection is intended to provide summary guidance for evaluation of the

deployment and retrieval of the Installation’s mooring system using anchor-handling
tugs with emphasis on Company minimum recommendations for safety, operations
and equipment.
This subsection is applicable to all Company floating moored Installations including

semi-submersibles, moored drill ships and tender-assist Installations conducting
operations in isolation or in the vicinity of other Installations, structures or platforms.
It is important to note that the Installation-specific requirements for anchor-handling

tugs (AHVs) will vary depending on the mooring system that is to be deployed and
retrieved, the location, water depth, and Installation equipment characteristics.
However, the following is intended to provide some initial guidance and outline the
differences in AHV requirements effected by increasing water depth.
2 DEEP TO ULTRA-DEEP CATENARY, CHAIN-WIRE, MOORING SYSTEMS
For the purpose of this subsection, ultra-deep refers to water depths in excess of
3,000 ft. where catenary moorings are deployed. Forces seen by the AHV are
produced by the weight of the system and the requirement to “stretch” the line to get
the anchor out to its target distance.
• The following list is meant to provide guidance when choosing vessels for this
application and is not intended to preclude Installation-specific requirements:,
Bollard pull certified at 350 kips.
• Stern and bow thrusters of sufficient aggregate horsepower to maintain
station while running anchors in 25 knot beam wind and associated sea
conditions.
• Anchor / towing winches with the following certified ratings:
− Dynamic inhaul and braking capacity on first layer of 775 kip.
− Static holding capacity of 990 kip.
• Total combined winch capacity for 7,200 ft. x 3 in. active work wire without
spooling from a storage winch.
• Inner drum diameter approximately 54 in. or sized with drum diameter to wire
diameter ratio (D:d) of 18:1. Minimum work wire diameter is 3 in.
• Level wind devices.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
• Chain handling wildcat with whelps sized for Installation chain.

• Chain locker(s) and/or aft deck space capable of stowing 5000 ft. of
Installation chain.
• Stern roller rated to 1,100 kips.
• Triplex Jaws, Karm Forks or similar hydraulic stopper, two (2), hydraulic,
rated to 990 – 1,100 kips and sized for Installation chain
• Hydraulic pop-up 'guide' deck pins and capstans.
• Hydraulic deck tuggers rated to 45 kips +.
3 MEDIUM TO DEEP CATENARY, WIRE-CHAIN MOORING SYSTEMS
For the purpose of this subsection, medium-to-deep refers to water depths from
1,500 to 3,000 ft. Forces seen by the AHV are produced by the weight of the system
and the requirement to “stretch” the line to get the anchor out to its target distance.
Additionally, bottom-dragging issues may manifest depending on the mooring
system particulars when deployed at the shallower end of this depth range.
• Bollard pull certified at 250 kips.
conditions.
− Dynamic inhaul and braking capacity on first layer of 500 kips.
− Static holding capacity of 600 kips.
• Total combined winch capacity for 4,500 ft. x 2-1/2 in. active work wire without
• Inner drum diameter approximately 45 in.or sized with drum diameter to wire
diameter ratio (D:d) of 18:1. Minimum work wire diameter is 2-1/2 in.
• Chain locker(s) or aft deck space capable of stowing 3,500 ft. of Installation
chain.
• Stern roller rated at 600 kips.
• Shark jaws, two (2), hydraulic, sized for Installation chain, and rated at 550 -
600 kips.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS

• Hydraulic deck tuggers rated to 45 kip.
4 SHALLOW TO MEDIUM CATENARY, ALL CHAIN MOORING SYSTEMS
This depth category is defined as water depths from 100 to 1,500 ft. Forces seen by
the AHV are produced by the requirement to keep from dragging the mooring line
across the bottom. As the chain is dragged, it slows the AHV down and may prevent
it from getting the anchor to its target distance. Additionally, if there are any
pipelines, bundles, umbilicals, etc. in the vicinity, careful attention should be paid as
chain cannot be dragged across the bottom with the potential for causing damage.
• Bollard pull certified at 200 kips.
conditions.
− Dynamic inhaul and braking capacity on first layer of 350 kips.
− Static holding capacity of 500 kips.
• Total combined winch capacity for 2,500 ft. x 2-1/4 in. active work wire without
• Inner drum diameter approximately 41 in. or sized with drum diameter to wire
diameter ratio (D:d) of 18:1. Minimum work wire diameter is 2-1/4 in.
• Chain locker(s) or aft deck space capable of stowing 2500 ft. of Installation
chain.
• Stern roller rated at 500 kips.
• Shark jaws, Triplex Jaws, Karm Forks or similar hydraulic stopper, two (2),
hydraulic, sized for Installation chain, and rated at 450 - 500 kips.
• Hydraulic deck tuggers rated to 45 kip.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
5 ANCHOR-HANDLING VESSEL EQUIPMENT
Equipment will vary depending on the location, water depth and mooring system
deployed and retrieved. However, the following should be considered as a
minimum:
• Work wires should be fitted with "Pee Wee" or "Goldnose" type closed spelter
sockets. Length and diameter should be as noted above for each water
depth category. A continuous, single length work wire is preferred.
• 3 in. or 3-3/8 in. detachable chain connecting links of the "C", Kenter or
Ramfor type.
• Minimum of two (2) cross over chains, 3 in. diameter, eight (8) links long and
two (2) x 3 in. eye to eye "on load" type swivels that rotate under load. These
are used for chain / wire cross over connections.
• One full set of spare wires and connectors as above.
• One (1) ultra wide radius 'J' hook, suitable for chasing and recovering
mooring chain or wire.
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
24 HOUR OPERATIONAL MANNING
1 POLICY
Primary control stations for operations in progress must be manned at all

times.

Subsection 2.4.
2 PURPOSE
To effectively monitor, respond to and communicate changes of status that affect the
Installation’s safety and performance.
3 SCOPE
4 PROCEDURE
Installations must designate primary control stations required to be manned at all

times by competent qualified personnel for operations in progress. Once
established, the manning levels of primary control stations must be communicated to
applicable personnel and it is recommended this notice be posted at each
designated primary control station.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER OR DIVISION MANAGER (I)

ensuring Business Unit or Division uniformity of Installation marine operations.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (I)
conducted in accordance with this Policy and Procedure.
5.3 OIM (D)
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
24 HOUR OPERATIONAL MANNING
6 REFERENCES
No references are associated with this Policy.
RISER OPERATIONS
PROCEDURES
Riser Operations
1 POLICY
Each floating Installation must operate its drilling riser system within design
limits.

Subsection 2.5.
2 PURPOSE
To ensure drilling riser is operated within the riser design criteria, Installation specific
equipment capabilities and defined limits of variables such as mud weight, tension,
installation motions, and environmental forces.
3 SCOPE
This Procedure is applicable to all Installations with marine riser systems.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 To ensure marine riser systems are operated in accordance with Company
policy each Installation must:
• Prepare a riser analysis and drilling riser space out for each well that
meets Company and API RP 16Q minimum standards that defines
operating riser tensions and limiting mud weights considering the site-
specific environment. In consultation with Engineering, the Business
Unit Field Support Manager may waive site specific riser analysis for
similar locations where riser analysis has been previously conducted.
Detailed procedures and supplemental information regarding riser
analysis and space out are located in the Appendices to this section.
• From riser analysis define and communicate site specific watch circles
and point of riser disconnect.
• Prepare a riser running and retrieval plan that includes:
− limiting Installation motions and environment for safe operations
− the procedure to safely disconnect the riser from the wellhead
− the maximum allowable hang off length (if any)
− the method of riser hang off
− the required duration of riser running and retrieval
RISER OPERATIONS
PROCEDURES
Riser Operations
− the forecasted weather during riser running and retrieval

Detailed requirements and recommended practices regarding riser analysis
and space out are located in the Appendices to this section.
4.2 Each BOP must have a specified bending moment limitation based on the
well head connector in use for a given well. The equipment manual should be
consulted for the limiting loads for various tension and internal pressures.
4.3 BOP equipment must not be run on wellheads where the wellhead angle is
greater than 1.0 degree to avoid key seating damage unless (1) approval is
obtained from the Business Unit Manager or his designee and (2) the client
accepts responsibility, in writing, for any and all damage that might occur
(including repair and / or replacement of the damaged equipment and full
compensation during any resulting idle period.
Detailed requirements and recommended practices for operations with riser
and wellhead angle are located in the Appendices to this section.
4.4 During the well planning period, DP Installations must evaluate torque
transmitted from the riser system into the wellhead caused by heading
changes. Allowable torque limit must not be exceeded during a heading
change.
Detailed requirements and recommended practices regarding wellhead
torque are located in the Appendices to this section.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
The Business Unit Operations Manager is responsible for ensuring Business Unit
uniformity of Installation riser operations.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (I)
The Rig Manager is responsible for ensuring Installation operations are conducted in
accordance with this Policy and Procedure. The Rig Manager is responsible for
preplanning of riser analysis, WSOG and riser running and retrieval.
5.3 OIM (D
RISER OPERATIONS
PROCEDURES
Riser Operations
6 REFERENCES
Procedure, Riser Space out
Procedure, Riser Running and Retrieval
Procedure, Riser Connected Mode Operation
Procedure, Tensioner Ring Operations
Recommended Practice, Riser Storm Hangoff
Recommended Practice, Wellhead Design Considerations
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Riser Operations - Riser Spaceout
1 RISER SPACEOUT
A riser spaceout is designed for each well must take into account the following
criteria:
• Water depth
• Site-specific environmental conditions (wind, wave and currents)
• Connected performance including maximum required mud weight for well
• Riser collapse
• Riser running hook load limits and sea states
• Survival hang off requirements
The spaceout can be obtained from on-board spaceout records (subject to prior
approval from engineering) or by requesting a riser spaceout from Engineering for
the specific conditions through the REA process.
Tension settings for various mud weights must be calculated according to API
RP16Q requirements and, where necessary riser recoil requirements. The tension
setting must take into account, as a minimum, the following:
• Loss of a tensioner unit pair (or single if system allows) and still maintain
sufficient tension in the riser to avoid buckling
• Weight and buoyancy factors applied to nominal riser weights
• Tensioner fleet angle and friction losses
• For dynamic positioned Installations, recoil and LMRP lift off tension
requirements
As a minimum, the drilling crew should have prepared the following information prior
to the BOP run:
• Riser spaceout and running list
• Riser tension versus mud weight calculation
2 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION / BACKGROUND
The basic principles behind design of a spaceout are discussed in this subsection.
This subsection does not discuss all considerations that go into spaceout selection.
However, some of the key factors are outlined and further information can be
obtained through the Engineering department.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
2.1 RISER SPACE OUT DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
A riser spaceout should balance the following requirements:

• Allow the maximum mud weight for the well to be achieved at no more than
90% of the installed tension capacity (according to API calculation methods).
• Provide sufficient drilling operability (control of upper and lower angles) in the
design current profiles for the site.
• Maintain hook loads (static + dynamic) during a BOP run to less than gross
nominal hoisting equipment ratings.
• Provide sufficient in water weight during a hang off condition to prevent
excessive upper angles when suspended in a high current and prevent
compression in the riser during storm sea states.
Some of these requirements contradict one another (i.e. minimize BOP running
loads while providing sufficient in water weight for storm hang off) and require some
experience when selecting the correct spaceout. In particular, as the riser length
increases, it becomes more difficult to maintain a balance that can meet all of the
above criteria without sacrificing safety margins or reducing allowed environments in
which some operations can be conducted.
2.2 RISER STRETCH VERSUS DRILL PIPE STRETCH – RKB TO WELLHEAD

MEASUREMENT
A general rule of thumb for water depths (<5000 ft) is that drill pipe stretch during the
RKB to well head measurement is about equal to the stretch in the riser when it is
under tension. In the past this has provided a relatively easy way to account for
stretch in the riser spaceout and pup joint selection. However, in deeper water
depths the stretch of the drill pipe can exceed the riser stretch by some 5 to 10 ft.
This is because the length can be 2 to 10 times greater over which the stretch
occurs.
Drill pipe stretch can be estimated as follows:
Stretch = (P x L) / (A x E)
Where:
P = Wt. Per foot pipe x 0.87 x length + overpull at wellhead during measurement, units [lb]
L = measured length of drillpipe, units [ft]
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
A = 0.7853 x (OD2 – ID2), OD and ID units [in]

E = 29,000,000 [lb/in2]
So, for example, if the measurement was taken with 6-5/8 in, 25.2 lb/ft (adjusted for
buoyancy) drill pipe with 50,000 lb overpull and the recorded length found to be 8206
ft the stretch would be equal to:
A = 0.78653 x (6.6252 – 5.8712) = 7.40 in2

Stretch = (25.2 x 8206 ft x 0.87 + 50,000 lb) x 8206 / (7.40 in2 x 29,000,000 lb/in2)
= 8.8 ft (~ 9 ft)
So the true RKB to well head length would be 8206 + 9 = 8215 ft
2.3 TENSION VERSUS MUD WEIGHT CALCULATION
The required tension setting for a specific mud weight should be calculated
according to API RP16Q methods and take into account LMRP lift off/recoil criteria
for DP Installations. The basic equation from API RP 16Q to calculate tension is:
Tmin = TSRmin N / [Rf (N-n)]
TSRmin = Minimum Slip Ring Vertical Tension

= Riser wet weight + mud volume weight + margin over buckling
N = Number of Tensioners Supporting the Riser

n = Number of Tensioners Subject to Sudden Failure
Rf = Reduction Factor Relating Vertical Tension at the Slip Ring to Tensioner
Setting to account for fleet angle and mechanical efficiency (usually 0.90 –
0.95 for non-drilling and drilling modes)
This formulation outlines the minimum tension requirement. Tension can be

increased from the minimum value to help reduce angles and vortex induced
vibration up to the point where 90% of the total tension limit is reached, any one
component reaches a design load limit, or up to the maximum allowed riser recoil
system limits, whichever occurs first.
2.4 COLLAPSE ESTIMATE
The riser spaceout needs to be checked for collapse resistance for two conditions:
• When the entire connected riser is evacuated from losses to the formation
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
• When the riser is quickly disconnected with mud as the content (EDS for DP
Installations does not allow the mud to be circulated to sea water) it will fall to
a given distance into the riser (u-tube effect) and the external pressure builds
over a distance of the upper portion of the riser
Collapse ratings can be estimated according to API Bulleting 5C3 formulas.

Engineering can assist with the calculation if necessary. When estimating the
collapse pressure of a tube the following should be taken into account:
• Inspection records for minimum wall thickness (if available)
• Mill tolerance (can be as large as -12% of wall thickness)
• Corrosion and wear allowance (from key seating or similar wear)
Once the collapse pressure or equivalent water depth is estimated, it should be

determined whether a fill-up valve is required to prevent riser collapse.
HQS-OPS- HB-05 SUBSECTION: 2.5
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Riser Operations - Riser Running And Retrieval
1 RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL REQUIREMENTS
BOP runs will be successful only if properly planned and executed with good
communication between the marine and drilling crews. For each well, a worksheet
must be developed for the riser spaceout to facilitate onboard discussions between
the marine and drilling departments in preparation for the riser run. Prior to the run a
meeting should be held to discuss the following issues:
• The riser running order and weights to be shifted need to be supplied to the
marine crew for use in the ballast and stability calculations.
• Estimate the duration of the BOP running operation.
• Obtain weather forecast for the duration of the riser run. Note maximum
expected wind speeds, swell, and sea including direction. This forecast
should be compared to the allowed maximum values for the operation.
• Obtain current profile using the acoustic doppler profiler (if available) and
obtain current predictions for the days of the BOP run.
• Verify derrick rating in the max wind speed expected during the run is not
exceeded for combined setback and maximum predicted hook load for the
BOP run. If required, reduce setback weight to required level.
• Note riser normal drilling and maximum connected limits for angle & tension
versus mud weight. These limits must be used to establish the Installation
offset limits.
• Note riser collapse concerns. If high mud weights are expected on the well,
collapse may occur in the event of an EDS if there is not an auto fill-valve in
the system or if the fill-valve does not function properly.
• Discuss the maximum wave condition for the riser run, including the required
heading of the Installation relative to the dominant wave/swell direction. The
heading should be selected to minimize heave motion of the Installation
during the riser run. The OIM/Master must approve heading changes prior to
conducting the maneuver.
• Note the maximum survival hang-off storm wave and maximum allowed
Installation heading to the wave.
• Subsea BOP’s will be landed and/or disconnected with slip-joint locked closed
using an appropriate riser landing joint unless the slip-joint used is specifically
designed to allow landing a BOP in the extended position.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
2.1 DYNAMIC TOP TENSION DURING RISER RUNNING OPERATIONS
When running riser in deepwater, the hook load may oscillate because of the
Installation heave motions. This is due to a “rubber band” effect that occurs when a
long and heavy riser is forced to move with the Installation, causing it to stretch and
contract. The reason for this is a long riser can have a natural period (a period at
which it tends to move up and down most) in the range of 4 to 6 seconds. In shallow
water (less than 4000-ft) a typical riser natural period is less than 2 seconds.
Commonly, Installations will move in waves and swell with 4 to 6 second periods.
Although the motion is small, because it is near the natural period of the riser, the
tension fluctuations can be extremely large. It is important that the vessel heave
motion be minimized during the riser run.
Dynamic tension problems usually occur during the last half of a riser run (first half of
riser retrieval); therefore, a good weather forecast during this time period is
extremely important. Each Installation and riser combination is different in terms of
limiting heave motion before tension fluctuations may exceed allowed values.
Therefore, it is difficult to provide generalized guidelines for operations since an
Installation that operates in 9000-ft of water will have very different limits when it
moves to 4000-ft of water. Each well must have limits outlined on a case-by-case
basis by a riser analysis.
If large tension fluctuations are experienced during a running operation and exceed
design system ratings, the following guidelines are recommended:
• The riser should be placed in the spider/gimbal and the load should be shared
25% on the hook and 75% on the spider. This load sharing will reduce the
risk of either component exceeding design limits.
• The weather and Installation heave should be monitored. If possible a new
heading should be selected in an attempt to minimize heave motions.
Typically, this would be with the bow to the dominant wave direction. If bi-
directional seas and swell are present, the optimal heading will likely be
somewhere between the seas and swell direction, closer to the swell
direction. At no time should the heading be changed to bring an Installation
beam to the waves. This condition will cause extremely large tension
fluctuations in the riser leading to compression in the riser string. BOP
running/retrieving operations have priority over supply boat offloading
operations and Installation heading should be optimized accordingly during
these operations.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
For a semi-submersible the optimum heading to minimize heave motion is typically a

25 to 45 degree heading off the wave/swell.
2.2 MAXIMUM PREDICTED STATIC RUNNING LOADS
The maximum static and dynamic running loads should be predicted in a running list
for each well. The Installation should keep a record of the measured running
weights from the hook to aid in selecting future riser spaceouts. The comparison of
predicted to actual weight helps to estimate long-term buoyancy losses.
2.3 PREDICTED RISER RUN DURATION AND WEATHER FORECAST
The time it takes to run the BOP must be estimated prior to starting the operation so
that a sufficient forecast window can be obtained. The following is one example of a
run time estimate:
1) Total No. Riser Joints to Run (including pups) 90 joints

2) Estimated Run Time per Joint 20 min (0.33 hrs)
3) Number Joints between Testing 7
4) Total Tests 13 (90 / 7 = ~13)
5) Individual Test Duration 15 min (0.25 hrs)
6) BOP Prep Time 4 hrs
7) Telescopic Joint Rig Up Time 6 hrs
8) Slip Ring / Hose Terminations Time 4 hrs
9) Contingency 6 hrs
10) Total BOP run time estimate (1x2 + 4x5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9) 53 hrs
It should be kept in mind that forecasts lose accuracy the further they predict in the
future, therefore if a riser run is estimated to last 3 to 5 days; it is recommended that
each day the forecast is updated and reviewed between the drilling and marine
crews.
2.4 DERRICK RATING, COMBINED HOOK LOAD AND SETBACK
Once the running loads (static plus dynamic) are estimated for the well, the derrick
setback load should be reviewed to make certain the total gross derrick and
substructure loads during all portions of the riser run are within allowed values
according to the derrick operating manual and Installation’s Operating/Operations
Manual. If the hook load plus setback will exceed design maximum values, drill pipe
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
or casing may need to be removed from the derrick prior to starting the riser running
operation.
2.5 INSTALLATION HEADING GUIDELINES
During a deepwater (>4000-ft water depth) BOP run the most critical Installation
motion is heave and secondary to that is roll and pitch. The Installation heading
(bow) relative to the wave direction is the single-most determining factor of heave
motion. The 9120-ft water depth BOP run by the Deepwater Expedition is a good
benchmark for the importance of heading selection. During the last 500-ft of riser
deployment, the swell was approximately 2-3 ft with negligible wind and seas. The
vessel heading was changed from head into the swell to 100 degrees off the swell in
order to place the bow into the wind. This caused hook load fluctuations from the
riser to change from +/-75 kip to +/-240 kips, an increase of more than 3 times the
optimal Installation heading. It is important that the bridge and drilling crews realize
the importance of Installation heading and that management of the heading relative
to the waves and swell during a BOP run is a critical factor to a successful operation.
Guidelines for heading selection on a dynamically positioned drillship are:

• For single direction swell / seas place the bow no more than 10 degrees from
the waves, do not exceed 20 degrees from wave direction
• For bi-directional sea and swell place the bow between the seas and swell.
Typically, the swell will cause more motion than moderate to mild seas,
therefore a heading slightly more towards the swell may help to reduce the
motion.
Guidelines for heading selection on dynamically positioned semi-submersibles are:

• For single direction swell / seas place the bow 25 to 45 degrees from the
waves, heave is typically minimal in this condition. However, adjustments
may be required depending on roll and pitch motions and the hull shape of
the specific unit.
• For bi-directional sea and swell place the bow between the seas and swell.
2.6 RUNNING BOP, SEVERE CURRENT CONDITIONS – CURRENTS

GREATER THAN 2.0 KNOTS
Running riser in severe currents (typically greater than 2 knots) can lead to several
concerns as follows:
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
• Extreme upper angles and diverter contact force (excessive local stress in the
riser)
• Vortex-induced vibration fatigue of the riser
• Riser contact with the hull
In order to limit the stresses, several methods can be employed to reduce the effect
of currents which include operations such as trimming the Installation and drifting
into location while running (DP Installations: reference HQS-OPS-PP-01). These
operations, however, are not typically thought of as “routine” and therefore need to
be reviewed carefully prior to commencing the operation. It is recommended that the
HQS Engineering department be made aware of riser running operations when
currents exceed approximately 2 knots over a significant portion of the water depth
to aid the Installation crew in maintaining a satisfactory level of safety during the
operation.
3 SCOPE
These guidelines apply to drilling locations where the surface current exceeds or is
expected to exceed 1.5 knots. Transocean’s experience demonstrates the efficiency
of operations is not diminished by SURFACE CURRENTS of 1.5 knots or less.
It is recognized that Gulf of Mexico operations may be subjected to Loop Current

and Eddy Current phenomena that will effect operability due to the distribution of
current with depth. High current conditions for this guideline are defined as 1.5 knots
or higher with the 10 -year loop generally considered beginning at 2.5 knots.
These guidelines provide general guidance and suggest operational considerations

for various scenarios relative to environment, equipment and safety. The prerogative
and the responsibility for actual operational decisions always reside with the onboard
rig management, the OIM and the Captain. This is based on their knowledge of their
equipment, experience in its operation, and on their knowledge of site-specific
environmental conditions. However, Operations and Engineering is to be contacted
for support when surface current velocity reaches 2.5 knots or riser VIV is
experienced.
DATA REQUIREMENTS
• Loop Current prediction information
• ADCP – current profile
• Bathymetric charts
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
• Weather forecast
• Upper and Lower riser angle
• Well specific riser analyses
• Operators Well Plan
HIGH CURRENT OPERATIONS
RISER DEPLOYMENT AND RECOVERY (CONTACT OPERATIONS/ENGINEERING

SUPPORT)
Moving (controlled drift) while running/pulling riser Operations Limited by:
Weather Window
• Ensure an adequate weather window exists. The environmental limits will
need to be established considering both axial and lateral response of the riser
string. Consult Transocean Engineering for further guidance.
Bottom clearance
• Scrutinize bathymetric information and vessel approach to drilling location
relative to current direction. Consider ROV deployment when riser system is
within 500 ft of seafloor (Attachment A).
Vibration from VIV

• Moving speed generates slab current on riser, drift speed must be controlled
to prevent VIV.
Static and Dynamic Hook Loads limitations

• Vessel heave motion can generate axial loads on traveling equipment and the
riser system for long strings.
• Select vessel heading to maintain acceptable axial response as indicated on
the Martin Decker or VICIS hook load while running riser.
Spider and Diverter clearances

• Manage riser angle in moonpool and diverter to prevent damage of riser joints
and flotation modules. Can be managed by trim/heel to 1.0 degree or by
vessel drift.
Riser stab in and make up

• Limited to <1.0 degree of angle during stab in of pin to box
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
• Prevent potential damage during engagement by performing a controlled drift

to reduce riser angle.
Limiting Transit Speed (under power)

• Consult Floating (Field) Operations Manual guidance of 0.3 knots for general
conditions. Contact Transocean Engineering to model transit riser system.
• Do Not allow VIV to be induced to riser system.
CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS
High Current Operations (Attachment B)

• High Current considerations include Depth and Direction, not just surface
velocity.
• Minimize Flex Joint Angles (Upper and Lower) tension and vessel position
adjustments.
• Minimize Riser Bow (increasing tension versus repositioning the rig).
• Vortex-Induced Vibration reduction methods:
• Increasing tension – (consider riser and wellhead limitations).
• Move rig up current to straighten out lower flex joint.
• Reduce mud weight to seawater.
Maximum Drilling Limits

• Indicators that show max drilling limits are approaching.
• Flex Joint Angles >1.0 degree (refer to Floating (field) Operations
Manual).
• Riser Vibration Induced Vortex (VIV).
• Vessel power requirement exceeds pre-determined maximum of 80%.
• Consideration for loss of one engine scenario.
• Consideration for loss of one thruster scenario.
• Consult rig specific Operations Manual for vessel operating limits.
• Discuss situation with Shore Based Operations and Engineering
support teams.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Maximum Connected Limits

• Riser System, FJA +4 degrees.
• Tensioner System limitations – loss of tensioners per API requirements.
• Telescopic Joint stroke position – riser deflection, vessel heave.
• Riser Recoil system – minimum stroke requirements.
• Discuss situation with Shore Based Operations and Engineering support
teams.
Station Keeping Considerations

• Watch Circles (drift off based, assume discuss drive off prevention by DPO).
• Vessel Positioning Relative to Well Center – optimize vessel position and
reaction time.
• Vessel heading selection and considerations – current vs wind (attachment).
• Heading changes - variability in turn rates for position optimization.
• DP System Component Failure or Power Limitations – if loss of position is
predicted when an engine, thruster, or switchboard fails actions should be
taken to secure well in preparation of an EDS.
• Awareness of current inflow to thrusters reduces maximum thrust available.
• Awareness of acoustic reference performance and changes.
• System setup may require adjustment to optimize performance or
prevent system degradation.
• Adjust “gain” settings to medium or high.
• Consider use of DP systems calculated minimum thrust heading.
• Awareness of heading optimization.
• Monitor forces allocated to Yaw, Surge and Sway.
• Eliminate bias from thrusters.
Drilling Operations
Upper and lower Flex Joint Angle management.
• Lower FJA differential angle between BOP and Riser.
• Increase awareness for potential subsea equipment wear and integrity.
• Monitor mud cuttings returns for metal.
• Monitor drill string for indication of wear.
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Establish operational FJA limits for:

• Rotation of drill string.
• Tripping of drill string.
Extreme current, consideration should be given to:
• Cease normal operations.
• Pull drill string to casing shoe.
• Hang off drill string (or set storm packer).
Displacement of riser with seawater.
Emergency Disconnect Considerations

Watch circle management, will riser disconnect safely?
• Consider bias position for vessel up environment/drift direction.
• Impose Dynamic Position Standby for weather/current conditions.
• Consider DP system component failure and consequence.
Documentation of Events
Careful documentation of events is imperative to gain knowledge of Gulf of Mexico

Loop Current events. Documentation is not limited to but should include the
following:
• ADCP information
• DP information
• Riser Angles
• Vessel Heading
• Power Utilization at thrusters
• Met-ocean and environmental data
• Visual indication of VIV
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Attachment A
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Attachment B
START Criteria for Suspending
Operations Due to High
Currents
IS CURRENT NO
> 2 KTS?
YES
OPTIMIZE
ARE RISER
TENSIONER & VESSEL NO
POSITION OPTIMAL FOR
MIN RISER ANGLE?
YES
IS TOP RISER ANGLE YES

>2 DEG. OR RIG
LIMIT?
NO
IS LOWER
YES
RISER ANGLE >2 DEG.
OR RIG LIMIT?
NO
YES
OPTIMIZE
IS HEADING OPTIMUM
TO MINIMIZE DP
NO
FORCE?
YES
NO
IS KW USED
> GEN(N-1)(.80)
YES
SUSPEND OPERATIONS
(BRING DRILLSTRING TO SAFE POSITION &
DISPLACE OIL BASE MUD FROM RISER)
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Riser Operations - Riser Connected Mode Operations
1 RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Prior to connected mode operations on each well the following information and
communication must be established for the Drilling and Marine crews:
• Maximum excursion limits based on riser parameters must be established so
that:
a) for DP Installations the LMRP may be disconnected in sufficient time
so as to not damage equipment
b) for moored Installations, following a one line failure event the maximum
excursion will not damage equipment.
• A tension versus mud weight chart should be posted that is calculated
according to approved API recommended methods for setting tensions; it
should include (for DP Installations) minimum and maximum tension settings
for safe EDS events.
• Allowed Installation excursion for normal drilling limits (flex joint angle and
stroke control) must be established to aid in set point selection during
operations.
Minimum riser to BOP differential angles are to be actively maintained at all time,
with less than ½ degree average being considered optimum and acceptable. With ½
-1 degree average differential angles, corrective action is recommended by
repositioning and/or increasing riser tension to reduce angle.
With average differential angles between 1-2 degrees, corrective action is required
for prior to continuing rotation operations.
All rotating operations must cease when the average differential angle between the
flex joint and wellhead structure can not be managed to 2 degrees or less.
Corrective action (increase tension, reposition rig) must be taken prior to continued
rotating operations. It is advisable to limit tripping operations as this can also be a
source of key-seating wear in the BOP/flex joint.
The OIM is responsible for insuring the upper and lower differential flex joint angles
are monitored by the Driller and DPOs (for DP Installations) throughout the drilling
program.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
1.1 TENSION SETTING REQUIREMENTS
Riser tension must be set to allow for the loss of one or more tensioner units to
provide redundancy and prevent riser buckling in the event of losing a tensioner unit
(or pair of units). For DP Installations, the tension requirement can be greater than
the API recommended minimum since at all times the Installation must be able to
perform an EDS in the event of a DP system upset. The amount of additional
tension is a function of the recoil control system installed on the unit, the riser weight
parameters, and the mud weight at the time of disconnect, the LMRP weight, and
vessel heave.
1.2 RISER CONNECTED MODE LIMITATIONS
There are several key parameters that determine the operating limit of a riser
system: the flex joint angle, slip joint stroke, stress limit, and wellhead/casing
bending moment. This subsection will address these limits and recommendations of
API RP16Q.
Riser connected limitations for drilling and not drilling conditions are outlined in API
RP16Q according to Table 3.10.3.1. Where possible, the flex joint angle limits
should be restricted further than API recommendations of 2 deg mean angle in order
to prevent key seating in the BOP and lower flex joint equipment.
1.2.1 FLEX JOINT ANGLES
The flex joints under the diverter and above the LMRP have rotation limits to prevent
damage to the riser from contact with the Installation, key seating (rotating drill pipe
rubbing against riser ID), and improper disconnect. There are two types of angles,
mean and maximum. The mean angle is the average angle observed when
watching the indicator. A maximum angle is the highest angle observed. The
Installation roll and pitch motions and surface excursions around a mean offset
cause the maximum angle. Angle indicators should be calibrated before running the
BOP. The Driller and DP Operator are accountable to monitor the angle. Typical
values for limiting flex joint angles for various operating conditions are outlined in
Table 3.2.5.1.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
1.2.2 SLIP JOINT AND TENSIONER STROKE
Slip joint and tensioner stroke limits the Installation in the amount of surface offset
that is allowed. When the tensioners or the telescopic joint runs out of stroke, the
riser tension increases rapidly and the riser is subject to catastrophic failure.
The stroke limit is the smaller of the tensioner or the telescopic joint stroke. For
instance, a vessel with a 50-ft (double amplitude) tensioner stroke and 65 ft
telescopic joint only has available 50 ft of allowed stroke capacity, the smaller of the
two limits. This value is then used to determine the amount of allowable surface
offset in combination with heave in the maximum design storm condition.
As an example, consider the following:
(1) Tensioner Stroke: 50 ft

(2) Telescopic Joint Stroke: 65 ft
(3) Allowable Stoke: 50 ft (minimum of (1) and (2))
Single amplitude stroke: 25 ft (50 ft / 2, up or down)
(4) Predicted vessel heave: 8 ft (single amplitude,
8 ft x 2 = 16 ft peak to peak)
(5) Stroke remaining for vessel offset: 17 ft (single-amplitude, up or down)
NOTE: (3) – (5) must be adjusted for space out actual results.
This example case shows there is only 17 ft of useable stroke to determine the
maximum offset allowed before a disconnect. An Installation’s heave motion is
determined from the maximum connected operating motion in view of storm
conditions or operability constraints. Riser hang off stresses must also be
considered when evaluating the maximum connected condition.
1.2.3 STRESS LIMITATIONS
Stress in a riser is caused by a combination of applied tension (from MRTs), bending

moments (from current forces and offset), internal pressure, and auxiliary line
pressure end loads. The maximum amount of stress allowed in the riser is a
percentage of the yield stress of the material, typically 67% for deepwater risers.
Dynamic stresses occur in the riser system due to Installation motions in the waves
and dynamic offsets around well center. These dynamic stresses must be kept to a
minimum to ensure a long fatigue life for the riser system. API RP-16Q requires that
the stress criteria outlined in Table 3.10.3.1 are met while operating a riser system.
The API stress criteria is considered in the Engineering department riser analysis.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
As an example, the stress in an 80 ksi yield strength riser joint must remain below
53.3 ksi, a 65 ksi yield joint must remain below 43 ksi for deepwater operations
(deeper than 2000-ft).
Table 3.2.5.1 - API RP-16Q & Transocean Drilling Riser Maximum Operating
Guidelines
CONNECTED CONNECTED RISER

DESIGN PARAMETER
DRILLING NOT DRILLING DISCONNECTED
Flex Joint Angle Limits < 1.0 deg mean The smaller angle of: Less than angle where
preferred, 1) max angle for bottom contact occurs
< 2.0 deg mean load limits (6 – 8 degrees)
acceptable 2) safe LMRP disconnect
departure angle, or
< 4.0 deg max 3) 90% of max available
angle.
Stress Criteria
Method A (< 2000 ft WD) 0.40 σy 0.67 σy 0.67 σy
Method B
(1)
(> 2000 ft WD) 0.67 σy(2) 0.67 σy 0.67 σy
Significant Dynamic Stress Range

(SAF = stress amplification factor)
@ SAF ≤ 1.5 10 ksi NA NA
@ SAF > 1.5 15 / SAF NA NA
Minimum Top Tension Tmin(3) Tmin NA
Dynamic Tension Limit DTL(4) DTL NA
Max Tension Setting 90% DTL 90% DTL NA
Note: 1) Method B for Deepwater Analyses 2) σy = yield strength of material

3) Tmin = TSRmin x N / [Rf (N-n) ] 4) DTL = PA x Acyl / NLF
1.2.4 WELLHEAD AND CASING LOADS
Forces at the lower flex joint impose shear loads and bending moments into the
wellhead structure at the sea floor. These moments must be carefully monitored
in deepwater riser systems due to the large amount of installed riser tension on
most Installations and the high current loads on the riser string. Figure 3.2.5.1
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
shows a typical BOP and wellhead system with forces drawn describing the
loads seen at the base of the riser and BOP.
Figure 3.2.5.1, Riser Bottom Loads and Wellhead Bending Moment
Tension at LFJ
Bending Moment
at LFJ
Shear at LFJ
Elevation
Shear at Wellhead =
Shear at LFJ
Bending Moment at Wellhead =

Bending Moment at LFJ +
(Shear at LFJ x Elevation LFJ from Wellhead)
The lateral forces are supported by soil reactions with the structural casing allowing
the BOP to lean over under high load conditions. As each well location has a
different soil makeup with some uncertainty in composition, a “fixed at the seabed”
assumption is conservatively applied unless conditions warrant a soil analysis.
Typical limits for common wellhead connectors have variations from 2500 kip-ft to
8500 kip-ft of allowable bending moment depending upon the particular wellhead
system in use. This is an important factor in determining the allowable offset prior to
unlatching the LMRP or starting the EDS sequence. At no time can the design
bending moment be exceeded in a drift-off situation. When operating on a 16-3/4
inch wellhead system in deepwater, it is likely that the wellhead bending moment or
structural casing bending moment limit will determine the maximum allowed
Installation excursion.
In deepwater the mud weight can easily out weigh the BOP. When this happens the
amount of tension required according to API RP-16Q guidelines will put the well
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
head in tension. Traditional common practice has been to support approximately

half of the BOP weight, or, put the neutral point of tension in the BOP. This is not
always possible in deepwater applications due to buckling stability tension criteria,
LMRP EDS lift off requirements and high current loads requiring ample tension to
minimize riser angles.
2 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION - VORTEX-INDUCED VIBRATIONS (VIV)
Risers operating in moderate to strong current profiles are subject to vortex induced
vibrations during operations. This phenomenon will cause the riser to shake back
and forth at various speeds depending on the riser configuration, current speed, and
tension applied to the riser. The two principal effects of VIV are fatigue damage due
to cyclic stress as the riser bends and increased drag on the riser creating larger
upper and lower flex joint angles.
Deepwater risers will primarily be affected by increased drag. Fatigue is more a

factor with shallow water risers since the bending is over a shorter length of riser,
causing a smaller bending radius and higher stresses. Various methods to prevent
or reduce VIV have been devised including strakes, fairings, and staggering buoyant
and slick joints. Helical strakes reduce if not eliminate most VIV. However the
current drag on the riser will be significantly increased even without the presence of
VIV thus requiring more tension to manage riser angles. Fairings, primarily used to
reduce current drag, also aid in decreasing VIV. The shape of the fairing allows
water to flow evenly over the riser section whereas a circular shape creates vortex
shedding on the down-current side of the riser. Staggering bare and buoyant joints
can also aid in reducing VIV by changing the diameter and flow along the riser, thus
reducing the area of riser that can be affected by one period of VIV. Bare joints with
auxiliary lines exposed to the current tend to disrupt vortex formation since the flow
is not around a single smooth cylinder such as with buoyant riser joints.
General guidelines to reduce VIV problems include:

• Increasing riser top tension (to the maximum recommended limit of the
system, limit of any component, or recoil tension limit)
• Decreasing mud weight while maintaining tension level
• Offsetting the Installation slightly up current
• Using fairings in the high-current zone along a riser
• Staggering buoyant and bare joints along the riser
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Riser Operations - Tensioner Ring Operations
1 TENSIONER RING OPERATION REQUIREMENTS
The drilling crew must be made aware of the approximate heading rotation required
to generate the necessary breakout torque at the prevailing operating tension. The
breakout torque must be compared to the allowed wellhead torque to verify
adequate safety margin during a heading change maneuver. It should be kept in
mind that a tension ring that has not been functioned / rotated for a period of time
may require an additional 15% breakout torque compared to theoretical calculated
values to overcome additional frictional resistance.
Prior to each well the following information should be determined:

• Installation specific tension ring break out torque versus tension setting
• Wellhead torque limits (if necessary as a function of set down weight) should
be obtained from the operator.
• Limiting heading change allowed without ring rotation. The allowed heading
change with out tension ring rotation (referenced to heading at time of landing
the BOP) should be provided to the marine crew to assist in heading change
decisions.
A method should be established to track tension ring rotation. During a heading

change, a person should be stationed in the moonpool to monitor relative tension
ring to riser rotation. The relative angle can be monitored visually by means of a
paint marking on the tension ring/outer barrel for those Installations where the ring is
out of the water. All DP installations should have a method to track riser torque.
Should the wellhead and/or casing be suspected of rotating, all turning operations
should cease. The heading and angle of the wellhead/BOP should be checked and
compared to the original readings. If the heading and angle are still be within
acceptable limits, the casing should be tested to verify integrity. Corrective actions
such as a cement squeeze job or running a liner should be considered prior to
continuing normal operations.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
2 TENSIONER RING LOCKING PROCEDURES
All tensioner ring slip joint dogs and tension ring diverter dogs will be equipped with
Technical Field Support / Engineering approved manual dog locks. The mechanical
dog locks are to maintain the dogs extended and locked in the event hydraulic
pressure is loss or if the function is accidentally actuated.
Tensioner ring and diverter locking dog controls shall be clearly marked indicating
the function of all possible valve positions all the relevant panels. Manipulator
valves must have the central position clearly marked ‘VENT’ and Selector valves
marked ‘BLOCK’.
All operating panels should be within clear line of sight of the Tensioner Ring.
A pad lock and protective cover must be installed on the valve handles of the
following valve function(s) to ensure the valves cannot be accidentally actuated
without proper approval authority.
i. Tensioner ring slip joint lock dogs

ii. Tensioner ring diverter lock dogs
All personnel working in the moonpool shall be on deck and clear of the tensioner
ring and slip joint prior to any function being operated.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Figure 3.2.5.2-Vetco Mechanical Lock-Out Assembly For Tensioner Rings Dogs
3.1 TENSIONER SUPPORT RING FUNCTION/DESIGN
The tensioner ring serves the following functions in a riser system:

• Point if attachment for riser tensioners (wireline or direct acting)
• Rotating seal to allow Installation heading changes without developing
excessively high torque on the wellhead
In addition to the above, some tension rings, such as the KT ring, also are the
termination point for auxiliary line goosenecks.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Riser tensioner rings come in many different configurations. The support ring can be
a permanently fixed, solid ring; a removable hinged, rotating split ring; or a
removable solid ring with retractable load shoulders which permits running the riser
through. Removable tensioning rings are usually stored hanging below the diverter.
The rings can be stored with all tensioner lines attached, providing a significant
timesaving when running the riser. Some tensioning rings (KT rings) are capable of
leaving the auxiliary lines attached as well.
3.2 GENERATION OF BREAKOUT TORQUE
Dynamically positioned Installations are periodically required to make heading

changes to minimize environmental force on the Installation. During a heading
change, if the tensioner ring does not rotate with the Installation (stays latched to the
riser) a large amount of torque could develop in the riser and at the wellhead. The
amount of torque depends on several factors:
• Riser length
• Joint wall thickness
• Type and number of tensioner connected to the ring
• Amount of heading change
In general, the following holds true when turning an Installation’s heading without the
tension ring rotating freely with the Installation:
• As the heading change increases from the initial BOP landing heading, the
torque will increase in the riser.
• As water depth increases torque generated by a 180-deg turn will decrease in
the riser.
• Wire line tensioners delay the build up of torque by acting as springs.
What these trends show is that torque buildup for shallower water depths (<3000 ft)
can be rather quick while an ultra-deep water site up may require a larger initial
heading change to reach breakout torque levels to start the tension ring rotation.
Additionally, several degrees of rotation may occur before the tensioners begin to
transmit a significant amount of torque to the riser due to the spring effect they
generate.
3.3 COMPARISON OF BREAKOUT TORQUE VERSUS ALLOWED WELL

HEAD TORQUE
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
The introduction of high capacity riser tensioner rings raises the issue of ring torque
versus wellhead torque. This issue is particularly pronounced on the smaller 16-3/4”
wellheads where allowed torque can be a function of BOP set down weight. For
these types of wellheads, if no weight is set down the torque capacity of the system
is near 0 kip-ft. All DP Installations should estimate torque values prior to a change
in heading to avoid damage to the wellhead.
It is important to recognize that some subsea wellhead systems require BOP weight
down upon the well head to obtain torsional capacity. For each location a riser
analysis can determine the torque developed during a heading change.
A generic example of breakout torque versus wellhead torque is provided in

3.10.4.2. The upper chart provides the specific break out torque for the tension ring
on the Installation as provided by the manufacturer. For this condition, 700 kips
tension at the slip ring will require approximately 45 kip-ft of breakout torque. The
lower chart in the figure provides the comparison of torque build up in the riser as a
function of heading change to the 45 kip-ft of breakout torque just estimated. Note
the following from the figure:
• For the specific wellhead, the maximum allowed torque is 59 kip-ft, which is
greater than the breakout torque of the tension ring. Therefore, under this
condition, it would be OK to turn the Installation without adjusting tension to
lower the ring breakout torque.
• The heading change where the tension ring is estimated to start turning is
between 23 to 28 degrees (wire line tensioners require additional 5 degrees
of heading rotation due to spring effect).
• If the ring does not rotate, the heading change where the wellhead torque
limit is exceeded is approximately 30 to 35 degrees (again, tensioner spring
effect adds about 5 degrees to the chart results).
Following a procedure similar to the above will allow safer heading changes by
advising the drilling and marine crews of maximum allowed turning angles that can
cause well head damage.
It should be kept in mind that once the ring breaks free and starts rotating, the vessel
should (if possible to the extent it does not degrade station keeping) maintain
rotation until the ring aligns with the desired Installation heading. Once the ring is
aligned, the Installation can then turn back to the desired heading.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE
Figure 3.2.5.3-Example of Riser Torque vs Rotation and Wellhead Torque Capacity
Tension Ring Breakout Torque vs Tension / Manufactuer Test Data or Calculations

120
100
80
60
45.2
40
20 700.0
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Tension (kips)
Wellhead Torque versus Rotation and Required Tension Ring Breakout Torque for 700 kips
Tension
100
90
80
70
60 59.2
50
Tension Ring Breakout Torque LESS
than Wellhead Allowed Torque
45.2
40
30
Torque on Wellhead
20 Applied Tension Breakout Torque
10 Allowed Torque
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Rotation Angle (deg)
HQS-OPS-PR-01 SUBSECTION: 2.5
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Riser Operations - Riser Storm Hang Off
1 RISER STORM HANG OFF
The survival sea or environment in which the riser can survive in a hung off condition
should be obtained from a riser analysis specific to the well and region of operation.
Installation specific procedures should be available on the Installation for hang off
method and means of placing the riser in a safe hang off position.
Under no circumstance should a soft hang-off be performed without approval of the

Business Unit / Division Manager. Soft hang-off is not to be conducted on rigs with
direct acting tensioners.
2.1 WEATHER LIMIT TO DISCONNECT AND HANG OFF WITH LMRP
The limiting weather where operations stop and preparations should be made to
disconnect depends on four(4) parameters:
• Water depth
• Installation motions
• DP system/mooring system capability
• Strength of current profile
The maximum wave the riser can survive in a hang-off condition depends on the
length of the riser (water depth) and the heave motion characteristics of the
Installation. Deciding whether or not to disconnect the riser in worsening seas is the
likelihood of the installation being forced to go to storm draft. Before the installation
runs out of air gap to avoid wave impact, the riser should be disconnected.
DP or Mooring system capability is simply; can the Installation remain on station in a

storm with a single point DP system or mooring line failure?
Current loading on riser can be quite large. During a disconnect, the upper riser
angle can greatly increase once the riser and LMRP are disconnected from the BOP
since tension in the string is reduced to the suspended wet weight of the riser. Prior
to disconnecting in a strong current, it should be determined whether the riser upper
angle will be too excessive to pull riser or so great that the riser will make contact
with the moonpool or hull.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
2.2 RISER COMPRESSION – MAX DESIGN SURVIVAL STORM AND

DYNAMIC TENSIONS
The riser space out is selected so that the riser can survive a design storm condition
in a hang off condition without experiencing compression. Hang off conditions can
be either “hard” or “soft”. A “hard hang off” is where the riser is supported on the
riser spider or by the tensioners/diverter flex joint with the telescopic joint locked. A
“soft hang off” is where the riser is supported on the riser tensioners that are at
approximately mid position on stroke and allowed to stroke with all APVs open to
allow the riser to remain nearly stationary while the Installation heaves. Both
methods of hang off have Installation specific issues that require evaluation by the
Engineering department during the well planning riser analysis to avoid potential
riser damage.
The max storm, similar to the BOP run dynamics, depends on the Installation and
riser combination. The minimum survival design storm for hang-off in any region of
operation is the 1-yr return period environment (the likely maximum environment to
occur in one year). It is preferable to design for the 10-yr return period event so
when the Installation disconnects in the max design operating condition the riser
would safely ride out the storm if the weather were to worsen.
As a riser increases in length, the dynamic tension (tension fluctuations caused by

Installation heave motion) increases. It becomes more difficult to prevent
compression from occurring in a deepwater riser than a shallow water riser in the
same storm condition. This is due to the greater amount of mass of the longer riser
system as compared to the apparent weight in water, or the wet weight to dry weight
ratio. A suspended riser with a large mass (6000+ kips) can generate significant
dynamic tensions for relatively low heave accelerations. These fluctuations can
easily exceed 500 to 800 kips in survival sea conditions. This amount of tension
fluctuation can be greater than the suspended weight at the top of the riser or at the
top of the buoyancy region resulting in the riser experiencing compression.
2.3 HANG OFF LIMIT IS EXCEEDED – STAY LATCHED OR DISCONNECT?
Situations can occur where weather picks up rapidly and before anything can be
done, the seas may be larger than the survival condition of the riser in a disconnect
mode. The OIM is then faced with a decision to stay connected to protect the riser
or disconnect and ride out the storm, risking compression in the riser. In this
situation it is difficult to advise on the correct decision to make since there are many
parameters playing a role in the process. It is a “point of no return” condition that
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
should be avoided if at all possible. Several considerations or suggestions in the

decision process are as follows:
1. How much worse is the weather expected to get? Is the storm expected to last a
long time or will it be over shortly? If this is a short duration storm chances are it
may not get much worse than what is presently being experienced. However, if
the event is something like a tropical storm, the weather may get quite a bit
worse and actions need to be taken to disconnect and attempt partial riser
retrieval.
2. Are Installation roll/pitch motions causing the riser to contact the hull? Is
Installation heave more than the slip joint/tensioner stroke allows?
3. Is the DP system at its power limit or is there margin remaining if the storm were
to worsen? Are the thrusters running at over 50% to 60% of their capacity?
What are the maximum excursions from well center and do the excursions stay
within allowable yellow circle offsets? If the DP system is performing well, and
since compression in the riser is likely if disconnected, it may be best to stay
connected to the last possible moment. Keep in mind that the Driller should be
ready to start an EDS at any moment, therefore should always remain at the
EDS control button ready to take action if the DP system becomes overloaded or
fails.
Again, this is a last means of action that occurs only when guidelines have not been
followed or unexpected weather conditions arise due to poor forecasts. Under
normal operating conditions, proper planning and weather monitoring should allow
time to disconnect and retrieve riser to a safe length before a storm exceeds the
maximum allowable hang-off limits.
2.4 HARD VERSUS SOFT RISER HANG OFF METHODS
The traditional and most common method of riser hang off is the hard hang off.
Typically in a hard hang off the riser is supported on either the riser spider or on the
diverter housing/tensioners. In both scenarios, the telescopic joint is closed and
locked and the riser is constrained to heave with the Installation. This can impart
extreme stresses and loads in riser systems that are hung off in storm conditions
beyond the design capacity for such a hang off method.
An alternative hang off method is the soft hang off. This is a less common method,
but it has been proven successful in a limited number of trial conditions. The
tensioners are re-set to the connected mode condition following the LMRP
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
disconnect from the well. Once the tensioners pressures are set to support the riser
and LMRP weight at a mid stroke position, all APV are open and the system is
allowed to stroke as it would in a connected mode condition. This allows the
Installation to heave while the riser will very nearly stay stationary. Prior to
conducting such a hang off the situation should be approved though HQS
Engineering department since the method depends directly on tensioner
system characteristics and sea states to perform correctly.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
Riser Operations - Deepwater Well Head Design Considerations
1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
High capacity design of the well head and BOP connector are an integral part of the
plan to minimize an environmental release given a DP or mooring failure event.
Given a loss of station keeping event, the Emergency Disconnect Sequence (EDS)
is initiated which automatically activates the BOP to safely shut-in the well and
disconnect the LMRP before the Installation has traveled to the point where
mechanical damage may occur to the well structure.
Non-high capacity well head systems require additional review (including soil
strength analysis) to ensure their. In some cases equipment upgrades might include
high strength bolting on the BOP Flanges, High Capacity Well Head Connector, High
Capacity HP Well head system and 38” conductor pipe for operations on deepwater
wells.
If a horizontal tree is atop the wellhead, consideration of the additional moment arm
should be evaluated.
Upgraded well foundation equipment is a critical part of the environmental

safeguards. Despite the very low probability of this event occurring, the design is a
major safeguard `if there is a failure of the LMRP to disconnect. Without this design,
the well foundation system could be exposed to loads exceeding the design limits
and fail or lose integrity. Riser analysis can identify the worst case loads in the
event of a drive off / drift off / mooring failure event combined with the inability to
disconnect at the LMRP during drilling and completion operations.
2 WELLHEAD CONECTORS AND CLAMP CONNECTIONS
Wellhead and LMRP Connectors and Clamp connections are designed to be

preloaded once made up properly. Subsea connectors should be tested per the
manufacturer’s recommended procedure to verify that the preload is within the
acceptable limits and that the components have not worn beyond acceptable limits.
As with subsea connectors, clamp connections should be verified that they are made
up properly, to the required torque, and the torque is to be checked on a frequent
basis (refer to API Specification 16A for clamp connections). The Company’s path is
towards elimination this type of connection for deepwater applications.
In the event that connectors and clamp connections are suspected to be turning,
operations should cease. Verification of suspected rotation should be confirmed. If
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
rotational failure is confirmed, it is recommended that the connection in question be

retrieved and repaired.
Typical limits are outlined in Table 3.2.5.2 for common ABB Vetco and Dril-Quip
wellhead connectors. The table shows variations from 2500 kip-ft to 8500 kip-ft of
allowable bending moment based on the particular wellhead system in use. This
limit is an important factor in determining the DP or mooring system allowable offset
prior to unlatching the LMRP or starting the Emergency Disconnect Sequence
(EDS). At no time can the design bending moment be exceeded in a drift-off
situation. When operating on a 16-3/4 inch system in deepwater, it is likely the
wellhead bending moment limit will determine the maximum allowable vessel
excursion prior to initiation of the EDS sequence.
Table 3.2.5.2-Typical Subsea Well Head Bending Moment Limitations
INTERNAL ALLOWABLE
AXIAL TENSION
CONNECTOR PRESSURE BENDING MOMENT
(KIPS)
(PSI) (KIP-FT)
ABB Vetco
16-3/4 in DHD H-4 15000 --- 2500
18-3/4 in HD H-4 15000 1500 3200

15000 0 4000
18-3/4 in SHD H-4 15000 1500 7000
Drill-Quip
DX-10 0 0 3250
0 1000 2800
10000 0 1650
10000 1000 1200
DX-15 0 0 4400
0 1500 3600
10000 0 2900
10000 1500 2200
15000 0 2150
15000 1500 1400
DX DW -15 0 0 8500
0 1500 7800
10000 0 7000
10000 1500 6200
15000 0 6200
15000 1500 5500
NOTE: Allowable loads summarized above are approximate, equipment manual on board are to be
used in place of values provided here.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
3 WELLHEADS
3.1 OVERVIEW
The components of a wellhead system include the low pressure and high pressure
housing, casing hangers and seal assemblies, assorted running tools, wear
bushings and test plugs. In addition, equipment such as mud mats and permanent
and temporary guide bases are provided by wellhead manufactures for use with the
selected wellhead.
Designs are generally based on an industry standard 18 ¾" high-pressure subsea

wellhead with a 21" marine drilling riser system. The 18 ¾" wellhead housing is
designed to hold three casing tubing strings which are hung from mandrel hangers.
A typical exploratory casing configuration might include:
• 36” Structural Pipe with Low Pressure Wellhead Housing (30” structural pipe
may also be used)
• Optional 26” Conductor - This is run as a liner or with a second low pressure
wellhead housing, depending on the presence/severity of a shallow water flow
zone and the ultimate TD of the well
• 20” Surface Casing with 18 ¾” Wellhead Housing
• 16” Liner
• 13-3/8” Protective Casing
• 9-5/8” Protective Casing
Because the small differences between pore pressure and fracture gradient often
require additional casing strings, the 18 ¾" wellhead imposes a limitation on
deepwater wells. The need for additional casing strings is usually addressed with
one of the following solutions:
• Extensive use of liner strings
• Use of slim line (reduced OD) or flush casing connectors to run larger
diameter casing
• Dual gradient drilling
• Expandable casing
Other riser and wellhead systems are available in some locations. For instance, an
18.625" OD riser with a 16 ¾" wellhead system was commonly used in the past due
to the reduced riser tension loads on the vessel and the fact that early subsea BOPs
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
were 16 ¾". Today most vessels have been converted to the more versatile 18 ¾"
wellhead system. However, the 16 ¾" wellhead system is still in use in some parts
of the world, notably by Petrobras in Brazil.
When operating a 18 ¾” system on a 16 ¾” wellhead with a conversion kit, the

maximum allowed Installation excursion should be reduced from normal operations.
Bridge/control room personnel should be made aware of the situation to adjust
watch circles or mooring excursions as necessary.
3.2 COMPONENTS
3.2.1 LOW PRESSURE WELLHEAD HOUSING
A low-pressure wellhead housing is welded to the top of the structural casing. It

lands in, and is run with, the guide structure that has been selected. The low
pressure housing and structural casing protects the mud line from erosion, provides
a re-entry point for the well prior to running the riser, and supports the high pressure
wellhead housing and surface casing string until they are cemented in place. Low
pressure housings are designed for 38" or 30" structural casing; the larger being
used when greater bending strength or additional casing strings are required.
The low pressure wellhead housing features:

• An external locking mechanism that engages and locks the guide structure of
choice (RGB or GRA) to the housing
• A butt weld bottom preparation of 1-1½ inch wall thickness for shop
Installation to the conductor
• An internal profile to accept the housing running tool
• A load shoulder for landing the high pressure housing
• A lock-down profile for locking the high pressure housing to the low pressure
housing
• Large circulation ports to take returns through while cementing surface casing
In the GOM, the structural casing and low-pressure wellhead housing are jetted into
position using an inner string and mud motor. The wellhead housing is usually
landed approximately 10' above the mud line to ensure ROV access and camera
visibility even with some cuttings buildup. The final angle of the wellhead housing
should not exceed one-half degree from vertical to minimize wear on the wellhead,
BOP and riser components. Higher angles can make it more difficult to stab the
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
wellhead connector. Relying on a calibrated bull’s-eye level indicator alone may not
be sufficient to insure minimal angle. Therefore, placing an MWD tool above the
running tool to monitor angle while jetting is advised. The housing running tool
should be cam actuated. A cam-actuated tool eliminates water depth effects by
rotating only the tool stem that has a cam profile. As the drill pipe is rotated, the cam
moves from behind spring-energized dogs enabling the dogs to retract from the
engaging profile in the wellhead, thereby releasing it. To verify cam position, the
running tool should incorporate a lock/unlock indicator that can be observed by the
ROV.
An alternative running tool, the drill-ahead tool, allows the center portion of the
running tool and drill pipe to be un-J’d from the outer portion such that the next hole
interval can be drilled immediately after having landed the structural casing. The
low-pressure housing should be designed with an adequate number of circulation
ports that are large enough to cement the surface casing. The circulation ports
should provide minimal back pressure, which could contribute to lost circulation
while cementing. The low-pressure housing designs in use today include from 4-12
ports with diameters ranging from 2-3½ inches. An ROV can be used to visually
monitor the cement returns to establish that the cement reaches the seabed. This
procedure is important in ensuring the integrity of the conductor/surface casing
strings.
Low-pressure wellhead housings should be designed to effectively seal against the

selected guide structure to prevent the migration of gas into the wellhead connector.
Migrating gas may form hydrates and prevent connector release. Other preventative
measures include installing a solid plate below the base of the guide structure or
fitting the wellhead housing with a funnel to divert gas away from the wellhead
connector and BOPs. The wellhead connector should also have a hydrate seal to
prevent gas migration into the connector. The hydrate seal provides a barrier
between the wellhead connector and high-pressure wellhead.
3.2.2 HIGH PRESSURE WELLHEAD HOUSING
The 18 ¾'' high pressure wellhead housing is the interface from the 20" casing to the
BOPs and riser. This housing lands in the low-pressure housing. The high pressure
housing features:
• A 10,000 psi or 15,000 psi service rating
• An external locking mechanism that engages and locks to the low pressure
housing
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
• A butt weld bottom preparation for shop installation to the 20" surface casing
• An internal profile that accepts the housing running tool
• A 17 ½" drift ID
• A single, high strength load shoulder for landing the 13 3/8" casing hanger
(upon which the remaining hangers must land)
• Capacity for landing a minimum of 3 hangers
• A mandrel or flange-type connection for mating to the hydraulic connector of
the BOPs. A mandrel or flange-type wellhead connector profile is located at
the top of the high-pressure housing. T his connection mates with the well
connector profile at the bottom of the BOPs. A metal ring gasket seated in a
seal profile on top of the housing provides metal-to-metal seal integrity to
10,000 or 15,000 psi. The seal profile should provide for a second metal-to-
metal seal surface in case the primary one is damaged.
Typically, the seal profile is coated with a stainless steel inlay for corrosion
resistance. A 20" multi-start threaded connector can be shop welded to the bottom
of the high-pressure housing. However, the relative difference in stiffness between
the thick-walled wellhead housing and the thin-walled 20'' casing results in low
fatigue resistance. Therefore, installing a 3-5 foot intermediate wall thickness casing
joint immediately below the housing will provide a better transition. The lower bore
of the housing body incorporates an internal load support shoulder, also referred to
as the nominal seat, which supports all of the subsequently installed casing hangers.
This shoulder may include a high strength inlay to increase load capacity. The
configuration may consist of all casing hangers, or it may include two casing hangers
and a tubing hanger.
3.2.3 16” LINER
16” liners are often run below 20" surface casing on deepwater wells. All wellhead
manufacturers can provide a mechanism for hanging a 16" liner from a sub welded
into the 20" casing string. The 16" hanger may be set using either a positive stop
load shoulder or a mud line suspension-type profile. If the positive stop shoulder is
used, the ID must be reduced to less than 17 ½". In either case, a seal assembly is
used to isolate the 16" x 20" annulus. As with the high pressure housing hanger and
seal assemblies, the 16" hanger and seal assembly are run in one trip.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
3.2.4 WEAR BUSHINGS
Nominal bore/seat protectors and wear bushings are used to protect the ID of the
high pressure housing from wear caused by drill string tripping and rotation or
wireline work. In order to eliminate a trip, the nominal bore/seat protector is typically
run with the high pressure housing when casing is run. The protector sits on the
nominal housing seat and is used prior to the installation of the first casing hanger.
The bore protector has an internal profile that permits retrieval with a
running/retrieving tool. It also has external O-rings to prevent solids from migrating
into the area between the bore protector and the housing, causing the protector to
become stuck. The bore protector should be run with the wellhead in order to
protect the sealing area while POOH with the stinger. To ensure the angle of the
high-pressure wellhead, a slope indicator can be run on the landing string above the
running tool. Additionally, the wellhead should be monitored with the ROV while
POOH to indicate problems. The bore protector can be held in position by the
friction of the O-rings or by the incorporation of integral shear pins. These pins latch
into the 18 ¾" housing and must be sheared to retrieve the protector. The ID of the
bore protector must be greater than 17 ½" and should be large enough to pass the
16" liner hanger, if used.
Wear bushings are required to protect the high pressure housing after each casing
string is landed. They have the same features as the nominal bore protector and
serve the same purpose. Wear bushings are run with a running/retrieving tool and
are landed on the top of the casing hanger. The running tools should have
washing/jetting attachments to permit washing of the wear-bushing seat prior to
releasing the wear bushing. These tools should also permit cleaning of the wear
bushing and sealing area as it is pulled, prior to running casing. The bore protector
and wear bushings should be examined for signs of wear after retrieval. If it has
been established that the wellhead is not vertical, it may be necessary to retrieve the
wear bushing more frequently to inspect for signs of wear. BOP testing may be
performed with the bore protector and wear bushings in position using a test tool.
Options are provided for testing the BOPs without the seal assemblies seeing
pressure and for testing the BOPs with the use of a cup tester extension. This
extension seats in the casing and allows the seal assemblies to see pressure.
3.2.5 MISCELLANEOUS TOOLS
The drill pipe hang-off tool is useful in cases of planned riser disconnect. This tool is
made up to the drill pipe and is landed on the wear bushing. The drill pipe above the
tool is then backed off, leaving the hang-off tool in position. The length should be
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
such that upper pipe rams can close on the tool and the blind/shear ram can close
without contacting the tool.
3.3 WELLHEAD FEATURES
3.3.1 ANNULAR SHUT OFF
A 26" conductor may be installed before penetrating a shallow flow sand. The
conductor is cemented in place to provide a sound structural foundation for the well
before drilling into the flow zone. In a shallow water flow situation with the 20" casing
set through the hazard zone, a SWF-type wellhead system should allow annular
shut off of the 26" x 20" annulus by means of a seal assembly.
For mild shallow flow situations, a non-retrievable annulus seal can be used. A
retrievable and testable seal would be required for more severe flow zones. The
need for annular shut off is driven by the likelihood of encountering a shallow hazard
(water flow, gas, hydrates) and whether a backup to mud weight and cement is
considered necessary to provide an increased safety factor (justifying the extra
cost). The annular shut-off seal is intended to ensure that flow does not occur
during the transition period, while cement is setting or after cement has set due to
cement channeling. Because the seal is hydraulically activated, it does not increase
Installation time, as no additional tripping is required.
3.3.2 RIGID LOCK-DOWN
In deepwater drilling applications, a rigid lock-down mechanism preloads the 18 ¾"

and 36" housing to provide resistance to the cyclic stresses that are generated from
the platform motions down through the riser. Currents can also cause vortex
shedding on the riser which, in turn, can cause cyclic loading. Preloading provides
torsional resistance as well, which may be generated by a moment at the wellhead
due to DP operations. Visual ports in the guide funnel and clearly marked
references are monitored by ROV for correct positioning of the 18 ¾" and 36"
housings to allow activation of the lock-down mechanism.
3.3.3 ROV INTERVENTION
The wellhead should be designed for quick and easy ROV intervention when
performing primary and secondary tasks, such as installation and retrieval of the
guide base, bit guide, temporary abandonment (TA) cap, guideposts and wellhead
connector ring gasket. To save valuable Installation time, ROV interface operations
should be designed offline when possible. It should also be possible to inject
corrosion-inhibiting fluids through the corrosion cap in the wellhead.
APPENDIX: 7
RISER OPERATIONS
Guidelines for Moving onto a Previously Installed Subsea Wellhead
1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this document is to give the Rig Manager and Offshore Personnel
guidance for information gathering and documentation needed prior to moving onto
and existing wellhead. This is of particular importance when moving onto a wellhead
that the rig did not set, or has been away from for an extended period of time. This
guideline is not meant to be used in template, subsea development or other types of
multi-well operations where the same rig batch sets several wellheads, before
moving back over them to finish drilling, sidetrack or complete.
2 BACKGROUND
Increasingly, our rigs are being called on to perform operations on wells that were
drilled by other rigs or operators, or wells that we have not been on for some time.
This experience has highlighted the importance of evaluating what condition the
wellhead and well below it are in, prior to commencing operations. One of the
objectives of this guideline is minimizing the downtime impact resulting from
damage, inclination or other problems with previously installed wellhead equipment.
3 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE
3.1 Well location coordinates should be obtained from the operator along with the
block, well number and ocs-g number, as applicable. This information should
be verified with a third party, preferably the survey company who located the
rig that originally drilled the well. Seabed surveys around the well should be
obtained to verify the location of any other structures or installations around
the location. In addition, a copy of the seabed clearance survey performed
following the last operation on the well should be obtained from the operator.
3.2 After arriving on location and locating the wellhead, a detailed rov video
survey should be recorded of the wellhead, permanent guide base and any
other support structure around the wellhead, as well as the seabed before
any well intervention operations are commenced. A video of the readings and
position of any angle indicating equipment should also be recorded. The OIM
and toolpusher should review these video surveys before any operation on
the well is started. Any anomalies should be discussed with the rig manager
and operator representative before proceeding.
APPENDIX: 7
RISER OPERATIONS
3.3 A detailed ROV video survey should be recorded of the wellhead as soon as
the corrosion cap is pulled, before any cleaning or other operations are
commenced.
3.4 The wellhead should be jetted and brush as clean as possible, in particular
the ring gasket seal area and connector latch profile.
3.5 The inside of the wellhead should be jetted and brushed clean deep as
possible inside the wellhead bore.
3.6 Any other wellhead structures should be jetted and cleaned, removing any
debris that may inhibit well intervention operations.
3.7 A post cleaning video survey should be recorded to document the results of
the cleaning effort and establish a base line for future comparison. The
gasket seal area and connector latch profile should be emphasized on the
survey.
3.8 Run the wellhead angle survey tool (wast) with bull’s-eye and land in the
wellhead. Ensure that tool lands level and verify with rov video from the side
of the wellhead. Record video of the observed wellhead inclination and make
a hard copy drawing. Rotate the wast tool 90 deg. And re-check the tools
land out and record inclination. Repeat two times, rotating the tool 90 deg
each time.
3.9 Any wear bushings or other wellhead protection devices should be removed
and inspected before commencing operations. A detailed photo survey of the
wear bushing should be made and included in the written report. If wellhead
protection devices are found to have noticeable wear, the OIM, company
representative, rig manager, operations manager (if applicable), and Business
Unit or Division Manager should all be made aware of the situation.
3.10 Observed readings should be documented and the detailed inspection report
prepared and signed by ROV operator and wellhead manufacturer
representative. The OIM and company representative should then approve
the documentation.
APPENDIX: 7
RISER OPERATIONS
3.11 A copy of the signed bull’s-eye observation reports and detailed inspection
reports, along with a copy of the video of the operation, should be sent to the
rig manager to be included in the rigs well operations documentation file.
3.12 If observed reading indicate that the wellhead inclination is over 1° do ,not
commence operations until the special requirements for this situation are met.
These requirements are detailed in the field operations manual section 3
subsection 2.5 item 4.3.
3.13 Recommended practice regarding flex joint to wellhead differential angle is

addressed in section 3 subsection 2.5 appendix 3 of this manual.
3.14 Recommended practice regarding wellhead and surface casing design

strength for deepwater installation operations is addressed in section 3
subsection 2.5 appendix 6 of this manual.
3.15 If the exact angle of the wellhead is of high importance, or the inclination
measuring methods available on the rig does not resolve most discrepancies,
a survey technique is available from gyro data using their earth rate sensing
gyro tool. Special stabilization equipment is required for this survey and the
equipment may not always be available. Sufficient lead-time to air freight the
stabilization equipment from the U.K. may be required, so planning ahead is
important if you think you may need this degree of survey accuracy.
DYNAMIC POSITIONING WELL SPECIFIC OPERATING GUIDELINES
(WSOG)
PROCEDURE
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG)
1 POLICY
Well Specific Operations Guidelines (WSOG) for dynamic positioning

operations must be developed for each DP Installation at each location.

Subsection 2.6.
2 PURPOSE
Forward planning is essential to efficient DP operations leaving no room for doubt or

dissension and that the DP Operator and Driller on-duty at the time of an emergency
act to the same priorities without undue hesitation.
The purpose of a WSOG is to identify the potential critical issues that influence a DP
Installation to undertake an emergency disconnect in the event of system failure(s).
By identifying critical items, it is possible to rank the relevance of that item in the
decision path and initiate the correct level of DP status alert.
3 SCOPE
This procedure is applicable to all dynamic positioned Installations.
4 PROCEDURE
4.1 A WSOG must include information such as approach to location, location of
other Installations in the immediate area, beacon deployment and Installation
heading. Information on the expected environmental conditions for the
proposed location must be obtained and used in the preparation of the site-
specific plan.
4.2 The WSOG must take into account all the site-specific criteria outlined within
the Riser Management plan.
4.3 The WSOG document must clearly and systematically identify significant
limiting criteria that impact upon the station keeping ability of the vessel. The
document must quantify the minimum availability of these criteria for the
various stages of degrading operational status, i.e. through the deteriorating
operational conditions:
Green Advisory YYeellloow
w Red
(WSOG)
PROCEDURE
It is the responsibility of the onboard management team to set the limits,

which are effective for their particular Installation, well site, etc.
4.4 Bathymetric charts must be obtained defining sub sea obstructions and
depths at the drilling site. This information is essential to planning an escape
route. In some cases such as field development, extensive seabed
architecture may require a Hazard Identification review.
4.5 The WSOG must take into account the Installation’s equipment and
capabilities, the site specific and client requirements, including but not limited
to:
• Establish the definition of an Emergency Disconnect.
• Identify each DP alert level and define the system(s) status for each
level including operational requirements with respect to systems,
power and environmental criteria when DP station must be maintained.
• Identify any issues that may influence an Emergency Disconnect.
4.6 The WSOG must be reviewed by the onboard operations team and carry the
endorsement of the OIM, Master, Toolpusher, Driller and Chief Engineer /
Maintenance Supervisor. If the client actively requires such a WSOG, the
issued document must carry the signatures of the Rig Manager and the
Client. The client must be made aware of the WSOG if he has not actually
requested such a document. Once agreed the WSOG for that location must
be forwarded to the Rig Manager.
5 RESPONSIBILITY
5.1 BUSINESS UNIT OPERATIONS MANAGER / DIVISION MANAGER(I)
The Business Unit Operations Manager and Division Manager are responsible for
ensuring Business Unit uniformity of Installation marine operations.
5.2 RIG MANAGER (D)
The Rig Manager is responsible for ensuring Installation operations are conducted in
accordance with Company Policy and Procedures. The Rig Manager is responsible
for ensuring a Well Specific Operating Guideline is established for each drilling
location.
(WSOG)
PROCEDURE
5.3 OIM (D)
6 REFERENCES
1. Field Operations Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-05, Section 3.2.6, Dynamic
Positioning WSOG:
• Appendix 1, Recommended Practice, Well Specific Operating
Guidelines
• Appendix 2, Recommended Practice, Well Specific Operating
Guidelines – DST Example
• Appendix 3, Recommended Practice, Dynamic Positioning
Watchcircles
• Appendix 4, Recommended Practice, Personnel
• Appendix 5, Recommended Practice, Communication and Alarms
• Appendix 6, Recommended Practice, Documentation and Reporting
• Appendix 7, Recommended Practice, DP Operations and Trials
• Appendix 8, Recommended Practice, DP Technical Issues
2. Petrobras DPPS Emergency Disconnection Procedures
3. Installation Specific DP Capability Plots
4. Installation Specific FMEA and Proving Trials
5. IMO 645 Guidelines for Vessels fitted with DP Systems
6. Installation Specific Emergency Response Manual
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operational Guidelines (WSOG)
1 PRIORITIES
Priorities should be clearly established for dealing with a DP problem. The

authority of the Master and OIM are of fundamental importance at such times.
They should co-operate closely on these priorities so there is no room for doubt or
dissension and the DP Operator and Driller on-duty at the time of an emergency
act to the same priorities without undue hesitation.
As a guideline, if time permits at least the following should be assessed jointly by

the DPO, Master and OIM during any alert condition. If circumstances warrant,
an immediate RED alert may be issued by the DPO, Master, OIM, or Driller
without consultation or discussion.
• Position or heading performance loss

• Weather conditions
• Drilling operation
• Expected changes in work progress
• Additional hazards as a result of alert
• Change of weather
• Time required to reach a stable condition
• Emergency response requirements
2 REFERENCE MATERIAL
The following documents may be useful references in establishing the Offshore

Installation specific Well Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG):
• Petrobras DPPS Emergency Disconnection Procedures
• IMCA DP Guidance Documents and Incident Data Base
• DP Capability Plots
• FMEA and Proving Trials.
• Operator specific well, field, or operational requirements
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
3 WSOG PROCESS DEFINITIONS
3.1 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT
An Emergency Disconnect is defined as an event that generates a RED DP alert

and initiates the automatic process that secures the well, disconnects the LMRP
from the BOP followed by movement of the Offshore Installation along a pre-
ordained escape route to deeper water clear of subsea architecture.
3.2 DP STATUS ALERT LEVELS
Offshore Installations operating offshore Brazil should assess these requirements

against those limitations contained in the Degraded Status Document agreed
between the Client and the Offshore Installation.
Offshore Installations operating in areas other than Brazil should use the Alert
definitions and WSOG process outlined herein.
The Company defines four alert levels as follows:
NORMAL = GREEN
The following condition applies when the Offshore Installation is in a Normal or

GREEN operating status and is either connecting or connected to the seabed:
• The Offshore Installation should be under DP Control and the DP system
operating normally with appropriate back up systems available.
• Thrust and total power consumption is equal to or less than the maximum
thrust and power that would be needed after the worst case single failure to
avoid exceeding the critical excursion.
• Offshore Installation's indicated position and heading are within
predetermined limits.
• Negligible risk of collision exists from other vessels.
ADVISORY (no color allocated)
The Offshore Installation is able to maintain position when in an "ADVISORY"

operating condition, but there has been an equipment, system or component
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
failure that when combined with another similar failure could result in a change of
operating status. The Offshore Installation should be in the ADVISORY condition
when the following apply:
• A failure in a subsystem has occurred leaving the DP system in an
operational state but insufficient back up available to meet Class
requirements.
• The Offshore Installation is under stable DP control but with temporarily
reduced capability in some way. The loss of a thruster, generator, or
sensor in use would temporarily put the vessel in Advisory mode. Once
capability is restored Advisory Mode ends. (Advisory mode does not
include equipment out of service for maintenance or repairs).
• Offshore Installation’s indicated position and heading are outside
predetermined limits.
• Close or simultaneous operations such that the risk of collision warrants
monitoring.
The ADVISORY condition is designed in order that supervisory staff can assess
any failure or loss of performance against current and planned operations in order
to make prudent changes to planned operations. The Advisory condition should be
used whenever there is a reasonable risk of progression to YELLOW alert status.
PREPARE FOR DISCONNECT = YELLOW
The watch circle distance or operational situation at which drilling operations stop,
the well is secured, and preparations are made to conduct an emergency
disconnect should the Offshore Installation continue to lose station. Typically the
YELLOW Alert watch circle is set to a percentage (e.g. 50% or 60%) of the
distance from well center to the red watch circle. This distance must be reduced
in circumstances that reduce reaction time, e.g. high current or wind, or shallow
water operations. In all cases the YELLOW watch circle must be set such that
there is sufficient time to terminate drilling operations and secure the well before
reaching the RED watch circle.
A YELLOW Alert status should exist when the Offshore Installation has lost some
form of DP capability that presents a high likelihood of resulting in a disconnect.
In addition, in the event of a well control situation being outside normal
parameters, the change of alert status may be generated from the drill floor. Also,
the DPO, Driller, OIM, or Captain may declare a YELLOW ALERT status at any
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
time, based upon their judgment that environmental or operational considerations

may require a disconnect.
During operations when disconnect would result in an oil discharge, specifically

when oil based mud or produced hydrocarbons are inside the marine drilling riser,
YELLOW ALERT will be declared upon the loss of critical DP equipment
redundancy. During operations with low or no risk of an oil discharge, YELLOW
ALERT with regards to loss of DP equipment redundancy will be situation-
specific, at the discretion of the Captain or OIM based upon assessment of risk.
For example, loss of all but one gyrocompass might be considered an ADVISORY
situation while waiting on cement to harden in a well and drilling with water based
mud, but would be an automatic YELLOW ALERT while drilling ahead with oil
based mud. The increase risk of gyro failure resulting in oil discharge warrants
the increased caution of hanging off and displacing the oil based mud. If the
Captain and OIM feel that operations can safely continue with reduced
redundancy and risk of an oil discharge, an exemption may be granted after
discussion with the Rig Manager and shore based DP Superintendent.
Examples of situations that might be considered YELLOW alert are:

• Offshore Installation velocity is such that available thruster power cannot
halt Offshore Installation momentum before crossing the YELLOW watch
circle.
• Drilling with oil based mud and loss of all but one position reference sensor
• Loss of all but one gyrocompass while producing wellbore hydrocarbons.
• Offshore Installation’s position keeping performance is deteriorating and/or
unstable.
• Offshore Installation’s indicated position deviates beyond established limits
for efficient riser management.
• Environmental conditions exceed Offshore Installation’s anticipated
operational capability limits.
• Thruster power demand reaches the upper limit specified by the WSOG
(e.g. 80%) for any period more than occasional peak demands, i.e. less
than 1 minute.
• Thruster per-buss spare capacity is less than the minimum specified by the
WSOG (e.g. WSOG may require capacity of one spare thruster available
on each buss)
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
• Total power demand exceeds predetermined upper limit as defined by the

vessel’s WSOG.
• Collision or risk of collision from another vessel.
• Client specified limits as agreed upon in the WSOG.
• Well control situation or risk of a well control situation that is likely to result
in disconnect.
DISCONNECT = RED
A RED Alert Status exists when the riser angle cannot be maintained within
operating limits and immediate disconnect is required to prevent damage or injury
to personnel, the environment or equipment as defined in the WSOG. The RED
watch circle is the distance inside the Point of Disconnect (POD) at which the
disconnect sequence must be initiated in order to properly unlatch the LMRP from
the BOP before the POD is reached. The riser should be unlatched when:
• The position excursion crosses the RED watch circle.
• Offshore Installation velocity is such that recovery before exceeding the
RED watch circle is impossible.
• Offshore Installation velocity is such that available thruster power cannot
halt Offshore Installation momentum before crossing the POD.
• Environmental forces are such that with maximum available power and
thrust the Offshore Installation is still losing location, and this situation is
not going to change by the time the Offshore Installation reaches the RED
watch circle.
• Failures put the Offshore Installation in such a position that recovery before
exceeding the RED watch circle is impossible (e.g. blackout recovery time
exceeds drift-off time)
• There is an imminent risk of danger by maintaining the Offshore Installation
on location, i.e. collision.
• There is an imminent risk of danger to the Offshore Installation and crew
due to a deteriorating well control situation.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
4 WSOG OPERATIONAL PLANNING
The WSOG identifies satisfactory operation of numerous systems and the

integrity of the back up systems providing redundancy. There are five main areas
where there is an ability to define failure impact or quantify limiting factors:
• Hardware Limitations
• Systems Limitations
• Riser Limitations
• Environmental Limits
• Operational Limits
4.1 HARDWARE LIMITATIONS
The main hardware components effecting DP status are identified in Table 3.2.6.1
Potential Hardware Failure Considerations.
The operational alert level is defined by relating to the level of redundancy

available after a single system failure. When defining the alert level required,
consideration should be taken of the risk involved by operating with this reduced
capability.
For example,
• The loss of a communication system has a minimal impact, which can
be defined and accommodated by procedure or backup options (such
as handheld radios).
• The loss of a thruster in certain circumstances may be of little
consequence but in others could be critical.
Loss of Position reference systems may in certain circumstances be sustainable,

i.e. dead reckoning may be acceptable for short periods, as long as the riser angle
sensors are properly calibrated and able to verify that the vessel has not reached
red alert status.
Table 3.2.6.1 identifies possible system failure criteria and considerations.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
Table 3.2.6.1-Potential Hardware Failure Considerations
System Failure Class II DP Unit Class III DP Unit Comments

DP Control Standard requirement a Same as Class II plus Recovery Time is
Unit dual redundant system ability to withstand critical, also location of
compartment loss due to backup controller(s)
fire/flood. Typically at
least 2 plus 1 systems.
Wind Sensors 2 Required 2 Plus 1 required Only critical if significant
wind is present.
Motion Sensors 2 Required Same as Class II plus Reliability of individual
ability to withstand units reduces risk of any
compartment loss due to single failure. Site
fire/flood. specific, MRUs are not
critical to all position
reference sensors
Heading 2 Required Same as Class II plus Reliability of individual
Sensors ability to withstand units reduces risk
compartment loss due to presented by any single
fire/flood. Typically at failure.
least 2 plus 1 sensors.
Position 2 + 1 Independent Same as Class II plus Criticality of failure
Reference dissimilar systems ability to withstand depends on effect of
Systems compartment loss due to sensor loss on Offshore
fire/flood. Typically at Installation’s ability to
least 2 plus 1 systems. hold station.
Communication 2 Independent systems 2 Independent systems. Criticality depends on
Systems availability of backup
systems (e.g. hand held
radios). Status lights
should have suitable
UPS back up.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS

Generator Sufficient power Sufficient power Single worst case
generation available to generation available to failure should have
meet demand in event meet demand in event been determined within
of a single worst case of a single worst case the Offshore
failure failure or compartment Installation’s DP
loss due to fire/flood. capability plots.
Thrusters Sufficient units on line Sufficient units on line or Single worst case failure
or available at any time available at any time to should have been
to maintain Offshore maintain Offshore determined within the
Installation on location Installation on location in Offshore Installation’s
in event of loss of worst event of loss of worst FMEA, and proven by
case Bus Bar. case Bus Bar or documented trials
compartment loss due to
flood or fire.
Network Dual network Dual network Does failure mode
disable network or
controllers?
UPS UPSes to be UPSes to be configured Battery life determines

configured to provide at to provide at least single required rapidity of
least single system system availability in response.
availability in event of event of loss of main
loss of main supply supply or compartment
loss due to flood or fire
4.2 SYSTEM LIMITATIONS
System limitations can be established to assure sufficient spare capacity to cover

a worst case failure. On an Offshore Installation with few generators of large
capacity, the loss of a single generator may critically impact upon power
availability and station keeping, whereas on an Offshore Installation with multiple
small generators the loss of a single generator is less critical. A similar scenario
applies in the thrust consumption requirements and the loss of worst case thruster
should be considered. Refer to Table 3.2.6.2.
APPENDIX: 1
OPERATIONS
For Offshore Installations capable of operating with open or closed busbars, the
concept of working both with open and close busbars should be considered and
suitable limits set for both configurations.
All Offshore Installations have typical position and heading performance

characteristics (footprints). The ability (or inability) of the Offshore Installation to
maintain these performance characteristics provide the DPO with a significant
indicator of the DP System’s capability relative to normal performance.
Table 3.2.6.2-Potential System Failure Areas Effecting DP System Status

Power Should not be Should not be Bias and drilling
Consumption greater than the total greater than the power not to be
power available less total power available considered as part
largest generator on a less largest of power
per-bus basis. generator on a per- consumption
bus basis. calculations
Thrust Maximum limit on unit Maximum limit on Bias not to be
Consumption demand to be set and unit demand total considered as part
maximum limit on system thrust on a of thrust limitations.
total system thrust on per-bus basis. Both
a per-bus basis. Both to be set in event of
to be set in event of loss of most useful
loss of most useful unit
unit
DP Position Set limiting criteria Set limiting criteria Depends on
Footprint over suitable time over suitable time environment and
(over set time) scale scale operations
DP Heading Set limiting criteria Set limiting criteria Depends on
Footprint over suitable time over suitable time environment and
(over set time) scale (e.g. 5 minutes) scale (e.g. 5 operations
minutes)
APPENDIX: 1
DYNAMIC POSITIONING WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Well Specific Operational Guidelines
4.3 RISER LIMITATIONS
The intent of the dynamic position keeping system is to maintain the Offshore
Installation in a location that has been defined by the location specific riser
management document. The dynamics of riser management are driven by an
extensive number of variables.
For Offshore Installation operational purposes the definition of the mechanical

limitations upon the riser is established with respect to position in the form of
allowable Offset. Offset should have its own margin of safety which is given by
YELLOW and RED limitations, which ties back to riser management. The
relationship between the riser watch circles and the DP position and heading alarm
status is shown in diagrams below.
As a guideline, the Offshore Installation is expected (as far as possible) to be

stationed at the ZAP (Zero Angle Position). ZAP is defined as the position of
Offshore Installation which maintains the differential angle between the BOP and
LFJ / Riser Adapter as close to zero as possible. As such, the Offshore Installation
may not be directly over the well / BOP position when connected when holding
position at the ZAP.
Close monitoring of the BOP / LFJ sensors is required and use should be made of
trend options within the DP Control system software to maintain the ZAP. It is the
effect of not having the riser perpendicular to the BOP (not in the ZAP position) and
movement of the drill pipe that causes “key seating” of subsea equipment. It is the
OIM/Master's responsibility to decide on the optimum position over the well bearing
in mind the following:
• Present weather conditions
• Drilling operations (casing, production trees, etc.)
• Current, surface and water column conditions
• Riser condition including length (water depth), weight and net tension applied
• Sub-surface Sensor availability and accuracy
• Position of unit when BOP (or in re-entry) LMRP when landed
• Slip joint stroke limitations and space-out set-up
• Limitation imposed by moonpool or tensioning system
• Any difficulties in passing tubulars through BOP
APPENDIX: 1

Offshore Installation motion limitations are also a factor that should clearly be
identified within the well specific riser management document. Offshore Installation
motions may influence a possible course of action in the event of a degradation of
operating status.
Figure 3.2.6.1 illustrates the relationship between the Riser watch circles derived
from the Riser Management data, and the Offshore Installation watch circle which is
set as a standard DP alarm criteria. It should be noted the Offshore Installation ZAP
set point is at a position offset from the Well center. This position is defined by the
various riser criteria and environmental conditions.
Figure 3.2.6.1 illustrates the relationship between the Riser watch circles derived
from the Riser Management data, and the Offshore Installation watch circle which is
set as a standard DP alarm criteria. It should be noted the Offshore Installation Zero
Riser Angle Position (ZAP) set point may be at a position offset from the Well center.
This position is defined by the various riser criteria and environmental conditions.
The ZAP set point is the location from which the YELLOW and RED Watch Circles
are calculated. The YELLOW and RED watch circles are dynamic limits that vary
with respect to ongoing riser and environmental conditions. To determine the
appropriate watch circle radius the site specific riser management plan (from HQS
Engineering) should be used. If available, an Offshore Installation specific drift off
program can be used to calculate the RED watch circle for prevailing environments
based on riser point of disconnect limits in the riser management plan. The RED
Watch Circle is established by the Emergency BOP Disconnect Sequence (EDS)
timing and the Point of Disconnect (POD) as calculated by the well specific riser
analysis. The RED circle will be set to the lesser of the RED circle established by
the driftoff time to POD or fixed maximum limits as defined by regional or client
requirements. The YELLOW Watch Circle is typically defined as some percentage
of RED, but in all cases must include sufficient time for the Driller to hang off.
APPENDIX: 1

Figure 3.2.6.1-Riser Watch Circles and Vessel Position Watch Circle
RED is “EDS
Seconds” inside
POD
Point of Disconnect
(POD) defined by Riser
Analysis
Environment YELLOW at least
“Hang-off Seconds”
inside RED
YELLOW
Watch Circle
RED Watch
Circle
Well
Center
Adjustable
DP Position
Alarm
Set Point or Zero

Riser Angle Position
(ZAP) may not be
well center
APPENDIX: 1

4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL LIMITS
Offshore Installation operating environmental limitations should be taken into

account at all times. As environmental forces increase, the propulsion and
generation systems may approach maximum operating capability for DP
classification. Drift-off speed will be accelerated resulting in reduced operational
margins and time for problem recognition and decision making. Water depth is a
key factor in determination of environmental limits.
Environmental limits are Offshore Installation specific and should be checked on a

periodic basis. Prevailing environmental conditions affect the Red and Yellow alerts.
Specifically, increased environmental forces reduce the Red and Yellow circles.
Table 3.2.6.3-Environmental Limits

Wind Speed Limit to be Limit to be Information
quantified quantified available within the
DP capability study
document
Wind Direction Limit to be Limit to be Information
DP capability study
document
Surface current Limit to be Limit to be Information
DP capability study
document
Significant wave Limit to be Limit to be Information
height quantified quantified available within the
DP capability study
document
APPENDIX: 1

4.5 OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS
Offshore Installation may have operational limitations for at least the following
situations.
• Heave (while deploying templates or re-entry)
• Pitch or roll during crane operations or rigging up equipment
• Wind / wave / current while running riser (buoyancy damage or bending)
• Wind / wave / current while running or pulling casing
• SIMOPS
• Critical operations (DST, running templates, etc.)
• Wind / wave / current while loading/offloading boats
5 DRIVE OFF / DRIFT OFF / FORCE OFF
In the event of a Drive-off there is a significant thrust ramp up above what is required
to hold station. In this case, remedial action must be immediate. If remedial action is
ineffective in halting the increase in velocity, YELLOW and RED alerts will result.
In the case of a Drift-off, the rate and direction of movement away from the location
are dependent upon environmental forces. Drift-off data are quantified by technical
analysis and where possible should be checked against measured performance
during pre-location, annual, or DP trials. Measured drift rates and the best possible
estimate of ambient current, wind, and waves should be sent via the Offshore
Installation Manager to the HQS Engineering Department for evaluation relative to
model predictions.
In the case of a Force-off, the rate and direction of movement away from the location
are dependent upon environmental forces and available thrust. The WSOG should
consider situations where environmental forces are approaching the limit of the
Offshore Installation’s capability.
6 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION
The following documentation is of significant benefit when determining any criteria

affecting the Emergency Disconnect criteria:
APPENDIX: 1

6.1 FMEA AND FMEA TRIALS REPORT
This document should clearly identify possible failure modes. Knowing these, an
appreciation can be made of their impact at any specific instance. In addition, the
FMEA trials also verify failure patterns and consequences which provide background
information regarding capability in the event of a particular system failure.
6.2 DP TRIALS REPORT
This document should provide valuable proven data on Offshore Installation

performance in certain power and thrust configurations. The performance section
should provide data on actual drift-off tests and power consumption and thruster
loadings for an assortment of standard tests for both heading and position changes.
6.3 DP CAPABILITY PLOTS
This document should identify expected Offshore Installation performance for an

assortment of weather criteria and thruster configuration. In particular the document
should clearly identify the expected Offshore Installation performance in the event of
a worst case failure condition.
6.4 INTEGRATED DP CAPABILITY / DRIFT-OFF PLOTS
The DP software may include integrated DP Capability and/or drift-off plots. If

available, it should be used to estimate Offshore Installation performance for an
assortment of weather criteria and thruster configuration, in particular to identify the
expected Offshore Installation performance in the event of a worst case failure
condition.
Where this software is available, it should be periodically consulted to estimate

Offshore Installation performance for existing weather criteria and thruster
configuration. This information may be used to improve the watch circle
calculations.
6.5 LOCATION SPECIFIC RISER MANAGEMENT DOCUMENT
This document should clearly identify the limiting criteria for the safe management of
the riser during specific operations. It not only specifies the limiting offsets but also
limiting weather criteria for specific operations.
APPENDIX: 1

6.6 DRIFT OFF AND WATCH CIRCLE CALCULATOR
This Excel spreadsheet is provided by Houston Engineering Department for each

well. The spreadsheet calculates drift off criteria and associated Red and Yellow
watch circles.
7 WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
7.1 WSOG REVIEW & APPROVAL
The review process for the WSOG should include the OIM, Captain, Company man,
Electrical and Maintenance Supervisors, plus any other personnel who may have
situation specific knowledge (e.g. if non-standard operations like well testing or
SIMOPS are planned). The completed WSOG should be forwarded to the Rig
Manager and to the DP Operations Superintendent .
7.2 WSOG TEMPLATE
An example follows of a template for the WSOG of a Class III Offshore Installation.
The items to be covered are not definitive or exclusive. Each and every Offshore
Installation is expected to arrive at a slightly different WSOG, as per the particular
requirements of the Offshore Installation, environment, operations, and customer
preferences.
The tabulated data demonstrate the degree of quantification required and possible
limiting factors. The attached format should be used, but modified to meet the
particular requirements of the Offshore Installation. While some Offshore
Installations may require more qualifications, most will require less than shown in
this template. If a more restrictive limitation always sets the minimum requirement,
the less restrictive limitation(s) should be left out of the final guideline to reduce
confusion. (e.g. if riser tensioner pull-down always occurs before maximum slip joint
extension, maximum slip joint extension need not be included as a limitation)
Note: The limiting figures contained in the sample WSOG are hypothetical and
provided as guidance only. It is the responsibility of the onboard management
team to set appropriate limits for their particular Offshore Installation, well
site, etc. No limit should be included in the WSOG that is not fully understood
and accepted by all signatories.
APPENDIX: 1

WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES (WSOG)
VESSEL: ________________________ DATE: ____________

LOCATION: Block: WELL: CLIENT:
Riser Limits (from Site Specific Riser Document)
Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red

Riser limitation UFJ 0 – 1.5 deg 2 deg. 3 deg 5 deg
.
Note: this is only an
example, required value
is specified by riser
analysis
Riser limitation LFJ 0 – 0.5 > .5 deg. 3 deg 5 deg
deg. .
Note: specified by riser
analysis
Riser twist < 90 deg 90 – 140 140 deg 200 deg
deg
Note, actual numbers
depend on rig
Distance from ZAP
DRIVE OFF 0 – 10m 10 – 14m >14m or Immediately when
DRIFT OFF Immediately confirmed that situation
FORCE OFF when recognized cannot be controlled.
Unit offset deviation that cessation of No later that at 50
Water depth: Ops required meters offset from Initial
meters (Pre-incident) Position.
Note: these are

hypothetical
numbers, real
numbers come from
the driftoff analysis or
client requirements
APPENDIX: 1

Power; Thrust/Electrical

Power consumption <60% 60% >80% or > 90%
unified HV bus consequence
(note 1) alarm with all
generators,
Note: these are only whichever occurs
hypothetical first
numbers for this
example
Power consumption <50% 50% >70% or > 90% either buss
each bus (2-splt HV consequence
bus) (note 1) alarm with all
generators,
whichever occurs
first
Power consumption < 50% 50 % >70% or > 90% any buss
each bus (4-split HV consequence
bus) (note 1) alarm with all
generators,
whichever occurs
first

Thrust consumption <50% 50% >70% sustained 90% sustained for over
each online unit ( 2- over 60 seconds 60 seconds, highest
split HV bus) (note 2) loaded unit
Thrust consumption < 50 % 50 % >70 % sustained 90% sustained for over
each online unit (4- over 60 seconds 60 seconds, highest
split HV bus) (note 2) loaded unit
Note 1: Station keeping power only - DP Bias and other sheddable Power not part of calculation
Note 2: Station keeping thrust only - DP Bias thrust not part of calculation
APPENDIX: 1

Footprint Alarm Settings

DP position footprint <3m 3m Situation specific Situation specific
(5 min. maximum
from set point)
DP heading footprint <3 deg. 3 – 5 deg. 5 deg. If threat to If threat to position
(5 min. maximum position
from set point)
System Redundancy

DP control system 3+1 Any failure 1 or 0
backup or loss of failure/loss of
performanc backup
e in any controller if
system risk of oil
discharge,
situation
specific
otherwise
Network 2 NA 1 or 0
failure/loss of
backup
controller if
risk of oil
discharge,
situation
specific
otherwise
APPENDIX: 1

Reference Systems

Position reference 3 Failure One remaining If threat to position
available independe or loss (when there is a
nt of risk of oil
perform discharge).
ance Situation specific
otherwise.
Wind sensors 3 2 Yellow Alert If threat to position
Radius
Motion sensors (VRS) 3 2 Yellow Alert If threat to position
Radius
Heading sensors (Gyro) 3 2 One remaining If threat to position
(when there is a
risk of oil
discharge).
Situation specific
otherwise.
Communications
Comms systems Dual 1 Situation specific Situation specific

systems
(DP/Driller)
Offshore Installation Motion (MOM, Riser Document & DP Capability Manual)

Heave Situation Situation Situation specific Situation specific
specific specific
Pitch Situation Situation Situation specific Situation specific
specific specific
Roll Situation Situation Situation specific Situation specific
specific specific
APPENDIX: 1

Operational Status

Nonshearables Normal ½ normal Situation specific Situation specific
through BOP limits advisory
limits
Production testing Normal ½ normal ½ RED, adjusted RED adjusted for
limits advisory for additional time additional EDS time
limits to secure well
Operational Action

Advise Master, Issue alarm and
Normal OIM, Driller, Issue alarm and follow procedures
Action required
status Toolpusher, follow procedures
Company Rep.
Notify Master and
Normal
OIM immediately Y Y Y
conditions
(Y/N)
Notify Client Normal
Y Y Y
immediately (Y/N) conditions
Alerting should be used during both connected and non-connected situations. Escape
route: (To be identified: shortest route to Deep water crossing no subsea obstructions)
Well: __________ Direction: __________
APPENDIX: 1

WSOG Assessment Team
Position Name Signature Date

Master
OIM
TP
Chief Engineer
Signed on behalf of Company: Signed on behalf of Client:
Title : ___________________________ Title : ___________________________
Print Name : _____________________ Print Name : _____________________
Signature: ______________________ Signature: ______________________
APPENDIX: 2
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines - Well Testing
1 DP – DST GENERAL
The key factors to ensure an effective DP-Well Test (DST) Operation, are vigilant
and conscientious watch-keeping, combined with an ability to react immediately with
the correct remedial action in the event of a worse case scenario occurring at the
worst possible moment.
Forward planning is essential to safe DP-DST operations. A plan should be

developed for each DST operation that includes limiting Installation motions, limiting
environmental conditions and Installation specific DST Example Procedures to
ensure the potential for damage to the test string or sub sea equipment is minimised.
2 – DST OPERATING EXAMPLES
A Well Specific Operations Guidelines document should be completed specifically

for DST Operations prior to the commencement of DST operations. This WSOG is
in addition to that required for drilling at a new site. The DST-WSOG should be
reviewed by the onboard operations team and carry the endorsement of the OIM,
Driller, Master, and Chief Engineer. The client should be made aware of the DST
WSOG if he has not actually requested such a document Once agreed the DST-
WSOG for that location should be forwarded to the Rig Manager.
The DST-WSOG document should clearly and systematically identify significant

limiting criteria that impact upon the station keeping ability of the vessel. The
document should quantify the minimum availability of these criteria for the various
stages of degrading operational status, i.e.; through the deteriorating operational
conditions:
Green Advisory YYeellloow

w Red
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines - Watch Circles
1 DEFINITION OF TERMS
In order to standardize approach, several terms and their definitions are as follows:
1.1 POINT OF DISCONNECT (POD)
The distance from well center at which the LMRP must lift clear of the BOP in order to
prevent riser parameters (flex joint angles, stroke out, stresses, wellhead bending
moments, etc.) from exceeding allowed limits.
1.2 RED WATCH CIRCLE
The distance from the vessel set point at which the emergency disconnect sequence
must be initiated (pushing the EDS button) in order to properly unlatch the LMRP from
the BOP before any riser limit is exceeded.
1.3 YELLOW WATCH CIRCLE
The distance from the vessel set point at which drilling operations stop and
preparations are made to conduct an emergency disconnect should the Installation
continue to lose station. Typically, this distance is one-half the distance from the set
point to the red watch circle.
1.4 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT SEQUENCE TIME
The time in seconds for the disconnect sequence to occur from the point of pushing
the EDS button until the LMRP connector opens to allow the LMRP to separate from
the BOP. This time is to be determined on board the Installation by the OIM or
Toolpusher for the EDS sequence in use for a given operation.
1.5 REACTION TIME
The duration of time from the start of a drift-off until the Installation moves to the red
watch circle.
1.6 DRIFT-OFF
A condition where the Installation loses station due to a power blackout. The
Installation will tend to drift in the direction of the resulting environmental forces of
wind, wave and current directions.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
1.7 DRIVE-OFF
A condition where the vessel attempts to move off location under power due to a bad
or errant position reference signal, a thruster malfunction, or other means.
2 BACKGROUND & TECHNICAL INFORMATION
In order to determine the red disconnect watch circle of a dynamic positioned vessel
the following information is required:
• Environmental forces specific to the subject vessel
• Estimated drift off curves providing time versus position for a number of wind
speed and directions
• Riser connected limits for slip joint stroke, maximum upper and lower flex joint
angles, and wellhead bending moment limit.
The first two points are obtained from model tests and computer simulations for each
Installation. The drift curves are independent of water depth (for a given wind speed
the Installation will drift at a certain rate, regardless of water depth), therefore, no
matter what the site water depth one set of drift curves will apply for the Installation on
all locations. The third point, however, is determined on a well-by-well basis as the
riser limits are highly dependent upon water depth, current profile, top tension, and
mud weight.
The red disconnect watch circle is an ever-changing limit based on the environment at
a given time. When little or no wind and current are present the watch circle may be
quite large and the reaction time before initiating an EDS during a power loss situation
is a considerable amount. The time may be so great as to allow power recovery and
repositioning before it becomes necessary to start the disconnect sequence.
However, if winds pick up, the drift rate of the vessel will increase and the watch circle
will need to be tightened in order to provide time for an EDS sequence before drifting
past the riser limits.
3 DRIVE-OFF
The drive-off scenario is a difficult situation to predict since there are a large number
of conditions that could occur. Typically, the drive-off scenario is caused by a faulty
input for position reference. Should the vessel suddenly begin to drive-off the DPO or
captain should have ample time to place the ship on manual control or turn off power
to thrusters causing the drive-off. Since the possibilities to prepare for and calculate
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
are endless, the drive-off scenario is not included at this time in the DP watch circle
calculation.
4 INSTALLATION DRIFT-OFF CALCULATIONS
The drift-off curves are calculated for a range of environmental headings and wind
speeds. They are estimated and used in a manner to build conservatism into the
results of the watch circle calculation worksheet while also ensuring that LMRP lift-off
and separation is achieved prior to reaching the point of disconnect (POD). Briefly,
the background assumptions are as follows, and are generally applied in the absence
of site-specific metocean data:
• Wind, waves, and current act co-linear (in the same direction, therefore the
vessel will lose heading faster than in a non-co-linear environment)
• The 1-min mean, sustained wind speed is used rather than a gusting wind
spectrum
• A minimum 0.5 knot background current is applied in addition to a wind driven
current equal to 2% of the wind speed (total current = 0.5 kt + Wind speed x
0.02)
• The heading is rounded up to the next highest increment of 5 degrees from the
bow (example 16 degrees is calculated with a 20 degree off bow curve)
• A 3-second margin is applied in the position of the point of disconnect to
account for normal vessel excursion around well center.
Where site-specific metocean data is provided for assessment, or where the
installation is equipped to determine watch circle radii from environmental
observations, non-collinear environmental components may be input and the
corresponding watch circle determined accordingly. Regardless of the origin of the
calculation, regional guidelines of policies on maximum watch circle radii for different
water depth ranges will not be superceded by the calculations.
To calculate the drift-off curve a relationship between wind speed and significant wave
height, wave period, and current speed should be developed. General relationships
are provided in Figure 3.11.3.1. For a given wind speed, the chart can be used to
estimate a wave height, period, and current speed. For instance, a 30-knot wind is
estimated to generate 10-ft significant seas with an 8-second peak period and a 1.6-
knot current.
Figure 3.11.3.2 is an example of a drift-off curve for a fixed wind direction with multiple
wind speeds.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.6.2-Relationships between Wind Speed, Wave Height,

Wave Period, and Current Speed
Figure 3.2.6.3-DW Discovery Drift-off Curves Example
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
5 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT RED WATCH CIRCLE CALCULATIONS
The red watch circle should be based on the blackout scenario where the Installation
drifts off when power to the thrusters is lost. The two primary goals to consider when
setting the red watch circle are:
1) To allow sufficient time for the Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) to

completely function commencing at the initiation point (red watch circle) until
the point of disconnect (POD) is reached.
2) To allow a sufficient reaction time for the crew to respond to the emergency
and/or for the blackout recovery system to restart the Installation power system.
Goal (1) is the most important, as the environment increases, the response time is
reduced to activate the EDS in time to safely get off the well.
A well specific example of this philosophy is presented in Figure 3.2.6.4 below. From
a riser analysis, the POD position is determined to be 138.9m (6.9% WD) from the DP
set point for the given riser and environmental conditions. The POD occurs at
approximately 198 seconds (3.3 minutes) into the drift off. The EDS timing for this
example is 45 seconds, therefore, the reaction time duration is about 153 seconds.
Looking at the drift off curve, the Installation has moved to about 88.4m (4.4%WD)
from the set point 153 seconds after the blackout. Therefore, 88.4m is the maximum
distance from the set point that allows enough EDS time to disconnect before
reaching the POD. This establishes the red watch circle distance.
If the Installation crosses the red watch circle, regardless of whether or not power is
recovered, the EDS should be initiated.
It is up to the OIM, Master, and Toolpusher / Driller to set the watch circle closer to the
DP set point than the maximum distance calculated by this procedure if it is deemed
necessary to add additional margin.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.6.4- Drift-off Predications / Emergency Disconnect

and Red Watch Circle Limits
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.6.4- Drift-off Predications / Emergency Disconnect

and Red Watch Circle Limits (continued)
6 WELL TEST – EMERGENCY DISCONNECT
When calculating watch circles during a DST, time to disconnect the subsea test tree
in addition to the time required for the Installation’s EDS to function should be
considered. Calculation of the DST “Yellow” watch circle at which time the DST test
string is disconnected should consider the maximum overpull on the test string in the
event of compensator failure as agreed with the Operator.
The understanding of the interactions required between the Driller, Well Test
subcontractor and DP Operator during a DP-DST requires clear communication and
on-site planning. Figures 3.2.6.6 through 3.2.6.8 are provided as a site specific
example for communicating the required actions of the Driller and Well Test
subcontractor during the various DP watch circles.
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.6.6-DST Watch Circles Example
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.6.7-DW Discovery ESD Summary Example
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figures 3.2.6.8-DST Watch Circles Examples
APPENDIX: 3
OPERATIONS
Figures 3.2.6.8-DST Watch Circles Examples (continued
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines - Personnel
1 DP WATCHKEEPING
1.1 GENERAL
Effective DP Operations combines vigilant and conscientious Watch-keeping with

correct remedial action in the event of a worse case event occurring at the worst
possible moment.
The purpose of the practices described below is to provide a vision of the quality of
watch-keeping to be maintained by the DP Operational Team.
1.2 MANNING LEVEL AT KEY LOCATIONS
Three primary control stations should be manned at all times during DP operations
and maintain regular communication with each other on any change of status that
may affect the overall safety of the operation. These primary control stations are:
• DP Control Desk
• Driller’s Console
• Vessel Management System Control Center
NOTE: When there is an increased level of personnel present a control area

the person in charge should be clearly identified.
For the purposes of this recommended practice where reference is made to the “DP
watch stander/keeper” this means the DP Operator actually manning the DP desk.
1.2.1 DP CONTROL DESK
1. At all times an Installation is engaged in DP operations the DP desk should

be monitored continuously by a competent DPO. There should be a
competent DP Operator in attendance within the DP Control center at all
times.
2. When the Installation is engaged in DP operations and environmental

conditions deteriorate to a level where equipment utilization levels are
increased, the DP Desk should be manned and monitored continuously. The
Master may require an increased level of manning to support specific DP or
other marine operations as he deems necessary.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
3. In the event the Installation is on DP but there is a component failure such

that the system has limited/impaired redundancy the DP desk must be
continuously manned with a second competent DPO in the immediate
proximity of the DP Control center at all times.
Two competent DP Operators are to be on tour at all times. The manning of the DP
Desk should be undertaken on a rotation basis to ensure the “on desk” DPO
maximizes his concentration during the watch period.
1.2.2 VESSEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONTROL CENTER
At all times the Installation is engaged in DP operations and connected to the

seabed, the Vessel Management System should be monitored by a competent
person. The person in charge of the vessel management system may include a
DPO, Assistant Engineer, Mechanic who is deemed competent by the Installations
Management Team and meets the statutory requirements of the Safe Manning
Certificate.
On Installations which have combined DP and vessel management control centers it

is permissible for the Vessel Management System Operator / Assistant Engineer to
be an assistant DPO, and the duties at the consoles to be shared.
The Installation’s Management Team should decide upon any increase to this level
of manning during periods of especially critical DP Drilling Operations.
1.3 DP ASSOCIATED WATCH-KEEPING DUTIES
The Watch-keeping duties identified below are those necessary in the operation of a
Dynamically Positioned Installation and are in addition to those required for an
Installation at sea on a routine passage.
1.3.1 DP OPERATOR
DP Operators in general work a 12-hour shift with a rotation on the DP Desk. With
one person dedicated to the DP desk the other should undertake all other support
duties which may include:
• VMS Watch-keeping.
• General VHF Communications.
• Communications with Helicopters and standby vessels.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Anti collision and weather radar watch.

• Communication with Supply vessels.
• GMDSS associated duties.
• Ballast and Stability issues.
• Advise relevant parties if a heading or positional change is required.
• Obtaining up to date weather forecast.
• Completion of Marine Log and DP check lists etc.
• Respond to any central alarms e.g. fire or gas and ensure their cause is fully
investigated by another party, and necessary action set in place.
• General navigational and marine duties.
• Communicating with the Master or his nominated deputy as required.
The on desk DPO should be dedicated to the operation of the DP console and
communicating with the key control centers, Driller, and Machinery Control Room as
is required by the operation. The off-desk operator should communicate all activities
with his colleague to ensure that both parties are fully aware of the current situation
as it effects the overall DP operation.
The on desk DP Operator should concentrate on the following tasks:
• Maintaining the Installation within the circle of critical position to enable

operations to continue. Ensuring reference systems are operating effectively
and defective systems taken off line if not rejected.
• Verify watch circle limits are satisfactory for the prevailing environment and
drilling operation
• Ensure power generation and propulsion configuration as indicated at the DP
desk represents actual on-line systems, and ensure systems are being used
efficiently to sustain optimum fuel usage and efficient equipment running time.
• Monitor position-keeping trends with particular attention to any deterioration
that may indicate a requirement to change the Installation’s position or
heading.
• Communicating with the key areas, particularly when making a heading
change to ensure:
− Drill floor aware of operation as regards orientation of down hole tools.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
− Subsea Supervisor monitors choke and kill lines, slip or fluid rings and
control hoses etc
− VMS Operator / Assistant Engineer is aware of increased power
requirements.
− ROV are aware with regard to re-orientation of vehicle if required.
When the DP Operator is on-duty at the DP Desk he should not stand down until
such time as the off-shift operator relieves him. The on-duty DPO should reside at
the DP desk and he should only undertake such communication duties as he can
achieve without leaving his position.
1.3.2 DUTY (ON-TOUR) ENGINEER
On Installations operating with a conventionally manned engine room, the Duty

Engineer is designated as the Senior Engineer on watch at any time. The Duty
Engineer will work a 12-Hour shift during which time his prime responsibility will be
to ensure there is sufficient electrical power on line with sufficient reserve power
available to support current operations. In addition he should also ensure that the
requirements for equipment configuration are met to support the aspect of
equipment redundancy should any failure occur.
The Duty Engineer should undertake frequent communication with the Bridge and
Driller’s console to advise them both of equipment status.
The Duty Engineer should also communicate immediately with the Chief Engineer /
Maintenance Supervisor in the event of any unplanned or unexpected event
occurring, which causes a deviation of the on line plant from their normal
configuration. In such a case the Duty Engineer should also inform the DP Operator
and the Driller of the occurrence.
The Duty Engineer should always ensure the Control room is manned by a
competent engineer if he has to undertake any specific task, e.g. maintenance or log
duties outside of the area. He should inform the DPO of his movements prior to
departing and after returning to the Machinery Control Room.
He should also ensure that his relief is fully briefed as to the ongoing situation as it
effects the DP operation. The oncoming Duty Engineer should ensure he has had a
full hand over from his relief.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
1.3.3 DRILLER
The Driller should regularly communicate with the DPO to advise him of current
activities and deviation from the planned activity that may require a change of
Installation attitude or online equipment. This flow of communication between the
Driller and DPO ensures both are fully aware of any adverse operating trends that
may require urgent remedial actions.
2 DP CONTROL CONSOLE PROCEDURES
The purpose of the recommended practice presented below is to establish set

guidelines on the quality of Watch-keeping to be maintained by the DP operational
team. Local or client requirements should be sanctioned by the Rig Manager and the
Business Unit Operations Manager.
2.1 GENERAL
• The DP Control Desk will not be left unattended at any time during DP
operations.
• The on watch DP operator is not to be involved in any other activity than DP
watch and communicating as required with the other control centers.
• When the DPO takes over the desk he should ensure he is fully aware of
reference system status, and be ready to respond to any failures.
• Under no circumstances will drinks be consumed at the DP desk, and under
no circumstances will other personnel be allowed to congregate in the area of
the DP desk or otherwise distract the DPO from his duties.
• If required, on-watch personnel will ask other personnel to leave the DP
Control Center area if these “visitors” are distracting the personnel on watch.
• A log should be maintained of all spurious alarms or computer anomalies that
may need software fixes. The details of these systematic errors will be
passed to the DP system vendor if required. This log will also form a historical
record of system performance. Sensor outages greater than a few seconds
should be reported on the monthly GRS DP report.
• All unexpected DP alarms should be reported to the Master.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• The DP status board should be kept up to date. The status board should
display such items as:
− Stack heading.
− Position coordinates.
− Escape route heading to deep water.
− Rotational Limits. (include max riser / wellhead torque)
− Direction to deeper water in event of EDS.
− Engine availability and/or maintenance.
− Thruster availability.
− On line acoustics details.
− Antennae elevation and azimuth for reception of Differential Signals.
− Reference Stations for DGPS solutions.
− Fuel status.
− Any degraded Reference item.
− Other DP vessels in close proximity.
− Acoustic conflict.
− Supply vessel noise.
− Critical Data derived from the riser management system (if installed).
− ROV Status.
• If there is any doubt as to DP performance, the “Off Desk DPO” should call
the Master, at the direction of the Sr. DPO.
• Regular weather forecasts should be obtained and made fully available to the
DP control room, in order to plan any necessary maneuvering to prepare the
Installation for adverse conditions.
2.2 DP DESK HAND OVER CHECKS
The on-coming DPO should confirm the following items and be aware of their status
as a minimum. When satisfied the status is verified he should confirm to the off-
going DPO that he has control. Each installation should develop a DPO handover
check list.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Station keeping redundancy is secure.

• Installation position is stable and footprint within levels expected for the
existing environmental conditions.
• On-coming DPO knows the well position set point aspect in relation to the
Installation set point.
• Riser angle, tension, torque and mud weight data to be confirmed (as
applicable).
• On-coming DPO to be aware of quantity and direction of riser windup from
BOP land heading.
• On-coming DPO to be aware of number of on line reference systems
(typically 3 systems) and that those systems on line are set to achieve
maximum performance.
• On-coming DPO to be satisfied that heading is optimized for the prevailing
meteorological conditions and Online/Hypothetical capability check has been
made.
• On-coming DPO is aware of diesel generator and switchboard status and is
familiar with action required in the event of a failure.
• On-coming DPOI will verify system status by using a rig specific check list.
• When satisfied that all checks have been completed the on-coming DPO
should confirm to the off-going DPO that he has control, with a clear verbal
statement:
“I HAVE CONTROL”
3 TRAINING AND FAMILIARIZATION
3.1 GENERAL
Properly trained Dynamic Positioning personnel and effectively maintained systems

are essential to the safe and successful completion of all operations undertaken by
DP Installations.
It is the Company’s intent that all personnel directly involved with the day to day
operation of the DP Station Keeping System should have the appropriate DP
Operation and Maintenance Training in line with the International Marine Contractors
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Association (IMCA) agreed standards of Competency and Training and Company

DP OJT.
All personnel involved directly with the daily operation of the DP system should
ensure they record their time dedicated to DP Operations in an approved format, i.e.
IMCA or other approved DP Logbook.
3.2 ONBOARD TRAINING
Some installations have a DP simulator available for personnel to undertake specific

DP Maneuvering training on a dedicated DP simulator. Where this is possible a set
of scenarios relevant to the area of operation should be undertaken by the relevant
personnel on a routine basis, at a time when they are Off Watch, or full DP Watch-
keeping is not ongoing. Such onboard training should be formally recorded by the
Master and records maintained.
Where such a dedicated stand-alone facility is not available but is only in-built as
part of the DP control desk, the ability for such training should be limited to periods
of non-DP operation. Although there may be other demands upon the DP operators
at this time they should avail themselves of such an opportunity to enhance their
skills.
During periods where the installation is not connected subsea with a riser, the
Master shall be responsible for ensuring that DP training is undertaken on an
opportunity basis. Practice in DP manual (joystick) may form part of the
Installation’s operational training to develop the DPO’s level of competence in ship
handling. Positioning on acoustics only, to gain familiarity and experience with this
system, may be appropriate during this period. Any training should be undertaken in
a controlled manner under supervision of the Master or his representative.
Permission for such training shall be sought from the Master and appropriate
records shall be maintained.
3.3 DP EMERGENCY TRAINING
Emergency preparedness is a contingency for which the DP Operators should

always be prepared in case of a system, component or function failure. For
Installations with stand alone DP training simulators such an eventuality can be
practiced with comparative ease. For those Installations that do not have such
equipment it may be valid for the Master to conduct “table top” exercises with the off-
duty personnel so that formal procedures and guidelines can be practiced and any
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
shortfalls noted and amendments made. Records of such training shall be

maintained. The DP Alert drill training shall take the form of discussion between all
involved as well as actual (non-intrusive) practice sessions.
Each installation should have a written plan in place that identifies possible
situations or scenarios for a DP emergency. As part of this plan, a formal DP
Emergency Response Drill should take place at least every 90 days as part of a
weekly rig emergency drill or stand alone exercise. This written plan should identify
al responders to the emergency situation and specify what training or certification
level for each individual is required.
3.4 DP FAMILIARIZATION
The Master should develop an installation specific DP shipboard familiarization

course for all new marine, engineering and drilling staff. These personnel should
receive an induction upon joining an Installation for the first time that emphasizes
their specified duties.
The period of familiarization may extend for a period of time until a particular
individual is sufficiently competent and familiar with the systems for which he should
eventually be responsible.
Specific induction checklists for personnel associated with the DP station keeping or
VMS Control systems should be developed by each Installation and should be
appended to the Installation specific DP manual. Once completed such an individual
checklist should be signed by the designated authority and kept on file.
Every DP Installation will differ even if they are intended as being of the same class
or design. Therefore, whenever personnel transfer between what should be
identical Installations, the requirement for the completion of the formal induction
checklist remains valid.
3.4.1 DP FAMILIARIZATION PROCESS
Figure 3.2.6.9 below is an example familiarization process to introduce new Key DP

Personnel to DP Operations. This checklist may be used as a means of providing
guidance for the following personnel engaged in DP Operations. Reference: IMCA
M 117 Jan 1996 Training & Experience of Key DP Personnel.
• Chief Mates
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Senior DPOs
• DPOs
• Toolpusher & Drillers
• Maintenance and Engineering staff including C/E, Assist/E, and VMS
Operators
• Electronic / electrical staff
The Company Dynamic Positioning Operator OJT Module should be completed by

personnel identified in the Worldwide Training Matrix.
3.4.2 DP MARINE PERSONNEL
All key DP personnel joining any DP Installation should follow a structured

familiarization procedure which starts with the reading of appropriate manuals, DP
Event reports, FMEA, DP operations manual and any documented DP history, e.g.
DP trials reports, checklists etc. Installation familiarization requirements should be
controlled onboard to ensure relevant manuals and familiarization routines are
completed
3.4.3 ENGINEERING PERSONNEL
The Master is responsible for ensuring that the provisions of IMCA M117 Paragraph
6.1.5 are followed for all newly appointed Engineering staff. Additional cross
familiarization (Engineering / DP) should be provided by the installation DP staff.
3.4.4 DRILLING PERSONNEL
The Master shall be responsible for ensuring that all newly appointed key operating
personnel are provided with cross Drilling / DP familiarization training following IMCA
M117 Section 6.2, Project Familiarization. The training should be provided at the DP
control station by the Senior DPO or Master's nominated deputy.
3.5 DP FAMILIARIZATION
Best practice within the fleet is a checklist with supporting information in a package
that can be followed easily by the trainer.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
Figure 3.2.6.9-DP Familiarization Criteria

No Description Position Check
SDPO DPO C/O TP Driller Engr Elec

1 HSE Policy 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
2 Field Ops. – DP Section 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
3 Masters responsibility 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4 Shipboard reporting lines 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
5 Senior DPO’s responsibility 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
6 DP system overview 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Station keeping task
7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
overview
8 Engineering & Redundancy 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
9 Generation available 9 9 9 9
10 Propulsion available 9 9 9 9
11 Electrical – DP awareness 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
12 DP Guidance documents 9 9 9 9 9
13 Codes of best practice 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
14 Position reference systems 9 9 9 9
DP logbooks (Marine, Eng,
15 9 9 9 9 9
Elec)
16 DP Checklists 9 9 9
17 Engineering checklists 9 9
18 Hazardous Operations cases 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
19 Drilling systems checklists 9 9 9
Show Alert matrix for
20 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
installation
Reporting (to Master and
21 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
OIM)
22 Advisory Condition definition 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Yellow, Advisory & Red
23 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Alerts
24 Alerting & communications 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Client contact and Policy
25 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
aboard
A record should be maintained to show that all Key DP Personnel have been provided with
an adequate level of instruction to enable them to carry out their function correctly.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
4 KEY DP PERSONNEL
It is critical to the operation of the DP installation that an effective flow of

communication exists throughout all levels of management and all departments.
Departmental specialists should be aware and have knowledge of what is happening
in areas outside their immediate domain and understand the ramifications of
activities within their sphere of operation.
The following personnel are identified as having roles that are key to the Company’s
DP Operations and have input to the communication flow.
It should be noted there may be a duplication of roles or variation in terminology.

The intent herein is to express the minimum expectations of each position.
Installation specific personnel should be identified in an installation specific manual.
• Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)

• Master
• Chief Mate
• Senior DPO
• DPO
• Toolpusher
• Driller
• Assistant Driller
• Subsea Supervisor
• Chief Engineer or Maintenance Supervisor
• Assistant Engineer / Mechanic / VMS Watch stander
• Electrical Supervisor / Electrician
• Electronic Technician
All of the above personnel have general roles and responsibilities that are prescribed
in other documentation, i.e., Job Descriptions that should be read in conjunction with
this section.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
5 RECOMMENDED PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES DURING DP OPERATIONS
5.1 OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER (OIM)
The Offshore Installation Manager is the onboard manager, who reports directly to
the shore-based Rig Manager. It is his role to control the onboard administration
and ensure the day to day operations of the Installation are carried out in
accordance with best industry standards as well as the client’s and Rig Manager’s
instructions. He is the principal liaison with the onboard client representative. It is
the responsibility of the OIM as chairman of the onboard management team,
consisting of the Installation’s department heads, to insure the department
specialists are aware and have knowledge.
The Offshore Installation Manager is the most senior onboard manager. However,
the Master is the Person in Charge during an emergency in accordance with the
Station Bill.
The OIM should liase closely with the departmental heads so that he has an overall
understanding of the daily DP Drilling operation and is aware of any critical areas
that may impact on the continuity of the operation.
The OIM should have an understanding of the Company policies and procedures as
they relate to his operation and be able to communicate any concerns to the Client.
The OIM and the Master should at all times work very closely together. In the event
of a deteriorating situation the OIM, or his nominated deputy, has the support of
management should he determine that he should take immediate action to ensure
the safety of personnel and equipment (Red Alert / Emergency Disconnect).
5.2 MASTER
The Master is responsible for DP station keeping, safe navigation and collision
avoidance, general safety and pollution prevention, Installation stability, regulatory
compliance, ISM/MODU Code compliance, port security (ISPS), marine crew
licensing, implementation of emergency response training and all marine operations.
Under Section 14.8 of the MODU Code, the Company designates the Master as
“Person in charge” during an emergency as indicated on the Station Bill. During an
emergency he determines from available situation reports, written procedures,
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
acceptable safe working practices and advice from the onboard management team if
there is a threat to personnel or Installation safety or the environment.
The Master has the responsibility and authority under IMO convention A.443.(XI) to
operate in a manner consistent with safety of human life, equipment and protection
of the marine environment. With his experience and knowledge of Marine
Operations he is authorized to make decisions that may effect the overall DP Drilling
operation.
The Master should ensure that:
• All DP Operating personnel and technical staff have received the correct
induction and are competent to carry out their duties associated with the DP
System. If potential shortfalls become evident, the Master shall be
responsible for drawing these to the attention of the OIM and Rig Manager.
• All new personnel fulfilling a role identified as a key position in the DP drilling
operation have satisfactorily completed a period of familiarization and are
ready to assume that position.
• The necessary documentation and records, including check lists ,associated
with the operation of the DP system are completed and distributed as
required.
• All DP policies, procedures, standing orders and specific operational
requirements are being adhered to.
• The DP control system and all reference systems are operational and fully
available for use.
• Any shortfall in equipment performance or personnel competence are
reported to the OIM and Rig Manager in a timely manner.
The Master should ensure there is full liaison between all key DP personnel
regarding DP Drilling operations and highlight any specific marine related issues and
their possible impact upon the current operation, i.e. weather, supply vessels etc.
As the DP Operations Department Head, the Master should be a qualified DP

Operator in possession of a DP Operators Certificate, and should be able, if
required, to take over a DP watch.
The Master and the OIM should at all times work very closely together. In the event
of a deteriorating DP marine situation the Master, or his nominated deputy has the
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
support of management should it become apparent that immediate action is required

to ensure the safety of the crew, equipment and the protection of the marine
environment.
5.3 CHIEF MATE
The Chief Mate is the Master’s deputy and should have the same level of knowledge
of the DP Operating System as the Master.
The Chief Mate's prime activity may be centered about the Deck. However in his
role as the Master’s immediate subordinate he should undertake DP watch-keeping
duties to gain suitable DP experience to fulfill the future role of Master of a DP
Installation.
The Chief Mate should be prepared to undertake such DP watch-keeping duties so

as to enable the DPO to undertake any necessary maintenance duties about the
Installation as required.
The Chief Mate should work with the DPO to develop his DP Desk skills if he is not
familiar with the Installation’s DP Operating system.
The Chief Mate should be in possession of a DP Operators Certificate and the

supporting DP Logbook.
5.4 SENIOR DPO
The Senior DPO is the primary DP watchkeeper and the Master’s representative on
the bridge/control station in his absence. Apart from navigational duties he should
also ensure the safe and efficient operation of the DP system.
The Senior DPO is responsible for maintaining the various records, reports and
industry publications regarding the DP operation, and should ensure the suitable
distribution of that information to all relevant personnel.
In his role the Senior DPO should have a close working relationship with the drill
floor and as such he should develop a working knowledge of the drill floor
operations, to ensure the smooth conduct of the integrated DP drilling operation.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
It is important in the pursuit of a safe and effective DP drilling operation that the on
tour Driller and on desk DP Operator are both aware of the ongoing operations in
each other’s area and of any heightened risks arising.
Each should be aware of any forthcoming change or likely change of operational

status that may effect the DP drilling operation.
The on tour Driller and on desk DP Operator hold the authority to initiate emergency
disconnect activities and Red Alert Alarms respectfully in the event of a deteriorating
situation, without immediate reference to their superiors.
A clear and precise line of communication between the DPO and Driller will be
maintained to ensure no possibility for confusion during a critical situation requiring
immediate action.
The Senior DPO should keep the Master or his authorized deputy informed of any
changes in equipment status or current operations that may require a change of
installation DP criteria, i.e. heading, offset, reference system status.
The Senior DPO should be in possession of full DP Operator certification and the
necessary supporting IMCA DP Logbook.
5.5 DP OPERATOR (DPO)
The DPO is subordinate to the Senior DPO and works under his direction at the DP
console. The DPO should be in possession of full DP Operator certification and the
necessary supporting IMCA DP Logbook.
When at the DP Desk the DPO should confirm any change of parameter to the
Senior DPO prior to it being initiated. When the DPO has been adjudged Competent
by both the Senior DPO and Master of the installation to which he is appointed he
should be able to act upon his own discretion at the DP Control desk.
As part of normal operations all changes of operating parameters should be

communicated as appropriate as they happen.
The DPO main activities in respect of DP Drilling Operations are:
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• Become competent in the operation of the DP system and its peripheral

systems under supervision of a Senior DPO and the Master
• Become competent in the controlling of the Installation in the Manual /
Joystick control mode
• Gain an understanding of the DP Computer Control systems, reference
systems and the various modes of operation
• Gain a general understanding of the vessel management system, power plant
and power distribution system that provides power to the thruster units and
drill floor
• Gain an understanding of Capability Plots, FMEA, Proving Trials, Riser
Performance Studies and consequence analysis
• Gain an understanding of the various Drilling Operations carried out onboard
• Gain an awareness of the various DP industry standards, IADC, IMCA, IMO,
and Company DP Policies, Procedures and Guidelines
5.6 TOOLPUSHER
As the OIM’s deputy the Toolpusher may at times be called upon to make decisions
that will require an understanding of the interaction between Drill Floor activities and
the DP System. He should have a good understanding of the Installation’s DP
station keeping system.
It is important that the Toolpusher has an understanding of the following areas of

activity that will effect the DP station keeping operation:
• Increased requirement for electrical power to the drill floor, or instability of

power on the drill floor
• The timing of critical drilling operations in the face of deteriorating or changing
environmental conditions
• Loss of redundancy on any system as it effects the DP station keeping ability
of the Installation
• Drill floor emergency guidelines as they effect the DP operation
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
5.7 DRILLER
The Driller should at times be called upon to make critical decisions in the absence
of the Toolpusher, to whom he normally reports. Therefore, the Driller should have a
good knowledge of how his activities interface with the DP system operation.
The Driller should maintain a close line of communication with the DPO at the DP
Desk to ensure that these two critical control centers are each aware of the other’s
activities. The Driller should inform the DP Operator before a BHA or casing that
cannot be sheared enters into the BOP and again when that BHA is clear of the
BOP.
It is important, in the pursuit of a safe and effective DP drilling operation, that the on
tour Driller and on desk DP Operator are both aware of the ongoing operations in
each other’s area and any heightened risks arising. Each should also be aware of
any forthcoming change or likely change of operational status that will effect the DP
drilling operation.
The on tour Driller and on desk DP Operator both hold the authority to initiate
emergency disconnect activities and RED ALERT alarms respectively in the event of
a deteriorating situation, without immediate reference to their superiors.
It is important that there is a clear and precise line of communication between the
Driller and DPO with no possibility of confusion should there be a critical situation
arising which requires immediate action.
The Driller should be aware of the necessary activities in the event of receiving a
Yellow or Red DP alert, and he should be able to respond immediately.
The Driller’s main focus should be the effective and safe operation of the drill floor
activities, but as an integral part of the DP drilling operation he should also gain an
understanding of the DP operation as it interacts with the Drilling operation.
5.8 SUB SEA SUPERVISOR
The Sub Sea Supervisor is in charge of and responsible for all sub sea related
equipment, including but not limited to BOP/LMRP, Riser Tensioners, Riser Angle
Indicators and Drill String Compensators, where fitted, and the associated
equipment.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
The Sub Sea Supervisor is an integral part of the communication chain for DP
Drilling Operations as his role is important when responding to a change of
Operational status and alerts brought about by the requirements of the operations at
the DP or Drill Floor Control Centers.
Maintenance of certain Sub Sea related equipment may have an impact upon
ongoing DP Operations. The Sub Sea Supervisor should understand how operation
of his components are integrated into and impact the DP station keeping. For
example riser tensioner status and riser tensioner mean stroke used for watch circle
calculation.
5.9 CHIEF ENGINEER/MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR
The Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for the Installation’s

power generation, distribution and propulsion systems.
The Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor should have an in depth knowledge of

the interface of his systems and how they influence the DP station keeping system
from the point of view of control and system redundancy. He should be able to
recognize when systems are operating close to their maximum parameters and
ensure that maintenance systems do not compromise system redundancy on a long-
term basis.
The Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor should work closely with both the
Master and OIM to ensure that both are fully aware of the availability of the systems
under his control and how any potential failures could affect the current DP station
keeping requirements.
It is important to the continuity of the DP Drilling system that any preventative

maintenance being performed does not impact upon the conduct of the DP Station
keeping system in its widest context. He is responsible for ensuring the permit to
work system identifies potential work that affects DP system redundancy/reliability
and minimize the exposure to DP events by managing work appropriately.
Given the extensive amount of equipment that falls under the Chief
Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor’s responsibility, he should be aware of the various
DP Studies that have been conducted on the Installation such as:
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
• FMEA
• FMEA Proving Trials – including action items and resolution thereof
• Annual trials document when completed
• Riser and Vessel Capability
• Installation specific PMS and DP limitations documentation
• Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels
IMCA M 103 dated February 1999.
He should also be aware of other relevant DP related publications as they effect his
area of responsibility such as the publications relating to fires in engine rooms on DP
installations.
5.10 ASSISTANT ENGINEER / MECHANIC
The Assistant Engineer / Mechanic (on tour) is the person responsible for the safe
and efficient operation of the Engine Room spaces during his duty period. The
watch keeping duties may be carried out either within the Engine Room(s) or at the
remote Vessel Management System (VMS) control station provided the Installation
is classed for unmanned engine room operations. The Assistant Engineer /
Mechanic should be deemed competent to operate the VMS system and associated
machinery systems by the Chief Engineer / Maintenance Supervisor and Master (for
the purpose of delegating authority).
Due to the nature of the DP station keeping operation it is essential that the Duty
Assistant Engineer / Mechanic is aware of the ongoing DP Drilling operation and
understands the need to ensure equipment optimization is maintained to sustain a
suitable level of equipment redundancy in support of the DP Drilling operation.
5.11 VESSEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (VMS) OPERATOR
The VMS Operator is responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the vessel
management system (VMS) during his period of duty. Dependent upon the
classification and operation of the Installation, these duties may be undertaken
remote from the engine spaces in the case of an Installation being classed for an
Unmanned Machinery Space or at the local Engine Control Center in the case of a
conventionally classed Installation.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
In the case of an Installation operating a conventionally manned engine room, the

VMS watchkeeping shall be a part of the Assistant Engineer / Mechanic’s duties.
In the case of an Installation operating with an unmanned engine room the VMS
Operator should be deemed competent to operate the VMS and associated
machinery systems by the Chief Engineer / Maintenance Supervisor and Master (for
the purpose of delegating authority). The VMS Operator shall hold an engineering
license if required by the Installation’s Safe Manning Certificate.
It is essential the VMS Operator is aware of the ongoing DP Drilling operation and
understands the need to ensure equipment optimization is maintained to sustain a
suitable level of equipment redundancy in support of the DP Drilling operation.
The VMS Operator should maintain a good line of communication with the DP
control center and if required the Drill Floor, and he should ensure that all
communications are fully understood by all parties.
The VMS Operator should be fully aware of all appropriate DP and Drilling
Emergency Guidelines.
5.12 CHIEF ELECTRICIAN/MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR
The Chief Electrician/Maintenance Supervisor should have a sound knowledge of

the interfaces of his systems and how they influence the DP station keeping system
operation from the point of view of control and system redundancy. He should be
able to recognize when systems are operating close to their maximum parameters
and ensure that maintenance does not compromise system redundancy on a long-
term basis.
It is important to the continuity of the DP Drilling system that any preventative

maintenance being performed does not impact upon the conduct of the DP station
keeping system. Before any such work is commenced it should be brought to the
attention of the Master, OIM and Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor, and if
deemed necessary a suitable permit raised and the DP Operator informed both at
the commencement and completion of the work.
The Chief Electrician/Maintenance Supervisor should have a good working

knowledge of the Installation’s FMEA and FMEA Trials results as well as all the
appropriate manuals, including the DP system Operating and Commissioning
Manuals. He should also be aware of DP industry publications that are relevant to
his area of responsibility.
APPENDIX: 4
OPERATIONS
5.13 ELECTRONIC TECHNICIAN (ET)
The Electronic Technician should be undertaking routine DP electronic (IT)

equipment maintenance, and as such he should hold an appropriate DP
maintenance training certificate from the equipment manufacturer. He should have
a thorough knowledge of the various DP Control System manuals and their
associated position reference systems. He should also have knowledge of the
Installation’s FMEA and FMEA Proving Trials report.
He should liaise closely with the DPOs, Chief Electrician/Electrical Supervisor, and
Master. He should not undertake any work on the DP System without consulting
with one of those three key persons, and obtaining the permission of the on duty
DPO. Should there be any changes to system settings the Senior DPO should be
informed and record such changes in the DP Occurrence Log. Such changes
should also be notified in the Monthly DP report.
The Electronic Technician should be in possession of an IMCA DP Logbook that

verifies his DP Maintenance Experience.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines - Communications and Alarms
1 DP COMMUNICATIONS AND ALARMS
1.1 GENERAL
All personnel have a responsibility to report to the control room watch keeper any
observation or occurrence which may indicate that the safety and efficient operation
of the Installation may be effected. This would include, but not be limited to the
following:
• A Permit to Work should be obtained, signed by the Master / Chief Officer,

before work is performed upon any DP related equipment or electrical or
mechanical system which could directly affect online DP equipment, or make
standby equipment unavailable.
• Intention to start or stop auxiliary air or hydraulic units, which may affect
pressure on DP associated equipment.
• Intention to discharge mud pits or the sand traps (acoustical interference).
• Intention to start or stop the use of radio or radar equipment that may effect
the DP signal reception.
• Intention to move equipment that may effect the trim of the Installation.
• Imminent arrival or departure of a helicopter or vessel alongside may affect
DP antenna reception and wind sensors.
1.2 TESTING OF COMMUNICATION AND ALARMS
The following tests of communications should be carried out and logged between the
DP control center, drill floor, engine room or VMS center and the ROV control cabin
before commencement of DP drilling operations. Notification of an alarm test should
be given and acknowledged by all areas in advance of the test. All areas should
confirm the satisfactory operation of the visual alarm signals, i.e. Yellow or Red
Lights:
• Open line - loud speaker communication

• Back up communication system
• DP Alert System
• VHF/UHF radio
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
2 COMMUNICATION
Communication between the Driller’s station, the DP console, and the Engine
Control Room should be regular, tested at the start of each tour and logged. Each
watch keeper should inform the other about any changes in operational
circumstances.
• Plain language should be used when using the open net

• On all Company DP Installations key personnel should communicate in
English
• Communication should be clear and an acknowledgement of understanding
received
• Channels of communication should not be tied up for other reasons
• Channels of communication should only involve relevant parties
Note: Communication by alarm system should provoke immediate, “no questions

asked”, reaction.
3 TYPES OF INFORMATION
Communication between the DP Operator and the Driller is important. The extreme
example of this is when the DP Operator initiates a Yellow or Red Alert and the
Driller must react instantly and correctly.
The DP Operator and Driller should communicate verbally and regularly regarding
normal operations. The DP Operator and Driller should develop an understanding
that they keep each other informed of all events in their respective working areas
that could affect the other.
3.1 DP OPERATOR COMMUNICATION TO DRILLER (EXAMPLE)
• Any change to be made to set point heading. DPO has the responsibility to
ensure that the tensioner load ring is observed during maneuver.
• Watch keeper to confirm riser tensioner fluid bearing ring is pressurized with
the Driller.
• Any unplanned operational change that may impact on Riser Management.
• Any significant change to be made to set point position.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
• Deterioration of environmental conditions (forecast and actual).

• ROV launch and recovery.
• Supply boat arrival and departure.
• Indication that Installation is approaching preset limits regarding station
keeping.
• Helicopter arrival and departure.
• Loss of reference system or loss of redundancy.
• Degraded system status other than Yellow or Red Alert.
3.2 DRILLER COMMUNICATION TO DP OPERATOR (EXAMPLE)
• Any situation which could develop into an emergency

• Any unplanned operational change that may impact on Riser Management
• Any change that will affect the EDS duration
• Increased mud weight
• Advise when Drill string above BOP
• Commencing new operation
• Dumping mud or cleaning pits (acoustical interference)
• Entering and clear of BOP with BHA
• Entering and clear of BOP with Casing
• Commence run in or pull out of hole
3.3 ENGINE CONTROL ROOM (VMS) COMMUNICATIONS (EXAMPLE)
• The DPO should communicate with the ECR / VMS Watch-keeper, as

applicable, if the DPO expects any significant increase in power demands and
if the DPO is either bringing on or taking thrusters off line. In an emergency
situation, this is not always possible but during normal operational conditions
the ECR / VMS Watch-keeper should be advised.
• The ECR / VMS Watch-keeper should communicate to both the DPO and the
Driller any problems with the power plant that might limit the power available
to either the drill floor or the DP Systems.
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
• The ECR / VMS Watch-keeper should inform the DPO of any problems
identified during routine thruster checks.
• The ECR / VMS Watch-keeper should communicate with the DPO in regard
to any intention to take engines off line or to change the sequence of online
engines.
• The DPO should inform the ECR / VMS Watch-keeper when DP operations
are to commence.
• The DPO should keep the ECR / VMS Watch-keeper informed when the
Installation is connected to the seabed and when it is not. This affects the
number of engines required to be online.
3.4 ROV COMMUNICATIONS (EXAMPLE)
• The Drill Floor, DP Control Desk and ROV supervisor should have good
communication during operations such as open hole re-entry and running of
the BOP. When this type of operation takes place, there should be three way
communication at all times and all three parties should work together to
obtain the best result.
• The ROV Supervisor should be in continuous communication with the DPO
every time the vehicle leaves the deck and until it is safely onboard on
completion of operations. The ROV supervisor should inform the DPO and
the Driller immediately of any problems when the vehicle is in the water.
• The DP Control Desk should communicate with the ROV Supervisor at times
when the ROV is operating, any change in DP status, anticipated heading
changes or other action that could affect the operation or safety of the ROV.
• The DP operator should have at hand a visual indication in the line of sight to
show the ROV status.
4 DP ALERT STATUS
All Company DP Installations should operate on a modified two alert system. Yellow
Alert and Red Alert. Non alert conditions include a “Green Light” or “Green Status”
signifies a normal operating status and an “Advisory Status” where a single failure
condition is envisioned that might result in a Yellow Alert.
These levels of alert are clearly defined in the riser management WSOG prior to the
commencement of any DP operation. The limits may change according to
APPENDIX: 5
OPERATIONS
environment, geographical location, water depth, client instructions, or limitations

decided by the Installation management onshore or offshore. Limits may also
change depending on the nature of work being carried out, namely completion
operations as against normal drilling operations.
When the limits have been defined they should be documented and copies given to
all relevant parties. This document should be unambiguous and easily understood
regarding the conditions set.
A copy of the operating limits should be displayed close to the DP desk so that the
DPO is aware of his duty regarding implementation, and at the Driller’s console so
that the Driller is aware of his duty of immediate response.
Note: The watch keeper can activate an alert status prior to the conditions being
met. Nothing in these status levels is meant to imply, or impose, any constraints on
him taking any reasonable, effective action in a timely manner based upon his
assessment of the circumstances of the case.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines - Documentation And Reporting
1 DP DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING
1.1 GENERAL
Checklists and records establish the background of a formal approach to the DP

station keeping operation. These records provide important historical data
identifying how the Installation has operated for given criteria in the past and
therefore provide a sound basis for future operational deployment.
1.2 DEFINITIONS
The following terminology is used as standard to report DP Events:
1.2.1 DP OCCURRENCE
A DP Occurrence (ex-“DP Degraded”) is any situation where capability / redundancy

is reduced (not routine maintenance). The performance of the DP system does not
result in loss of position outside the Green watch circle, but by its nature is unusual
and worthy of note. A “DP Occurrence” is usually managed by the DP operator as
an operational fact of life (loss of a reference system due to scintillation or acoustic
noise etc).
1.2.2 DP UPSET
A DP Upset is an unexpected event or activity that, if not controlled, could have led
to a grave consequence, i.e. disconnect scenario. The outcome of a DP upset may
be a loss of position within the “Yellow DP alert criteria”.
1.2.3 DP INCIDENT
A DP Incident occurs where excursion becomes equal to or greater than the “Red
DP Alert” limit or results in damage to equipment or riser disconnect.
1.2.4 DP EVENT
A DP Event includes DP UPSETs and DP INCIDENTs and triggers DP EVENT

REPORT requirements.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
2 DP SYSTEM RECORDS AND REPORTING
In accordance with IMO 645 Section 4 every Installation is required to establish a

system of formal DP System checklists and logs to cover various stages of the
operation. The intent of these documents is to ensure system integrity and confirm
that the current DP operating parameters are verified against the operational and
environmental criteria at the current location.
The following should be developed by each Installation:

• Pre Location Arrival Trials
• DP Desk Hourly Log
• Daily Rough Log (Operational Log)
• Engine Room Checklists
• DP Anomaly Log
• Beacon Log
• Weather
• Bridge Marine or Deck Log
• DP shift handover check list
• DP Event Reports
• Well Planning Checklist
2.1 PRE-LOCATION ARRIVAL TRIALS (CHECKLIST)
This checklist should be completed when:

• The Installation arrives at a new location (excludes template shifting moves)
prior to spudding in.
• The Installation has been off DP for more than 4 days
• Work has been carried out on any of the systems between wells
The purpose of the Pre-Location Arrival Checklist is to document and ensure the DP
system functionality. This check list identifies the minimum trials/testing guidelines
required to ensure that by the time the Installation is established in a full automatic
DP mode above the well location, all the DP and associated systems have been
proven to be fully functional. The formal document should be signed off as proof of
satisfactory completion of the trials.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
In addition to the location trials report the Installation should also use a single page
document as a record of initial system set up.
The checklist should follow the process as the DP Installation arrives on location,
and should fall into distinct sections aimed at verifying the functionality of the
system.
• Pre arrival physical checks - Well verification and equipment inspection
• Pre operational checks - Basic functions checks
• Manual DP checks - Functionality of the manual DP controls
• Automatic DP checks - Auto DP system functionality checks
• Drift-off test to determine vessel drift rate over a 10-minute period with loss of
power
The following data should be clearly recorded on the checklist at the completion of
the tests:
• Heading Alarm deviation limits
• Position Alarm deviation limits
• Thruster Alarm levels if manually set
• Escape corridor or direction of deeper water
• Position reference Set-Up Coordinates
2.2 DP DESK STATUS LOG
This hourly / bi-hourly (environment and operation dependent) status check should
act as the system hand-over check between the DP operators. It should log the
current operational status with regard to varying parameters that effect DP
operations, e.g., power usage, footprint, wind speed, direction, generators on line,
riser angle and if necessary, any operator input variable settings. The log should
also be used to record the system set up and established settings etc. The log
should demonstrate an overall picture of the DP station keeping performance, the
settings in place, equipment on line and their performance.
2.3 DAILY LOG (OPERATIONAL LOG)
This is a daily log of every circumstance or event that affects the DP and marine
based operation. Every action taken by the DPO, information received from external
sources and any other event that may be relevant should be recorded in this log.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
The log should include details of vessel movements, helicopter movements and
ROV Operations.
2.4 ENGINE ROOM CHECKLISTS
These checklists should be utilized by the Engine Room watch keepers to ensure
that the status of the generation and propulsion plant within their assigned
capabilities remains fully functional to support the necessary level of redundancy for
the DP operation. The duty watch keeper should complete these checklists at the
commencement of each shift. Any compromise of system status should be reported
immediately to the on-tour DPO and Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor.
2.5 DP ANOMALY LOG
This log should be used to record any malfunction of the DP system and its
peripherals, e.g. reference systems, control systems, propulsion unit’s software etc,
however trivial it might appear. This log provides a history of the performance of the
system components. This information may provide details for future software
upgrades. The sequence of events leading to the malfunction and relevant timings
should be accurately recorded. It may be useful to append print outs from the DP
control system printer to provide increased clarity as to the sequence of events.
The relevant technical authority should be provided with ready access to the log.
When a fault has been rectified a suitable entry should be made in the log detailing
the means of repair.
2.6 BEACON LOG
This log is used to record the number and type of acoustic beacons both deployed
and available as spare, and to monitor battery life and necessary change out. Each
beacon has a unique identification number. The following details are recorded:
• Beacon deployment date
• System identification for each beacon
• Transmit and receive frequencies
• Beacon location, by co-ordinates or reference to the BOP
• Daily plus cumulative running hours
• Battery status
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
2.7 WEATHER
The DP Operator should see that current weather forecasts are available at all
times. Weather forecasts, observations and weather radar (where installed) may
indicate adverse conditions such as squalls likely to impact DP operations,
necessitating a change of heading, or the re-scheduling of preventative maintenance
activities.
Extracts from these reports may be utilized in the DP Log to validate DP actions.
2.8 DP EVENT REPORTS
All DP Installations will maintain a file of their DP Event Reports. These documents
should be supported by relevant documentation, i.e. alarm printouts, copies from the
rough log etc. The formal reports provide a valuable guide to the Installation’s past
performance history and may also influence modifications to software, hardware,
policies, procedures, guidelines or training. Both Company and IMCA report forms
should be submitted to the HQS Engineering Department.
The HQS Engineering Department will submit reports to IMCA.
3 OTHER DP DOCUMENTATION
The documents identified below should be available to DP Operators and other

relevant personnel associated with the DP control system. The document’s
circulation should be the latest edition and closely controlled at all times, as they will
contain necessary information as to the DP operation of the Installation. Available
documents include:
• DP Capability Study
• FMEA Study and FMEA Trials report
• IMCA (International Marine Contractors Association) Standards
• OPL Publication on Principles of Dynamic Positioning
• Alarm Page/Parameter Print Out Reports
− DP and Reference System Operating Manuals.
− Vendors reports & DP related correspondence
− Riser Performance Analysis and associated Riser Management plan
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
− Site specific Environmental Operating Limits for the various drilling

related operations
− Monthly DP Report
− OPDOCS – Operational Information Document
3.1 DP CAPABILITY STUDY
This document is typically produced during the design of the Installation and
provides examples of expected station keeping performance for a variety of
environmental conditions and for a variety of thruster failure configurations and
limiting thruster power levels. It can guide the DPO on the expected DP station
keeping capability of the unit and should be readily available.
DP capability plots can be misleading. Onboard simulators, where installed, should

be used to address station keeping ability for the anticipated conditions.
3.2 FMEA STUDY AND TRIALS REPORT
This document contains an extensive amount of information on the failure modes of

the DP station keeping hardware and software and identifies the ramifications of
system failures. This document is a valuable source on the DP Station keeping
system as fitted and as tested, and is therefore an important source of information
for all those associated with the DP system. The FMEA should be utilized during the
preparation of Emergency DP Guidelines.
3.3 IMCA PUBLICATIONS
These publications provide a valuable source of information on Equipment

Standards, Equipment Performance and Internationally Agreed Operating Standards
and Guidelines. All Installations should maintain their library up to date with the
relevant material. The Company is a member of IMCA and has access to the
“members only” web site where some publications are on line. A user name and
password is required which can be obtained from HQ-Engineering.
Every DP Installation should carry copies of the following subject specific

publications:
• M 103 Guidelines for the Design & Operation of DP Vessels issued 1999
• M 141 Guidelines on the use of DGPS as a Position Reference Systems in
DP Control Systems 1997
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
• M 145 Review of Three Dual Hydro-acoustic Position Reference Systems for

Deepwater Drilling 1998
• M 151 The Basic Principles and Use of Hydro-acoustic Position Reference
Systems in the Offshore Environment 1999
• M117 The Training and Experience of Key DP personnel 1996
• Current edition of the IMCA Annual Review of Station Keeping Incidents
The above core documents should be supplemented by more subject specific

documents as deemed suitable by the Master of the Installation.
3.4 OPL PUBLICATION NO 9 - PRINCIPLES OF DYNAMIC POSITIONING
This document is an essential tool for trainee watch keepers who are new to the
industry and are starting the DP Training process.
3.5 ALARM PAGE/PARAMETER PRINT OUT REPORTS
These reports should be available to the DPO & VMS watch keeper as they provide
specific information regarding alarms.
3.6 DP AND REFERENCE SYSTEM OPERATING MANUALS
These manuals should be readily accessible to the DP watch keepers and those
technical personnel involved with the maintenance of the DP system and its
associated sub-systems.
3.7 VENDORS REPORTS & DP RELATED CORRESPONDENCE
These documents will provide important data on the operating and related systems
and all DP Operators should have access to the relevant sections that may affect the
operation.
3.8 RISER PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT REPORT
This document should be readily available to the DP operator as it will identify

installation positions to improve riser system performance and provide the point of
disconnect to determine a red watch circle. The data contained in this report
provides the basis for the well specific WSOG.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
3.9 ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATIONAL LIMITS
These limits may be contained within the Riser Performance Analysis or they may
be contained within a generic operations manual, or they may form part of the
contract agreement with the client. The DP Operator should be aware of the agreed
environmental limits that apply to specific operations.
These limits may be guidelines. However, if there are contractual obligations based
upon these limits, the Master should advise the OIM and Clients at any time that
these limits are being reached.
3.10 DP MONTHLY REPORT (GRS)
This document contains statements as to the DP system operability during the past
calendar month, and is the main DP functionality report from the Installation. This
report should be sent to the Rig Manager, Business Unit DP Superintendent and
HQS Engineering Department “DP Discipline Manager”. It should be held on file by
the Master but also available to the watch keepers and Technicians.
3.11 OPERATIONAL ADVISORIES (OPDOC)
This document or set of documents contain operational guidance on a wide range of

DP operations and activities. It is a system designed to enable the rapid
communication of any lessons learned, operational experiences, or technical
memoranda that are pertinent to the operation and use of the DP system and
associated sub-systems.
Copies are to be maintained on board. The Master is to ensure each Mate, DPO
and ADPO has read and understood the OPDOCS.
4 REPORTING
The Master is responsible for ensuring that all Operational and Technical issues
relating to functionality of the DP system are reported by the Installation to the Rig
Manager, Region Field Support Group and HQS Engineering Department. The
Company standard reporting method is through GRS. Additional reports may be
provided by electronic mail, unless the seriousness or criticality of the issue warrants
an immediate response, in which case the individuals should be contacted direct.
APPENDIX: 6
OPERATIONS
All DP audit items, outstanding items or important equipment issues will be tracked
in FOCUS.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines - DP Operations and Trials
1 DP OPERATIONS AND TRIALS
1.1 OPERATIONAL PRACTICES
Every Installation should develop procedures to cover all activities relating to and
impacting upon DP Operations.
Standard guidelines herein should be used by all Installations as a guide for their
specific requirements. The Installation should ensure that any such guidelines they
produce remain specific to equipment and location and if necessary, updates should
be made if parameters change.
1.2 DP OPERATIONAL BRIEFING
Prior to any DP operation it is important that key personnel be briefed in all aspects
of the project, including hazards to the Installation, personnel, equipment and the
interaction of other operations in the immediate vicinity.
Prior to arrival on location a meeting should be held to review the project guidelines.
DP Operators should be fully conversant with methods and lines of communication
prior to the commencement of DP operations.
1.3 POSITION REFERENCE SYSTEMS
The Company standard for DP Reference System availability requires that as a

minimum, three reference sensors should be on-line (and actively selected) at any
time with two being based on different principles. In deep water DP operations,
DGPS and acoustic reference systems are likely to be the only such references
available; hence the total loss of the DGPS will degrade system redundancy.
Two independent position reference systems are defined as reference systems

giving positional data to the DP system based upon two different principles, i.e.
DGPS being one and hydro-acoustic systems being another.
During scintillation only non-hazardous operations should continue if DGPS drops

out. Use of dual-acoustic systems during scintillation or solar anomalies is
acceptable and should be a part of the WSOG planning.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
2 STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
Every DP Installation should develop a set of DP operating procedures to cover

particular DP Operational circumstances. The list below identifies some specific
operations that may need formal procedures established.
• Setting Up for New Location.

• Coming On Location.
• Deploying Transponder Beacons.
• Calibration of Acoustics.
• Spudding in.
• Establishing Well Location.
• Use of ERA’s as Position Reference System:
ERA's can and have been used to facilitate station keeping. In the unlikely event
that a simultaneous loss of satellite as well as acoustic position information is lost,
ERAs may be used as a reference sensor under exceptional circumstances. This
does not constitute approval to carry out drilling operations only with ERA.
Some systems have a Hold Ball Joint angle mode. This should be used with
caution, and not for the purpose of carrying out drilling operations, but only to keep
the Installation in a relative position where the ball joint angle is as close to zero as
possible, in order to effect a disconnect should all other position reference systems
fail.
• Launch & Recovery of ROV.
• ADCP (Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler) launch and Recovery.
• Running GRA.
• Running Casing (20”).
• Running BOP.
• Landing the Stack.
• Passing non-shearables through the stack.
• Installation Heading Changes.
• Heavy Weather Precautions.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
• Bulls Eye Reports:
A record of the bulls eye reading should be maintained. One set of readings should
be taken, prior to landing the stack, and one soon after the stack has been landed,
and the connection tested against overpull. When the ROV is launched to carry out
riser inspections, bulls eye readings should be recorded and checked against the
previous records. Any significant deviations should be immediately notified to the
Master, OIM.
• Loop Current/Eddies:
In certain work areas, Loop Currents or Eddies may be experienced. Guidelines

need to be developed to address any limitations being imposed. Heading changes
may be dictated by the currents. It is not unusual to have to make frequent large
heading changes when hit by squalls thus well head and riser torque considerations
should be preplanned. At times it may become necessary to suspend drilling
operations due to riser limitations in extreme currents.
• Plug and Abandon.

• Pre Departure Location.
• Recovery of Beacons.
• Transponder Battery Change out.
• Emergency Disconnect.
3 NON STANDARD OPERATIONS
While the above list identifies a wide scope of operational procedures it does not
cover every possibility. There are occasions when operations present a higher risk
profile due to system limitations or potential equipment failure requiring a rapid
decision process as in the case for Drill Stem Testing (DST) with a DP Installation. It
is important that Well Specific operational procedures are prepared for non-standard
operations and appropriate personnel are familiar and prepared for the worse case
scenario.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
4 DP TRIALS
The requirement for trials is outlined in IMO 645 sections 4.4 and 5.
The intent of the trials is to verify the functionality of the DP system in a controlled
manner and provide accurate results that assist the DP Operators in the future
operation of the DP system. Copies of all trials results should be retained onboard
for information to the DP personnel.
DP Trials should be undertaken for the following reasons:
• Client Acceptance/Mobilization
• Software amendment trials
• Classification Society Trials
All trials should be conducted in a safe area disconnected from the well, and if
possible should be undertaken on transit between locations. In all cases, trials
should be conducted in line with a formal documented procedure and results
recorded and witnessed by the OIM or his designee. All documentation should be
submitted to the Rig Manager, Business Unit Field Support Manager and HQS
Engineering Department.
During failure tests, systems should not be re-instated until personnel undertaking
the trials are satisfied they understand the failure effects, and all information has
been noted.
When reinstating systems after failure simulations, two people should confirm that
the necessary breakers have been reinstated.
Trials should be undertaken in a controlled manner and should any uncertainty arise
regarding actual system status, the test may have to be repeated.
4.1 CLIENT ACCEPTANCE/MOBILIZATION TRIALS
Records of these trials should be retained onboard archived per the Company
document retention policy. The format for these trials should be agreed with the
HQS Engineering Department prior to the anticipated activity.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
4.2 PERIODIC DP TRIALS
Periodic DP trials may either be conducted to Client requirements or by the

Installation itself. The philosophy behind these trials is to ensure that the entire DP
system is set up and functioning in the correct manner, by functioning all systems to
their likely performance requirements and failure modes. In addition, the following
should be reviewed:
• Preceding period’s maintenance history

• Any hardware modifications
• Any software modifications
• Footprints
• Incident records
• Switchboard inspection reports
• Trials Guidelines
• Review Operators records of experience
4.3 SOFTWARE AMENDMENT TRIALS
On any occasion DP system software is upgraded or changed the DP system should

be tested to ensure there is no change to the Installation’s DP operational criteria.
4.4 CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY PERIODIC TRIALS
Many DP systems are classed by the Classification Society. For the system to
continue to remain in class the society requires periodic trials. These trials should
be scheduled when operations permit and not when the Installation is attached to
the well. If possible, they should be scheduled to be concurrent with annual or
acceptance trials.
5 OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY TRIALS
“Blackout” and UPS failure are two worst case scenarios for which every Installation
should have control procedures in place. Recovery tests should be undertaken on
an annual basis to ensure the competency of the personnel to effect recovery. After
completion of these recovery tests, the procedure used may need to be revised to
address any lessons learned.
APPENDIX: 7
OPERATIONS
5.1 BLACKOUT
A regular Blackout recovery should be practiced when possible, to ensure all

personnel are familiar with the duties assigned to them. The details of all such trials
should be documented.
5.2 FAILURE OF UPS
Following a failure of a UPS, a step by step recovery plan should be prepared. This
is more important where a static switch is used for rapid load transfer.
Particular care should be taken when reinitializing failed UPS, as historically it is

during this process that subsequent failures are experienced.
APPENDIX: 8
OPERATIONS
Dynamic Positioning Well Specific Operating Guidelines - DP Technical Issues
1 DP TECHNICAL ISSUES
Company DP Installations should establish and document Installation specific

procedures dealing with the following subjects:
• Operation of open/close bus tie breakers

• Engine loading criteria
• Use of consequence analysis
• Protocol for Installation and verification of DP software upgrades
2 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE
2.1 OPERATION OF OPEN/CLOSED BUS TIE BREAKERS
DP Class 3 Installations are capable of operating with an open bus tie configuration.
All Company DP Class 3 Installations should have suitable procedures in place to

cover Installation operation when the bus bar is broken into its relevant sections. It
is important that these procedures are in place when the main control center has a
dual role, as both DP and vessel management control center. Under these
circumstances, both the DP and vessel management system operators should be
fully familiar with any divergence from closed bus operating procedures.
Some DP Class 2 Installations are also capable of working under a split bus
condition as a routine operation. As in the previous case, an “open bus”
configuration should only be undertaken provided all the necessary Installation
specific procedures are in place and the offshore team are familiar with the operating
criteria.
2.2 ENGINE LOADING CRITERIA
The benefits of operating diesel engines close to their capacity rather than at
consistently light loads is well understood. Operational experience has shown that
engine maintenance and down-time can be significantly reduced by keeping average
engine loading in the range from 45% to 75% of engine capacity.
The acceptability of the higher engine loading will vary between Installations and is
dependant upon the ability of the vessel power management systems to cope with a
APPENDIX: 8
OPERATIONS
sudden loss of an engine. Higher engine utilization should not be seen as

detrimental to engine wear or maintenance.
2.3 USE OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
It is an IMO requirement that every Class 2 or Class 3 DP Installation has a DP

software function called Consequence Analysis IMO 645 Section 3, para. 3.4.4.
The Consequence Analysis software should continuously verify that the Installation
should remain in position even if the worst case failure occurs. This analysis should
verify that the thrusters remaining in operation after the worst case failure can
generate the same resultant thruster force and moment as required before the
failure. The consequence analysis should provide an alarm if the occurrence of a
worst case failure would lead to a loss of position due to insufficient thrust for the
prevailing environmental conditions. Frequently intermittent alarms are generated
indicating that insufficient thrust may be available for a short moment.
The issue of such an alarm is a precautionary advice to the DP Operator and does
not indicate that immediate remedial action should be taken. The alarm should be
acknowledged and the trend of alarm initiation reviewed in the light of the current
operation and the environmental conditions. If it is apparent that there is a
deteriorating situation then the Installation should initiate remedial action.
2.4 PROTOCOL FOR INSTALLATION AND VERIFICATION OF DP

SOFTWARE UPGRADES
As operational experience evolves and DP software matures, upgrades to the

existing systems may be necessary.
All software upgrades or changes are to be managed with the Management of

Change process.
The vendor supplying the software should be required to install the new software
onboard the Installation. Installation personnel should not undertake any software
upgrades without proper authorization. In exceptional cases, the vendor’s software
may be upgraded without a representative onboard, and then the installation of that
software should be supervised by a suitable member of HQS Engineering or
Business Unit Field Support group.
APPENDIX: 8
OPERATIONS
Whilst the vendor should ensure the integrity of the software, it is always possible
that previous changes may not be incorporated, hence particular attention should be
taken of system performance during the early stages of operation. Every opportunity
should be taken to test the functionality of the software on the DP simulator fitted
onboard, if available. The system performance should be carefully monitored during
the initial period of start up and usage and the vendor informed immediately of any
anomalies. During this stage of operation, the use of the DP Anomaly log is
important to ensure the successful performance of the system in the future
operation.

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Title:

FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL

SECTION 1 ........................................................................................................... GENERAL

SUBSECTION 1 CERTIFICATES AND SURVEYS

SECTION 3 ..................................................................................................... OPERATIONS

DRILLING RELATED OPERATIONS

SUBSECTION 1.1 WELL CONTROL – INCIDENT PREVENTION AND

APPENDIX 1RECOMMENDED PRACTICE – WELL TEST PLANNING

MARINE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RELATED OPERATIONS

SUBSECTION 2.1 MARINE OPERATIONS

SECTION 4 ................................................................................................................ ANNEX

SUBSECTION 1 DOCUMENT CONTROL / TABLE OF REVISIONS

The purpose of the company’s management system is to define and communicate

The company management system establishes consistent performance standards across

The Company Management System includes performance standards established at all

(D) – Direct Responsibility:

(I) – Indirect Responsibility:

This job category has a responsibility to be Aware of the Policy/Procedure in certain

The roles of Performance and Technology Group key areas are:

• Promote operational efficiency by making assessments of operations and verification

2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The responsibilities for HQS Operations Group are summarized below:

2.1 THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO)

2.2 EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER (COO)

2.2.1 Ensure implementation of operating policies and procedures of the Company.

2.2.3 Assist in the establishment of annual worldwide operating objectives and

2.2.4 Actively support and recognize the efforts of personnel.

2.3 VICE PRESIDENT, TECHNOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE

2.4.1 Review and preliminary approval of relevant Company level 1A operating

2.4.2 Review and approval of relevant Company level 1B operating policies,

2.4.3 Ensure a consistent approach to performance measurement, monitoring, and

2.4.7 Monitor and implement operating policies and procedures worldwide

2.4 VICE PRESIDENT, ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES

2.4.1 Review and approval of Company level 1A and 1B operating policies,

2.4.4 Monitor downtime performance of worldwide Installations and ensure

2.4.5 Review, approval and implementation of the maintenance management,

The Corporate Engineering and Technical Services Organizational Charts is located

Figure 1.4.1 Manual and Document Type and Identifiers

Each manual and document shown in Figure 1.4.2 is accompanied by a brief

Figure 1.4.2 Operations Document Organization Chart

HQS-OPS-PP-01 OPP Manual: This manual contains ALL of the

Policies and Procedures are prescriptive and subject to the

Field Operations Manual: This manual contains the

Well Control Manual: This handbook contains a copy

Surface BOP Operations From Floating

HQS-OPS-HB-03 Certificate And Survey Manual: This handbook

Coatings Manual: This handbook contains a copy of

Figure 1.4.2 Operations Document Organization Chart (continued)

2.1 HQS OPERATIONS INTRANET SITE

Other documentation and information related to Operations is found on the

Change to situations or unexpected events must be recognized and the

Reference: Company Management System Manual, HQS-CMS-GOV.

The purpose of this policy is to ensure personnel understand what is required to

ISSUE NO: 01 REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

All Installations and facilities must comply with applicable Classification

Reference: Operations Policy and Procedures Manual, HQS-OPS-PP-01 Section 2,

4.2 REVIEW OF DISTRIBUTED CORRESPONDENCE

Any person in receipt of correspondence dealing with changes or proposed changes

4.3 INSURANCE POLICY RIG REACTIVATION REQUIREMENT

Units being reactivated from a stacked location shall be surveyed by an approved

Policy Approved Surveyors

• Matthews Daniel Company

5.1 RIG MANAGER (D)