Alienation and The Decline of Utopia

Alienation and the Decline of Utopia
Author(s): KENNETH KENISTON

Source: The American Scholar, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring, 1960), pp. 161-200
Published by: Phi Beta Kappa Society
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Alienationand theDecline of Utopia
KENNETH KENISTON
is an age that inspireslittle enthusiasm.In the indus-

trialWest,and increasingly nowin theuncommitted nationsof
the East, ardor is lacking;insteadmen talk of theirgrowingdis-
tancefromone another,fromtheirsocial order,fromtheirwork
and play,and even fromthevalues thatin a perhapsromanticized
past seem to have given their lives cohesivenessand direction.
Horatio Alger is replacedby Timon, Napoleon by Ishmael,and
even Lincoln now seems pallid before the defiantimages of
"hoods" and "beats." The vocabularyof social commentaryis
dominatedby termsthat characterizethis distance: alienation,
estrangement, separation,withdrawal,indifference, disaffection,
apathy,noninvolvement, neutralism- all thesewords describethe
increasingdistancebetweenmen and theirformerobjectsof love,
commitment, loyalty,devotionand reverence.Alienation,once
seen as the consequence of a cruel (but changeable) economic
order,has become formanythe centralfactof human existence,
characterizingman's "thrown-ness" into a world in whichhe has
no inherentplace. Formerlyimposed upon men by the world
aroundthem,estrangement increasinglyis chosenbythemas their
dominantreactionto theworld.
These tendenciescan of course be exaggeratedin individual
cases.As manyor probablymoremenand womenlead individually
decentand humanlivesas everdid. There are pocketsof enthusi-
asm in everynation.Old values are clung to the more tenaciously
by some as theyare disregardedby others.But other factsare
О KENNETH KENISTON is thirtyyears of age. He began his work in political
theoryat Harvard, continuingin philosophyand psychologyat Oxford,where he
was a Rhodes Scholar. He returnedto Harvard as a Junior Fellow and is now a
lecturerin the departmentof social relations.Mr. Keniston is engaged at presentin
a psychologicalstudyof alienation.
161
THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR
equally incontrovertible: thattherehas seldombeen as greatcon-

fusionaboutwhatis valid and good as thereis now; thatmoreand
more men and women are fundamentally alienated fromwhat
theircultureoffers them;thathopefulvisionsof the future,ideal-
ismsand utopiasbecomeincreasingly rare and difficult.In short,
the directionof culturalchangeis fromcommitment and enthusi-
asmto alienationand apathy.
In the commentsto followI shall take it forgrantedthatthis
changeis takingplace,1and will exploretwoquestionswhichseem
to me importantto its understanding:Why are young people
increasingly unwillingto accept what theircultureoffersthem?
And,closely related to this,whydo we lack positivevisionsof the
future?
But beforeturningto thesequestions,I shouldlike to consider
brieflyone possibleexplanationof alienation - if only to exclude
it fromconsiderationhere. Severalyearsof researchinto the psy-
chologyof alienationhave shownthat,as mightbe expected,un-
happyhome lives,disillusionments and unresolvedbreaksin per-
sonalrelationships predisposeyoungmen to spurntheircultures.2
But such psychologicalexplanations,howeverrelevantin indi-
vidual cases, explain both too much and too little. On the one
hand,theaccidentsofan individual'spastlifeare all toooftenused
to *'explain away" his presentviews,as if thesecould be nothing
but a reflection of his own psychicconflicts. A man's viewsof the
worldare in factmuchmore thanthis; furthermore, an unhappy
life can make him perceptiveof actual inequities that remain
unperceivedby his more fortunatefellows.On the otherhand,
psychological accountsalone are seldomadequate to explain atti-
tudesand stancesthatcharacterize largenumbersof people simul-
taneously. To understand theseas socialphenomena,we musttrace
the complicatedinterplayof culturaland historicalforceswhich,
1 As such,thisessayomitsmanyof the qualifications and hesitationsthat would be
necessary to a morescientificaccount.Ratherthan to cite at each point the tendencies
countervailing to the alienativedirectionof culture,I have preferred,if anything,to
overstatethe severityand generalityof the problem.But such counter-examples come
readilyto mind,and are importantsince theypoint to possiblesourcesof commitment.
2 1 have conductedthisresearchat the PrinceHouse Annex of HarvardUniversity,
underthe supervision of Dr. HenryA. Murray,supportedby grantsfromthe National
Instituteof MentalHealth.
162
ALIENATION AND THE DECLINE OF UTOPIA
bytheirinfluence on individualfamiliesand theotheragenciesof

produceindividuals
"socialization," who are unusuallysensitized
to specialaspectsoftheirenvironment. A morecompleteaccount
ofalienation wouldseekto detailtheseinfluences.
Here,however,
I willconcentrate on onlyone aspectoftheproblem- namely, on
theculturalcontext inwhichandtowhichpredisposed individuals
reactwithalienation.
ComingofAge in America
Growingup is alwaysa problem,whether in Samoa,Nigeria
orYonkers. It entailsabandoning thosespecialprerogatives,world-
views,insights and pleasuresthatare definedby the cultureas
specifically "childish"and substituting forthemthe rights,re-
sponsibilities, outlooksand satisfactionsthatare suitableforthe
culturally defined"adult."Althoughthe conceptsof "childish"
and "adult" differfromone cultureto another,everyculture
requiressomechangein the child'shabitualwaysof thinking,
feelingand acting - a changewhichinvolvespsychicdislocation
and therefore constitutesa "problem"fortheindividualand the
culture.The transition maybe relativelypainless,especiallywhen
theadult'sroleis viewedas themoreattractive and childrenare
therefore eagerto growup; it maybe easedor hastenedbyelabo-
rateceremonials andritesofpassage,whosewanvestiges we see in
today'sgraduation dayexercises;or itmaybe delayedbya socially
sanctioned "moratorium" thatpermitsyoungmenand womento
experiment withadultidentities untiltheyfindone whichsuits
them.In societieswherethetransition to adulthoodis unusually
painful, youngpeople often form theirown "youthculture"with
a specialsetofanti-adult valuesandinstitutions, in whichtheycan
at leasttemporarily negate thefearedlifeof the adult.But some-
howchildren mustbe inducedto accepttheirrolesas adultsifthe
society is to continue.
Youthcultureas we knowit in Americais a characteristic
Americantransition fromchildhoodto adulthood,a kindof so-
ciallyambivalent and indefinitely prolongable moratorium. Cen-
163
traito all formsof youthcultureis the absenceof a straightand

smoothtransitionto what the culture definesas "adult roles."
Instead,theAmericanversionofyouthcultureoffers a hiatus- an
eddy,a whirlpool,a waitingperiodor even a finalrestingpoint-
in whichyoungmenand womenadopta wayoflifethatconstitutes
a protestagainsttheadult world.It maytakethe formof being a
"hood," being"beat,"being "Joe College,"beinga bohemian,in-
tellectuallyrejectingthewholetrappingand traditionofAmerican
-
culture,or less obviously - simplybeing utterlyindifferent to
themanyvoicesand beckoningsofthewidersociety.
It is importantto define"youthculture" broadlyenough to
include not only those who protestthroughword or deed, but
thosewho rejectthroughinaction.8Overtrebellion,in the sense
of programmatic and revolutionaryactivity,is extremelyrare in
our society;and evenovertlyantisocialbehavior,despiteour fasci-
nationwithdeviance,is relativelyrare.Much morecommonis that
covertrejectionof societythatRiesmanhas called "inneremigra-
tion," a termbroad enough to include not only thosewho con-
sciouslyabsentthemselvesfromwhat theysee as the "American
way of life," but those who remain inwardlysilent,apathetic,
boredand uncommitted, even while outwardlygoingthroughthe
motionsof participation. To be boredor indifferent to something
is in manywaysthe supremerejectionof it. Even oppositionand
antagonismconstituterecognitionof the object; boredomsimply
denies that its existenceis significant.
"Silent generations"and
"angryyoungmen" sharea commonrejectionoftheirculture:the
firstrejectingthroughlack of response,the otherthroughopen
opposition.
We would idealizethe past if we thoughtthattheseproblems
wereunique to individualsof our time: thousandsof youngmen
s Youth cultureis obviouslynot the onlyformof alienation,but in our societyit is
themostcharacteristic and prevalentexpression of culturaldisaffection.
Intellectuals
have
alwaysbeen to some extentdissidents, and over the past threecenturies,have become
Whatis remarkable
disaffected.
increasingly notthesmallgroupofintellectuals
is therefore
who are articulatecriticsof society,
but the growinggroupof youngpeople of all talents
who enterinto an increasingly protractedperiod of disengagement fromthe dominant
valuesand rolesof theirculture.Indeed,youthcultureis now such a factof lifein this
countrythatwe becomeawareof it onlyby contrasting our societywithothersin which
childrenmovemoredirectlyinto adulthood.
164
havefoundit difficult to accepttheadulthoodwhichtheirworlds

offered them,manyhaveleftaccountsoftheirperplexities, and a
fewhavemadesignificant changesin theirculturesas a resultof
theirdissatisfactions. Furthermore, "adolescent rebellion"has al-
ways been a feature
special of melting-pot America,withitslack
ofcleartraditions andcleardefinitions ofthegoodlife.Butin the
past those whorejectedtheirculturesweregenerally thebrilliant
or tragicexceptions totheirage,theKierkegaardian "individuals"
whocouldnotacceptthesolutions embraced bytheirfellows. Now,
it is
however, increasingly youth the who doesaccept adult roles
withenthusiasm and withouthesitation whois theexception. In
the past "adolescent rebellion"has been almostby definition a
transient phase,whichone "grewout of" laterby a genuineac-
ceptanceofwhatthecultureoffered; whatwe deal withtodayis
notalwaysso happilyresolved.
If,then,"youthculture"is characterized bya rejectionof the
"adultworld"through or
hostility indifference, and if thisrejec-
tionis bothmorewidespread andmoreenduring thanin previous
generations, howcan we account thechange?In the United
for
States,a numberofspecific historical factorsconspireto augment
theimportance and possibility ofyouthful devianceand indiffer-
ence: the absenceof anycleartradition exceptthe rejectionof
tradition; therelativecomfort and easeoflife,whichgivesyoung
mentimeand implements to expresstheirdisaffection; theinsta-
bilityof Americanfamilies, whichprovidesa reservoir of young
peopleprepared togeneralize theirprivatehurtsto publicplaints,
andso on. ButI doubtthatthesefactors, important as theyarein
explaining theparticular forms and recruiting policiesof Ameri-
can youthculture,suffice to explainits existence - nor are they
adequateto explaintheTeddyBoysofEngland,Italyor Greece,
the quicklysuppressed hooligansof Moscow,or the rebellious
"dry"youthofJapan.A moregeneralexplanation ofyouthculture
(and ofthe present extent ofalienation) seems to me to lie in the
socialand culturalsituation createdby a highlysuccessful indus-
-
trialsociety a society whichasks for more froman adult,offersless
inreturn, andyetencourages than
higheraspirations any before it.
165
Three closelyrelatedsocial trendshelp to explain the increas-

of our cultureto its potentialrecruits.One of
ing distastefulness
theseis whatwe mightcall thegap betweentheculturalimagesof
thechildand of theadult- thefirst(apperceivedas) integral,con-
crete,immediateand spontaneous;the other(as) dissociated,ab-
stract,specializedand conformist. Second, even when the youth
is willingto "choose"theadultworldas he sees it,it is difficult
for
himto knowwhatto choose;adultrolesin our societyare ambigu-
ously definedand subject to unpredictableand drasticchanges.
Finally,the vast increasein our materialwealth and power has
made us less willingto acquiesce to the nonmaterialdeprivations
thatadulthoodseemsto involve.Althoughwe are seldomable to
articulateour ideals clearlyand forcefully,
our level of aspiration
has increasedand thenumberofconditionswe are willingto accept
as "inevitabletragediesof life" has correspondingly decreased.
Childhoodvs. adulthood. It is by now a sociologicalcommonplace

that the high standardof living in industrialsocietieshas been
partlytheresultofan increasingdivisionoflabor.Divisionoflabor
demandsthatmendo highlyspecializedjobs in the preparationof
the finalproduct;theassemblyline, our mythology has it,is more
efficient
thanHenryFordin hisgarage."Efficiency" has historically
meantthatmenweretrainedto do evermorespecificand detailed
workwithan increasingdegreeof expertise - sometimeseven in
traditionaloccupationslike teaching,where efficiency was once
consideredirrelevantat best.The routineand mechanicalnature
of workon an assemblyline is the classicillustrationof thistrend
towardspecialization.But even in highlyskilledjobs, "automated
jobs," or workin serviceindustries,routineand specializationare
almostas marked:watchingthe controlsof a self-regulating ma-
chine,feeding cards intoa or
computer, running a cash registerin
a supermarket, does notdiffer
markedlyin thisrespectfromscrew-
ing bolts into an motor.These jobs have in
incipientrefrigerator
commonthattheyrequire highlycompartmentalized, specialized
workwhichis monotonousand repetitive,and which,above all,
enlistsa verysmall proportionof the worker'stotal talent and
understanding.
166
They are also alike in theirdistancefromthe finaluse of the

work- fromtheman who sitsin thechairmade by theautomated
machine,fromtheactualreceiptofthepaymentscalculatedby the
computer,or fromeating the food bought in the supermarket.
Furthermore, the operationsrequired of the workerare them-
selveshighlyabstract,in that theyselect a small numberof the
totalfeaturesof theenvironment as relevantto the task.The total
environment ofthecashregisteroperatorincludesthepersonalities
of her customers;the "job-relevant"featuresof thatenvironment
includeonlythepriceof the groceries.In otherwords,mostwork
is not onlyspecializedin termsof the worker'stotaltalents,but it
bearsa highlyabstractand distantrelationto the finaluse of the
product.
The specializationand abstractnessof work is increasingly
characteristic of professionalroles as well. One is not merelya
lawyer,but a CorporationLawyer specializingin Problemsof
Investment; one does notsimplyteachliterature, but FrenchLiter-
ature(Late Middle Agesand EarlyRenaissance);one is rarelynow
simplya doctor,but rathera Gastro-enterologist. Even relatively
intactfieldslikearchitecture are beingdividedintosubdivisionsof
cityplanning,industrialdesign,et cetera.Betweenthelawyerand
theclientstandsthe Law Firm; betweenthe teacherand the stu-
dent standsthe Field, the Dean, the Grader,the Reader and the
SectionMan; eventhedoctorseldomdeals withtheentirepatient.
The professional man is forcedto developone skill to the neglect
of others;his relationto the subjectof his workbecomesincreas-
inglydistant,partialand abstract.
These featuresof workextendintoa numberof otherareas of
life in our society:theycan be seen in the increasingdistance
betweenworkroles,familyroles,and play; theyare manifestin the
formalization of on-the-joband off-the-jobpersonalrelationships;
theyare reflected even in the advertisements of job opportunities
whichseekto counterthefearthatworkwill be overlyspecialized
("varied,interesting work").But theyare above all apparentin the
relationship between fantasyand work.
Imaginationis at itsbestwhenit is relatedto, but not tied to,
theproblemsthatconfront theimaginerin his everyday life.When
167
this is not the case, we can speak of the dissociationof fantasy:

fantasythennotonlyhas a lifeof itsown,but thislifebearslittle
relationshipand has littlerelevanceto everydaylife exceptas an
escape. It is perhapsunreasonableto expect thateveryact of an
individualbe garlandedwithrichimaginativeand symbolicmean-
ing; yetacts thatare so enrichedassumesignificance farbeyond
their immediateconsequences.When imaginationand life are
separated,imaginationcontinuesto operate but becomes sterile
and escapist,no longerdeepeninglifebut impoverishing it at the
expense of another dream world that containsall that real life
lacks.
The dissociationoffantasy a characteristic
is increasingly ofour
social order.Never beforehave such quantitiesof "packagedfan-
tasy"been so availableand so eagerlyconsumed.In Raw magazine
the IBM operatorreadsof cannibalismon the Amazonwhile the
computerrelentlessly writeschecks;the benign image of Arthur
Godfrey lulls the housewife throughher routinehousework;the
fearlessexploitsofBatmancounterthedull afternoon monotonyof
P.S. No. 117; and thetiredand friendly businessmanrelaxesin the
evening to the sadism of MickeySpillane.The point about these
packagedformsof imaginationis not thattheyare in themselves
new,but thattheirprevalence,availabilityand acceptanceare new.
To be sure, insofaras privatefantasiesare projectedonto a
televisionscreenor into a comic book wheretheycan be shared
withothers,this may,under the rightcircumstances, tie society
together morecohesively. But thepriceofcohesionis high.For one
thing, our shared are almostentirelycontrastsor opposi-
fantasies
tionsto dailylife:theycontrastwiththelack ofviolenceor intense
passionin the averageman's life,and withthe specializationand
abstraction ofhis work.Thus, theyseldomserveto enrichlife,but
ratherto vitiateits imaginativevitalities.The "self-alienation" of
which Frommand othershave writtenis an alienationof man
fromhis own creativepotentialities, imbeddedin his fantasylife.
When a man's primarycontact with his own imaginationis
throughthe negativevisionsof the comic book or the television
screen,thesepotentialities remainunexpressed.Social cohesion,if
168
thusgained,is not cohesionof sharedgoals but of sharedescapes

and dreads.Fantasythatdeepensthemeaningofwork,love or play
becomesless and less potent.
Finally,we shouldmentionthemuch-discussed themeof "con-
formity," "loss of individuality,""massification," cetera.With-
et
out attemptingto judge whether"individuality"is in facton the
wane,we can statewithcertaintythatmostobserversbelievethat
it is; and thatmostintellectualsare continuallyon guard against
conformity in any form.Perhapsthisbeliefis more importantto
our questionsthantheactual facts,whatevertheybe. For thefear
of conformity is closelyrelated to the topicswe have discussed:
specialization,abstractionand the dissociationof fantasy.Lacking
symbolically meaningfulworkand relationships, men have almost
no alternative but to see instanceswheretheyact like theirfellows
as acts of conformity.4 Were adult roles viewed as excitingand
fulfilling,therecould be littleproblemformostmen and women,
even the most discriminating, about conformingto the adult
world.Whatmakesconformity appearas a dangeris thatwhatone
conformsto seemsso humanlyunappealing.Whateverthe actual
natureof society,if a significant portionof thosewho are askedto
constitutethe communityin the next generationview it as unat-
tractive,theywill be reluctantto accept theirtask.In the case of
Americanyouth,this reluctanceis heightenedby the sharply
contrasting image(and to a lesserextent,facts)ofchildhoodin our
society.
Childhoodin Americais definedas a timeforthedevelopment
of the totalpersonalityand the cultivationof a freshimmediate
perceptionof the world; as a timewhen fantasyand life are still
inextricably connectedthroughthe ritualsof workand play,and
when thereis still room forspontaneityand hooky-playing non-
conformity. These definitions not
are important only because we
view our childhoodsin theirterms,but because theycorrespond
*No one arguesagainstconformity withothersin a good cause; whatis opposedand
- "keepingup withtheJoneses/'
forthe sakeof conformity
seenas universalis conformity
"not standingout." The problemof conformity is coextensivewith the lack of good
causes.Were such causesreadilyapparent,we could perhapsdiscussspecificinstancesof
conformity moreconcretely in termsof whetherconformity to this or that patternwas
justifiedin termsof our ends.
169
in factwith importantaspectsof our own (and all men's) child-

hoods. Childhood is a time for experimentation and the use of
diversetalents;thechildis notyetexpectedto limithimselfto any
one area of endeavoror accomplishment. And children - although
certainlymembersof theircultures - have not yet so assimilated
its normsas to develop thatcapacityforselectiveinattentionand
specialemphasiswhichmarksthe"successfully socialized"adult in
anysociety.(Wisdomcomesfromthemouthsofbabes becausethey
have yetto learn the culturaltaboos about what can be noticed
and said withoutfearof reprisal.)The experienceof the child,
furthermore, tendsto be lessabstractand conceptualizedthanthat
of the adult: wherethe meteorologist sees signsof rain,the child
sees fluffyclouds; the engineerwho now contemplatesthe design
of theBrooklynBridgemayhave once seen a gracefulstructurein
mid-air.For manyadults,the immediacyand aestheticdepth of
childhoodexperiencesare neverequalled in laterlife.
Anothercharacteristic ofchildhoodin mostsocieties,including
our own,is whatwe can call "integralfantasy."The child'simagi-
nation operateson the objects of his daily environment, which
-
becomemythologizedfirstinvestedwithsupernaturalattributes
and laterloaded with a cargo of associationsand mentalimages
that add to the meaningof the "realisticallyperceived"object.
Whatwe usuallycall "immediacyof perception"is, above all, per-
ceptionin close touchwithimagination,in whichthe stimulus -
the cloud or personor bridge- is allowed to act not onlyon the
highercortexbut on theentirepsyche,so thattheresultingexperi-
ence is in somesensemore "whole" than the pre-eminently adult
experience of the physicistwatching his laboratory dials. The
- -
games of children played with utterseriousness illustratethe
same closenessof fantasyand reality:the child can workthrough
the problemsof growingup, the difficulties of associatingwith
otherpeople,and can learnto masterhis environment in a setting
notat all detachedfromtheotheractivitiesofhis life.Work,play,
love and fantasyare closelyintertwined; and theresultingconnec-
tion is not onlyusefulforthechild'sdevelopment, but independ-
entlyand inherently satisfying.
170
The nonconformity ofchildrencan be easilyexaggerated, espe-

ciallyin an age of "peer-groupmorality/1 Here again,perhapsthe
mostimportantfactis thatwe tend to thinkof childrenas non-
conformist, as sayingthe true but inconvenientthing,as not yet
knowing how to behaveaccordingto adult standards.Mostparents
smileindulgently on hooky-playing in all but theirown children;
and evenour impoverished mythology is richwithtalesofchildren
whounmaskthephoninessof theadultworld,exposethe bombast
of the pedant, and delightfullyviolate the conformities of the
adult. Even allowingforthetruthful exaggerations myth,child-
of
hood ¿5a timewhenconformity (to adult standards)is notyetfully
required, and when spontaneousand impetuousreactionsare far
morelikely.More than most societies,we allow childrena long
period of freedombeforedemandingthat theyassume adult re-
sponsibilities;ifchildrenconform,theyconformto theirown and
not the adult's rules.
That we tend to romanticizeour childhoodsis probablythe
best evidenceof the contrastbetweenthe worldof the child and
thatoftheadult.Psychologists knowall too muchof thesufferings
of children,and manyof us recall the unhappinessof our own
childhood.Nonethelesswe tend to idealize the firstyearsof our
lives,reserving"youthful"as thehighesttermof praise,and view-
ing the "innocent" games of children with nostalgia.5We see
childrenin the imageof Huck Finn, the Catcherin the Rye, and
thefreckle-faced boyson the coversof our familymagazines.Such
idealizationof one period of life,coupled with a denigrationof
another,usuallyhas a firmbasisin fact(althoughnot alwaysin the
factsthatare cited in evidenceforthe judgments).Here I think
the factsare relativelyclear: thevalues and imageswe have about
a givenperiodof lifeshape thisperiodand are shaped by it, too:
underneaththeabsolutestereotype lies a real tendencyin thesame
direction.
Childhoodemergeswell fromthiscomparisonwithadulthood.
б "Innocence"in this contextconnotes,I think,not only relativeignoranceof adult
and sexuality,but a kind of epistemological
responsibilities naïvetéand directness,the
same immediacyand aestheticquality which is to some extenta characteristic of the
outlooksof children.
171
The adult abandonsa worldof directness,immediacy,diversity,

wholeness,integralfantasyand spontaneity. He gainsabstraction,
distance,specialization,monotony,dissociatedfantasyand con-
formity. Faced witha transitioninto an adult world thathe sees
as denyingtheseveryhumanqualitiesofchildhood,theyouthcan
onlyhesitateon its threshold.Like the child who is told to go to
bed, he falters,dragshis feet,becomesangry,createsdiversions,
by-plays and distractions,changesthe subject,seeksso to fascinate
the"grown-ups" byhis charm,witor violencethatthe initialpres-
sures are forgotten - anythingto avoid the sensed extinctionof
bedtime.And evenifhe is eventuallytuckedin,thetemptation not
to
really sleep remains verygreat.The more marked the feltcon-
trastbetweentheblissone leavesand theemptinessone enters,the
greaterthe foot-dragging, diversionand anger. A vicious circle
begins: the worldof childhoodis romanticized, and the prospect
of "settlingdown,""growingup" and "assumingresponsibilities"
is seen in an ever blackerlight.The Holden Caulfieldsof this
countrylove childrenbecause theylove themselvesbest as chil-
dren; it is the "phony"grown-upswho are the objects of anger
and pity.
One explanationof youthculture,then,is the feltcontrast
betweenwhatis expectedof a child and whatis expectedofa man
or woman.The real contrastbetweenthe two stateshas, histori-
cally,increasedwithindustrialization. Children'splay is moreand
moreseparatefromadults'work:childrenno longerworkin the
fieldsor factories;insteadtheygo to school,developingtheirown
cultureand stylesof life appropriateto theirage. And adults no
longerretaintheelementofplay,totalinvolvement and immediate
contactwiththeirworkor withthe people near themthatappear
to characterizeless industrialsocieties.Small wonder,then,that
thereare symptoms ofreluctanceto enteradulthood.The humani-
zationofchildhoodhas been accompaniedby a dehumanization of
adulthood:youthcultureis one consequence.
The ambiguitiesof adulthood. Althoughsome separationof the

worldsof the child and the adult is a biologicallyrootedrequire-
172
ment of everysociety,in ours this separationis probablymore

complete,more sharplydefined,and farmore evaluativelyladen
than in most. But this factalone will not sufficeto explain the
widespreadand diversealienationof youthtoday.Anthropologists
have studiedothersocietieswithsimilarcontrastsbetweenchild-
hood and adulthoodin whichno youthcultureexists.Adults in
thesesocietiesmayalwayspreservea nostalgiaand envyforyouth,
theymay createmythsof a Golden Age in the distantpast,and
theymay individuallyfindthe transitioninto the adult world
painful- but thetransitionis made. To explainwhya protracted,
sometimesunending,period of delay, rebellion or indifference
characterizes adolescencein our society,we must examine adult
rolesin greaterdetail.
I have so farspokenofthe "adultworld"as ifAmericanshad a
clear and univocalview of what it is to be an adult. Actually,of
course,thisis farfromtrue,and the feltcharacteristics of adult
-
life specialization, abstraction, and
dissociatedfantasy conformity
- are informalqualities of most adult roles ratherthan formal
definitions ofwhattheadult is to do, how he is to behave,whathe
is to say- how,concretely, he is to run his life.The veryabsence
of, and in some waysthe impossibility of, such clear definitions
is anotherfactorwhichmakesour socialorderunattractive. On the
one hand, the varietyof roles now open to youngpeople might
seemto maketheirchoiceof adulthoodless difficult; forgiventhis
variety,it shouldbe possibleto findsomerole that"fits"theneeds
and individuality of theadolescent.
Yet withouta criterionforchoice,varietyitselfcan be confus-
ing,as whenwe standwitha smallplatebeforea groaningsmorgas-
bord.Choice becomeseven moredifficult whenvarietyappearsto
be chaos, or when varietyitselfvaries kaleidoscopically.And if,
finally, we cherishthe suspicionthatnone of whatis offeredus is
as good as thatwhichwe are askedto renounce,the temptationto
dally,walkawayor onlynibble oftenbecomesoverpowering. The
variety of adult roles is so great,and theboundaries of each role so
imprecise,thatforany but the mostresoluteor unimaginative, a
period of inaction is almost mandatory when facedwith choosing
17З
betweenthem.And the acceleratingpace of technologicaland

social changeseemsto teachus thata definitionof adulthoodto
whichwe commitourselvesin one decade may proveobsoletein
thenext.Apartfromthesharedand unattractive informalqualities
in
we see adult roles in general,we can seldombe sure precisely
whatis requiredto be an adult.
Even such universaladult roles as thoseof motherand father
are variouslydefined,amorphousand changeable.We lack anybut
the mostminimallegal definitions of these functionsin society:
physical maintenance and lack of physicalcrueltyare mandatory.
Beyond these legal requirements,however,few universallyac-
cepted preceptscan be found.A parentshould love his or her
children,but "love is notenough."Childrenshouldbe broughtup
democratically, but theyalso need the stronghand of authority
and parentswhomtheycan admire.Government manualsprovide
parentaladvice,but it is theoppositeof theadviceof twentyyears
ago. Do parentsbecomeanxiousabout how to raisetheirchildren?
Then theylearn that the worstfaultof all is anxiety.Or take
anotherequallybasicdefinition, thatofmaleness,ofwhatit is to be
a man. Here theadolescentboyis confronted witha welterof con-
flictingpressures,images of violence, tenderness,ambition,re-
nunciation,hardnessand sensitivity - all ofwhichactivelycompete
forhis attention.If, as is increasingly the case, he is unable or
to
unwilling accept the models his own parentsofferhim, the
prospectof manhoodmustbe disturbingas well as intriguing.
In the occupationalsphere,work roles are somewhatmore
rigorouslydefined.But even here,thereare wide areas of uncer-
taintyas to preciselywhat being a lawyer,mechanic,doctoror
truckdriverwill involve.The problemis not so much that the
individualis unaware of the operationshe would performas a
mechanicor lawyer,but ratherthat these specificoccupational
effortshaveno associatedstylesoflife,and,in addition,maychange
under the role-occupier withoutany warning.Having decided to
become a plumber,a youngman still has to make all the other
decisionsabout how, whereand with whomhe will live; an ad-
vertisingman can live in GreenwichVillage,Upper Manhattan,a
174
suburbor an exurb.Vocationalcommitment is onlya prefaceto a

seriesof otherdecisionsthatare relativelyindependentof it: close
associationbetweenvocationand styleof lifeis a thingof thepast.
Everyonemustin somewayschoosean idiosyncratic arrangement
of selectionsfromthe vastrepertory of life-styles available in our
culturaljuke box.6
The increasingrateof social changealso makesthestabilityof
adult commitments equivocal. In the past fifty years,our society
has changedat a devastatingand acceleratingpace. Today's world
was inconceivablefifty yearsago; the world of twenty-five years
fromtodayis probablyequally unimagined."Generations,"for-
merlymeasuredby a man's lifespan,now span a decade at most.
One of the greatproblemsof an industrialsocietyis to ease the
effectsofthesechangeson themembersof thesociety.Technologi-
cal changesproducejob obsolescenceand skillobsolescence:pain-
fullylearnedworktechniquesmaybe unwantedin an age of auto-
mation.But even deeper stressesresultfromsocial changesthat
replaceone ethicand ethoswithanother,makingobsoletenot only
a man's skills,but oftenthe entirestructureof his characterand
outlook. Partlyto cope with these stresses,new typesof social
characterare developing,producingmen whosecommitment is to
the shiftingpressuresof the environment, to adaptabilityand to
changeitself.Yet theverynatureof this"other-directed" character
is thatit cannotbe pinneddownor specifiedin termsofvaluesand
life goals. "Other-directedness" offerslittle to a youthwho seeks
some stable or constantcore of adult identity."Choose to be
changed"may be feasibleas a once-or-twice-in-a-lifetime impera-
tive,but it is seldomviable as a wayof life.
In short,manyof our currentmodels of adult characterand
identityare by theirverynaturevague and amorphous,emphasiz-
ingtheabilityto adapt,to accommodateoneself,and tochangewith
e "Conformity" can be seen as one mode of adaptationto the problemof choice.Just
as the popularityof a song is the usual criterionfor selectingit fromamong the soo
availablefora dime,and just as an elaborateinformation
selections serviceof Hit Parades
keepspeople informedas to what is currently popular,so consumerpopularityand the
vastattentionpaid in popular magazinesto "How AmericaLives" providepeople with
criteriaforchoosingamongdifferent stylesof life.
175
shiftingcircumstances. Even in theoccupationalsphere,it is more

difficultfora youngman to bringhimselfto learn the techniques
of the engineerwhen he believesthatthesemaybe outmodedin
fifteenyears.More generaladult rolesare even morefluid,witha
kind of built-inprincipleof change.The perceptiveyouthmay
consciously or unconsciouslysensein all of theserolesthecommon
disadvantages ofspecialization,abstractionand dissociatedfantasy;
at the same timehe is unable to findin our social orderrolesor
definitionsofselfhoodthatpromiseto outlivethenexttechnologi-
cal, moral or social revolution.Thus, the choice of adulthood
becomes even more difficult, and the probabilityof alienation
increases.
The changein aspirations.Youthcultureand alienationhavebeen

characterized as a silentrebellionagainsttheprevailingorder,what
itasks,and whatitseemsto offer. Yet one ofthelessonsofthestudy
of rebellionsis thattheycome about not because of any absolute
level of misery,but because of a gap, a feltdiscrepancy, between
whatis and whatis believedto be important, desirableand possi-
ble. Revolutionsusually occur in timesof increasingprosperity
and well-being, and thuscannotbe explainedon groundsof abso-
lute povertyor deprivation.Ratherit is the conviction,the belief,
that the presentorder is inadequate which producesdiscontent.
If we distinguishbetween revolution,with an active and
articulateprogramof changeand reform,and rebellion,whichis
more random,unfocusedon goals, amorphousand inarticulate,
thenoursis an age- in theindustrialdemocraciesof theWest- of
rebellionbut not of revolution.The lack of programamong the
alienatedmakestruerevolutionunlikely.But thisis, nonetheless,
a timeof silentrebellion,of nay-saying of a thousandkinds.And
rebellionsdifferfromrevolutions not in theiroriginsbut in their
articulateness.Even in explaininga phenomenonlike youthcul-
ture,we musttherefore considerthe gap betweenaspirationsand
actualitiesas one of thechiefsourcesof alienation.
Manyoftheoutwardfactsofour cultureare happyones: as we
are continuallyremindedby the defendersof our culture,we live
176
in the greatestplentythe worldhas ever known.Our societyhas

exceededthematerialdreamsofour forefathers; yet,theconditions
theyyearned havingbeen attained,theirdreamshave ceased
for
to exciteus. To foreigners - indeed to manyAmericanparents -
dissatisfaction with today's securityand prosperityseems gross
petulance or rank ingratitude.And it is undoubtedlytrue that
judged by the standardsof fifty or a hundredyearsago, our con-
temporary societygivesgroundsonlyfordelectationand rejoicing.
That suchrejoicingis uncommon,and thatalienationis so preva-
lent, thereforeindicatesdifferent standardsof judgment,a new
and narrowerdefinitionof "what mustbe enduredwithoutpro-
test"- and beneaththis,an implicitchangein whatmen feelthey
are entitledto ask of life.
It is easyto be misledhere.Young people oftenseemto justify
theirelders'criticisms of theirirresponsibility
or ingratitude when
theyprotest thatthere is "no to
longeranything protestagainst."
This complaintat firstseemsabsurdand childish:nothingto pro-
testagainstimpliesa perfectworldand is clearlyno groundsfor
protest.But in facthereare manythingspeople do protestagainst
- manyof themthe thingswe have earlierdiscussed.On closer
examination,"nothingto protestagainst" seemsratherto mean
"no articulateprinciplesupon which to ground one's intuitive
dislikesand rejections,"and is thus joined to anothercommon
complaint,"nothingleftto believe in." The lack of any positive
moralityupon which to ground criticismof the existingworld
helpsexplaintheabsenceofreformand revolutionary spirittoday,
and I will returnto thispoint later.But fornow,we need to re-
mind ourselvesthat absence of articulateexpressiondoes not
demonstrate theabsenceoffeeling,passionand belief.That a man
cannotfullyarticulatehis aspirationsdoes not mean thathe may
notstillrebelagainstthediscrepancy betweenwhatis and whathe
dimly, almost unconsciously, senses mightbe. Men may feel that
theyhave a rightto "somethingbetterthan this,"withoutbeing
able to definethe "something."
Giventheproverbialsilenceof thisgenerationabout itsobjects
of devotion,any attemptto investigatethe "real aspirations"of
177
thosewho react to theirculturewith apathyor alienationmust

necessarily remainspeculations.But one clue to theseaspirations
can be foundin whatyoungpeople findit difficult to acceptabout
the lives theyare askedto lead. To dislikeabstraction, specializa-
tion or the dissociationof fantasypresupposesthatone cherishes
directexperience,a more total employmentof talents,and the
integrationof fantasyinto everydaylife. And in the prevalent
rejection of conformity, routinization,"massification"and the
submersionof the individualin the group,thereoftenappear to
be implicitaspirationstowardindividuation,autonomy,integrity,
"authenticity"and uniqueness.7These values have long been
imbeddedin our culture,but were neverbeforeconsideredade-
quate groundsforrejectingit.Whyshouldtheynowbecomemore
compellingand urgent?
One obviousreasonis thatthe values one stressesare to some
extenta reflection of thedefectsof thecurrentsituation.In sunny
regions,shade is treasured;northernclimatesprize the sun. Inso-
far as modern societyhas characteristic weaknesses,we should
expecttheiroppositesto be emphasizedas values. Our industrial
society,howevergreatitsvirtues,has broughtattendantevils; and
it is unrealisticto expectthateach generationwill merelycontinue
tobe gratefulforthevictorieswonby itspredecessors. Moreunder-
standableand moredesirableis thatit should turnto attackthe
problemsthatfollowthesetriumphs.The aspirationsof a genera-
tionshouldcounteritsown mostpainfulrealities,not thoseof its
parents.
This changein maywaysan extremely basic changein our
social and culturalfactsof lifesuffices to accountforthe apparent
ingratitude of this generation.But it is not adequate to explain
whatseemsnot onlya changein aspirationsbut a heightened,if
stilllargelymute,senseofwhatcan be demandedoflife.To under-
standthiswe mustconsiderthe psychologicaleffectsof our vast
extensionof physicalpowerin the pastcentury.As Galbraithhas
pointedout,we live on thebrinkof an age of affluence whosefull
significance forour thinkingremainsto be comprehended.Many
7 1 will considerbelowsomeof thereasonswhyyoungpeople findit difficult
to form-
ulate coherentalternatives to what theyreject.
178
nationscan foreseethetotalabolitionofscarcityin thenextgenera-

tion;eventhattraditionally mostfantastic ofall unrealimaginings,
a tripto the moon,seemspossiblewithinthe next decade. When
theconquestof povertyand space are almostwithinour grasp,we
naturally - althoughperhapsunconsciously - tendto viewall fron-
tiersas withinour reach,whethertheybe physical,economic,so-
cial or psychological.Given our immensephysicalpowers,we are
less willingto accepta social and personalmilieu whichleavesus
unfulfilled.
The currentsituationis thereforeparadoxical; and in this
paradoxlies a keyto understanding thepeculiarqualityofmodern
alienation.For it is importantto recall thatveryfewmodernmen
are activelypossessedof the beliefthattheycan controltheirown
destiniesor theshape of societywiththe same assurancethatthey
can managetheforcesofnature.Quite theoppositeis true,in fact;
rarelybeforehave men experiencedsuch massresignationbefore
the forcesof society,such a senseof distancefromthe sourcesof
power,such defeatismin the faceof an explosiveworldsituation.
The paradoxis therefore this:thenaturallogicofour immense
technological and materialprogressis, by generalization,to con-
vince us thatwe should be able to determineour fatesas human
beingsin our socialand culturalsettings just as we beginto control
the physicalworld; yet consciouslywe lack any such conviction.
The culturalcorrelateof materialprogressis therefore not,as we
would expect,reformor revolution,but whatwe mightcall "un-
programmaticalienation"- rejectionof societywithoutany ex-
plicit programof objectivesor techniquesfor improvingit, and
withoutevenan articulatesetof principlesfromwhichto criticize
it. Our discontentnecessarilyremainsat thelevel of a "feeling,"a
dumbunrest,a vaguesensethatsomethingis wrong,an unwilling-
nessto put up witha life thatseemsin some undefinedway less
thanwe mightdemand.
In otherwords,theextensionof someof our powersreinforces
ourdissatisfactionwithhowlittlewe seemable toaskforin ourown
lives.Even thoughour aspirationsare seldomexplicitin our com-
plaintsand inertias,our implicitdefinitionof "psychologicalsub-
179
sistence"has changed.In an enormously successful age suchas this,

youngmen are more likelyto refuseto pay too high a price for
membership in society.Sincewe alreadylive in thematerialutopia
dreamtof by the nineteenthcentury,whysettleforanythingless
thanthebestin anyotherarea?
Mythsand UnconsciousUtopias
This accountof the rootsof alienationhas so farbeen incom-
plete in two ways.To be sure,in manyareas of life,our culture
demandsa higherdegreeofabstraction, specializationand dissocia-
tionthananybeforeit,while at the same timeoffering fewstable
incentivesforabandoningthe integritiesof childhood.And it is
doubtlesstrue thatour materialpower has lessenedour willing-
ness to acceptnonmaterialdeprivations.But theseconsiderations
alone will not sufficeto explain our increasingdisaffection. For
one, theygive inadequateweightto those real social and material
advanceswhichin themselvesshould make alienationless likely.
Scientificand technologicalprogresshas removedmany of the
formertargetsof protest,reform,rebellion and revolution.In
manyWesterncountries - preciselythosein whichalienationnow
seemsmostwidespread - thesenselesssufferings of physicalillness,
thevastdisparitiesof extremeaffluence and extremepoverty,and
the injusticesof tyrannicalrule seem on the way to being elim-
inated.Neverbeforehave therebeen so manyalternatives open to
man,such variedexperiencesavailable,so much real freedomto
choosebetweenbeliefe,work,stylesof life,and domiciles.These
new social realitiesmightwell have outweighedthe disadvantages
of adulthoodof whichwe have spoken;the factis, however,that
theyhavenot; theirneteffect has,ifanything, been opposite.
But all of these profferedexplanations alienationare also
of
incompletein a morefundamental sense.Like individualbehavior,
socialphenomenacan be viewed from twopointsofview: in terms
of the presenceof forcesthatco-operateto produce them,or in
termsof theabsenceof factorsthatmightpreventthem.An indi-
vidual neurosiscan be "explained" in termsof the factorsthat
predisposethe individualto the illnessand immediately occasion
180
itssymptoms; but it can also be understoodby studyingthe forces

deterrentto illnessthatare absent.The morewe study"normal"
individuals,the morewe see thattheyoftensharecommonback-
groundswithneurotics;the determining difference maylie in the
"normal's"experienceof a singleadmiredteacherwho filledhim
withan abidinglove of knowledgeand wisdom,in the influence
of an understandingaunt who early gave him a kernelof self-
esteemon whichhe could later build, in an earlyacquired and
-
tenaciouslyheld conceptionof what he mightbecome in short,
in constructive, integrativeforcesthat enabled him to overcome
or profitfromthe same conflictsthathave incapacitatedthe neu-
rotic.I haveso farconsideredonlythepresent,activedeterminants
of alienation;the missingcountervailingforcesremainto be dis-
cussed.
Men will happilytolerategreatdiscomfort, discontinuity and
frustration if- and only if- theyare workingforsome purpose,
towardsome end, which theyconsiderwise, true, excitingand
meaningful.It is a tragicfactthatduringwarsor revolutionsthat
coalesce societiesaround a centralpurpose,the symptomsof in-
ternalsocial pathologydecline: mental illness,despondencyand
suicidedecrease.The ambivalentnostalgiawithwhichEnglishmen
recall the glorious-tragic daysof the Blitz,the significance of the
Resistanceto theaverageFrenchmanfifteen yearsafterthewar-
theseattestto theimportanceofa commonpurposeand a common
enemy.For the war was a time of intensefrustration and daily
suffering,whensocietyaskedmuchand offered littlebut a distant
hope of victory,and when the gap between the contestin which
menstruggledand thepeace to whichtheyaspiredwas greatest.It
is preciselythe absence of any such positivevision which would
makefrustration worthwhilethatmostexplainsour contemporary
alienation.
The transvaluation of utopia. The decline of culturalmorale- of

co-operationbasedon theacceptanceofsomecommonvisionofthe
desiredfuture- is perhapsmostobviousin thedeclineand devalu-
ation of utopias. There was a time when "Utopian" was, for at
least some men,a termof praise,and when utopias were defined
181
as tangibleand desiredpossibilitiesthatmen mightwriteabout

and actuallyset out to realize.The BrookFarmsand Nauvoos of
America,the Proudhons,St. Simons,Owens and Fouriersof Eu-
rope- all expressedthe convictionthattherewerecertainvalues
which should be implementedconcretelythroughnew formsof
socialorganization, and thatsuch implementation was well within
the practicalimmediatepossibilitiesof ordinaryhuman beings.
Perhaps it is significantthat Brook Farm, initiallythe most
AmericanoftheUtopiancommunities, perishedin a holocaustand
was neverfullyrebuilt.A paralleldestinypursuedall of the other
implementations of utopia in this country;and throughoutthe
Westernworld,concreteimagesof the desiredfuturehave met
withthesamefate.Marx'sclasslesssociety,thegreatestofall nine-
teenth-century utopias,has as surelydied as an objectofaspiration
to mostWesterners. We can or dare no longervisualizea future
betterthanthepresentabout whichwe complain.
But ifwe definea utopia as anyattemptto make the possibili-
tiesof the futureimaginatively concrete,utopiashave not in our
day ceased to exist; theymerelyhave been transvalued.The con-
trastbetweennineteenth- and twentieth-century utopiasis drastic.
Our visionsofthefuturehaveshiftedfromimagesofhope tovistas
of despair;utopiashave becomewarnings,not beacons. Huxley's
BraveNew World,Orwell's1984 and AnimalFarm,Young's The
Rise of theMeritocracy and, ironically,even Skinner'sWaiden II
- thevastmajorityofour visionsofthefutureare negativevisions,
extensionsof the mostpernicioustrendsof the present.They are
deterrents, cautionarytales: utopia has become counter-utopia.
The connotationsof "utopian" have similarlychanged: the term
is nowunequivocallyassociatedwith"unrealistic,""self-defeating"
and, forsome,withman'sdeepestand mostpridefulsins.
The reasonsforthisshiftare complex,and to considerthem
fullywouldtakeus farafield.Mostfundamentally, thisshiftis part
and symptom ofa moregeneral"lossof faith"in theWest,seen in
the movementfrom"positivevalues" (ends which men should
seek) to a "negativemorality"(which elucidates the evils and
terrorsmen should avoid), and in our widespreaddoubt as to
whetherthere are any values which can be legitimatelyand
182
passionatelyheld. This transitionhas oftenbeen discussed:it be-

ginswiththebreakdownofmedievalcertainty, progresses through
centuriesof increasingrationalskepticismand "demythologizing"
ofreligion,and culminatesin thecynicismand senseof ideological
defeatthathave followedour two worldwars.Nietzsche's"trans-
valuationof values" has takenplace. But the old creedshave not
been replaced,as he hoped,by values moreadequate to whatman
mightbecome, but by the value nihilismagainstwhich he ex-
plicitlywarned. The hammerhas been retained,but not the
conceptof a transcendent man above all men so farenvisaged.
A moreimmediatecause of the transvaluation of utopia is our
unhappyexperiencewithattemptsto make real the visionsof the
pastcentury - above all thevisionof Marx. Whateverthe reasons
forthefailureof Marxismin Russia to achieveitshighmoraland
spiritualaims, the repercussionsof this failurehave been disas-
trous.Not onlyhas theworldbeen dividedintotwohostilecamps,
each with the power to destroythe otherat an instant'snotice,
but- if possibleeven more important - the failureof thisutopia
has furthercrushedinterestin visualizingand hope of attaininga
betterworld. Communismin Russia involved far more than a
parochialnationalrevolutionthatfailed.It was an attempt,like
thatof the FrenchRevolution,to create a world in which men
would be freenot onlyfromthe tyrannies of wantand power,but
fromthe oppressionsof theirsocial and economicorder- an at-
temptto make concretethe spiritualpromisesof Christianity. Its
failurehas been a tragedyfor the entire West, one which has
materiallyunderminedour decliningfaithin our capacityto im-
proveour world.
But I doubt that the failureof Marxism is really adequate
groundsfor the far-reaching, if implicit,conclusionsthat many
seemto have drawnfromit. The collapseof one enterprise, how-
evermammoth,does not necessarily showthatall such enterprises
are inevitablydoomed. Perhapsthe mostgenerallesson thatcan
validlybe drawnfromsuch collapsesis thatmeans and ends are
inextricably to attainpeace throughviolence,
related.It is difficult
or mass happinessthroughgenocide: it is impossibleto change
radicallyan entiresocietyat a single stroke.(Characteristically,
183
manymodernCommunists denythisintegralrelationshipbetween
whatis to be accomplishedand howit is to be attained.)
We have, however, already overlearnedeven this lesson.
Spenglerspeaksof "technicism" - an exclusiveconcentrationon
the techniques,instruments and means forattainingonce-desired
-
ends as themarkofthedecliningcivilization.Otherwritershave
commentedon the replacementof "substantive"reason,which
can judge thevalidityofendsand goals,by "instrumental" reason,
whichcan judge onlytheefficacy of techniquesin attainingpre-or-
dainedends.This technicism is more and morepervasive:in every
areamethodology replacessubstance;technicalproficiencyisvalued
over finalexcellence;the analysisof philosophicalquestionssub-
stitutesfor their resolution; "know-how"supplants wisdom;
"Whither?"has become archaic,but "How?" is on everyman's
lips. It is small wonderthatmen should feel powerlessbeforea
social orderin whoseday-to-day workingstheyare technicallyen-
meshedbut whosedirectiontheyfeelunable to judge.
Even in ethics,apparentlythe fieldmostconcernedwith the
properends of conductand life,technicismreignsvirtuallyun-
challenged.Academicethicshas concentratedmore and more on
what was once only a prelude to substantiveethics: the formal
logical and linguisticanalysisof ethical propositionsand their
characteristic Philosophersnow seldom tryto de-
justifications.
finetheGood Life,but ratherconsidertheseveralsensesin which
the term"good" can be used. Popular philosophyis of equally
littlehelp. Our mostcharacteristic tractson popular ethicshave
a certain"how-to-do-it" quality; how to thinkpositively(about
doing in yourneighbor?);how to get along withpeople (what if
theyare not worthgettingalong with?);how to cope withguilts
and anxieties(but supposeyou have sinned?).
Even the nonacademicphilosophersofferfewnoninstrumental
suggestions. Perhapsthe mostappealingmoral termsof our time
are words like "spontaneity,""individuality,""authenticity/'
"identity"and "autonomy,"termsusuallymostfullydevelopedby
psychoanalytic or existentialwriters.Yet one can "spontaneously"
commitmurderand "authentically" - God forbid- pressa guided
missilebutton.These termsgiveus criteriaforjudginghowa thing
184
is done,but onlyindirectlyifat all forevaluatingwhatis done. To

recurto an old philosophicaldistinction, the mannerin whichan
act is performedmay be a necessary conditionbut is not a sufficient
conditionforits virtuousness. To suffice,a virtuousact or goal is
also needed.8
The transvaluationofutopia is thuspartofa widertransvalua-
tion of values,a long-term declineof positivemoralitywhichhas
not onlyleftmen unable to visualizea betterfuture,but has de-
privedthemofarticulatebaseson whichto judge thepresent.The
rise of the counter-utopiais one aspectof this more generalhis-
toricaltrend,whichreachesitsacme in thenegativevisionsof the
twentieth century.
The submersionof positivemyth.Everyage has its characteristic

myths, itsimaginedor real events,laden withassociations, symbols
and marginalmeanings,which expressthat time'sdeepest inter-
pretationof the visibleworldand of the worldof good and evil.
These mythsvaryin time,amongindividuals,and amongnations.
So it is onlyas an abstractionthatwe can speak of the "mythof
an age," or of the generalcharacteristics of mythin any timeand
place. Nonetheless, evenas abstraction,suchdiscourseis useful,for
the deepest vitalitiesof rational belief and discourselie in its
mythicsubstructure. The mythof an age mustbe soughtin the
concreterepresentations of thatage: in the stories,the folktales,
the philosophicalvisions,the entertainments, the questionsthat
are takenforgrantedand thosethatare in issue in the age's ex-
hortationsand cautions.
Everyage, too,has its characteristic balance betweenpositive,
eductive,hortatory, constructive,imperative,visionary,Utopian
myths, and negative, deterrent,cautionary,warning,direful,de-
structiveand counter-utopian myths.In some periodsof Western
history,images of violence, demonism, destructiveness, sorcery
e This is obviouslynot to say thatfanaticism is betterthaninstrumentalism. To folget
whatwe havepainfully learnedof thenexusbetweenmeansand endswouldbe to fallinto
a ferocious, unprogressivedialecticin whicheach generationover-reacts againstthe views
of the previousage and recommits the sinsof the last but one. But just as no end,how-
everadmirable,can be attainedwithoutstudyingthe meansmostconduciveto it, so no
knowledge, howeveradequate,of instruments and techniquescan lead to improvement
withoutsomeconceptions of the valuesthat thesetechniquesmustserve.
185
and witchcraft have prevailed; in others,mythsof blessedness,

justice,co-operation, and universalconcordancewithdivineorder
havedominated.Othertimes,perhapsthehappiest,havebeen able
to includevisionsof both lightand darknessin one mythicem-
brace: onlyin such timesdo we finda clear public articulationof
theexistenceofand thelinksbetweenthedivineand thedemonic.
But despite the great differences between the dominantly
positivemythsofone age and thepredominantly negativemythsof
another,a more subtleequilibriumalso prevails.The sweetrea-
sonablenessoftheEnlightenment is thebackdropforDe Sade'smost
demonicof all envisionedrepublics.When the devil is denied,he
manifestshimselfnonetheless - in some ways the more because
hisexistenceis no longerrecognizedand thuscannotbe combatted.
Similarly,thedivinereasserts itselfmostpowerfully in individuals
whenthecollectivemythsignorethe Good: saintslive in timesof
the devil. Withoutdenyingthatthereare real contrastsbetween
different ages in theirratio of positiveand negativemyths,we
should also be aware thatboth typesof mythare alwayspresent,
sometimeson the surface,sometimessubmergeddeep below the
dominantconsciousness of the time.
Few would disagreethatour own timeis one of predominantly
negative,deterrent or even satanicmyths.Our dissociatedfantasy
is fantasyof violence,crueltyand crime,presentedostensiblyas a
warning,but oftenactingas a stimulant.More fundamentally, the
highestliteraryand intellectualattainments of contemporary cul-
ture presentus not with imagesof integration, co-operationand
reality,but with of
myths decay,chaos, warfareand illusion.Analy-
sis everywherereplaces synthesis;fission,fusion; asymmetry,
symmetry; regression, growth.Even in immediateworld politics,
themythofThe Bomb and of InevitableWar has greatercogency
thananybeliefin peace or concord.
This shift,whichwe have seen clearlyonly in the past fifty
years,has been long in the making.Our specificdisillusionments
and tragicexperiencesofrecenthistoryonlypartlyaccountforit;
fortheverywillingness to be disillusionedand to considerhistory's
lessonstragicis itselfa partofthemoregeneralsubmersionofposi-
tive myth.Historically,the change in the typeof mythseemsto
186
consistof tworelatedprocesses,one the intellectualizationof posi-

tivemyth,theotherthedebunkingof ideology.I obviouslycannot
hope to chronicleadequately the stages throughwhich these
processeshave takenplace, but can only suggestthemin general
terms.
Rationalism,as it emergedsubsequentto the Renaissance,at-
temptedto dissociatereasonand faith,extirpating superstitionand
basing beliefon the sounder tenetsof reason."
"self-evident The
Cartesiancritique of religion,althoughit finallyarrivedat re-
ligioustruthsalmostidenticalwiththosefromwhichit had started,
nonethelessfoundedthese truthson a primarilycognitiveand
intellectualbasis.Faithwas notreallynecessary;reasonalone could
arriveat truthin mattersof value just as in mattersof science.
The primaryeffectof this new faithin reason was to separate
the emotional and the cognitive sources of myth, abetting
the rationalisticcritique of the affective, imaginai components
of the medieval mythand producing a new mythwhich, on
the surfaceat least, was far more rooted in reason and less at-
tached to fantasyand the nonrational."Demythologizing"re-
ligion did not, however,resultin the disappearanceof myth(as
we here use the term),but merelyin a new kind of myth,which
we mightcall an "ideology"to indicateits primarilyintellectual
content,and to distinguishit fromother mythsmore directly
rootedin passion,faith,imaginationand poetic experience.This
ideology,carrying a visionofa newsociety,was expressedabove all
by the French philosophersof the eighteenthcentury,and its
Utopianaspectsculminatedin the French Revolution.The ex-
cessesof thisrevolutionmightwell have taughtthatthe optimistic
rationalismof the Enlightenment had ignoredimportantaspects
of humanexperience,forit had been unable to anticipateor even
to comprehendtheeagernesswithwhichmen rejectedReason and
in itsname chosefirstTerror and thenNapoleon.
But in fact,of course,thislessonwas not learned.Insteadof a
deepeningof whathad become a primarilyideologicalmyth,this
mythpersistedin the same formand merelyproved itselfmore
vulnerableto attack.Purelycerebralvalues are usually the most
vulnerable;thosewhicharerootedin personalexperienceare more
187
passionately held. Withouta sanctionedbasis in feeling,tradition

or fantasy, thevaluesoftheEnlightenment weredifficult to defend.
Just as it was easy to show thatthe rationalists' natural
laws had no
basisin physicalfact,but wererootedin faith(now disreputable),
so it provedsimple to demonstratethat intellectstandingalone
was impotentto arriveat valid conclusionsabout ultimateques-
tions.Conceptslike "progress,""reason"and "perfectibility" could
readily be shown to be of
principles interpretation, not facts:
bereft
of theirnonintellectual foundations, theytoo havecollapsed.Since
historycontinually refuted the rationalists'claims,and since they
had voluntarily deprivedthemselves ofanyappealsbut thoseto the
intellect,theycould do littleto defendtheircauses.
Opennessto suchdebunkingis a necessarycharacteristic of any
systemof beliefsthatattemptsto separateitselfcompletelyfrom
thenonrationaland the negative.With a furythatseemsborn of
deprivationand frustration, modernthoughthas systematized the
techniquesof intellectualsubversion.Whatevertheirpositivecon-
tent,psychoanalysis, existentialism, Marxism and even modern
philosophicalanalysisstartfroma systematized debunkingofexist-
ing belief. The techniques forthis destruction vary,but theyhave
certainfeaturesin common.All consistin demonstrating the im-
potenceof intellectbeforemore powerfulnonintellectualforces
which"truly"determinethebeliefsmenhold and professtojustify
by reason.Whetherthesebeliefsare held becauseof the denial of
irrationalimpulsesin man,refusalto face the trueconditionsof
existenceand death,economicinterest, or simple"misunderstand-
ings" about the use of language, the resultis thesame: conviction
is underminedby associatingbeliefswith undesirableinterests,
fearsor errors.
Through thisintellectualization of positivemythand the de-
bunkingof the ensuingideologies,little remainsof our former
faiths.What startedas an attackon specificbeliefsand typesof
illusionhas becomea generalattackon all positivemyths.Reason
and the Good have been.firmlyassociatedsince Plato, and the
attackon the one has in effectresultedin subvertingthe other.
Our positivemythhas been shornof its strength, separatedmore
188
and morefromthenonrational,theimagination, and fromitsroots

in fantasy,desiccatedfromsubstantive to instrumentalreason.The
vitalitieswhichit once possessedhave passedto thenegativemyth.
What fascinates, enchantsand seducesus now is not any
horrifies,
positivevision, but the disparateimagesof chaos, destructiveness
and cruelty.
To be sure,we rationalizeour fascinationwith these images
by appealingto theirdeterrenteffects. Two hoursof violenceand
crueltyis a moralityplayiftheculpritis punishedin thelastscene
ofthelastact. But Satandominatestheplayand secretlytriumphs,
as he is wontto do in our day.And not withoutreason,forby ac-
ceptingtheaffective desiccationof positivemyth,we almostguar-
anteethatemotionshouldbe on theside of thenegative,whatever
intelligencemay dictate.Evil always has its seductiveness;but
whengoodhas been deprivedofadventure,poetryand excitement,
thefascination ofthedemonicbecomesalmostoverwhelming, even
when we believe thatwe observeit merelyto learn its negative
lessons.
The unconsciousness of contemporary utopias.The dominanceof

deterrentand destructivemythsshould not lead us to conclude
that utopias and eductivemythshave simplyvanished without
vestige.I have argued thatthe positiveand negativecomponents
of mythare relatedmuchas theconstructive and destructivesides
ofan individual'sfantasy life: ifone dominatesit usuallyindicates
thatthe otherhas been drivenunderground,where it continues
to existuntil it can be reintegrated into consciousnessand given
coherentform.There is much indirectevidencethatsuch is the
case with eductivemythsat the presenttime. As Camus points
out, everyact of rebellionpresupposesan implicitaffirmation of
thatin thenameofwhichone rebels;so too inasmuchas alienation
constitutesa refusalto participate,it indicatesthatsome interest
standsabove participation.It need hardlybe said thatdisaffection
has its purelydestructive componentsand, by itself,can be sheer
nihilism.But it may also contain,especiallywhen articulate,the
seedsofpotentialcommitment. Indeed,theveryfactofwidespread
189
alienationfroma societydominatedby vestigialideologiesor de-

structiveand deterrentmythsitselfsuggeststhat more positive
values,howeverinarticulateor unconscious,stillexist.
Atfirst itmayseemparadoxicaltospeakofan unconsciousmyth.
For we usuallyassociatemythswiththeirspoken,written, pictorial
or filmedexpressions.And yet none of these is the mythitself,
whichmaybe expressedvariouslyand thus cannotbe identified
withanyone of itsconcretearticulations. A mythresidesabove all
in thedeepestplaces in men'sminds,and mayutterlylack expres-
sionwithouttherefore ceasingto exist.To speakofan unconscious
or implicitmyth,as of an unconsciousfantasy, merelyrequiresan
inference,based on evidencewhich cannot be readilyexplained
withoutsuch an inference.Much of the evidenceforthe uncon-
sciousness - as opposed to the nönexistence- of positivemythsin
our timehas alreadybeen discussedin consideringalienationand
youthculture.The rathersurprisingcontrastbetweenour sense
of physicalpowerand the clarityof our materialaims on the one
hand and our senseof spiritualimpotenceand purposelessness on
theothershouldlead us to the inferencethatforsomereasonmen
are preventedfromexpressingtheiraspirations, whichexistnone-
theless,althoughnot in communicableform.Second,I have men-
tionedtheunprogrammatic - sometimesnihilistic- natureofmod-
ern alienation, which only occasionallyreaches the form of
articulateprotest,and almostneverleads to an impulsetowardre-
form.Yet if to refuseto takepartin somethingpresupposessome
superordinatevalue on which the rejectionis at least implicitly
based,we again have indirectevidencethatmen feelsomeattach-
ment to values which, although unexpressed,they nonetheless
serve.
But perhapsthemostcogentevidenceofimplicitpositivemyths
is to be had simplyby conversing withpeople about whattheyde-
sirefromlife.There is normallya signalincongruity betweenthe
superficiality,the banalityand remoteness of theirexpressedaims
and purpose,and the depthand "feltness"of theirimplicitgoals,
whichwe mustusuallyinferfromwhat theydislikeand seek to
avoid. Young men and women today feel great uneasinessand
discomfort at expressingany ambitionor conceptionof life that
190
has notbeen longsincesappedofanyreal vitalityforthemor their

fellows.Were such unease, embarrassment and incongruitybe-
tweenovertand covertvalues evidentin a discussionof sex or
we wouldknowwhatconclusionto draw: beneaththeex-
hostility,
pressed views lie less conscious,contrasting and perhapsopposite
valuesand attitudes.
Anotherobstacleto acceptingthe conclusionthat men have
unconsciousconstructive fantasiesand unconsciouseductivemyths
is our currentnotionof "thecontentsof the unconscious."We are
accustomedto thinkof unconsciousprocessesin termsof "Freud-
ian" repression,whichconsistsprimarilyin rejectingunacceptable
aggressiveand sexual fantasies.Accordingto this principle,only
the destructiveor libidinal fantasieson which a mythmightbe
basedcould be repressed,and it would be virtuallyimpossiblenot
to be awareof "good" fantasies.
But thereis increasingreasonto believethatFreud'sdefinition
of thecontentsof theunconsciousis a historicalone, relevantpri-
marilyto the Victorianworld in which he lived. Psychoanalysts
commenton theincreasingrarityof thehysterical and compulsive
symptoms upon which Freud based his views of repression:the
newertypeofpatientarrivesat theanalyst'soffice morefullyaware
of his aggressionand sexuality,but seekingto findsome purpose
forhis life.Perhapsa moregeneralstatementof the determinants
ofrepressionis this:whateverwould,ifit wereconscious,cause the
individual trouble (discomfort, pain, guilt, ridicule, shame, et
cetera)tendsto remainunconscious.This formulation would sug-
gest that "good" impulses,drives, and
fantasies aspirationsmight
be thosemostunconsciousin thepatientwithouta purposein life.
We mighteven speculatethatin the mid-twentieth century,the
"contentsoftheunconscious"have changedto counterbalanceour
invertedmyths:whatis mostunconscioustodayis theconstructive,
prospectiveand affirmative partof man.
A numberof psychoanalysts have developedtermsthatpermit
us to speak of unconscious"good" fantasies.Erikson's"positive
identities,"Horney's"real self,"Sullivan's"personifications of the
good me," Fromm's "creativepotentialities"- all of theseaspects
of theselfadmitofrepression, and theanalystsees one of his tasks
191
as makingthe patientaware of them. But althoughsuch com-

ponentsof personalityare increasingly discussed,we know little
about the reasonswhytherapeuticassistanceis so oftenrequired
tomakethemconscious.And moreimportant to theunderstanding
of alienation,we do not understandwhy,despitethe widelyex-
presseddesirefora morepositiveand cogentmyth,and despitethe
signsthattheseedsofsucha mythare presentin manyof us, such
a mythdoes not findmore readyculturalexpression.What pre-
ventsus fromarticulating our now-dumbaspirations?
I have alreadymentionedour contemporary disillusionment
withutopias,a disenchantment bornpartlyof thespiritualfailure
of so many attemptsto translateutopia into practice.Western
civilizationhas come to bear a deep and ultimatelydestructive
convictionthatnot onlyutopias,but everysystematic attemptto
translateideals into practice,especiallyin the social and political
spheres,is similarlydoomedto defeat,or worse,to thatreinstalla-
tionof the evilsof the old regimewhichhas attendedmostmajor
revolutions.Given a widespreadconvictionthat deliberateat-
temptsat reformlead to excessesworsethanthosetheyseekto cor-
rect,theeasiestsolutionforthe individualor the cultureis never
to voice the principlesby whichreformmightbe guided. Disillu-
sionofoverlyhighhopeshas producedcynicism - not thecynicism
of the nativeopportunist, but the more corrosivecynicismof the
man or theculturewhichhas seen its hopes dashed.
Beneaththiscynicism, whichusuallyexpressesitselfin lack of
interestin idealismor in boredomat high aspirations,lie more
concretefears.If one articulatesa set of principles,constructsa
utopia or other eductivemyth - whetherfor himselfor for his
-
cultureor forboth he automaticallybecomes in some way re-
sponsibleto thisvision.Mostmenconsiderthecynicismof notact-
ing to promoteone's avowed purposesa worseoffensethan the
cynicismof not havinganypurposesat all. But to act to promote
or makereala positivevisionofthefutureis- in our currentworld
view- to condemn oneselfto certain frustration and probable
failure.The thoughtthatit maymakemattersworseis even more
paralyzing formenofgoodfaith.Thus, a welterofgood intentions,
desirenot to do harm,doubtas to whetherthereare anymeansto
192
promoteworthyends,and fearof frustration or failureconspireto

make it far easier not to articulateany positivemoralityin the
firstplace.
But even if a man overcomestheseobstacleshimself,he must
next overcomethe neglect,skepticismor even active hostilityof
mostof his fellows.I earlierarguedthatour dominantideologies
weremostsystematically developedas instruments of deflationand
debunking, and that our most powerfulmyths were deterrent myths
whichpointout the probableevils thatwould followcertain(in-
deed most)coursesof action.Any attempt,howevertentative,to
enuniciatesome principleof positiveaction or enthusiasmmust
thusfaceattackson twofronts.First,themotivesof theproponent
will be thoroughly and hostilelyinvestigated,with the intentof
showingthattheproposalsconceal"irrational,""ulterior,"or other
undesirablemotives,interests or errors.And second,the proposals
themselveswill be attackedas merelyleading to furtherevils,
usuallybyextendingsomealreadyundesirabletrend.To takeonly
one example,the World Federalistmustanswerchargesthat he
himselfis uprootedand withoutsound nationalties,and further-
morethathis proposedOne World would merelylead to further
extremesof homogenization, uniformity, legalism,bureaucratiza-
tionor whateverthedominantpresentevilsare seen to be.
Manyan advocateof a worthycause,however,would be grate-
ful forcriticism, whichat least acknowledgesthe existenceof his
proposals.His morecommonfateis neglect.As we have arguedbe-
fore,indifference is as greata rejectionas attack: as Dostoevsky
knew,the ultimatereductionof a man is to stare throughhim
withoutseeinghim.Whetherneglector criticismis or is notvalid
is not at issuehere: thepointis thatthecompletepredictability of
such reactionsmakes even the most affirmative hesitatebefore
in
affirming public.
Little subtletyis needed to unearththe reasonsfor thesere-
sponses.In some cases, theymay be justified.Some purportedly
good causesare whatall are usuallysaid to be: "crackpot,""hare-
brained,""naïve" and "unrealistic."But the responseto any pro-
posalforreform is so invariantthatthisexplanationwill notsuffice.
He whoproposesinnovationmustalwaysfaceoppositiongrounded
19З
in the universalinertialunwillingness to move fromthe familiar

to the unknown.Even more important,as a man of virtueis a
reproachto thosewithoutvirtue,so a man of visionshamesthose
who lack vision,implicitlyfindsthemwanting,and calls forthem
to change.When changeinvolvesmakingexplicitwhat forgood
reasonsis kept unstated,indifference and (if this fails) angryre-
jection can surelybe foreseen.
But probablythe mostpotentdeterrentto the enunciationor
eventhesearchforanymorepositivemythis thegenuinehumility
ofthosewho are mostconsciousof our culturalproblems.If a fear
mustbe foundhereto parallelthefearofresponsibility and failure
or the fearof criticismand neglect,it is the simplefearof being
wrong.To thosewho lack agreedprinciplesforthe interpretation
of reality,the twentiethcenturyseemsincreasingly complex.Ex-
perts, each with his own specialcanons of selectionand judgment,
dominatetheirfields.There is so muchto be known.And even if
we knewit,who would reallydare to judge and, more,to propose
alternatives? Our real problemis notso muchthatwe lackrequisite
but
knowledge, thatthe values fromwhichwe mightbuild have
ceased to exist in the public mind. The advocate,reformeror
mythmaker facesan almostsuperhumantask:he mustfirstof all
unearththe veryvalues whichhe will then attemptto develop,
illustrate,enhanceand implement.Faced withthistask,humility
is theonlypossibleresponse;and themostprobable- althoughby
no meanstheonlypossible- behavioris withdrawalintosomepri-
vatedomainwherethejob to be done has moredefinedand attain-
able ends.
Finally,a somewhatdifferent typeof obstacleto positivemyth
exists:therelativeabsenceofconceptsappropriateto,adequatefor,
or expressiveof eitherthe feltevilsof thecontemporary worldor
the vague aspirationsfora betterworld. If it is true,as I have
argued,thattheimminenceofan age ofaffluence meansa complete
reappraisal of what is wrongand what should be rightin theworld,
thisrevaluationhas yetto be made. Preoccupiedby theirspecialist
endeavors,immersedin the improvement of techniquesforthis-
and-that, or,at best,nostalgicallyrelivingthewisdomof a happier
past, men have to
yet giveadequate diagnosesofour presentsitua-
194
tion.The concepts bywhichwe interpret ourcontemporary world

-
arebyandlargethoseofthepastcenturya century notonlymore
confident butalsoconsiderably moreimpoverished thanourown.
The changesthathavetakenplaceare notmerelychangesin
quantity or degree,a littlemorehereand a littlelessthere.They
amounttoabsolutealterations ofoursocial,culturaland,in many
ways,ourhumancondition. Wé do notonlyhavemoreofthegoods
oflife;forthefirst timemanyofus haveenough, andbarring world
wecanbe relatively
disaster, confident thatwewillcontinuenotto
want.We notonlyhavelessconfidence in our powersto evaluate
andchangesociety; many of us have none, andseelittlepossibility
ofregaining ourhope.We notonlyfacethepossibility ofa some-
whatmoredestructive warthanthelast,but therealchancethat
anotherwarwouldmeantotalannihilation of lifeon our earth.
These transformations are absolute;theirunderstanding requires
newconcepts, newwaysofthinking; theirjudgment requiresnew
values,newpositive myths; and thesolutionoftheproblems they
bringrequires new utopias, defined this time with a surer under-
standingof the means bywhichtheymaybe leastpartially attained.
is a
Language prerequisite of cure.One way lookingat in-
of
dividualpsychotherapy is to viewit as a meansof acquiringan
adequatelanguage(in thebroadest senseoftheword)forhitherto
unexpressed feelings and impulses.If thisis inadequateas a total
explanation oftheprocessofcure,thedevelopment ofa language
partially to
adequate symbolize theroots of illness and thestages
andgoalsofcureisat leasta prerequisite toanysuccessful therapy.
Regardless of whether such a languagereallyexistsforthecureof
theindividual,9 we clearlylackconcepts adequateto thediagnosis
ofa worldin whichpoverty is formanyan ancestral recollection
and in whichlimitedwaris merelya statement of hope.To our
oldervocabulary we owe a paradoxical debt: it enabled us to ap-
proachthesolutionofour former problems, and thusled to our
»Even here I doubt that mostof our currentdefinitions of "adjustment,""mental
health"or even "maturity" are fullyadequate.The searchforuniversalstandardsin this
-
of healthas the absenceof psychicor socialtensionor conflict
area has led to definitions
to manyan unappetizingand dull prospect.That each individualmighthave his own
uniqueformof thefullness of life,and thatformanythecontinualovercoming of tensions
and conflicts mightbe the keyto zestand vigor - thesethoughtshave receivedtoo little
attention.
*95
presentcondition.But in our presentcondition,thisvocabulary

merelyblindsus to our realities.
Doubtlessmanyotherfactorshelp produceour currentrepres-
sion ofanypositivemyth,utopia,moralityor value. But the fears
and humilitiesand inadequaciesof intelligencementionedmay
partlyexplain whywe now findit so difficult to give adequate
articulationto the foundationsof our dissatisfactions. Lacking
suchexpressionsof whatwe aspireto,our discontents can onlybe
alienations,seldomeven protests.For thosewhose creativity will
not be stifled,privateconcernsremain.There is a directrelation
betweenthedeclineof politicalardorand theriseof thearts.The
ratio of paeans on the privatepoetic act to praise of the future
estatesof mankindapproachesinfinity.Without an affirmative
vision of what is activelydesiredas an alternativeto alienation,
creativechangeis difficultfortheindividualand impossibleforthe
society.
The reconstruction ofcommitment. If thesereflections

on theroots
ofalienationin our societyare valid,anycommentson how aliena-
tion mightbe translatedinto reformor apathyinto commitment
are bound to be inadequate.They would be inadequatenot only
because in thisday anyattemptto expressaffirmation is bound to
seem inadequate,but because the problem of alienation is co-
extensivewiththemartialand moralcrisisof our civilization,and
as suchcan be resolvedonlybygenerations ofmendedicatedto the
reconstruction of commitment. Thereforemy commentswill of
necessitybe directed toward what mightbe done to createcircum-
stancesmorefavorableto the alleviationof alienation,and not to
the unformulated mythswhichcould providenew objectsof in-
dividual and social commitment.
In consideringthe factorsconducive to alienation and its
most characteristic Americanform,youth culture,I contrasted
viewsofchildhoodand adulthood.To changethefactsthatunder-
lie thesefeltand resenteddiscontinuities and our ensuingunwill-
to
ingness accept the of
disadvantages "maturity,"far-reaching
modifications of our presentconceptionsofwork,humanrelations
and leisurewillbe needed.As productionperse ceasesto be a valid
196
social goal, we can now affordto recall the originalaims of pro-

duction,and toaskwhetherthesehumanitarian goals,ifstillviable,
are beingservedby a systemin whichsheer"output" has become
an end in itself.It is notenoughto providein leisurea dissociated
escapefromthemonotony, abstractionand specializationrequired
ofwork- especiallyiftheuse ofleisuretime,in theabsenceofany
othercriterion, is subjectto rigidcanonsofconformity.
Given the increasingingenuity,appeal to vanity,avarice,lust
and evenpatriotism requiredto cajole, entice,browbeator seduce
consumersintoacceptingproductstheydo not want,we mustask
whetherour natural and psychologicalresourcesmight not be
betterspentin alteringworkitself,so as to makeit moreinherently
rewardingto the worker,in addition to (or, if necessary,rather
than)makingit moreefficient. It mightevenbe, forexample,that
men could performmore than one specializedoperationin their
jobs, thattheymightbe givenworkthattaxesimaginationinstead
of patience,thattheymightreacquiresome understanding of and
contactwith the finaluse of theirwork and some pride in the
qualityof whattheydo. Then perhapssome men mighteven re-
joice that theyhad worktheycould "take home with them" in-
stead of plungingdirectlyinto the oblivion of the televisionset,
recreationroom or home workshop.And perhapsour proverbial
Americaningenuitycould devisewaysof accomplishingthesehu-
maneaims,Utopianas theymayseem,withouttotallywreckingour
sometimesover-productive industrialproductivity.
In otherareas,too,we have onlybegun to conceiveof alterna-
tivesto our presentdefinitions of the lives men and womenmust
lead. The tremendousambitionsand talentsofour vastentertain-
ment industryhave never been known to study the aesthetic,
psychological or moraleffects of theiroutputwiththe sameeager-
nessas theynowscan indicesof thenumberoflisteners, readersor
viewersper product.But theymight;and iftheydid, a revolution
in the use and effects of leisurewould ensue. Or again, we have
neverbeen able to,or notreallywantedto,teachour childrenthat
knowledge,learningand wisdomwererewarding,demandingand
inherently valuable pursuits.Were we interestedin allocatinga
greaterportionof our wealthtowardcreatingdifferent conditions
197
forlearning,our childrenmightbe betterpreparedto understand

and live amidstthe necessaryambiguitiesof adulthood,and to
choosewithlessanxietyfromamongthevarietyofcareers,spouses,
convictions and stylesoflifethatcompetefortheirenthusiasm.Or
to takea finalexample,we now have too muchtimeand too little
idea ofhowto playin a waythatinvigorates and refreshes. We have
hardlybegunto imaginethepossibilitiesthatmayexistfora more
enhancinginteraction betweenour love,our workand our play.
If all ofthesequestionscould be answeredbyproposalsdeemed
desirableand feasible,and if the proposalswere successfully im-
plemented, commitment to our societymightbe moreenticing.To
be sure,thechancesare smallthatevensuchgeneralsuggestions as
thesecouldresultin eithercompletely desirableor completely feasi-
ble reforms. Indeed, thisis not the point- it is thatwe thinktoo
seldomofhow we mightchangeourselvesand our society,and we
reflecttoo attentively on the minorinterstices of existingfabrics.
Our slowlyincreasingunderstanding of man and society,inade-
it
quate though remains, is seldom applied to problemssuch as
these:we experiment withwhatwe knowor are indifferent to,and
not withwhatmightconcernus morecentrallyas humanbeings.
Yet specificproposalssuchas thesemerelytouchthesurfaceof
the problemand are therefore bound to be inadequate.Concrete
reforms, howeverdesirable,will remainextemporizations in the
absenceof an explicitpositivemyth,ideology,faithor utopia. In-
deed,no lastingor potentreformis everpossibleexceptas mencan
be rousedfromtheirdisaffection and indifference by the prospect
ofa worldmoreinvitingthanthatin whichtheynow apathetically
reside.Our deepestneed is not to proposespecificreforms,but
ratherto createan intellectualand culturalatmospherein which
it is possibleformen to attemptaffirmation withoutundue fear
thatvalid constructions will collapse throughneglect,ridiculeor
theirown inherenterrors.Such an ethoscan onlybe built slowly
and piecemeal,yetit is alreadyclearwhatsomeof itspreconditions
mustbe.
For one, we need a moregeneroustoleranceforsynthetic and
constructive formulations.Insteadofconcentrating on thepossible
bad motivesfromwhichtheyarise (the geneticfallacy)or on thè
198
possiblebad consequenceswhichmightensue fromtheirmisinter-

pretation(theprogenitivefallacy),we mustlearn to assessthemin
termsof theirpresentrelevance,depth and appropriateness. To
accomplishthisis a double work.Destructively, we mustsubvert
the methodologiesof reductionthat now dominate intellectual
life.Constructively,
we mustreplacethesewithmorejust measures
of relevance,subtletyand wisdom,learningto cherishthe enrich-
ingcomplexity ofmotivesand interests thatwill necessarilyunder-
lie and supportanyfuturemyths.
Second,we mustreappraiseour currentconceptsand interpre-
tationsof man and society.It is characteristic of the intellectual
placidityof thisperiod,obviouslydifferent so manywaysfrom
in
formertimes,that we continue to operate with language more
appositeto pastgenerationsthanto our own. We requirea radical
reanalysisof thepresent,one which,startingfromuncriticalopen-
nessto the experience,dissatisfactions
and joys of men today,can
graduallydevelop frames of reference thatcan more totallycom-
prehendus. The sharpanalysis,finediscrimination and imagina-
tive interpretationneeded are available; but we have yetto focus
themon theproblem.
But above and beyonda generousatmosphereand an adequate
comprehensionof our time,ordinaryhuman courage is needed.
To criticizenegativismopenlyrequiresa strongheartwhennega-
tivismis ubiquitous; only a man of mettlewill proposea novel
interpretation offactsnow arrangedin entrenchedcategories.And
no matterhow eagerlythe audience awaitsor how well-prepared
theset,onlycouragecan taketheperformer to thestage.There are
manykindsof courage; needed here is the courage to riskbeing
wrong,to riskdoingunintentionalharmand, above all, the cour-
age to overcomeone'sown humilityand senseof finiteinadequacy.
This is not merelydiffuse"courage to be" withoutprotestin a
worldofinherentuncertainty and anxiety,but theresolveto be for
somethingdespitethe perishabilityand transienceof all human
endeavors.
thatstandbeforeevenpartialrealization
Despitethedifficulties
of thesepreliminary goals,thereis reasonnot to despair.Here is
a purposeworthyof thehighesttalent,a dedicationforthosewho
199
THE AMERICANSCHOLAR
claimsuch causesno longerexist.And if thisreasoningis correct,

such dedication,if it bearsfruit,will not be withoutitsapprecia-
tors- thosewhonowsensetheirlackofaim or aspiration.Nor need
we beginfroman uttervoid to createa universeex nihilo.Instead
we need thehumanwisdomto shape new understandings of who
and whatwe are, and the courageand foresight to voice our own
and our fellows'dimlysensedaspirations.Ironically,we can hope
forsuch new commitments in the futureonlyif men now resolve
theiralienationsby committing themselves - throughthe analysis,
synthesisand reformoftheirownlivesand worlds - to theprepara-
tionfornewutopias.Perhapsthenwe will movenearerthatworld
of creativeindividual fulfillment within self-renewing cultural
for
vitality which men have alwayslonged.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To attemptto annotateor documentan essayof thissortwouldbe foolishif
not impossible.
Anyonefamiliarwiththewritings of HenryA. Murraywill recog-
nizemygreatindebtedness to himformanyof theideascontainedhere.To David
RiesmanI am gratefulbothforhis inspiration and forthe opportunity to work
withhisteachingstaff,an experiencethatoffered theimmediate inducement to set
thesethoughtsto paper.These twomen,David Bakan,David Ricks,RogerHagan
and Ellen Uvillerhavecommented on an earlierdraftof thispaper.Althoughless
personal,myotherdebtsare nonetheless real: ErikErikson'sperceptivecomments
on identity;ErichFromm'sanalysesof social characterand in particularof the
culturalbackgrounds of alienation;MargaretMead's workson the passagefrom
childhoodinto adulthood;AlbertCamus'brilliantstudiesof rebellion;Denis de
Rougemonťscomments on diabolismin thetwentieth and bookslikeJ.K.
century,
Galbraith'sThe Affluent - all have
SocietyorDaniel Bell'sWorkand Its Discontents
obviousrelevanceto thetopicsdiscussedhere.But perhapsmostimportant are the
manyundergraduates at HarvardCollege,alienatedand committed, "beat" and
"square,"whohaveconsistently impressedmewiththeimportance of theirconcerns
and thedignity of theiraspirations.
2OO

Alienation and The Decline of Utopia

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Alienation and The Decline of Utopia

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Alienation and the Decline of Utopia

Author(s): KENNETH KENISTON

is an age that inspireslittle enthusiasm.In the indus-

equally incontrovertible: thattherehas seldombeen as greatcon-

bytheirinfluence on individualfamiliesand theotheragenciesof

traito all formsof youthcultureis the absenceof a straightand

havefoundit difficult to accepttheadulthoodwhichtheirworlds

Three closelyrelatedsocial trendshelp to explain the increas-

Childhoodvs. adulthood. It is by now a sociologicalcommonplace

They are also alike in theirdistancefromthe finaluse of the

this is not the case, we can speak of the dissociationof fantasy:

thusgained,is not cohesionof sharedgoals but of sharedescapes

in factwith importantaspectsof our own (and all men's) child-

The nonconformity ofchildrencan be easilyexaggerated, espe-

The adult abandonsa worldof directness,immediacy,diversity,

The ambiguitiesof adulthood. Althoughsome separationof the

ment of everysociety,in ours this separationis probablymore

betweenthem.And the acceleratingpace of technologicaland

suburbor an exurb.Vocationalcommitment is onlya prefaceto a

shiftingcircumstances. Even in theoccupationalsphere,it is more

The changein aspirations.Youthcultureand alienationhavebeen

in the greatestplentythe worldhas ever known.Our societyhas

thosewho react to theirculturewith apathyor alienationmust

nationscan foreseethetotalabolitionofscarcityin thenextgenera-

sistence"has changed.In an enormously successful age suchas this,

itssymptoms; but it can also be understoodby studyingthe forces

The transvaluation of utopia. The decline of culturalmorale- of

as tangibleand desiredpossibilitiesthatmen mightwriteabout

passionatelyheld. This transitionhas oftenbeen discussed:it be-

is done,but onlyindirectlyifat all forevaluatingwhatis done. To

The submersionof positivemyth.Everyage has its characteristic

and witchcraft have prevailed; in others,mythsof blessedness,

consistof tworelatedprocesses,one the intellectualizationof posi-

passionately held. Withouta sanctionedbasis in feeling,tradition

and morefromthenonrational,theimagination, and fromitsroots

The unconsciousness of contemporary utopias.The dominanceof

alienationfroma societydominatedby vestigialideologiesor de-

has notbeen longsincesappedofanyreal vitalityforthemor their

as makingthe patientaware of them. But althoughsuch com-

promoteworthyends,and fearof frustration or failureconspireto

in the universalinertialunwillingness to move fromthe familiar

tion.The concepts bywhichwe interpret ourcontemporary world

presentcondition.But in our presentcondition,thisvocabulary

The reconstruction ofcommitment. If thesereflections

social goal, we can now affordto recall the originalaims of pro-

forlearning,our childrenmightbe betterpreparedto understand

possiblebad consequenceswhichmightensue fromtheirmisinter-

claimsuch causesno longerexist.And if thisreasoningis correct,

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