G.R. No. L-34112.

June 25, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. HON. FRANCISCO DE LA ROSA, as Judge of the Court of
first Instance of Rizal, Branch VII, Pasay City; and BERTI HILDEGARD EDERY, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent was apprehended before leaving the country after being caught for concealing 28 pieces of
gold bars and failing to declare it to customs authority. Hence, accused was charged for violation of Tariff
and Customs Code. Petitioners alleged that accused did not include the gold bars in her baggage
declaration and entry form thus evading imposition of tax and duties to the said items.

Accused filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the facts contained does not constitute an offense.

The respondent court sustained the motion stating that the gold bars are not imported articles and the
accused does not show any intent of importing it and moreover, she declared herself as tourist.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred in ruling that the facts charged does not constitute an offense
and whether or not the respondent court erred in quashing the criminal case charged to accused.

RULING:

No. The court did not err in ruling that the facts charged does not constitute an offense and subsequently
quashing the criminal case filed.

The respondent court made a finding that the allegation in the Amended Information, in the light of the
admitted facts as they emerged after the hearing, did not constitute an offense. The pertinent rule that
applies is Rule 117. Section 6 of this Rule provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Trial of issues arising on a motion to quash. — The motion to quash shall be heard immediately on
its being made unless, for good cause, the court postpones the hearing. All issues, whether of law or fact,
which arise on a motion to quash shall be tried by the court.

It is to be noted that the essence of the charge against accused Edery is for failing to declare the 28 gold
bars which she carried in her person in landing here and going to spend the night in Manila Hilton Hotel,
which petitioner would consider an illegal importation resulting in the loss of duties accruing to the
Philippine Government.

Here again is where the facts as established in the hearing and admitted by the prosecution should have
to be considered in resolving the motion to quash. This is what the respondent court did. There is one
important and vital circumstance in the instant case that establishes conclusively that the 28 gold bars are
not ’imported’ articles, and that their entry into the Philippines for a number of hours did not convert
them into ’imported’ articles such that their entry resulted in the loss of Customs duties. This circumstance
is the stubborn fact that accused Edery brought in 28 gold bars and in matters of hours she was taking the
same 28 gold bars out of the country. It was at the time she was taking these gold bars out of the country,
only hours after her arrival, that she was arrested by the Customs authorities at the Manila International
Airport. There can be no doubt whatsoever that she was at the airport, definitely to leave the Philippines
with the 28 gold bars. As already stated above, she had an advance booking for Taipeh on a plane leaving
the next day, she had a valid ’TOURIST VISA’ for a single journey to Taipeh, and the plane she was about to
board when she was arrested was a Japan Airlines plane bound for Taipeh. It is of relevance to note that
the City Fiscal of Pasay, after proper preliminary investigation resolved to dismiss the complaint against
the accused. It must be safe to assume that the City Fiscal found no probable cause to hold the accused
for trial. When the State Prosecutor took over from the City Fiscal and filed the information, and later an
amended information, he must have thought that trial on the merits would follow, as a matter of course.
He did not reckon on the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the amended
information do not charge an offense. But such a motion was filed, and not only was a hearing had thereon,
but the prosecution asked the court to be allowed to present evidence as did the other party, the accused.
The State Prosecutor presented evidence and made certain admissions. This could have proved to be their
tactical mistake. For with all the evidence presented before the court, the respondent judge cannot discard
the same in resolving the motion to quash, on the mere technicality that the motion should be resolved
solely on the basis of the allegations of the informations, closing its eyes to evidence aliunde duly
presented at the instance of the prosecution itself, followed by the defense presenting its own evidence.
The result was, in effect, a trial on the merits, and an insistence on the part of the petitioner to restore the
informations already quashed in order that trial on the merits could proceed, as prayed for in this petition
fails to find support upon consideration of substantial justice. It is a resort to mere technicality so strongly
frowned upon by the courts and expressly discouraged by our own rules of procedure. It would not also
seem in keeping with the true role of the prosecutor to see that justice is done.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed, and the order of the respondent judge dated February 12,
1969, quashing the amended information is affirmed, together with the order dated June 14, 1971 denying
the People’s Motion for Reconsideration of the former order.
G.R. No. 83754. February 18, 1991

TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, Fifteenth Division, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, along with several others, in four
separate informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents.

It was alleged that the petitioner, together with Melania Guerrero, who produced a special power of
attorney claimed to have been executed by the late Clemente Guerrero, had conspired with their co-
accused in selling some properties of the decedent to the widow’s sister, Luz Andico, through fictitious
deeds of sale notarized by the petitioner.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner and his co-accused entered a plea of not guilty. Subsequently, the
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the four informations did not charge an offense. At
the hearing on this motion, the petitioner submitted testimonial and documentary evidence which was
not refuted by the prosecution. For its part, the prosecution submitted no evidence at all but later moved
to deny the motion. The motion to dismiss was eventually denied by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court’s decision is incorrect based on the following grounds:

The court proceedings on petitioner’s motion to dismiss are clearly sanctioned by law and jurisprudence.

The prosecution is in estoppel to question said proceedings.

The informations do not charge an offense.

There exists a variance between the allegations in the information and the evidence presented in the
motion to dismiss.

The documents were notarized on their stated dates.

Substantial justice demands the dismissal of the informations filed against herein petitioner.

Ruling:

No. A complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged;
otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly sustained.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Contrary
to the petitioner’s contention, a reading of the informations will disclose that the essential elements of
the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the very
outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a
fuller examination. Given the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the
prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the informations on the basis only of the
petitioner’s evidence, such as it is.

It is clear that the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion to
dismiss on the grounds that" (a) interest of substantial justice that the prosecution could adduce evidence
during the trial; and (b) to avoid technicalities that may arise later.

The petitioner’s contention that the questioned transactions were already in existence before the months
of November and December 1980, when they were supposedly falsified, is a matter of defense best
examined during the trial rather than in the preliminary hearing on his motion to dismiss. The prosecution
should be given ample opportunity to prove the allegations in the informations at the appropriate time,
and that is the trial itself. The proper time to offer it, following the normal procedure prescribed in Rule
119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, is after the prosecution shall have presented its own evidence during
the trial.

Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases filed against him was
denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy was not to file a petition for certiorari but to
go to trial without prejudice on his part to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and,
if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed as authorized by law and precedents. Instead,
he took the usual step of filing a writ of certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion
is unwarranted it being contrary to the usual course of law.

In the case at bar. As already observed, the challenged informations are not insufficient on their face and
neither did the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing justify their dismissal even before the trial
had commenced. If "substantial justice" is to be accorded by this Court, as the petitioner insists, then the
step it must take is to sustain the denial of the motion to dismiss and allow the criminal cases to follow
their normal course.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED