13TH SHANKARRAO KANITKAR NATIONAL MOOT 2018-19

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

AT NEW DELHI

WP No. ________/2018

RAINBOW

V.

UNION OF INDIA

BEFORE SUBMISSION TO HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES

OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE A UNIVERSITY)

AMITH LM
ANIRUDH RS
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………….2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………...…...3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………………..4
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………………..5
STATEMENT OF ISSUES………………………………………………………………….6
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………………..7
Issue 1- Whether the writ petition in the instant case is maintainable?.....................................7
Issue 2- Whether the courts act as legislatures, and thereby create law for the sake of matters
related to marriage & divorce?................................................................................................10
Issue 3- Whether writs can be issued by courts, when there exists no right, and the origin for
the same, would only be through legislation?..........................................................................13
3.1. Existence of public or common law duty………………………………………………..13
3.2. Existence of a specific demand and refusal……………………………………………..14
3.3. Right to call for enforcement……………………………………………………………15
3.4. Subsistence of Right in the instant case…………………………………………………16

PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………….17
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES/BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………....18

2
 LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

§ Section

& And

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court(s)

NGO Non Governmental Organization

LGBTQI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender,

Queer, Intersex
AIR All India Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Hon’ble Honourable

HMA Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

HAMA Hindu Adoption & Maintainance Act, 1955

DVA Domestic Violence Act, 2005

ICMA Indian Christian Marriages Act

MWA Muslim Women’s (Protection) Act, 1986

SMA Special Marriage Act, 1954

IDA Indian Divorce Act, 1969

ISA Indian Succession Act, 1925

IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860

HSA Hindu Succession Act, 1955

3
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioners have contended that, in the instant case, the court has jurisdiction over the
matter under Article 32 of the Constitution. The respondents, do not submit to this jurisdiction
in the instant case.

4
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Mr. X & Mr. Y are citizens of India, who had gone to pursue their higher education in
Ireland. Subsequently, they began to work in the nation of Ireland.
2. In the instant case, the two, that is, Mr. X & Mr. Y were in a relationship, and
subsequently got married, as according to Irish laws, whilst their time in Ireland. The
marital relationship went on for two years, and the couple thereby stayed in Ireland
until the year 2017, wherein, on the 15 of September 2017, they relocated to India.
3. On a certain date, which is noted to be, 10 September 2018, Mr. X left the flat, in which
both Mr. X & Mr. Y were residing.
4. Despite several noted instances, of attempting to establish contact with Mr. X, Mr. Y
fails to get a trace of Mr. X.
5. A case was filed in Mr. Y’s personal account, but, was rejected.
6. Upon being aggrieved, Mr. Y, approached an NGO, by the name, ‘RAINBOW’, which
works primarily in the field of LGBTQ rights in India.
7. A Writ Petition was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, seated in New
Delhi.

5
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1
Whether the writ petition in the instant case is maintainable?
It is submitted, that in the instant case, the petition, is not maintainable before the Hon’ble
Court, and thereby the jurisdiction of the court cannot be invoked under Article 32. This is on
account, of the factor of the court, intruding into the domain of the legislature, and thereby also
looking into matters that are akin to personal law.
ISSUE 2

Whether the courts act as legislatures, and thereby create law for the sake of matters
related to marriage & divorce?
It is submitted, that in the event of there being an overlap and intrusion of the functioning of
one organ of the State by another, then it is would be a mandate that would be violative of the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, which has been clearly enunciated and demarcated in the
Indian Constitution.
ISSUE 3
Whether writs can be issued by courts, when there exists no right, and the origin for the
same, would only be through legislation?
It is submitted, that while issuing writs such as that of mandamus, it is mandatory for the court,
to look into the conditions and context upon which such a writ and its jurisdiction maybe
exercised by the Hon’ble Court.

6
 STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1
Whether the writ petition in the instant case is maintainable?
It is submitted, by the respondents, that the instant case, is not maintainable before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. This, is submitted, so on account of the following factors-
1. The legislative competence over matters, which relate to the passage of a legislation,
on subjects listed under the Seventh Schedule, and by virtue of Article 246 of the Indian
Constitution.
2. Matters related to the personal and religious practices are to be governed and looked
upon by the legislatures, and it is not in the court’s prerogative to adjudicate matters, in
such a way, that it becomes tantamount to creation of a legislation.

In furtherance of the aspects of non-interference of the personal laws, it is submitted, that in

the case of State of Bombay v. Narsuappa Mali1, that personal laws, do not fall under the ambit
of the term, ‘law’, and cannot be called into question, by any court of law, until and unless,
there is a provision, which is violative or deviant of the basic structure of the Constitution.

To add to this, it is has been laid down in the case of Ahmedabad Women Action Group(AWAG)
v. Union of India2, that the court, while exercising its jurisdiction is ought not to delve into the
questions, that are in essence to be matters of policy of the State policy. Such cases, are to be
dealt with, by the legislature or executive, in order to act, as the sole repository of modifying
the law, and thereby providing a system of law, which creates or modifies the rights in such
regard. In this regard, the court refused to entertain matters, which dealt with the personal laws
of Hindus, Muslims and Christians, and all other religion.

Furthermore, it is contended, that the court, cannot hear or adjudicate upon matters, which
intend to create a new system of law, wherein the courts, act in a cavailing direction, to usurp
and overtake the legislative functions of the other organs of the State. In this regard, it is
submitted, that as under the case of State of HP v. Umed Ram Sharma3, it is mandated, that the
court cannot abdicate or cause an abdication of the duties and obligations that are enshrined

1
State of Bombay v. Narsuappa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84
2
Ahmedabad Women Action Group(AWAG) v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 573
3
State of HP v. Umed Ram Sharma, (1986) 2 SCC 68

7
and engraved upon a body, such as the courts, and thereby create a scenario of meticulous
administrative interference.

In furtherance of this, it is provided in the case of Suresh Chand Gautam v. State of UP4, that
the courts, in consonance with the spirit and essence of the Constitution, and in the exercise of
its jurisdiction under Article 32, are not to make laws, and thereby encroach into the territorial
bounds of the legislature, and this exercise, also does not permit them, to contemplate on the
creation of a legislation or a policy. The restraint, thus created, ensues into the matters of even
creating a subordinate legislation, and thus, permits the court, to merely promulgate guidelines
and directions, on which the legislature may discuss and deliberate to formulate a law.

In the instant case, in the event of there being both personal laws considered, and the possibility
of a judicial legislation and overreach, it is humbly submitted, that the personal laws which are
present in the instant case, such as-
i. HMA, 1955
ii. HAMA, 1955
iii. HSA, 1955
iv. Parsi(Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1937
v. SMA, 1954
vi. IPC, 1860
vii. MWA, 1986
viii. ICMA, 1872
ix. IDA, 1969
x. ISA, 1925
xi. DVA, 2005
Are all, to be amended, only by the legislature, whereby the courts, will have a role, of an
adjudicator of disputes.

In addition, to the grounds laid out, it is observed, that in the case of Indira Sarma v. VKV
Sarma5, it has been held that the DVA, 2005, does not apply to same sex relationships, as under
the said case, as that expressly, under §2(a), DVA, 2005, only gives recognition to women.

4
Suresh Chand Gautam v. State of UP, (2016) 11 SCC 113
5
Indira Sarma v. VKV Sarma , (2013) 15 SCC 755

8
Any omission or commission or conduct of any of the same sex couples cannot fall under the
scope and ambit of the said enactment, and thereby no relief can be sought for.

In furtherance, of all the aforementioned grounds so raised, it is submitted, in conclusion that,

as under the case of Common Cause v. Union of India6, that PIL’s cannot be treated as the
panacea of all ills, and litigants must ensure that there is to be a check of procedure, wherein
litigants, are to introspect, as to whether a remedy can be constitutionally validated and
provided for, thereby ensuring that the mandate and spirit of the Constitution, and the balance
thereunder, is maintained.

6
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2008) 2 SCC 706

9
 ISSUE 2

Whether the courts act as legislatures, and thereby create law for the sake of matters
related to marriage & divorce?
It is humbly submitted, that the courts, in the instant case, cannot create a law, or a legislation,
which encompasses rights, and cannot overstep its authority in matters that involve the aspects
of legislative competence and attention.

In this regard, it is submitted, that the instant case, which is pertinent to marriage and divorce
of two individuals, is a matter that is to be dealt with by the legislatures. This aspect, is to be
covered by both State and Central legislatures. It is put forth, before this Hon’ble court, that
the topic of marriage and divorce, is covered, under Article 2467 read with List III, Entry 5 of
the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution 8. With this, thus, it is made clear, that it is the
legislative organ of governance which is to deal with such matters, and thereby create a body
of rights, and not the courts.

It is prescribed, as under the doctrine of Separation of powers, that the four cardinal principles
for the possible promulgations of the separation of powers, is as follows9-
1. The principle of exclusion, wherein there are to be structural divisions between that of
the three organs of the State.
2. The principle of functionality, which acts as a repository to ensure that none of the
organs of the governance mechanism, usurp or amalgamate the other’s functions, and
thus bring about a harmonious interaction.
3. The system of checks and balances, which ascribes that the organs of the State may
exercise a certain level of checks to keep the other within its constitutional bounds.
4. Mutuality principle, which mandates that there is to be a concord, between the organs
of the State, and a harmonious balance, to ensure that the mandates of a free, egalitarian
society, under the ambit of the rule of law, are to be in existence.

In furtherance to this proposition so laid forth, it is noted, that in the case of Ram Jawaya Kapur
v. State of Punjab 10, it has been held by the court, that the Indian Constitution, despite not

7
INDIAN CONST., Art. 246
8
INDIAN CONST., Seventh Schedule
9
IP MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 37-39(9th ed. 2017)
10
Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 149

10
creating a rigid system of separation of powers, has still, recognized and demarcated the various
functions, to which the branches or organs of State are to work under, and be bound by. By
this, it is prescribed, in the very mandate and philosophy of the Constitution 11, that the organs
of the State, in essence, are not to intrude or interrupt into the functioning of another organ of
the State.

This stance, of the court, has been furthered, with respect to the intrusion into the organs and
their functioning, in the case of Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain12, wherein the court, in its
affirmation, held that, the none of the three separate organs, can take over the functions of the
other, irrespective of whether such a move, can be made, as under Article 368 of the Indian
Constitution13, and against the consonance of the basic doctrine, that has been prescribed by
the court in the case of Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala14, under the aegis of which,
the concept of separation of powers, has also been prescribed as a part of such features.

Thus, in light of the precedents, and various theories so laid out, it is contended by the
respondent, that there cannot be a usurpation and intrusion into the matters that the legislature
has competence upon. To further this, it has been mandated in the case of State of HP v. Parent
of a Student of Medical College15, that when matters fall under the ambit and scope of executive
or legislative branch of the government to decide, as to whether or not to introduce a particular
legislation, the court cannot certainly mandate the executive or legislatures, to initiate
legislation, howsoever necessary or desirable the court may consider the same to be. But the
court, thus, cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive and the legislature, and
thereunder assume a role of a supervisor of the law making activities.

Furthermore, it is submitted, that as under the mandate of the Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union
of India16, that while entertaining a PIL, the court, is to do so, not on a confrontational or
cavailing front, or in a manner that seeks to tilt or usurp the executive authority. The basic role
of the courts, with this, in matters of public interest, are to ensure that there is to be adjudication

11
Refer to, GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: A CORNERSTONE OF A NATION,
199-203(1972)
12
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 Supp. SCC 1
13
INDIAN CONST., Art. 368
14
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225
15
State of HP v. Parent of a Student of Medical College, (1985) 3 SCC 169
16
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 317

11
of rights, that are seen to be bestowed by the law, which have thereupon, been promulgated by
the legislature or the executive.

In addition to the above principles enunciated, it is put forth, that in the case of P Ramachandra
Rao v. State of Karnataka 17, that the courts must exercise restraint in the manner of giving
directions, which are akin to the functions and role that is played by the legislative or executive
organs of the State, and cannot exercise and enjoy unfettered powers, which would make it a
body above the others.

Thus, with this, it is submitted, that the courts, in exercise of their role and function, cannot
create a legislation, but may only fill gaps, which are present in the inherent legislation, as held
by the courts, in the case of State of UP v. Jeet Singh Bisht18

17
P Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578
18
State of UP v. Jeet Singh Bisht (2007) 6 SCC 586

12
 ISSUE 3
Whether writs can be issued by courts, when there exists no right, and the origin for the
same, would only be through legislation?
It is humbly submitted, that the the writs which are put forth under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution19, are of the nature of determining the existence and practice of the enforcement
of rights enshrined. It is thus, humbly submitted that the courts cannot issue writs, such as that
which is pleaded in the instant case, which is the Writ of Mandamus.

A writ of mandamus is a judicial remedy issued in the form of an order from the SC or HC, to
any constitutional, statutory, or a non-statutory agency to do or forbear from doing any specific
act, which that agency is obliged to refrain from doing under the law, and which is in the nature
of a public duty or a statutory duty.20

The conditions, therein, for the issue of such a writ, are as follows-

1. There must be a public or common law duty

2. There must be a specific demand and refusal
3. There must be a clear right to enforce the duty
4. The right must be subsisting on the date of the petition.

3.1. There must be a public or common law duty-

A public duty, is one which is created either by a statute, rules or regulations having the force
of law, the Constitution, or by some rule of common law. The duty, thus accrued, must be an
absolute duty, and must be of the nature that makes it mandatory, and not merely discretionary
upon the authority. In this regard, it is put forth, that in the case of Manjula Manjari Dei v.
Director of Public Instruction 21, that in the event of there being a scenario to compel the
functions of a certain executive or legislative organ of the State, then in such a case, it is not fit
for the court, to issue a writ of mandamus in order to compel such an authority.

To further this, it has been mandated in the case of State of HP v. Parent of a Student of Medical
College22, that when matters fall under the ambit and scope of executive or legislative branch
of the government to decide, as to whether or not to introduce a particular legislation, the court

19
INDIAN CONST., Art. 32
20
IP MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 407-409 (9th ed. 2017)
21
Manjula Manjari Dei v. Director of Public Instruction, AIR 1952 Ori. 344
22
State of HP v. Parent of a Student of Medical College, (1985) 3 SCC 169

13
cannot certainly mandate the executive or legislatures, to initiate legislation, howsoever
necessary or desirable the court may consider the same to be. But the court, thus, cannot usurp
the functions assigned to the executive and the legislature, and thereunder assume a role of a
supervisor of the law making activities.

Thereby, in the instant case, it is noted, that the courts, by allowing such a matter, which pleads
for issuance of a writ, would act in a manner that would, in principle, go against the very nature
of the doctrine of separation of powers,23 which is considered as a constituent element of the
Doctrine of Basic Structure of the Constitution.24 This, is on account of the powers that were
vested upon Parliament, and the various constituent State legislatures, by virtue of Article 246,
with regard to matters that are of the nature of marriage and divorce, which are enlisted under
List III, Entry 5 of the Seventh Schedule.

In this regard, it is submitted that the Hon’ble Court cannot accede to the petition on the
grounds, that the primary function of the court is that of adjudication of disputes, and not that
of legislature, whereby the courts would create law, for the sake of adjudication. In furtherance
of this proposition, it is submitted that in the case of Ahmedabad Women Action Group(AWAG)
v. Union of India25, that the court, while exercising its jurisdiction is ought not to delve into the
questions, that are in essence to be matters of policy of the State policy. Such cases, are to be
dealt with, by the legislature or executive, in order to act, as the sole repository of modifying
the law, and thereby providing a system of law, which creates or modifies the rights in such
regard. In this regard, the court refused to entertain matters, which dealt with the personal laws
of Hindus, Muslims and Christians, and all other religion.

There must be a clear demand & refusal-

In the issue of mandamus, the courts, must note that there must be a specific demand for the
fulfilment of a duty and also a specific refusal by the authority. With this, it is put forth that in
the case of Naubat Rai v. Union of India26, the court has made it clear that, in the event of there
being no real demand and refusal or the same, there cannot be a writ issued, to ensure a certain

23
L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261
24
Refer to, I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 9 SCC 1
25
Ahmedabad Women Action Group(AWAG) v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 573
26
Naubat Rai v. Union of India, AIR 1953 Punj. 137

14
degree of forbearance for the creation of an order, rule or law.

In the instant case, it is to be noted that, the process of the creation of a legislation is not a point
wherein there can exist a quid pro equation, or a certain system wherein the equations of
demands can be met at an immediate and commensurate period. This, thereby leaves no scope
for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, or any other such writ, as under the Constitutional
mandate, as it would a twin violation of the separation of powers, and thereby causing the
executive to come under pressure by another organ of the State machinery.

Clear Right to call for the enforcement of the duty-

The writ of mandamus, or any writ of such nature, cannot be issued unless there is, in the
applicant, a right to compel the performance of some duty that has been cast on the authority,
on the given date of which the pleading or petition has been put before the court. In the instant
case, a pleading for a writ in such regard, cannot be called for tangible expression, as the courts
cannot act, in such a manner that would be tantamount to causing a vertical rift in the
functioning of the organs of the State, and thereby damaging the prospects of the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers. By construction and interpretation of statutes, it is noted, it would be a
subversion of all the rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely
necessary to do so. Similarly, it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other
words for words of the statute. It is equally well settled that a statute enacted for a reason should
not be used in a meaning broader than that they would ordinarily bear. 27

To further this, it is submitted that in the case of State of HP v. Parent of a Student of Medical
College28, that when matters fall under the ambit and scope of executive or legislative branch
of the government to decide, as to whether or not to introduce a particular legislation, the court
cannot certainly mandate the executive or legislatures, to initiate legislation, howsoever
necessary or desirable the court may consider the same to be. But the court, thus, cannot usurp
the functions assigned to the executive and the legislature, and thereunder assume a role of a
supervisor of the law making activities.

27
JUSTICE G.P. SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 58 (9th Ed., 2016)
28
State of HP v. Parent of a Student of Medical College, (1985) 3 SCC 169

15
In furtherance of this construct, it is submitted, that in the decision in Sakshi v. Union of
India29,wherein it was observed that the attention of the Court should be on what has been said
and also on what has not been said while interpreting the statute and that it would be wrong
and dangerous for the Court to proceed by substituting some other words in a statute. In
addition to the aforementioned precedents, it is added that in the case of Public Interest
Foundation v. Union of India 30, the Court in its exercise cannot rewrite, recast or re-frame the
legislation for the good reason that it has no power to legislate, and thereby such power has
been divested solely with the Parliament, and only they are to exercise their jurisdiction, in
determining matters of legislative competence.

The right must be subsisting on the date of the petition-

For any writ to be issued, it is submitted, that there is to be a right that is present in the
concurrent period of the filing of a petition or a pleading before the court. To add this, it is
submitted, that in the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar (Union) v. Union of India 31, the
court has mandated, that in order to cause the exercise of Article 32 of the Indian Constitution,
it is essential that there is a right, which is quite realistically and apparently violated, by certain
actions or omissions of the State bodies and instrumentalities.

In the instant case, if the petitioners, are to act, in a manner claiming redress for a right which
has been violated, they are allowed to do so, only in the event of there being clear and specified
rights, which can only be possible post the creation of an enactment, or amendment moved
solely by the legislature, in exercise of its powers under the Article 246, read with List III,
Entry 5.

Thus, in the instant case, there are conditions fulfilled with regard to the aspects of non issuance
of the writ of mandamus by the court, in the instant case.

29
Sakshi v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518
30
Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India, 2018 SCC Online SC 1617
31
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar (Union) v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568

16
 PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India be pleased to:

Dismiss the writ petition devoid of any merit

Pass an order that provides for an understanding of the clear mandate of the separation of power
which is to mandated between the legislatures and judiciary, and thereupon a causation of
judicial legislation.

AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Counsel on behalf of Respondent

Sd/-

17
 BIBLIOGRAPHY/TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS & COMMENTARIES:

• MAMTA RAO, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION, LEGAL AID & LOK ADALAT, (5TH ED.

2018)
• GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: A CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1972)
• VN SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (13TH ED., 2017)
• MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (8TH ED., 2018)
• ACHARYA DD BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, VOLUME III (9TH
ED. 2014)

• ZIA MODY, 10 JUDGEMENTS THAT CHANGED INDIA, (2013)

• HARISH NARASAPPA, RULE OF LAW IN INDIA: A QUEST FOR REASON, (2018)
• IP MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, (9TH ED., 2017)
• JUSTICE G.P. SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 58 (9th Ed., 2016)

LAWS AND STATUTES:

• The Constitution of India, 1950
• Anand Marriage Act, 1909
• Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1955
• Muslim Women(Protection) Act, 1986
• Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
• Hindu Succession Act, 1955
• Indian Divorce Act, 1869
• Parsi (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1937
• Special Marriage Act, 1954
• Indian Christian Marriage Act,
• Domestic Violence Act, 2005

CASES REFERRED:
Bombay HC-
• State of Bombay v. Narsuappa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84

18
Punjab HC-
• Naubat Rai v. Union of India, AIR 1953 Punj. 137

Orissa HC-
• Manjula Manjari Dei v. Director of Public Instruction, AIR 1952 Ori. 344

Supreme Court-
• Ahmedabad Women Action Group(AWAG) v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 573
• Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 317
• Common Cause v. Union of India (2008) 2 SCC 706
• Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar (Union) v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568
• I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 9 SCC 1
• Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 Supp. SCC 1
• Indira Sarma v. VKV Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755
• Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
• L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261
• P Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578
• Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India, 2018 SCC Online SC 1617
• Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 149
• Sakshi v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518
• State of HP v. Umed Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68
• State of HP v. Parent of a Student of Medical College, (1985) 3 SCC 169
• State of UP v. Jeet Singh Bisht (2007) 6 SCC 586
• Suresh Chand Gautam v. State of UP (2016) 11 SCC 113
• Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323

19
ONLINE SOURCES:
• Final Judgement: Gender Identity and Self-Expression basic to human dignity, SCC
Online Blog, https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/09/06/gender-identity-and-
self-expression-basic-to-human-dignity-article-377-unconstitutional-in-so-far-it-
penalises-consensual-sexual-acts-between-adults-in-private-sc/
• www.manupatra.in
• www.scconline.com

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