Hume's Metaphysics: A New Theory of Order

Author(s): Paul Grimley Kuntz

Source: Religious Studies , Dec., 1976, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1976), pp. 401-428
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20005370

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Rel. Stud. 12, pp. 40I-428

PAUL GRIMLEY KUNTZ

Professor of Philosophy, Emory University

HUME'S METAPHYSICS:
A NEW THEORY OF ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION: POKING THROUGH THE ASHES

A paper on Hume's metaphysics might be exceedingly short: we might say

that Hume pricked bubbles but blew none. Most readers of Hume think
there is nothing here to write about, unless anti-metaphysics be a form o
metaphysics.' Hume's good repute rose with agnosticism and positivism, an
it is characteristic of the Germans to credit Hume with being the awakener
from dogmatic, that is, metaphysical, slumbers. Add to this those who deplor
Hume as the antithesis of classical philosophy, and we have a chorus who
would laugh down the claim that Hume had, as he claimed, a system. An
indeed who cannot quote Hume's eloquent conclusion about 'divinity or
school metaphysics': 'Commit it then to the flames: for it can contai
nothing but sophistry and illusion' (EcHU I32, p. I65) ?2
This paper does not deny that Hume subjected to the most intense tests
traditional propositions about causality and arguments for deity. But what is
questioned is that from Hume's critical scorching there remains nothing but
ashes. What's left of' God'? The concept is 'reduced to a beggarly minimum
1 Roland Hall, A Hume Bibliography from 1930 (York, 1971), lists only F. Zabeeh, 'Hume o
Metaphysics', Theoria 27 (I96I), pp. 12-25, and W. H. Walsh, Metaphysics (Hutchinson, London
I963, ch. 7). J. A. Passmore has much on Hume as a methodologist, Hume as a positivist and
phenomenologist, Hume as a sceptic, but there is no chapter on Hume as a metaphysician.
Walsh concludes that Hume is among the boldest and the most attractive of metaphysicians, p. 195
2 Works of Hume are abbreviated as follows:
A = An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, J. M. Keynes and Pierro Sraffa, editors (Cam
bridge University Press, 1938).
NKS D = Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Norman Kemp Smith, editor (Nelson, Edinburgh
1947; N.Y., I962).
D Aik = Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Henry David Aiken (Hafner, N.Y., 1957).
EcHU = An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, with Hume's section numbers, followed b
page number in Selby-Bigge, second edition (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1927).
EcPM = An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, followed by page numbering, Selby-Bigge,
second edition (Clarendon Press, 1927).
L = A Letter from A Gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh, Ernest C. Mossner and John V. Pric
(Edinburgh University Press, I967).
NHR = The Natural History of Religion in Hume on Religion, Richard Wollheim, ed., Meridia
Books (World, Cleveland, I963).
T = A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, I896).
TEV = A Treatise of Human Nature, A. D. Lindsay, ed. (Dent, London, I91 I), 2 vols.
J. H. Burton = Life and Correspondence of David Hume, Wm. Tait (Edinburgh, 1846), 2 vols.
J. Y. T. Greig = The Letters of David Hume (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1932).
NKS PDH = Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origin
and Central Doctrines (Macmillan, London I942).
I4 RES I2

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402 P. G. KUNTZ

concluded the greatest auth

there is also in Hume a who
religious attitude towards natu
even gratitude and trust (N
pect that there is somethin
traditional metaphysics into th
we should expect to find from
Hume did not consume in hi
metaphysics'. Rather he refi
assaying is designed to be tr
which sounds thoroughly de
preserved as indubitable.' Th
to do justice to the positive
in a phase of work that stress
The most promising area of
experience that we inhabit a
this in Hume from beginnin
school metaphysics with the m
head called it 'conviction in e
lar, of an Order of Nature'.3
old scene. This natural belief
so much trust, coming togeth
heritage, was in Hume's age
physics and calling for inves
ever doubt that every area w
sincere what he calls in the
473 f.). Unless we stress uni
make sense of Hume's positiv

1 Wollheim correctly identifies the

Hume on Religion, Meridian Books (
2 Among the best positive interprete
Hume (Princeton University Press, 1
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religi
Emergence of Philosophy of Religion
Stern, A Faculty Theory of Knowledge,
One nineteenth-century leader of Sc
rehabilitate Hume as a defender of th
irony of his statements about 'our mo
the identification of Hume with athe
we may say that 'traditional view[s]
Henry Calderwood, David Hume (Ch
3 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the
his Dissertation on the Natural History
4 It may well seem inappropriate to
metaphysical system.
George Stern, A Faculty Theory of Kn
University Press, Lewisburg, 197I), ar
content of 'Church dogmas of his ti

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 403

II. METHOD OF HUME S MADNESS

Late as well as early in his career Hume was concerned with the metaphys
question: what kind of 'scene the universe must be . . .' (D Aik I 9; N
I45). This is what Philo grasps of Cleanthes' project, and Philo differs
in proposing that we study, not the abstract order or merely our own ide
but that we 'open [our] eyes and contemplate ... the world as it really is . .
What method would enable the philosopher to contemplate the world
really is? Young Hume, aged 23, proposing the Treatise, wrote of' a new sc
of thought'.' '. . . There seemed opened up to me a new scene of thou
which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ar
natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to a
entirely to it' (J. H. Burton, x, 31; cf. Greig I, I3).
There have been several interpretations of this 'new scene'. It makes
to hold this to have been the promise of experimental method, in contras
speculation, to end the anxious dialectic in Hume between asserti
'arguments to conform the common opinion' and doubts that continu
creep in and thus perpetuate 'a struggle of a restless imagination ag
inclination, perhaps against reason .2
Hume's 'new scene' was inspired by Newton, and Newton's 'Rule
Reasoning in Philosophy' became Hume's rules. As Newton discovered
order presented in gravity, so Hume would discover the lawful regularitie
human nature. It is inspiring, or as Hume found it, even something
revelation, to follow Nature's simplicity and to do 'nothing in vain',
assign the same causes to the same effects, and to seek what holds o
things. Newton found a 'rule [of] all bodies whatsoever. . .' and Hume
find a rule of all ideas whatsoever. What better way of making sense o
subtitle, usually omitted, [A Treatise of Human Nature], Being an Attemp
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects? Hum
self appeals to Newton's Principia where there appear the four 'Rule
Reasoning in Philosophy': 'It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philosoph
and even to common reason; where any principle has been found to h
apprehension of the irrational concepts of religion' and that faith is in this sphere prior to reaso
subsidiary problems on which the author is not as convincing (p. I27). Stern is particularly re
to my argument in his dialectical claim that Hume is making a claim similar to A. E. Taylor's
miracles are not the ground for a theistic metaphysic. . .'We cannot expect to arrive at a
physic of any great worth so long as we confine our contemplation to the domain of formal logi
epistemology, or even of experimental science', p. 128 (from A. E. Taylor, Philosophical S
Macmillan, London, 1934, p. 363). Taylor then comes close, as does Stern, to specifying the o
of Hume's philosophic faith as a 'principle of order'.
1 Ralph Cohen, The Critical Theory of David Hume, University Microfilms (Ann Arbor, Mic
1973) (Columbia Ph.D. I 952) sees in the letter no attention to method or metaphysics, only to
nature and literature.
2 Among those who restrict the new scene to psychology are T. E. Jessop, 'Some Misunders
ings of Hume', Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vi, no. 20 (1952), fasc. 2, pp. I59-60; and
Basson protests that Hume seeks foundation for 'a complete system of the sciences': 'The Sci
of Man' mnust be broader than psychology. David Hume (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1958), pp.
I4-2

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404 P. G. KUNTZ

great force and energy in one in

similar instances. This indeed i
(EcPM I62, p. 204). Hume is writi
in discovering the natural order ca
kind has at last evidence that the
The importance of presuming or
not merely attempting to formula
important contribution to psychol
of nature, as did Newton.'
In stressing Hume's 'scene' and
tance of order the most important
a great improvement over the trad
of disorder are exceptions and m
injustices refute universal theodicy
important than the oft-quoted P
changes and corruptions . . . are but
nor can matter ever rest in total de
the parts, we may infer in the who
which you rest your whole theory
system of this nature, which I never
ible than that which ascribes an ete
though attended with great and co
once solves all difficulties; and if th
complete and satisfactory, it is at le
recourse to, whatever system we e
are, were there not an original inhe
or in matter? And it is very indiffere
Chance has no place, on any hypo
surely governed by steady, inviolabl
laid open to us, we should then disc
no idea. Instead of admiring the or
that it was absolutely impossible for t
any other disposition. (D Aik 46;
The importance of this passage is
the author made in it. Where el
line, io lines with 5 changes? The
that Hume omitted an interpreta
the same thing liberty'. Does ord
determinism? Why not take one

1 On the importance of Galileo's method of

of David Hume (Princeton University Press,
explicit, 383 if.
On the close connection between Hume's
Hurlbutt III, 'David Hume and Scientific The
pp. 490-7. There is also R. H. Hurlbutt; Hu
Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1956).

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 405

wards Peirce by calling randomness a type of order and adm

constancy as a mode of law?
Kemp Smith admits the 'central importance' of this p
emphasis on the problem of substance, that 'in nature matter
inseparable' (NKS D I I i). Was not Hume further escaping the
dualism by stressing relations? The real failure of Cleanthes is t
think traditionally of the question 'what is there?' rather
things related?'. In the response of Cleanthes, which Kemp
reinforce the above statement, he is concerned lest the princ
without which there cannot be an orderly world, be 'the m
Hume has already asserted a principle of being which is not
physics, applying both to what is called 'physical' and 'm
I90) . This is crucial to any confidence that we know the cosmos
demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. No
distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever w
existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no Bei
whose non-existence implies a contradiction' (NKS D I89). The non
then includes possible existents and actual existents, but the con
impossible and the impossible is non-existent. There is here
Locke and Berkeley, a residual rationalism.'
However he may have expressed the prevailing scientific d
his views of world order included possibilities that were then
that they had not yet been named. The above quotation show
whatever the relation between logical principles and laws of
latter may only hold for a particular epoch. Hume had an a
determinism.

IlI. THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE

Hume set out to be the Newton of the moral sciences. As Newton reduced
principles to simplicity, so Hume presents us with Resemblance, Contiguity,
Causation. Order emerges out of apparent disorder when we discover these
regular relations. 'There is a secret tie or union among particular ideas,
which causes the mind to conjoin them more frequently together, and makes
the one, upon its appearance, introduce the other. Hence arises what we call

1 There is little discussion of Hume's principles of contradiction and excluded middle. A fine
exception is Nicholas Rescher, 'Logical Analysis in Historical Application', Methodos, I I (I 959),
pp. 187-194. Perhaps only someone with a background in Leibniz would be sensitive to the crucial
importance of such statements as 'nothing, which he clearly conceives, could be esteemed impossible
or implying a contradiction' (D II). There are similar statements in EcHU I32 p. 164 and NHR xi,
Wollheim, Religion, p. 72. It would go too far to ascribe to Hume any commitment to real possibilities
or possible existence, but there is a commitment to an 'order of things' which Whitehead contrasts
to an 'order of nature.' This can be defended by saying that Whitehead's 'eternal objects' are not
actual, mere forms of definiteness. Moreover, the shades of blue are not exhausted by the actual
tones we have perceived in the concrete. Whitehead and Humne would agree on that surely.

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 406 P. G. KUNTZ

the apropos of discourse: he

order, thread, or chain of th
the loosest reverie' (A 3I-2).
Is it not more important in H
related rather than that at so
If the parts are as bricks, th
whole.
As Berkeley had interpreted God, the 'principle of order of nature ...
[is] an agency like the activity of our minds'.' We should then look for
evidence of a cosmic order, whether transcendent or immanent, in the order
of ideas. If we can discover laws, we have at least confirmed the hypothesis.
There is not only a physical geography, with which Newton had been con
cerned, but also a 'mental geography'. If mind is a 'seeming disorder', this
is only because we have not yet discovered the relations. If Newton achieved
success in 'a true system of the planets and adjusted the position and order of
these remote bodies; [it is unworthy of a philosopher] to overlook ... the
parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately concerned' (EcHU 8, pp. I 3
I4).There is also astronomy of ideas, astronomical in addition to geographical
order to explain the dynamics of ideas (EcHU 9, pp. I4-I5) .
'Twill be easy to conceive of what vast consequences these principles must be in
the sciences of human nature, if we consider, that so far as the mind, these are the
only links that bind the parts of the universe together, or connect us with any per
son or object exterior to ourselves. For as it is by means of thought only that any
thing operates upon our passions, and as these are the only ties of our thoughts,
they are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind
must, in a great measure, depend on them. (A 32)
It must suffiice here, whatever relation there may be between the order of
impressions because there is an order among events, to say that Hume's
theory of order includes what are called 'natural relations' between things in
space and time. How else could there be gravity? Whether there is a theory
of space, time and causality only because of an order among impressions, or
an order among impressions because there is an order among events, or
whether they are the same order as various alternatives, the most important
point to be used in this argument is that there is order and we know order and we
create order.2

1 C. W. Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume (Princeton University Press, 1925), cites
this conception of God as principle of order, from The New Theory of Vision, as among the main
problems which were Hume's concerns along with relations between men and the efforts to achieve
knowledge.
2 Hume states his position so that we might read him as a subjectivist in his theory of spatial,
temporal or causal order. Order might then be categorial function of the mind or formal a priori
categories we impose upon experience. But, concludes Metz, it is 'likelier that he is to be under
stood in a naive empiricist way'. The superior order is between objects (der 'ubergeordnete Ord
nungsbegriff auf der Seite der Objekte oder Inhalte, ohne dass das Form-Inhalt Problem schon
erkenntnistheoretisch relevant geworden wiire. Die Ordnung als formale Kategorie ist von Hume

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 HUME 5S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 407

Hume's most explicit statement of realism occurs in An Enquiry Concerning

Human Understanding, 44:

The belief of the correlative object is always presupposed; without which the rela
tion could have no effect. The influence of the picture supposes, that we believe our
friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home,
unless we believe that it really exists.
Here then is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature
and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the
former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions
have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature.
Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so nece
sary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every
circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object
instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our
knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses;
and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural
powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Those, who delight
in the discovery and contemplation of final causes, have here ample subject to
employ their wonder and admiration (EcHU, pp. 53-5).

This passage goes further than any other in restating a realistic meta
physics. There is an order of nature, and our order of ideas, when true,
corresponds to this order. Only because there is a known order of events can
man regulate his conduct and know how to produce the effects he chooses
Beyond these three orders, distinct, yet interrelated, is yet a fourth, 'a kind o
pre-established harmony' which excites 'wonder and admiration'. This fourth
will lead us naturally, within Hume's system, to his theism.

IV. BETWEEN CHAOS AND SLAVERY

Man's condition in his environment is somewhere between the extremes of

perfect abundance and complete want. Under the first condition there would
be no need ofjustice in the sense of 'a partition of goods'. Under the second
condition, there could only prevail conduct motivated by self-preservation.
Thus it is the mean between extremes in the natural order that gives to man
the conditions requiring the 'order in society'. Hume's 'Of Justice' is an
account of the origin of the moral order as a substitute for having either the
ancient myth of original perfect natural order or the modern myth of
original anarchy (EcPM I45-53, pp. I82-92).

nigends erfasst; er ist an dieser Stelle ebensoweit von Apriorismus entfernt wie iiberall sonst'.)
David Hume: Leben und Philosophie (Frommann, Stuttgart, I968), p. I45. Metz does not connect,
as does this paper, Hume's theory of order with Newtonian methodology or with the theory of
society, but stresses order as Hume's solution to the problem of how, if the mind is but a bundle of
impressions, there can be any unity. The self is no mere bundle because 'ideas fall into order'.
Unless we are mad, the self can then be, even if no substance, an orderly system or organic whole.
Ibid. p. 226.

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 408 P. G. KUNTZ

The important point here i

dependent upon the natural
sense of absolute or unrelate
moral order is not reducible
new relations emerge makin
even if it cannot be separate
No passage better illustrat
upon men 'sensible of the[se
rules of justice are establishe
tion between sexual appetite
I92). By no means would Hum
mer, and he might as well say
natural order plus other diffe
in the Platonic sense of an o
totelian sense of more inclusiv
of ends for which we desig
marily by passions, but gen
needs.
However narrow Hume's definition ofjustice may seem, the general prob
lem is order. Sidgwick defined 'order' here as 'the observance of the actual
system of rules, whether strictly legal or customary, which bind together the
different members of society into an organic whole, checking malevolent or
otherwise injurious impulses, distributing the different objects of men's
clashing desires, and exacting such positive services, customary or con
tracted, as are commonly recognized as matters of debt'.' Although we
began with a simple physical notion of order as lawfulness or regularity of
sequence of prior and consequent conditions, it is obvious that the obser
vance of rules here connotes also harmonizing interests, and securing the
appropriate fulfilment of reciprocal duties and obligations.
The established order of society is never one of perfect justice, but without
society there would be perfect injustice. Hence it can be changed but not
rapidly, lest the basis of custom and sentiment be disrupted. The key to
wisdom is moderation. How to strike the correct balance between liberty
and authority, how not to exaggerate liberty into anarchy nor to exaggerate
authority into tyranny? This is the precise problem faced by the founders of
the American Republic, debated in the Federalist Papers and embodied in the
Constitution of the American federal republic

It is possible to see a portent of chaos in every relaxation of authority. It is pos

sible to see a threat of slavery in every reduction of individual liberty. At this
point, a basic difference in the characters of men becomes important. The in
evitable ambiguity evokes two different reactions: men of cautious, hesitant

1 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Macmillan, London, 1922), pp. 440.

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 409

temperament will worry about Chaos, while boisterous, self-reli

fearsome of Slavery'
Hume is probably one of the earliest of philosophers to r
emotions involved in responses to various states described
'disorderly'.
The ideal order by which Hume judges the degree of obedience to rules
and authority to be optimum would of course depend upon circumstances
and we cannot expect from him sufficient formal definition. What Hume
intended, moderation and gradually emergent new orders, can be gathered
from his definitions of Tory and Whig. Tory, 'a lover of monarchy, though
without abandoning liberty'; Whig, 'a lover of liberty, though without
renouncing monarchy '.2
Order, in the usage 'moral order', is in Hume's analysis a very good thing
indeed. Is it, for example, associated with benevolence
The social virtues are never regarded without their benevolent tendencies, nor
viewed as barren and unfruitful. The happiness of mankind, the order of society,
the harmony of families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as
the result of their gentle dominion over the beasts of men (EcPM 144, pp. i81-2).
Order is apparently in society self-regulating. Excesses fail, no matter how
clever we may become in evading obligations and violating rules. The just
man
has the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and
abilities, betrayed by their maxims; while they propose to cheat with moderation
and secrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give in to the
snare; whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of reputa
tion, and forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with mankind (EcPM 233,
p. 283).

V. IS THERE A PRINCIPLE OF ORDER?

Now that we have traced the theme of order through the order of nature,
with Newtonian method applied to uncover the order of ideas and the order
of justice, it is inevitable to ask about the order of these orders. Without a
order of objects there could be no order of ideas of those objects and without
knowledge of order of events we could not produce that admirable state of
human society that enables us to attain our goals.3 It now becomes natural to
ask whether there is a principle of order to make this relation of order
intelligible.

1 John B. Stewart, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (Columbia University Press,
N.Y., I963), pp. 235-6.
2 Ibid. pp. 238-9.
3 NKS D 25, although he agrees with T. H. Huxley that almost nothing remained of Hume's
theism, then claims Hume was writing in the tradition of Plato's Laws, as interpreted by Cicero:
Hume accepted Providence in this sense: 'Divine Existence, he teaches, is the source or principle
of order, i.e. the principle determnining the regular course of nature - the order which by its fixed laws

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4IO P. G. KUNTZ

Hume's theory of order at thi

has been buried under many
great interest in their own rig
has usually interrupted sustain
There is a positive premis
This is that there is 'uniform
of nature can be known by '
'laws', which have a very hig
all men must die; that lead c
that fire consumes wood,
pp. I I4-I5; Wollheim 2IO-I
Hume is surely right in giv
Providence and of a Future
nature' to 'a particular intel
preserves order in the unive
the subject lies entirely bey
inference not useless 'becaus
entirely from the course of
just reasoning, return back fr
additions to the common an
new principles of conduct an
Within the context of Hum
interrelations, the theism he
moral order. The religious
'Are there any marks of a di
tion then is that the principle
the sustaining of the world,
called 'providence' (ibid. pp
One might then reach a neg
enables us to arrange our lives with pro
which "Providence" has provided.' Is
truth coincide? Kemp Smith is clear t
Prayers or Sacrifices', an atheism fo
' principle of order', then even if we c
then we should be grateful for such o
make this distinction, but I venture t
Hume a view of 'Providence', as does
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1932), I, p
1 The concept miracle, defined as an
quires logically that we know all the l
Matthews, review of Anders Jeffners, B
p. 370. How could such an elementary
The texts reveal, I believe, that the mir
and if there were other so-called exce
scheme. The positive point is that ther
essay by A. E. Taylor, 'David Hume an
1934), the theist concedes that miracl
must be based on the cursus ordinariu

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 411

of origin and a moral order, but a positive conclusion wit

tinuing orderliness of the process.'
The belief in a principle of order seems a natural belief;
nature' suggests, as does an unfinished building, some 'more fi
or plan, which will receive its completion in some distant p
time' (Ibid. p. I 43).
If this Deity is known to us only from 'a single being in
how far may we trust analogy? The positive result is that 'the
of nature may convince us, that almost everything is regulate
and maxims very different from ours. . .' (Ibid. pp. 146-7).
'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm' attacks 'two species of false
with the implication that there is 'true religion'. What is this
the best which, when corrupted, produces the worst (Woll
The Natural History of Religion and 'Of Suicide' are ironic an
If the 'Introduction' and 'General Corollary' are taken i
Letter' of I 745, we may conclude that Hume did not reach a to
conclusion about Theism. Even if the very positive open
History, on the 'foundation in reason' that 'the whole fram
speaks an intelligent author' is the shield behind which he
arguments for polytheism, still there is the general belief thr
in 'invisible, intelligent power' that would give it the status of
(Wollheim, p. 3I).
If there is such invisible power behind nature, the universali
laws does suggest a single ground, if not 'one single purpo
And we can see why men have ascribed to this one all the po
ascribed to God in contrast to a devil: 'the good, the great,
ravishing' are exalted in theism, selected in order to 'dign
(Wollheim, pp. 96-7). Are the natural attributes, particularly p
to the moral attributes, particularly justice and mercy, which
We may be put in position to see the logic of God, that in
attempt to explain the natural order, in part an attempt to su
order of man. Then what of God's 'intelligence'? That could
sustain the cognitive order of man. Hume does not carry thro
of the human motivations, which do not necessarily explain
concept, but make more acute the problem of justifying w
'the genuine principles of theism'.
Was Hume 'philosophically disingenuous' in defendin

1 It makes more sense to say that EcHU is 'inconclusive' rather than 'neg
maybe some form of theism rather than a flat no (Hendel Hume Selections, Sc
XIX).
The link between EcHU and NHR is the effort to state the principle of 'genuine theism'. The intro
duction to NHR may be a feigned certainty, but nothing in the sceptical rejection of the arguments
compels the believer to 'suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism
and Religion'. (Wollheim, p. 3 I). Between 1748 and I757 had come The History of England.

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 4I2 P. G. KUNTZ

Arguments for Natural Relig

Author's Principles conce
Professor Mossner says Hu
full development in the Dialo
'an infinitely perfect Arch
'humility' with regard to the
ofeverything (Ibid. pp. I 9-2I).
inference, and how can this b
the Enquiry?
Wherever I see Order, I infer from Experience that there, there hath been Design
and Contrivance. And the same Principle which leads me into this Inference, when
I contemplate a Building, regular and beautiful in its whole Frame and Structure;
the same Principle obliges me to infer an infinitely perfect Architect, from the
infinite Art and Contrivance which is display'd in the whole Fabrick of the Uni
verse. Is this not the Light in which this Argument hath been placed by all
Writers concerning Natural Religion? (Ibid. pp. 25-6)

Hume was charged with atheism and rejects the charge, in part based on
Hume's nominalism, which he shared with Berkeley. If the Bishop was no
atheist because he had no abstract general idea, such as of existence, why
should Hume be persecuted? Could it be the clue to Hume's often professed
theism that the 'Light' in which the argument is seen is admiration for the
beauty of order? Something was left in Socrates 'the wisest and most reli
gious of the Greek Philosophers, as well as Cicero among the Romans, who
both of them carried their Philosophical Doubts to the highest Degree of
Scepticism' (ibid. pp. 20-I). The above passage shifts the force of evidence
behind the argument to 'what leads me into this Inference'.
Then, provided one had the ground, even though formally deficient, the
'moral Evidence' would attain to just as high a degree of assurance (ibid.
p. 29), or at least doesn't deny it, as charged. The important question is
what is its ground that is 'absolutely universal in all nations and ages, and
has always a precise determinate object, which it inflexibly pursues' (NHR,
Wollheim p. 31)?
Is there such a ground leading us to the theistic inference? Hume pro
vides affections as such ground.
Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of invisible, intelligent
power, hope as well as fear, gratitude, as well as afflictions ... (NHR, Wollheim
P. 43).
The answer to the question is then to 'examine our own hearts'. Even
if we do not know the cause, we can be grateful for the ' regular and constant
machinery' (ibid. p. 40). Then, being grateful, we can personify the object
of our thankfulness and rise to a 'magnificent idea', 'that infinitely perfect
spirit, who alone, by his almighty will, bestowed order on the whole frame of
nature' (ibid. p. 42).

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 HUMES' METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 4I3

'Tlhe only point of theology, in which we shall find a consent of mank

almost universal, is, that there is invisible, intelligent power in the w
but whether this power be supreme or subordinate, whether confined to o
being, or distributed among several, what attributes, qualities, connex
or principles of action ought to be ascribed to these beings,' concern
these points, there is the widest difference in the popular systems of theo
(ibid. p. 44).
But the attempts to simplify theology that lead Hume at one point to
stress 'intelligent power' as the principle of order leads him also at another
point to stress the 'sentiment of order and moral obligations'. When this
sentiment guides thought Hume writes that 'nothing but morality could
gain the divine favour' and that 'the most genuine method of serving the
divinity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures' (ibid. p. 93).
Hence we may state a dilemma, if God is only essentially 'intelligent power'
we cannot consider an obligation to serve it, but if God is nothing but ideal
goodness, how do we know in him anything connected with producing real
effects?
Although it would be in the spirit of Hume's efforts to simplify the principle
of order, we have already seen that two simplifications lead to the com
plexity of a dilemma, but there are yet other simplifications which we will
consider below: one applies to divinity the principle eminent in 'taste and
sentiment: Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than
conceived' (EcHU I3I, P. I65). The other is to stress the intellectual
approach alone ' To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other wor
ship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious' (NKS D 226). It
might seem that Hume's admired style is flawed by too many 'onlys' and
'nothing buts'1
Did Hume succeed in clarifying a 'logic of God' to show what he con
cluded was 'true philosophy' and 'true religion' and 'genuine theism'?
The most constructive development of how true philosophy can positively
help in the development of true religion is ' On Suicide'. Although sentiment
is never much changed by reason, 'true philosophy has inspired juster senti
ments of superior powers' (Wollheim, p. 252).
What is inappropriate is 'fear lest [man] offend his Maker'. What there
fore is appropriate is trust. Why? Because of 'the presents of GOD and
nature', which are obviously life and the conditions for well-being. Since
these are 'presents', gratitude is due to the givers of gifts (ibid. p. 253). Does
this stray from 'plain good sense'? In NHR Hume argues similarly for 'the
human affections [that] may lead us into the notion of invisible, intelligent
power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction.. .'. Hume argues
for a religion based on 'the agreeable passions' (ibid. p. 43).
1 Robert J. Henle, Method in Metaphysics (Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, I95I), on the
fallacy of 'only', passim.

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414 P. G. KUNTZ

What aspect of true philosoph

tion as any man's course of lif
superstition' the knowledge of or
laws, must increase true reli
flavour by saying that when m
they become acquainted 'with
infinitely perfect spirit, who alo
whole frame of nature'. This i
beauty of the work' (ibid. p. 4
Nowhere as clearly as in 'On S
that the order of creation is a
bodies from the greatest plane
sphere and function'. Is this t
everything? Clearly not, for th
animal world continually encro
forward each other's operati
rather checks and balances. Not
but, as we would put it, the an
animal reshapes its environment
discord or disorder'; on the contr
and proportion, which affords th
providence of the Deity appear
governs every thing by those g
How then does God 'govern'
meting out punishment and re
universal laws, by which a hou
he wisely fits the operations of
laws, he brings ruin on himsel
Man, as any animal, depends o
order of some parts of matter,
general laws of motion'. Hume
fixed order, in the sense of law
crete course of events. Relative t
one of consequence the free d
fully employ that power with w
Hume is clearly arguing that G
events are his, in the sense tha
specific ordering is attributabl
false religion is then to make Go
of order (ibid. p. 257).
No particular agent 'can en
providence, or disorder the uni
theistic statement in oppositio

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 4I5

suggest that it doesn't matter which way we say the metaphysi

'It is a kind of blasphemy to imagine that any created being can
order of the world, or invade the business of Providence.' W
be but a denial that creatures are 'subordinate to his go
authority'? The only order man can disturb is the order of socie
has made 'but the government of the world is placed far be
and violence' (ibid. pp. 259-60).
Are the order of things and the order of society, the natural
moral order, sacred? We say religiously that to offend God
pleasure. Hume can make sense of this. 'And how does it ap
Almighty is displeased with those actions that disturb so
principles which he has implanted in human nature and wh
with a sentiment of remorse if we ourselves have been guilty of
and with that of blame and disapprobation, if we ever observe t
(ibid. p. 260).
Not only does Hume analyse the sense of sin, which some critics have
claimed entirely escaped his attention, but he gives an account of obligation,
which some critics have said was beyond his scope. 'All our obligations to
do good in society seem to imply something reciprocal. I receive the bene
fits of society, and therefore ought to promote its interests . . .' (ibid. p. 260).
We may then safely conclude that Hume's theory of order is a unifying
metaphysic, and a naturalistic justification of a theism far richer, in its ex
pression of gratitude for order, respect for order as sacred, and coupled with
a sense of sin when it is violated. Hume has given us what some readers have
not found in him, a 'logic of God'.

VI. 'ORDER' HAS MANY MEANINGS1

No student of Hume denies the importance in any area of the category
'order'. It is of particular importance metaphysically that in spite of the
differences between the characters in the Dialogues 'there is one feature in
which all agree, namely order'.2 But no critic of Hume has devoted any sus
tained criticism to the nature of the agreement for a very obvious objection:
is it not a superficial verbal compact that pastes over the deepest real dis
agreements? Therefore it is assumed, it would be only necessary to demon
strate an ambiguity or two to show that whatever agreements about a truly
natural belief there may seem to be, on such an ultimate problem we have
again an issue impossible to decide on any philosophic basis. Therefore must
we not confront the charge that an examination of 'order' in the broadest
1 I would feel better about the title if I could find these very words in Hume. In many ways he is
a pluralist. 'There are many different kinds of Certainty. . .'J. Y. T. Greig, Letters (Oxford, 1932),
x. 187.
2 B. M. Laing, 'Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,' Philosophy, vol. I2 (I937),
p. 183.

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4I6 P. G. KUNTZ

sense yields not a coherent met

of sceptical anti-metaphysics?
If we put together the consid
synonymous, 'arrangement',
course, 'design') how strong m
i. The first ambiguity is the mo
and a priori anything may be th
whence do we gain the right to
the first view chance could serv
regularity, but on the second, c
order then merely what we exp
happen regularly?2
2. The second ambiguity of 'o
needs little further comment. T
times to be an argument from
other times an argument from
regularities could be reclassified
universal teleology could be clai
3. In Hume's language there is
evaluative uses of terms of the a
from order to good order (or from
to find order to disorder and ev
state. Obviously the use of desig
or purpose of the whole of natu
coveries of science, rests upon this
what Cleanthes in pt. VIII calls '
good and evil, Philo's self-order
4. If 'order' is a certain foundat
always a 'mental' intention, then
basic metaphysics is theistic. There
the parts of a machine or organ
of similarities between these, is
supposed result of the a posterio
in mind is inconsistent with the
Philo's example, that have a prin
'self-organizing' cannot therefor

As a theory of order we mig

1 NKS D, p. 99. Perhaps the most th
'Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural
2 B. M. Laing, David Hume (Benn, L
miracles, but the question of chance see
defect of the Dialogues and general atten
theological aspects of metaphysics.
3 NKS D noted this ambiguity and
design', p. 72. The most thorough exa
Theism', Journal of the History of Idea
4 Charles W. Hendel, Jr., Studies in th
I925), p- 343.
r B. M. Laing, 'Hume's Dialogues Co
pp. I82-7.

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 4I7

worse than muddled, it could be a muddle of muddles. This conclusion

reached by Kemp Smith from the confusion of' argumentfrom design and
argument to design'. The appeal to a common meaning of 'order' lead
the sophistry that the atheist agrees with the theist and that they both bel
in 'the original principle of order'. It all rests on putting together all sorts
regularities, such as 'the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal' (N
2I8, Fi).
Was Hume deliberately hiding confusions, or worse, as A. E. Taylor
charged, making his characters reason fallaciously? The evidence of Hume's
examination of a providential moral order is against the charge of calculated
sophism.' Events may be regular as cause and effect without being morally
regular as sin and suffering or iniquity and death. The evidence seems to be
that not even that other protester against theodicy, Voltaire, found it neces
sary to distinguish meanings we find so very different. 'This word order
applied to nature is void of sense, unless it signifies an arrangement of which
we apprehend the regularity and design.'2
Although Hume had not completed his analytic work, still he had a syn
thetic or metaphysical intent. I find this the only sound way to read Hume.
The error of theodicy is to identify the order of nature with a moral order,
but there is the opposite error into which Hume scholars fall in spite of Hume.
Hume took care to make out relations between orders, or what was called
above 'the order of orders'. That is, there is more to Hume than making
distinctions.
The best passage in which this is made clear is this:
Where would be the foundation of morals if particular characters had no certain or
determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had
no constant operation on actions? Then Hume adds that 'natural and moral
evidence' link together, and form only one chain of argument ... derived from the
same principles. (EcHU 70, p. 90)
Are the four difficulties named above as disastrous to Hume's total position
as most critics have assumed? Not at all. The world as a whole is so various
that we should expect the orders to be diverse. Hume's system is far from
being a hopeless muddle.
i. Hume's thought was outgrowing the identification of laws of nature with
necessities found in purely abstract formal relations. Since he denied necessity of ex
istence, he should also deny necessity of relations between existents. If what happens
regularly happens in conformity to what has become habitual, we may expect changes,
perhaps owing to chance variations, and new habits may develop. The new theory
of order in Hume is one of transitions from order to order (NKS D I 74).
2. Hume's playful self Philo is not committed, as is Hume's dogmatic self
Cleanthes, to forcing universal teleology. On this point pts. x-xi seem decisive.
1 A. E. Taylor, 'The Present-Day Relevance of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion',
Aristotelian Society Supplement, vol. I8 (I939), esp. pp. I8o-0o.
2 B. M. Laing, 'Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion', Philosophy, vol. I2 (I937),
p. i86n.

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4I8 P. G. KUNTZ

3. There is a link between an

find regularity, and the use to
is elliptical to call order 'bene
we explain, as Hume does, th
order there could not be wha
but without order there wou
4. Clearly Hume was using P
self-organizing beings. But H
order to one of four princip
ordinate. At least, all four-'re
ciples ... which are similar t
the principle of principles co

Is the theistic argument n

tion of universal order and
and scientific discovery as
conclusion about Hume's p
The faith in an order of
as a 'moral certainty'. Act
and therefore the process of
the original presumption w
The above may make sen
proposition that 'the Being of
Evidence' (L 23). It is requi
Nature' so that we have a
Is there anything in com
Evidently all of them requ
way of being related and o
relations. This would enable
different orders. But vario
of relations founder on var
our thinking has not creat
comparing ideas. Whereas
changed, they are also con
simple constituents withou
Had Hume clarified the ty
formal logic to laws of a sy
and degrees of necessity or
Very little in Hume expli
such. '. . . We know by thi
and B is greater than C, t
about knowledge of the rel

1 Julius R. Weinberg, Abstraction, R

(University of Wisconsin Press, M
on Hume's Treatise.

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 419

tance. His view seems to be that such knowledge is analytic: e.g., in o

see that A is greater than C you only have to know what ... the
"greater than" means. Once you know what it means, you can se
denial ... would be a contradiction.'"
Hume's philosophy does indeed, when considered as a whole, d
all sorts of order. The only ultimate metaphysical justification is
world is made up of just these orders. Therefore the crucial pro
metaphysics as a theory of order is how these orders are related to e
This is exactly the side of Hume's work that has been neglected
the simpler or lower orders, such as regularity and design, hav
haustively studied, the more complex or higher orders have bee
ignored.
L. J. Henderson called attention to the importance of 'the tendency
towards dynamic equilibrium', a principle of both physics and biology, which
is broadly stated by Hume. There is an adjustment between the forms of life
and what we call their 'environment'. ... . The whole itself must have a
relation to the other parts of the universe . . .' This is fitness, and the forms
of life that are unfit are eliminated.2 We have above called attention to the
balancing processes in society and politics. What needs doing, in under
standing Hume as a systematic thinker, is to recognize that there is cosmic
equilibrium, what the Chinese call yang and yin. Hume puts into the mouth
of Philo as part of the recognition of organicism that 'a continual waste in
every part is incessantly repaired' (NKS D 170-I).
Orders may be related hierarchically, and it has been shown that certain
orders could not be except on the basis of others, as the moral order could not
be except on the basis of the order of ideas and the order of events. The tra
ditional hierarchy of The Great Chain of Being assumed the lower existed for
the sake of the higher, and since it is assumed in Hume's Dialogues that earth
exists for man and that man's rule is beneficent, it is reasonable for a Hume
student to have expected A. 0. Lovejoy to include a consideration of Hume
in his study.3
Hierarchy has been generally based on mind as the active principle, with
matter as the passive principle, yet Philo is allowed to voice the opinion that
matter is self-organizing. Hence it is fitting for A. E. Taylor to criticize this
position as absurd.
Why ... may not the 'material universe' fall into order of itself, or why may not
the order in it be due to some unknown character of its own? . . . If the suggestion
. . . is to have any relevant meaning, its sense must be that teleological order,

1 H. H. Price, 'The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy', Philosophy, XL (1940), p. 13.

2 L. J. Henderson, The Order of Nature, An Essay (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1925), pp. 50-i.
3 A. 0. Lovejoy GCB doesn't mention Hume, as Dr Laing notes in 'Hume's Dialogues Concern
ing Natural Religion', Philosophy, vol. I2 (I937), p. I90. He does nothing towards showing how
hierarchy enters into the conception of the world order.

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 420 P. G. KUNTZ

'prospective' adaptation, can b

and that possibility is excluded .
Is Hume, then, as charged, one
than reading the levels correc
means to the higher? At least
found them not really far apar
wish to add to this that they are
a reductionist, relates his orders
for higher orders. All he denies
ontologically real antecedent to
world.
Closely associated with hierarchy is the higher order called 'harmony'.
Hume gives to Philo the statement of organic order in which 'the closest
sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system, and each part or mem
ber, in performing its proper office, operates both to its own preservation and
to that of the whole' (NKS D I 7 I) .
In Hume's view there is, to use Whitehead's terminology, an 'order of
things' as well as an 'order of nature'. The principle of a more inclusive
order, the order of possibles, is conceivability without contradiction. The
logical realm is more inclusive, because whatever is actual is possible, but
many possibles are not actual. We may not then from the principle of possi
bility deduce any actuality, but all actuals conform to the principle of
possibility.
That things possible and actual do not contradict one another is a likely candidate
for the principle of harmony.3
We cannot complain too much about Hume's failure to spell out the exact
nature of equilibrium, hierarchy, and harmony, or even of analogy. He
lacked a logic of relations with which to effect such an analysis. But he gave
important expression to these beliefs and opened up possibilities beyond the
hackneyed subjects of regularity and design.

VII. IN WHAT SENSES COULD A PRINCIPLE OF ORDER BE A

GROUND OF VALUE?

Most interpreters of Hume's theory of order have a simple answer to this

question: in no sense whatever could a principle or order be a ground of
value.4 In no small measure this is because we have focused on Hume as a
1 A. E. Taylor, 'Symposium: The Present-Day Relevance of Hume's Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion', Aristotelian Society Supplement, vol. I8 (1939), p. 194.
2 George Stern, A Faculty Theory of Knowledge: The Aim and Scope of Hume's First 'Enquiry'
(Bucknell University Press, I971), pp. 128-9.
3 This statement is not formally spelled out by Nicholas Rescher in 'Logical Analysis in His
torical Application', Methodos, vol. ii (I959), pp. 187-194, but I believe it fits Hume's logical
assumptions.
' There is a considerable literature on the is/ought distinction, and it is now known to readers of

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 42I

predecessor of those engaged in defending the autonomy of eth

perpetrators of the alleged naturalistic fallacy. Generally
recognized that the same question occurs in Hume's theistic
Similarly our attention has been largely on the difference
'natural' and the 'moral'. When 'value' means moral value,
attribute of the principle of order is the justice and merc
theodicy, the conclusion of the Dialogues Concerning Natu
unambiguous. The most likely hypothesis, concludes Ph
' perfect goodness', nor 'perfect malice', nor ' both goodness an
'neither goodness nor malice' (NKS D 212).
But if we consider intellectual virtue or intelligence, the verd
as negative. The theist's hypothesis of intelligence of 'the or
of order bears some remote analogy to human reason' (NK
Even when the thought is still of analogy, there is a thir
that might be considered in the order of nature and therefore
the principle of order. This is of course beauty. Philo's appr
and here I must also acknowledge, Cleanthes, that, as the works
much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance than
benevolence and justice; we have reason to infer that the natural
Deity have a greater resemblance to those of men than his mora
virtues (NKS D 2 I 9).
It is curious that Cleanthes fails to press this analogy. Wh
order, we can enjoy beauty. Is not the principle of order a kind
His analogy of the principle to a judge has been ruined, ye
thinking of saving goodness by the necessity of future punishm
to secure 'morals', which evokes from Philo the rebuke of
stition' (NKS D 2I9).
Philo has given an even stronger premise: 'That the works
a great analogv to the productions of art is evident . . .' (N
mine).
So much attention has been paid to the ' remote analogy to human intelli
gence,' the lack of analogy to human justice and mercy, that what goes wrong
with theism seems to rule out anything positive.'
Rather than read Hume's Dialogues as an examination of scientific theism
or moral theism, let it be read as an attempt to introduce a new approach to
the value man finds in the cosmos. This should be called 'aesthetic theism'.
philosophical journals as 'Hume's Law'. Among noted articles are A. C. MacIntyre, 'Hume on
" Is" and " Ought" ', The Philosophical Review, LXVIII (I959), 45I-68, and R. F. Atkinson, 'Hume on
" Is " and " Ought": A Reply to Mr MacIntyre', ibid. LXX (I96I), 23I -8, and many subsequent
essays.
1 Milton C. Nahm, The Artist as Creator: An Essay of Human Freedom (Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, 1956), deals with the 'great analogy' between the artist and God, when 'God' is under
stood both as Hebraic-Christian creator and Platonic demiurge. But Hume's use of it is ignored.
Rather Hume figures only in rejecting the 'intangling brambles' of metaphysics derived from 'the
craft of popular superstitions' (pp. 6i, 63).

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 422 P. G. KUNTZ

The closest to poetry of an

sponse, which has most freq
logic. But this is Hume's a
passion should take a passion
The order and arrangement of
plain use and intention of ever
in the same testimony: The wh
of its Creator: ... I have found
Cleanthes is still ensnared i
isolated aesthetic theism. He
ment rather than getting othe
bespeak in the clearest langu
irritated to be asked about '
experience.
But is not Cleanthes more successful than he recognized in getting Philo to
see the world in this way, the way of admiration, awe, amazement, wonder?
At the beginning of part vi Philo has also found a Deity. Philo regards the
world organically rather than mechanistically.
Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a
great resemblance to an animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like
principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no
disorder: A continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: The closest sym
pathy is perceived throughout the entire system: And each part or member, in
performing its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation, and to that of
the whole.... The Deity is the SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by
it (NKS D 170-I).
Philo indeed adds that this is the analogy of the universe to 'a human
body' rather than 'the works of human art and contrivance', but the
approach is aesthetic, as to a work of art.
It has been often observed that the participants in the Dialogues agree
that there is order. But can we not add that when Cleanthes enjoys this
order he praises the Creator and when Philo enjoys this order he acknow
ledges a soul of the world? Then aesthetic theism may take a transcendental
or an immanentist form.
If order is enjoyed, then necessarily the principle of order is a ground of
value. If the value is aesthetic, then we need to examine how 'order' is
aesthetically apprehended, and exactly what this order might be.
Works of nature are similar to works of art in that they have 'the same
matter, a like form . . .'. Because this is judged 'self-evident and undeniable'
we are deprived of an analysis of the exact similarity of forms in nature and
art. Perhaps other references suggest formal aspects. There is 'order, propor
tion, and arrangement of every part'. There is 'correspondence of [male,
and female] parts and instincts'. There is the beauty that comes from irregu
larities, which 'seem contrary to rules, and which gain the affections and

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 423

animate the imagination in opposition to all the precepts of

the authority of the established masters of art'. The artistry o
exhaustible in detail and what 'discoveries in anatomy, chem
reveal are 'new instances of art and contrivance'. The 'magn
opened to us' elicits the response 'so perfect a production' . .
to remark] the 'excellences of the work'. The universe enjoy
is a universe, yet not monotonous, and a variety, yet not co
as well grounded and widely accepted a standard as all that
posed: unity in variety, variety in unity, and neither Philo
can do anything but appeal to it as a basis for metaphysics (
I 54, I 55, I 66, I 78).
It has been found helpful to recall the argument Berkeley pu
of Philonous. Beginning with 'the fields covered with a delig
Philonous surveys woods, rivers, ocean, mountains. The gloo
us with 'a pleasing horror', and in deserts there is 'an agree
Opposites constitute parts of the whole: 'while they mutua
port, do they not also set off and illustrate each other?'. T
'boundless' yet thoroughly lawful and leads the mind to an
[who] activates the universe'.

Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond express

thought? What treatment then do those philosophers deserve, wh
these noble and delightful scenes of all reality? How should tho
entertained, that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the c
imaginary glare?'

Berkeley cannot imagine a cogent reply to put into the mouth

Interpreters of Hume who have read the Dialogues of Hum
ances of Philonous. They forcefully argue that this Berkeleyan
one to feel the 'presence' in nature's order that is 'irresisti
an 'irregular' argument, it is, in Philo's judgment, 'legit
manner of recognizing how the 'natural sentiments' of 'well-
are aroused, since the conclusion is vague and incomplete, fa
ment what reason establishes. Nelson Pike concludes that Ph
prior scepticism and emerges as a metaphysician.2
Charles W. Hendel carries the argument farther. Hum
Berkeley's new argument 'that Nature is itself a Visual Lang
meaning to us exactly as one person does to another in face t
tion. And this is the point of the dogmatist: all order in what
1 George Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision and Other Select Philosophical Writings (E
J. M. Dent, London, 1910 (1926), pp. 243-4.
2 Nelson Pike, ed. and com., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Bobbs-Me
N.Y. 1970), pp. 233-5.

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 424 P. G. KUNTZ

us irresistibly leads us to thi

tion " of our thought, Hume
Calling this submerged th
judgment: an appeal to taste
Although in the Treatise Hu
self' to 'what exists in the nat
dard of sentiment', is it only
of what one finds pleasing? T
of passion, the brilliancy of
what if there is general agre
Dialogues, about the beauty o
Theism requires a shift fro
beauty in the object, at leas
difficulty in an author famou
themselves'. Yet Hume appea
knowledge and not merely p
Figures in the Clouds, our F
Did Hume make the shift f
objectivism? In so far as Hu
appeals to the beauty of the m
of Philo. The cosmos 'ravishe
templated [the parts adapted
and indeed dubious, but the
aspect of 'common sense and
' perverse, obstinate metaphys
idea of a contriver does not i
that of sensation' (NKS D I
Can we then say more abou
Can we go further to call i
say no and can go no furthe
benevolence of order, even pro
and the theism is aesthetic th
moral realms. Hume rejected

Divine existence, he teaches, is

determining the regular course o
us to arrange our lives with pr
the goods which 'Providence'

1 Charles W. Hendel, Studies in the P

p. 328.
2 J. S. Boys Smith, The Journal of Theological Studies, vol. 37 (October I936), p. 348.

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 425

VIII. CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS: NATURALISM OR THEISM?

In a general book on Metaphysics W. H. Walsh comments that 'Hu

among the boldest and most attractive of metaphysicians'.1 In this
have attempted to show how Hume can be read as a systematic and
structive theorist of order. In doing this I suggested that the ant
physical conclusions of the first Essay and the Dialogues are only the ne
side of a dialectic whose positive side is a successful search for order in
epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. The conclusion of Hume's phi
career cannot then be scepticism or an appeal to groundless fai
presumption of order is part of the traditional conviction to which
head called attention in Hume, 'conviction in existence of an Order of T
and in particular, of an Order of Nature'. Hume's wavering about th
clusion is because the total result is not so simple and clear as the
results in epistemology and ethics. Hume was diffident and, as he p
the opening of the Dialogues, after 'logics, next ethics' should
' physics, last of all the nature of the gods' but 'none but a mind en
with all the other sciences can safely be entrusted with " the science of
theology"' (D Aik 5). Perhaps the enrichment from the research in
Natural History of Religion was not the best sort since the historical me
leaves a mass of confused and sometimes contradictory particular
rather than the clarified theories.
Hume was able to think of nature organically rather than mechanistic
and when this is coupled with a view of 'passages from one state of
another', the position can easily be classified as a proto-process philo
Classifying Hume's eventual metaphysics in this way requires several re
tions about his statements and has called forth several suggested
fications to render it more coherent. In his interpretation of Hume's th
and unfortunately limited to the Dialogues, Charles Hartshorne str
most constructive the 'order of the cosmos . . . [as] the essential pre
theism, point[ing] to God simply because personal order is the only for
order able to constitute a world '.2 The difficulty Hume had with
conclusion about a 'Cosmic Orderer' sprang from his order determinism
made Him 'responsible for all evils'. But if each event is to 'some d
[capable] of self-determination not wholly controllable by any
principle or power', then the great difficulty is removed. Surely the pa
in which God's power is limited to save his goodness is a tendency
Whitehead and Hartshorne have fulfilled.
Hartshorne's interpretation of Hume's metaphysics is easy to ove
because Hume is classified as a successor to ancient Carneades in the
'logico-metaphysical scepticism.' But the scepticism was that of an
1 W. H. Walsh, Metaphysics (Hutchinson, London, I963), p. 195.
2 Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (The University o
Press, 1953), p. 435.

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426 P. G. KUNTZ
metaphysician who saw that a wholly tr
from data of the world nor could there
finite and infinite. Hence the dilemma
human terms or saying nothing at all -
But Hume's characters do escape the dile
be a principle of order.
Although Hartshorne complains that H
that God might be 'perfect in his finit
theism of Hume is indeed spelled out. M
polar form of order-disorder which allow
Moreover, this is an immanent and lim
Hume's necessity, applying not to any u
ship between God and world that can b
order no world, and without a world n
stated as the relation between ordering
indeed asked, whether the principle of
(D I 7 I: 'Deity ... actuating it, and act
willing to consider a plurality of order
order 'absolute and unbroken'. The latter
of the autonomy of other agents, or reduc
to aspects of one (ibid. 436).
If there are constructive suggestions of a
the old system, why then does Hume
apparently sceptical note? Philo is often
cism: '. . . The whole of natural theolog
undefined proposition, that the cause or causes
some remote analogv to human intelligence'.
Anyone who claims that Hume's metaph
to naturalism or theism, has to respond
reply is that this famous summary is no m
than is the famous Treatise iiI, I, I on is-ou
that the statement above is a misquotation
in a hypothetical setting. Nearly everyone
'If', and all the other subsequent 'Ifs'.
Had Hume reached constructive results,
ers have recognized what they were? T
most deeply conclude that he was a sceptic
who defend the anti-metaphysical interp
regard to theism, most frequently quote
words from Philo. Is it not ridiculous for a
with the agnosticism? Yet has not this who
a conclusion counter to that '... the whol

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 HUME S METAPHYSICS: A NEW THEORY 427

'one simple, at least undefined proposition, that the cause o

in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to h
If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, o
explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life
of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy ... can be car
to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with
probability, to the other qualities of mind, if this really be t
most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more
philosophical assent to the proposition as often as it occurs,
arguments on which it is established exceed the objectives w

Rather than take the fideism seriously, which is based on

let us examine them from the first to the last. Is the belie
order capable of 'extension, variation or more parti
Hume's philosophy is one long extension, variation and
Does this belief affect human life, by inference bearing
duct? Clearly it is the basis of science and morality. Doe
fer probability to other than intellectual qualities? Cle
aesthetic life, for the order of nature is constantly evo
admiration. Is 'there is a principle of order' a bare D
asserted as more likely than the proposition ' there is no pr
This is a way to ridicule the rationalism that ignores passio
the whole of vital importance. To accept this last hypo
moreover the importance of natural belief.'
More likely as a correct conclusion is the proposition th
Hume did seek some 'Center of Unity of all Men . . .
credible that he found such a centre.3 Norman Kemp Sm
natural belief:
'His entire philosophy, both theoretical and practical, is built around the
view of Nature as having an authority which man has neither the right nor the
power to challenge.'

1 NKS D 122 misquotes the hypotheticals as categoricals, making Hume's mind very flatly dog
matic, and missing the humour of the man. Hume is quite as free from taking Deism seriously as he
is from taking any religious orthodoxy as its own proponents would wish it taken. Although Huxley
quotes the hypotheticals, he also turns them into categoricals, but after an argument supporting the
negative interpretation of Hume's results. Professor [T. H.] Huxley, Hume (Harper and Bros, N.Y.
[n. d.]), pp. I43-4, 151-2. The only helpful interpreter here is Hendel who spots the whole argu
ment as an example of deism, and that there is 'one natural religion discoverable by reason at all
times' apart from the artifice of priests, is a position to which Hume's NHR put an end ... Hendel
SPDH 396 n.
MacNabb ends his article 'Hume, David' with this remote analogy statement as Hume's own
exclusive and simple, but characterizes this as an empty concession. Even if Hume rejects as super
stitious 'the moral attributes of God, providence, immortality, and the whole Christian story from
the Fall to the Day of Judgment' there is much left to consider seriously as 'true or philosophical
religion'. Why identify theism with a peculiar kind of Christianity? The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Paul Edwards, Macmillan, N.Y., I967), IV, 89.
2 G. J. Nathan, 'Hume's Immanent God', in V. C. Chapell, Hume (Anchor Books, Doubleday
and Co., Garden City, N.Y., I966), pp. 396-423.
3 John Laird, Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature (Dutton, N.Y., 193 1), p. 302.

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 428 P. G. KUNTZ

Nor is it only that Nature has t

This is 'among the presupposi
start to finish, he has taken f
and in his time so unquestion
himself, they are not among th
discussion'.'
But the same evidence that creates the problem of evil for belief in an
omnipotent Creator counts against a simple naturalism when interpreted so
optimistically. Hence the shift from the ordered world that does not wholly
conform to balance and harmony to the principles of balance and harmony.
Thus, on a naturalistic basis, Hume's metaphysics must add to conviction of
an order of nature, conviction of an order of things. Thus he was led to
theistic conclusions.2
1 Norman Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, p. 565. Earlier Kemp Smith quoted Shaftes
bury 'For Nature Will Not Be Mocked' (p. 138).
2 Hume could not employ a Platonic move to a 'pre-existive order and contrivance of God's
ideas'. John Anderson, 'Design', The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, xiii, no. 4
(December I 935), p. 252. And even if order is assumed to require an ordering mind, he is not free to
assume only one mind. Thomas McPherson, 'The Argument from Design', Philosophy, vol. 32, no.
I22 (July 1957), p. 220. Although it is simpler to say that the theistic proposition means no more
than the universe has such order as it has, more complexity is needed (ibid. p. 228). Those who have
claimed that Hume chooses 'principles of theism in preference to those of naturalism' are vague as
to what these 'principles' are. Hendel, SPDH, 347, 330-I, 398. But they can be made clear enough
when one pays close attention to order.

Note
For the opportunities that made this study possible I am indebted to the American
Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, the Research Committee of Emory University,
the Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution
where I spent the school year 1970-71. I would also like to acknowledge the editorial
assistance given by Allen Lee Harris.

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