Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention

Author(s): Nicholas J. Wheeler

Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.
18, No. 1, The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention. Les dilemmes de l'intervention
humanitaire, (Jan., 1997), pp. 9-25
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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InternationalPolitical ScienceReview (1997), Vol. 18, No. 1, 9-25

Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention

NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER

ABSTRACT.This article examines some of the justifications that have been

proffered as to why "we" should sacrifice in the name of common human-
ity. The first section examines the views of two leading thinkers who
reject the statist paradigm, Bhikhu Parekh and Michael Walzer. Focusing
on Parekh's and Walzer's conception of the state as a moral agent, and
their conviction that states should engage in humanitarian intervention,
the article argues that the problematic nature of the state as a moral
agent is posed most starkly in relation to military humanitarian inter-
vention. The theme of the second section is the critique of foundational-
ist claims to moral knowledge. Non-foundationalists emphasize the
contingent nature of human solidarity, and this article focuses on the
work of Richard Rorty. He is very critical of the claim that it is possible
to construct a non-foundationalist universalism, and this controvery is
increasingly prominent in the discipline of international relations. The
final part of the article analyzes the attempt by Richard Falk and Ken
Booth to construct a non-foundationalist defence of ethical universalism.
By focusing on both foundationalist and non-foundationalist theories of
human solidarity, the article attempts to provide insights into the
question of how far different metatheoretical positions lead to different
views of moral agency.

Introduction
A key question of world politics at the end of the twentieth century is why those of
us who are fortunate enough to live our lives in relative comfort and security should
care about the suffering of others. The scale of human suffering in the 1990s is like
a tidal wave which threatens to drown the best efforts of humanitarian practitioners
committed to "relieving life threatening suffering and ensuring respect for human
rights" (Weiss and Minear, 1995: 21). This article will examine some of the justi-
fications that have been proffered as to why "we" should sacrifice in the name of
common humanity, and it will consider how different metatheories of human
solidarity lead to different views of moral agency. In particular, it focuses on the

0192-5121 (1997/01) 18:1, 9-25 ? 1997 International Political Science Association

SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
10 Agency,Humanitarianism
andIntervention

role of the state as a moral agent of humanitarianism, and argues that this issue
is posed most starkly in relation to the question of forcible intervention in defence
of humanitarian ends
The notion of common humanity/human solidarity' is diametrically opposed to
the statist paradigm which is predicated on the contention that state leaders and
citizens do not have moral responsibilities or obligations to aid those beyond their
borders.2From the standpoint of the statist paradigm, forcible humanitarian inter-
vention is a theoretical idea with no "real-world"application since states do not
intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons. Moreover, it is not only that statists
are arguing that states do not behave in this way, they are also asserting that states
shouldnot behave in this way. State leaders-those men and women who think and
act in the name of states-do not have the moral right to shed blood on behalf of
suffering humanity. Bhikhu Parekh expresses well the core postulates of the statist
paradigm, "the state is only responsible for its own citizens and...its obligations
and duties are limited to them" (Parekh, 1993: 15). The onlyjustification for risking
the lives of service personnel is in defence of the national interest. As Charles
Krauthammer put it, "Statesmen...do not have the right to launch their nation
into large unfathomable military adventures, to risk not their lives but the lives of
their countrymen, purely out of humanitarian feeling" (Krauthammer, 1992).
Consequently, statists have little difficulty explaining why Britain intervened in the
1991 Gulf War but refused to countenance full-scale military intervention in the
appalling humanitarian crises of Bosnia and Rwanda.
Theorists of human solidarity reject the proposition that the sovereign boundaries
humans have constructed are morally decisive. Statists reify sovereignty, citizenship
and national interest as the "natural"condition of world politics, but critics argue
that there is nothing natural or inevitable about the statist conception of moral
boundaries. The moral frontier-whom "we" choose to include or exclude-is a
historical and social construction; humanitarianism is what we make of it.3
The purpose of this article is to examine the views of some of the leading thinkers
who reject the statist paradigm. Behind the post-statist consensus lies an important
theoretical division. The first section explores the underlying premises of essen-
tialist and foundationalist theorists of common humanity, who argue for a concep-
tion of moral agency which includes forcible humanitarian intervention in
exceptional cases of human suffering. The theme of the second section is the
critique of foundationalist claims to moral knowledge. Non-foundationalists empha-
size the contingent nature of human solidarity, and this essay will examine what
these theorists have to say about the question of moral agency and the issue of
forcible humanitarian intervention. By focusing on both foundationalist and non-
foundationalist theories of human solidarity, it attempts to provide insights into the
question of how far different metatheoretical positions lead to different views of
moral agency.

Foundationalist Conceptions of Human Solidarity

As Richard Rorty puts it, "[t]he traditional philosophical way of spelling out what
we mean by 'human solidarity' is to say that there is something within each of us-
our essential humanity-which resonates to the presence of this same thing in other
human beings" (Rorty, 1989: 189). This claim lies at the core of the body of think-
ing on human rights and humanitarianism. An illustration of this is RJ. Vincent's
conviction that "[h]uman rights are the rights that everyone has, and everyone
 J. WHEELER
NICHOLAS 11

equally, by virtue of their very humanity" (Vincent, 1986: 13). We can turn our
backs on our common humanity and engage in the most appalling acts of brutal-
ity, but when we do so, we are deemed to be inhuman, missing that vital "compo-
nent which is essential to a full-fledged human being" (Rorty, 1989: 189). The
fundamental issue which goes to the heart of this article is not how we judge killers
and murderers, but how we judge those who witness such acts of brutality and fail
to respond: those tilling their fields next to the Nazi concentration camps, or those
who watch the spectacle of genocide or starvation from the comfort of their living-
room chairs. Are "we"bystanders to global human wrongs and if so, are "we"failing
to realize our true capacity for solidarity with suffering others?
Foundationalist and essentialist conceptions of human solidarity are ultimately
predicated on the idea that there is a "core self' which is transhistorical and
transcultural. The difficulty with this claim is that it ignores the contingency of the
"self," and the fact that human subjectivity is constantly in a state of flux depend-
ing on historical and social circumstances. How else can we explain the disturbing
phenomenon of the woman who is "a tender mother and a merciless concentration-
camp guard"? (Rorty, 1989: 32). Is it possible, then, to recognize the contingency
of the human subject whilst still holding on to the idea that there is something in
all of us-some core essence which might be called our "common humanity"?Two
most insightful political philosophers in this regard are Bhikhu Parekh and Michael
Walzer, both of whom not only provide moral justifications for human solidarity,
but also engage in debates about the morality and practicalities of forcible human-
itarian intervention.
According to Parekh, "[t]he self is basically like Hegel's concrete universal, whose
humanity is articulated in and realised through its social relations" (Parekh, 1993:
19). Individuals are constituted by their social identities and interactions, but they
have a unique capacity for self-reflection which differentiates them from animals.
In arguing that human beings share a common capacity for critically reflecting upon
their moral identities, and that they are capable of acquiring new ones, Parekh
appears to posit a core human essence which establishes crucial limits to the contin-
gency of the self:
[H]er social identities presuppose her humanity, and since her humanity
commitsher to recognisingother humanbeings as her equals,her socialidenti-
ties are subjectto the fundamentalconstraintof not requiringher to behavein
a mannerthat ignoresor tramplesupon the claims of other humanbeings....
In being a citizen I do not cease to be a humanbeing; to the very contrarymy
citizenshipexpressesand articulatesmy humanity.My citizenshipcannotthere-
fore absolveme frommy moralobligationsto other humanbeingswhereverthey
may happento live (Parekh,1993: 19).
Contrary to the statist paradigm, Parekh is arguing that citizenship does not
exhaust our capacity for human solidarity. Evidence for Parekh's essentialist view
of humanity can be read into his claim that a person's capacity for solidarity
"inheres in him as a human being, and is integral to what makes him human"
(Parekh, 1993: 19).4 The level of human suffering in the world is testimony to the
fact that humankind has not realized what Parekh sees as its moral capacity for
human solidarity, but his contention seems to be that this potential is latent within
all human beings.
Like Parekh, Walzer seeks to embed his understanding of common humanity
within an appreciation of the contingency of human subjectivity. His starting point
12 Agency,Humanitarianism
andIntervention

is the distinction between what he calls moral minimalism and maximalism. The
former describes a core set of moral principles and beliefs with which, he argues,
all individuals begin; these are then shaped depending upon historical experiences,
cultural norms and social interactions into a multiplicity of forms of social life.
Walzer argues that moral reality has to be seen in terms of a complex duality
between universalism and particularism, and that any human society will reflect
this: "universal because it is human, particular because it is a society" (Walzer,
1994: 8). Particular moral communities create shared ways of life which give
meaning to individuals in their daily lives, but "[h]umanity, by contrast, has
members but no memory...no history and no culture, no customary practices, no
familiar life-ways, no festivals, no shared understanding of social goods." Humans
have such things, but Walzer argues that "there is no singular human way of having
them" (Walzer, 1994: 8). Despite his commitment to communitarianism, Walzer
holds on to an underlying conception of a shared humanity. He argues that we are
capable of giving expression to a universalist moral code because the struggles and
suffering of others resonate with our own particular histories, values and experi-
ences. The reason why they resonate is because we are all human and because of
this we "can acknowledge each other's different ways, respond to each other's cries
for help, learn from each other and march (sometimes) in each other's parades"
(Walzer, 1994: 8).
How should "we"discharge our moral obligations to suffering others on Parekh
and Walzer's accounts of human solidarity? According to the latter, forcible
humanitarian intervention is "morally necessary whenever cruelty and suffering
are extreme and no local forces seem capable of putting an end to them" (Walzer,
1995: 36). Walzer does not specify what he means by "extreme" but suggests that
forcible intervention was morally required in the cases of Somalia, Rwanda, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Walzer's conception of the state as a moral agent of forcible
humanitarian intervention is shared by Parekh, who argues that in those cases
where states are massively threatening the security of their citizens, or where they
have collapsed into lawlessness and civil strife, the duty of moral guardianship
requires state leaders to spend treasure and shed blood in the name of human
solidarity. Thus, Walzer and Parekh's opposition to the statist paradigm does not
prevent them from according moral responsibility to states for forcible humani-
tarian intervention.
However, far from exhibiting the state's capacities for moral agency, there are a
number of reasons for arguing that forcible humanitarian intervention is an issue
that exposes its weaknesses. The first point concerns Parekh's and Walzer's core
claim that state leaders and public opinion should be willing to risk the lives of
their soldiers on behalf of common humanity. A state's citizenry, when faced with
a case of horrendous human suffering in another state, might initially be in favour
of its government forcibly intervening to rescue innocent civilians; the question is
whether this civic enthusiasm for human solidarity will survive once the dead begin
arriving home? As Walzer puts it, if this is a cause in which we have decided that
we are prepared to see our soldiers die, "we cannot panic when the first soldier or
the first significant number of soldiers, like the eighteen infantrymen in Somalia,
are killed in a firefight" (Walzer, 1995: 38). If, however, state leaders judge that
public opinion will not have the stomach for casualties when they occur, it would
be morally irresponsible for them to start down this path. This is one interpreta-
tion of the refusal of Western governments to intervene massively in the war in the
former Yugoslavia.
 NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER 13

Alternatively, it could be argued that it is the responsibility of democratic state

leaders to persuade public opinion that it should bear the human and material costs
of forcible humanitarian intervention. Thus, in relation to the case of Bosnia, it is
claimed that Western governments should have taken the lead in making a moral
case for forcible humanitarian intervention, and that had they done so, Western
publics would have been prepared to pay the price to stop the killing in the former
Yugoslavia. The problem with this view-as its advocates recognize-is that there
is little or no evidence to suggest that state leaders are prepared to take a lead in
advocating forcible humanitarian intervention. Indeed, what emerges clearly from
a study of post-cold war cases of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler and Morris,
1996) is that the principal force behind intervention is not state leaders taking the
lead in persuading a reluctant public opinion to respond to human suffering, but
media and domestic publics who have "shamed" (Moravcsik 1995: 184) policy
makers into taking actions.
These public pressures for action were at their strongest in relation to the Kurdish
and Somali cases, but both demonstrate the fickle nature of public opinion and the
media as agents of humanitarianism. In the case of Kurdistan, it is clear that
military intervention to rescue the Kurds would not have occurred in any other
circumstances than in the context of the Gulf War. As James Mayall argues, action
was only taken to protect the Kurds "because the attention devoted by the Western
media to the plight of the Kurds along the Turkish border threatened the political
dividends that Western governments had secured from their conduct of the war
itself' (Mayall, 1991: 426). As for Somalia, the initial intervention to deliver human-
itarian aid reflected feelings of "altruism and compassion" (Falk, 1993: 755) on the
part of us citizens, but this sense of solidarity disappeared once Americans saw the
blood of their fellow countrymen being spilt on the streets of Mogadishu. The Somali
case demonstrates that the "CNNfactor"5is a double-edged sword: it can pressurize
governments into humanitarian intervention, yet with equal rapidity, pictures of
casualties arriving home can lead to public disillusionment and calls for withdrawal.
In the case of Bosnia, there is no doubt that Western publics were outraged by
scenes of human suffering, but why did these feelings of compassion not turn into
vigorous public pressures for forcible intervention? Michael Ignatieff suggests that
the failure of West European publics to respond to human suffering only a few hours
away from their homes reflects the lack of solidarity between "us" and "them":
If the cause of Bosnia failed to arouse the universaloutrage and anguish that
the atrocity footage on our television screens led one to expect, it was not
becausethose watchingsuch images in the comfortof their living roomslack a
conscienceor humanitarianimpulse.The charitableresponsewas quite strong.
The real impedimentto sustainedsolidarityran deeper:in some nearlyincorri-
gible feeling that their securityand ours are indeeddivisible;that their fate and
ours are indeed severed,by history,fortuneand good luck;and that if we owe
them our pity, we do not share their fate (Ignatieff,1996).
Yes, the "charitable response" was laudable, and West European publics expected
their leaders to send in peacekeeping forces to guard the humanitarian relief convoys,
but helping the needy in these ways is not the same as rescuing them from murder
and starvation. "We" have a humanitarian "conscience,"but our feeling of solidarity
with "them" is not strong enough to make them one of "us."Moreover, if the peoples
of the former Yugoslavia are excluded from real moral concern, what about those
outside of Europe?The fact is that "we"remain very selective in how we express our
14 Agency,Humanitarianism
andIntervention

sense of solidarity with the defenceless and oppressed. For example, Thomas Weiss
points out that the suffering in Sudan in 1992 was just as acute as that in Somalia,
but there was no comparable intervention in Sudan (Weiss, 1994: 61). The media
spotlight ensured that governmentsdirected their humanitarianenergies to the crises
in Kurdistan, Somalia and Bosnia, but during the same period millions perished in
the brutal civil wars in Angola, Liberia and Afghanistan. The global humanitarian
community did eventually make a response to the appalling human displacement
producedby the genocide in Rwanda,but where were the humanitarianrescuerswhen
500 000 people were being slaughtered by Hutu militias?
In suggesting that a common humanity is built into all of us, Parekh and Walzer
should explain why that potential for solidarity remains dormant despite the
increased awareness of human suffering in the second half of the twentieth century.
Is it that citizens are trapped in a form of false consciousness where their identity
as citizens virtually drives out their identity as subjects of common humanity? In
short, have our humanitarian consciences been nationalized by the ideology of the
statist paradigm? Parekh argues that the state should be the "moral medium
through which its citizens express their moral nature and realise their moral obliga-
tions" to common humanity (Parekh, 1993: 22), and therefore state leaders have a
moral responsibility to help citizens break free from the hold of the statist
paradigm. The problem with this view is that it assumes that state leaders are not
themselves imprisoned by the ideology of statism.
The difficulties of relying on the state as a moral agent of humanitarianism are
further illustrated by the second problem with the concept of humanitarian inter-
vention, namely, the place of humanitarian considerations in decisions to intervene.
Parekh defines humanitarian intervention as an act "whollyor primarily guided by
the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow feeling, and in that sense disin-
terested" (Parekh, 1993: 13). If this is the criterion for judging whether an inter-
vention is humanitarian, there are few, if any, cases that meet such a demanding
test. This leads Walzer to argue that interventions will always involve "mixed
motives" since "[s]tates don't send their soldiers into other states, it seems, only in
order to save lives" (Walzer, 1977: 101). Accepting that considerations of national
self-interest will always be primary in decisions to intervene, Walzer suggests that
even if a state intervenes for a mix of self-interested and humanitarian motives,
the intervention may still be labelled "humanitarian" if there are humanitarian
benefits (Walzer, 1977: 104-108).
The strength of Walzer's position is that it recognizes the reality of state inter-
ests and power; its weakness is that it makes humanitarianism dependent upon
shifting geopolitical and strategic considerations. Walzer attempts to escape this
criticism by arguing that protecting humanitarian values is not incompatible with
an enlightened conception of our security interests. In response to his own rhetor-
ical question, "Should we put soldiers at risk in faraway places when our own
country is not under attack or threatened with attack?",Walzer replies, "All states
have an interest in global stability and even in global humanity, and in the case of
wealthy and powerful states like ours, this interest is seconded by obligation"
(Walzer, 1995: 38). Walzer offers us a powerful account of why we should care about
human suffering, but in his discussion of motives for forcible intervention he makes
clear that he believes moral obligation is not sufficient by itself to move state
leaders to risk their soldiers on humanitarian crusades.
The third problem concerns the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Walzer
recognizes that the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force are an
 NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER 15

important safeguard against the strong abusing the weak, but he argues that high-
minded principles cannot stand in the way of the defence of the suffering and
oppressed. Ideally, humanitarian interventions would be collectively legitimized by
the wider society of states, but Walzer is clear that failing this, "we will have to
look for and live with unilateral interventions" (Walzer, 1995: 41). The concern here
is two-fold: In the first place, there is the question of abuse. If it is left up to individ-
ual states to decide when to intervene, there is a greater risk that states might
espouse humanitarian motives to cover the pursuit of national self-interest.6 Walzer
might reply that humankind is sufficiently solidarist to distinguish between genuine
acts of rescue and the manipulation of humanitarianism for political ends, but the
problem of abuse is a real one and it only arises because the state cannot be relied
upon to act as a moral trustee for common humanity. The second concern relates
to disagreement among states as to which situations justify humanitarian inter-
vention. In the absence of a consensus on the moral principles which might govern
a unilateral right of humanitarian intervention, there is the danger that such acts
could lead other states to act on their particular moral principles, thereby under-
mining an international order based on the norms of sovereignty, non-intervention
and non-use of force (Bull, 1984: 84).
Finally, there is the question of whether forcible humanitarian intervention is a
strategy which can produce success. Do the adjectives "force" and "humanitarian"
go together, or does the oxymoron "humanitarian war" hide a tragic contradiction?
Is forcible intervention a slippery slope which leads to anti-humanitarian policies
and eventual failure? According to the traditional view of humanitarian interven-
tion, the criterion for success and the evidence of its humanitarian legitimacy is
that the intervening force removes the source of human suffering and then
withdraws. As Walzer notes, the assumption here is that suffering has singular polit-
ical causes-tyrannical leaders like Idi Amin and Pol Pot-which can be dealt with
quickly and effectively. But, he asks, what if the source of the inhumanity is the
collapse of state structures leading to violence which is "locally and widely rooted,
a matter of political culture, social structures, historical memories, ethnic fear,
resentment, and hatred?" (Walzer, 1995: 36). With one or two exceptions, this
describes the type of conflicts characteristic of the post-cold war world. As Walzer
says, the quick "in and out" strategy is not appropriate for these cases, since if the
underlying roots of violent conflict are not addressed, the withdrawal of the inter-
vening force will simply lead the warring parties to resume hostilities.
Instead, Walzer proposes that we recognize that forcible humanitarian interven-
tion requires a long-term commitment, what he calls "standing interventions." He
claims that what is required is a "long-term military presence, social reconstruc-
tion...'political trusteeship'...and along the way, making all this possible, the
large-scale and reiterated use of force" (Walzer, 1995: 37). He appreciates that such
a strategy is not likely to prove attractive to policy-makers or publics who are eager
for "quick fix" interventions. One only has to think of the desire of the United
States in Somalia and the French in Rwanda to identify clear "exit strategies" prior
to their interventions, to see the force of Walzer's observation.
Even if it is plausible to think that citizens might be prepared to tolerate the
human and material costs of a long-term strategy of forcible intervention, there is
the question of whether this type of intervention can ever succeed in reconstruct-
ing a viable polity. Like Walzer, Parekh also views humanitarian intervention as a
long-term political project, which he sees as "intended to help create a structure of
civil authority acceptable to the people involved" (Parekh, 1993: 14). He suggests
16 Agency,Humanitarianism
andIntervention

that even if the intervening parties are genuinely disinterested (raising the question
of whether states ever act for genuinely disinterested reasons), they will inevitably
"have their own ideas on what is good for the country concerned, what is likely to
last and what general political principles a new polity should satisfy which might
all conflict with those of the warring parties" (Parekh, 1993: 14). How to act
partially with regard to the relief of human suffering whilst retaining the creden-
tials of political impartiality is the challenge that the intervening states failed to
meet in Somalia and Bosnia. Suffering always has political causes and the funda-
mental question raised by the UN's experiences in Somalia and Bosnia is whether
forcible humanitarian intervention can ever be even-handed to all the protagonists.
There is room for legitimate debate about the practicalities of a long-term strat-
egy of forcible intervention in humanitarian crises, but the vital prerequisite for
any such project is a willingness on the part of citizens in Western states to sacri-
fice in the name of common humanity. Currently, as Walzer points out, public
opinion is not prepared to see their forces committed for years, perhaps decades,
to enterprises which might reduce the overall level of human suffering but which
represent a continuous and seemingly never ending drain on human and material
resources. Perhaps intervention on this scale is too demanding a test of human
solidarity, but Parekh and Walzer suggest that a capacity for expressing such
cosmopolitan solidarities is at the centre of our human nature. The problem is how
to bring individuals to that level of moral consciousness where they are able to
express their capacity for moral solidarity.
Walzer tries to short circuit this process of moral learning by arguing that consid-
erations of enlightened self-interest should push us towards the commitments and
solidarities which are entailed by virtue of our common humanity. Yet as Michael
Ignatieff points out in relation to the Bosnian conflict, "we" have not been very
good at seeing that "[i]t is not our conscience alone which should connect us to
these zones, but the most soberly egotistical calculation of our interest" (Ignatieff,
1996). For Parekh, the moral agency of the state is relied upon to bring us to the
required level of cosmopolitan moral awareness, but the state's record as a moral
agent of humanitarianism is very dubious.
How to realize our true moral potential is clearly a fundamental question, but
there is perhaps an even deeper question to be asked, and that is whether there
really is any essential common humanity inside us that is waiting to be emanci-
pated. This is the moment for postmodernism, with its anti-foundationalist denial
of an essential human nature. Following Nietzsche's critique of Kantian notions of
moral obligation grounded in reason, postmodern writers like Foucault argue that
it is the search for an essential "core self" grounded in universal knowledge claims
that is responsible for the barbaricand totalitarian politics of the twentieth century.
My concern here is not with the merits of this thesis, but with the criticism that
the anti-foundationalism of postmodernists leads to moral relativism. For this
reason, the question of humanitarian intervention is something of a limiting case
for postmodernists, as it forces them to confront the charge of moral relativism.
Three related questions follow from the above: first, how persuasive is the anti-
foundationalist critique of an essential human nature; second, are non-foundation-
alists as impoverished as critics suggest in supplying an account of human solidarity;
and, third, what do non-foundationalists say about moral agency and the question
of forcible humanitarian intervention?To explore these questions, this essay focuses
on Richard Rorty, one of the leading postmodern philosophers, who has written
about the possibilities of human solidarity. Rorty is very critical of the claim that
 NICHOLAS J. WHEELER 17

it is possible to construct a non-foundationalist moral universalism, and this contro-

versy is increasingly prominent in the discipline of international relations. Richard
Falk and Ken Booth are two theorists of international relations whose work might be
interpreted as non-foundationalist, and an examination of their work is important
because they harness critiques of essentialism and epistemological foundationalism
to an analysis of moral agency which holds on to the possibility of universalist ethics.

Non-foundationalist Ethics and Humanitarianism

Richard Rorty argues that the search for secure grounds in which to anchor moral
claims of ethical universalism is the El Dorado of social and political theory.
Rejecting the epistemological claims of rationalism and empiricism, he embraces a
pragmatist epistemology. Pragmatism differs from other epistemologies in that it
regards knowledge as contingent and fallible. As Steve Smith puts it, pragmatism
"defines what is true as what is good in the way of belief, with good here meaning
what is most useful" (Smith, 1996: 23). For a pragmatist, epistemological founda-
tionalism "can be nothing but a myth; we do not have it, cannot have it, and could
not justify it if we did" (Aune, 1970: 177). Rorty's thesis is that our beliefs and
values are caused by nothing deeper than historical contingency. He recognizes that
this position provides him with no epistemological certainties in the face of the Nazi
who argues that it is right to kill Jews, but argues that it certainly does not prevent
him from trying to convert the Nazi to his cause, however hopeless that might be
(Rorty, 1993a: 282). This leaves Rorty vulnerable to the accusation that his defence
of a liberal society is no better "grounded"in epistemological terms than the Nazi
defence of the "final solution." However, as Chris Brown argues, "this charge only
makes sense on the assumption that there is some defensible, non-relativist,
position" (Brown, 1994: 234) and it is this which Rorty denies.
Communities are not natural or inevitable, but constructions that develop out of
"we" feelings. This belief in the contingency of moral communities leads Rorty to
argue that it is "impossible to think that there is something which stands to my
community as my community stands to me, some larger community called 'human-
ity' which has an intrinsic nature" (Rorty, 1989: 59). Against an essentialist view of
human solidarity, Rorty argues that instead of asking what is humanity's "intrinsic
nature," we should ask "[w]hat can we make of ourselves?" (Rorty, 1993b: 115).
This conception of human solidarity rejects an ahistorical essential human nature
and sees it as contingent and socially constructed because "everything turns on who
counts as a fellow human being," and our identity of being "a certain good sort of
human being" is defined by "explicit opposition to a particularly bad sort" (Rorty,
1993b: 126).
Communities define themselves in opposition to others, for example, Americans
against Russians, whites against blacks, citizens against foreigners, but Rorty is
explicit that his position is not incompatible with a view of moral progress where
the sense of "we" feelings can enlarge so that "them" becomes part of "us." But
can this process of community building extend to encompass all of humankind, or
can the "we" feeling of community only exist if there are others against whom we
define ourselves? This is a tension which lies at the heart of Rorty's work. He tells
us that no one can claim to speak for common humanity because no individual "can
make that identification" (Rorty, 1989: 198) but he also argues that some particu-
lar moral communities will be better at enlarging the sense of "we" feelings than
others. Not surprisingly given his liberal commitments, Rorty argues that it is "we
18 Agency,Humanitarianism
andIntervention

twentieth-century liberals" who have the responsibility "to createa more expansive
sense of solidarity than we presently have" (Rorty, 1989: 196). This cannot come
from an appeal to our essential nature as rational moral beings since we simply do
not possess such a nature. What human solidarity depends upon is a growing aware-
ness that our differences with others are less important than our sharedcapacity to
experience pain and suffering. The difficulty here is, how can Rorty argue for a
shared human capacity for experiencing pain and suffering whilst at the same time
denying that humans have a shared human nature?7
Agreeing with Eduardo Rabossi that the post-Holocaust world has chosen to
construct a "human rights culture," Rorty suggests that this "seems to owe nothing
to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental
stories" (Rorty, 1993b: 118-119). Consequently, good pragmatists recognize that
the efficient thing to do is to give up the search for foundations and concentrate
on the business of educating and manipulating sentiments of common humanity.
The prospects for the global "human rights culture" depends upon how far "we"
come to feel the suffering and pain of others by imagining ourselves in the "shoes
of the despised and oppressed" and coming to realize "what it is like to be in her
situation-to be far from home, among strangers" (Rorty, 1993b: 127, 133). Giving
up the foundationalist belief that human solidarity is part of what it means to be
human and replacing it with a story of contingency is uncomfortable, since it leaves
it open as to whether humankind will go forward or descend into barbarism.
Moreover, although sentimentality may not seem much of a weapon against the
power of those who have chosen to turn their back on the pain and suffering of
others, Rorty's haunting pragmatist response is that it is all we have.
Rorty's conception of moral agency relies on the "sentimental education" of the
secure and prosperous, because the insecure and fearful cannot afford the luxury
of thinking about others. His faith in the power of sentimentality can be seen in
his assertion that manipulating the sentiments of "generations of nice, tolerant,
well-off, secure, other-respecting students... in all parts of the world is just what
is needed-indeed all that is needed-to achieve an enlightenment utopia" (Rorty,
1993b: 127). Rorty's conception of moral agency does not depend upon state leaders
nurturing a latent moral consciousness among their citizens; rather, it depends
upon "we twentieth-century liberals" reading novels, hearing stories, and watching
media images that increase our feelings of solidarity with human suffering.
A fundamental question raised by Rorty's notion of "educating the sentiments"
is how far do "we liberals" have a moral duty to use force in defence of the despised
and oppressed? Since Rorty does not directly address this question, what follows is
an attempt to bring him into the conversation about humanitarian intervention.
Responding to the claim of postmodernists like Lyotard that the radical incom-
mensurability of cultures means that one culture cannot convert another except
through the imposition of force, Rorty argues that liberal societies are capable of
converting through persuasion rather than force (Rorty, 1991: 214). If we think
about Rorty's suggestion that the way to deal with Nazis is to try to convert them
to our way of thinking by showing them what our liberal and tolerant society looks
like compared to their concentration camp, we can infer through analogical reason-
ing that the West should engage in dialogue with illiberal states. But Rorty provides
little guidance as to how a postmodern liberal community should conduct itself if
the conversation breaks down. In short, how many divisions does Richard Rorty
have? Postmodern liberals and the Nazis share "different final vocabularies," but
Rorty does not want to argue that liberals should impose their contingent values
 NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER 19

and beliefs on the other. Rorty, then, seems to advocate what we might call
postmodern pacifism, rejecting forcible humanitarian intervention because it is
always going to be based on the cultural preferences of the powerful.

Non-foundationalist Defence of Ethical Universalism

This construction of a Rortyesque position on forcible humanitarian intervention
leads to interesting comparisons with the arguments of Richard Falk and Ken
Booth. They are also critics of forcible humanitarian intervention, but what is strik-
ing is that neither rules out military intervention for the reasons here associated
with Rorty. Booth, like Rorty, argues that there are some ethnocentric values for
which we should not apologize, but contraRorty he accepts that there might be some
cases where force should be employed in defence of these (Booth, 1994: 68).
Nevertheless, he thinks that in most cases, military force is an ineffectual instru-
ment for stopping human rights abuses, and that it is unlikely that military inter-
vention will produce a lasting settlement (Booth, 1994; 1995: 120-121).
Richard Falk contends that the moral case for forcible humanitarian intervention
is often "compelling" and that "intervention can be an emancipatory instrument,
at least in certain extreme situations" (Falk, 1993: 758). "Emancipatory interven-
tion," according to Falk, requires the "intervening side to commit significant
numbers of lives and resources over a prolonged period, with the prospect of possi-
bly heavy losses, and even then with no assurance of success" (Falk, 1993: 758).
Having pointed out what "emancipatoryintervention" entails, Falk argues that such
a strategy presupposes a "different political ethic than currently exists in any
country," and that governments that pressed for such an interventionary strategy
without a compelling strategic justification would "encounter overwhelmingly
hostile public opinion" (Falk, 1993: 758). The unwillingness of state leaders and
citizens to make the sacrifices necessary for "emancipatory intervention," and the
question of whether forcible intervention can ever be successful, lead Falk to
conclude that "military action in an inteventionary mode virtually always produces
destructive and counterproductive results" (Falk, 1993: 757).
Falk and Booth's distrust of a strategy of forcible humanitarian intervention leads
them to look for alternative ways of being morally engaged with human suffering.
Raising the moral consciousness of citizens so that they will be prepared to act as
moral agents of common humanity is at the heart of their conception of agency,
and here they see a central role being played by those transnational social
movements committed to humanitarian ethics: Amnesty International, Medecins
Sans Frontieres, the International Red Cross, Oxfam, Save the Children, and Care
all identify and act on behalf of a common humanity. The existence of these moral
agents demonstrates that individuals can be empowered to identify with the suffer-
ing of others in practical ways, and casts doubt on Rorty's claim that it is not possi-
ble for individuals to identify with a notion of common humanity.
Non-foundationalist ethical universalists share Rorty's rejection of an essen-
tialist "core self' which exists ahistorically, but they are committed to the idea
that it is possible to construct a politics anchored in universal values. Falk argues
that identifying with moral universals is not only possible but essential to any
moral project committed to relieving human suffering. He considers that individ-
uals have a responsibility to act for suffering humanity and that by bringing
"postmodern ethics and politics concretely to bear" on the plight of suffering
humanity, it is possible to imagine a new world into existence (Falk, 1992: 22).
20 Agency,Humanitarianism
andIntervention

Booth writes appreciatively of Rorty's contribution to our thinking about a

cosmopolitan utopia, and shares his belief in the contingency of the self. However,
where Rorty generates his conception of human solidarity from anti-universalist
premises, Booth argues that "since the "self" is an evolutionary (historical)
phenomenon...it is too soon in history to say that we cannot have a cosmopoli-
tan self' (Booth, 1995: 119). In employing the language of universalism, both Falk
and Booth are vulnerable to the critique that their position ends up relying on
foundationalist claims to knowledge and morality. This ambiguity does not neces-
sarily leave them open to the postmodern charge that universalist narratives are
always imperialist, because they are explicit that their cosmopolitanist conception
of solidarity does not seek to suppress local differences.
Whatever metatheoretical ambiguities there are about the concept of non-
foundationalist ethical universalism, it is clear that Booth and Falk have a very
different conception of moral agency to that of Rorty. Instead of placing the
question of agency at the door of progressive social movements, Rorty expects
liberal societies to sympathize with the pain and suffering of others. But he does
not tell us how the "nice," "tolerant," "secure" liberals should act once they have
been subjected to an "education of the sentiments." What good is sympathywithout
the willingness to sacrifice for the political project of common humanity?
Sentimentality is an important part of heightening moral consciousness, but it only
works if it leads individuals to develop a "more intense moral or practical commit-
ment" to human solidarity (Geras, 1995: 98). Rorty argues that liberal communi-
ties are our best hope of identifying with the suffering of others, but what he ignores
is the unwillingness of these relatively successful societies to engage seriously with
questions of distributive justice.
If, as RJ. Vincent argues, seriousness about human rights is tested by success
in addressing the human wrongs of poverty and starvation (Vincent, 1986: 145)
"we liberals" are failing massively to address what Henry Shue calls the
"holocaust of neglect."8 The media focus on harrowing images of famine, and of
civilians trapped in war zones, and this often produces a sympathetic response
among Western publics who are outraged at the treatment of what they see as
their fellow humans. However, the "silent genocide" of slow death through poverty
and malnutrition of millions on this planet is seemingly accepted as a natural and
inevitable condition of global politics. The "holocaust of neglect" demonstrates
how the discourse of humanitarianism is constructed in such a way as to exclude
millions of individuals who are denied basic subsistence rights. If seriousness
about human rights is to be tested against the calamity of the "holocaust of
neglect," isn't the triumph of Rorty's liberal story intimately bound up with the
denial of subsistence rights? It is no good arguing that liberal societies are most
empathetic to the pain and suffering of others when these societies seem unpre-
pared to make even those modestchanges to their life-style and consumption
patterns that could do so much to relieve global human suffering and express a
sense of human solidarity. The point is that telling sad and sentimental stories is
not in itself going to contribute to a radical restructuring of global capitalist
relations which, as Ken Booth points out, requires us to ask "uncomfortable
questions" about the privileged position that Western societies hold in the global
capitalist system (Booth, 1994: 73).
The weakness, then, of Rorty's postmodern liberal theory is his silence on the
ideological nature of the discourse of humanitarianism. Rorty tells us that "every-
thing turns on who counts as a fellow human being," but his complacency about the
 NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER 21

superiority of a liberal society leads him to neglect how ideologically biased are its
constructions of what counts as human suffering. By contrast, Bhikhu Parekh's
conception of human solidarity does not prevent him from reflecting sensitively on
the cultural and ideological biases of the contemporary discourse of humanitarian-
ism. Why, he asks, should "suffering and death become a matter of humanitarian
intervention only when they are caused by the breakdown of the state or by an
outrageous abuse of its power?" (Parekh, 1993: 14). This question deserves an
answer in a world where 13 000 children die every day from diarrhoea for want of
"a simple daily 10p sachet of salts and sugar" (Booth, 1995: 125).

Conclusion
All the theorists of human solidarity discussed in this article are dissatisfied with
the statist paradigm's conception of moral duties, and they are united in the view
that there is space for the extension of moral solidarity. However, they are divided
over metatheory, the nature of our obligations to suffering others, the role of the
state as a moral agent, and the issue of forcible humanitarian intervention. How
significant are these differences if "we" are committed to an emancipatory politics
of humanitarianism?
At first sight, the divide between foundationalist and non-foundationalist accounts
of human solidarity seems unbridgeable; one must either accept that human beings
share an essential common humanity, or opt for the view that humanity is what we
make it. But things are not quite that simple. Let us consider the positions of Parekh
and Rorty. The former suggests that humans share a moral potential which has to
be nurtured before we develop true moral consciousness. Is this really so different
from Rorty's idea that human beings have the potential to contract or expand their
sense of moral solidarity? The problem with Rorty's non-foundationalism is that in
his desire to hold on to liberal values, he concedes that all humans share "similari-
ties with respect to pain and humiliation" (Rorty, 1989: 192). In accepting that our
vulnerability to pain and suffering is a shared human faculty, and that "we" have
the potential to identify with the suffering of others, Rorty's conception of human
solidarity becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish from that of Parekh.
Does this philosophical speculation matter for the political project of common
humanity? Is it a case that we have all these metatheories but the bodies keep piling
up?9 Clearly, the vital work of humanitarian international non-governmental
organizations, like Amnesty International, does not depend upon resolving the
metatheoretical debate between foundationalist and non-foundationalist theorists
of human solidarity, but do different metatheories lead to different views of agency?
At one level, it seems that foundationalist theorists advocate forcible humanitarian
intervention, whilst non-foundationalists oppose it. But these differences are not a
result of metatheoretical disputes. Instead, they seem to reflect different views of
the state as a potential moral agent, and differences about the practicalities of
employing military force for humanitarian ends.
By analyzing some key difficulties with the concept of forcible humanitarian
intervention, I have tried to show how problematic is the claim that the state is a
moral agent of humanitarianism. Far from taking the moral high ground, leaders
of constitutional states seem very reluctant to take the political risks of forcible and
non-forcible emancipatory humanitarian intervention. In the absence of state
leaders recognizing an ethic of humanitarian responsibility to suffering others, anti-
statists like Falk and Booth look to the growth of transnational social movements
22 andIntervention
Agency,Humanitarianism

committed to universalist ethics. Indeed, they see the ideology of statism as the
principal barrier to an emancipatory politics of humanitarianism. In contrast to
states, humanitarian organizations like Amnesty International and Medecins Sans
Frontieres are not selective in their responses to human suffering. Nevertheless,
their resources are very limited compared to state actors. Western governments
provide some financial support for humanitarian non-governmental organizations,
but what is needed is for state power and resources to be mobilized much more
effectively in support of these activities. The latter are often the most efficient
agents of humanitarianism and what is needed is a more explicit recognition by
state leaders of the value of these organizations.
One of the great strengths of non-state humanitarian agencies is their pacific
nature; but what happens in those cases where their operations are overwhelmed
by the scale of violence and human suffering? Should these actors appeal to states
to forcibly intervene in the knowledge that whilst the use of force is unlikely to offer
a lasting solution, it might save thousands of lives in the short term? Having refused
since its inception to advocate forcible humanitarian intervention, Medecins Sans
Frontieres finally called for it in response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994
(Hermet, 1995: 91). It had not dropped its long-standing suspicions about states
manipulating humanitarianism for political ends, but the scale of human suffering
in this case meant that "there could be no qualms about the methods used"
(Hermet, 1995: 95).
If we accept that forcible intervention might be the only option in certain
extreme humanitarian crises, the challenge for publics is to ensure that the choice
of targets for humanitarian intervention does not reflect narrow parochial interests
on the part of state leaders. Domestic publics and the media have the potential to
hold Western state leaders accountable for greater humanitarian responsibility, but
these agents are also highly selective in their response to human suffering. The
clamour of Western publics for intervention to rescue the Kurds and Somalis has
to be set against the distant response to the genocide in Rwanda. Nevertheless, it
is only through the mobilization of intense pressures on the part of domestic publics
that governments will be prepared to embark on humanitarian policies which they
would normally regard as electorally disastrous. Thus, the political project of
common humanity depends upon bringing citizens in constitutional states to a level
of moral consciousness where their feelings of sympathy for the suffering of others
lead them to make a sustained moral and practical commitment to the deepening
of human solidarity. This might mean a willingness to bear the costs of a long-term
strategy of forcible humanitarian intervention, but it most certainly requires liberal
societies to take the practical steps that would reduce the number of slow deaths
through poverty and malnutrition.
The fact that humanitarian aid workers clearly identify with an imagined commu-
nity of humankind suggests that Rorty is wrong to claim that humans do not gener-
ally come to the rescue of others simply because they are fellow humans (Rorty,
1989: 190). His story of expanding the sense of "we feelings" through an education
of the sentiments raises the question of what follows from sentimentality, since as
Geras puts it, "sentiment alone could not possibly be enough to a moral conscious-
ness" (Geras, 1995: 97). Humans may feel moved by stories of suffering, but what
explains why some of us seek to become politically involved?Why did some individ-
uals hide Jews from Nazis, or Tutsis from Hutus, when others refused to take such
risks? Rorty would argue that our capacity for human solidarity is a product of our
socialization, and that we identify most closely with groups more local and smaller
 NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER 23

than the whole of humanity. This might be true, but it does not follow from this
that sentiments of a common humanity are "a weak, unconvincing explanation"
(Rorty, 1989: 191) of why some individuals risk their lives rescuing others. What
else but a strong sense of "imaginative identification" with all of humanity explains
the commitment of humanitarian aid workers?
If we accept that some individuals identify with, and to varying degrees, sacrifice
for a common humanity, is this capacity for moral solidarity latent within all of us?
Whatever the metatheoretical differences between Parekh on the one hand and
Booth and Falk on the other, they share a commitment to a progressive politics of
humanitarianism. This emancipatory project contrasts sharply with the more
minimalist projects of Walzer and, especially, Rorty. Walzer is sceptical that
humankind is capable of developing a consensus on maximalist projects like global
redistributive justice, and confines his conception of human solidarity to the politics
of forcible rescue. As for Rorty, his conception of humanitarianism is ideologically
and culturally biased, offering little or no practical guidance as to how sentimen-
tality should be translated into a politics of humanitarian responsibility.
What is significant about these differences is that they cut across the metatheo-
retical divide. Some metatheoretical stories of human solidarity may be more
persuasive than others in persuading individuals that they should pay more taxes
into an overseas development fund, or risk their country's soldiers, to alleviate the
suffering of fellow humans. However, what matters is not the metatheoretical
underpinnings of these stories, but their capacity to generate in "us" a practical
and sustained commitment to suffering others who live outside the secure sphere
where liberal metatheorists reside.

Notes
1. I use the termscommonhumanityand humansolidarityinterchangeablythroughoutthe
article but as we will see, one of the writersdiscussedhere, RichardRorty,would not
wish to be associatedwith the term "commonhumanity."
2. For an exegesis and critiqueof the statist paradigm,see Parekh(1993). The statist or
realist paradigm,as it is more conventionallyknownin the disciplineof international
relations,shouldbe distinguishedfrom the internationalsocietytradition,which makes
the core claim that states are capableof moralresponsibility,but disagreeshow far this
responsibilityextends to issues of human rights and humanitarianintervention.The
confusionarises in the literature because these theorists are sometimes labelled as
statists. For a discussionof the differencesbetween the realist paradigmand the inter-
nationalsocietytradition,see Hurrell (1993) and Wheeler (1996).
3. I am borrowingfromAlexanderWendt'stitle "Anarchyis what states make of it" which
he used to describe the social constructionof power politics. See Wendt (1992). In
contemporaryinternationalrelationstheory,there is an increasinginterest in applying
socialconstructivistideas to globalpoliticalpractice.For other applicationsof construc-
tivism to internationalrelations, see Onuf (1989), Hoffmann (1993), Booth (1995),
Dunne (1995), Zalewski,(1995).
4. Contraryto my claim, Parekhargues in this issue that "there is nothing essentialist"
about his position.However,he providesno compellingevidenceto suggest that he has
movedawayfrom the essentialismimplicitin his earlier 1993work(cited here). Indeed,
evidenceof his continuingcommitmentto an essentialist position can be seen in his
contention"that humanbeings qua humanbeings share certain commonbasic capaci-
ties, desires and needs and are at the fundamentallevel equal"(Parekh,1996, quoted
elsewherein this issue).
5. The "CNN factor"is discussedin Weiss (1994).
24 Agency,Humanitarianism
andIntervention

6. The best discussion of the problem of abuse is Franck and Rodley (1973).
7. This is a point made by Haber (1994) and the subject of an excellent critique of Rorty
by Geras (1995).
8. I am borrowing this term from Henry Shue, who uses it to describe the starvation of
over six million people in Asia during the Second World War which, he argues, has gone
unnoticed by the North Atlantic scholarly community (see Shue, 1980, p. 201).
9. For a discussion which pursues this theme, see Zalewski (1996).

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Biographical Note
NICHOLASJ.WHEELER is a lecturer in international politics at the University of Wales.
He has published in the fields of security studies and international relations theory.
His current research interests include the security dilemma in international relations
and humanitarian intervention. ADDRESS:Department of International Politics,
University of Wales, Penglais, Aberystwyth, Dyfed SY23 3DA, United Kingdom.

Acknowledgements. Some of the conceptual thinking in this article is drawn from, and builds
upon, the theoretical work in Timothy Dunne and Nicholas J.Wheeler, "Human Rights,
Human Wrongs," paper presented to a conference on Human Rights, Human Wrongs, held
at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, July 1995. The conference proceedings are being
edited by Dunne and Wheeler and will be published in 1997. I am extremely grateful to
Timothy Dunne for his invaluable contribution to this article. In addition, I am indebted to
Steve Smith for his incisive comments on the key metatheoretical moves. Two of the key
theorists discussed in this article are Ken Booth and Bhikhu Parekh; Ken has been, and
continues to be, a constant source of intellectual inspiration and encouragement. Similarly,
I am grateful to Bhikhu for his friendship and for opening my mind to the big questions of
political theory. Finally, I would like to mention three other members of the Department of
International Politics at Aberystwyth, who in different ways have helped me to think about
the questions raised in this work: Veronique Pin-Fat, Richard Wyn Jones and Marysia
Zalewski.