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The Moral Limits of Military Deception
John Mark Mattox

Online Publication Date: 01 January 2002

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Deception', Journal of Military Ethics, 1:1, 4 - 15
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 Journal of Military Ethics (2002) 1(1): 4 – 15
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The Moral Limits of Military

Deception
John Mark Mattox
USA NATO, CMR 450 Box 749, APO AE 09705. Tel: »011 32 65 44 5172.
Fax: »011 32 65 44 5593. E-mail: mattoxjm@belgacom.net

Deception always has played, and continues to play, a signiŽ cant role in military
operations at all levels. Nevertheless, its signiŽ cance does not override the reality
that deception, like so many other phenomena of war, is subject to limitations
imposed by the demands of morality. Those demands include the imperative that
military professionals act in good faith even with those who are their adversaries.
Military leaders sensitive to this reality are far better equipped to use deceptive
measures in a way that minimizes their long-term negative effects than are those
who ignore the moral dimension of deception.

KEYWORDS: deception, good faith, lying, military deception.

From at least as early as the Trojan War, military leaders have used deceptions of all kinds.
Indeed, as Grotius notes:

The general sense of mankind seems to have approved of such a mode of warfare. For
Homer commends his hero, Ulysses, no less for his ability in military stratagem, than
for his wisdom. Xenophon, who was a philosopher as well as a soldier and historian
has said, that nothing can be more useful in war than a well-timed stratagem, with
whom Brasidas, in Thu[c]ydides agrees, declaring it to be the method from which many
great generals have derived the most brilliant reputation. And in Plutarch, Agesilaus
maintains, that deceiving an enemy is both just and lawful. The authority of Polybius
may be added to those already named; for he thinks, that it shows greater talent
in a general to avail himself of some favourable opportunity to employ a stratagem,
than to gain an open battle. This opinion of poets, historians, and philosophers
is supported by that of the Theologians. For Augustin[e] has said that, in the
prosecution of a just war, the justice of the cause is no way affected by the attainment
of the end, whether the object be accomplished by stratagem or open force, and

© 2002 Taylor & Francis

 The Moral Limits of Military Deception 5
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Chrysostom…observes, that the highest praises are bestowed on those generals, who
have practised successful stratagems.1

More recently, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted that:

Historically, military deception has proven to be of considerable value in the attain-

ment of national security objectives, and a fundamental consideration in the develop-
ment and implementation of military strategy and tactics. Deception has been used to
enhance, exaggerate, minimize, or distort capabilities and intentions; to mask deŽ cien-
cies; and to otherwise cause desired appreciations where conventional military activi-
ties and security measures were unable to achieve the desired result.2

That deception is now, and for the foreseeable future will be, a standard component of
military tactics, operations, and strategy is clear. The Joint Chiefs continue: ‘The develop-
ment of a deception organization and the exploitation of deception opportunities are
considered to be vital to national security. To develop deception capabilities, including
procedures and techniques for deception staff components, it is essential that deception
receive continuous command emphasis in military exercises, command post exercises, and
in training operations.’3

The Moral – Philosophical Problem

For moral philosophers, statements of this kind invite an important question: ‘Why, in a
profession such as the military, in which the actions of its practitioners often have
far-reaching moral implications, might one hold that deception of any kind is morally
acceptable?’ Certainly, in private conduct, one almost never is recognized as having moral
license to act in an intentionally deceptive way. Moreover, governments (at least demo-
cratic ones) are rarely, if ever, regarded as having the right to deceive those subject to
them, even if the deception is for an ostensibly good aim. Not surprisingly, then, the
position that deception is morally permissible as long as it is directed toward one’s enemies
is one that military leaders sensitive to the demands of morality are entitled to view with
discomfort. Considering, therefore, that almost all moral theories place (sometimes very
restrictive) limits on the way in which, or the degree to which, one might be justiŽ ed in
deceiving another, it is worth considering what moral limits might reasonably apply to
military deception.
Three alternatives readily present themselves as possible accounts for the moral status
of military deception: The Ž rst alternative is simply to argue that military deception is
tantamount to lying. In this case, the practice seems difŽ cult if not impossible to justify on
moral – philosophical grounds. In order to appreciate the magnitude of the moral– philo-
sophical problem at issue, consider, for example (among many possible examples), the

1
Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace {De Jure Belli ac Pacis } (translator unspeciŽed), ed. by Wei
Wilson Chen, Book III, Chapter I:VI; available from http: www.geocities.com Athens Thebes 8098; Inter-
net; accessed 29 June 2001.
2
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-2, BattleŽeld Deception (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), iii.
3
Ibid.
 6 J. M. Mattox
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Kantian position on the moral status of lying. Kant holds that there exists no condition in
which lying constitutes other than a morally blameworthy act. According to Kant, even if
one deŽ nes lying as nothing more than ‘an intentionally untruthful declaration to another
man’,4 one still could not be justiŽ ed in concluding that the lie did no harm. ‘For a lie
always harms another; if not some other [speciŽ c] human being, then it nevertheless does
harm to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right.’5 If Kant is
correct, then lying in the context of armed international disputes should be a matter of
particularly acute moral concern for soldier and noncombatant alike, because everyone—
both soldiers and noncombatants — could fall victim to its ill effects. Among the most
obvious ill effects of lying would be the erosion of conŽ dence in any utterance made on
behalf of a nation or its military.6 Hence, ‘truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as
the basis of all duties founded on contract, and the laws of such duties would be rendered
uncertain and useless if even the slightest exception to them were admitted. To be truthful
(honest) in all declarations is, therefore, a sacred and unconditionally commanding law of
reason that admits of no expediency whatsoever’.7 Because Kant’s prohibition against lying
is absolute by reason of its being ‘an unconditional duty which holds in all circumstances’,8
the necessity to avoid it would seem to constitute a duty that extends both to soldiers on
the battleŽ eld and to the war-making politicians who direct them. Hence, if military
deception amounts to nothing more than a specialized kind of lie, on what moral– philo-
sophical grounds is it possible to justify it? (Moreover, as a practical matter, while the
problem of equating military deception with lying admits of an elegant solution, namely,
the discontinuance of all deceptive practices in war, that solution is by far the most difŽ cult
to imagine being put into multilateral practice within the international community.)
The second alternative is to adopt the position of the military realist and to argue that
although military deception may be nothing more than a kind of lying, because ‘all is fair
in war’, one need not have any moral scruples concerning its practice. However, this
alternative is totally unacceptable for adoption by the armed forces of civilized nations
because, as we shall see, it involves a moral stance that runs altogether counter to the
demands of the customary law of war and the international treaties relative to the humane
conduct of war.
The third and perhaps most promising alternative is to argue that military deception
is, in fact, something essentially different from lying. Consider how this may be so. Figure
1 illustrates lying as a phenomenon that occurs at the intersection of the set of all things
deceptive and the set of all things intentional. Note that the set of all lies is not coextensive
with the set formed by the intersection of deception and intentionality. If this understand-
ing of what constitutes a lie is correct, then, as the diagram suggests, there are instances —

4
Immanuel Kant, ‘On the Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns’ {UÈ ber ein vermeintes
Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen}, supplement to Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals {Grundle -
gung zur Metaphysik der Sitten }, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company,
1992), 64.
5
Ibid., 64– 65.
6
Indeed, as Kant elsewhere argues, at least ‘some conŽdence in the character of the enemy must remain
even in the midst of war, as otherwise no peace could be concluded and the hostilities would degenerate
into a war of extermination’. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795);
available from http: www.mtholyoke.edu acad intrel kant kant1.htm; Internet; accessed 3 July 2001. I
am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of this article for this useful insight.
7
Kant, ‘On the Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns’, 65.
8
Ibid., 66.
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Figure 1

military deceptions, for example— in which one might intentionally deceive and yet not be
held guilty of a lie. Note, however, that it is also possible that some military deceptions fall
within the set of all lies while others do not. Indeed, there is strong historical evidence to
support this claim.

Military Deception as an Institutionalized Practice

The law of land warfare makes speciŽ c provision for deceptions of various kinds. For
example, The Hague Convention of 1907 succinctly states that ‘Ruses of war and the
employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the
country are considered permissible’.9 However, it also states that ‘it is especially forbid-
den… To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army
[or] To make improper use of a  ag of truce, of the national  ag, or of the military
insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva
Convention [e.g. the red cross symbol, etc.]’.1 0 With respect to the duties of parlementaires
appointed to enter into communications with an enemy, the convention states: ‘The
parlementaire loses his rights of inviolability if it is proved in a clear and incontestable
manner that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an
act of treachery.’1 1

9
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land
Warfare (Washington, DC: GPO, December, 1956), 13.
10
Ibid., 12.
11
Ibid., 14.
 8 J. M. Mattox
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The Geneva Convention provides a somewhat expanded treatment of the same themes:

It is prohibited to kill, injure, or capture an adversary by resort to perŽ dy. Acts inviting
the conŽ dence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged
to accord, protection under rules of international law applicable to armed con ict,
with intent to betray that conŽ dence, shall constitute perŽ dy. The following acts are
examples of perŽ dy:
the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a  ag of truce or of a surrender;
the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and
the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the
United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the con ict.1 2

The Geneva Convention then offers a useful insight as to why certain kinds of
deception in war are at least legally, if not morally, justiŽ able. It explains that ‘Ruses of
war’ such as involve the use of camou age, decoys, mock operations, and misinformation
are not prohibited because, while they may cause an adversary to act recklessly, they do
not constitute acts that an adversary should not expect to occur as part and parcel of
war.1 3

Good Faith
Consistent with this principle, one might argue that because war is itself a social
phenomenon, it presupposes a shared understanding among its participants of the social
practices it entails. This is so even if the participants do not agree on the particular details
of how war ought justly to be executed. As pertaining to the question, ‘What constitutes
morally permissible deception in the context of war?’, there emerges from the writings of
the canonical Ž gures of the just war tradition the common view that the moral permission
to deceive in war is not unlimited. Moral permission to deceive one’s enemy appears to be
constrained largely by the jus ad bellum dictate that peace must be the ultimate objective of
war, and that, accordingly, the only violent actions morally permissible in war (jus in bello )
are those that will hasten the restoration of a just and lasting peace.
With this in mind, the idea of ‘good faith’ imposes itself as the sine qua non of morally
acceptable military deceptions. The relationship between peace as the ultimate objective of
war and the expectation of good faith becomes evident in the words of de Vattel: without
good faith, ‘War would degenerate into cruel and unrestrained acts of violence and there
would be no limit to its calamities…. If there were no longer any faith between enemies, the
only certain end to a war would be the complete destruction of one of the parties.’1 4 Why
is it that the absence of good faith would destroy any basis for the restoration of peace? It

12
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-1-1, Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Washington DC: GPO, September, 1979), 28.
13
Ibid.
14
E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or The Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the
Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns {Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la
Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains } (1758), ch. X, trans. Charles G. Fenwick (New
York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964), 296.
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is because the absence of good faith implies the intention by those who lack it not to
comply with rationally shared expectations. Thus, without good faith, the absence of which
is implied by the perpetration of illicit deceptions, there exists no rational basis for the
minimization either of violence or of suffering, and hence no expectation that a just and
lasting peace is actually the true aim toward which the war is prosecuted.
But how does the concept of good faith assist in the determination of what counts as
a morally allowable military deception? Clausewitz observes that ‘war is nothing but a duel
on an extensive scale’.1 5 To think of war as a duel is useful in the present context because
it highlights the fact that both duels and wars presuppose the observance of certain
conventions or practices and thus carry with them certain expectations.1 6 For example, a
duel presupposes that the duelers will separate themselves a mutually agreed number of
paces and that they each will Ž re at the other a certain number of shots in a mutually
agreed manner. Therefore, if the shared expectation is that the duelers will separate
themselves by an interval of, say, ten paces, and then turn and Ž re one shot, then, if one
of the duelers turns after Ž ve paces and Ž res multiple shots, that dueler has clearly failed
to act in good faith.
Perhaps a richer analogy might issue from a sport such as American football or some
similar game. Such an example is valuable for the fact that games of this kind include the
shared expectation that each team deliberately will attempt to deceive the other. By any
account, a football play that is successful by reason of its embodying a well-conceived and
skilfully executed deception deserves the commendations of friend and foe alike. Indeed, it
is entirely normal for a team that has fallen prey to its opponent’s deceptions to praise the
opposing team for its demonstrated skill. However, that does not mean that the permission
to deceive is unlimited as long as it constitutes a demonstration of skill. For example, if a
team scored a touchdown with a play that included passing the ball out of bounds, into the
spectator stand, and then back into bounds in close proximity to the goal, that team would
receive fully justiŽ ed scorn for the play. Clearly, this is so because the game of football
includes no shared expectation that touchdowns be scored in a manner that allows the ball
to be passed Ž rst out of bounds and then back in bounds. On the contrary, it positively
includes the shared expectation that all points will be scored as the result of play conducted
completely within the boundaries of the playing Ž eld. Note that the rules themselves are
not sacrosanct; they are changed from time to time under the direction of organizations
that govern the sport. Hence, it is not the presence or absence of any particular rule or
practice that makes an act illicit, per se; it is the violation of shared expectations
concerning the extant rules, whatever the rules might be.
The same might be said of war as a social practice. For example, de Vattel, writing in
1758, observes: ‘It is reported that since the commencement of the present hostilities
between France and England, an English frigate came within sight of the coast of France
and made signals of distress in order to decoy out some vessel, and thereupon seized the

15
Carl von Clausewitz, On War {Vom Kriege} I.I.2 (1832), ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 101.
16
Of course, any analogy between wars and duels is bound to present certain limitations that will be
evident to students of the medieval just war tradition. Contrary to Clausewitz, ‘bellum’ and ‘duellum’ are
not, strictly speaking, merely small- and large-scale versions of the same thing. For example, as Professor
James Turner Johnson points out, ‘a knight could engage in a duel on his own authority, but only a
sovereign could commit to a war’. Hence, it is important to consider the example only as it applies to the
matter of good faith.
 10 J. M. Mattox
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boat and made prisoners of the sailors who generously went to its aid.’1 7 He comments
that: ‘If the report be true, the contemptible trick deserves severe punishment.’1 8 ‘Besides’,
he concludes, ‘to make signals of distress is to ask men for help, and thus impliedly to
promise perfect safety to those who give it. Hence the act attributed to the frigate was a
detestable breach of good faith.’1 9
We come now full circle to the question of whether it is, in fact, morally permissible
to deceive in warfare. A possible answer to the question is that military deception is
morally permissible because of the shared expectations that arise from the nature of war as
a highly specialized form of social intercourse. Properly speaking, war is not a normal social
setting. Hence, it admits of certain highly specialized— and highly speciŽ able —exceptions
to the normal set of moral expectations for human conduct. For example, war permits the
taking of human life, the restriction of personal freedom without due process of law, the
destruction of public and private property, deprivation of the necessities of life, and so forth.
It is at least plausible, therefore, that an institution that allows these things, and counts
them as morally acceptable within the institutional context, could likewise allow certain
deceptive practices to be considered morally acceptable.
Given this approach to understanding military deception, it is possible to argue that
lying per se and military deception are, in fact, morally incommensurable in the same way
that murder and the taking of lives of combatants in war are, by some accounts at least,
morally incommensurable. To the extent that lying and military deception may be found to
differ, one may argue that they are subject to signiŽ cantly different criteria (some of which
may overlap but not necessarily so) for moral evaluation.
At Ž rst blush, one might be tempted to dismiss the argument that lying and military
deception are fundamentally different as a sleight-of-hand trick— an attempt to have one’s
philosophical cake and eat it too. Nevertheless, the argument that lying, by its very nature,
always involves a breach of faith, whereas morally permissible military deception, by its
very nature, never involves a breach of faith appears to offer a reasonable basis for
distinguishing the two phenomena. Indeed, those who have addressed the topic throughout
the history of Western warfare — particularly within the context of the just war tradition—
have almost universally agreed that military deception, if practiced in good faith (i.e. in
such a way that no explicitly made promises are broken and that no implicitly understood
obligations to one’s enemy are disregarded), is morally acceptable by reason of its being
mutually understood, at least tacitly sanctioned, and institutionalized as a regular practice
among participants in warfare. In this connection, consider the following observation by
Augustine of Hippo, regarded by many as the father of the just war tradition in the West:
‘Now every man who lies commits an injustice; and if any man thinks that a lie is ever
useful, he must think that injustice is sometimes useful. For no liar keeps faith in the matter
about which he lies. He wishes, of course, that the man to whom he lies should place
conŽ dence in him; and yet he betrays that conŽ dence by lying to him. Now every man who
breaks faith is unjust.’2 0 Thus, if one is willing to understand the term ‘bad faith’ to
encompass the Augustinian notion that a lie requires both that a statement be false (falsa

17
De Vattel, 298.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine {De Doctrina Christiana } 1.36, trans. J. F. Shaw, in The Nicene and
Post -Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, First Series, vol. II (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1993), 533.
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signiŽ catio) and that the agent have a will to deceive (fallendi voluntas),2 1 it may be said
that Augustine regards bad faith as the sine qua non of lying. However, if bad faith is the
sine qua non of lying, then it seems reasonable that, as argued herein, good faith is the sina
qua non of morally acceptable military deceptions.
This position appears to receive additional endorsement from the writings of other
prominent Ž gures of the just war tradition. For example, Thomas Aquinas observes:

The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be
deceived by another’s word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something
false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this [i.e. the breaking of a promise]
is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are
certain ‘rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among
enemies,’ as Ambrose states (De OfŽ ciis I).2 2

Aquinas further notes that the practice of what commonly is called ‘operational security’,
i.e. the taking of measures deliberately to conceal military information from an enemy, does
not even deserve to be called a deception at all:

[A] man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our
purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in
Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest
they deride it…. Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from
the enemy…. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be
lawfully employed in a just war. Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor
are they contrary to justice or to a well -ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate
will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him.2 3

This latter point is entirely consistent with the Augustinian position that one might have
the will to deceive (as evidenced by deliberate efforts to prevent an enemy military force
from learning of one’s intentions) and yet not engage in lying because no falsa signiŽ catio
is present.2 4
Augustine considers the deliberate presentation of a falsa signiŽ catio in the case of
Joshua’s campaign against the city of Ai, and he justiŽ es Joshua’s actions by an appeal to
Divine command. Augustine does not take a position relative to the question of whether
the Divine permission given in Joshua chapter eight extends beyond the speciŽ c circum-
stances for which it was given. If it does, then Augustine’s pronouncement that, provided
that the war is otherwise just, ‘it does not matter at all, as far as justice is concerned,
whether [one] wins victory in open combat or through ruses’2 5 would appear to argue for
the moral permissibility of deception operations, such as the sending of false radio trafŽ c,
the preparation of false tank or artillery emplacements, etc., that clearly constitute falsa
signiŽ catio.

21
I am indebted to Professor James Turner Johnson for this important observation.
22
Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, Benziger Brothers edition, 1947, trans. by Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 40: Of War, Article 3; available
from http: www.ccel.org a aquinas summa SS SS040.html, Internet; accessed 26 June 2001.
24
Ibid., italics added.
25
Grotius, bk. III, ch. I:X.
 12 J. M. Mattox
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However, Grotius seems to opine that, even if the Divine permission given to Joshua
did not, per se, extend beyond the case of the campaign against Ai, Joshua’s actions still
might be understood as morally permissible on other grounds. The men of Ai interpreted
Joshua’s feigned retreat in fear as positive evidence of fear —and this, says Grotius, they
were at perfect liberty to do ‘without debarring the other [i.e. Joshua] of his right to march
this way, or that, with an accelerated or retarded motion, with a show of courage, or an
appearance of fear, as he might judge it most expedient’.2 6 Clearly, Grotius regards the
latitude to deceive in this way to be well within the prerogative of the combatant in light
of the conception of just war as institutionalized in the West.

A Word About ‘Institutionalization’

The idea of institutionalization as it has been invoked here is one that merits speciŽ c
comment. Institutionalized practices are practices that the members of a group share and
that they expect others within the institution to observe. For example, Western society
expects, as evidenced by The Hague and Geneva Conventions, that parties to international
agreements (such as cease-Ž re agreements, peace treaties, non-aggression pacts, etc.) will
regard those agreements as inviolable. By the same token, Western society also expects that
participants in war aggressively will seek occasions in which to deceive their opponents in
recognized ways (e.g. sending false communications, feigning movements of combat forces,
attacking at unexpected times and places, etc.). Indeed, the expectation is so thoroughly
entrenched that any party to an armed con ict that refuses to deceive in these and similar
ways would be regarded by onlookers from the community of nations as naive in the
extreme.
As intended here, the idea of ‘institutionalization’ should not be construed as part and
parcel of an argument for moral relativism —the idea that something is morally right or
wrong simply because a segment of society— or even society as a whole— wills it so. (It is,
of course, possible for a society to institutionalize morally repugnant practices, such as
genocide in Nazi Germany.) Imagine, for example, a society in which everyone told only
lies. In such a society, no one would expect anyone else to tell the truth. Hence, there
would be no breach of good faith via the act of lying. In reality, however, at least part of
the moral repugnance that attaches to lying results from the fact that there does exist
among humans the expectation (in principle) that all people ought to tell the truth.
Therefore, in reality, the idea of ‘institutionalization’ or ‘shared expectations’ as intended
here might itself actually derive from some foundational principle that sounds very much
like the Golden Rule.

Problems
For one who holds that military deception is merely an example of a special kind of lie, the
original tension between the position that one is never justiŽ ed in lying and the position

26
Grotius, bk. III, ch. I:X.
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that identiŽ es wartime as a permissible exception to the otherwise absolute prohibition

against lying remains unresolved. The tradition that allows for military deception includes
numerous safeguards designed to prevent abuse of the permission, granted by the tradition,
to deceive an enemy. Nevertheless, if lying is an activity that rightly belongs to the set of
those things that humankind should recognize as categorically morally forbidden, then no
number of safeguards on the permission to lie or deceive in war will serve to eliminate the
logical contradiction. Conversely, if military deception as sanctioned in the West is, in fact,
something that should be regarded as morally permissible, then one of two conclusions
must obtain: either the prohibition against lying is not absolute, or military deception is not
lying per se.
Another criticism that one might be tempted to levy is that if deception is immoral for
individuals it also must be immoral when it is perpetrated by the state. However, the state
has long been recognized as competent to act in certain ways that individuals are not. For
example, the state can proscribe or mandate certain behaviors, and it can take measures
to enforce compliance with its edicts. It can try a person for life or limb, and it can imprison
or execute those found to have deŽ ed its authority. More relevant to the present study, it
can both declare war and prosecute the war by a variety of means, to include the practice
of military deception. A private citizen —or more properly, one acting in the capacity of a
private citizen— can do none of these things. Even one who acts as an instrumentality of
the state can act only in ways that the state directs. This is so because the permission to
deceive, when it exists at all, extends only to persons who are acting in their ofŽ cial
capacity as instruments of the state in the same way that an executioner acts as an
instrument of the state when administering capital punishment.
Of course, this does not mean that the state can do whatever it pleases without regard
for moral boundaries. SufŽ ce it to say, however, that whatever problems this concern
might raise for military deception, it also raises for any and all other activities that are
morally forbidden to individuals but traditionally permitted to states.
It likewise should be noted that the principle of shared expectations is not totally
without difŽ culties. For example, it may be (and probably is) the case that not all cultures
share precisely the same set of expectations concerning what is morally acceptable as
wartime conduct. By way of analogy, consider the case in which a soccer team (that plays
strictly by the rules of soccer) engages in a contest with a rugby team (that plays strictly
by the rules of rugby). From the perspective of the soccer team, its opponent may appear
to play with no rules at all. From the perspective of the rugby team, its opponent may
appear to be unnecessarily particular in its insistence that the game be played in a
‘restrictive’ way. Both teams are playing by the rules —their rules —but neither team can
have realistic expectations concerning the other team’s conduct on the playing Ž eld. Some
will agree that this analogy illustrates important aspects of the British experience in the
Boer War or of the American experience in Viet Nam.
Finally, one can admit a certain discomfort over the analogies used in this argument.
Notwithstanding the explanatory value of analogies that liken war to duels or football
games, these analogies naturally have a pernicious quality about them; their seeming
innocence can, if one is not careful, anesthetize one to the genuine horrors of war. The
taking of human life is a serious thing, whenever it occurs. So is deception. The claim of
this essay is not that deception— even the limited case of military deception —encourages
the moral behavior of individuals and nations. Quite the contrary, any grant of permission
to deceive under any circumstances is likely to have the insidious effect of self-propagation,
of justifying its use in other morally questionable circumstances. Rather, the claim is simply
 14 J. M. Mattox
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this: Given the inevitability of war in the present human condition, the best way to serve
the ends of morality is to conduct war in a way that ameliorates suffering and hastens the
restoration of just and lasting peace. To the extent that military deception contributes to
the realization of this imperfect aim, the claim — its difŽ culties notwithstanding— that
military deception, as institutionalized in Western warfare, is a morally permissible practice
appears to be one that will withstand philosophical scrutiny.
In conclusion, let us observe that warfare is, by nature, an activity whose practices
merit regular moral – philosophical reappraisal. This is so because the potential for moral
misadventure in warfare is as great as can be found in any Ž eld of human endeavor.
Hence, even those practices in war that are, prima facie, accepted as morally well founded
in accordance with long-established precedent merit periodic reappraisal to ensure that the
justiŽ cations that previously have underwritten those practices continue to carry sufŽ cient
moral and rational force. The practice of military deception is no exception. Laymen ‘often
assume that, when it comes to war, ethical prohibitions are relevant only with respect to…
egregious acts, such as the systematic targeting of noncombatants, the use of indiscrimi-
nate weapons such as poisonous gas, and so forth’.2 7 As a result, some ‘assume that
unlimited deception is part and parcel of war and that it would be wholly unrealistic to
expect the contrary’.2 8 Indeed, the long history of military deception suggests that this
may be true. However, it does not follow that anything that the military practitioner wishes
to label ‘military deception’ is, therefore, morally permissible. On the contrary, as this essay
has attempted to show, a long philosophical tradition, the received standards of military
practice, international law, and reasonable moral norms combine to place considerable
emphasis on distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable strategies of deception.2 9
The precise nature of the political order that will govern conduct among nations in the
next century is yet unknown. This much, however, seems clear: the extent to which true
and lasting peace and cooperation among nations can be established depends upon the
extent to which nations trust one another. If nations in the twenty-Ž rst century Ž nd that
they cannot resolve their differences without resorting to war, the wars they Ž ght are likely
to be shorter and, all things considered, less bloody if they avoid deceptions that involve
breaches of faith. Tactics and technologies may change; government administrations and
forms of government may undergo revolution; alliances may form and dissolve; but good
faith has an enduring quality because it provides the logical basis for all covenants and
promises. Indeed, without good faith, there is no basis for the exercise of any faith that a
yet unfulŽ lled obligation will be fulŽ lled. One certainly could argue that the nation that sets
aside good faith will gain the quickest advantage in war. However, that advantage is
almost always short lived because, as human history attests, those who thus are deceived
neither soon forget nor forgive breaches of faith. Moreover, the advent of high-tech military
gadgetry that now is propagating around the globe may both facilitate altogether new
deception techniques and enhance the conduct of old ones to a degree now unimaginable.
That same gadgetry also may provide the technology necessary to undermine the success
of, or altogether to defeat, enemy attempts at deception. Whatever the case, these deception
mechanisms now unforeseen and perhaps unforeseeable too will require moral – philosoph-
ical assessment, for there is no guarantee that these mechanisms, no matter how advanced,
will make morally deŽ cient deceptions more desirable options for use on the battleŽ elds of

27
I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
 The Moral Limits of Military Deception 15
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tomorrow than they are today. Accordingly, it may well be that the challenges facing
armies and nations in the third millennium AD will be such as demand that the moral
dimension of deception operations be evaluated with greater care than ever before.
However, this much seems certain: whatever forms of military deception win genuine
moral approbation will be those that preserve good faith among nations —that inestimable
quality without which the maintenance or restoration of just and lasting peace can be only
a dream.

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Biography
Lieutenant Colonel John Mark Mattox is a NATO nuclear policy planner at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium. He holds a BA from Brigham
Young University, an MMAS from the United States Army Command and General Staff
College, and MA and PhD degrees from Indiana University.