Journal of Military Ethics (2003) 2(2): 168
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BOOK REVIEWS

Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion, eds. Moral

Constraints on War. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2002. ISBN 0739104373. 321 pp.
This book is laid along a spine of traditional just war theory. Each chapter in Part I
examines one of the traditional principles of jus ad bellum (principles guiding the
decision of whether to initiate war) and jus in bello (the moral principles which
govern the conduct of war). In Part II each chapter employs the full set of just war
principles to analyze recent military conflicts.
The book has two features which prevent it from simply replowing familiar
terrain in just war theory. First, the chapters were written by contributors from
Belgium, the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and the United States. As the
editors note, discussions of military ethics tend to be parochial, written for and read
by members of a single culture. By virtue of their varied backgrounds, this book’s
contributors bring useful perspectives to these discussions. Second, the chapters
regularly apply these abstract theories to particular cases. The early chapters, which
examine individual principles of just war theory, employ concrete cases to illustrate
how the principles can guide deliberation and to illuminate difficulties in applying
these principles. Hence, an array of concrete instances vividly illustrates the
difficulty of determining whether the just war principle of right intention is satisfied
in particular instances in which nations have gone to war. Also, the analyses reveal
the importance, and difficulty, of weighting the various principles to resolve cases
where they conflict. Thus, a nation’s leaders may have an obviously just cause for
war but wonder whether the resulting human suffering outweighs the merit of their
cause.
The chapters are nicely done. Though the authors come from different nations
and intellectual traditions, each applies the principles of just warfare in even-
handed and nuanced fashion. As a result, analyses often conclude that a given
conflict met the standard of several of the principles of just war, failed others, and
may or may not satisfy yet others. The authors commonly disagree, but that is part
of the value of a work of this sort.
The chapters of Part II are most timely and serve to illustrate the ways in
which contemporary circumstances challenge just war theory. The earliest case
examined is the War in the Persian Gulf of 1990
/1991 and the most recent is the
continuing post-September 11 struggle against terrorism. Of these, the Gulf War
most closely resembles traditional warfare. It was fought by a coalition of national
armies in opposition to another national army. The other cases include civil wars,
humanitarian intervention undertaken by the authority of international organiza-
tions, and, finally, the unprecedented post-September 11 war against terrorism,
which has facets of conventional warfare, espionage, and ordinary law enforce-
ment.

ª 2003 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/15027570310000270

 Book Reviews 169

It is notable that the traditional array of just war principles, as the various
chapters demonstrate, are fully capable of addressing the challenges posed by these
unusual conflicts. Whether an author is examining the First Chechen War or
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the array of just war principles prove useful guides
to moral reflection. The analyses also illustrate why some just war principles require
modification if they are to address the demands of present circumstances. In past
years, only individual states held right authority to wage war. However, many of
the conflicts of the recent past have been authorized and supervised by organiza-
tions, such as NATO and the United Nations. Further, for much of the 20th century,
international consensus was that only wars of national self-defense were justified.
Many recent conflicts, however, have been undertaken to relieve human suffering
in other nations, and some of the authors believe that these types of conflicts are
especially problematic and should be carefully circumscribed. Finally, recent
conflicts accelerate a trend which began over a century ago in which the line
between combatants and noncombatants is increasingly blurred. Terrorists, in their
dormant phase, commonly lead mundane lives with jobs and families. They are, by
design, indistinguishable from ordinary citizens*/and yet they contribute to a
deadly struggle.
This book performs useful service. The chapters display both the continuing
strength of the traditional principles of just war and the strain which current
military conflicts place upon them. The three chapters on the intervention in
Kosovo, one by a Russian, one by a Belgian, and one by two Chinese authors, each
offer a different perspective on its moral justification, and that is precisely the type of
discussion that advances our understanding of such issues.

Professor Gerard Elfstrom, Auburn University

Michael Oren. Six Days of War; June 1987 and the

Making of the Modern Middle East. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-515174-7. 446 pp.
This book is a most valuable source of facts and ideas about the Arab
/Israeli War of
1967, set in a very wide context of the causes and consequences of the armed
conflict.
The work gives detailed descriptions of the political and diplomatic events and
developments before, during and after the period of hostilities. There are particularly
full accounts and imaginative reconstructions of conferences, conversations and
negotiations in Israel, the United States and the United Nations. These are based on
a very diligent use of a great variety of sources, documentary and oral, official and
unofficial. The passages dealing with the making of policy decisions in Egypt,
Jordan, Syria and the USSR are much less detailed, no doubt because of a lack of
reliable sources. These passages give a vivid and stimulating impression of the
processes of making and conducting security and defence policies.
The overall approach to policy in the book is neo-realist. In essence, it is a body
of evidence concerning the workings of power politics under the stress of military
threats and diplomatic crises in relations with friends, enemies and virtual neutrals.
170 Book Reviews

Where ethical and moral issues are mentioned or discussed, it is clear that the view
of them was that adopted by Machiavelli; wise rulers always contrive to appear to be
conforming to conventional virtues, but must act in accordance with considerations
of power alone. The study of the background to the war of 1967 leads to the
conclusion that it was not inevitable. The origins of hostilities in the immediate
context lay in a concatenation of events and actions; some deliberate provocations,
misunderstandings, unfortunate coincidences, that were fatal to peace in the
charged atmosphere of tension that prevailed. If there is a villain of the piece it is
Field Marshal ’Amer, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, who is vilified as a man lacking in
personal virtues as well as judgement or ability. Nasser is portrayed as responsible
more for his failure to restrain ’Amer than for any positive intention to start the war
himself.
The Israelis are not represented as being all wise and good. The clashes of
personality and policy which occurred within the government, high command and
nation are explored and analysed. This analysis is a valuable source of insights into
the principles and practice of civil military relations in the real world. The issues of
policy and strategy, which were debated with such vigour and clarity in Israeli
institutions, are also revealed in these accounts.
The military operations are described in general outlines, illustrated with some
passages of tactical detail and personal recollection to bring home the realities of
war. But this is more reportage than deep analysis. Although this book does not give
the detailed information and comment that would fully satisfy a military specialist,
it does give food for thought regarding some strategic issues and controversies, in
broad terms. The inevitable and eternal conjunction between policy and military
action is reaffirmed. From the perspective of the Clauswitzian, the importance of
chance and friction in war is illustrated very effectively. So is the necessity of
sometimes having to meet enemy forces at a predictable time and place, concentrate
a stronger force, and inflict unendurable suffering by attritional combat in order to
win a decisive battle. This despite the Israeli preference for the Jominian method of
using indirect approaches, manoeuvres and stratagems, to inflict a psychological
defeat on the enemy with a minimum of casualties and damage and in the shortest
possible time.
No work of history or political commentary on the Middle East can be impartial
or unbiased, and this is no exception. There is a natural slant in favour of the Israeli
view and case. This becomes clear very early, when the Balfour declaration of 1917
is, by being only partially quoted, effectively misrepresented. If this natural slant is
kept in mind, this is a book well worth reading. It does contain a mass of historical
information, as well as being an apologia for the Israeli action of 1967. In an era
when some other states are justifying pre-emptive self-defence and resort to war on
highly speculative grounds in an attempt to remove risks before they even develop
into threats, this is of great interest. We seem to be entering a new era in which
‘salus populi suprema lex est ’ is taking an absolute priority over all other
considerations.

Senior Lecturer Nigel de Lee, Royal Military Academy, Sand-

hurst