Tore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies Treen risopiy — T onenccan | 444 ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 14 Feminist Philosophy Feminism is an entire world view or Gastak. net just a laundry list of “womens issues” — Charlotte Bunch Girls and boys develop different relational capacities and senses of Sef as a result of growing up in a Family in which women mother. —Nangy Chodorow ‘As nature [during the scientiic revolution] came to seem more like a woman ‘whom itis appropriate to rape and torture than like a nurturing mother. did rape and torture come to seem a more natural relation of men to women? — Sandra Harding ‘eminist thought is often divided into two waves. The first, from the late eigh- teenth century through the early part of the twentieth century, tended to focus ‘on legal issues, especially women’s enfranchisement, and included as a notable ac~ ‘complishment in the United States the vote for women in 1922. The second wave, still happening, began in 1949 with the publication of Simone de Beauvoir’s The ‘Second Sex. The second wave has focused more on personal issues, especially the personal relations between men and women, and is often referred to nowadays as feminism. THE FIRST WAVE ‘One of the grandmothers of feminist thought was Mary Wollstonecraft (1759— 1797), who wrote in response both to what she saw around her and to some of the views about women that the philosophers of the time were putting forward. Her mother and sister were both victims of domestic violence, which caused her to takeTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 don id XO) a] Bay Chapter M4 + Feminist Philosophy 445 eee eed ‘not happy; her father was an unsue= ‘cessful gentleman farmer who squan= ee ees his frustrations on his wife and chile dren, While still uitea young woman, ‘Wollstonecraft stuck out on her «wen to London to become a write. After some early years of stuggle, her work began to gain considerable acceptance ‘among the intelligentsia of London society. She was ete eae ee ication of the Rights of Woman.” “er personal life was unconventional and tue Bee ee ee eee birth of her frst daughter, Fanny. When Fanny was stil very young, Wollstonecraft mst William God- win, the political anarchist. They were well matched intellectually and emotionally, and after Wollstone- craft became pregnant, they married. Their ifeto- died from complications following the alivery of the child. Godwin was dev= stated at Wollstonecraft’s death and ‘wrote a tender book of memoirs about hher. This book caused significant public ‘scandal both for Wollstonecraft and for ‘Godwin, since he made no effort to hide the illegitimacy of er first child or the fact that she was pregnant when they rmutried. Iysshe Shelley and went on to write the novel Frunkenstin. Mary Shalley had no interest in worn ns rights and spent considerable energy trying el alee ed eed lives. It-was not until the end of the nineteenth ‘century tha te scandal associated with Mary Wol- ‘stonecraft died down enough to permit later femi- nists to include her name in thei ists of honorable forebears. ‘gether was cut short, however, when Wollstonecraft issue with the idealized view of marriage being put forth by her culture. As an in- tellectual, she was familiar with many of the high-minded views of womanhood her contemporaries perpetuated. She was particularly annoyed at Rousseau’ view of women because he advocated that women's education should be designed en- tirely to make them pleasing to men. “To please, to be useful to us, to make us love and esteem them, to educate us when young and take care of us when grown up, to advise, to console us, to render our lives easy and agrecable— these are the du- ties of women at all times, and what they should be taught in their infancy,” re~ flected Rousseau. Wollstonecraft employed several arguments against Rousseau and his allies. First, she argued that educating women to be the ornaments to, and playthings of, men would have bad consequences for society. How could silly, vain creatures ever be expected to do an adequate job of raising a family? They would become “mere propagators of fools.” Second, she argued that raising women to be ornamental would have bad con- sequences for women. No matter how charming a woman might be, after a few years of daily contact, her husband would ultimately become somewhat bored and distracted. If women have no inner resources to fall back on, Wollstonecraft ar~ gued, they will then “grow languid, or become a spring of bitterness,” and love will turn to jealousy or vanity. ‘Third, and perhaps most important, she argued that women were as ca- pableas men of attaining the “masculine” virtues of wisdom and rationality, if onlyTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 society would allow those virtues to be cultivated. She noted that the “vines” of ‘women —docility, dependence, and sensitivity —were commonly associated with ‘weakness. She held that there should be no distinction between female excellence and human excellence. Like many intellectuals of the Enlightenment, Woll- stonecraft gave pride of place to rationality and argued that women must develop their capacity for reason to its fullest extent if they were to become excellent ex- amples of humanity. ‘Wollstonecraft painted an unflattering portrait of the “ideal” woman ofher era. Imagine what women would be like, she said in effect, if they did nothing but read the equivalent of today’s Harlequin romances and aspired to be like the passive, ‘swooning heroines of these books. Some women might be successful at imitating, such heroines, and might enjoy themselves for a while, but Wollstonecraft pointed ‘out that once past age nineteen or so, there is litle left for such women to do with their lives. She suggested that women who have no other ambition than to inflame passions will have no real strength of character, no true moral virtue, and no inner resources. It was time, Wollstonecraft argued, to restore women to their lost dig~ nity by encouraging better ideas of womanhood. ‘Utopian philosophers were also important in the struggle for women’s rights. ‘Who were the utopian philosophers? They were utilitarian reformers — social re~ formers who subscribed to the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham (see Chapter 10)— who wished to structure society so as to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. They envisioned societiesin which all members were social equals, Where education was reformed to promote the development of “benevolent” or “tumanistic” feelings of mutual care and concern, and where property was redis~ tributed to the benefit of all members of society. Model utopian societies sprang up in Europe and the United States; the utopian movement culminated in the late nineteenth century. For utopians, societies should help people feel they are doing something important for themselves, their families, and their communities; in an ideal society, people would work only because they wanted to, and they would want to work because they would understand that their work helps make their commu- nity a great place to be. Yet at that time the largest and most exploited (because un- paid) labor force was women, a fact that did not escape the attention of Anna Doyle Wheeler (1765—1833), a utilitarian reformer. ‘Wheeler was an Trish feminist, a self-educated philosopher, and an avid utili= tarian who published numerous articles (under various pseudonyms) and frequent translations of French socialist philosophical writings. Jeremy Bentham introduced to Wheeler the utopian /reformist philosopher and economist William Thomp- son (1775-1833); Wheeler and Thompson collaborated on a famous essay titled “The Appeal of One Half of the Human Race, Women, against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Restrain Them in Political, and Thence ia Civil and Do- mestic, Slavery.” In the essay, published in 1825, Wheeler and Thompson argued that denying rights to women is in fact contrary to the interests of the whole of so- ciety and, accordingly, is not consistent with the greatest happiness of the greatest ‘number. They also argued that denying rights to women is just plain unjust; many ‘commentators think a more stirring defense of equal rights for men and women has never been put forth. Another important utilitarian was Harriet Taylor (c. 1807-1858), who until recently was most often remembered through her connection with John Stuart Mill.Tore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 Chapter 14 + Feminist Philosophy 447 “Taylor also thought that the nonphysiological differences henween men and women were socially constructed, to the detriment of women and of society in general. She was a vociferous proponent of women's suffrage and used several arguments from justice in support of her appeal. Everyone agreed there should be no taxation with- out representation; well, she pointed out, many unmarried women paid taxes on their property yet could not vote for the government that spent their money. She argued that we cannot make arbitrary distinctions between groups of people with- out giving good reasons for doing so, and no good reasons could be given for say- ing that men could vote and women could not. The burden of proof should be on those in favor of discrimination, not on those who oppose it. And, Taylor argued, the differential in freedom between men and women was so drastic— including not only political liberty but personal freedom as well—that no good reasons could possibly be advanced for the discrimination. Eventually, of course, the rest of the British public saw it her way and women were given the vote. Taylor also provided the classic answer to the question, Why should women have a voice in government? (See the box by that title.) ‘The first wave of feminism saw some dramatic results, including changes in the laws regarding women’s property rights and the right to vote. After 1920, when women in the United States obtained the right to vote, active theoretical work on feminist issues subsided for a few decades. But the larger social problems did not go away, and theorists who had hoped that the right to vote and own property would resolve the problem of women’s lower social and economic status saw those hopes vanish. Women were still educated differently, still viewed primarily as or~ namental and nurturing, still paid less, and still seen as having a lower fundamen- tal worth than men. THE SECOND WAVE Philosopher and novelist Simone de Beauvoir [bow-VWAHR] (1908-1986) recognized the problem. The earlier ferninists were primarily English and Ameri- can. They had been steeped in the traditions of empiricism and utilitarianism. De Beauvoir came from the Continental traditions of existentialism and phenom- enology, and her approach focused less on the public world of laws, rights, and ed- ucational opportunities and more on the cultural mechanisms of oppression, which left women in the role of Other to man’s Self. She developed this notion of wom- er’s essential othemess in her book The Second Sex. And what a book. De Beauvoir undertook a sweeping analysis of all the ideas and forces that conspired to keep women in a subordinate position relative to men, Herexamination encompassed Freud, Marx, the evidence of biology, the evi- dence of history, representative novelists, and what we would call the evidence of sociology. There had not previously been anything like this systematic and sus- tained analysis of the condition of women; de Beauvoir’s work was unique. But its very scope makes it a difficult book to summarize or outline. De Beau- voir, like some of her existentialist colleagues, was more interested in the fascinat- ing variety of theoretical approaches than in the project of making them — or herTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | (Ohana ‘he Power lens Sith. amp, 205 don 448 Part Four + Other Voices ‘The classic answer was provided by Harriet Taylor, ‘who was discussed earlier. Even those who do not look upon a voice in the goverment as a matter of personal right, nor profess principles which require tha it should be extended to all, have usualy traditional raxims of political justice with which its im- possible to reconcile the exclusion of all women. from the common rights of citizenship. Ieis an axiom of English freedom that taxation and representation should be coextensive. Even un- der the laws which give the wife's property to the husband, there are many unmarried women ‘who pay taxes. It i one of the Fundamental doctrines ofthe British Constitution, that all persons should be tried by their peers: yet ‘women, whenever tied, are tried by male jndges and a male jury. To foreigners the law sccords the privilege of claiming that half the jary should be composed of themselves; not 10 to women. Apart from maxims of detail, which represent local and national rather than univer- ‘al ideas: itis an acknowledged dictate of justice to make no degrading distinctions without ne- cessiy, In all things the presumption ought vo be on the side of equality. A reason must be given why anything should be permitted to one person and interdicted to another. But when that which is interdicted includes nearly every- Why Should Women Have a Voice in Government? thing which those to whom itis permitted most prize, and to be deprived of which they feel to ’be most insulting: when not only political erty but personal freedom of action is the pre~ rogative ofa caste; when even in the exercise of industry, almost all employments which task the higher faculties in an important field, which lead to distinetion, riches, or even pecuniary in- dependence, are fenced round as the exclusive domain of the predominant section, scarcely any doors being left open to the dependent class, except such as all who can enter else- ‘where disdainflly pass by; the miserable expe- diencies which are advanced as excuses for $0 ‘grossly partial a dispensation, would not be sufficient, even if they were rea, 10 render it other than a flagrant injustice. While, far from being expedient, we are firmly coavinced that the division of mankind into fo castes, one ‘born to rule over the othe, isin this cas, as inall cases, an unqualified mischief; a source ‘of perversion and demoralizaton, both to the favoured class and to those at whose expense they are favoureds producing none ofthe good Which itis the custom to ascribe tit, and forming a bar ... toany really vita improve~ ‘ment, ether in the character or inthe socal condition of the human race. ‘own views— completely consistent. Like other existenti lists, she borrowed liber~ ally from the insights of psychoanalysis and from Marxian perspectives but tended to ignore the deterministic conclusions of those approaches. No matter that we may be controlled by our own internal psychodynamies or by the forces of economic history; ultimately, we can always “transcend our own immanence,” create our selves anew, and overcome the straitjackets of history and culture. This view, as you ‘can imagine, has important consequences for political action. Suppose you believe that culture shapes individuals and that itis very hard, or impossible, to overcome cultural conditioning. Then if you conclude that the condition of a particular group, such as women, is not what it should be, you should emphasize that society ‘overall should change so that women will be changed. But if you think that the in dividual can always overcome his or her circumstances, then you might argue that individuals should focus on their own self-transformation. De Beauvoir argued that society should change, but if you are a thoroughgoing existentialist, itis not clearTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 Chapter 4 + Feminist Philosophy 449 PROFILE: Si femmes erent the Sorbonne second in her class, behind only Simone Wei, the Jewish eae eres sity, she met Jean-Paul Sartre, Mau- rice Merleau-Ponty, and many other young intellecials who would go on to prominence in twentethcentary French lewers and polities. Some of thee men and women formed the ‘group that Sarve and de Beauvoir ‘would call “The Family"—a collec ieee eee tion of writers, actors, and activists pressed for marriage, but de Beauvoir who associated for intellectual stimu ‘vas opposed tothe institution and une eet tee ete ce eae De Beauvoir and Sarre formed a parmership mained active and invelved with writing, traveling, ‘while they were in their early twenties. Sartre de- and constant political work unt close tothe end of cided that theirs was an “essential” love that ber life would be most important in their lives—but that did not rule out “contingent” love affairs with other people. Indeed, Sartre went on to de- velop a reputation as one of France's most compulsive womanizers. De Beauvoir consistently claimed that Sartre's myriad one-night stands did not bother her at al, She herself formed several yearslong_ liaisons with other men, most notably Nelson Why you should not focus on your own personal transformation to overcome the culture. ‘Whatis a woman? de Beauvoir wondered. It cannot bea simple biological cate~ gory, for there are people who have the relevant biological equipment who are nevertheless excluded from “womanhood.” In one of her most famous passages, de Beauvoir argues that “one is not bor, but rather becomes, a woman.” The cate~ gory of womanhood is imposed by civilization. And the fundamental social mean- ing of womanis Other. De Beauvoir held, “No group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over against itself.” She argued that people in small towns do this to strangers, natives of one country will view natives of another country as Others, and members of one race will invariably set up the members of another race as Others. Others are mysterious and almost by definition need not be treated with the same consideration and respect that the members of one’s own group must he accorded. Men set up women 28 Others, de Beauvoir observed, and since men have the political and social power, women come to see themselves as Others. They become alienated from themselves. As she articulated what it was like to be the Other, de Beauvoir ridiculed cer tain popular myths, including that of “feminine mystery.” Very handy concept, she pointed out. To paraphrase her, if you do not understand what another person is complaining about, well, you need not bother to listen sympathetically or place yourself imaginatively in that person's position. Just say, “Oh well, members of that group are justso mysterious!” and you are off the hook. If they want something dif ferent from what you want, you do not need to give equal weight to their prefer~ ences because everyone knows that their preferences are mysterious. De BeauvoirTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | (Ohana ‘he Power lens Sith. amp, 205 don 450. Part Four + Other Voices Feminism comes in lots of varieties: socialist, psychoanalytic, postmodern, radical, and. beral “These last two are the kinds you hare probably come across the most often when reading the pa~ pers and popular magazines. Leaming the differ- ences between the two ean help you make sense of the next editorial you read on women's issues. Liberal feminism has its roots in some very traditional American notions: freedom of choice and equality of opportunity. Liberal feminists insist that women can do everything men dof only they are given a fair chance. Liberal feminists do not generally ask whether the things men are doing are really worth doing. Nor do they challenge those ‘women who are living out traditional roles. Their focus is on making sure there is freedom and op= portunity for those wino do nor want to live out ta ditional roles. Liberal feminists tend to focus on changing restrictive laws and climinating formal bartiers to womed's advancement. Liberal Feminism and Radical Feminism Radical feminists think the problems run very deep and that the solutions mustcut deeptoo. They argue that entrenched socalarttades do as much or rmore harm than restrictive laws. To change socal aatitudes 40 that women are tken seriously, ey think drastic steps must be taken, In particular, they believe that reducing women to ther sexuality is the eet eee Jence,and general contempt for women. Thus, they target cultural phenomena such as pomography, tae eri ee Care eee eed 4s nothing but sexual toys. Liberal feminists object that protesting these phenomera is foo much like censorship and, hence, contrary to freedom. Radi= cal feminists reply that unt women are safe from violence in the street and in ther own homes, they ‘will never truly be free. pointed out that men had conveniently argued not that women were mysterious to ‘men—that might imply that men were stupid— but, rather, that they Were myste~ rious objectively, absolutely. One final consequence of de Beauvoir's existentialist perspective is that she does not emphasize freedom of choice to the same extent that the English writers do, Not all choices are okay. From de Beauvoir’s perspective, if all you do is stay home and have babies, then you might as well be a brood mare. After all, all animals reproduce; there is nothing distinctively human about simple reproduc tion, Distinctively human activity is the activity of the mind, of culture, and of seli= transcendence. ‘The publication of The Second Sex in 1949 created a furor, and de Beauvoir was startled at the vitriolic response that many critics had toward her work. But there was no turning back; the ideas were now rolling again, and over the next thirty years there would be a huge resurgence of feminist thought. The end of the socially turbulent 1960s was a particularly fertile time for feminist theory (it was also when the public began talking about “radical feminists”; see the box “Liberal Feminism and Radical Feminism” for one explanation of “radical feminism”). The five-year period from 1968 to 1973 saw publication of several classic feminist texts, includ ing Robin Morgar’s Sisteriood Is Powerful (1970) and Kate Millett’s Sexual Poli= tics (1970). Influential in bringing feminist thinking to the attention of the larger public was Gloria Steinem (sce Profile). ‘Kate Millett’s work was inspiring to many writers because she gave a system~ atic analysis of how women are oppressed by patriarchal institutions. Her work wasTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 don Chapter 14 + Feminist Philosophy 451 (One of the best-known contemporary feminists is Gloria Steinem. Steinem ‘was bom into a working-class family in Toledo, Ohio, in 1934. Her parents were divorced when she was relatively young, and she spent much of her ‘youth and adolescence in relative pov= ‘erty, caring for her emotionally un- stable mother, She graduated from ‘Smith Colleze in 1956 and began her career 2s a jouralist. In the 1960s ‘she became involved in the women's movement and has remained one of ‘ions in dorms or shared housing, and are generally equally rewarded by their professors for hard work. Thus, for many women college students, the feminist battles all seem to be won; ‘men and women are equal. Not until young women get out into the work= ing world and are faced with (for ex- ‘ample) the fact that male high school sraduates still earn, on average, more than female college graduates, do the differences between men's and wom ‘en's situations become more apparent. feminism’s most visible and recognizable activists. Probably her single most important accomplish ‘ment was helping to found the original Ms. maga- zine, which brought women’s perspectives and is~ ‘sues to the attention of mainstream America, Steinem has written insightfully on many issues, inclading the differences between male and female college students. Young men, she noted, are often at ‘their mest radical and rebellious during theit college ‘years. Young women often start out quite conserva tive in their early twenties and become more radical ‘and politically oriented only later on. Steinem sug- ‘gests that this difference stems from the divergence in men's and women’s lives as they get older. ‘In college, all students, male and female, are ‘more or less equally poor, have equal living situa Furthermore, women come to recognize that chil- ‘dren are still largely considered the mother’s re- sponsibility, so the problems of combining career ‘and parenthood rest more heavily on them than Finally, women in ther late teens and early twen- ties are at the peak of their social power: stil very sexually desirable, sil full of potential as wives and childbearers. As women age, however, they lose this social power as their attractiveness fades, and this loss can be a very radicalizing experience —partic- ularly when their gray-haired male contemporar~ ies are stil being called distinguished, instead of haggard, inspiring to many because she challenged these who suggested that women actu ally had lots of power to look at the avenues of power. She ran through the list: industry, the military, technology, academia, science, politics, and finance. How many of these avenues of power had women at the top ranks? There might be women bank tellers, but how many large banks had women presidents or even vice presidents? How many women were in Congress? How many women were gen- erals? How many women university presidents—or even tenured professors? Millet directed attention not to personal relationships but, rather, to the struc ture of society. She also looked at the socialization process and observed that the characteristics systematically encouraged in women— passivity, ignorance, docil- ity, “virtue”—were those that made them convenient subordinates. Millett focused especially on the way the political, sociological, and psychological aspects of male— female relations were interrelated, If you have to take on a certain type of role in society, Millett maintained, it is to your advantage to develop the psychologicalTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 don 452 Part Four « Other Voices characteristics that make that role easier. One of Millett’s major contributions to the second wave of feminism was to make these links explicit. ‘Another classic text from this period was Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialec~ tic of Sex (1970). Now the writers discussed in this chapter take it for granted that ‘women’s subordinate status is a social and political problem, not a biological one. Almost all feminists think that the biological differences between men and women, ‘though real, are not in themselves anywhere near sufficient to explain the extremely diiferent social roles men and women play. Conservative thinkers such as Freud, who argued that anatomy is destiny, are routinely dismissed by contemporary fem- inists and other social philosophers. Firestone argued that women’s childbearing ‘was at the root of their social oppression. Thus, she might be categorized as a bio~ logical determinist. She argued that reproductive technology was the route to wom- en's freedom; developments that liberated women from having to bear and nurse children would free them to participate as equals ia the new society. Firestone was not an unguarded optimist, though. She argued that reproduc tive technology could be used against women as well as for them. Therefore, it would be necessary for women to seize control of the new fertility technology to make sureit was put to legitimate uses. Firestone suggested that if babies were born through artificial reproduction, they would be born to both sexes equally and that “the tyranny of the biological family would be broken.” Androgyny as an Alternative ‘Suppose you have become convinced that de Beauvoir was right, that people have an unfortunate tendency to set themselves up as Self versus Other, or Us versus ‘Them. One solution that might seem hopeful is to eliminate the differences be- ‘tween groups of people as much as possible so that there would be less reason to feel that the members of a different group were Others. This is the logic of the “melting pot” ideal of race relations. If there were no more distinet races but, rather, only one blended race, there would be no more basis for racism. ‘Well, if there were no obvious differences between the sexes, there would be no ‘more basis for sexism either. There is, of course, no possibility (in the near future) of completely eliminating the biological differences between the sexes; our repro~ ductive plumbing will probably remain different. But as almost all feminists have observed, there are very few other differences between men and women that are not socially constructed. Certainly it seems likely that men’s and women’s bebav- iors and interests are formed more by society than by biology. There is plenty of evidence for that claim from anthropology and biology. In some cultures women adorn their bodies, and in some cultures men do. In some cultures men are re- sponsible for the finances, and in other cultures women are. For almost every behavior you can name, there has probably been at least one culture in which it was ‘men’s purview and another in which it was women's. ‘You may think that women are physically weaker than men, and they may be asa general rule, but think how different they might be if they were raised to de~ velop their physical strength as a matter of course. After all, women athletes are hardly fragile flowers. And if you compare women who do manual labor for a liv-Tore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 Chapter 14 + Feminist Philosophy 453 ing with men who sit behind desks pushing pencils, you will hardly conclide that women are naturally weaker than men. A lot of that strength difference is culturally imposed, as are the more subtle social differences between men and women. ‘So many feminists in the late 1960s and early 1970s concluded that perhaps androgyny (from andros, the Greek word for man, and gyne, the Greek word for woman) would be the ideal solution. No more setting up one group as the Other; instead, let’s all be one homogencous group. Since there will be no other set, one set of people will not be able to abuse the other set. An androgynous culture could take several forms. First, you could have a cul- ture in which everyone, girls and boys, are raised exactly the same: given the same education, the same games to play, the same challenges to face, the sme rules to follow. You would probably end up with a culture where it was not immediately apparent which people were female and which were male. ‘There would be no sex roles; no concept of masculine and feminine. There would be orly one standard for everyone. Or you might have a culture in which there are concepts of masculine and feminine, but they are not directly matched with males and females. So you could have “feminine” men and “masculine” women. For such a society to work and re~ ally be free, there could be no social stigma attached to being a “masculine” woman ora “feminine” man. All choices would be equally acceptable. A very free world, indeed. ‘The first possible society, called monoandrogyny, is endorsed by Ann Fer- guson. In her influential essay “Androgyny as an Ideal for Human Development” (1977), Ferguson argues that since men and women are socially unequal, there can be no true love between them. Ideal love is the love between equals. Ferguson also suggests that because of this lack of ideal love, we are all unable to develop fully as hhuman beings. She argues that a truly androgynous society would allow us all to develop fully as human beings. ‘What would an androgynous personality be like? Ferguson wondered. Well, both men and women need to be active, independent, creative, and productive. ‘They both need meaningful involvement in their community. Ferguson believed that being active and assertive were rightly thought of as valuable human char- acteristics, not just valuable male characteristics. Active and assertive did not necessarily mean aggressive and competitive: if we eliminate the competitive, hier archical aspects of the culture, we might produce assertive people who were also cooperative and supportive of one another. Androgynous men would be more sen- sitive to the needs and concerns of others than they are now. This would make them better parents, among other things. But equally important, men and women would be able to enjoy much richer relationships with each other because they would have more in common. Shared experiences and shared activities frequently lead to deeper bonds between people. If men and women were raised androgynously, they would have more communication, more companionship, and deeper love and un- derstanding for cach other. Ferguson's hope was that a monoandrogynous society would lead to more loving and deeply mutual relationships between people. Joyce Trebilcot, in “Two Forms of Androgynism” (1977), argues for the second type of androgynous society. She suggests that we need not eliminate the categories of “masculine” and “feminine.” Instead, we should just let individualsTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 don 454 Part Four + Other Voices choose which type of role they wish to adopt. She calls this type of society P for polyandrogyny, and contrasts it with hypothetical society M, for monoandrog- yny, the type of society Ferguson was arguing for. Trebilcot argues that society Pis better than society Mbecause P allows individuals greater freedom of choices bbut she ends by suggesting that if Mis really the better society, then people will probably eventually freely choose it. ‘Trebikeot was more concerned with freedom of choice than with fostering lov ing and matual relationships between people. She understood the persuasive force of Ferguson's argument and reflected on the characteristics that might be valuable for both sexes. From traditionally feminine traits, she thought that openness, re~ sponsiveness, compassion, expressiveness, and tenderness might be good qualities for all to have. From the traditionally male basket, she believed that being logical, objective, efficient, responsible, independent, and courageous would benefit every ‘one. But Trebilcot was concerned how one might prove that these traits were good for everyone. She argued that the best test would be to allow everyone to pick what- ever traits he or she might like to have. Then, once everyone was fully informed and ‘genuinely free to choose what type of person to be, pethaps everyone would in fact choose monoandrogyny. Trebilcot argued that polyandrogyny was the best strat egy to adopt because it preserved freedom and would lead to monoandrogyny anyway if monoandrogyny were indeed the best type of society to have. Problems with Androgyny as an Ideal Although the logic behind the push for androgyny seemed reasonable, after a while some feminist theorists began to see that it had some deep conceptual problems. It ‘was all very well to say that there were good feminine qualities and good masculine ‘qualities and that everybody should have some of each, but what if those qualities were really direct opposites? It would then be impossible to combine the two sets of qualities because they would simply cancel each other out. If the ideal for one set of people is to be rational, calm, and silent, and the ideal for the other set is to bbe emotional and expressive, it is difficult to see how those qualities could all be ‘combined to make one whole, balanced human. Feminist philosopher Mary Daly, whose work is discussed further in Chapter 13, argued that androgyny as an ideal would not work because it would be like “two distorted halves of a human being stuck together [something like Jennifer Aniston and Brad Pitt (our example, not Daly’s) scotch-taped together] as if two distorted ‘halves? could make a whole.” Af- ter all, one cannot expect to combine the concept of “master” and the concept of “slave” and get the concept of a free person. The original concepts are both too warped to be usable. According to Daly, we must completely transcend those orig inal categories and start over from scratch. ‘More evidence for the view that the categories of “masculine” and “feminine” were too broken ever to be fixed came both from the social sciences and from ‘erature and philosophy. At the beginning of the 1970s, it was often remarked that gender roles inhibited everyone, male and female alike. Men were cut of touch With their feelings and were unable to cry or show affection publicly. But soon people began to realize that masculine behavior, though limiting, limited men totheTore-srde: Pitsopy oer veies ‘emia Phiesopiy | onenccan | ‘he Power lens Sith. compi 2085 Chapter 4 + Feminist Philosophy 455 positions of power that Kate Millett listed in her book Sexual Politi. Ifyou are une able to cry and show emotion, by the standards of our culture, that makes you a very good candidate for being a CEO or high-level politician since we would not want them to fall apart emotionally ata crucial moment. Of course, being unemo- tional is not a sufficient condition for being a CEO, but itis a necessary one. Simi larly, being ambitious and competitive—traits generally valued in men—keeps them from settling down to a nurturant family role, but it also “limits” them to a better economic position. Some people argue that itis a greater benefit to be able to be expressive and nurturing than to be able to earn in the six figures. It certainly is not bad to be expressive and nurturing, but ask yourself this: Would you rather bbe expressive and emotional while living just above the poverty line? Or would you rather be a little more closed off emotionally and earn a comfortable living? Those are too often the real alternatives that face men and women today. In her important 1983 article, “Sexism,” Marilyn Frye argues that the whole system of gender is really one of power. She implies that masculinity is about domi- nance and that femininity is about subordination, She notes that we go to a great deal of trouble to keep the sexes distinct; even products that have no inherent dif ferences —like shampoos, deodorants, and razor blades —are packaged differently for men and women. Men and women talk, move, and sit differently from each other. In a myriad of unnecessary details, men and women are trained to keep themselves distinct from each other. This whole process contributes to the domi- nance/subordination dynamic, Frye argues. ‘Or consider clothing. Ever since feminism first got media attention in the 1960s, there has heen a lot of fuss over the way some women who are feminists dress. Many people criticize feminists for looking sloppy and unfeminine. Actually, however, most political and social groups eventually develop a general style of dress that helps them form a sense of community and solidarity. But for feminism, the issue goes deeper. High heels, short skirts fragile fabrics, and tight-fitting jeans erally hobble women; they keep women more confined and uncomfortable than do the styles mea wear. Frye observed that “ladies? clothing is generally restrictive, binding, burdening and frail; it threatens to fall apart and for to uncover something that is supposed to be covered if you bend, read, kick, punch, or run.” (And be- cause physical assaults an all-too-real possibility for most women, being unable to defend yourself isa genuine problem.) For one group to oppress another, Frye reasoned, there must be (at least) two distinct groups. ‘The more differences between the members of one group and the members of the other group, the better because then it will seem more rational to treat the nwo groups differently. So, Frye argues, those thousands of ways in which artificial differences between women and men are reinforced are all litle acts of sexism. It may seem harmless to have men’s colognes and women’s colognes, ‘women’s deodorants and men’s deodorants, and so on, but every time we reinforce the view that men and women are inherently different, we also reinforce the notion that they must inevitably be treated differently. Anything that contributes to the ap- pearance of extreme natural dimorphism also contributes to the practice of male dominance and female subordination. But there is a double bind here, which particularly harms women. If women are traditionally feminine, then they are participating in social practices that limit