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Descartes’ Mechanism and Animals

Linda Mariani
Late 20th century has marked the increasingly central role of the issue of animal suffering.
Questions dealing with animal experience and well-being are becoming widespread in society as
animal welfare is starting to be considered a moral issue. The relationship between man and animal
is not a new field of study, it has been addressed by philosophers since ancient times. Most of the
writings devoted to the problems of ethics by the philosophers of the modern West have dealt with
the relationship between man and animal, in a hasty and insensitive way: as in the case of
Descartes.
Cartesian attitude towards animals can be derived from the use within his philosophy, of the
concept of mechanism as an interpretative model of all natural reality. This notion is structured
around the view that natural bodies can be regarded as machines, namely as complicated material
systems composed of parts which move only by physical contact. In this framework the human
body follows the very same principles since it is conceived as a local modification (as every other
body in the world) of a single indefinable extended substance: matter. Cartesian mechanism is the
result of the rationalist character of his philosophy; this view allows the quantification, in a
mathematical sense, of every aspect of sensible reality.
Descartes reduces all biological functions according to the functioning of the "machine". The only
thing able to guarantee the correct control of this machine is reasoning, which corresponds to the
possession of a rational soul, proper only to human beings. Without the soul, the human body would
be a simple automaton waiting for orders. In man, in fact, this biological mechanism is interrupted
by thought which following his dualist view of the world is pure, free and above all distinct from
the body. It is the thought that elevates man above all other natural entities, including other animals.
The Cartesian conception of animals is elaborated in Part V of the Discourse on the Method, and it
is commonly known as Bête Machine Doctrine. Descartes was convinced that it was sufficient to
use the model of machines to explain animal behavior, since they were perceived by him only as
automatons which acted instinctively, only in response to external stimuli. He further argued that, if
desired, it would even be possible to replicate their behavior artificially. In support of his theory,
Descartes firstly points out that “they could never use words to put together other signs as we do in
order to declare our thoughts to others” - we have no proof that animals are anything more than
machines, given that the only conclusive proof of rational thought is speech and the absence of this
element in non-human animals makes them soulless. The secondary basis for denying nonhuman
animals an immaterial soul lies in their inability to “act in all the contingencies of life in the way in
which our reason makes us act”– namely to act according to understanding. As a result, reason
becomes then a criterion to distinguish human and machines.

Although Descartes' main focus was on mathematics, he dedicated a fair amount of time in
investigating other disciplines such as anatomy and physiology. Descartes embraced his Bête
Machine characterization to pursue these studies since his own theory about animals as incapable of
experience pain would allow him to engage in vivisection. This practice allowed him to understand
how the various parts of the animal body moved and it was particularly useful to provide
information on human organs given their similarity to their animal counterpart.
Descartes position in the Discourse emphasizes the divide between non-human and human animal:
the lack of a soul supports the thesis that animals are incapable of feeling pain or to have subjective
experiences, which is merely a human prerogative. This statement encourages a total exclusion of
animal from the sphere of ethics and legitimize all sorts of cruelty towards them. In this context
humans seem to have no moral responsibility towards animals: they hold purely instrumental worth
and therefore can be manipulated unlimitedly and without any scruple, for the human benefit.
Although nowadays science suggests us that the similarity between the human and animal brain is
such that we can safely conclude that animals are sentient beings, also capable of suffering and
undergoing subjective experiences, we tend to selfishly set aside this consideration to continue
exploiting these creatures for our own gain. In this sense, can we consider ourselves to be
contemporaries of Descartes?

References:
Cottingham, J. (n.d.). Descartes.
Descartes, R. (1637). Discourse on Method.
Voelpel, J. (s.d.). Descartes’ Bête Machine, the Leibnizian Correction and Religious Influence.

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