G.R. No.

L-953 September 18, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

v.
PEDRO MARCAIDA, defendant-appellant.

PAUL, J.:

This is from an appeal filed by Pedro Marcaida that he was sentenced for the crime of treason, after the
corresponding hearing, to life imprisonment with the accessories prescribed by law and the payment of a fine
of P10,000 and court costs. The appellant points out three errors that, according to him, the People's Court
made. 1. When declaring that the defendant's citizenship and loyalty were sufficiently proven; 2nd By giving
credence to the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses; and 3rd By convicting the defendant of charge No. 3.

The defense contends that the evidence on file does not prove the defendant's Filipino citizenship and alliance
with the Commonwealth government. The transcript of the shorthand notes says that the defendant is a native
of Lopez. The defense alleges that the witness testified in Tagalog saying: "Taga Lopez" and did not say "ay
panganak sa Lopez." He does not appear such a thing in the file. If it were true, it is strange that the lawyer did
not ask the Court to order the stenographer to record this in his notes. When a party is not satisfied with the
translation of a statement by a witness, they must request that not only the translation be recorded in the
record, but also the original translated statement; failing that, the translation of the official interpreter will be
presumed correct.

But even admitting — says the defense — that the defendant was a native of Lopez, province of Quezon, his
Philippine citizenship is not duly proven. In support of this contention, he invokes article IV of the Constitution,
which entered into force on November 15, 1935. (Article XVI, section 6, Constitution.) The hearing of this case
took place on July 15, 1946. If the defendant I was born, for example, one day after the Constitution entered
into force, on the day of the hearing I would not have been more than ten years and eight months old, and then
I committed the crime at the age of about nine years. Although the date of his birth is not recorded on record,
we are nevertheless sure that he was not a child of that age when he came into view. He would not have sued
the prosecutor for such a serious crime. Undoubtedly, he was born before and not after the Constitution came
into force.

Article 2 of the Jones Act approved by Congress on August 29, 1916, provides as follows: "That all the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who on April 11, 1899 were Spanish subjects and who at that time resided
in said Islands, and their children born after that date, will be considered and held as citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except for those who have preferred to maintain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, in accordance with
the provisions of the Peace Treaty between the United States and Spain, signed in Paris on December 10,
1898, and with the exception of those others who after said date have become citizens of some other
country: ... .

Article 4 of the Constitutive Law of the Philippines of July 1, 1902 reads as follows: "All the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who reside in them and who on April 11, 1899 were resident Spanish subjects in said Islands
and their children born after that date, will be considered and held as citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such with the right to the protection of the United States, except for those who have chosen to maintain their
loyalty to the Crown of Spain, of accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty between the United States
and Spain signed in Paris on December 10, 1898."

The defendant's name is Pedro Marcaida. By his name and surname, he can be Filipino, Spanish or South
American. No hay proof that he was a resident of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899. If he
was a resident and not a Spanish subject he could not acquire the Filipino citizenship because he would
continue to be a foreigner.
If you were a Spanish subject and resided in the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899, you automatically
became a Filipino citizen unless you chose to retain Spanish citizenship; but since there is no evidence in that
sense, the presumption is that he is a Filipino.

If you were born after April 11, 1899 to parents who were Spanish subjects, your nationality would follow:
Spanish, if your parents wanted to maintain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, and Filipino, if they chose to
lose it. There is no evidence presented one way or the other: it may then be Spanish or Filipino.

If you were born after April 11, 1899 to Filipino parents, you are Filipino.

It may happen that descendant of a South American who has settled in the province of Quezon after the
signing of the Treaty of Paris; If his father did not want to take advantage of the provisions of the naturalization
law, then the defendant is a foreigner: follow the nationality of his father.

If you are a descendant of a Spanish citizen who began to reside in the Philippines after the Treaty of Paris,
you would continue to be Spanish unless you have naturalized. There is also no evidence in this regard; So he
is Spanish, a foreigner.

Paz Chua Uang, for the mere fact of being born in the Philippines, was declared a Filipina because she was
not a Spanish subject or the daughter of a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899. (Chua v . Secretary of Labor, 68
Phil., 649.) This doctrine has implicitly revoked that of Roa against Insular Customs Administrator (23 Jur. Fil.,
321) and other subsequent ones. (Vaño v . Insular Customs Administrator, 23 Jur. Fil., 491; United States v .
Ong Tianse, 29 Jur. Fil., 352; United States v . Ang, 36 Jur. Fil., 915; Go Julian v . Government of the
Philippine Islands , 45 Jur. Phil., 301;Haw v .Insular Customs Administrator, 59 Jur. Fil., 646.) In the matter of
Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim, the theory established in the Roa matter was adopted again, but the
Court was divided in the proportion of four by three. The current President of the Court and the Imperial
Magistrate were dissidents. Justice Villareal was of the opinion that mere birth in the Philippines does not make
one a Filipino citizen; but he concurred in the operative part because Roa's doctrine had been applied for more
than 20 years. The principle of stare decisis is the main reason that moved the majority to re-adopt Roa's
theory. In his dissent, the current President of the Court said:

The majority says nothing in support of the correctness of the Roa ruling, and seeks simply to justify its
continued observance upon the fact that it "had been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years
before the adoption of the Constitution," and that not "only this Court but also inferior courts had
consistently and invariably followed it; the executive and administrative agencies of the Government
had theretofore abide by it; and the general public had acquiesced in it. I do not yield to this judicial
policy. If we induced the Government and the public to follow and accept an error for some time, it does
not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them to follow and accept the same error once
discovered. The rule of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error (15 C. J., p.
918.) It is the duty of every court to examine its own decisions without fear and to revise them
reluctance (Baker vs. Lorillard, 4 N. Y., 257.) As was well said in a case, "I hold itto be the duty of this
court freely to examine its own decisions, and, when satisfied that it has fallen into a mistake, to correct
the error by overruling its own decision. An acknowledged error must be more venerable and more
inveterate than it can be made by any single decision before it can claim impunity upon the principle
of stare decisis." (Leavitt vs. Blatchaford, 17 N. Y., 521, 523.)"Precedents are to be regarded as the
great storehouse of experience; not always to be followed, but to be looked to as beacon lights in the
progress of judicial investigation." (Per Bartley, C. J., in Leavitt vs. Morrow, 6 Ohio St., 71, 78.) Their
"authority must often yield to the force of reason, and to the paramount demands of justice as well as to
the decencies of civilized society, and the law ought to speak with a voice responsive to these
demands." (Norton vs. Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383, 58 S. 283.)" (Torres y Gallofin contra Tan Chim,
69 Phil., 518.)

In the matters of Tan Chong v . Secretary of Labour, p. 249, ante , and Lam Swee Sang v . Commonwealth of
the Philippines, p. 249, before , we have definitively declared abandoned this theory and adopted the de
Chua against Secretary of Labor. The reason is simple. The jus soli theory in the United States is absolute: the
simple birth in the American according to its constitution and the decision in United States vs. Wong Kim Ark
(169 US,649). The American constitution never entered into force in the Philippines. The jus soli theory in the
Philippines in accordance with the law of July 1, 1902, approved by the American Congress which, according
to the Treaty of Paris, is the one that has to determine the conditional condition: that the person born in the
Philippines is considered a Filipino citizen if he was a resident and subject Spanish or son of a Spanish
resident and subject on April 11, 1899. If he was a foreigner or son of a foreigner on that date, he cannot be a
Filipino citizen.

The defendant, then, according to the evidence in the record, may be a Filipino or a foreigner.

Under Treason Law No. 292 of the Civil Commission, any resident of the Philippines who, owing allegiance to
the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, wages war on them or forms common cause
with their enemies by helping and succoring them inside or outside said Islands, committed the crime of
treason. Article 1 of this law is a simple transplantation of the provisions of the American Criminal Code, which
reads as follows: "Whoever, owes allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason." (Sec. 1, Crim.
Code: RS, sec. 5331; Mar. 4,1909, c. 321, sec. 1, 35 Stat., 1088.)

"Treason against the United States," dice la Constitucion Americana, "shall consist only in levying against
them,or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort." (Section 3 [1], Article III.)

In Americana, both foreigners and nationals can commit the crime of treason. Foreigners owe allegiance to the
government of America during the time of their residence. (Carlisle v . US, 21 Law. ed., 426; Raditch v .
Hutchins, 24 Law. ed., 409.) The English hold the same theory. (DeJager vs.. Attorney General of Natal, 8
Ann. Cas., 76.) It is not necessary to be an American citizen to be able to commit the crime of treason. But the
Revised Penal Code has excluded foreigners, only nationals can commit it. Article 114 reads as follows:
"Whoever, owing fidelity to the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a
foreign national, makes war on them or forms common cause with their enemies, helping or helping them
inside or outside said Islands , will be punished with the penalties of temporary imprisonmentto death and a
fine not to exceed twenty thousand pesos." Executive order No.44, acknowledging that it was not possible
under the Revised Penal Code to punish foreigners residing in the Philippines who have helped enemies for
the crime of treason, amended Article 114, adding a paragraph as follows: "Likewise, any alien, residing in the
Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished
by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 20,000 pesos." (Executive Order No. 44, May 31,
1945.)

If the defendant is a Filipino, he owes allegiance to the Commonwealth Government and must be
convicted of treason; but if you are a foreigner you cannot be punished for acts committed by you
before the amendment of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the evidence does not clearly
establish that the defendant is a Filipino, he cannot be criminally responsible for the crime of treason.
It revoked the original ruling. His immediate release is ordered ex officio with the costs .HE
FACTS:
 The case is an appeal by Pedro Marcaida, who was convicted of the crime of treason. He points out
three errors incurred by the Court of Pueblo, one of which is that his citizenship was sufficiently tested.
 The defense contends that the evidence of record does not prove citizenship.
 The defense contends that the evidence on file does not prove the defendant's Filipino citizenship and
alliance with the Commonwealth government. The transcript of the shorthand notes says that the
defendant is a native of Lopez. The defense alleges that the witness testified in Tagalog saying: "Taga
Lopez" and did not say "ay panganak sa Lopez." He does not appear such a thing in the file
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the defendant shall be convicted of treason
HELD: NO.
 The defendant then, according to the evidence of record, may be a Filipino or a foreigner. His Philippine
citizenship is not sufficiently tested or proven. The defendant is called Pedro Marcaida. By his name, he
can be a Filipino, Spanish or South American.
 There is no proof of the citizenship of his parents. He can be a descendant of Spanish subjects who
opted to remain Spanish and retain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaty of Paris. It may also happen that he is a descendant of a South American, with
his father refusing to use the provisions of the naturalization law, thereby acquiring the nationality of his
father. Certainly, his citizenship cannot be ascertained.
 Foreigners owe allegiance to the government of America during the time of the defendant's residence.
Furthermore, Article 114 of The Revised Penal Code, which reads "Any Filipino citizen who levies war
against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or
elsewhere...", is guilty of treason, has excluded the foreign nationals in its scope. However, Executive
Order No.44, recognizing that it was not possible under the Revised Penal Code to punish foreign
residents in the Philippines that have helped the enemies, for the crime of treason, amended Article
114, by adding the paragraph, "Likewise, any alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts
of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished..."
 But in the case at bar, the events took place in 1944, a year before Executive Order No. 44 has taken
effect on May 31, 1945.
 If the defendant is Filipino, owing allegiance to the Commonwealth Government, he must be
condemned for treason, but if he is a foreigner, he cannot be punished for acts committed prior to the
amendment of Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. As the evidence clearly established that the
defendant is either Filipino or a foreigner, he cannot be criminally responsible for the crime of
treason.
RATIO
: Under the first paragraph of Article 114, the offender in treason must be a Filipino citizen, as he should not be
a foreigner. Before Article114 was amended by Executive Order No. 44, it was not possible under the Revised
Penal Code to punish for treason, resident aliens who aided the enemies. Now, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code punishes a resident alien who commits treason.